Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots
Gao ID: GAO-02-822R June 28, 2002Although pilots and other crew members are currently prohibited from carrying weapons on-board aircraft, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act raises the possibility of arming pilots in the future. In responses to a congressional request, GAO provided information on reasons for and against allowing pilots to carry firearms in the cockpit; questions to be addressed if pilots were armed; and possible alternatives to arming pilots, such as providing them with less than lethal weapons. Proponents' and opponents' views on firearms in the cockpit fall into four categories: the potential effectiveness, risk, and cost-effectiveness of pilots carrying weapons, and policy issues that would arise if pilots were allowed to carry weapons. GAO concluded that without additional research, the potential benefits, risks, and costs of using weapons on aircraft cannot be fully determined.
GAO-02-822R, Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots
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June 28, 2002:
The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings:
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
Subject: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, legislation has
been enacted to enhance the nation‘s approach to aviation security.
Specifically, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and, among other actions,
federalized passenger and baggage screening staff at airports and
authorized the arming of commercial pilots, subject to the approval of
the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security and other
conditions. [Footnote 1] On May 21, 2002, the Under Secretary
testified that he would not approve the arming of commercial pilots
because he believed they must focus exclusively on flying the
aircraft. However, the question of arming pilots remains open because
H.R. 4635, introduced on May 1, 2002, would require TSA to establish a
program to arm pilots within 90 days of the bill‘s enactment. On June
19, 2002, the House Transportation and Infrastructure‘s Subcommittee
on Aviation passed an amended version of H.R. 4635 to:
* limit the maximum number of pilots participating in this pilot
program to 2 percent of the total number of pilots employed by air
carriers and:
* require that TSA address a number of procedural issues before
beginning the selection, training, and deputizing of pilots.
In addition, four other bills, introduced before the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act‘s enactment, include proposals to carry
weapons. [Footnote 2] (See enc. I for more detailed information.)
To facilitate congressional decision-making, you asked us to provide
information on (1) reasons for and against allowing pilots to carry
firearms in the cockpit; (2) questions to be addressed if pilots were
to be armed; and (3) possible alternatives to arming pilots, such as
providing them with less-than-lethal weapons. On May 20, 2002, we
briefed you on the results of our work. This report summarizes the
information we provided at that time.
To obtain the information you requested, we analyzed a docket of over
7,500 comments that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had
received by March 15, 2002, in response to a request for comments,
published in the Federal Register on December 31, 2001, [Footnote 3]
on whether pilots should be allowed to carry firearms in the cockpit.
[Footnote 4] Our analysis included all comments from airlines, trade
associations, unions, other advocacy groups, and aviation security
firms and a sample of comments from individuals. In addition, we
examined available research studies on the potential risks and
benefits of using firearms on aircraft and possible alternatives, such
as the use of less-than-lethal weapons. We identified only one study
that addressed the use of firearms on aircraft; this study focused on
structural damage to aircraft by ammunition and bombs. We also
examined a study by the National Institute of Justice, mandated by the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, on the potential use of less-
than- lethal weapons on aircraft. [Footnote 5] To obtain further
information, we interviewed industry aviation security experts on the
issue of arming pilots with firearms or less-than-lethal weapons.
Finally, we reviewed articles and position papers by airlines,
industry associations, pilot and flight attendant unions, and other
organizations. The detailed results of our analysis appear in
enclosures II, III, and IV. We performed our work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards in May and June 2002.
Results in Brief:
Without additional research, the potential benefits, risks, and costs
of using weapons on aircraft cannot be fully determined. Proponents‘
and opponents‘ views on allowing pilots to carry firearms in the
cockpit fell into four categories: the potential effectiveness, risk,
and cost-effectiveness of their carrying weapons, and the policy
issues that would arise if pilots were allowed to carry weapons. For
example, proponents saw arming pilots as a last line of defense if
other security measures failed, while opponents considered the current
security enhancements, such as improved screening and increases in the
number of federal air marshals, sufficient. Views also differed on
whether arming pilots with firearms would be effective or safe.
Proponents maintained that arming pilots would be more cost-effective
than other security enhancements, while opponents contrasted the
potentially high costs of the risks with the small benefits they
anticipated. Finally, views differed on the public policy implications
of arming pilots. Proponents cited the potential deterrent value of
firearms and past regulatory precedents for arming pilots (see enc.
I), whereas opponents cited the moral dilemma pilots would face if
they were prohibited from using firearms outside the cockpit and
passengers or crew members were being threatened in the cabin (see
enc. III). Opponents also said that arming pilots would introduce from
10,000 to 100,000 guns into our society. Enclosure II summarizes the
reasons for and against arming pilots that we obtained from our
analysis of FAA‘s docket and from our research and interviews.
If pilots were to be armed, a number of questions would need to be
resolved, such as (1) who would regulate and oversee pilots‘ carriage
of weapons; (2) what qualifications and training would pilots need to
carry weapons; (3) what types of weapons could be carried and how
would they be maintained, stored, and transported; (4) what
modifications to aircraft would be required; and (5) how much would it
cost to arm pilots. FAA raised some of these questions in its request
for comments, and some respondents raised additional questions and
proposed solutions. Most respondents that addressed these questions
were proponents of arming pilots. Yet even these proponents expressed
a range of views on critical questions, such as whether pilots‘
participation would be voluntary, whether the use of firearms would be
restricted to defending the cockpit, and where the firearms would be
stored between flights. The responses generally attempted to maximize
the effectiveness of any program to arm pilots while minimizing its
risk to safety and security. Opponents of arming pilots generally did
not address these questions or maintained that the questions could not
be addressed in a way that would sufficiently mitigate unacceptable
risks to safety and security. Enclosure III summarizes these questions.
The National Institute of Justice reviewed the information available
on less-than-lethal weapons, as mandated by the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, and identified six general categories--
electrical shock, chemical, impact projectile, physical restraint,
light, and acoustic. [Footnote 6] While FAA‘s request for comments did
not identify particular types of less-than-lethal weapons that might
be used as alternatives to firearms, most of the comments that FAA
received on less-than-lethal weapons and most of the Institute‘s study
focused on electric shock devices, which are already used outside
aircraft for law enforcement purposes, such as riot control.
Proponents of arming pilots with these devices emphasized their
ability to incapacitate an aggressor without posing a lethal risk to
others, while opponents noted that recovery from electrical shock
takes less than a minute and that the effectiveness of the devices can
be limited in a variety of ways. Although one major U.S. carrier has
tested electric shock devices onboard aircraft and has found no
effects on airworthiness, the Institute regards their effects on
aircraft avionics as unknown and favors further testing. Observations
on the other less-than-lethal weapons focused primarily on their value
as temporary deterrents to aggressors and on the difficulty of
controlling their effects. Enclosure IV provides more detailed
information on these weapons.
In addition to less-than-lethal weapons, we identified other security
enhancements that organizations or individuals suggested as
alternatives to arming pilots. These included:
* providing additional training for pilots in maneuvers that could
disable attackers, such as steeply banking the aircraft;
* installing technical improvements that would allow the aircraft to be
controlled from the ground if the pilot were disabled or the aircraft
were hijacked;
* adding other enhancements to cockpit security, including changes to
the design and equipment of aircraft that would (1) limit access to the
cockpit by unauthorized personnel, such as the double-door system used
by El Al, Israel‘s national airline or (2) permit the flight crew to
monitor cabin activities through the use of video cameras in the cabin;
and:
* having more armed security or law enforcement officers onboard.
Detailed information was not available on the feasibility or cost of
these suggested alternatives.
Agency Comments:
We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this
report for its review and comment. The Department generally agreed
that the information in the report fairly presented the range of
opinions on the issue of arming pilots. The Department provided
technical corrections that we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of
Transportation and will make copies available to others upon request.
If you have any questions about our work, please contact me at (202)
512-2834. Key contributors to this letter were Bonnie Beckett, Michael
Bollinger, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, David Goldstein, Heather Krause,
Teresa Spisak, and Alwynne Wilbur.
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gerald L. Dillingham:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues.
[End of Section]
Enclosure I:
Background Information on Arming Pilots:
In 1961, regulations [Footnote 7] promulgated by the former Federal
Aviation Agency, now the FAA, exempted law enforcement officers and
other persons authorized by air carriers, such as pilots and other
crew members, from a general prohibition against the carriage of
weapons aboard aircraft. In 1975, the FAA changed the provision
covering the nation‘s largest commercial carriers (known as part 121
carriers) to provide that law enforcement officers or crew members,
including pilots, could not carry weapons onboard aircraft unless (1)
the FAA Administrator, as well as the carrier, authorized the carriage
of weapons and (2) the individual successfully completed a course of
training in the use of the weapon. On July 21, 2001, FAA limited the
carriage of weapons on aircraft to certain law enforcement officers.
[Footnote 8]
Although pilots and other crew members are currently prohibited from
carrying weapons onboard aircraft, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act raises the possibility of arming pilots in the future.
Specifically, this act authorizes air carrier pilots to carry a
firearm in the cockpit if:
* the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security approves;
* the air carrier approves;
* the firearm is approved by the Under Secretary; and:
* the pilot has received proper training in the use of the firearm, as
determined by the Under Secretary.
TSA has issued regulations that will continue to allow the arming of
pilots who operate in special situations. Specifically, TSA will
continue to allow guns onboard aircraft if they are part of a state-
required emergency kit. Alaskan law, for example, provides that
certain aircraft must have emergency equipment onboard, including a
firearm, in case they make a forced landing at a remote wilderness
location. [Footnote 9] This regulation becomes effective on June 24,
2002.
[End of Section]
Enclosure II:
Reasons for and against Arming Pilots:
Issue: Need;
Reasons presented by those in favor of arming pilots; We need a last
line of defense if other security measures fail. Reasons presented by
those opposed to arming pilots: Current security enhancements, such as
improved screening, increases in the number of federal air marshals,
and cockpit door reinforcement, are sufficient.
Issue: Effectiveness;
Reasons presented by those in favor of arming pilots; Firearms are a
highly effective means of permanently disabling one or multiple
attackers. Arming pilots is the best deterrent to hijackers. Reasons
presented by those opposed to arming pilots: Firearms are not
sufficiently effective compared with the risks they present. Trained
law enforcement officials have only an 18 to 22 percent hit ratio in
armed confrontation. The cramped quarters of a cockpit do not lend
themselves to success.
Issue: Risk;
Reasons presented by those in favor of arming pilots; The risk to
aircraft integrity, including depressurizing aircraft or damaging
vital flight components, is very small. The risk to other people
onboard is very small, particularly if the firearms are used only in
the cockpit and pilots are well trained. Only when all other measures
have failed would the pilot be authorized to use the firearm to
protect the cockpit. Pilots are trained to do several tasks at once
and would be able to incorporate the use of a firearm into their other
tasks. Many pilots have had previous military training in the use of
firearms. Reasons presented by those opposed to arming pilots: The
risk to aircraft integrity, including depressurizing the aircraft or
damaging vital flight components, is significant. The risk to other
people is significant. The firearm could be used against a pilot or
other passengers. Violence Policy Center cites statistics that 21
percent of officers killed with a handgun were shot with their own
weapon. Accidental weapon discharge and pilot mishandling of the
weapon are also risks. Pilots are trained to land aircraft quickly in
an emergency, and in an emergency this should be their primary task.
Firearms could distract pilots from their critical mission of flying
and landing the aircraft. Military training for ground combat differs
significantly from what would be needed to defend the cockpit.
Generally, law-enforcement officers have serious objections to arming
pilots.
Issue: Cost-effectiveness;
Reasons presented by those in favor of arming pilots; Arming pilots is
cost-effective when compared with the cost of expanding the federal
marshal program or implementing other security enhancements. Reasons
presented by those opposed to arming pilots: Arming pilots is not cost-
effective when compared with the risks it would present and the small
likelihood it would be beneficial.
Issue: Policy issues;
Reasons presented by those in favor of arming pilots; There is a
precedent for arming pilots: FAA authorized the arming of flight crew
members in the 1960s. Section 128 of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act permits air carrier pilots to carry a TSA-approved
firearm into the cockpit if approved by the Under Secretary for TSA
and the carrier, and if the pilot has received proper training.
Reasons presented by those opposed to arming pilots: Arming pilots
would introduce 10,000-100,000 guns into our society, contradicting
other efforts to discourage the number of firearms in the population.
Arming pilots might lead to other transportation workers requesting to
carry weapons onboard aircraft. For example, the Maryland Pilots‘
Association has petitioned to allow ship captains to carry their
weapons onboard aircraft when in transit to their ships. In addition,
it might lead to requests for the arming of other transportation
workers, such as bus or taxi drivers. Many air carriers oppose arming
pilots because of concerns about liability, training, and storage of
the weapons when not in use.
Sources: Comments received as of March 15, 2002, on FAA docket 2001-
111229, published in the Federal Register on December 31, 2001;
testimonies on May 2, 2002, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, by Sarah V. Hart,
Director, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
and Henry P. Krakowski, Vice President, Safety, Security, and Quality
Assurance, United Airlines; literature search; and interviews with
aviation experts and officials from DOT, FAA, and TSA.
[End of Table]
[End of Section]
Enclosure III:
Questions to Be Addressed If Pilots Were to Be Armed:
Topic: Regulation and oversight;
Questions: How would protocols be established and enforced? What
entity would decide what types of weapons, ammunition, or aircraft
modifications would be required and whether airlines or pilots would
have any choice in these matters? What entity would be responsible for
ensuring that only acceptable firearms and ammunition were used on
aircraft, and how would it accomplish this? How would the use of
firearms by unauthorized persons be prevented? What entity would be
responsible for establishing protocols for the use of firearms and to
minimize risks such as unauthorized use or accidental discharge? How
would the defensiveefforts of armed pilots, air marshals, and other
law enforcement officers be coordinated?
Topic: Pilot qualifications;
Questions: What qualifications, if any, would be used to establish
which pilots would be permitted to carry firearms? If carriage of a
firearm were authorized, would carriage be at the pilot‘s discretion?
What background checks or other screening would be required? Would all
pilots of commercial airlines be permitted to carry firearms? Would
periodic recertification of pilots be required? What actions by a
pilot, such as the commission of a felony or misdemeanor or the abuse
of alcohol or drugs, would trigger an automatic review of the right to
carry a firearm? Would pilots of cargo-only aircraft be permitted to
carry firearms? Would any types of general aviation pilots be
permitted to carry firearms? ; Would permission to carry firearms
first be offered to those pilots with prior military or law
enforcement experience? Would the qualifications for using firearms be
integrated into the existing systems for establishing and maintaining
airman qualifications, such as pilot certifications and ratings?
Topic: Deputizing of pilots;
Questions: Would pilots be deputized as law enforcement officers? What
rights would this grant pilots beyond the carriage of weapons in
aircraft cockpits? How would this affect liability issues?
Topic: Training of pilots in the use of firearms;
Questions: What entity would provide firearms training to pilots?
Would the training require certification? How extensive would the
initial training be and what would it cover? Would recurrent training
be required, and if so, how often and what type? If the weapon were
stored on the aircraft, would training be required for other personnel
who had access to the aircraft?
Topic; When and where to use firearms;
Questions: Under what circumstances would pilots be authorized to use
firearms? Would pilots be restricted to using firearms to defend the
cockpit? If there were two pilots, would one be permitted to use the
firearm in the cabin as long as the other remained in the cockpit? If
a pilot had a firearm in the cockpit, would a severe disturbance in
the cabin present an unacceptable moral dilemma?
Topic: Type(s) of firearms and ammunition;
Questions: What type(s) of firearms and ammunition would be most
appropriate to meet the dual purpose of maximizing the pilot‘s ability
to permanently disable an attacker while minimizing the risk of damage
to the aircraft and other people? What criteria would be used (e.g.,
simplicity, caliber, maintenance, reloading) in authorizing types of
weapons and ammunition?Which weapons have the least risk of accidental
discharge? Are the weapons that have been authorized for use by FBI
agents or air marshals appropriate for pilots?
Topic: Maintenance of firearms;
Questions: Who would be responsible for the maintenance and care of
the firearms? What procedures would be required to ensure that the
firearm was properly maintained and cared for, and to reduce the
possibility of accidental discharge?
Topic: Storage and transportation of firearms;
Questions: How would firearms be stored to minimize security risks?
Would firearms be stored on the aircraft, at the airport, or with the
pilot? If the firearm were stored on the aircraft or in the airport,
what kind of lock and container would be used to ensure security, and
how would access be controlled? If the firearm remained with the
pilot, how would the authority be established for the pilot to carry
the firearm from home to work or during overnight stays in other
cities, states, or foreign countries? Given that it is not uncommon
for pilots to cross state lines in their commute between home and the
place their work duties begin, how would jurisdictional issues
regarding interstate travel with a concealed firearm be resolved? If
the firearm remained with the pilot, how would the firearm be
transported through the airport to the aircraft? Would current
screening procedures be revised? Would separate screening facilities
for pilots be established to facilitate pilots getting through
security without delays while minimizing their contact with the public
while in possession of a firearm?; How would the security and
liability risks associated with each option be addressed? Are the
procedures that have been established for federal air marshals on
these matters appropriate for pilots?
Topic: Aircraft modifications;
Questions: Would aircraft modifications be required for the storage of
weapons? Would aircraft modifications be required to reduce the
possibility of damage to key aircraft components caused by a bullet?
Topic: International issues;
Questions: How would pilots handle firearms when flying to or from
other countries? Are the procedures that have been established for air
marshals on this matter appropriate for pilots? Would foreign pilots
flying for a foreign air carrier be permitted to carry firearms when
flying on routes in the United States?
Topic: Cost;
Questions: Is arming pilots a cost-effective way to increase aviation
security? How much would it cost to purchase firearms and ammunition
for pilots, train pilots, service and maintain firearms, and make any
necessary modifications to aircraft? Would liability concerns raise
insurance costs? What other costs would be involved? What entity would
bear the cost of arming pilots? Would arming pilots be less expensive
than sufficiently expanding the air marshal program?
Topic; Coordination;
Questions: How would armed pilots coordinate with air marshals and
other law enforcement officers on the aircraft to minimize risk and
confusion?
Sources: Comments received as of March 15, 2002, on FAA docket 2001-
111229, published in the Federal Register on December 31, 2001;
testimonies on May 2, 2002, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, by Sarah V. Hart,
Director, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
and Henry P. Krakowski, Vice President, Safety, Security, and Quality
Assurance, United Airlines; literature search; and interviews with
aviation experts and officials from DOT, TSA, and FAA.
[End of Table]
[End of Section]
Enclosure IV:
Less-Than-Lethal Weapons:
The National Institute of Justice has identified six general
categories of less-than-lethal weapons--electrical shock, chemical,
impact projectile, physical restraint, light, and acoustic. Weapons in
the first three categories already exist. Weapons in the last two
categories are currently under development. Because the effects of
these less-than-lethal weapons are temporary, physical restraints,
which are not considered weapons, are often used in conjunction with
them. The following table provides information, where applicable, on
the types of weapons in each category, their benefits and
disadvantages, and their readiness for deployment.
Electric shock; Types;
Characteristics: Handheld direct-contact weapon:
Has two probes that are pressed against an aggressor‘s skin or
clothing. When the operator presses a switch, the skin contact and
pressed switch complete a circuit and the subject receives a
debilitating and possibly painful electrical shock. Dart-firing
electrical shocking device: Fires two barbs connected to trailing
wires that lead back to the operator; contact with the subject‘s skin
or clothing completes an electrical circuit, and an electrical
discharge automatically results.
Electric shock; Benefits;
Characteristics: Immediately incapacitates an aggressor, who loses
control over muscles and nerves and cannot perform coordinated action.
Not likely to kill or maim. Can be reactivated repeatedly as long as
the wires remain attached to the assailant. Can be used in a confined
space, especially if handheld. Not likely to damage buildings or
aircraft fuselages or to ignite standard solids or black gunpowder.
Easier to control than chemicals and less likely to cause damage than
blunt instruments, such as beanbag weapons.; Easy to operate--little
training needed.
Electric shock; Disadvantages;
Characteristics: Does not disable an aggressor for long--recovery
takes less than a minute. Highly motivated and trained aggressors may
be able to withstand the effects. Can be used on only one aggressor at
a time and requires immediate use of physical restraints. Can be
deflected by a book or dinner tray; may be foiled by thick clothing;
may not penetrate soft body armor. Effectiveness substantially limited
if one probe lands on a nonconductive surface (e.g., concrete,
asphalt, or wood). Range of dart version may be too great for the
cockpit or inadequate for the cabin. Sparks can ignite some flammable
liquids, vapors, or sensitive explosives. Requires preventative
maintenance--batteries must be fully charged.
Electric shock; Readiness for deployment;
Characteristics: Deployment has begun. Presently used by three
international foreign carriers. At least one domestic carrier has
provided training and another three are moving forward on using these
items. One carrier has tested devices on all types of aircraft it
flies and has found no effect on airworthiness and negligible effects
on electrical and electronic equipment during testing, and has
purchased several hundred devices.; National Institute of Justice
considers weapon‘s effects on aircraft avionics and other critical
systems unknown--favors further testing.
Chemicals; Types;
Characteristics: Tear gas and pepper spray; Anesthetics or calmative
chemicals.
Chemicals; Benefits;
Characteristics: Tear gas, pepper spray can limit mobility of an
aggressor. Anesthetics or calmative chemicals could be released,
potentially remotely, into the cabin to incapacitate all passengers,
including hijackers, until the plane can be safely landed.
Chemicals; Disadvantages;
Characteristics: Chemicals cannot be adequately controlled in an
aircraft and may contaminate pilots and flight attendants, although
handheld dispensers of pepper spray offer better control than tear
gas. Some individuals may become more violent in response to the use
of these chemicals. Tear gas and pepper spray have reversible, but not
rapidly reversible, effects--problematic if flight crew is affected.
Anesthetics or calmative chemicals; do not take effect rapidly, may
create unacceptable health risks to infants and persons with upper
respiratory problems, and; may prevent other passengers from helping
to immobilize or restrain hijackers.
Chemicals; Readiness for deployment;
Characteristics: Remains under study or development. Should be tested
in multiple aircraft settings before any deployment.
Impact projectiles; Types;
Characteristics: Rubber bullet or blunt trauma projectile.
Impact projectiles; Benefits;
Characteristics: May be appropriate in the aircraft‘s cabin, where
restrictions on space are less severe and the risk of damage to
critical systems or injury to the flight crew are reduced.
Impact projectiles; Disadvantages;
Characteristics: Degree of incapacitation varies greatly. Effect can
wear off quickly. Not designed for use in confined spaces--launched
from a pump-action shotgun or a single round tear gas gun that
requires two hands to operate. Large and not designed to be easily
carried on a belt or in a pocket.
Impact projectiles; Readiness for deployment;
Characteristics: Should be tested in multiple aircraft settings before
any deployment.
Physical restraints[A]; Types;
Characteristics: Handcuffs Nets--also exist in a prototype electrified
design; Surface chemicals applied to surfaces to make them extremely
slippery or extremely sticky, to impede the movement of an aggressor.
Physical restraints[A]; Benefits;
Characteristics: Handcuffs and flexible cuffs--common and useful in
conjunction with less-than-lethal weapons.
Physical restraints[A]; Disadvantages;
Characteristics: Nets are probably not adequate to incapacitate a
determined and trained hijacker. Surface chemicals could impede
efforts of passengers and crew to subdue hijacker.Deployment may not
be fast enough to be helpful. Net guns are not practical in the cabin.
Physical restraints[A]; Readiness for deployment;
Characteristics: Effect of electrified nets on aircraft electrical
systems is unknown--further testing is needed.
Light; Types;
Characteristics: Bright white lights or lasers can produce a ’wall of
light“ that may deter an aggressor from attacking someone behind the
light.
Light; Benefits;
Characteristics: Lower power level could be used to distract or delay
the advance of an aggressor and provide time for passengers and crew
to protect themselves or restrain the aggressor.
Light; Disadvantages;
Characteristics: May not prevent determined aggressor from using a
weapon. If powerful enough to disable an aggressor, may cause eye
damage.
Light; Readiness for deployment;
Characteristics: Still being developed by the Department of Defense
with support from the National Institute of Justice. Should be tested
in multiple aircraft settings before any deployment.
Acoustics; Types;
Characteristics: A sound source produces acoustic energy at audible
and inaudible frequencies.
Acoustics; Benefits;
Characteristics: ’Ear-splitting“ audible sounds halt the advance of an
aggressor.
Acoustics; Readiness for deployment;
Characteristics: Still being developed by the Department of Defense
with support from the National Institute of Justice. Should be tested
in multiple aircraft settings before any deployment.
[A] Although not considered weapons, physical restraints are used in
conjunction with less-than-lethal weapons.
Sources: Comments received as of March 15, 2002, on FAA docket 2001-
111229, published in the Federal Register on December 31, 2001;
interviews with aviation experts; and testimonies on May 2, 2002,
before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, by Sarah V. Hart, Director, National Institute of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, and Henry P. Krakowski, Vice
President, Safety, Security, and Quality Assurance, United Airlines.
[End of Table]
[End of Section]
Footnotes:
[1] P.L. 107-71, November 19, 2001.
[2] H.R. 2958, H.R. 2896, H.R. 3171, and S. 1463.
[3] 66 Fed. Reg. 67620.
[4] According to FAA‘s analysis, more than 96 percent of the comments
favored the arming of pilots. FAA noted that more than 99 percent of
the comments were from individuals and pilots and that most of the
comments appeared to have been solicited by a few gun advocacy groups.
FAA also noted that less than 1 percent of the comments were from
organizations, such as industry associations, unions, airlines, public
interest groups, or security-related businesses.
[5] For publicly available information on this report, see the
testimony of Sarah V. Hart, Director, National Institute of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, May 2, 2002.
[6] Weapons in the first three categories already exist. Weapons in
the last two categories are currently under development. Because the
effects of these less-than-lethal weapons are temporary, physical
restraints, which are not considered weapons, are often used in
conjunction with them.
[7] These regulations initially responded to hijackings of U.S.
aircraft to Cuba.
[8] See 66 Fed. Reg. 37330.
[9] 9 C.F.R. 1544.103. 67 Fed. Reg. 8205, February 22, 2002.
