Coast Guard
Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions Gao ID: GAO-03-155 November 12, 2002The September 11th attacks affected the scope of activities of many federal agencies, including the Coast Guard. Homeland security, a long-standing but relatively small part of the Coast Guard's duties, took center stage. Still, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other missions, such as helping stem the flow of drugs and illegal migration, protecting important fishing grounds, and responding to marine pollution. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's current efforts and future plans for balancing resource levels among its many missions.
As the Coast Guard adjusts to its new post-September 11th environment, it will likely take several years to determine how best to balance carrying out nonsecurity missions alongside new security responsibilities. In recent months the Coast Guard has increased its level of effort in nonsecurity activities such as drug interdiction and fisheries patrols, but some of these activities remain below earlier levels. For example, patrol boats formerly used for drug interdiction are still being used for harbor security patrols. Substantial increases in nonsecurity activities are also unlikely in the near future, because the mission-related initiatives proposed in the fiscal year 2003 budget are directed primarily at security missions. Most notably, most of the proposed 1,330 new staff would replace reserve staff activated after September 11th. The Coast Guard has not yet developed a strategy for showing, even in general terms, the levels of effort it plans for its various missions in future years. Understandably, the Coast Guard's attention has been focused on assimilating added security responsibilities. However, developing a more comprehensive strategy is now important, as a way to inform the Congress about the extent to which the Coast Guard's use of its resources--cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel--will allow it to continue meeting its many responsibilities. Also important is designing a way to keep the Congress informed about its progress in achieving this balance. The Coast Guard has considerable data from which to develop progress reports, but this information is currently in disparate forms and documents.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-155, Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-155
entitled 'Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring
Levels of Effort for All Missions' which was released on November 19,
2002.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products‘ accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
Report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate:
November 2002:
Coast Guard:
Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All
Missions:
GAO-03-155:
GAO Highlights:
November 2000:
COAST GUARD:
Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All
Missions.
Highlights of GAO-03-155, a report to Subcommittee on Oceans,
Atmosphere,
and Fisheries, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The September 11th attacks affected the scope of activities of many
federal
agencies, including the Coast Guard. Homeland security, a long-
standing but
relatively small part of the Coast Guard‘s duties, took center stage.
Still,
the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other missions, such as
helping
stem the flow of drugs and illegal migration, protecting important
fishing
grounds, and responding to marine pollution. GAO was asked to review
the
Coast Guard‘s current efforts and future plans for balancing resource
levels
among its many missions.
What GAO Found:
As the Coast Guard adjusts to its new post–September 11th
environment, it
will likely take several years to determine how best to balance
carrying
out nonsecurity missions alongside new security responsibilities.
In recent
months the Coast Guard has increased its level of effort in
nonsecurity
activities such as drug interdiction and fisheries patrols, but some
of these
activities remain below earlier levels. For example, patrol boats
formerly
used for drug interdiction are still being used for harbor security
patrols.
Substantial increases in nonsecurity activities are also unlikely in
the near
future, because the mission-related initiatives proposed in the
fiscal year
2003 budget are directed primarily at security missions. Most notably,
most
of the proposed 1,330 new staff would replace reserve staff activated
after
September 11th.
The Coast Guard has not yet developed a strategy for showing,
even in general
terms, the levels of effort it plans for its various missions
in future years.
Understandably, the Coast Guard‘s attention has been focused on
assimilating
added security responsibilities. However, developing a more
comprehensive
strategy is now important, as a way to inform the Congress about
the extent
to which the Coast Guard‘s use of its resources--cutters, boats,
aircraft,
and personnel--will allow it to continue meeting its many
responsibilities.
Also important is designing a way to keep the Congress informed
about its
progress in achieving this balance. The Coast Guard has
considerable data
from which to develop progress reports, but this information
is currently
in disparate forms and documents.
Figure:
[See PDF for image]
Coast Guard patrol boats like this one, formerly used mainly
in activities
such as intercepting drugs or illegal immigrants, were still
being used
extensively for harbor security patrols in mid-2002.
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
GAO recommends that the Coast Guard:
* Develop a longer-term strategy that outlines how the Coast
Guard sees its
resources being distributed across its various missions, and
a time frame for
achieving this desired balance.
* Develop and implement a useful reporting format that allows
the Congress
to understand and assess the progress in implementing this
strategy.
* Reexamine recommendations from past studies of the agency‘s
operations as
a way to identify and improve operational efficiencies and
help leverage
resources.
The Coast Guard reviewed a draft of this report but did not
take a formal
position on GAO‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-155.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology,
click on
the link above.
For more information, contact JayEtta Hecker at
(202) 512-2834 or
heckerj@gao.gov.
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Expanded Security Activities Primarily Affected Law Enforcement and
Marine Safety Missions:
Funding Increases Proposed in Fiscal Year 2003 Budget May Not Have A
Major Effect on Nonsecurity Missions:
Opportunities for Increased Operational Efficiency Could Help Meet
Mission Responsibilities:
Framework for Monitoring Levels of Effort and Results Has Two Main
Components:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables :
Table 1: Description of Selected Coast Guard Ships and Aircraft:
Table 2: Allocation of Proposed New Personnel by Program Area, Fiscal
Year 2003 Budget Request:
Table 3: Examples of Coast Guard Partnering in Individual Ports:
Table 4: Types of Measures for Monitoring Agency Missions and
Activities:
Table 5: Examples of Measures Currently Developed by the Coast Guard:
Figures:
Figure 1: Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard High-and Medium-
Endurance Cutters before and after September 11th:
Figure 2: Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard 82-, 87-, and
110-
Foot Patrol Boats before and after September 11th:
Letter:
November 12, 2002:
The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate:
The aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks affected the
scope of activities for many federal agencies. This is especially true
of the United States Coast Guard. The attacks prompted the nation to
evaluate its vulnerabilities to terrorism, and this evaluation has
focused considerable attention on the nation‘s vast and sprawling
network of ports and waterways. Ports and waterways are particularly
vulnerable because they are both a potential target for a terrorist
attack and an avenue for tools of destruction to make their way into
the country. While homeland security has long been one of the Coast
Guard‘s missions, the agency has spent the past decade focusing on
other major national objectives, such as the nation‘s attempts to
reduce the flow of drugs, monitor and protect important fishing
grounds, and respond effectively to marine pollution.[Footnote 1]
September 11th drastically changed the nation‘s priorities, but it did
so by adding to the Coast Guard‘s many responsibilities rather than by
replacing responsibilities that were already in place.
The impact of these changes on the Coast Guard, and consideration of
how to manage them, have been a matter of intense congressional
attention. For example, proposals to move the Coast Guard from its
current organizational home within the Department of Transportation
(DOT) to a new Department of Homeland Security have generated questions
about the Coast Guard‘s ability to meet its new security
responsibilities while still dealing with its other more traditional
roles. You asked us to examine how the Coast Guard‘s various missions
have fared since September 11th. As agreed with your staff, we focused
our work on the following four questions:
* What nonsecurity missions were most affected by the September 11th
terrorist attacks, and what are the most recent levels of effort for
these missions?
* To what extent would proposed funding for new initiatives in the
President‘s fiscal year 2003 budget request allow the Coast Guard to
increase levels of effort for nonsecurity missions, while addressing
increased security responsibilities?
* Are there operational efficiencies that the Coast Guard can consider
as a way to help accomplish all of its missions in 2003 and beyond?
* What framework would help the Congress monitor levels of effort and
results attained for all Coast Guard missions?
To answer these questions, we conducted such activities as reviewing
Coast Guard documents and records and visiting Coast Guard
installations to determine how activities were being affected. We
conducted our work at Coast Guard headquarters and at five of the Coast
Guard‘s nine districts. The districts we visited spanned three coasts-
-East, West, and Gulf. Our work, which was conducted from December 2001
through October 2002, was done in accordance with generally accepted
governmental auditing standards. A detailed description of our scope
and methodology appears in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The September 11th attacks primarily affected levels of effort in two
nonsecurity missions: law enforcement (such as drug and migrant
interdiction and fisheries enforcement) and marine safety (such as
pollution-related exercises, inspections of certain types of vessels
and facilities, and boating safety). For law enforcement activities,
which are carried out extensively with multiple-mission resources such
as cutters, patrol boats, aircraft, and small boats, the effect can be
partly seen in shifting usage patterns for these resources. Coast Guard
data show that the number of hours spent on law enforcement by cutters
and patrol boats, aircraft, and smaller boats dropped from about 67,000
hours for the quarter ending June 30, 2001, to about 39,000 hours for
the quarter ending December 31, 2001. By the quarter ending September
30, 2002, total hours spent for law enforcement by these resources had
risen to about 62,500, near the pre-September 11th level. Such
aggregate data provide a useful indication of overall effort, but they
do not tell the entire story, particularly for individual Coast Guard
locations. Our visits to Coast Guard sites turned up examples in which
law enforcement activities remained below pre-September 11th levels.
For example, in the Northeast, some patrol boats formerly used for
fisheries patrols were conducting security patrols, and as a result,
fisheries patrols were 40-50 percent lower than in previous years. The
Coast Guard does not have data that provide a similar overview of how
marine safety activities were affected, but our visits to individual
sites identified instances in which the level of these activities was
reduced after September 11th and remained reduced as of mid-2002. At
local marine safety offices, for example, officials said they had
reduced planning and outreach functions, pollution and planning
exercises, and selected safety inspections of fishing and other
vessels.
Proposed funding increases for new mission-related initiatives in the
Coast Guard‘s fiscal year 2003 request submitted as part of the
President‘s budget would likely not have a major effect on the level of
effort for nonsecurity missions, according to Coast Guard officials.
The administration‘s fiscal year 2003 budget request for the Coast
Guard proposes $213 million for new initiatives, $188 million of which
would be directed at security missions; the remaining $25 million is
for search and rescue initiatives and enhancements to the vessel
traffic information system. The proposed security initiatives would add
1,330 new staff, many of whom would replace reserve personnel activated
after September 11th, and acquire more than 80 small patrol boats for
security patrols. The Coast Guard is still working out plans for using
new staff, but Coast Guard field personnel said that because the
positions are largely expected to be replacements for reservists who
would return to civilian status, opportunities to increase security
staffing levels and thereby free up other staff for nonsecurity
missions would be limited. Moreover, the Coast Guard‘s preliminary
allocation of cutter, patrol boat, and aircraft hours for fiscal year
2003 largely mirrors the allocation for fiscal year 2002--a further
indication that the Coast Guard does not plan major changes in the
level of effort for nonsecurity missions in the short term. The Coast
Guard, which so far has been understandably focused on developing and
implementing its expanded homeland security missions, has not yet
devised a plan for how much of its resources will be devoted to
security-related and nonsecurity-related missions in the long term.
A number of opportunities to improve operational efficiency are
potentially available for helping the Coast Guard with the challenges
it faces in accomplishing all its missions and tasks in 2003 and
beyond. In the past, we and others have made recommendations for
improving the Coast Guard‘s operational efficiency. Many of them--such
as examining whether dockside monitoring by other federal or state
agencies can substitute for part of the Coast Guard‘s at-sea boardings
of commercial fishing vessels--still have relevance in the Coast
Guard‘s new environment. In particular, opportunities may exist for
enhanced partnering with federal, state, and local agencies, as well as
private entities, helping all parties to leverage limited resources and
achieve efficiencies. For example, the Coast Guard is successfully
partnering with the State of California and the Ports of Los Angeles
and Long Beach to operate the area‘s vessel traffic-monitoring system.
Such partnering may be possible in other locations where the Coast
Guard operates such systems. Although some mechanisms are in place to
help ports share information about the various kinds of successful
partnering projects, these mechanisms are not working effectively.
Although the Coast Guard generates considerable information about its
mission activities, this information in its current form does not
provide a framework the Congress and the Coast Guard can use to monitor
the agency‘s levels of effort and results attained for security and
nonsecurity missions. As part of the proposed legislation creating the
Department of Homeland Security, the Congress is currently considering
a requirement for periodic reports about the levels of effort being
directed at nonsecurity missions. Our current review, along with past
reviews of other agencies, indicates that a useful framework for
monitoring these levels involves two main components. The first is a
strategy that identifies, at least in general terms, the levels of
effort the Coast Guard projects for its various missions in future
years, along with a time frame for achieving these planned levels. This
strategy is not yet in place, and as a result the Congress does not
know what the Coast Guard believes the appropriate levels of effort
should be to achieve these missions over the longer term in this new
operating environment. The second component is having adequate
information for assessing progress in achieving these levels of effort
and the desired results. Several kinds of quantitative measures are
needed: inputs (such as budget allocation by mission); outputs (such as
the utilization of Coast Guard cutters, or the number of fisheries
patrols that are conducted); and outcomes (such as the percentage of
distress calls that result in a successful rescue). To help interpret
these measures correctly, it is also important for the Coast Guard to
provide explanations of changes in its strategy and other pertinent
developments. For example, a reduction in expenditures might occur for
different reasons, such as a reduced effort or discovery of a way to
accomplish the same task with fewer resources.
We are recommending that the Coast Guard develop (1) a longer-term
strategy that outlines how the Coast Guard sees its resources--cutters,
boats, aircraft, and personnel--being distributed across its various
missions, as well as a time frame for achieving this desired balance
among missions; (2) a useful reporting format allowing the Congress to
understand and assess the Coast Guard‘s progress in implementing this
strategy; and (3) a systematic approach for reviewing past
recommendations for operational efficiencies and sharing information
about successful partnering projects. The Coast Guard reviewed a draft
of this report, but did not take a formal position on GAO‘s
recommendations.
Background:
The Coast Guard, a Department of Transportation agency, is involved in
seven main mission or program areas: (1) enforcement of maritime laws
and treaties; (2) search and rescue; (3) aids to navigation; (4) marine
environmental protection; (5) marine safety and security (including
homeland security);[Footnote 2] (6) defense readiness; and (7) ice
operations. The Coast Guard has two major commands that are responsible
for the overall mission performance in the Pacific and Atlantic areas.
These commands are further organized into a total of nine districts,
which in turn are organized into a number of groups, marine safety
offices, and air stations. Groups provide more localized command and
control of field units, such as small boat stations, and patrol boats.
Marine safety offices are located at coastal ports and on inland
waterways, and they are responsible for the overall safety and security
of maritime activities and for environmental protection in their
geographic areas. To accomplish these varying missions and
responsibilities, the Coast Guard operates a variety of equipment (see
table 1), including high-and medium-endurance cutters,[Footnote 3]
patrol boats, and aircraft.
Table 1: Description of Selected Coast Guard Ships and Aircraft:
Type of asset: Ships.
Type of asset: 378-foot high-endurance
cutter; Number: Ships: 12; Ships: [Empty]; Description: Ships: This is
the largest multipurpose cutter in the fleet. It has a planned crew
size of 167, a speed of 29 knots, and a cruising range of 14,000
nautical miles. The Coast Guard operates it for about 185 days a year,
and it can support helicopter operations.
Type of asset: 270-foot medium-endurance cutter; Number: Ships: 13;
Ships: [Empty]; Description: Ships: This cutter has a planned crew size
of 100, a speed of 19.5 knots, and a cruising range of 10,250 nautical
miles. The Coast Guard operates it for about 185 days a year, and it
can support helicopter operations.
Type of asset: 210-foot medium-endurance cutter; Number: Ships: 14;
Ships: [Empty]; Description: Ships: This cutter has a planned crew size
of 75, a speed of 18 knots, and a cruising range of 6,100 nautical
miles. The Coast Guard operates it for about 185 days a year, and it
can support operations of short-range recovery helicopters.
Type of asset: 110-foot patrol boat; Number: Ships: 49; Ships: [Empty];
Description: Ships: This patrol boat has a planned crew size of 16, a
speed of 29 knots, and a cruising range of 3,928 nautical miles. The
Coast Guard operates most of these craft for about 1,800 hours a year.
Type of asset: 87-foot patrol boats; Number: Ships: 50; Ships: [Empty];
Description: Ships: This patrol boat has a planned crew size of 10, a
speed of 29 knots, and a cruising range of 900 nautical miles. The
Coast Guard operates most of these craft for about 1,800 hours a year.
Type of asset: Total; Number: Ships: 141[A]; Ships: [Empty];
Description: Ships: [Empty].
Type of asset: Aircraft; Number: Ships: [Empty]; Ships: [Empty];
Description: Ships: [Empty].
Type of asset: HC-130 long-range surveillance airplane; Number: Ships:
27; Ships: [Empty]; Description: Ships: This is the largest aircraft in
the Coast Guard‘s fleet. It has a planned crew size of seven, a speed
of 290 knots, and an operating range of about 2,600 nautical miles. The
Coast Guard operates most of these aircraft for about 800 hours every
year.
Type of asset: HU-25 medium-range surveillance airplane; Number: Ships:
25; Ships: [Empty]; Description: Ships: This is the fastest aircraft in
the Coast Guard‘s fleet. It has a planned crew size of five, a speed of
410 knots, and an operating range of 2,045 nautical miles. The Coast
Guard generally operates these aircraft for about 800 hours a year.
Type of asset: HH-60J medium-range recovery helicopter; Number: Ships:
42; Ships: [Empty]; Description: Ships: This helicopter is capable of
flying 300 miles off shore, remaining on scene for 45 minutes, hoisting
six people on board, and returning to its point of origin. The Coast
Guard operates most for about 700 hours a year. It has a planned crew
size of four, a maximum speed of 160 knots, and a maximum range of 700
nautical miles.
Type of asset: HH-65 short-range recovery helicopter; Number: Ships:
95; Ships: [Empty]; Description: Ships: This helicopter is capable of
flying 150 miles off shore. It has a crew allowance of three, a maximum
speed of 165 knots, a maximum range of 400 nautical miles, and a
maximum endurance of 3.5 hours. The Coast Guard operates most for about
645 hours a year.
Type of asset: Total; Number: Ships: 200[B]; Ships: [Empty];
Description: Ships: [Empty].
[A] Total does not include icebreakers or buoy tenders but does include
a 213-foot medium-endurance cutter that was commissioned in 1944, a
230-foot medium-endurance cutter that was commissioned in 1942, and a
282-foot medium-endurance cutter that was commissioned in 1999,
following 26 years in service with the U.S. Navy. :
[B] Total does not include three support aircraft (VC-4, C-20, and C-
37) and eight leased MH-68A helicopters used in support of the counter-
drug mission.
Source: Developed by GAO from data supplied by the Coast Guard.
[End of table]
A federal agency that is also part of the armed services, the Coast
Guard has both military and civilian positions. At the end of fiscal
year 2001, the agency had over 41,000 total full-time positions--about
36,100 military and about 5,700 civilians. The Coast Guard also has
about 8,000 reservists who support the national military strategy and
provide additional operational support and surge capacity during
emergencies, such as natural disasters. Also, about 35,000 volunteer
auxiliary personnel assist in a wide range of activities, ranging from
search and rescue to boating safety education.
Added homeland security requirements pose a challenge to the Coast
Guard as it works to balance all of its missions. While maritime
homeland security is not necessarily a new mission, the Coast Guard‘s
level of effort in this mission prior to September 11th had been
minimal when compared with most of its other missions.[Footnote 4] The
events of September 11th caused the Coast Guard to direct efforts
increasingly into this area, highlighted by the Coast Guard‘s
establishing a new program area: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal
Security. Additionally, legislation now under consideration by both
houses of Congress would mandate that the Coast Guard take on even
greater homeland security responsibilities.[Footnote 5] For example,
some of the additional responsibilities the Coast Guard would be
required to perform if the legislation passes include conducting port
vulnerability assessments, establishing local port security
committees, assessing antiterrorism measures at foreign ports,
conducting antiterrorism drills, and maintaining harbor patrols.
Expanded Security Activities Primarily Affected Law Enforcement and
Marine Safety Missions:
Taken together, the available data and additional information provided
by Coast Guard field personnel about levels of effort indicate that
activities in two nonsecurity missions--law enforcement and marine
safety--were the most affected by the Coast Guard‘s shift of resources
to security functions after September 11th. For law enforcement, data
show that the Coast Guard shifted the use of multiple-mission resources
like cutters and patrol boats to security efforts immediately after
September 11th. Specifically, the data show a sharp decline in the
number of hours these resources spent in law enforcement after
September 11th, followed by a return to more traditional levels, though
the results vary by type of resource and continue to be affected when
the Coast Guard must respond to heightened security levels. For marine
safety, which is largely carried out without using these resources,
there are no similar data for making comparisons in the levels of
effort. However, during our visits at individual Coast Guard sites, we
were provided many examples showing that as of mid-2002, expanded
security responsibilities were still affecting levels of effort for
both missions. Resource levels in two other nonsecurity missions--aids
to navigation and search and rescue--were also temporarily affected by
September 11th, but according to Coast Guard personnel, overall effects
on mission performance from these changes were minimal.
Initial Effect of September 11th on Resource Deployment Was
Substantial:
For the Coast Guard, the events of September 11th produced a dramatic
shift in resources used for certain missions. The Coast Guard responded
quickly to the attacks with a number of significant steps to ensure
that the nation‘s ports remained open and operating. The Coast Guard
relocated vessels, aircraft, and personnel--especially those
associated with law enforcement--to enhance security activities. For
example, nearly all cutters that were conducting offshore patrols for
drug, immigration, and fisheries law enforcement were recalled and
repositioned at entrances to such ports as Boston, Los Angeles, Miami,
New York, and San Francisco. Smaller patrol boats and motor lifeboats,
which had been used for search and rescue, fisheries patrols, and other
nonsecurity functions, were used to conduct security patrols within
port facilities, becoming the port‘s ’cop on the beat,“ according to
Coast Guard officials.
This change can be seen in the mission hours logged by multiple-mission
resources. The Coast Guard does not have an agencywide measure, such as
a mission-by-mission breakdown of how all employees spend their time,
that would provide a comprehensive picture of how nonsecurity missions
were affected throughout the entire organization. The best quantitative
picture of how missions were affected can be obtained from data about
how the Coast Guard‘s multi-mission resources, such as cutters, boats,
and aircraft, were used before and after September 11th. These
resources are used in a variety of nonsecurity missions, and they
figured heavily in the Coast Guard‘s homeland security
response.[Footnote 6]
The resource-hour data show a large rise in homeland security activity
and a drop in several other missions, especially law enforcement.
Overall, the data for all types of resources (cutters and patrol boats,
other boats, and aircraft) showed that homeland security activities
accounted for 2 percent of total hours during the quarter prior to
September 11th (April-June 2001). For the quarter in which September
11th occurred (July-September), the figure for homeland security rose
to nearly 16 percent, and in the subsequent quarter it more than
doubled, to 37 percent. Law enforcement was the nonsecurity mission
most affected as a consequence of this rapid rise in homeland security
activities, according to Coast Guard personnel. Law enforcement
accounted for 28 percent of all mission hours from April through June
2001, 26 percent from July through September, and 15 percent from
October through December. Total law enforcement resource hours for the
various types of resources declined from about 67,000 from April
through June 2001 to about 39,000 from October through December. Here
are resource-by-resource breakdowns:
* For Coast Guard high-and medium-endurance cutters, the months
immediately before and after September 11th showed a dramatic shift
toward security-related activities and away from law enforcement.
Typically, 73 to 88 percent of these cutters‘ resource hours have been
spent on law enforcement activities, compared with less than 3 percent
on homeland security. In the second quarter of fiscal year 2001
(January-March 2001), for example, they logged about 25,700 resource
hours in law enforcement activities, compared with less than 1,000
hours in security-related activities and about 4,600 hours in all other
missions, including such activities as search and rescue and marine
environmental protection. In the quarter immediately after September
11th(October-December 2001), law enforcement activities dropped to
about 13,400 hours, or about 47 percent of their total resources hours;
efforts devoted to security-related activities increased to more than
11,000 hours, and other missions were at about 3,800 hours.
* For the Coast Guard‘s 82-, 87-, and 110-foot patrol boats, the shift
was even greater. Prior to September 11th, these boats were used mainly
for law enforcement and search and rescue activities in offshore
waters, with law enforcement activities generally accounting for 68
percent or more of their resource hours and homeland security missions
for less than 5 percent. In the quarter immediately after September
11th (October-December 2001), security-related hours increased to the
point that they greatly exceeded the number of hours spent on law
enforcement activities (about 20,500 hours for security versus about
12,000 hours for law enforcement).[Footnote 7]
These and other changes put a strain on some resources. Local
commanders reported that to meet new security requirements while still
being able to meet other essential missions, such as search and rescue
activities, they have had to operate small boats at 20 to 50 percent
above normal levels. They reported that hours for patrol boats also
increased, and that some personnel were working 60 to 100 hours a
week.[Footnote 8]
Although Coast Guard officials indicated that marine safety activities
were also heavily affected by the need to shift personnel to security
activities, the Coast Guard does not have data capturing the extent of
this shift. To a much greater extent than for law enforcement, marine
safety activities are carried out in ways other than using multiple-
mission resources. For example, personnel at marine safety offices are
extensively involved in conducting inspections of ships in port,
examining facilities, and carrying out a variety of other shoreside
activities. The Coast Guard‘s current information systems do not
capture the time devoted to these activities. Officials at Coast Guard
districts and local offices told us that they had to curtail marine
safety activities related to recreational boating safety, fishing boat
safety, pollution drills, and other activities. However, since these
activities are not captured in terms of the level of resources expended
on them, we were unable to quantify the overall extent to which these
reductions occurred or the impact they had.
Nonsecurity Activities Have Increased, but Missions Are Still Affected:
Since the initial response immediately following September 11th, levels
of effort for nonsecurity missions in general--and for law enforcement
in particular--have risen. During the first 6 months of 2002, the level
of resource hours provided for law enforcement activities rose to the
point that by July-September 2002, total resource hours were above
62,000--or within about 5,000 of the level of April-June 2001. The
degree to which this occurred varied from resource to resource. For
medium-and high-endurance cutters, for example, the amount of time
spent on security-related activities dropped substantially in the
January-March 2002 and April-June 2002 quarters, while the amount of
time spent on law enforcement activities began to approach levels that
existed in January-March 2001, and before. (See fig. 1.) During the
April-June 2002 quarter, high-and medium-endurance cutters logged over
27,000 hours for law enforcement missions, compared with about 1,100
hours for security missions. This is in marked contrast to the quarter
immediately following September 11th, when hours for the two types of
missions were about the same. However, security hours rose sharply
again in the July-September 2002 quarter. According to Coast Guard
officials, this increase came in response to the Office of Homeland
Security‘s raising the national threat level from ’elevated“ to ’high“
risk. During this period, which lasted from September 10 until
September 24, the Coast Guard reassigned its resources to respond to
the increased threat condition. Such shifts show that even relatively
short periods of increased security activity can affect other missions.
Figure 1: Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard High-and Medium-
Endurance Cutters before and after September 11th:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The pattern was similar, but not as pronounced, for 82-, 87-, and 110-
foot patrol boats. (See fig 2.) Compared with hours for high-and
medium-endurance cutters, patrol boat hours continue to show a more
lasting effect for expanded security requirements.[Footnote 9]
Immediately after September 11th, hours logged by these boats on
security activities outstripped law enforcement hours. By the April-
June 2002 quarter, the number of hours devoted to law enforcement
activities had once again increased so that it was more than twice the
number spent on security activities. However, for the July-September
2002 quarter, patrol boat hours for security purposes nearly doubled in
response to the heightened threat condition, and hours spent on other
missions declined as a result.
Figure 2: Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard 82-, 87-, and
110-Foot Patrol Boats before and after September 11th:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Changes in resource hours provide a useful indicator of the overall
level of effort for most missions, but these data alone do not tell the
entire story. There are limitations in using the data, and these
limitations make quarter-to-quarter comparisons difficult and
potentially misleading. For example, as we pointed out earlier, the
data do not include the activities of about one-fourth of the Coast
Guard, particularly the personnel assigned to the Coast Guard‘s 43
marine safety offices spread throughout the country. Many of these
personnel were and continue to be assigned to security functions,
according to Coast Guard officials. In addition, the resource hour data
do not reflect a working environment in which all fluctuations in hours
over time can be readily attributed to the events of September 11th.
For example, mission hours can be affected by seasonal fluctuations,
such as the need for more fisheries patrols during the fishing season
and the need for more buoy servicing because of weather damage,
especially during hurricane season. Similarly, fluctuations can result
from changes in budget levels, as they were in the months immediately
preceding September 11th. During this period, in response to pending
budget cuts, the Coast Guard pulled a number of cutters and aircraft
out of service, some temporarily and others permanently. Finally, the
Coast Guard‘s operating tempo increased sharply after September 11th,
and the higher levels of resource activity, while feasible temporarily,
may not be sustainable in the longer term because resources are being
used far beyond their normal limits.
To determine whether the situation at specific locations was different
from the trends shown in the overall data, we visited a number of Coast
Guard facilities on the East, West, and Gulf coasts. Officials at
individual Coast Guard districts and offices identified many examples
of law enforcement and marine safety activities that, as of mid-2002,
were still less than existed before September 11th. The type and extent
of these examples varied from location to location, depending on the
particular Coast Guard responsibilities in that location. For example,
districts with large industrial ports receiving additional security
attention after September 11th reported having to shift the most
resources to security missions. The following are examples, from the
five Coast Guard districts we visited, of how the districts said they
were faring in returning resources to nonsecurity missions by June
2002:
* In the First District,[Footnote 10] officials said that they
reassigned patrol boats from security to nonsecurity missions because
the number of security patrols[Footnote 11] was reduced from 48 from
October through December 2001 to 18 from April through June 2002.
These reassignments allowed the district to increase such activities
as fishing boat boardings, which had been reduced to 38 during the
October-December 2001 period, compared with 300 in the same quarter
the year before. Still, they said the capacity to conduct dockside
safety inspections of commercial fishing boats had been cut in half
from pre-September 11th levels. District officials also said that the
increased hours of operation brought on by the security operations
created $400,000 in unforeseen maintenance expenditures.
* Fifth District[Footnote 12] officials said that they once again use
three 110-foot patrol boats for law enforcement patrols. However,
because the district‘s 87-foot patrol boats are still involved with
homeland security activities, they said that law enforcement operations
conducted by patrol boats will likely remain about 40 to 50 percent
lower than they were before September 11th. Officials said that this
reduction in law enforcement operations would likely continue for
several years. At one of the district‘s local marine safety offices we
visited (Hampton Roads, Virginia), officials said that they eliminated
or reduced activities in such areas as planning and outreach, pollution
planning exercises, and selected safety inspections of foreign vessels.
* Eighth District[Footnote 13] officials said that all missions have
seen significant resource reductions except for homeland security,
search and rescue, and aids to navigation. For example, during fiscal
year 2002, the district boarded 1,020 U.S. fishing vessels, compared
with 2,701 boardings for fiscal year 2001. At one of the local offices
we visited (Houston/Galveston), officials reported that the requirement
for providing cruise ship security had a major impact on personnel
allocations. Local marine safety unit officials said that they
currently assign at least six marine safety personnel for terminal
security sweeps, sea marshal operations, and tugboat and bunker barge
security monitoring; they also dedicate both an aircraft and patrol
boats for cruise ship escort duty. They said that an expected increase
in cruise ship activity would add to this workload.
* In the Eleventh District,[Footnote 14]officials said that they were
not sending a 110-foot patrol boat to southern California and northern
Mexico to conduct counter-drug patrols. Prior to September 11th they
had done so, but since the terrorist attacks this boat has remained
within the district‘s area of responsibility to conduct security-
related activities. Besides reductions in counter-drug patrols,
district staff indicated that other missions were being affected by
increased security requirements. For example, in San Francisco,
officials said that they used patrol and small boats to conduct harbor
patrols and enforce established security zones. The group commander
said that since the terrorist attacks he has had to eliminate a number
of nonsecurity missions for these boats, including fishing vessel-
safety inspections and fisheries-and other living marine resources-
enforcement operations.
* In the Thirteenth District,[Footnote 15] officials said that they had
resumed some ready cutter patrols,[Footnote 16] which were suspended
between September 2001 and April 2002. Nonetheless, the district is
continuing to use one of its patrol boats for homeland security patrols
on inshore waters and along the border. This precludes using this boat
for its former duty in fisheries enforcement patrols, since these
patrols are normally conducted on offshore waters.
These examples of local officials‘ difficulties in returning
nonsecurity missions to earlier levels reflect a central issue that
Coast Guard officials have pointed out: a number of their activities
are dependent on cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft that are used to
meet a variety of missions. If a cutter or patrol boat is assigned to
conduct security patrols because this mission is judged to be a higher
priority, it is less available to perform other types of missions.
Coast Guard officials said that multiple-mission resources may be
involved in simultaneous missions, such as a cutter‘s engaging in both
fisheries enforcement and marine environmental protection tasks while
at sea. However, particularly when these resources are engaged in
close-in security work, they said the resources are less available to
multitask in this way or less effective in doing so.
Effects on Other Nonsecurity Missions Were Not as Great:
While other nonsecurity missions besides law enforcement and marine
safety were affected by the increased emphasis on homeland security,
the available data and our discussions with Coast Guard officials
indicate that by comparison, other missions were affected to a much
lesser degree than law enforcement and marine safety. For example:
* Although search and rescue resources were used to perform homeland
security functions, doing so did not materially affect the Coast
Guard‘s ability to respond to search and rescue missions, according to
Coast Guard officials. Although search and rescue boats were initially
redeployed for harbor security patrols, they said that any potential
impact of doing so was tempered by normal changes in workload in the
season when the attacks occurred. Search and rescue hours normally tend
to follow a cyclical pattern, with heavier demand in the April-through-
September period, and lower demand in October through March. They said
that because the attacks occurred at the beginning of the low-demand
season, resources could be redeployed with little or no effect on the
mission. Coast Guard officials also emphasized that search and rescue
is a primary mission that will always receive priority. Operational
data we reviewed showed that the drop in search and rescue hours after
September 11th mirrored the normal annual cycle, and that since that
time, the quarterly fluctuations have continued as they have done
historically.
* For aids to navigation, the data showed a drop in cutter resource
hours after September 11th, when, according to Coast Guard officials,
some boats that normally operate as buoy tenders were used for security
purposes instead. However, this drop was not as great as it had been
for law enforcement and was relatively short-lived. By the April-June
2002 quarter, the number of cutter resource hours spent on aids to
navigation had returned to traditional levels. Coast Guard officials
said that resources for aids to navigation were among the first to be
returned to their former missions.
Funding Increases Proposed in Fiscal Year 2003 Budget May Not Have a
Major Effect on Nonsecurity Missions:
Most of the proposed funding increase for new mission-related
initiatives in the Coast Guard‘s fiscal year 2003 budget request is
directed at security activities and, according to Coast Guard
officials, would likely have a limited impact on nonsecurity missions.
The $213 million proposed for new operational initiatives would be
directed primarily toward new, permanent, security-related personnel
positions and new security patrol boats. The Coast Guard is still
working out plans for how these additional personnel would be used and
where they would be assigned, but, according to Coast Guard personnel
in the units we visited, it is unlikely that the additional personnel
would allow units to shift substantial resources to nonsecurity
missions. Many of the proposed new positions would replace reservists
activated on a temporary basis after September 11th. To the degree that
the proposed positions would replace temporarily activated reservists,
they would not result in a net addition of staff.
Proposed Spending for New Initiatives Is Focused on Expanded Security
Role:
The administration‘s fiscal year 2003 budget request for the Coast
Guard includes a total of $213 million for new mission-related
initiatives.[Footnote 17] Of this amount, $188 million (88 percent) is
proposed for security-related purposes, such as increased patrols and
vessel boardings; the remaining $25 million is for enhanced staffing of
search and rescue operations, and for vessel traffic information system
improvements. One of the main objectives of the security-related
initiatives is to provide permanent staff following the Coast Guard‘s
initial staffing buildup after September 11th, which was accomplished
largely by temporarily activating reservists. While there is variation
among the districts, many of the proposed positions would be permanent
slots that would replace the positions filled by reservists. In all,
the Coast Guard plans to hire almost 2,200 new personnel by the end of
fiscal year 2003. Of these positions, 870 were authorized in the
supplemental appropriation approved for fiscal year 2002, and 1,330 are
proposed in the fiscal year 2003 budget request. The Coast Guard
expects nearly 90 percent of these 2,200 new positions to be assigned
to security-related functions. (See table 2.) Coast Guard officials
expect that at least 80 percent of the personnel will be assigned to
field units (area commands, districts, marine safety offices, marine
safety units, air stations, or small boat stations).
Table 2: Allocation of Proposed New Personnel by Program Area, Fiscal
Year 2003 Budget Request:
Program area: Security mission; Number of additional personnel:
[Empty].
Program area: Maritime domain awareness; Number of additional
personnel: 316.
Program area: High-interest vessel control; Number of additional
personnel: 268.
Program area: Presence and response capabilities; Number of additional
personnel: 1,062.
Program area: Critical infrastructure and force protection; Number of
additional personnel: 85.
Program area: Domestic and international outreach; Number of additional
personnel: 190.
Program area: Homeland Security Liaison Billets; Number of additional
personnel: 43.
Program area: Total for security mission; Number of additional
personnel: 1,964.
Program area: Nonsecurity missions; Number of additional personnel:
[Empty].
Program area: Commissioning and operation of three seagoing buoy
tenders; Number of additional personnel: 165.
Program area: Maritime search and rescue/Personnel safety; Number of
additional personnel: 193.
Program area: 47-foot motor life boat follow-on; Number of additional
personnel: 36.
Program area: Commissioning and operation of three coastal patrol
boats; Number of additional personnel: 35.
Program area: Decommissioning of three seagoing buoy tenders; Number of
additional personnel: -195.
Program area: Total for nonsecurity missions; Number of additional
personnel: 234.
Program area: Grand total; Number of additional personnel: 2,198.
Source: Developed by GAO from Coast Guard data.
[End of table]
In addition to the increased numbers of permanent positions, the Coast
Guard plans to buy 80 homeland security response boats and 4 87-foot
coastal patrol boats.[Footnote 18] While both types of boats are multi-
mission capable, officials stated that these new boats are intended
mainly for use in homeland security missions.
Ability to Shift Resources to Nonsecurity Missions May Be Limited:
The additional personnel and assets included in the fiscal year 2003
budget request may allow field units to free up some resources for
nonsecurity missions, but for several reasons, the flexibility to do so
appears limited. One reason is that many of the new positions would
replace reservists activated at field locations since September 11th,
thereby providing these units only the resources necessary to maintain
operations at current levels. The Coast Guard can use reservists for up
to 2 years, but from a practical standpoint, the agency typically uses
them in large numbers only for surge capability during emergencies.
Moreover, having permanent personnel is more cost effective and
provides long-term workforce stability, according to Coast Guard
officials. Our interviews with district staff indicated that this would
be the case to a greater degree in some locations than in others. Coast
Guard staff in some districts told us that new personnel would largely
replace currently activated reservists, and therefore would do little
more than allow them to maintain the status quo. Some districts also
reported that because of the large number of reservists called to
active duty, there would not be enough new active duty personnel to
replace reservists on a one-to-one basis. As a result, the new
authorized personnel strength would not match the current personnel
numbers at some locations, and the impact would actually be a reduction
in resources allocated to lower-priority missions.
The second reason why the flexibility to shift additional resources to
nonsecurity missions may be limited is that the Coast Guard plans to
assign a number of the new positions to security units that would
provide only limited replacement of any existing activity. Nearly 430
personnel, or 20 percent of all new personnel, are expected to be
assigned to six maritime:
safety and security teams.[Footnote 19] Currently, the Coast Guard has
four such teams--in Seattle; San Pedro, California; Houston/Galveston,
Texas; and Hampton Roads, Virginia--and there are plans for two
additional teams in Jacksonville, Florida, and New York City. Our
conversations with Coast Guard officials indicated that there are still
many unresolved issues concerning how these teams will be used.
District and headquarters officials believed that these teams help meet
certain security requirements, but individual teams will have to learn
how best to use these assets.
The third reason for limited flexibility is the time that will probably
elapse before many of the people in these new positions could be in
place or ready to make optimum contributions. Time lags normally occur
from when a position is authorized to when a person is assigned to fill
it. Both headquarters and district officials have reported that they do
not expect some personnel to start filling headquarters and field
positions for at least 6 months, or maybe even longer. In addition,
once a number of these positions are filled, the effectiveness of the
persons in them could be decreased by what some Coast Guard personnel
refer to as ’juniorocity“--that is, persons at a lower rank or pay
grade (in the case of civilians) filling positions that call for
higher-level candidates. Coast Guard officials said that this could
potentially occur, and if it does, these people may need additional
supervision from senior personnel.
The Coast Guard‘s fiscal year 2003 allocation of cutter and patrol boat
resource hours provides further indication that nonsecurity missions
would not be greatly increased, because the resource hours allocation
is relatively the same as it was for fiscal year 2002. The Coast Guard
sets this allocation for all law enforcement program areas in its
annual operational and maritime safety mission planning guidance. This
guidance shows that for fiscal year 2003, the overall number of cutter
hours for those activities is to rise by about 5,700, a 2 percent
increase from the previous year, with each of the law enforcement areas
seeing small changes from the prior year. The planning guidance data
support the conclusion that even with new security boats funded in the
fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Coast Guard would not be able to
redeploy cutters to nonsecurity missions. According to the guidance,
continued shifting of small boats and 87-foot patrol boats to port
security activities will leave gaps in inshore fisheries enforcement.
Opportunities for Increased Operational Efficiency Could Help Meet
Mission Responsibilities:
A number of opportunities for improving operational efficiency are
potentially available to help the Coast Guard accomplish its various
missions. In recent years, we and others have studied Coast Guard
operations and made recommendations for more efficient operations, and
a number of these recommendations have merit in this new operating
environment. In addition, the Coast Guard has attempted, through local
port organizations, to develop ways to partner more effectively with
local, state, and federal agencies, as well as with public and private
entities. Individual ports have made notable--but isolated--
accomplishments in this regard. Although some mechanisms are in place
to help ports share information about these projects, these mechanisms
are not working effectively.
Previous Recommendations for Improving Operations Still Have Merit:
Over the past decade, we and other outside organizations, along with
the Coast Guard itself, have studied Coast Guard operations to
determine where greater efficiencies might be found. We consolidated
many of these recommendations to improve Coast Guard operations in
reports issued in 1997 and 1999.[Footnote 20] As part of previous
initiatives aimed at operating more efficiently, the Coast Guard has
used many such recommendations, undertaking such steps as reducing
administrative staff, consolidating offices, and streamlining
operations. However, a number of past recommendations that were not
adopted still have relevance. For example:
* Dockside fisheries enforcement by the National Marine Fisheries
Service. Past studies found that the Coast Guard had opportunity to
replace some of its at-sea boardings for domestic fishing vessels with
dockside enforcement by the National Marine Fisheries Service (an
agency of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) and by
state agencies. Whether this same opportunity still exists in the
current environment is unknown, but it represents a possible way to
leverage resources and minimize any overlap that may be occurring. A
closer look at potential efficiencies seems particularly warranted
given the increasingly complex nature of the Coast Guard‘s work in
fisheries enforcement. For example, fishing regulations in the New
England fisheries have evolved to include 18 fisheries management plans
involving more than 40 marine species.
* Privatizing vessel traffic service systems in more ports. Vessel
traffic service systems, which are responsible for controlling harbor
traffic operations in a number of the nation‘s ports, are operated
predominantly by Coast Guard personnel. However, two systems--Delaware
Bay and Los Angeles/Long Beach--are either privately operated or
operated jointly with the Coast Guard, and past studies have
recommended that the Coast Guard examine the possibility of privatizing
at least some additional systems. At Los Angeles/Long Beach, for
example, the system uses Coast Guard and Marine Exchange personnel to
monitor traffic and provide mariners with information.[Footnote 21] The
state of California reimburses the Coast Guard‘s personnel costs, using
fees paid by vessel owners using the system.
Leveraging Resources through Partnerships Provides Mission
Efficiencies to the Coast Guard:
One area that has come to the forefront since September 11th, given the
expanded duties that the Coast Guard and other port stakeholders have
assumed, is the agency‘s potential ability to partner with other port
stakeholders to help accomplish the varied security and nonsecurity
goals involved in port operations. These stakeholders include state and
local agencies as well as private-sector interests. As we visited Coast
Guard locations, we noted many examples in which cooperative
arrangements had been used to accomplish these varied goals
successfully. Table 3 provides examples of some of the partnerships we
found.
Table 3: Examples of Coast Guard Partnering in Individual Ports:
Port: Boston; Example of partnering: Coast Watch. This program acts in
a neighborhood-watch fashion and allows fishermen and other port
stakeholders to alert the Coast Guard to irregularities that might
indicate security threats.; Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) Escorts. In
developing its plan for escorting LNG ships, the Coast Guard cooperated
with other agencies and entities to share the burden. As a result,
state and local agencies in the Port of Boston assist in escorting LNG
ships through the port, providing on-shore security, and coordinating
bridge closures.; Spill Response. The Coast Guard has turned over
responsibility for responding to minor oil spills to the state of
Massachusetts.
Port: Hampton Roads; Example of partnering: Maritime Incident Response
Team (MIRT). Local municipalities have created a firefighting
cooperative to respond to marine fires. In the event of an incident, in
addition to deploying as first responder, the team acts under the
command and control of the captain of the port and liaises with
affected municipalities. The MIRT trains by conducting field exercises
with the Coast Guard. Through this program, the Coast Guard benefits
from the presence of a marine firefighting resource, while the
municipalities involved benefit from coordinated federal
participation.
Port: Houston/Galveston; Example of partnering: Mobility Program. The
Coast Guard partnered with the Houston/Galveston Navigation Safety
Advisory Committee on identifying mobility issues associated with both
recreational and commercial users of the Houston Ship Channel,
Galveston Bay, and connecting waters. As a result, the Coast Guard
derived lists of local waterways needs and their relative importance to
the users‘ outcomes.; Ship Rider Information Exchange Program. The
Coast Guard entered into agreements that allow vessel inspectors to
ride on many of the chemical and oil tank ships that frequent Houston,
the nation‘s largest petro-chemical port. The inspectors get to see
bridge resource management, cargo operations, tank cleaning evolutions,
and engine room procedures first hand. The program exposes Coast Guard
inspectors to the unique aspects of the tank industry, while allowing
the ships‘ crew to develop insights into Coast Guard enforcement and
U.S. and international legal requirements..
Port: Los Angeles/Long Beach; Example of partnering: Vessel Traffic
Service. In cooperation with the state of California and local
interests, the Coast Guard jointly operates a VTS system. State law
requires all vessels over a certain size to participate, and operating
costs are paid from user fees on vessels using the system. Developed
under Coast Guard guidance, the system operates under many of the same
rules and procedures as Coast Guard VTS sites, provides the Coast Guard
valuable assistance during its search and rescue efforts and law
enforcement actions, and aids in the dissemination of captain of the
port orders..
Port: Puget Sound; Example of partnering: Harbor Safety Plan. Through
the efforts of the Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee, guidelines were
developed to cover issues such as emergency response, lightering, and
pilotage. By working through the harbor safety committee, the Coast
Guard was able to achieve buy-in from those affected by the plan,
thereby ensuring greater success. Guidance developed through this
process has been incorporated into the charts that mariners use when
navigating the waters of Puget Sound.; Ballast Water. The Puget Sound
Harbor Safety Committee developed voluntary standards of care for
exchanging ballast water that were eventually used as the basis for new
state regulations.; Standards of Care to Prevent Drifting Ships.
Through the work of the Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee, a
mechanical problem was identified that caused seven to eight groundings
per year, on average. This cooperative effort resulted in a new
standard of care that requires ship operators to complete a check of
their propulsion systems upon checking in with the Vessel Traffic
System. The change mitigates groundings that could result in spills or
loss of life..
Source: Developed by GAO.
[End of table]
The Coast Guard has recognized possibilities for greater efficiencies
through partnering and is beginning to implement better guidance and
procedures in this area. In May 2002, the Commandant stated that the
Coast Guard intended to build strategic partnerships to enhance its
mission outcomes, bring clarity to mission planning and execution, and
leverage the capabilities of Coast Guard forces. Likewise, the Coast
Guard‘s strategic plan declares partnering to be a guiding principle
for decisionmaking. To help local Coast Guard officials promote these
efforts, headquarters has issued general guidance to aid in the
development of harbor safety committees. Although there are other
cooperative arrangements in ports, including area committees and port
security committees, the Coast Guard has focused on harbor safety
committees or their equivalents[Footnote 22] because it believes that
such committees, composed of facility operators and port users, are
often the only local bodies available to meet and discuss mutual
safety, mobility, and environmental protection issues.
Harbor safety committees, established largely on an ad hoc basis by the
Coast Guard or other entities over the years, differ widely in their
membership and structure. These differences, in part, reflect the
differences that exist from port to port. The Coast Guard guidance is
intended to increase harmonization between committees without imposing
a mandated structure for them. The guidance illustrates the attributes
of particularly successful committees and focuses on overall
organizational structure, committee membership, and areas for potential
action. The guidance also points out that tools are available to assist
committees in their work, particularly the Coast Guard‘s National
Harbor Safety Committee Web site. Coast Guard officials told us that
some recently formed committees were established using the guidance,
and that some existing committees have made changes to come into closer
alignment with the guidance.
Effectiveness of Some Partnerships Is Hampered by Limited Scope of
Activity and Lack of Information Sharing:
Although the Coast Guard recognizes the potential offered by partnering
and has provided guidance toward this end, current efforts are limited
by two main problems. The first is related to the variations between
harbor safety committees: some are much narrower in scope and activity
than others. The second is related to the lack of effective sharing of
information among harbor safety committees.
The makeup of harbor safety committees, which varies somewhat from port
to port, can sometimes affect their ability to tackle new projects. The
actions the Coast Guard can undertake often reflect the extent of the
individual committee‘s interests. Some committees have broad
representation among various stakeholder groups. For example, the
committee in Puget Sound has included a broad mix of shipping industry
groups, labor organizations, port representatives, environmental
agencies, and state representatives. Consensus efforts of this
committee resulted in new state regulations about the dumping of
ballast water, for example. By contrast, in Philadelphia, when the
Coast Guard attempted to carry out a safety assessment with the
cooperation of the local harbor safety committee, the stakeholders
perceived the assessment effort as threatening the competitiveness of
the port and decided not to cooperate. Coast Guard officials attributed
this lack of interest to the makeup of the committee, which did not
have representation beyond industry representatives.
More effective information-sharing is another way the Coast Guard could
better leverage its resources. There currently is no effective way for
stakeholder groups in the more than 100 locations where such committees
exist to share information with each other about successful projects or
about best practices that contribute to these successes. Our
discussions with Coast Guard and port officials indicated that
information between committees tends to be exchanged sporadically, by
word of mouth or happenstance. There currently is no national harbor
safety association or other umbrella group that can share information,
although a few committees have recently expressed interest in forming
an association. Likewise, no formal process exists for sharing best
practices and information within the Coast Guard. Numerous Coast Guard
personnel noted that personal relationships and the rotation of
personnel currently are the best tools available for information-
sharing about the operation of other ports.
In the absence of a mechanism or process for effectively sharing
information, communication within the Coast Guard and among its
partners could be facilitated by greater use of the Coast Guard‘s
National Harbor Safety Committee Web site, which is currently
underutilized. When we checked in September 2002, it had just five
examples of best practices--three from Puget Sound, one from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and one from the Coast
Guard. By contrast, during our field visits we were told about examples
of good partnerships in each of the ports we visited.
Framework for Monitoring Levels of Effort and Results Has Two Main
Components:
The Congress has expressed great interest in monitoring the Coast
Guard‘s mission resource levels, especially for nonsecurity missions.
In particular, legislation currently under consideration for
establishing a Department of Homeland Security includes a requirement
for the Coast Guard to report regularly on the status of its
nonsecurity missions. We think our experience in reviewing such
information may be helpful in establishing a meaningful framework for
keeping the Congress informed. In this instance, such a framework would
involve two main components. The first component is a strategy that
identifies, at least in general terms, the planned levels of effort for
these various missions in future years and a time frame for achieving
these planned levels. The second component is adequate information for
assessing progress. This information has to capture not only how much
the Coast Guard is spending on these missions but also what these
expenditures produce, both in the level of service provided and the
results achieved. Much of the necessary information may already exist,
but not in a report that specifically responds to the Congress‘s
interest in nonsecurity missions.
First Component: Establishing Planned Resource Levels and a Time Frame
for Achieving These Levels:
In the Coast Guard‘s substantial transformation following September
11th, it is understandable that the agency‘s primary planning focus has
been on incorporating its expanded security mission. The agency has not
yet developed a plan for how it intends to balance these various
missions over the longer term. For its multiple-mission resources such
as cutters and aircraft, the Coast Guard has established fiscal year
2003 resource levels for its various missions, but there is no
indication that these levels represent planned levels for future years.
Specifying the proposed resource levels for these missions, as well as
establishing a strategy for achieving them, is an important first step
in the Coast Guard‘s communication with the Congress and other
decisionmakers about what it intends to accomplish with its additional
resources. This information is critical; without it, neither the Coast
Guard nor the Congress knows what level of activities and services are
to be expected. Operating without such knowledge for an extended period
of time places decisionmakers in the position of being asked to decide
on funding levels without knowing what this funding is likely to
produce.
Second Component: Adequate Information for Assessing Progress:
Once resource levels are set, it is important to be able to assess
progress in achieving those levels. An effective reporting mechanism
needs a variety of measures and a way to set these measures in context.
Although the Coast Guard may already be collecting this information, it
currently does not exist in a useful format.
Measures That Address Both Efforts and Accomplishments:
Program measures are most useful when, taken together, they can provide
a picture of both the resources being applied to a mission (inputs) and
the results of applying these resources (outputs and outcomes). Input
measures include such things as the amount of money spent on a mission
or the number of persons assigned to the mission. (See table 4 for
other examples.) Output measures, such as the number of patrols or
inspections conducted, describe what is being provided with these
resources. Outcome measures go further than output measures, in that
they address the extent to which program goals are accomplished.
Together, these different measures allow decisionmakers to answer
questions about how many resources are being applied, how the
application of these resources translates into specific activities, and
what these activities are producing.[Footnote 23]
Table 4: Types of Measures for Monitoring Agency Missions and
Activities:
Measures of effort: inputs: Type (or subtype) of measure: Financial
information; Explanation: These measures are based on information
about expenditures. This can include items such as salaries, employee
benefits, materials, supplies, and equipment.
Measures of effort: inputs: Type (or subtype) of measure: Nonfinancial
information; Explanation: Measures of effort: inputs: These measures
focus
on the number of personnel used in a specific mission or activity.
Using
nonfinancial information in effect removes wage, benefit, and cost-of-
living
differences from resource inputs, making it easier to compare levels of
effort over time.
Measures of effort: inputs: Type (or subtype) of measure: Other
information;
Explanation: Measures of effort: inputs: These measures could include
such
things as the amount of equipment or assets assigned to a specific
mission or
activity.
Measures of accomplishment: outputs and
outcomes.Type (or subtype) of measure: Outputs; Explanation: These
measures focus on the quantity of a service provided to
address a specific mission or activity, such as the number of
inspections conducted..
Measures of accomplishment: outputs and
outcomes.Type (or subtype) of measure: Outcomes; Explanation: These
measures are used to determine whether the
service provided results in an actual accomplishment besides the
activity itself. These measures are useful in setting goals, targets,
and standards..
Source: Developed by GAO based on information from the Governmental
Accounting Standards Board.
[End of table]
Having all three types of measures is important, because exclusive
dependence on any one type has built-in limitations. For example, a
rising level of expenditures (an input measure) does not necessarily
equate to higher levels of effort (outputs). Instead, it may be a
reflection only of rising personnel costs or increased capital
expenditures. Similarly, although a rising level of outputs (such as
increased numbers of patrols) may appear desirable, they tell only a
limited story on their own. Increased outputs may simply represent
inefficiencies--more effort is expended, but with little or no increase
in the desired outcome. Including outcome measures is particularly
important because they provide a ’so what“ tool to help assess whether
the level of effort is justified and whether it needs to be modified in
some way.
The Coast Guard currently has a variety of all three types of measures.
(See table 5 for examples.) Many of these measures are already reported
in some context or another. In particular, the Coast Guard currently
collects and reports a variety of outcome data to comply with the
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). Under GPRA, DOT is
required to establish annual performance plans that contain annual
goals and measures to assess progress in reaching these goals, which
are linked to their long-term strategic goals. The Coast Guard‘s
current performance plan also contains some discussion of how security-
related priorities are affecting performance targets for other missions
in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The plan notes five areas that have been
negatively impacted by increased security requirements--drug
interdiction, foreign fishing vessel interdiction, fisheries
protection, military readiness, and support for military operations.
For example, the Coast Guard does not expect to reach its fiscal year
2002 cocaine seizure rate goal, because drug interdiction resources
have been diverted to port security missions.
Table 5: Examples of Measures Currently Developed by the Coast Guard:
Type of measure: Input; Example: Dollar expenditures by mission, both
planned and actual.
Example: Authorized strength levels for specific
units or offices.
Example: Number of vessels or aircraft assigned to
specific program areas or missions.
Type of measure: Output; Example: Number of hours that assets such as
cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft were spent on each mission.
Example: Number of fisheries patrols conducted.
Example: Number of vessel-safety and -security
inspections conducted.
Type of measure: Outcome; Example: Percentage of mariners in distress
who were saved.
Example: Number of foreign fishing vessel incursions
detected.
Example: Percentage of time that navigation aids were
fully operational.
Source: Compiled by GAO from Coast Guard reports and information
systems.
[End of table]
Additional Information Providing Context for Measurement Data:
To give context to these various types of measures, it may be necessary
to report other explanatory information. Such information might be
needed to explain changes in the way an agency is doing business, or
special circumstances that had an impact on the agency‘s goals or
missions. This information is of two main types:
* External factors, such as environmental or demographic
characteristics, that are outside of an organization‘s control.
Declines in fish stocks, for example, can be affected by many things
beyond the management of the fishery, such as climate or actions by
other nations.
* Internal factors, such as staffing patterns, patrol routes, or any
other significant developments that the agency has control over. Such
information is important because data from the measures themselves--
particularly input and output measures--may, in isolation, tell only
part of the story. For example, the Coast Guard‘s marine safety office
in New Orleans recently curtailed some of its safety-related foreign
flag-vessel inspections because of reduced staff levels. Any measure
related to the number of inspections made by Coast Guard personnel
would thus likely show a decline and lead to a conclusion that the
Coast Guard had significantly curtailed its safety oversight. However,
the Coast Guard decided in this instance to rely on Coast Guard-
approved maritime classification societies for these safety
inspections. This additional information would be needed to put the
data in proper context.
No Current Report Usefully Provides This Information:
Although much potentially useful information exists for explaining and
analyzing the Coast Guard‘s levels of effort in nonsecurity missions,
no current report assimilates this information and sets it in the
context of organizational or program developments related to
accomplishing nonsecurity missions. The Coast Guard‘s annual
performance plan, while acknowledging in several places that
nonsecurity performance targets are likely to be negatively affected by
ongoing security efforts, has a relatively limited amount of data, is
not intended as a report on increasing resource levels for nonsecurity
missions, and does not have the level of detail that may be desired on
this issue.
Assembling a meaningful report calls for a mix of input, output, and
outcome measures and a complementary explanation of what difficulties
the Coast Guard is facing, what externalities have affected the
outcome, and what plans the Coast Guard is making either to bring more
resources to bear or to find ways to leverage resources or otherwise
operate more efficiently. A meaningful report could potentially use
many different measures. In concept, the best set of measures would be
one that allowed both the Coast Guard and the Congress, to the degree
possible, to link resources and activities with results--for example,
linking the number and types of fisheries patrols with the recovery of
fish stocks, or the level of drug enforcement patrols with the level of
success in preventing drugs from entering the country.
It is important for the Coast Guard to work with the Congress in
defining what information should be provided, because some information
is readily available while other information is not. For example, under
current information systems, it is much easier to determine, on a
mission-by-mission basis, how personnel aboard ships and aircraft spend
their time than it is to create a similar mission-by-mission picture of
how time is spent in headquarters and program offices.[Footnote 24] The
value of developing additional measures that are not already in place
needs to be weighed against the possible cost. We did not undertake a
detailed evaluation of the Coast Guard‘s information systems to
determine
the full range of information these systems might be able to supply.
It may be that, if the Congress decides that certain additional
measures
are important for reporting purposes, Coast Guard information
specialists
can assemble the data with relative ease. However, if the systems do
not already collect the information, considerable work may be needed,
and there may be little historical information to provide a benchmark
for current data.
Conclusions:
The Coast Guard‘s adjustment to its new post-September 11thenvironment
is still largely in process. Sorting out how traditional missions will
be fully carried out alongside new security responsibilities will
likely take several years. The Congress has expressed strong interest
in monitoring the activity levels for these missions, particularly
those nonsecurity missions that saw a reduction in activities after
September 11th. The Coast Guard acknowledges that for the foreseeable
future, absorbing new security activities will continue to affect
activity levels for some of these other missions. After September 11th,
the Coast Guard‘s attention understandably turned to assimilating added
security responsibilities, and beyond its short-term plans for fiscal
year 2003 it has not indicated the levels of effort its various
missions are likely to receive. However, given the degree of
congressional concern, it is important for the Coast Guard to develop a
framework that will keep the Congress apprised of what is happening. It
is also important for the Coast Guard to develop and share with the
Congress a longer-term strategy that identifies, at least in general
terms, the levels of effort the Coast Guard projects for its various
missions, along with a time frame for achieving these planned levels.
Because the Coast Guard must adjust to rapid changes in its multi-
mission environment, these levels are likely to remain fluid and
therefore in need of revision as necessary, but the direction they set
is nonetheless important. Without this sense of direction,
decisionmakers are less able to make spending and other decisions with
a clear understanding of how the Coast Guard intends to balance its
missions.
It is also important for the Coast Guard to provide decisionmakers with
information about progress in achieving the intended balance among
missions. The Coast Guard currently collects and disseminates a wide
variety of information about its nonsecurity missions and activities,
but this information is in disparate forms and documents. To make such
information more useful for the Congress, a better synthesis is needed.
In short, existing information must be analyzed in the context of the
Coast Guard‘s efforts to address all of its missions as effectively and
efficiently as possible. In doing so, information regarding agreed-upon
performance measures also needs to be developed and provided to
congressional decisionmakers. The absence of such information limits
their ability to assess current efforts and decide if changes should be
made.
In meeting the challenges involved with its various missions, it is
also important for the Coast Guard to carefully consider and implement,
where appropriate, ways of operating more efficiently and effectively.
Many past suggestions for more efficient operation still appear
relevant. These would include looking for ways to share monitoring
duties with other agencies, eliminating possible duplication of effort,
and conducting joint operations or projects with state and local
partners. The Coast Guard‘s recent efforts to expand partnerships with
other maritime stakeholders at individual ports offer promising
examples of greater leveraging of existing resources. However, the
processes for sharing information between ports are limited,
diminishing the potential for replicating a port‘s successes in other
locations.
Recommendations:
To provide the Congress with a useful framework for reviewing and
monitoring Coast Guard activities, we recommend that the Secretary of
Transportation direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to:
* Develop a longer-term strategy that outlines how the Coast Guard sees
its resources--cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel--being
distributed across its various missions, as well as a time frame for
achieving this desired balance among missions.
* Work with the Congress to develop and implement a useful reporting
format that provides a full range of input, output, and outcome
measures, as well as a means to keep the Congress apprised of ongoing
developments that have an effect on nonsecurity missions.
To improve operational efficiencies and help leverage resources, we
also recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the
Commandant to reexamine past recommendations for operational
efficiencies and, in particular, to develop an effective way to
systematically share information on successful partnership efforts.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation
and the Coast Guard for their review and comment. Coast Guard officials
provided a number of comments and clarifications, which we incorporated
to ensure the accuracy of our report. The Coast Guard did not respond
in writing to our recommendations, but, in oral comments, Coast Guard
officials expressed a concern that our recommendation about developing
a longer-term strategy would involve disclosing budgetary information
well in advance of approval by DOT and Office of Management and Budget
officials in the normal budget process. We have modified the wording of
the recommendation to help clarify that it is meant to identify, in
more general terms, how the Coast Guard envisions distributing its
resources to meet its many missions.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 7 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report
to the Honorable Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary of Transportation, and
Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard. We also will
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at
heckerj@gao.gov or (202) 512-2834, or Randall Williamson at
willamsonr@gao.gov or (206) 287-4860. GAO contacts and acknowledgments
are listed in appendix II.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JayEtta Z. Hecker:
Director, Physical Infrastructure:
Signed by JayEtta Z. Hecker:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Coast Guard has restored its
nonsecurity missions following the September 11th terrorist attacks, we
reviewed the Coast Guard‘s Abstract of Operations. This data, reported
by crews of cutters, boats, and aircraft, represents the hours that
these resources spent in each of the Coast Guard‘s mission areas. We
reviewed this data to identify how resources were utilized across
missions both before and after September 11th. In addition, we also
spoke with officials at Coast Guard Headquarters and at the Atlantic
Area and Pacific Area commands in Portsmouth, Virginia, and Alameda,
California, respectively, regarding restoration of nonsecurity
missions. To obtain information on how the restoration varied around
the country, we visited Coast Guard district offices and operational
units in Alameda, Boston, New Orleans, Portsmouth, and Seattle, as well
as personnel at operational commands under these district commands.
To assess the impact of the fiscal year 2003 budget request on
nonsecurity operations, we reviewed the Coast Guard‘s fiscal year 2002
budget and supplemental appropriations, as well as their fiscal year
2003 budget request. In addition, we interviewed Coast Guard officials
within the Coast Guard‘s Office of Programs, the Human Resource
Directorate, Operations Directorate, and the Marine Safety Directorate
to identify where budget increases would be spent and the impact of the
budget increase. To discuss the impact of the increase in the budget
request, we interviewed staff at Coast Guard Headquarters, area
commands, and district offices. In addition, we also reviewed Coast
Guard planning documents to determine the extent of changes in planned
resource allocations for fiscal year 2003.
To identify types of operational efficiencies the Coast Guard should
consider to help restore nonsecurity missions, we reviewed previous GAO
and Department of Transportation Inspector General reports. In
addition, we discussed options for operational efficiencies and for the
development of partnerships at district offices we visited, as well as
at local Coast Guard offices under these districts‘ commands. We also
reviewed Coast Guard guidance for Harbor Safety Committees and Marine
Transportation System issues.
To identify a framework that would help the Coast Guard report on
progress toward restoring nonsecurity missions, we reviewed previous
GAO work on performance management and developing performance measures.
We reviewed the Coast Guard‘s current strategic documents and discussed
these reports with staff in the Coast Guard‘s Office of Programs to
determine the extent to which existing data collection activities could
support a reporting framework.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
JayEtta Z. Hecker (202) 512-2834
Randall B. Williamson (206) 287-4860:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, David Hooper, Christopher M. Jones,
Molly C. Laster, Sara Moessbauer, Tim Schindler, and Stan Stenersen
made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Throughout this report, we define ’nonsecurity“ missions as those
that fall outside of the Coast Guard‘s defense readiness and homeland
security responsibilities. These mission areas include law enforcement
(including drug and illegal migrant interdiction), search and rescue,
aids to navigation, marine environmental protection, marine safety, and
ice operations.
[2] Since the events of September 11th, the Coast Guard has created a
separate program area, called Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security,
for homeland security activities.
[3] ’Cutter“ is defined as any Coast Guard vessel 65 feet in length or
greater with adequate accommodations for the crew to live on board.
Besides high-and medium-endurance cutters, this definition includes
icebreakers, buoy tenders, and patrol boats. In addition, the Coast
Guard operates a variety of types of smaller boats. All vessels under
65 feet in length are classified as boats and usually operate near
shore or on inland waterways. Examples include motor lifeboats, rigid-
hull inflatable boats, and utility boats.
[4] Prior to the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Coast Guard
included maritime security activities under its marine safety program
area.
[5] Pending legislation (S.1214 and H.R. 3983) proposes a number of
security measures for U.S. seaports. Major provisions of these bills
would require heavy involvement by the Coast Guard in conducting
vulnerability assessments at U.S. ports, reviewing port security plans,
developing seaport security standards, making loan guarantees and
authorizing grants for port security improvements, and evaluating
security at foreign ports that are points of origin for ships calling
on U.S. ports.
[6] The Coast Guard maintains information, on a mission-by-mission
basis, about how these resources were used. Each hour that these
resources are used in a mission is called a ’resource hour.“ These
resource hours are logged into employment categories that fall under
such missions as search and rescue, aids to navigation, defense
readiness, enforcement of laws and treaties, ice operations, marine
environmental protection, ports and waterways security, and marine
safety. Resource hours do not include such things as the time that the
resource stands idle or the time that is spent in maintaining it. Coast
Guard officials told us they estimate that the resource hours we use
here would represent the employment in which approximately 77 percent
of Coast Guard personnel spend their time.
[7] Small boats and aircraft resource hours also saw a shift away from
law enforcement missions and toward homeland security.
[8] Coast Guard officials said that there were no significant increases
in the resource hours for helicopters and fixed wing aircraft because
of maintenance requirements and orders to stay within budget.
[9] Small boats saw shifts similar to patrol boats--that is, additional
hours were spent on law enforcement in the most recent quarters--but
the return to earlier levels was not as complete as it was for cutters.
[10] The First District is headquartered in Boston and is responsible
for Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and parts of New York and New Jersey.
[11] The district defines security patrols as specific high-interest
vessel security escorts or nonroutine security patrols.
[12] The Fifth District is headquartered in Portsmouth, Virginia, and
is responsible for North Carolina, Virginia, the District of Columbia,
Delaware, Maryland, and parts of New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
[13] The Eighth District is headquartered in New Orleans and is
responsible for Colorado, Nebraska, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Texas,
Kansas, Wyoming, Louisiana, Arkansas, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Missouri, Mississippi, Iowa, Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, West
Virginia, and parts of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana,
Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Florida.
[14] The Eleventh District is headquartered in Alameda, California, and
is responsible for Arizona, California, Nevada, and Utah.
[15] The Thirteenth District is headquartered in Seattle and is
responsible for Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana.
[16] The district defines ’ready cutter patrols“ as having at least one
patrol boat assigned to conducting full-time law enforcement
operations.
[17] In addition to requesting $213 million for new mission-related
initiatives, the Coast Guard is also requesting the following other
increases: $172 million for pay increases and military personnel
entitlements; $123 million in various technical adjustments; $49
million in other expenditures, such as reserve training; and $14
million for capital expenditures. The budget request also includes $1.2
billion in retirement-related costs for current and future retirees,
according to Coast Guard officials. These retirement-related costs were
included in response to proposed legislation (Managerial Flexibility
Act of 2001 [S.1612]) directing agencies to fully fund the future
pension and health benefits of their current workforces. Although this
legislation has not been enacted, the Coast Guard complied with the
administration‘s requirement to include these costs in its fiscal year
2003 budget request.
[18] These figures include boats funded through the fiscal year 2002
supplemental appropriations. The supplemental appropriations funded 42
of the 80 homeland security response boats, and all 4 of the coastal
patrol boats.
[19] The maritime safety and security teams are each composed of 71
personnel. They are under the administrative and operational control of
the area commanders, but the tactical control of the local unit.
[20] Coast Guard: Challenges for Addressing Budget Constraints (GAO/
RCED-97-110, May 14, 1997) and Coast Guard: Review of Administrative
and Support Functions (GAO/RCED-99-62R, Mar. 10, 1999).
[21] The Marine Exchange of Los Angeles and Long Beach operates the
vessel traffic information system serving these two ports.
[22] The Coast Guard uses the term ’Harbor Safety Committee“ to refer
to any port Marine Transportation System (MTS) coordinating body or
committee in its guidance on the topic.
[23] In addition to these three types of measures, there is a fourth
main type--one that relates efforts to accomplishments. Efficiency
measures, which provide information about the cost of providing a
certain level of service, are the most common form of effort measure.
We have omitted this category of measurement here because the category,
while important, is not as central as the other three for answering
questions about returning to previous levels of effort and program
results.
[24] The Coast Guard collects and reports information about the number
of hours that each resource, such as a cutter, a patrol boat, or a
helicopter, is used for each type of mission. However, this asset-based
information does not include mission-related time spent by other
personnel. Coast Guard officials told us that new information systems
currently under development are expected to provide a variety of
information related to the tasks of these employees, such as the number
of inspections performed or the number of boardings conducted.
GAO‘s Mission:
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress,
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO‘s commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO‘s Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as ’Today‘s Reports,“ on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select ’Subscribe to daily E-mail alert for newly
released products“ under the GAO Reports heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street NW,
Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.
General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.
20548:
