Combating Terrorism
Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports Gao ID: GAO-03-15 October 22, 2002The October 12, 2000, attack against the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden illustrated the danger of unconventional threats to U.S. ships in seaports. The September 11, 2001, attacks further heightened the need for a significant change in conventional antiterrorist thinking, particularly regarding threats to the U.S. homeland. The new security paradigm assumes that all U.S. forces, be they abroad or at home, are vulnerable to attack, and that even those infrastructures traditionally considered of little interest to terrorists, such as commercial seaports in the continental United States, are now commonly recognized as highly vulnerable to potential terrorist attack. Of the more than 300 seaports in the United States, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Transportation have designated 17 as "strategic," because in the event of a large-scale military deployment, DOD would need to transport more than 95 percent of all equipment and supplies needed for military operations by sea. If the strategic ports were attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be sustained, but DOD could also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on its overburdened airlift capabilities. The security environment at strategic seaports remains uncertain because comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical port infrastructure and functions have not been completed, and no effective mechanism exists to coordinate and disseminate threat information at the seaports. GAO identified two significant weaknesses in DOD's force protection process for deployments through domestic seaports. First, DOD lacks a central authority responsible for overseeing force protection measures of DOD organizations that move forces from domestic installations through U.S. seaports. Second, during some phases of a deployment, DOD transfers custody of its military equipment to non-DOD entities, including foreign-owned ships crewed by non-U.S. citizens.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-15, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
October 2002:
combating terrorism:
Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD Deployments through
Domestic Seaports:
Combating Terrorism:
GAO-03-15:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Current Risk Management Approach Creates Uncertainties about the
Security Environment at Strategic Seaports:
Weaknesses in DOD Force Protection Process Increase Risks for
Deployments through Domestic Seaports:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Review:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Ownership and Crew for Commercial Ships Used in Deployments
GAO Reviewed from Three Installations in 2001:
Table 2: Examples of Equipment Carried on Foreign-Owned and Foreign-
Crewed Ships:
Figures:
Figure 1: Reserve Sealift Ships Berthed at a Commercial Seaport:
Figure 2: A Commercial Container Vessel and Related Infrastructure at a
Seaport:
Figure 3: Coast Guard Crew in a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat
Demonstrating Enforcement of a Security Zone at a Commercial Port:
Figure 4: The Domestic Phases of the Deployment Process and Responsible
Organizations:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 22, 2002:
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The October 12, 2000, attack against the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in
the port of Aden illustrated the danger of unconventional threats to
U.S. ships in seaports. The September 11 attacks further heightened the
need for a significant change in conventional antiterrorist thinking,
particularly regarding threats to the U.S. homeland. The new security
paradigm assumes that all U.S. forces, be they abroad or at home, are
vulnerable to attack, and that even those infrastructures traditionally
considered of little interest to terrorists, such as commercial
seaports in the continental United States, are now commonly recognized
as highly vulnerable to potential terrorist attack. The Department of
Defense (DOD) and all agencies associated with seaport security
recognize this new paradigm and are taking steps to reduce
vulnerabilities and increase security.
Of the more than 300 seaports in the United States, the Departments of
Defense and Transportation have designated 17 as ’strategic,“ because
in the event of a large-scale military deployment, DOD would transport
more than 95 percent of all equipment and supplies needed for military
operations by sea. These ports are therefore vital to national
security. If the strategic ports (or the ships carrying military
supplies) were attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be
sustained, but DOD could also lose precious cargo and time and be
forced to rely heavily on its overburdened airlift capabilities.
Military commanders are responsible for the protection of personnel,
equipment, and other assets. To achieve this objective, commanders
apply a ’risk management“ approach, which is a systematic, analytical
process to determine the likelihood that a threat will negatively
impact physical assets, individuals, or operations and identify actions
to reduce risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack. The
principles of risk management acknowledge that although risk generally
cannot be eliminated, it can be significantly reduced by enhancing
protection from known or potential threats.
You asked us to examine how DOD protects its forces and assets as it
deploys them through strategic commercial seaports. This report focuses
on domestic seaports and analyzes (1) the security environment at
domestic strategic seaports used by DOD for military deployments and
(2) DOD‘s process for securing military deployments through those
ports. Overseas seaports will be the focus of a subsequent review.
As part of our evaluation, we examined seaport force protection efforts
at six strategic seaports in the United States. Although the
information we obtained at these locations cannot be generalized to
describe DOD‘s overall seaport force protection, it provides insight
into how force protection efforts at strategic seaports were
implemented at selected locations. For security reasons, we do not
discuss location-specific information in this report. Further
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The security environment at strategic seaports remains uncertain
because comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and
critical port infrastructure and functions have not been completed, and
no effective mechanism exists to coordinate and disseminate threat
information at the seaports. These conditions compound the already
difficult task of protecting deploying forces and increase the risk
that threats--both traditional and nontraditional[Footnote 1] ones--
may not be recognized or that threat information may not be
communicated in a timely manner to all relevant organizations. Recent
efforts by the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration,
and other agencies at the ports have begun to address many of these
weaknesses. The Coast Guard initiated vulnerability assessments of port
infrastructure and is deploying additional teams dedicated to seaport
security. Further, if enacted, legislation currently before the
Congress proposes steps that may assist these efforts and provides
additional measures that could improve the coordination and
dissemination of threat information.
We identified two significant weaknesses in DOD‘s force protection
process for deployments through domestic seaports. First, DOD lacks a
central authority responsible for overseeing force protection measures
of DOD organizations that move forces from domestic installations
through U.S. seaports. As a result, potential force protection gaps and
weaknesses requiring attention and action might be overlooked. DOD has
such an authority for the overseas portions of deployments and is
therefore better able to identify and mitigate force protection gaps
there. Second, during some phases of a deployment, DOD transfers
custody of its military equipment to non-DOD entities, including
foreign-owned ships crewed by non-U.S. citizens. Although consistent
with current DOD policies and procedures, this practice limits DOD‘s
ability to provide security oversight. As a result, equipment could
fall into the hands of individuals or groups whose interests are
counter to those of the United States.
We are making recommendations to improve (1) threat information
coordination at strategic seaports, (2) DOD‘s oversight and
coordination of force protection for deployments through seaports, and
(3) DOD‘s control over the in-transit phases of a movement of
equipment. In comments on a draft of this report, the Departments of
Defense and Transportation generally agreed with the contents of this
report and its recommendations.
Background:
DOD defines force protection as ’actions taken to prevent or mitigate
hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include
family members), resources, facilities, and critical
information.“[Footnote 2] Our review concentrated mostly on the
physical security and related aspects of force protection that include
measures to protect personnel and property and encompass consequence
management, intelligence, and critical infrastructure protection.
We have identified a risk management approach used by DOD to defend
against terrorism that also has relevance for the organizations
responsible for security at commercial seaports. This approach can
provide a process to enhance preparedness to respond to terrorist
attacks or other emergencies, whether natural or man-made (intentional
or unintentional). The approach is based on assessing threats,
vulnerabilities, and criticalities (the importance of critical
infrastructure and functions).
Threat assessments identify and evaluate potential threats on the basis
of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. These
assessments represent a systematic approach to identifying potential
threats before they materialize. However, even if updated frequently,
threat assessments may not adequately capture all emerging threats. The
risk management approach therefore uses vulnerability and criticality
assessments as additional input to the decision-making process.
Vulnerability assessments identify weaknesses that may be exploited by
identified threats and suggest options that address those weaknesses.
For example, a vulnerability assessment might reveal weaknesses in a
seaport‘s security systems, police force, computer networks, or
unprotected key infrastructure such as water supplies, bridges, and
tunnels. In general, teams of experts skilled in areas such as
structural engineering, physical security, and other disciplines
conduct these assessments.
Criticality assessments evaluate and prioritize important assets and
functions in terms of factors such as mission and significance as a
target. For example, certain power plants, bridges, computer networks,
or population centers might be identified as important to the operation
of a seaport. Criticality assessments provide a basis for identifying
which assets and structures are more important to protect from attack.
These assessments also help determine mission-essential requirements to
better prioritize limited force protection resources while reducing the
potential for expending resources on lower priority assets.
In the event of a major military mobilization and overseas deployment,
such as Operation Desert Shield, a large percentage of U.S. forces
(equipment and other materiel) would be sent by sea through a number of
commercial seaports in the United States to their respective areas of
operations. [Footnote 3] To accomplish this, DOD would use several
shipping methods, including government-owned and maintained reserve
sealift ships[Footnote 4] and ships operated or chartered by the
Military Sealift Command. Figure 1 shows two reserve sealift ships
berthed at a commercial seaport.
Figure 1: Reserve Sealift Ships Berthed at a Commercial Seaport:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
The military also uses commercial seaports for deployments such as
those to operations in the Balkans. The Departments of Defense and
Transportation have identified 17 seaports on the Pacific, Atlantic,
and Gulf Coasts (13 commercial ports, 1 military port, and 3 military
ammunition ports) as ’strategic,“ meaning that they are necessary for
use by DOD in the event of a large scale military deployment.
Because the security activities that DOD may conduct outside its
installations are limited, it must work closely with a broad range of
federal, state, and local agencies to ensure that adequate force
protection measures exist and are executed during deployments through
strategic seaports. Force protection responsibilities for DOD
deployments through commercial seaports are divided among a number of
DOD organizations including the U.S. Transportation Command and its
components (particularly the Military Traffic Management Command and
the Military Sealift Command), the U.S. Army Forces Command, and
individual deploying units.
Port Readiness Committees[Footnote 5] at each strategic port provide a
common coordination structure for DOD, the Coast Guard, and other
federal, state, and local agencies at the port level and are the
principal interface between DOD and other officials at the ports during
the movement of military equipment. The Port Readiness Committees are
focused largely on preparing for potential military movements through a
port and not on day-to-day security concerns at the port.
The issue of security at the nation‘s seaports has been the subject of
a recent major study, as has the broader issue of homeland security. In
fall 2000, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.
Seaports reported that security at seaports needed to be improved in a
number of areas, including:
* assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical infrastructure
at ports;
* coordination and cooperation among agencies; and:
* establishment of guidelines for commercial facilities handling
military cargo.
In February 2001, the Commission on National Security/21st Century
(commonly referred to as the Hart-Rudman Commission) reported that
threats such as international terrorism would place the U.S. homeland
in great danger. In addition to recommending national action, the
commission urged DOD to pay closer attention to operations within the
United States.
Current Risk Management Approach Creates
Uncertainties about the Security Environment
at Strategic Seaports:
The security environment at strategic seaports is uncertain because
comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and port
infrastructure and functions have not been completed. Recent efforts by
the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, and other
agencies at the ports have begun to address several important security
issues, and maritime security legislation before the Congress may
assist these efforts. Further, proposed legislation may provide a
framework for seaport organizations to improve the coordination and
dissemination of threat information.
Weaknesses Exist in the Process to Assess Risk at Seaports:
There is a wide range of vulnerabilities at strategic seaports,
including critical infrastructure such as bridges and refineries in
close proximity to open shoreline, shipping containers with unknown
contents, and an enormous volume of foreign and domestic shipping
traffic. Figure 2 illustrates typical commercial port infrastructure
and operations.
Figure 2: A Commercial Container Vessel and Related Infrastructure at a
Seaport:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Many of the organizations responsible for seaport security do not have
the resources (such as trained personnel, equipment, and funding)
necessary to mitigate all vulnerabilities. To determine how best to
allocate available resources and address security at seaports, it is
vital that responsible agencies involved follow a risk management
approach that includes assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and
critical infrastructure and functions. The results of these assessments
should then be used to better conduct risk-based decisions involving
security planning and actions.
Since September 11, the organizations responsible for security at
strategic seaports have increased emphasis on security planning. They
now recognize that planning must include the protection of critical
seaport infrastructure and assets that have not generally been
considered vulnerable. Port authority officials stated that increased
security planning has led to improvements in physical security, such as
higher fences, more security personnel, and better coordination with
local law enforcement and other agencies. The Coast Guard has taken
broad actions forward and has redirected resources towards security
planning improvements.
However, in their planning efforts, the organizations at the ports we
visited applied the elements of risk management differently. At only
one of six ports we visited were the results of threat, vulnerability,
and criticality assessments incorporated into a seaport security plan
that included all relevant agencies. The Port Mobilization Master Plan
developed by the Port Readiness Committee at this port employs a risk-
based process and systematically identifies the mission,
responsibilities, and functional relationships of each activity or
agency involved in supporting a military deployment through the
port.[Footnote 6] Specific weaknesses in the assessment process used at
ports we studied include the following:
* Individual organizations at the seaports conducted separate
vulnerability assessments that were not coordinated with those of other
agencies and were not based on standardized approaches. The Coast Guard
has taken the lead in developing a standard methodology for
comprehensive portwide vulnerability assessments (also called port
security assessments) that it plans to complete at 50 major ports,
including all strategic seaports.
* Assessments of the criticality of seaport infrastructure were not
done at all the ports we visited prior to September 11. The Coast Guard
has since addressed this shortcoming by conducting assessments of high-
risk infrastructure at all major ports. It coordinated the assessments
with commercial facilities at the ports. Criticality of seaport assets
and functions will also be incorporated into the port security
assessments.
* In some cases, threat assessment information received by agencies at
the ports is based on higher-level regional assessments that do not
focus on the local port facility. These regional assessments, while
helpful in providing a broader view of the security environment, do not
provide site-specific local threat information to the port.
* Agencies involved with seaport security have different concepts of
how threat assessments should be developed and the degree to which
threat information should be shared and disseminated. Some agencies
have not traditionally shared threat information as widely as may be
necessary for comprehensive security measures at seaports.
In addition to these specific weaknesses, we found that there is no
single mechanism (such as a working group or committee) at the seaports
we visited to analyze, coordinate, and disseminate information on a
routine basis on the broad range of threats at each port. Most threat
information at the ports was coordinated on an informal basis, such as
through personal contacts between law enforcement individuals and those
at other agencies. The lack of such a mechanism compounds the already
difficult task of protecting deploying military forces and increases
the risk that threats--both traditional and nontraditional ones--may
not be recognized or that threat information may not be communicated in
a timely manner to all relevant organizations. Currently, interagency
bodies at or near the ports, such as port readiness committees, joint
terrorism task forces, or the newly formed antiterrorism task forces,
do not routinely coordinate threat information focused solely on the
ports. The port readiness committees were designed to prepare
commercial ports to conduct military movements. The task forces were
designed to focus on threat information but on a regional rather than a
port level.
The need for efficient coordination of threat information has been
amply documented and recognized, and there are examples of improved
coordination efforts. The Interagency Commission on Crime and Security
in U.S. Seaports noted in 2000 the importance of interagency threat
coordination. The commission said that officials at seaports need a
means to analyze, coordinate, and disseminate information on the broad
range of threats they face. This includes information on ships, crews,
and cargo and information on criminal, terrorist, and other threats
with foreign and domestic origins. Although the commission did not
recommend centralizing threat information distribution into a single
agency or regulating dissemination procedures at seaports, it did
recommend improvements in integrating threat information systems and
improved coordination mechanisms for law enforcement agencies at the
seaport level.
Furthermore, the Coast Guard recognizes that agencies involved with
seaport security are currently unable to adequately analyze, share, and
exploit available threat information, and it also recognizes that
asymmetric[Footnote 7] military and terrorist threats have a natural
gateway into America via its ports. In response, the Coast Guard has
developed a ’maritime domain awareness“ concept that emphasizes a risk
management approach for preventing or mitigating both traditional and
nontraditional threats through the analysis and dissemination of threat
information. The concept involves being knowledgeable of all activities
and elements in the maritime domain that could represent threats to the
safety, security, or environment of the United States or its citizens.
Through the timely delivery to the appropriate civilian or military
authorities of processed information, drawn from all available sources,
effective actions involving limited resources can be taken.
Additionally, the maritime domain awareness concept allows the Coast
Guard and other relevant agencies to incorporate nontraditional threat
information, such as unintentional biological hazards in empty cargo
containers or impending weather hazards into actionable intelligence.
Both of these issues can constitute potential threats to a port and its
operation.
In commenting on a draft of this report, Transportation Security
Administration officials agreed that the coordination and dissemination
of threat information at the port level is an issue that needs to be
addressed. They noted that the Transportation Security Administration
is overseeing studies (as part of ’Operation Safe Commerce“) aimed at
identifying potential threats and risk mitigation techniques that will
contribute to meeting this goal.
Finally, as we have previously reported, DOD uses threat working groups
at its installations as a forum to involve installation force
protection personnel with local, state, and federal law enforcement
officials to identify potential threats to the installation and to
improve communication between these organizations.[Footnote 8] These
working groups help coordinate as much information as possible on a
broad range of potential threats. Given the limited information
available on threats posed by terrorist groups or individuals, such a
mechanism assists the installation commander and local authorities in
gaining a more complete picture of internal and external threats on a
more continuous basis over and above what is provided by an annual
threat assessment.
Recent Efforts and Proposed Legislation May
Assist Port Security Improvements:
Since the September 11 attacks, the Coast Guard and other agencies at
ports have made efforts to improve risk management and security
measures. The Coast Guard, traditionally a multimission organization,
has made a significant shift in operational focus toward seaport
security. In so doing, the Coast Guard, in the months immediately
following September 2001, diverted resources from other missions such
as drug interdiction but has since restored some of its effort in those
areas.
Examples of additional recent efforts by the Coast Guard and other
agencies include:
* formation of Coast Guard maritime safety and security teams based at
selected ports to assist in providing port security personnel and
equipment;
* Coast Guard escorts or boarding of high-risk ships, including cruise
ships, in ports;
* Coast Guard escorts for naval vessels;
* establishment and enforcement of new security zones and increased
harbor security patrols (figure 3); and:
* port authority cost estimates for improving facility security and
interim security improvement measures.
In commenting on a draft of this report, Transportation Security
Administration officials indicated that they are taking initial steps
toward accomplishing seaport security goals by awarding approximately
$217 million in grants (funded through both regular and emergency
appropriations) to public and private entities at the ports for initial
security assessments, preliminary security improvements, and port
incident response training.
Figure 3: Coast Guard Crew in a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat
Demonstrating Enforcement of a Security Zone at a Commercial Port:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Legislation on maritime security before the Congress (as of October 22,
2002)[Footnote 9] may promote and enhance these seaport security
efforts. Some of the major provisions include:
* vulnerability assessments to be conducted at ports;
* establishment of port security committees at each port, with broad
representation by relevant agencies, to plan and oversee security
measures;
* development of standardized port security plans;
* background checks and access control to sensitive areas for port
workers; and:
* federal grants for security improvements.
On the basis of our discussions with agency officials at the ports we
visited, we believe that if enacted and properly implemented, these and
other provisions of the maritime security legislation should assist
officials in addressing many of the weaknesses we have identified. For
example, comprehensive vulnerability assessments and the proposed
standardized security plans could provide a more consistent approach to
identifying and mitigating security weaknesses. In providing for port
security committees and interagency coordination, the legislation would
also provide a framework for organizations at seaports to establish a
mechanism to coordinate, analyze, and disseminate threat information at
the port level. There may be challenges, however, to implementing the
maritime security legislation, including uncertainty about the amount
and sources of funds needed to address security needs at seaports. We
recently reported on these and other challenges to implementing the
provisions of this legislation and the establishment of a new
Department of Homeland Security.[Footnote 10]
In commenting on a draft of this report, Coast Guard officials reported
that notwithstanding the status of the proposed legislation, port
security committees have already been established at some major ports
and that the Coast Guard is preparing a nationwide policy to delineate
the purpose and composition of these committees. Coast Guard officials
believe that in addition to consideration of vulnerabilities and
security planning, the port security committees, as currently
envisioned, may provide a more effective mechanism for threat
information coordination.
Weaknesses in DOD Force Protection Process Increase
Risks for Deployments through Domestic Seaports:
During our review, we identified two significant weaknesses in DOD‘s
force protection process. First, DOD lacks a central authority
responsible for overseeing force protection measures of DOD
organizations while carrying out the various domestic phases of
military deployments to and through U.S. seaports. As a result,
potential force protection gaps and weaknesses requiring attention and
action might be overlooked. Second, there are instances during some
phases of these deployments when DOD transfers custody of its military
equipment to nongovernment entities. At these times, the equipment
could fall into the hands of individuals or groups whose interests are
counter to those of the United States.
DOD Lacks a Central Authority to Coordinate
and Execute Domestic Force Protection Measures:
Deploying units traditionally focus their force protection efforts
primarily on their overseas operations. Before they arrive in an
overseas region, the units are required to submit force protection
plans to the unified combatant commanders, who are responsible for
force protection of all military units in their regions, with the
exception of DOD personnel assigned to the Department of State. The
tactics, techniques, and procedures in the units‘ plans must match the
guidance developed by the unified commander, who coordinates and
approves the individual plans. This allows the commander to ensure that
a unit‘s plan takes into account all current threats that could affect
the mission and to accept or mitigate any security risks that arise.
The situation for the domestic phases of overseas deployments is
different: there is no designated commander with centralized force
protection responsibilities similar to those of the overseas unified
combatant commander. This creates gaps, during the domestic phases of a
deployment, in DOD‘s ability to coordinate individual force protection
plans, identify gaps that may exist, and mitigate the identified risk.
The one coordination mechanism that is in place--the Port Readiness
Committee--is focused largely on port operations and at this time does
not coordinate all phases of a deployment from an installation through
the port. Figure 4 illustrates the domestic phases of a deployment and
key organizations responsible for force protection.
Figure 4: The Domestic Phases of the Deployment Process and Responsible
Organizations:
Source: GAO, based on DOD information.
In the deployments we reviewed, service guidance and DOD antiterrorism
standards, particularly those that emphasize the elements of risk
management (such as Army major command force protection operations
orders), were not always followed in all phases of a deployment from an
installation through a port. For example, the Military Traffic
Management Command‘s transportation units recognized the vulnerability
of seaport operations and prepared security plans for deployment
operations at the ports that were based on assessments of threats,
vulnerabilities, and critical infrastructure. The transport of military
equipment to the port by commercial carrier was not always supported by
such detailed plans and assessments. In contrast, we found that when a
military unit travels by road to a seaport in its own convoy, it
generally follows exhaustive planning and risk management measures.
In discussing the absence of a focal point for coordinating and
executing force protection measures for the domestic phases of military
deployments, DOD officials indicated that the recently established U.S.
Northern Command may serve as such a coordinating mechanism.
Additionally, in commenting on a draft of this report, DOD officials
noted that the principal defense guidance on military transportation
issues[Footnote 11] is in the process of being revised to incorporate
force protection guidance.
Military Equipment and Cargo Are Sometimes Not under DOD Control:
During deployments from domestic installations through commercial
seaports, there are three phases in which DOD either transfers custody
of its equipment to nongovernment persons (in some cases foreign
nationals) or does not have adequate information about who is handling
its equipment, as follows:
* Private trucking and railroad carriers transport equipment and cargo
from military installations to seaports.
* Civilian port workers handle and load equipment onto ships.
* Private shipping companies with civilian crews sometimes transport
DOD equipment overseas.
The four deployments we reviewed from three military installations in
2001 involved the use of road and rail contract carriers transporting
equipment from the installation to a port of embarkation. Contract
carriers are required to provide security for the equipment they
transport, including sensitive items. For example, contract carriers
are required to provide their own security at railroad switching yards,
rest areas, overnight stops, and along the entire route whenever they
transport sensitive equipment. Although we did not review the steps
taken by DOD to evaluate the contractors‘ security measures, the
transfer of accountability to these nongovernmental agents creates a
gap in DOD‘s oversight of its assets between installations and ports.
Once equipment arrives at a commercial seaport, it comes under the
control of the military units responsible for managing the loading
process. However, civilian port workers, stevedores, and longshoremen-
-who undergo limited screening and background checks by port
authorities or terminal operators--handle military equipment and cargo,
as well as the loading and unloading of ships used to transport the
equipment overseas. This was the case in all the deployments we
reviewed. In all cases, the stevedores or longshoremen were in the same
labor pool as the one used for commercial port operations. While DOD
officials have not identified port workers as a particular threat, they
are concerned that lack of information on the background of individuals
handling military equipment increases potential risk. Organizations at
some of the ports we visited are now implementing or reviewing efforts
to increase screening of port workers. And the maritime security
legislation currently before the Congress includes provisions for
background checks and access control for port workers. These measures,
if approved and properly implemented, may help address this issue. In
commenting on a draft of this report, Transportation Security
Administration officials acknowledged the problems posed by the lack of
screening for port workers and indicated that they plan to study and
eventually issue nationwide standards for credentialing port workers.
DOD also transfers custody of its equipment when the equipment is
placed aboard a commercial ship for transport overseas. We reviewed
four major overseas deployments from three military installations
during calendar year 2001 that involved about 6,550 tons of military
equipment and supplies. Although these four deployments are not
representative of all DOD deployments conducted in 2001, they do
illustrate the use of foreign-owned commercial vessels by DOD. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DOD officials stated that about
43 percent of cargo shipped overseas in 2001 as part of deployments
involving major equipment in support of overseas operations was carried
on foreign-flagged ships.[Footnote 12] As indicated in table 1, most of
the ships for the deployments we reviewed were both foreign-owned and
foreign-crewed.
Table 1: Ownership and Crew for Commercial Ships Used in Deployments
GAO Reviewed from Three Installations in 2001:
[See PDF for table]
[End of table]
In addition to transferring custody over its assets to non-DOD
personnel, DOD did not generally provide security forces aboard these
vessels. Several of the ships used in the deployments we reviewed did
have DOD maintenance personnel aboard, but the ship manifests did not
indicate that armed DOD personnel were aboard as a security force. The
Military Sealift Command reviews charter vessel crew lists to determine
whether any crewmembers are known security threats. Some of the
materiel transported by these vessels included sensitive and mission
essential items. Table 2 provides examples of equipment carried aboard
foreign-owned and foreign-crewed ships for the deployments we reviewed.
Table 2: Examples of Equipment Carried on Foreign-Owned and Foreign-
Crewed Ships:
Equipment Category: Major weapon system; Example: * Bradley fighting
vehicles; * 155mm howitzers; * Apache attack helicopters; * Blackhawk
helicopters; * Stinger anti-aircraft launchers; * Armored light
vehicles.
Equipment Category: Other weapons; Example: * Antitank missile
launchers; * .50 caliber machineguns; * 40mm grenade launchers; * 9mm
pistols; * M-16A2 rifles; * Squad automatic weapons; * Bayonets.
Equipment Category: Individual equipment; Example: * Night vision
goggles; * Minefield marking system; * Chemical agent monitor; * Body
armor; * Nuclear, biological, and chemical protective suits and masks;
* Mine detection sets; * Global positioning system receivers.
Equipment Category: Communications equipment; Example: * Radio sets; *
Antenna assemblies; * Satellite communications terminals.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
When DOD relinquishes control over its equipment, it relies on
nongovernment third parties to protect its assets. Placing military
equipment outside DOD‘s control also complicates the steps needed to
mitigate the higher risk and could disrupt military units from
performing their intended missions. An example of the dangers of such
loss of control occurred in summer 2000. While in the North Atlantic,
the captain of a commercial vessel carrying Canadian military equipment
and three Canadian Forces personnel from the Balkans refused to proceed
to the ship‘s destination port in Canada after a dispute over payment
to the vessel‘s owner. The vessel, GTS Katie, was owned by a U.S.
company but registered in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and crewed by
non-U.S. citizens. Alarmed at the loss of control over its equipment,
including sensitive items, the Canadian government was compelled to
board the Katie with a contingent of Canadian Forces naval personnel
from a nearby warship. The vessel was then brought safely into a
Canadian port.[Footnote 13]
The Canadian Defense Minister explained that the loss of control over
military equipment compromised Canada‘s ongoing military operations and
the ability to undertake new ones.[Footnote 14] Similarly, when the
third parties to whom DOD relinquishes control of its equipment include
foreign nationals, there may be an increased risk of the equipment
being tampered with, seized, or destroyed by individuals or groups
whose interests run counter to those of the United States and an
increased chance that those weapons or equipment might be used against
military or civilian targets.
During our review, officials from several military commands expressed
concern about placing military equipment aboard ships that are outside
DOD control. DOD officials told us that the reasons for the use of
commercial contract carriers include, among others, economy and
efficiency over using government-owned and -operated vessels and the
adequacy and availability of the U.S.-flagged merchant marine. In
commenting on a draft of this report, Maritime Administration officials
agreed with our concerns related to the use of foreign ships and crews
to transport sensitive military equipment and reiterated their interest
in increasing the number of U.S.-flag vessels appropriate for DOD use.
They indicated that the shortage of appropriate U.S.-flagged ships will
be exacerbated by Military Sealift Command plans to terminate existing
charters for some U.S.-flag vessels.
Conclusions:
The events of September 11 highlighted the vulnerability of the U.S.
homeland to unconventional attack, and the resulting new security
environment warrants that more attention be paid to the domestic phases
of military deployments. It is clearly evident that since September 11,
DOD and the organizations responsible for seaport security recognize
the need for increased vigilance at home during the domestic phases of
a military deployment, and this recognition provides an opportunity to
improve seaport security in a systematic and effective manner.
However, the inadequate assessment of threats and vulnerabilities and
lack of comprehensive security plans prevent organizations at seaports
and DOD from thoroughly analyzing the security environment at the
ports. This hampers the identification and prioritization of
requirements for the protection of critical assets. This situation
compounds an already difficult task of protecting deploying DOD forces.
However, if enacted and properly implemented, pending maritime security
legislation would address most of these issues. We are therefore making
no recommendations in this area.
The absence of a mechanism at the strategic seaports for coordinating
and disseminating comprehensive threat information increases the risk
that threats--both traditional and nontraditional--will not be
identified and appropriately communicated to all relevant
organizations. If established at the port level such a mechanism could
provide a formal, rather than informal and ad-hoc, process for
coordinating information, and it could focus on port-specific threats,
rather than a regionwide perspective. A central coordination mechanism
could also provide a means to analyze threats on a continuous basis.
Without a DOD authority or organization to coordinate force protection
planning and execution for the domestic phases of DOD deployments to
and through strategic seaports, potential gaps in force protection may
go unnoticed, increasing the risk to DOD operations and equipment.
Having such an authority would not only reduce such risks, but would
also provide oversight to ensure that risk management and antiterrorism
standards are consistently applied through all phases of a deployment
from an installation through a port.
When military equipment is entrusted to non-DOD personnel, with limited
DOD control over the equipment, there is a greater risk that it could
be tampered with, seized, or destroyed. While we recognize there are
times during a deployment when DOD will relinquish direct control of
its equipment, the new security environment warrants that DOD re-
evaluate its current policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate
security measures are applied during these times. Weaknesses in DOD‘s
force protection approach along with uncertainties in the security
environment at strategic seaports result in increased risks that
military operations could be disrupted, successful terrorist attacks
might occur, or sophisticated military equipment might be seized by
individuals or organizations whose interests run counter to those of
the United States.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the information available to develop effective seaport
security measures, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation
identify and direct the appropriate transportation agency to develop a
mechanism at the port level to compile, coordinate, analyze, and
disseminate threat information on a real-time basis to all relevant
organizations. Such a mechanism might be similar to DOD‘s threat
working groups but with broader membership or be part of an existing
coordinating body (such as the proposed port security committees or the
joint terrorism task forces). Whether established as a new entity or as
a modification of an existing coordinating body, this mechanism should
include representatives from a broad range of federal, state, and local
agencies. It should also include in its assessment process
nontraditional threats such as natural emergencies and information
technology attacks.
To improve DOD‘s oversight and execution of force protection for
deployments to and through domestic strategic seaports, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense:
* designate a single authority (such as the recently established U.S.
Northern Command) to coordinate and execute force protection planning
for deployments of units from installations in the United States
through seaports and until ships enter the destination areas of
operation (this responsibility would be similar to that of the overseas
unified combatant commands for their respective areas of operation)
and:
* direct the single coordinating authority (once established), along
with the U.S. Transportation Command, to develop and implement measures
to maintain greater security over equipment transported by non-DOD
carriers.
Agency Comments and Our Review:
DOD agreed with the need for a single DOD authority to coordinate and
execute force protection planning for deployments from installations in
the United States through seaports and until ships enter the
destination areas of operation. In commenting on this report, DOD
stated that the recently established U.S. Northern Command will work
closely with the U.S. Transportation Command to examine security for
deployments through domestic seaports.
DOD also agreed with the need for measures to maintain greater security
over equipment transported by non-DOD carriers. In its comments,
however, DOD stated that it has for decades relied on the commercial
sector to provide a large portion of the nation‘s strategic sealift
capabilities in both peacetime and during contingencies and that it is
not cost effective to use government-owned sealift vessels for routine
cargo movements or force rotations of the type included in GAO‘s
analysis. Nonetheless, DOD stated that the U.S. Transportation Command
and the new U.S. Northern Command will continue to seek ways to improve
the security of DOD cargo transported via commercial carrier, including
the use of satellite tracking of cargo and vessels and placing security
personnel aboard those ships. On those occasions when DOD transfers
custody of its equipment to non-DOD carriers, the kinds of additional
measures DOD discussed should help improve the overall security of
sensitive DOD cargoes.
DOD‘s written comments are included in their entirety in appendix II.
In addition, DOD officials suggested a number of technical
clarifications and corrections, which we have incorporated into this
report where appropriate.
In oral comments on a draft of this report, Department of
Transportation officials generally agreed with the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations. They also provided additional
information and suggested a number of technical clarifications and
corrections, which we have incorporated into this report where
appropriate. Transportation officials discussed several new and ongoing
efforts affecting seaport security by the newly established
Transportation Security Administration. Among other initiatives, these
include measures for seaport security grants, studies on credentialing
port workers, and a study on developing a threat assessment center.
These initiatives are funded through regular and emergency
appropriations for fiscal year 2002. Additionally, proposed
appropriations for fiscal year 2003 would provide further funding if
enacted into law. If properly implemented, these initiatives should
contribute to the goal of improved seaport security.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Secretaries of Defense and Transportation and interested congressional
committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
In addition, the report will be available at no cost on the GAO Web
site at http://gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, or wish
to discuss this matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-6020.
Key contributors are acknowledged in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Raymond J. Decker, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Raymond J. Decker
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To analyze the security environment at strategic seaports we reviewed
security planning and procedures during the conduct of site visits at
six selected commercial seaports and two military-owned ammunition
ports. These six commercial ports included ports that regularly support
DOD deployments as well as those that are used less frequently. We
selected ports on the West Coast, East Coast and on the Gulf of Mexico.
We visited two of the three dedicated ammunition ports identified by
DOD, one on each coast. For security reasons, we do not discuss
location-specific information in this report.
At these selected ports we reviewed documents, observed security
measures, and discussed port operations, security planning,
coordination mechanisms, specific vulnerabilities, mitigation plans,
and resource issues with government and nongovernment officials. Among
the organizations we visited during our seaport visits were the Coast
Guard, the U.S. Maritime Administration, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the U.S. Customs Service, port authorities, and local
law enforcement agencies. Although the information we obtained at these
locations could not be generalized to describe the environment DOD
could expect at all seaports, it provides insight into what DOD could
expect to encounter at domestic seaports. We also discussed these
issues with officials at Coast Guard headquarters and the U.S. Maritime
Administration, both in the Department of Transportation in Washington,
D.C.
To analyze DOD‘s process for securing deployments of military equipment
through strategic seaports we examined force protection plans,
procedures, and coordination measures for four deployments conducted in
2001. We selected these deployments based on information provided by
the U.S. Army Forces Command. The command provided a list of
deployments involving units moving from within the continental United
States to an overseas location during calendar year 2001 that required
the use of sealift to transport military equipment. We selected four
deployments originating from three installations in calendar year 2001
because they represented about 65 percent of the total tonnage of
equipment for all deployments to major DOD contingency operations
during that period. An additional factor in our selection was the
geographic dispersion of the domestic seaports used for the
deployments.
Our review of force protection procedures included the guidance and
criteria for force protection for deployments, the extent to which
these are clearly defined and carried out, and the extent to which DOD
works with other federal, state, and local agencies to plan and carry
out force protection measures. We also reviewed information from the
Military Sealift Command and Military Traffic Management Command on the
ships used to transport equipment for these deployments and the
equipment they carried. We interviewed officials from the following
organizations:
* Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict in Washington, D.C.
* U.S. Transportation Command at Scott Air Force Base, Ill.
* Military Transportation Management Command in Fort Eustis, Va.
* Military Sealift Command in Washington, D.C.
* U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Fla.
* U.S. Army Forces Command in Atlanta, Ga.
* Army and Navy Force Protection Offices in Washington D.C.
* Transportation and force protection officials at the installation and
unit levels for Army and Marine Corps units:
To examine DOD force protection efforts, we conducted site visits at
three military installations that were the origins of the four 2001
deployments in our review. During these site visits, we reviewed DOD
force protection plans, policies and standards used for the equipment
involved in the deployments and discussed with unit and installation
personnel how DOD addressed security weaknesses identified at the
seaports. We also discussed the experience of past deployments and
recent deployments with DOD officials at installations and the ports.
We also reviewed the findings and recommendations of the Interagency
Commission of Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports and the provisions of
maritime security legislation now before Congress to determine the
potential impact on current and future seaport security efforts. We
analyzed the provisions of both House and Senate versions of the
legislation and discussed key provisions with staff members of
cognizant Congressional committees.
We conducted our review from January through August 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-
2500:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS/ LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT:
OCT 4 2002:
Mr. Raymond J. Decker:
Director, Defense Capabilities Management, U.S. General Accounting
Office, Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Decker:
The Department of Defense (DoD) has reviewed the GAO draft report. GAO-
0315, ’COMBATING TERRORISM: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection
for DoD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports,“ dated October 2002 (GAO
Code 350156). The draft report reflects an extensive research and
reporting effort by your analysis team.
The Department concurs with comment on the two recommendations (Tab A)
in the report. Additionally, technical comments have been forwarded to
your staff to correct and clarify information in selected sections of
the report.
Sincerely,
Marshall Billingslea
Principal Deputy
Signed by Marshall Billingslea
Enclosures:
As stated:
Prepared by: CDR Carlos E. Aponte, (703) 697-3254:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED OCTOBER 2002 GAO-03-15/CODE 350156:
’COMBATING TERRORISM: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for
DoD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: To improve DoD‘s oversight of force protection for
deployments to and through domestic strategic seaports, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense designate a single authority (such as the
recently proposed U.S. Northern Command) to coordinate and execute
force protection planning for deployments of units from installations
in the United States through seaports and until ships enter the
destination areas of operation (this responsibility would be similar to
that of the overseas unified combatant commands for their respective
areas of operation). (pp. 23-24/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. USNORTHCOM was recently established as a
combatant command with regional responsibility for the express purpose
of coordinating DoD‘s Homeland Security efforts within CONUS.
USTRANSCOM will work closely with USNORTHCOM in the coming months to
examine security for deployments through domestic seaports.
RECOMMENDATION 2: To improve DoD‘s oversight of force protection for
deployments to and through domestic strategic seaports, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the single coordination authority
(once established), along with the U.S. Transportation Command, to
develop and implement measures to maintain greater security over
equipment transported by non-DoD carriers. (p. 24/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. It must be understood that DoD has, for
decades, relied upon the commercial sector to provide a large portion
of the nation‘s strategic sealift capability in both peacetime and
during contingency. This reliance is borne both out of necessity and
for cost reasons. Military Sealift Command maintains a fleet of
government owned strategic sealift vessels that are intended to surge
into action in event of a large-scale deployment. In such a
contingency, these vessels will be used primarily to move our most
critical war fighting equipment and supplies, such as deploying war
fighting forces and munitions. However, it is not cost effective to use
this fleet for routine cargo movement or deployment of forces for
exercises or force rotations. Military Sealift Command does decide what
type of vessel should be used (be it U.S. government owned or leased,
U.S. flagged commercial or foreign flagged commercial) based, in part,
on the type of cargo to be shipped and the perceived threat to that
cargo and vessel.
The necessity for using non-DoD carriers will continue for both routine
movements of cargo absent a contingency as well as to support an
increased flow of cargo in the event of one. USTRANSCOM will work with
USNORTHCOM and the Services to continue to improve the security of DoD
cargo moved via commercial carriers. Satellites tracking cargo and
vessels, as well as increased use of Supercargos (security personnel
aboard vessels), are two methods that we are moving forward with.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Ray Decker (202) 512-6020:
Bob Repasky (202) 512-9868:
Staff Acknowledgements:
In addition to those names above, Willie J. Cheely, Jr., Brian G.
Hackett, Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Jean M. Orland, Stefano Petrucci,
Elizabeth G. Ryan, and Tracy M. Whitaker also made key contributions to
this report.
[End of section]
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Vulnerabilities. GAO-03-24R. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2002.
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued
Management Challenges. GAO-02-1122T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism
Abroad. GAO-02-1021. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002.
National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges.
GAO-02-1048R. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to
Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to
Success. GAO-02-1012T. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO-02-1011T. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2002.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-
955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.
Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO-02-
957T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.
Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. GAO-
02-927T. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002.
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships
Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 1,
2002.
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting. GAO-02-893T. Washington, D.C.: June 28,
2002.
Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But
Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. Washington,
D.C.: June 25, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy. GAO-
02-811T. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Homeland Security: Responsibility And Accountability For Achieving
National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and
Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy
for Homeland Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development
of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-
550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National
Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to
Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T.
Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002.
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership
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Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2002.
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-and
Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7,
2001.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Considerations For Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.: October 17,
2001.
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO-02-
150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation‘s Issues. GAO-
01-1158T, September 21, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD‘s Antiterrorism
Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington, D.C.:
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FOOTNOTES
[1] Nontraditional threats can include natural or man-made disasters,
such as hurricanes, industrial accidents, and cyber attacks.
[2] Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Apr. 12, 2001, as
amended through May 7, 2002).
[3] Most personnel would be transported by air.
[4] These reserve ships are part of the Maritime Administration‘s Ready
Reserve Force.
[5] The Port Readiness Committees are part of the National Port
Readiness Network chaired by the Maritime Administration.
[6] The local Port Readiness Committee is currently revising the master
plan.
[7] Asymmetric threats include unconventional approaches (such as
terrorism, the use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction,
and information warfare) that circumvent traditional U.S. military
strengths.
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed
to Improve Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management,
GAO-01-909 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2001).
[9] S. 1214 passed the Senate on December 20, 2001. The House of
Representatives passed an amendment to S. 1214 on June 4, 2002.
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Port Security: Nation Faces
Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2002).
[11] DOD Directive 4500.9, Transportation and Traffic Management, Jan.
26, 1989.
[12] DOD further stated that only 18 percent of all cargo (including
deployments and general cargo, such as household goods) shipped by the
Military Sealift Command was transported by foreign-flagged vessels.
[13] The Department of Defense had also chartered the same vessel to
transport military equipment from operations in the Balkans.
[14] Although he recognized the danger of the Katie incident, the
Canadian Defense Minister also acknowledged that it would still be
necessary for Canada to charter nongovernment vessels for future
military movements.
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