Mass Transit
Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges Gao ID: GAO-03-263 December 13, 2002About one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation systems, and transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked. In light of the history of terrorism against mass transit and the terrorist attacks on September 11, GAO was asked to examine challenges in securing transit systems, steps transit agencies have taken to improve safety and security, and the federal role in transit safety and security. To address these objectives, GAO visited 10 transit agencies and surveyed a representative sample of transit agencies, among other things.
Transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their systems since September 11, such as conducting vulnerability assessments, revising emergency plans, and training employees. Formidable challenges, however, remain in securing transit systems. Obtaining sufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making transit systems as safe and secure as possible, according to GAO survey results and interviews with transit agency officials. Funding security improvements is problematic because of high security costs, competing budget priorities, tight budget environments, and a provision precluding transit agencies that serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more from using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. In addition to funding challenges, certain characteristics of transit agencies make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. For example, the high ridership and open access of some transit systems makes them attractive for terrorists but also makes certain security measures, like metal detectors, impractical. Moreover, because all levels of the government and the private sector are involved in transit decisions, coordination among all the stakeholders can pose challenges. While transit agencies are pursuing security improvements, the federal government's role in transit security is expanding. For example, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) launched a multipart security initiative and increased funding of its safety and security activities after September 11. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act gave the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) responsibility for the security of all transportation modes, including transit. TSA anticipates issuing national standards for transit security. As the federal government's role expands, goals, performance indicators, and funding criteria need to be established to ensure accountability and results for the government's efforts.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-263, Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
December 2002:
Mass Transit:
Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges:
GAO-03-263:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-263, a report to Congressional Requesters:
December 2002:
MASS TRANSIT:
Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges:
Why GAO Did This Study:
About one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation
systems, and transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked. In
light of the history of terrorism against mass transit and the
terrorist
attacks on September 11, GAO was asked to examine challenges in
securing
transit systems, steps transit agencies have taken to improve safety
and
security, and the federal role in transit safety and security. To
address
these objectives, GAO visited 10 transit agencies and surveyed a
representative sample of transit agencies, among other things.
What GAO Found:
Transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security
of
their systems since September 11, such as conducting vulnerability
assessments, revising emergency plans, and training employees.
Formidable
challenges, however, remain in securing transit systems. Obtaining
sufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making transit
systems as safe and secure as possible, according to GAO survey results
and interviews with transit agency officials. Funding security
improvements is problematic because of high security costs, competing
budget priorities, tight budget environments, and a provision
precluding
transit agencies that serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more
from using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses.
In addition to funding challenges, certain characteristics of transit
agencies make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure.
For example, the high ridership and open access of some transit systems
makes them attractive for terrorists but also makes certain security
measures,
like metal detectors, impractical. Moreover, because all levels of the
government and the private sector are involved in transit decisions,
coordination among all the stakeholders can pose challenges.
While transit agencies are pursuing security improvements, the federal
government‘s role in transit security is expanding. For example, the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) launched a multipart security
initiative and increased funding of its safety and security activities
after September 11. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act gave the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
responsibility for the security of all transportation modes, including
transit. TSA anticipates issuing national standards for transit
security.
As the federal government‘s role expands, goals, performance
indicators,
and funding criteria need to be established to ensure accountability
and
results for the government‘s efforts.
Figure:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To provide transit agencies greater flexibility in paying for transit
security enhancements, GAO recommends that the Secretary of
Transportation
consider seeking a legislative change to allow all transit agencies to
use
federal urbanized area formula funds for security-related operating
expenses.
GAO also makes several other recommendations to the Secretary of
Transportation.
The Department of Transportation generally agreed with the report‘s
findings
and agreed to carefully consider GAO‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-263.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above.For more information, contact Peter Guerrero, at (202)
512-2834 or guerrerop@gao.gov.
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Transit Agencies Face Challenges in Making Transit Systems
Secure:
Transit Agencies Are Taking Steps to Enhance Security:
Federal Government‘s Role in Transit Security Is Evolving:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: GAO‘s Survey Instrument and Overall Results:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Selected Survey Results:
Services Provided by Transit Agencies Surveyed:
Ridership of Transit Agencies Surveyed:
Operating and Capital Budgets of Transit Agencies Surveyed:
Security of Transit Agencies Surveyed:
Funding Sources for Transit Safety and Security Needs of Transit
Agencies Surveyed:
Acts of Extreme Violence against Transit Agencies Surveyed:
Surveyed Transit Agencies‘ Safety and Security Assessments:
Emergency Plans of Transit Agencies Surveyed:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contacts:
Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Profiles of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited, 2000:
Figures:
Figure 1: Ridership by Transit Mode, 2000:
Figure 2: Sources of Funding for Transit Operating and Capital
Expenses, 2000:
Figure 3: Funding Authorized by TEA-21 for the Urbanized Area Formula
Program and All Other Federal Transit Programs, 1998-2003:
Figure 4: Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems
Worldwide, 1997-2000:
Figure 5: Most Significant Challenge to Securing Transit Systems as
Reported by Surveyed Agencies:
Figure 6: Emergency Drill in Progress:
Figure 7: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority‘s Training
Tunnel:
Figure 8: FTA‘s Expenditures on Safety and Security Activities, 2000-
2003:
Figure 9: Diagram of a Risk Management Approach:
Figure 10: Location of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited:
Figure 11: Types of Transit Services Offered by Surveyed Transit
Agencies:
Figure 12: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Number of Unlinked
Passenger Trips in Fiscal Years 2000 - 2001:
Figure 13: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Size of Their
Operating and Capital Budgets, Fiscal Year 2001:
Figure 14: Types of Security Used by Transit Agencies in Large and
Small Urbanized Areas:
Figure 15: Sources of Funds for Operating Expenses Used by Transit
Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:
Figure 16: Sources of Funds for Capital Expenses Used by Transit
Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:
Figure 17: Acts of Extreme Violence during the Past 5 Years at Transit
Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:
Figure 18: Types of Assessments Performed by Transit Agencies:
Figure 19: Types of Coordination Specified in Transit Agencies‘
Emergency Plans:
Figure 20: Types of Emergency Situations Addressed in Transit Agencies‘
Emergency Plans:
Abbreviations:
APTA: American Public Transportation Association:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FTA: Federal Transit Administration:
GAO: General Accounting Office:
ISTEA: Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TEA-21: Transportation Equity Act for the 21ST Century:
Letter:
December 13, 2002:
The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes
Chairman, Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs
United States Senate:
The Honorable Jack Reed
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Housing and Transportation
Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs
United States Senate:
Over a year has passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, realigned our national priorities. While most of the early
attention following these attacks focused on airport security, emphasis
on the other modes of transportation has since grown. Moreover,
terrorist events around the world have shown that mass transit systems,
like other modes of transportation, are often targets of attack. For
example, roughly one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target
transportation systems, and transit systems are the mode most commonly
attacked.[Footnote 1] In May 2002, the Department of Transportation
issued a terrorist threat advisory to the transit industry indicating
that subway systems were a possible target. The industry remains in a
heightened state of alert.
Addressing transit safety and security concerns is complicated by the
nature and scope of transit in the United States. About 6,000 agencies
provide transit services, such as buses, subways, ferries, and light
rail, in the United States. Each workday, about 14 million Americans
ride on some form of transit. Because the effectiveness of transit
systems depends on their accessibility, security measures common in
aviation are difficult to apply. Furthermore, government agencies at
the federal, state, and local levels and private companies share
responsibility for transit safety and security and are involved in
making transit decisions.
This report examines transit safety and security at the federal and
local levels. In particular, the report describes (1) challenges in
securing mass transit systems, (2) steps transit agencies have taken to
enhance safety and security, and (3) the federal role in transit safety
and security. To address these issues, we visited 10 transit agencies
across the country, including the Capital Metropolitan Transportation
Authority in Austin; Chicago Transit Authority; Central Florida
Regional Transit Authority in Orlando; Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority; Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Council;
New York City Transit; Regional Transportation District in Denver; San
Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit; San Francisco Municipal Railway; and
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority in the District of
Columbia. We selected these agencies because they represent different
geographical areas and operate transit systems of different sizes and
modes. In addition, we surveyed a random sample of all transit agencies
throughout the nation that are eligible to receive federal urbanized
area formula funds[Footnote 2] to obtain additional information on
safety and security issues. We received responses to our survey from
155 of 200 transit agencies, for an overall response rate of 78
percent. Our survey results are generalizable to our sample population.
The survey instrument and overall results are included in appendix I.
(See app. II for a more detailed discussion of our report‘s scope and
methodology.):
Results in Brief:
Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems
secure because, in part, certain characteristics make them both
vulnerable and difficult to secure. For example, the high ridership of
some transit agencies makes them attractive targets for terrorists but
also makes certain security measures, like metal detectors,
impractical. The high cost of transit security improvements also
creates challenges for transit agencies. Although some security
improvements, such as closing bus doors at night, have little or no
cost, most improvements require substantial funding. For example, the
total estimated cost of the identified security improvements at 8 of
the 10 transit agencies we visited is over $700 million. According to
our survey results and our interviews with transit agency officials,
insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making their
transit systems as safe and secure as possible. Funding security
improvements is challenging for a number of reasons including tight
budget environments, competing budget priorities, and a prohibition on
transit agencies that serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more
from using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses.
This prohibition prevents transit agencies that serve large urbanized
areas from using federal funds for security-related operating expenses,
such as security personnel. Finally, our site visits and survey results
show that coordination among all transit stakeholders pose challenges.
Our discussions with transit agency and local government officials and
our survey revealed substantial coordination on emergency planning
among transit agencies and local governments; however, transit agencies
reported some challenges, such as limited awareness of terrorist
threats to transit and lack of coordination among various local
agencies. Furthermore, coordination of emergency planning among transit
agencies and governments at the regional, state, and federal levels
appears to be minimal.
Despite the formidable challenges in securing transit systems, transit
agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their
systems. The transit agencies we visited were implementing strategies
to improve both safety and security before September 11; however, the
terrorist attacks on September 11 elevated the importance of security-
related activities. As a result, the transit agencies we visited and
surveyed have implemented new security initiatives or increased the
frequency of existing activities since last September. For example,
many agencies have assessed vulnerabilities, provided additional
training on emergency preparedness, revised emergency plans, and
conducted multiple emergency drills. Several agencies we visited have
also implemented innovative practices to enhance safety and security,
such as training police officers to drive buses and implementing an
employee suggestion program to solicit ideas for improving security.
The federal government‘s role in transit security is evolving. For
example, although the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has limited
authority to oversee and regulate transit security, it launched a
multipart security initiative after September 11. In addition, the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation
and gave it responsibility for all modes of transportation; however,
TSA has yet to exert full responsibility for the security of any
transportation mode other than aviation. TSA and FTA are currently
developing a memorandum of agreement that will define each agency‘s
roles and responsibilities for transit security. TSA will also be
transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as part of the
recently passed Homeland Security Act (HR 5005). Although most of the
transit agencies we visited said FTA‘s security initiative has been
useful, they would like the federal government to provide more
assistance to support transit security, such as more information, help
in obtaining security clearances, increased funding, and more security-
related research and development. When considering the federal
government‘s role in funding transit safety and security initiatives,
policymakers will need to address several issues, including (1)
determining the roles of stakeholders in funding transit security; (2)
developing federal funding criteria; (3) establishing goals and
performance indicators for federal efforts in transit security; and (4)
selecting the appropriate federal policy instruments (e.g., grants and
regulations) to deliver assistance that may be deemed necessary by
policymakers.
To give transit agencies greater flexibility in paying for transit
security improvements, we are recommending that the Secretary of
Transportation consider seeking a legislative change to allow all
transit agencies, regardless of the size of the urbanized area that
they serve, to use urbanized area formula funds for security-related
operating expenses. We are also making several other recommendations
that are designed to promote accountability, direct finite federal
resources to the areas of highest priority, and help transit agencies
obtain intelligence information. We provided the Department of
Transportation with a draft of this report for their review and
comment. Department of Transportation officials generally agreed with
the report‘s findings and conclusions and agreed to carefully consider
the report‘s recommendations as the Department continues working to
improve transit security around the country.
Background:
In 2000, mass transit systems provided over 9 billion passenger trips
and employed about 350,000 people in the United States.[Footnote 3] The
nation‘s transit systems include all multiple-occupancy-vehicle
services designed to transport customers on local and regional routes,
such as bus, trolley bus, commuter rail, vanpool, ferry boat, and light
rail services, and are valued at a trillion dollars. As figure 1 shows,
buses are the most widely used form of transit, providing almost two-
thirds of all passenger trips.
Figure 1: Ridership by Transit Mode, 2000:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Ridership data for 2000 are preliminary. Percentages do not add
to 100 percent because of rounding.
[A] Heavy rail is an electric railway that can carry a heavy volume of
traffic. It is characterized by high speed and rapid acceleration,
passenger rail cars operating singly or in multicar trains on fixed
rails, separate rights-of-way from which all other vehicular and foot
traffic are excluded, sophisticated signaling, and high-platform
loading. Most subway systems are considered heavy rail.
[B] ’Other“ includes a variety of transit modes such as ferryboat,
vanpool, and demand response (i.e., paratransit).
[End of figure]
A number of organizations are involved in the delivery of transit
services in the United States, including federal, state, and local
governments and the private sector:
* FTA provides financial assistance to transit agencies to plan and
develop new transit systems and operate, maintain, and improve existing
systems. FTA is responsible for ensuring that the recipients of federal
transit funds follow federal mandates and administrative requirements.
FTA‘s Office of Safety and Security is the agency‘s focal point for
transit safety (freedom from unintentional danger) and security
(freedom from intentional danger).
* State and local governments also provide a significant amount of
funding for transit services. As figure 2 shows, state and local
governments provide funding for over 40 percent of transit agencies‘
operating expenses and about a quarter of their capital expenses.
According to statute,[Footnote 4] states are also responsible for
establishing State Safety Oversight Agencies to oversee the safety of
transit agencies‘ rail systems.
* Transit agencies, which can be public or private entities, are
responsible for administering and managing transit activities and
services. Transit agencies can directly operate transit service or
contract for all or part of the total transit service provided. About
6,000 agencies provide transit services in the United States, and the
majority of these agencies provide more than one mode of service.
Although all levels of government are involved in transit security, the
primary responsibility for securing transit systems has rested with the
transit agencies.
Figure 2: Sources of Funding for Transit Operating and Capital
Expenses, 2000:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Operating and capital expense data for 2000 are preliminary.
[A] ’Other“ includes taxes levied directly by transit agencies and
other dedicated funds, such as tolls and advertising.
[B] Directly generated expenses include nongovernmental funding,
subsidies from the nontransit sectors of a transit agency‘s operations,
taxes levied directly by a transit agency, and bridge and tunnel tolls.
[End of figure]
FTA administers a number of programs, both discretionary and formula
based, that provide federal funding support to transit agencies. The
largest of these programs is the urbanized area formula grant program,
which provides federal funds to urbanized areas (jurisdictions with
populations of 50,000 or more) for transit capital investments,
operating expenses, and transportation-related planning. As figure 3
shows, the urbanized area formula grant program accounts for almost
one-half of the total authorized funds for all transit programs under
the Transportation Equity Act for the:
21ST Century (TEA-21).[Footnote 5] Recipients of urbanized area formula
funds are required to spend at least 1 percent of these funds to
improve the security of existing or planned mass transportation systems
unless the transit agencies certify that such expenditures are
unnecessary.[Footnote 6]
Figure 3: Funding Authorized by TEA-21 for the Urbanized Area Formula
Program and All Other Federal Transit Programs, 1998-2003:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Totals represent guaranteed and nonguaranteed funding.
[End of figure]
Restrictions on the use of urbanized area formula funds for operating
expenses have changed over the years. When the urbanized area formula
program was created in 1982,[Footnote 7] funds could be used by transit
agencies, regardless of an area‘s population, for operating expenses
with certain limitations.[Footnote 8] However, during fiscal years 1995
to 1997, an overall cap was placed on the total amount of these formula
grants that could be used for operating expenses. In fiscal year 1995,
the cap was $710 million, and in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 it was $400
million. With the passage of TEA-21 in 1998, the restrictions on
urbanized area formula funds were again changed. Specifically, TEA-21
prohibits transit agencies that serve urbanized areas with populations
of 200,000 or more from using urbanized area formula funding for
operating expenses. According to FTA officials, the prohibition was
instituted because policymakers believed the federal government should
only pay for the construction of mass transit systems, not their
operations. The legislative history of TEA-21 indicates that the
Congress allowed transit agencies serving urban areas with populations
of less than 200,000 to continue to use urbanized area formula funds
for operating expenses so that they would have sufficient funding
flexibilities.
Throughout the world, public surface transportation systems have been
targets of terrorist attacks. For example, the first large-scale
terrorist use of a chemical weapon occurred in 1995 in the Tokyo subway
system. In this attack, a terrorist group released sarin gas on a
subway train, killing 11 people and injuring about 5,500. In addition,
according to the Mineta Transportation Institute,[Footnote 9] surface
transportation systems were the target of more than 195 terrorist
attacks from 1997 through 2000. As figure 4 illustrates, buses were the
most common target during this period.
Figure 4: Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems
Worldwide, 1997-2000:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Transit Agencies Face Challenges in Making Transit Systems Secure:
Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems
secure. Certain characteristics of transit systems, such as their high
ridership and open access, make them both vulnerable to attack and
difficult to secure. The high cost of transit security improvements,
coupled with tight budgets, competing needs, and a restriction on using
federal funds for operating expenses (including security-related
operating expenses such as additional security patrols) in large urban
areas creates an even greater challenge for transit agencies. Moreover,
because of the numerous stakeholders involved in transit security,
coordination can become a problem.
Characteristics of Transit Systems Pose Security Challenges:
According to transit officials and transit security experts, certain
characteristics of mass transit systems make them inherently vulnerable
to terrorist attacks and difficult to secure. By design, mass transit
systems are open (i.e., have multiple access points and, in some cases,
no barriers) so that they can move large numbers of people quickly. In
contrast, the aviation system is housed in closed and controlled
locations with few entry points. The openness of mass transit systems
can leave them vulnerable because transit officials cannot monitor or
control who enters or leaves the systems. In addition, other
characteristics of some transit systems--high ridership, expensive
infrastructure, economic importance, and location (e.g., large
metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)--also make them attractive
targets because of the potential for mass casualties and economic
damage. Moreover, some of these same characteristics make transit
agencies difficult to secure. For example, the number of riders that
pass through a mass transit system--especially during peak hours--make
some security measures, such as metal detectors, impractical. In
addition, the multiple access points along extended routes make the
costs of securing each location prohibitive.
Further complicating transit security is the need for transit agencies
to balance security concerns with accessibility, convenience, and
affordability. Because transit riders often could choose another means
of transportation, such as a personal automobile, transit agencies must
compete for riders. To remain competitive, transit agencies must offer
convenient, inexpensive, and quality service. Therefore, security
measures that limit accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or
otherwise cause inconvenience could push people away from transit and
back into their cars. Our discussions with transit agency officials and
our survey results indicate that striking the right balance between
security and these other needs is difficult. For example, as shown in
figure 5, 9 percent of survey respondents reported that the most
significant barrier to making their transit systems as safe and secure
as possible is balancing riders‘ need for accessibility with security
measures.
Figure 5: Most Significant Challenge to Securing Transit Systems as
Reported by Surveyed Agencies:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
[End of figure]
Funding Security Improvements Is a Key Challenge:
Funding security improvements is a key challenge for transit agencies.
Our survey results and our interviews with transit agency officials
indicate that insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in
making transit systems as safe and secure as possible. Moreover, our
survey results indicate that the most common reason for not addressing
items identified as needing attention through safety and security
assessments is insufficient funding. Factors contributing to funding
challenges include high security costs, tight budgets, competing budget
priorities, and a provision prohibiting transit agencies in large
urbanized areas from using federal urbanized area formula funds for
operating expenses, such as security training.
Transit security investments can be quite expensive. While some
security improvements are inexpensive, such as removing trash cans from
subway platforms, most require substantial funding. For example, one
transit agency estimated that an intrusion alarm and closed circuit
television system for only one of its portals would cost approximately
$250,000--an amount equal to at least a quarter of the capital budgets
of more than half the transit agencies we surveyed. According to our
survey results, the top three safety and security funding priorities of
transit agencies regardless of size are enhanced communication systems,
surveillance equipment, and additional training. The transit agencies
we visited have identified or are identifying needed security
improvements, such as upgraded communication systems, additional
fencing, surveillance equipment, and redundant or mobile command
centers. Of the 10 transit agencies we visited, 8 had developed cost
estimates of their identified improvements. The total estimated cost of
the identified security improvements at the 8 agencies is about $711
million. The total cost of all needed transit security improvements
throughout the country is unknown;[Footnote 10] however, given the
scope of the nation‘s transit systems and the cost estimate for 8
agencies, it could amount to billions of dollars.
Transit agency officials told us that they are facing tight budgets,
which make it more difficult for their agencies to pay for expensive
security improvements. According to most of the agencies we visited,
the weakened economy has negatively affected their revenue base by
lowering ridership, tax revenues dedicated to transit, or both. In
particular, 8 of the 10 agencies we visited reported that ridership has
dropped this year, primarily because of the slow economy. The decreased
ridership levels have lowered fare box revenue. In addition, state and
local sales taxes, which provide revenue for many transit agencies,
have declined with the weakened economy and reduced the transit
agencies‘ revenue, according to a number of transit agency officials.
Other competing funding needs also present a challenge for transit
agencies. Given the tight budget environment, transit agencies must
make difficult trade-offs between security investments and other needs,
such as service expansion and equipment upgrades. For example, an
official at one transit agency stated that budget shortfalls and
expenditures for security improvements have delayed some needed capital
projects and reduced the budgets for all departments--except the safety
and security budget. Similarly, an official at another agency reported
that his agency is funding security improvements with money that was
budgeted for nonsecurity projects. According to our analysis, 16
percent of the agencies we surveyed view balancing safety and security
priorities against other priorities as the most significant challenge
to making their systems as safe and secure as possible.
Officials from some transit agencies we visited also reported that the
funding challenges are exacerbated by the current statutory limitation
on using urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. The
urbanized area formula program provides federal funds to urbanized
areas (jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more) for transit
capital investments, operating expenses, and transportation-related
planning. The program is the largest source of federal transit funding.
As mentioned earlier, TEA-21 prohibits transit agencies in large
urbanized areas (jurisdictions with populations of 200,000 or more)
from using urbanized area formula funding for most operating expenses.
This prohibition limits many agencies‘ ability to use FTA funds for
security-related operating expenses. For example, transit agencies in
large urbanized areas cannot use their urbanized area formula funds to
pay for security training or salaries for security personnel, among
other uses. Officials from a number of agencies we visited said this
prohibition was a significant barrier to funding needed security
improvements, although several agency officials also noted that the
elimination of this prohibition would be helpful only if additional
funding were provided. Given the declining revenue base of some transit
agencies, however, the prohibition compounds the budgetary challenges
of securing transit systems.
Coordination Is Key to Transit Security but Presents Challenges:
Coordination among all stakeholders is integral to enhancing transit
security, but it can create additional challenges. Numerous
stakeholders are typically involved in decisions that affect transit
security, such as decisions about its operations and funding. As we
noted in our testimony before the Subcommittee on Transit and Housing
in September and in previous reports, coordination among all levels of
government and the private sector is critical to homeland security
efforts, and a lack of coordination can create problems, such as
duplication of effort.[Footnote 11] In addition, the national strategy
for homeland security recognizes the challenges associated with
intergovernmental coordination but emphasizes the need for such
coordination. According to our site visits and our survey results,
coordination of emergency planning is generally taking place between
transit agencies and local governments, despite some challenges;
however, such coordination appears to be minimal between transit
agencies and governments at the regional, state, and federal levels.
We found that transit agencies and local governments are coordinating
their emergency planning efforts. Our survey results indicate that 77
percent of transit agencies have directly coordinated emergency
planning at the local level; moreover, 65 percent of agencies surveyed
believe they have been sufficiently integrated into their local
government‘s emergency plans. Likewise, 9 of the 10 transit agencies we
visited said they are integrated to at least a moderate extent into
their local government‘s emergency planning. Officials from these 9
transit agencies noted that their agencies are included in their local
government‘s emergency planning activities, such as emergency drills,
tabletop exercises, planning meetings, and task forces. For example,
when Minneapolis held an emergency drill that simulated a biological
attack on the city, Metro Transit transported ’victims“ to hospitals,
even taking some victims to out-of-state hospitals because the local
hospitals were at capacity. Transit agency and local government
officials said their past experiences with weather emergencies and
special events, like Super Bowl celebrations, had helped establish good
working relationships. According to the officials, these past
experiences have demonstrated the types of support services transit
agencies can provide during emergencies, including evacuations, triage
centers, victim transport, and shelters. However, officials said these
working relationships are usually informal and undocumented. For
example, the majority of the transit agencies we visited did not have a
memorandum of understanding with their local government.
Although transit agencies are generally active participants in
emergency planning at the local level, they nevertheless face some
coordination challenges. According to our survey results, some of the
most significant challenges in coordinating emergency planning at the
local level are insufficient funding, limited awareness of terrorist
threats to transit, and lack of time. Similar concerns were often
raised during our meetings with transit agencies. For example, one
agency official noted that his agency operates in over 40 jurisdictions
and that coordinating with all of these local governments is very time
consuming.
In contrast to the local level, coordination of emergency planning
among transit agencies and governments at the regional, state, and
federal levels appears to be minimal. Most of the transit agencies we
visited reported limited coordination with governments other than their
local government. Our survey results reveal a similar pattern. For
example, 68 percent of transit agencies we surveyed have not directly
coordinated emergency planning at the regional level; 84 percent have
not directly coordinated emergency planning at the state level; and 87
percent have not directly coordinated emergency planning at the federal
level. As we have noted in past reports on homeland security, the lack
of coordination among stakeholders could result in communication
problems, duplication, and fragmentation. Without coordination,
transit agencies and governments also miss opportunities to
systematically identify the unique resources and capacities that each
can provide in emergencies.
Transit Agencies Are Taking Steps to Enhance Security:
Prior to September 11, all 10 transit agencies we visited and many of
the transit agencies we surveyed were implementing measures to enhance
transit safety and security, such as revising emergency plans and
training employees on emergency preparedness. Transit agency officials
we interviewed often noted that the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo
subway system or their agency‘s experiences during natural disasters
had served as catalysts for focusing on safety and security. Although
safety and security were both priorities, the terrorist attacks on
September 11 elevated the importance of security. (See app. III for
select survey results, which includes information on the emergency
planning and preparedness of the transit agencies we surveyed.
Differences and similarities of transit agencies in large urbanized
areas to those in small urbanized areas are also presented.):
Since September 11, transit agencies have taken additional steps to
improve transit safety and security. Officials from the agencies we
visited told us their agencies have been operating at a heightened
state of security since September 11. According to agency officials and
our survey results, many transit agencies in large and small urbanized
areas have implemented new safety and security measures or increased
the frequency or intensity of existing activities, including the
following:
* Vulnerability or security assessments: Many transit agencies have
conducted vulnerability or security assessments. For example, all 10 of
the agencies we visited and 54 percent of the agencies we surveyed said
they had conducted a vulnerability or security assessment since
September 11. The purpose of these assessments is to identify potential
vulnerabilities and corrective actions or needed security improvements.
Improved communication systems, more controlled access to facilities,
and additional training were some of the needs identified in the
assessments of the agencies we visited.
* Fast-track security improvements: Security improvements planned or in
process prior to September 11 were moved up on the agenda or finished
early. For example, one agency, which was putting alarms on access
points to the subway ventilation system before September 11, completed
the process early.
* Immediate, inexpensive security improvements: Removing bike lockers
and trash cans from populated areas, locking underground restrooms, and
closing bus doors at night were among the immediate and inexpensive
improvements that agencies made.
* Intensified security presence: Many agencies have increased the
number of police or security personnel who patrol their systems.
Surveillance equipment, alarms, or security personnel have been placed
at access points to subway tunnels, bus yards, and other nonpublic
places. Employees have also been required to wear identification cards
or brightly colored vests for increased visibility. For example, 41
percent of the transit agencies we surveyed have required their
personnel to wear photo identification cards at all times since
September 11.
* Increased emergency drills: Many agencies have increased the
frequency of emergency drilling--both full-scale drills and tabletop
exercises. For example, one agency we visited has conducted four drills
since September 11. Agencies stressed the importance of emergency
drilling as a means to test their emergency plans, identify problems,
and develop corrective actions. Figure 6 is a photograph from an annual
emergency drill conducted by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority.
Figure 6: Emergency Drill in Progress:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* Revised emergency plans: Agencies reviewed their emergency plans to
determine what changes, if any, needed to be made. For example, 48
percent of the agencies we surveyed, regardless of the size of
urbanized area served, created or revised their emergency plans after
September 11. In addition, some agencies we visited updated their
emergency plans to include terrorist incident protocols and response
plans.
* Additional training: Agencies participated in and conducted
additional training on antiterrorism. For example, all 10 of the
agencies we visited had participated in the antiterrorism seminars
sponsored by FTA or the American Public Transportation Association.
Similarly, 59 percent of all transit agencies we surveyed reported
having attended security seminars or conferences since September 11.
Transit Agencies Also Adopt Innovative Practices to Enhance Safety and
Security:
Some of the agencies we visited have also implemented innovative
practices in recent years to increase their safety, security, and
preparedness in emergency situations.[Footnote 12] Through our
discussions with transit agencies, we identified some innovative safety
and security measures, including the following:
* Police officers trained to drive buses: Capital Metro in Austin,
Texas, trained some of the city police officers to drive transit buses
during emergencies. The police officers received driver training and
were licensed to drive the buses. If emergencies require buses to enter
a dangerous environment, these trained police officers, instead of
transit agency employees, will drive the buses.
* Training tunnel constructed: The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority constructed an off-site duplicate tunnel, complete with
railcars, tracks, and switches, to simulate an emergency environment
for training purposes. (See fig. 7.):
* Employee suggestion program implemented: New York City Transit
implemented an employee suggestion program to solicit security
improvement ideas. If an employee‘s suggestion is adopted, he or she
receives a day of paid leave.
Figure 7: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority‘s Training
Tunnel:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Federal Government‘s Role in Transit Security Is Evolving:
The federal government‘s role in transit security is evolving. FTA has
expanded its role in transit security since September 11 by launching a
multipart security initiative and increasing the funding for its safety
and security activities. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act gave TSA responsibility for transit security; however,
TSA‘s role and responsibilities have not yet been defined. Although the
transit agencies we visited were generally pleased with FTA‘s
assistance since September 11, they would like the federal government
to provide more assistance, including more information and funding. As
the federal government‘s role in transit safety and security
initiatives evolves, policymakers will need to address several issues,
including (1) the roles of stakeholders in funding transit security,
(2) federal funding criteria, (3) goals and performance indicators for
the federal government‘s efforts, and (4) the appropriate federal
policy instrument to deliver assistance deemed appropriate.
FTA Has Limited Authority but Has Initiated a Variety of Transit Safety
and Security Activities:
FTA has limited authority to regulate and oversee safety and security
at transit agencies. According to statute, FTA cannot regulate safety
and security operations at transit agencies.[Footnote 13] FTA may,
however, institute nonregulatory safety and security activities,
including safety-and security-related training, research, and
demonstration projects. In addition, FTA may promote safety and
security through its grant-making authority. Specifically, FTA may
stipulate conditions of grants, such as certain safety and security
statutory and regulatory requirements, and FTA may withhold funds for
noncompliance with the conditions of a grant.[Footnote 14] For example,
transit agencies must spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula
funds on security improvements.[Footnote 15] FTA is to verify that
agencies comply with this requirement and may withhold funding from
agencies that it finds are not in compliance.[Footnote 16] FTA
officials stated that FTA‘s authority to sponsor nonregulatory
activities and to stipulate the conditions of grants is sufficient for
the safety and security work they need to accomplish.[Footnote 17]
Despite its limited authority, FTA had established a number of safety
and security programs before September 11. For example, FTA offered
voluntary security assessments, sponsored training at the
Transportation Safety Institute, issued written guidelines to improve
emergency response planning, and partially funded a chemical detection
demonstration project, called PROTECT, at the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority. Although FTA maintained both safety and
security programs before September 11, its primary focus was on the
safety rather than the security programs. This focus changed after
September 11.
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, FTA launched a
multipart transit security initiative last fall. The initiative
includes security assessments, planning, drilling, training, and
technology:
* Security assessments: FTA deployed teams to assess security at 36
transit agencies. FTA chose the 36 agencies on the basis of their
ridership, vulnerability, and the potential consequences of an
attack.[Footnote 18] Each assessment included a threat and
vulnerability analysis, an evaluation of security and emergency plans,
and a focused review of the agency‘s unified command structure with
external emergency responders. FTA completed the assessments in late
summer 2002.
* Emergency response planning: FTA is providing technical assistance to
60 transit agencies on security and emergency plans and emergency
response drills.
* Emergency response drills: FTA offered transit agencies grants up to
$50,000 for organizing and conducting emergency preparedness drills.
According to FTA officials, FTA has awarded $3.4 million to over 80
transit agencies through these grants.
Security training: FTA is offering free emergency preparedness and
security training to transit agencies through its Connecting
Communities Forums. These forums are being offered throughout the
country and are designed to bring together small-and medium-sized
transit agency personnel with their local emergency responders, like
local firefighters and police officers. The purpose of the forums is to
give the participants a better understanding of the roles played by
transit agencies and emergency responders and to allow the participants
to begin developing the plans, tools, and relationships necessary to
respond effectively in an emergency. In addition, FTA is working with
the National Transit Institute and the Transportation Safety Institute
to expand safety and security course offerings. For example, the
National Transit Institute is now offering a security awareness course
to front line transit employees free of charge.
Research and development: FTA increased the funding for its safety-and
security-related technology research and has accelerated the deployment
of the PROTECT system.
FTA also increased expenditures on its safety and security activities
after the attacks of September 11. To pay for its multipart security
initiative, FTA reprioritized fiscal year 2002 funds from its other
programs and used a portion of the Department of Defense and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2002 (DOD supplemental), which
provided $23.5 million for transit security purposes.[Footnote 19]
Specifically, FTA will put about $18.7 million of the DOD supplemental
toward its multipart security initiative.[Footnote 20] As a result of
these actions, FTA‘s expenditures on its safety and security activities
has increased significantly in recent years. As figure 8 shows, if FTA
receives the amount of funding it requested for fiscal year 2003,
FTA‘s:
expenditures on safety and security activities will more than double
since fiscal year 2000--increasing from $8.1 million to $17.9
million.[Footnote 21]
Figure 8: FTA‘s Expenditures on Safety and Security Activities, 2000-
2003:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Data include actual and planned expenditures on program
activities and oversight. It does not include funding for grant
programs.
[End of figure]
TSA‘s Role in Transit Security Is Evolving:
TSA is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation,
including transit. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created
TSA within the Department of Transportation and defined its primary
responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of
transportation.[Footnote 22] The act also gives TSA regulatory
authority over transit security, which FTA does not possess. Since its
creation last November, TSA has primarily focused on improving aviation
security in order to meet the deadlines established in the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act. As a result, TSA has not yet exerted full
responsibility for security in other modes of transportation, such as
transit.
TSA‘s role in transit security is evolving. For transit security, the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act does not specify TSA‘s role
and responsibilities as it did for aviation security.[Footnote 23] For
example, the act does not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain
transit security requirements. Similarly, although the President‘s
National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the federal
government will work with the private sector to upgrade security in all
modes of transportation and utilize existing modal relationships and
systems to implement unified, national standards for transportation
security, it does not outline TSA‘s or the Department of Homeland
Security‘s role in transit security.[Footnote 24] TSA will be
transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as part of the
recently passed Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).
To define its roles and responsibilities in transit security, TSA is
currently working with FTA to develop a memorandum of
agreement.[Footnote 25] According to FTA and TSA officials, the
memorandum of agreement will define the roles and responsibilities of
each agency as they relate to transit security and address a variety of
issues, including separating safety and security activities,
establishing national standards, interfacing with transit agencies, and
establishing funding priorities. For example, TSA officials said they
expect to mandate a set of national standards for transit security.
Consequently, the memorandum of agreement would articulate the roles
and responsibilities of TSA and FTA in establishing these standards.
TSA and FTA have not finalized the timetable for issuing the memorandum
of agreement. TSA and FTA officials originally planned to issue the
memorandum of agreement in September 2002. However, according to FTA
officials, the issuance was delayed so that the memorandum could
incorporate and reflect the administration‘s fiscal year 2004 budget
request. According to TSA officials, FTA and TSA would like to issue
the memorandum of agreement by January 2003. Although TSA and FTA are
informally coordinating transit security issues, the memorandum of
agreement will formalize their relationship, help prevent duplication
of effort, and help TSA manage the shared responsibilities involved in
securing the nation‘s transportation system.
Transit Agencies Said the Federal Government Should Provide More
Information and Assistance:
The transit agencies we visited were generally pleased with the
assistance FTA has provided since September 11. Officials from these
agencies added, however, that the federal government could do more in
helping them secure their transit systems. They suggested, for example,
that the federal government provide additional information on a number
of issues, invest more in security-related research and development,
help obtain security clearances, and supply increased funding for
security improvements.
Officials from the transit agencies we visited reported a need for the
federal government to disseminate additional information on topics
ranging from available federal grants to appropriate security levels
for individual agencies. A recurring theme was for the federal
government to establish a clearinghouse or similar mechanism that
maintains and disseminates this type of information. Specifically,
officials expressed a need for the federal government to provide
additional information on the following topics:
* Intelligence: Transit officials from a number of agencies stated that
the federal government should provide additional information on threats
to their transit agencies or cities. Officials also commented that
’real time“ information on attacks against other transit agencies would
be useful.
* Best practices: A number of officials said that information on
transit security best practices would be beneficial. According to FTA
officials, the assessments of the 36 transit agencies are helping them
identify best practices.
* Federal grants: Officials from several transit agencies suggested
that information on available grants that can be used for transit
safety and security improvements would be useful, noting that locating
these grants is challenging and time consuming. For example, an
assistant general manager stated that she spends too much of her time
searching the Internet for grants available for transit.
* Level of security: Transit officials from a few agencies told us that
it would be helpful for the federal government to provide information
on the appropriate level of security for their agencies. For example,
officials at one agency questioned whether they needed to continue to
post guards--24 hours a day, 7 days a week--at the entrance and exit of
their tunnel, a practice instituted when the Department of
Transportation issued a threat advisory to the transit industry in May
2002. Similarly, our survey results indicate that determining the
appropriate level of security is a challenge for transit agencies.
* Cutting-edge technology: Officials from a number of agencies said
that the federal government should provide information on the latest
security technologies. For example, officials from one agency said that
such information is needed because they have been bombarded by vendors
selling security technology since September 11; however, the officials
said they were unsure about the quality of the products, whether the
products were needed, or whether the products would be outdated next
year.
* Decontamination practices: Several transit agency officials expressed
a need for information on decontamination protocols. For example, one
agency official noted that information is needed on how to determine if
the system is ’clean“ after a chemical or biological attack.
According to FTA officials, FTA is developing two mechanisms to better
disseminate information on intelligence, best practices, and security-
related issues to transit agencies. First, FTA is launching a new
secure Web site to post best practices and allow for the exchange of
security-related information. In September 2002, FTA invited 100
transit agencies to register to use this Web site, which utilizes the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) secure Web site technology called
Infragard. Second, FTA is funding the transit Information Sharing and
Analysis Center, which will disseminate intelligence information to
transit agencies. The Center will initially be available for the
largest 50 agencies. The schedules for launching or expanding the
Center to other transit agencies have not been established.
Officials from several of the agencies we met with also said that the
federal government should be investing more in security-related
research and development. Agency officials noted that individual
transit agencies do not have the resources to devote to research and
development. Moreover, the officials said this is an appropriate role
for the federal government, since the products of research and
development endeavors should benefit the entire transit community, not
just individual agencies. FTA‘s Office of Technology is currently the
agency‘s focal point for research and development and is responsible
for identifying and supporting technological innovations, including
safety and security innovations. According to FTA documents, the Office
of Technology‘s obligations for safety and security technologies have
increased from $680,000 in fiscal year 2000 to an estimated $1.1
million in fiscal year 2002. FTA‘s fiscal year 2003 budget request
includes about $4.2 million for the Office of Technology‘s safety and
security technologies, representing a 272-percent increase from fiscal
year 2002. FTA is also conducting 13 research projects on a variety of
security-related issues, such as updating its guide for security
planning, developing material for a security awareness campaign, and
working on decontamination procedures for public transportation.
A number of transit officials also expressed a need for the federal
government to help them obtain security clearances. As we have reported
in our previous work on homeland security, state and local officials
have characterized their lack of security clearances as a barrier to
obtaining critical intelligence information.[Footnote 26] The
inability to receive any classified threat information could hamper
transit agencies‘ emergency preparedness capability as it apparently
did at one of the transit agencies we visited. In this agency‘s city, a
bomb threat was made against a major building, but because the transit
agency officials did not have the necessary security clearances, the
FBI did not inform them of this threat until about 40 minutes before
the agency was asked to help evacuate the building. According to
transit agency officials, the lack of advance notice negatively
affected their agency‘s ability to respond, even though, in this case,
the threat was not carried out. Proposed legislation (H.R. 3483)
provides that the Attorney General expeditiously grant security
clearances to governors who apply for them and to state and local
officials who participate in federal counterterrorism working groups or
regional task forces. FTA has offered to help transit agencies join
their local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force to better access
intelligence information, but it has not made assisting transit
agencies
with security clearances part of their security activities.[Footnote
27]
Officials from the transit agencies we visited also said that
additional federal funding is needed. As noted earlier, many of the
transit agencies we visited are experiencing tightened budgets, which
make it more difficult for them to fund safety and security needs.
Moreover, according to our survey results, insufficient funding is the
most significant obstacle agencies face in trying to make their systems
more safe and secure. The Congress has already made additional funding
available for transit security purposes--about $23.5 million through
the fiscal year 2002 DOD supplemental. FTA‘s fiscal year 2003 budget
request also includes $17.9 million for safety and security
expenditures.
Critical Decisions Remain about the Federal Government‘s Role in
Funding Transit Security Improvements:
Important funding decisions for transit safety and security initiatives
remain. Due to the expense of security enhancements and transit
agencies‘ tight budget environments, the federal government is likely
to be viewed as a source of funding for at least some of these
enhancements. These improvements join the growing list of security
initiatives competing for federal assistance. Based on our past work on
homeland security issues, site visits to transit agencies, and survey
results, we believe that several issues will need to be addressed when
the federal government‘s role in funding transit safety and security
initiatives is considered. These issues include (1) determining the
roles of stakeholders in funding transit security, (2) developing an
approach to distribute federal funds, (3) establishing goals and
performance indicators for the federal government‘s efforts, and (4)
selecting the appropriate federal policy instrument to deliver
assistance.
The roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in funding transit
safety and security need to be determined. Since all levels of
government and the private sector are concerned about transit safety
and security, determining who should finance security activities may be
difficult. Some of the benefits of transit systems, such as employment
and reduced congestion, remain within the locality or region. In
addition, private companies that own transit systems could directly
benefit from security measures because steps designed to thwart
terrorists could also prevent others from stealing goods or causing
other kinds of economic damage. Given the importance of transit to our
nation‘s economic infrastructure, some have argued that the federal
government should help pay for protective measures for transit. Transit
officials we spoke with said that the federal government should provide
additional funding for security needs. Fifty-nine percent of transit
agencies in large-and small-urbanized areas responding to our survey
said they plan to use federal funds to pay for their top three security
priorities. Additionally, TSA and FTA officials said they would seek
additional resources for transit security.[Footnote 28] The current
authorizing legislation for federal surface transportation programs,
TEA-21, expires on September 30, 2003. The reauthorization of TEA-21
provides an opportunity to examine stakeholders‘ roles and
responsibilities for transit security, including federal funding
responsibilities.
Since requests for funding transit security improvements will likely
exceed available resources, an approach for distributing the federal
dollars is needed. Transit agency officials we met with identified a
number of possible federal funding criteria, including ridership
levels, the population of the city the transit agency serves,
identified vulnerabilities of the agency, the potential for mass
casualties, and assets of the agency (e.g., tunnels and bridges). In
general, the transit agency officials we spoke with believed the
federal government should direct its dollars to agencies that are most
at risk or most vulnerable to a terrorist attack--a criterion
consistent with a risk management approach. A risk management approach
is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the
criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key
decisions linking resources with prioritized efforts for results.
Figure 9 illustrates that the highest risks and priorities emerge where
the three parts of a risk management approach overlap. For example,
transit infrastructure that is determined to be a critical asset,
vulnerable to attack, and a likely target would be at most risk and
therefore would be a higher priority for funding compared with
infrastructure that was only vulnerable to attack.
Figure 9: Diagram of a Risk Management Approach:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
We have advocated using a risk management approach to guide federal
programs and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other
threats and to better direct finite national resources to areas of
highest:
priority.[Footnote 29] FTA and TSA have not developed funding criteria
or an approach to distribute funding for transit security. However, the
agencies have the needed information to apply a risk management
approach. For example, FTA obtains threat information from a variety of
sources, including the FBI, and is in the process of identifying the
most critical transit infrastructure. In addition, FTA has
vulnerability information from the security assessments it recently
performed. Moreover, according to TSA officials, TSA used a risk
management approach to recently distribute grants to seaports and is
researching best practices for using risk management assessments.
In addition to a funding approach, goals and performance indicators
need to be established to guide the federal government‘s efforts in
transit security. These critical components can influence all
decisions--from launching new initiatives to allocating resources--as
well as measure progress and ensure accountability. The Congress has
long recognized the need to objectively assess the results of federal
programs, passing the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
(commonly referred to as the Results Act). The Results Act required
agencies to set strategic and annual goals, measure performance, and
report on the degree to which goals are met. However, goals or outcomes
of where the nation should be in terms of transit security or other
national security programs have yet to be defined. For example, as we
reported this summer, the National Strategy for Homeland Security does
not establish a baseline set of performance goals and measures for
assessing and improving preparedness.[Footnote 30] Moreover, the goals
and measures for transit safety and security in the Department of
Transportation‘s current strategic plan were developed before September
11 and focus more on safety and crime than on terrorism. Consequently,
they do not reflect today‘s realities or the changing role of the
federal government in transit security. Given the recent and proposed
increases in security funding, such as the DOD supplemental that
provided about $23.5 million for transit security, as well as the need
for real and meaningful improvements in preparedness, establishing
clear goals is critical to ensuring both a successful and a fiscally
responsible effort. Moreover, performance indicators are needed to
track progress toward these established goals.
Another important consideration is the design of policy instruments to
deliver assistance. Our previous work on federal programs suggests that
the choice and design of policy instruments have important consequences
for performance and accountability. The federal government has a
variety of policy tools, including grants, loan guarantees,
regulations, tax incentives, and partnerships, to motivate or mandate
state and local governments or the private sector to help address
security concerns. The choice and design of policy tools can enhance
the government‘s capacity to (1) target the areas of highest risk to
better ensure that scarce federal resources address the most pressing
needs, (2) promote the sharing of responsibilities among all parties,
and (3) track and assess progress toward achieving national goals.
Regardless of the tool selected, specific safeguards and clear
accountability requirements, such as documentation of the terms and
conditions of federal participation, are needed to protect federal
interests.
Conclusions:
Securing the nation‘s transit system is not a short-term or easy task.
Many challenges must be overcome. FTA and the transit agencies we
visited have made a good start in enhancing transit security, but more
work is needed. Transit agencies‘ calls for increased federal funding
for security needs join the list of competing claims for federal
dollars and, as a result, difficult trade-offs will have to be made.
Since requests for federal assistance will undoubtedly exceed available
resources, criteria will be needed for determining which transit
security improvements merit any additional federal funds. To ensure
that finite resources are directed to the areas of highest priority,
the criteria should be in line with a risk management approach. In
addition to helping distribute funds, establishing a risk-based funding
approach would inform congressional decision making and demonstrate to
the Congress that the funds will be managed efficiently. Moreover, as
the federal government‘s role in transit security expands--whether
through additional funding or the setting of national standards by TSA-
-it is important that goals and performance indicators are established
to guide the government‘s efforts in transit security.[Footnote 31]
These components are needed to ensure accountability and results.
The upcoming reauthorization of the surface transportation authorizing
legislation provides an opportunity to examine the role of the federal
government, including its funding responsibilities, in transit
security. However, transit agencies cannot wait for the new authorizing
legislation to implement transit security improvements and are moving
forward with improvements to enhance the security of their system and
passengers. The federal government could assist transit agencies as
they press forward with their security initiatives by allowing all
transit agencies, regardless of the size of the population it serves,
to use urbanized area formula funds for security-related operating
expenses. Although eliminating the prohibition on urbanized area funds
would not provide additional funding, it would give agencies increased
flexibility in financing transit security enhancements so that they
could decide, for example, to use their federal dollars to pay for
additional security patrols instead of a new rail car. This additional
flexibility would be especially helpful given the high costs of transit
security improvements and the declining revenues of many agencies.
Additionally, the Department of Transportation could help transit
agency officials obtain timely intelligence information so that they
can make better informed decisions about their agency‘s emergency
planning and response. The transit Information Sharing and Analysis
Center is a positive step in providing some transit agencies timely
intelligence information. The Department of Transportation could take
other steps as well, including helping transit agency officials obtain
security clearances, to further enhance the sharing of critical
intelligence information to transit agencies.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To provide transit agencies greater flexibility in paying for transit
security improvements, we recommend that the Secretary of
Transportation consider seeking a legislative change to allow all
transit agencies, regardless of the size of the urbanized area they
serve, to use federal urbanized area formula funds for security-related
operating expenses. To discourage the replacement of state and local
funds with federal funds, any legislative change should include a
requirement that transit agencies maintain their level of previous
funding.
To help transit agencies enhance transit security, to guide federal
dollars to the highest priority, and to ensure accountability and
results of the federal government‘s efforts in transit security, we
also recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following
actions:
* Develop and implement strategies to help transit agency officials
obtain timely intelligence information, including helping transit
agency officials obtain security clearances.
* Develop clear, concise, transparent criteria for distributing federal
funds to transit agencies for security improvements. The criteria
should correspond to a risk management approach so that federal dollars
are directed to the areas of highest priority.
* Establish goals and performance indicators for the department‘s
transit security efforts in order to promote accountability and ensure
results.
Agency Comments:
We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this
report for review and comment. Department of Transportation officials,
including the Deputy Administrator of the Federal Transit
Administration, provided oral comments on the draft on November 22,
2002. The officials generally concurred with the report‘s findings and
conclusions. Moreover, they stated that the Department of
Transportation will carefully consider our recommendations as it
continues working to improve transit security. The officials also
provided two minor clarifications on TSA‘s authority over transit
security and the expected issuance date of the memorandum of agreement
between TSA and FTA, which we incorporated into the report.
We conducted our review from May through October 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of
this report to the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of
the Federal Transit Administration, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and interested congressional committees. We will
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report
will be available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by Peter Guerrero:
Peter Guerrero
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I GAO‘s Survey Instrument and Overall Results:
This appendix presents our survey instrument and overall results.
Unless otherwise noted, we report the number of respondents for each
question and the weighted percentage of respondents who selected each
answer for each question.
[See PDF for image]
[End of section]
Appendix II Scope and Methodology:
To address our objectives, we visited 10 transit agencies across the
country, including the Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority in
Austin; Chicago Transit Authority; Central Florida Regional Transit
Authority in Orlando; Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority; Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Council; New York City
Transit; Regional Transportation District in Denver; San Francisco Bay
Area Rapid Transit; San Francisco Municipal Railway; and Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority in the District of Columbia. We
selected these agencies because they represent different geographical
areas and operate transit systems of different sizes and modes. (See
fig. 10 and table 1.) During our site visits, we interviewed key
officials from the transit agencies and the respective city governments
and reviewed the transit agencies‘ emergency plans.
Figure 10: Location of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Table 1: Profiles of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited, 2000:
Transit agency: Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority (CMTA);
Urban area served: Austin, TX; Population
served[A]: 604,621; Service area (sq. miles): 572; Services provided:
Heavy rail: ; Services provided: Light rail: ; Services provided:
Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday unlinked
trips[C]: 130,640.
Transit agency: Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority
(LYNX); Urban area served: Orlando, FL; Population
served[A]: 1,357,852; Service area (sq. miles): 2,538; Services
provided: Heavy rail: ; Services provided: Light rail: ; Services
provided: Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday
unlinked trips[C]: 70,546.
Transit agency: Chicago Transit Authority (CTA); Urban area served:
Chicago, IL--Northwestern IN; Population
served[A]: 3,708,773; Service area (sq. miles): 356; Services provided:
Heavy rail: x; Services provided: Light rail: ; Services provided:
Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday unlinked
trips[C]: 1,562,105.
Transit agency: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (LACMTA); Urban area served: Los Angeles, CA; Population
served[A]: 8,450,001; Service area (sq. miles): 1,423; Services
provided: Heavy rail: x; Services provided: Light rail: x; Services
provided: Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: ; Average weekday
unlinked trips[C]: 1,281,375.
Transit agency: Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Council (Metro
Transit); Urban area served: Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN; Population
served[A]: 2,265,788; Service area (sq. miles): 1,105; Services
provided: Heavy rail: ; Services provided: Light rail: ; Services
provided: Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: ; Average weekday
unlinked trips[C]: 243,987.
Transit agency: New York City Transit (NYCT); Urban area served: New
York, NY--Northeastern NJ; Population
served[A]: 7,322,000; Service area (sq. miles): 322; Services provided:
Heavy rail: x; Services provided: Light rail: ; Services provided:
Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday unlinked
trips[C]: 8,206,391.
Transit agency: Regional Transportation District (RTD); Urban area
served: Denver, CO; Population
served[A]: 2,400,000; Service area (sq. miles): 2,406; Services
provided: Heavy rail: ; Services provided: Light rail: x; Services
provided: Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday
unlinked trips[C]: 259,703.
Transit agency: San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART);
Urban area served: San Francisco--Oakland, CA; Population
served[A]: 829,156; Service area (sq. miles): 103; Services provided:
Heavy rail: x; Services provided: Light rail: ; Services provided:
Bus: ; Services provided: Other[B]: ; Average weekday unlinked
trips[C]: 310,268.
Transit agency: San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI); Urban area
served: San Francisco--Oakland, CA; Population
served[A]: 792,049; Service area (sq. miles): 49; Services provided:
Heavy rail: ; Services provided: Light rail: x; Services provided:
Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday unlinked
trips[C]: 713,266.
Transit agency: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA);
Urban area served: Washington, D.C.--MD--VA; Population
served[A]: 3,363,031; Service area (sq. miles): 945; Services provided:
Heavy rail: x; Services provided: Light rail: ; Services provided:
Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday unlinked
trips[C]: 1,169,806.
[A] Population information comes from 1990 census data.
[B] ’Other“ includes trolleybus, cable car, demand response, and
vanpool.
[C] Unlinked trips are the number of passengers who board public
transportation vehicles. Passengers are counted each time they board
vehicles no matter how many vehicles they use to travel from their
origin to their destination. :
Source: National Transit Database.
[End of table]
In addition to our site visits, we surveyed a sample of 200 transit
agencies. The sample from which we drew our population consisted of all
transit agencies throughout the nation that are eligible to receive
federal urbanized area formula funding, according to the most up-to-
date list of eligible agencies provided by the National Transit
Database. The results of our mail survey are generalizable to this
population, which we refer to as our sample population.
We stratified our sample population into two groups--agencies that
serve urbanized areas with a population of 200,000 or more (large
urbanized areas); and agencies that serve urbanized areas with a
population of 50,000 to 199,999 (small urbanized areas). We
distinguished between these two strata because agencies that operate in
large urbanized areas are prohibited from using federal urbanized area
formula funds for operating expenses, whereas agencies in small
urbanized areas are not prohibited from using FTA funds for operating
expenses. We randomly selected 100 agencies from each stratum to
survey.
Our overall survey response rate was 78 percent. However, we excluded 9
surveys from our analysis after determining that these transit agencies
were outside the scope of our review for one of the following reasons:
they had gone out of business (3); they were subsidiaries of other
agencies included in our sample (2); or they did not provide bus,
customized community transport, rail, subway, or ferryboat services
(e.g., they only provide vanpool service) (4). The reported survey
results are based on the responses of the subpopulation of 146 agencies
within the scope of our review.
To help design our survey instrument, we reviewed surveys on transit
safety and security conducted by FTA, the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA), and the Transportation Cooperative
Research Program. We also obtained input from Department of
Transportation, FTA, and transit agency officials; and representatives
from APTA and the Mineta Transportation Institute. After developing the
survey instrument, we pretested the content and format of the survey
with officials from several transit agencies and made necessary
revisions. All returned questionnaires were reviewed, and we called
respondents to obtain information when questions were not answered or
clarification was needed. All data were double-keyed and verified
during data entry, and computer analyses were performed to identify any
inconsistencies or other indications of error. A copy of the mail
questionnaire is included in appendix I.
All sample surveys are subject to sampling error--that is, the extent
to which the survey results differ from what would have been obtained
if the whole population had been observed. Measures of sampling error
are defined by two elements, the width of the confidence intervals
around the estimate (sometimes called the precision of the estimate)
and the confidence level at which the intervals are computed. Because
we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our
sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have
drawn. Moreover, because each sample could have provided different
estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular
sample‘s results as a 95-percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or
minus 5 percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the
actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have
drawn. As a result, we are 95-percent confident that the confidence
intervals for each of the mail survey questions includes the true
values in the sample population.
All percentage estimates from the mail survey have sampling errors of
plus or minus 10 percentage points or less, unless otherwise noted. In
addition, other potential sources of error associated with surveys,
such as misinterpretation of a question and nonresponse, may be
present, although nonresponse errors should be minimal.
Finally, in addition to our site visits and survey, we analyzed agency
documents and interviewed transit agency officials, industry
representatives, and academic experts. We analyzed FTA budget data,
safety and security documents, and applicable statutes and regulations.
We reviewed research on terrorism and attended transit security forums
sponsored by APTA and FTA. Finally, we interviewed FTA, TSA, and
Department of Transportation officials and representatives from APTA,
the National Governors Association, the Mineta Transportation
Institute, RAND Corporation, the University of California at Los
Angeles, and the Amalgamated Transit Union.
We conducted our review from May through October 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III Selected Survey Results:
This appendix provides our analysis of the responses we received to
selected questions from our survey of 200 transit agencies in the
United States. (See app. I for the overall survey results and our
survey instrument.) This analysis provides information about the
characteristics, including both general and safety-and security-
related characteristics, of the transit agencies surveyed. Differences
in the characteristics of transit agencies in large urbanized areas
(populations of 200,000 or more) and transit agencies in small
urbanized areas (populations between 50,0000 to 199,999) are also
presented.[Footnote 32]
Services Provided by Transit Agencies Surveyed:
The transit agencies we surveyed provide a variety of transit services,
including bus, rail, and ferryboat. Although a mix of services is
provided by the surveyed transit agencies, bus is by far the most
common transit service provided. (See fig. 11.) Our survey results also
indicate that there are some differences between transit agencies in
large urbanized areas and transit agencies in small urbanized areas.
For example, transit agencies in large urbanized areas offer more types
of services than transit agencies in small urbanized areas.
Additionally, transit agencies in large urbanized areas were more
likely to provide rail services than transit agencies in small
urbanized areas and were the only agencies to provide subway service.
Figure 11: Types of Transit Services Offered by Surveyed Transit
Agencies:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Customized community transport is characterized by (1) vehicles
that do not usually operate over a fixed route or on a fixed schedule
and (2) vehicles that may be dispatched to pick up several passengers
at different pick-up points before taking them to their respective
destinations and may even be interrupted en route to these destinations
to pick up other passengers. For our survey, we classified paratransit
and demand response as forms of customized community transport.
[B] ’Other“ includes inclined plane service, connecting shuttle
service, vanpools, and special events service.
[End of figure]
Ridership of Transit Agencies Surveyed:
The transit agencies we surveyed reported that they provided almost 10
billion unlinked passenger trips[Footnote 33] in fiscal years 2000 and
2001. Specifically, according to the agencies, they provided a total of
4.7 billion unlinked passenger trips in fiscal year 2000 and 4.9
billion trips in fiscal year 2001. Our survey results also indicate
that transit agencies in large urbanized areas carry more passengers
than transit agencies in small urbanized areas. For example, the
majority of transit agencies in small urbanized areas reported that
they provided fewer than 1 million passenger trips in fiscal year 2001,
while the majority of transit agencies in large urbanized areas
provided more than 1 million passenger trips. Moreover, 7 percent of
the transit agencies in large urbanized areas stated that they provided
more than 100 million passenger trips in fiscal year 2001. No transit
agency that we surveyed in a small urbanized area served that number of
passengers. (See fig. 12.):
Figure 12: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Number of Unlinked
Passenger Trips in Fiscal Years 2000 - 2001:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Operating and Capital Budgets of Transit Agencies Surveyed:
According to our survey results, transit agencies in large urbanized
areas typically have bigger operating and capital budgets than transit
agencies in small urbanized areas. (See fig. 13.) In particular, 57
percent of the transit agencies in large urbanized areas have operating
budgets of more than $10 million, while 10 percent of transit agencies
in small urbanized areas have operating budgets of comparable size.
Additionally, 32 percent of the transit agencies in large urbanized
areas have capital budgets of more than $10 million. In comparison,
none of the transit agencies in small urbanized areas that we surveyed
had capital budgets of that magnitude.[Footnote 34]
Figure 13: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Size of Their
Operating and Capital Budgets, Fiscal Year 2001:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
[End of figure]
Security of Transit Agencies Surveyed:
Most transit agencies we surveyed either contract with a security
service (35 percent) and/or have established agreements with local or
state police (34 percent) to provide security for their property.
However, our survey did reveal some differences between transit
agencies in large and small urbanized areas in terms of their transit
properties‘ security, as shown in figure 14. For example, of the
transit agencies we surveyed, only those agencies in large urbanized
areas had their own transit police officers.
Figure 14: Types of Security Used by Transit Agencies in Large and
Small Urbanized Areas:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Funding Sources for Transit Safety and Security Needs of Transit
Agencies Surveyed:
Our survey results show that all transit agencies we surveyed rely on a
variety of federal, state, and local sources to fund safety and
security expenses. As figure 15 shows, transit agencies in large and
small urbanized areas identified local funds as the most common source
of funding for safety and security operating expenses. A notable
difference between transit agencies in large and small urbanized areas
appears in their use of FTA funds. In particular, 62 percent of
agencies in small urbanized areas identified FTA funds as a source of
funds for safety and security operating expenses, while 23 percent of
agencies in large urbanized areas identified this as a source. In
contrast to safety and security operating expenses, we found that the
most common source of funds for safety and security capital expenses is
FTA funds. (See fig. 16.):
Figure 15: Sources of Funds for Operating Expenses Used by Transit
Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 16: Sources of Funds for Capital Expenses Used by Transit
Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Acts of Extreme Violence against Transit Agencies Surveyed:
The majority of the transit agencies we surveyed do not believe they
are likely targets for acts of extreme violence. In particular, 62
percent of transit agencies we surveyed believe they are unlikely or
very unlikely to be the target of an act of extreme violence in the
next 5 years. By contrast, 6 percent of the transit agencies we
surveyed consider the likelihood of an act of extreme violence on their
property likely or very likely. Thirty-one percent of the transit
agencies we surveyed believe they are as likely as not to experience an
act of extreme violence on their property in the next 5 years.
In addition, the majority of the transit agencies we surveyed have not
experienced an act of extreme violence on their property in the past 5
years. Specifically, 66 percent of the transit agencies we surveyed
said that they have not experienced acts of extreme violence on their
systems. However, the agencies that have experienced acts of extreme
violence have encountered a variety of situations. (See fig. 17.):
Figure 17: Acts of Extreme Violence during the Past 5 Years at Transit
Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Surveyed Transit Agencies‘ Safety and Security Assessments:
Seventy-five percent of the transit agencies we surveyed have conducted
an assessment of their transit system. As figure 18 shows, the majority
of the assessments have focused on general safety and security issues,
not necessarily on the transit systems vulnerability to a terrorist
threat or act of extreme violence. Seventy-seven percent of the
agencies reported that their assessments have identified items needing
action; however, the majority of these agencies indicated that a
variety of factors have limited their ability to resolve the identified
problems. According to these transit agencies, insufficient funding,
the need to balance security and safety priorities with other
priorities, and insufficient staff time or availability to complete
action items were the top reasons why identified needs have not been
addressed.
Figure 18: Types of Assessments Performed by Transit Agencies:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Emergency Plans of Transit Agencies Surveyed:
Sixty-six percent of all surveyed agencies have emergency plans. In
general, our survey results indicate that the majority of the agencies‘
emergency plans describe protocols for a number of emergency
situations, such as natural disasters, reported bomb threats, and
explosive devices. Moreover, our survey results also indicate that the
majority of all agencies‘ plans specify coordination with other
entities, such as local police departments, and most agencies have
shared their plans with other entities.
However, our survey results reveal that transit agencies in large
urbanized areas have more comprehensive emergency plans than agencies
in small urbanized areas, in terms of both the level of coordination
with other entities and the number of scenarios addressed by the
plans.[Footnote 35] For example, as figure 19 shows, the emergency
plans of agencies in large urbanized areas specify coordination with
the media more often than plans of agencies in small urbanized areas.
Furthermore, as figure 20 shows, the emergency plans of agencies in
large urbanized areas address more emergency situations--such as an
explosive device on the transit property--than the emergency plans of
agencies in small urbanized areas.
Figure 19: Types of Coordination Specified in Transit Agencies‘
Emergency Plans:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 20: Types of Emergency Situations Addressed in Transit Agencies‘
Emergency Plans:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Peter Guerrero, (202) 512-2834
Susan Fleming, (202) 512-4431:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Karin Bolwahnn, Nikki Clowers,
Michelle Dresben, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Michele Fejfar, David Hooper,
Wyatt R. Hundrup, Hiroshi Ishikawa, and Sara Ann Moessbauer made key
contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Congressional Research Service, Transportation Issues in the 107th
Congress, (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2002).
[2] The federal urbanized area formula program provides federal funds
to urbanized areas (jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more)
for transit capital investments, operating expenses, and
transportation-related planning.
[3] According to the American Public Transportation Association, its
2000 ridership data are preliminary.
[4] 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5330.
[5] P.L. No. 105-178 (1998). TEA-21 is the current authorizing
legislation for federal transit programs.
[6] 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5307 (d)(1)(J)(i) and (ii).
[7] Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, P.L. 97-424.
[8] Specifically, urbanized areas with populations over 1 million could
use up to 80 percent of their urbanized area formula funds for
operating expenses; urbanized areas with populations between 200,000
and 1 million could use up to 90 percent; and urbanized areas with
populations of less than 200,000 could use up to 95 percent.
[9] Congress, as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), established the Mineta Transportation
Institute. The Institute focuses on international surface
transportation policy issues as related to three primary
responsibilities: research, education, and technology transfer.
[10] Because about 40 percent of the transit agencies we surveyed could
not provide cost estimates for their identified safety and security
needs, we cannot provide an aggregated estimate for the surveyed
transit agencies.
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in
Securing Transit Systems, GAO-02-1075T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18,
2002); U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Effective
Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to Success, GAO-02-1011T
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2002); and U.S. General Accounting Office,
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and
Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy
for Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002).
[12] All of these practices, except for New York‘s program, were
implemented before September 11, 2001.
[13] 49 U.S.C. sec. 5324(c).
[14] 49 U.S.C. sec. 5324(c) and 49 U.S.C. sec. 5330.
[15] 49 U.S.C. sec. 5307(d) (1)(J)(i) and (ii).
[16] According to FTA officials, FTA verifies that agencies spend at
least 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds on security
improvements during its triennial review. FTA‘s triennial review is a
full review and evaluation of grantees‘ performance in carrying out
projects, including specific references to compliance with statutory
and administration requirements.
[17] FTA also has authority to enter into ’other agreements“ with
transit agencies to introduce innovative methods for safety and
security on negotiated terms and conditions more favorable to
nonfederal participants than are authorized under FTA contracts,
grants, or cooperative agreements under 49 U.S.C. sec. 5312(d), and FTA
may work with other federal agencies in developing defenses and
responses to terrorist incidents.
[18] A professional team of antiterrorism, transit operations, and
emergency response experts conducted each assessment.
[19] Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States Act 2002 (P.L. 107-117, H.R. Conference Report 107-350). The DOD
supplemental also provided $39.1 million to the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority for region-wide security requirements, including
$5 million for protective clothing and breathing apparatus, $2.2
million for completion of the fiber optic network project, $15 million
for a chemical emergency sensor program, and $16.9 million for
increased employee and facility security. On August 2, 2002, the
President signed into law the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States (P.L.107-206, H.R. 4775), which set aside $15 million for grants
to enhance security for intercity bus operations.
[20] The remaining $4.8 million of the DOD supplemental was dedicated
to the replacement of buses and kiosks in New York destroyed in the
terrorist attacks.
[21] Budget data include FTA‘s actual and planned expenditures on
program activities and oversight. It does not include funding for grant
programs.
[22] P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[23] For more information on TSA‘s role in aviation security, see U.S.
General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Transportation Security
Administration Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges, GAO-02-
971T(Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002).
[24] The strategy states that the Department of Homeland Security will
coordinate closely with the Department of Transportation, which will
remain responsible for transportation safety.
[25] TSA is developing memorandums of agreement with all modal
administrations in the Department of Transportation.
[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Port Security: Nation Faces
Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2002); and U.S. General Accounting Office,
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership
Sought, GAO-02-490T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 2002).
[27] According to the Department of Transportation, the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act gives TSA the authority to disclose
sensitive security information to approved officials from federal,
state, and local governments and the private sector on a ’need to know“
basis, even if the officials do not have clearances.
[28] TSA will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security
as part of the recently enacted Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).
[29] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk
Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T
(Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001); and U.S. General Accounting
Office, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize and Target Program Investments, GAO/NSIAD-98-74.
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 1998).
[30] GAO-02-1011T.
[31] TSA will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security
as part of the recently enacted Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).
[32] Unless otherwise noted, all estimates by size of agency have
sampling errors of plus or minus 13 percentage points or less.
[33] Unlinked passenger trips are the number of passengers who board
public transportation vehicles. Passengers are counted each time they
board vehicles no matter how many vehicles they use to travel from
their origin to their destination.
[34] Depending on the fiscal year, between about one-third and two-
thirds of the agencies we surveyed could only provide estimates of the
amount of their total operating and capital funds that were spent on
safety and security activities. Furthermore, additional analysis raised
questions about data reliability. Therefore, we cannot reliably
determine the percentage of the agencies‘ capital and operating budgets
that are used for safety and security activities.
[35] In this section, estimates by size of agency have sampling errors
of plus or minus 16 percentage points or less.
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