Mass Transit
Challenges in Securing Transit Systems Gao ID: GAO-02-1075T September 18, 2002Over a year has passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, realigned national priorities. Although most of the early attention following the attacks focused on airport security, emphasis on the other modes of transportation has since grown. Addressing transit safety and security concerns is complicated by the nature and scope of transit in the United States. About 6,000 agencies provide transit services, and each workday, 14 million Americans ride on some form of transit. Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems secure. Certain characteristics make them both vulnerable and difficult to secure. The high ridership of some transit agencies makes them attractive targets for terrorists but also makes certain security measures, like metal detectors, impractical. Another challenge is funding identified security enhancements. Despite the formidable challenges in securing transit systems, transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their systems. Transit agencies visited by GAO were implementing strategies to improve both safety and security prior to September 11; however, the events of September 11 elevated the importance of security-related activity. Many agencies assessed vulnerabilities, provided additional training on emergency preparedness, revised emergency plans, and conducted multiple emergency drills. The federal government's role in transit security is evolving. Although the Federal Transit Administration has limited authority to oversee and regulate transit security, it launched a multipart security initiative and increased funding for its safety and security activities since September 11. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation and gave it responsibility for transit security; however, TSA has yet to assume full responsibility for the security of any transportation mode other than aviation.
GAO-02-1075T, Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation, Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
U.S. Senate:
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT
Wednesday,
September 18, 2002:
Mass Transit:
Challenges in Securing Transit Systems:
Statement of Peter Guerrero
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-02-1075T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today about mass
transit safety and security in the United States. Over a year has
passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, realigned our
national priorities. While most of the early attention following the
September 11 terrorist attacks focused on airport security, emphasis on
the other modes of transportation has since grown. Moreover, terrorist
events around the world have shown that mass transit systems, like
other modes of transportation, are often targets of attack. For
example, roughly one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target
transportation systems, and transit systems are the mode most commonly
attacked.[Footnote 1] In May 2002, the Department of Transportation
issued a terrorist threat advisory to the transit industry indicating
that subway systems were a possible target and that the industry should
remain in a heightened state of alert.
Addressing transit safety and security concerns is complicated by the
nature and scope of transit in the United States. About 6,000 agencies
provide transit services, such as buses, subways, ferries, and light
rail in the United States. Each workday, about 14 million Americans
ride on some form of transit. Because the effectiveness of transit
systems depends on their accessibility, security measures common in
aviation are difficult to apply. Furthermore, government agencies at
the federal, state, and local levels and private companies share
responsibility for transit safety and security and are involved in
making transit decisions.
As you requested, my testimony today focuses on (1) challenges in
securing mass transit systems, (2) steps transit agencies have taken to
enhance safety and security, and (3) the federal role in transit safety
and security. My comments are based on our ongoing work for the full
committee and a body of work GAO has undertaken since September 11,
2001, on homeland security and combating terrorism.[Footnote 2] For our
ongoing work, we conducted 10 site visits at transit agencies across
the
country and surveyed about 200 transit agencies, among other things.
[Footnote 3]
Summary:
Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems
secure. Certain characteristics make them both vulnerable and difficult
to secure. For example, the high ridership of some transit agencies
makes them attractive targets for terrorists but also makes certain
security measures, like metal detectors, impractical. Another challenge
is funding identified security enhancements. Although some security
improvements, such as locking bus doors at night, have little or no
cost, most improvements require substantial funding. For example, one
transit agency estimated that an intrusion alarm and closed circuit
television system for only one of its portals would cost approximately
$250,000. According to our preliminary survey results and our
interviews with transit agency officials, insufficient funding is the
most significant challenge in making their transit systems as safe and
secure as possible. Funding security improvements is problematic for a
number of reasons including tight budget environments, competing budget
priorities, and the prohibition on transit agencies that serve areas
with populations of 200,000 or more from using federal urbanized area
formula funds for operating expenses. In addition, coordination among
all transit stakeholders can also pose challenges. Through our
discussions with transit agency and local government officials and our
preliminary survey results, we have found substantial coordination on
emergency planning among transit agencies and local governments;
however, transit agencies did report some challenges, such as limited
awareness of terrorist threats to transit, in coordinating with local
governments.
Despite the formidable challenges in securing transit systems, transit
agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their
systems. Transit agencies we visited were implementing strategies to
improve both safety and security prior to September 11; however, the
events of September 11 elevated the importance of security-related
activities. As a result, the transit agencies we visited implemented
new security initiatives or increased the frequency of existing
activities since last September. For example, many agencies assessed
vulnerabilities, provided additional training on emergency
preparedness, revised emergency plans, and conducted multiple emergency
drills.
The federal government‘s role in transit security is evolving. For
example, although the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has limited
authority to oversee and regulate transit security, it launched a
multipart security initiative and increased funding for its safety and
security activities since September 11. In addition, the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act created the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation and gave
it responsibility for transit security; however, TSA has yet to assume
full responsibility for the security of any transportation mode other
than aviation. TSA and FTA are currently developing a memorandum of
understanding that will define each agency‘s roles and responsibilities
for transit security. Although most of the transit agencies we visited
said FTA‘s security initiative has been useful, they would like the
federal government to provide more assistance to support transit
security, such as more information, help in obtaining security
clearances, increased funding, and more security-related research and
development. In considering the federal government‘s role in funding
transit safety and security initiatives, several issues will need to be
addressed, including (1) developing federal funding criteria, (2)
determining the roles of stakeholders in funding transit security, and
(3) selecting the appropriate federal policy instruments to deliver
assistance that may be deemed necessary by policymakers (e.g., grants,
tax incentives, etc.).
Background:
In 2000, mass transit systems provided over 9 billion passenger trips
and employed about 350,000 people.[Footnote 4] The nation‘s transit
systems include all multiple-occupancy-vehicle services designed to
transport customers on local and regional routes, such as bus, trolley
bus, commuter rail, vanpool, ferry boat, and light rail services, and
are valued at a trillion dollars. As figure 1 shows, buses are the most
utilized form of transit, providing almost two-thirds of all passenger
trips.
Figure 1: Ridership by Transit Mode, 2000:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Data are preliminary. Percentages do not add to 100 percent due
to rounding.
[A] Heavy rail is a transit mode that is an electric railway with the
capacity for a heavy volume of traffic. It is characterized by high
speed and rapid acceleration passenger rail cars operating singly or in
multi-car trains on fixed rails; separate rights-of-way from which all
other vehicular and foot traffic are excluded; sophisticated signaling;
and high platform loading. Most subway systems are considered heavy
rail.
[B] Other includes a variety of transit modes such as ferryboat,
vanpool, and demand response (i.e., paratransit).
Source: American Public Transportation Association.
[End of figure]
A number of organizations are involved in the delivery of transit
services in the United States including federal, state, and local
governments and the private sector. In particular:
* FTA provides financial assistance to transit agencies to plan and
develop new transit systems and operate, maintain, and improve existing
systems. FTA is responsible for ensuring that the recipients of federal
transit funds follow federal mandates and administrative requirements.
FTA‘s Office of Safety and Security is the agency‘s focal point for
transit safety (freedom from unintentional danger) and security
(freedom from intentional danger).
* State and local governments also provide a significant amount of
funding for transit services. As figure 2 shows, state and local
governments provide funding for over 40 percent of transit agencies‘
operating expenses and about a quarter of their capital expenses.
According to statute, states are also responsible for establishing
State Safety Oversight Agencies to oversee the safety of rail systems
of transit agencies.[Footnote 5]
* Transit agencies, which can be public or private entities, are
responsible for administering and managing transit activities and
services. Transit agencies can directly operate transit service or
contract for all or part of the total transit service provided. About
6,000 agencies provide transit services in the United States, and the
majority of these agencies provide more than one mode of service.
Although all levels of government are involved in transit security, the
primary responsibility for securing transit systems rests with the
transit agencies.
Figure 2: Sources of Funding for Transit Operating and Capital
Expenses, 2000 :
[See PDF for image]
Note: Data are preliminary.
[A] Other includes taxes levied directly by transit agencies and other
dedicated funds, such as tolls and advertising.
[B] Directly generated expenses include nongovernmental funding,
subsidies from the nontransit sectors of a transit agency‘s operations,
taxes levied directly by a transit agency, and bridge and tunnel tolls.
Source: American Public Transportation Association.
[End of figure]
Legislation also affects transit services, including transit safety and
security. In particular, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21ST
Century (TEA-21) is the legislation authorizing current federal transit
programs.[Footnote 6] TEA-21 authorized about $36 billion for federal
transit programs from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2003. The
largest federal transit program is the urbanized area formula grant
program, which accounts for almost one-half of TEA-21‘s total
authorizations for all transit programs. The urbanized area formula
grant program provides federal funds to urbanized areas (jurisdictions
with populations of 50,000 or more) for transit capital investments,
operating expenses, and transportation-related planning. However, TEA-
21 prohibits transit agencies that serve urbanized areas with
populations of 200,000 or more from using urbanized area formula
funding for operating expenses. Recipients of urbanized area formula
funds are also required to spend at least 1 percent of these funds to
improve the security of existing or planned mass transportation systems
unless the transit agencies certify that such expenses are
unnecessary.[Footnote 7] Additionally, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act created TSA within the Department of Transportation and
gave it responsibility for the security of all transportation modes,
including transit.[Footnote 8] The act also assigns regulatory
authority to TSA for all transportation modes.
Throughout the world, public surface transportation systems have been
the target of terrorist attacks. For example, the first large-scale
terrorist use of a chemical weapon occurred in 1995 on the Toyko subway
system. In this attack, a terrorist group released sarin gas on a
subway train, killing 11 people and injuring about 5,500. In addition,
according to the Mineta Transportation Institute,[Footnote 9] surface
transportation systems were the target of more than 195 terrorist
attacks from 1997 through 2000. As figure 3 illustrates, buses were the
most common target during this period.
Figure 3: Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems
Worldwide, 1997 to 2000:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Based on information from the Mineta Transportation Institute.
[End of figure]
Transit Agencies Face Challenges in Making Transit Systems Secure:
Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems
secure. Certain characteristics of transit systems, such as their high
ridership and open access, make them both vulnerable to attack and
difficult to secure. The high costs of transit security improvements,
coupled with tight budgets, competing needs, and a restriction on using
federal funds for operating expenses in large urban areas also creates
a challenge for transit agencies. Moreover, because of the numerous
stakeholders involved in transit security, effective coordination can
become a problem.
Characteristics of Transit Systems Pose Security Challenges:
According to transit officials and transit security experts, certain
characteristics of transit systems make them inherently vulnerable to
terrorist attacks and difficult to secure. By design, transit systems
are open (i.e., have multiple access points and, in some cases, no
barriers) so that they can move large numbers of people quickly.
However, the openness of transit systems can leave them vulnerable
because transit officials cannot monitor or control who enters or
leaves the systems. In addition, other characteristics of some transit
systems--high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic
importance, and location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist
destinations)--also make them potentially attractive targets.
Moreover, some of these characteristics make transit agencies difficult
to secure. For example, the number of riders that pass through a
transit system--especially during peak hours--make some security
measures, such as metal detectors, impractical. In addition, the
multiple access points along extended routes make the costs of securing
each location prohibitive.
Further complicating transit security is the need for transit agencies
to balance security concerns with accessibility, convenience, and
affordability. Because transit riders often could choose another means
of transportation, such as a personal automobile, transit agencies must
compete for riders. To remain competitive, transit agencies must offer
convenient, inexpensive, and quality service. Therefore, security
measures that limit accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or
otherwise cause inconvenience could push people away from transit and
back into their cars. Our discussions with transit agency officials and
our preliminary survey results indicate that striking the right balance
between security and these other needs is difficult. For example, a
number of survey respondents reported that balancing riders‘ need for
accessibility with security measures is a significant barrier to making
their transit systems as safe and secure as possible.
Funding Security Improvements Is A Key Challenge:
Funding security improvements is a key challenge for transit agencies.
Our preliminary survey results and our interviews with transit agency
officials indicate that insufficient funding is the most significant
challenge in making their systems as safe and secure as possible.
Moreover, our preliminary survey results indicate that the most common
reason for not addressing items identified as needing attention through
safety and security assessments is insufficient funding. Factors
contributing to funding challenges include high security costs, tight
budgets, competing budget priorities, and a prohibition on transit
agencies in large urban areas from using FTA funds for operating
expenses.
Transit security investments can be quite expensive. While some
security improvements are inexpensive, such as removing trashcans from
subway platforms, most require substantial funding. For example, one
transit agency estimated that an intrusion alarm and closed circuit
television system for only one of its portals would cost approximately
$250,000. According to our preliminary survey results, the top three
safety and security funding priorities of transit agencies are enhanced
communication systems, surveillance equipment, and additional
training. The transit agencies we visited have identified or are
identifying needed security improvements, such as upgraded
communication systems, additional fencing, surveillance equipment, and
redundant or mobile command centers. Of the 10 transit agencies we
visited, 8 agencies had developed cost estimates of their identified
improvements. The total estimated cost of the identified security
improvements at the 8 agencies is about $711 million. The total cost of
all needed transit security improvements throughout the country is
unknown; however, given the scope of the nation‘s transit systems and
the cost estimate for 8 agencies, it could easily amount to billions of
dollars.
Transit agency officials told us that they are facing tight budgets,
which make it more difficult for these agencies to pay for expensive
security improvements. According to most of the agencies we visited,
the weakened economy has negatively affected their revenue base by
lowering both ridership and/or tax revenues dedicated to transit. In
particular, 8 agencies we visited reported that ridership has dropped
this year, primarily because of the slow economy. The decreased
ridership levels have lowered fare box revenue. In addition, state and
local sales taxes, which provide revenue for many transit agencies,
have declined with the stalled economy and reduced the transit
agencies‘ revenue, according to a number of transit agency officials.
Other competing funding needs also present a challenge for transit
agencies. Given the tight budget environment, transit agencies must
make difficult trade-offs between security investments and other needs,
such as service expansion and equipment upgrades. For example, an
official at one transit agency stated that budget shortfalls and
expenditures for security improvements have delayed some needed capital
projects and reduced the budgets for all departments--except the safety
and security budget. Similarly, an official at another agency reported
that his agency is funding security improvements with money that was
budgeted for nonsecurity projects. According to our preliminary survey
results, a number of agencies view balancing safety and security
priorities against other priorities as a significant challenge in
making their systems as safe and secure as possible.
Another reported challenge in funding some security improvements is a
statutory limitation on using FTA funds for operating expenses.
Specifically, TEA-21 prohibits transit agencies in large urbanized
areas from using urbanized formula funding for most operating expenses.
This prohibition limits many agencies‘ ability to use FTA funds for
some security-related expenses, such as salaries for additional
security personnel and training. For example, officials from a number
of agencies said this prohibition was a significant barrier to funding
needed security improvements. However, several agency officials noted
that the elimination of this prohibition would be helpful only if
additional funding were also provided.
Coordination Is Key to Transit Security but Presents Challenges:
Coordination among all stakeholders is integral to enhancing transit
security, but it can create additional challenges. Numerous
stakeholders are involved in decisions that affect transit security,
such as decisions about its operations and funding. For example, states
are responsible for establishing agencies that oversee the safety of
transit systems with rail. As we have noted in previous reports,
coordination among all levels of government and the private sector is
critical to homeland security efforts, and a lack of coordination can
create problems, such as duplication of effort.[Footnote 10] In
addition, the national strategy for homeland security recognizes the
challenges associated with intergovernmental coordination but
emphasizes the need for such coordination. According to our discussions
with transit agency and local government officials and our preliminary
survey results, coordination on emergency planning is generally taking
place between transit agencies and local governments despite some
challenges, but appears to be minimal between transit agencies and
governments at the regional, state, and federal levels.
According to our site visits and preliminary survey results, transit
agencies and local governments are coordinating their emergency
planning efforts. Our preliminary survey results indicate that the
majority of transit agencies have directly coordinated emergency
planning at the local level and believe they have been sufficiently
integrated into their local government‘s emergency plans. Likewise, 9
of the 10 transit agencies we visited said they are well integrated
into their local government‘s emergency planning. Officials from these
9 transit agencies noted that their agencies are included in their
local government‘s emergency planning activities, such as emergency
drills, tabletop exercises, planning meetings, and task forces. For
example, when Minneapolis held an emergency drill that simulated a
biological attack on the city, Metro Transit transported ’victims“ to
hospitals, even taking some victims to out-of-state hospitals because
the local hospitals were at capacity. Transit agency and local
government officials said their past experiences with weather
emergencies and/or special events, like Super Bowl celebrations, helped
establish their good working relationships. According to the officials,
these past experiences have demonstrated the types of support services
transit agencies can provide during emergencies, including evacuation,
triage centers, victim transport and shelters. However, officials said
these working relationships are usually informal and undocumented. For
example, the majority of the transit agencies we visited did not have a
memorandum of understanding with their local government.
Although transit agencies are generally active participants in
emergency planning at the local level, they nevertheless face some
coordination challenges. According to our preliminary survey results,
among the most significant challenges in coordinating emergency
planning at the local level are insufficient funding, limited awareness
of terrorist threats to transit, lack of coordination among various
local agencies, and lack of time. Similar concerns were often raised
during our meetings with transit agencies. For example, one agency
official noted that his agency operates in over 40 jurisdictions and
that coordinating with all of these local governments is very time
consuming.
In contrast to coordination at the local level, coordination among
transit agencies and governments at the regional, state, and federal
levels on emergency planning appears to be minimal. Most of the transit
agencies we visited reported limited coordination with governments
outside of their local governments. In addition, our preliminary survey
results indicate that the majority of survey respondents have not
directly coordinated emergency planning at the regional, state, or
federal levels. As we have reported in past reports on homeland
security, lack of coordination among stakeholders could result in
communication problems, duplication, and fragmentation. Without
coordination, transit agencies and governments also miss opportunities
to systematically identify the unique resources and capacities that
each can provide in emergencies.
Transit Agencies Are Taking Steps to Secure Systems:
Prior to September 11, all 10 transit agencies we visited were
implementing measures to enhance transit safety and security, such as
revising emergency plans and training employees on emergency
preparedness. Transit agency officials often noted that the 1995 sarin
gas attack on the Tokyo subway system or their agency‘s experiences
during natural disasters had served as catalysts for focusing on safety
and security. Although safety and security were both priorities, the
events of September 11 elevated the importance of security.
Since September 11, transit agencies we visited have taken steps to
further improve transit safety and security. All of the transit
agencies we visited have been operating at a heightened state of
security since last September. According to officials from the agencies
we visited, their agencies have also initiated a number of safety and
security measures, including:
* Vulnerability assessments: External or internal vulnerability
assessments have been conducted. The purpose of these assessments is to
identify potential vulnerabilities and corrective actions or needed
security improvements. Improved communication systems, more controlled
access to facilities, and additional training are some of the needs
identified in the assessments of the agencies we visited.
* Fast-track security improvements: Security improvements planned or in
process prior to September 11, were moved up on the agenda or finished
early. For example, one agency, which was putting alarms on access
points to the subway ventilation system before September 11, completed
the process early.
* Immediate, inexpensive security improvements: Agencies implemented
immediate and inexpensive security improvements. Removing bike lockers
and trashcans from populated areas, locking underground restrooms, and
closing bus doors at night are among the immediate and inexpensive
improvements that agencies have made.
* Intensified security presence: Many agencies have increased the
number of police or security personnel who patrol their systems.
Surveillance equipment, alarms, or security personnel have been placed
at access points to subway tunnels, bus yards, and other nonpublic
places. Employees have also been required to wear identification cards
or bright colored vests for increased visibility.
* Increased emergency drills: Many agencies have increased the
frequency of emergency drilling--both full-scale drills and tabletop
exercises. For example, one agency we visited has conducted four drills
since September 11. Agencies stressed the importance of emergency
drilling as a means to test their emergency plans, identify problems,
and develop corrective actions.
* Revised emergency plans: Agencies reviewed their emergency plans to
determine what changes, if any, needed to be made. Some agencies
updated their emergency plans to include terrorist incident protocols
and response plans.
* Additional training: Agencies participated in and conducted
additional training on antiterrorism. For example, all 10 of the
agencies we visited had participated in the antiterrorism seminars
sponsored by FTA or the American Public Transportation Association. In
addition, one agency‘s police force has received training on al Queda
attack behavior patterns.
Federal Government‘s Role in Transit Security Is Evolving:
The federal government‘s role in transit security is evolving. For
example, FTA has expanded its role in transit security since September
11 by launching a multipart security initiative and increasing the
funding for its safety and security activities. In addition, the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act gave TSA responsibility for
transit security; however, TSA‘s role and responsibilities have not yet
been defined. Although the transit agencies we visited were generally
pleased with FTA‘s assistance since September 11, they would like the
federal government to provide more assistance, including providing more
information and funding. As the federal government‘s role in transit
safety and security initiatives evolves, policymakers will need to
address several issues, including (1) federal funding criteria, (2) the
roles of stakeholders in funding transit security, and (3) the
appropriate federal policy instrument to deliver assistance deemed
appropriate.
FTA Has Limited Authority but Has Initiated a Variety of Transit Safety
and Security Activities:
FTA has limited authority to regulate and oversee safety and security
at transit agencies. According to statute, FTA cannot regulate safety
and security operations at transit agencies.[Footnote 11] However, FTA
may institute nonregulatory safety and security activities, including
safety-and security-related training, research, and demonstration
projects. In addition, FTA may promote safety and security through its
grant-making authority. Specifically, FTA or legislation may stipulate
conditions of grants, such as certain safety and security requirements,
and FTA may withhold funds for noncompliance with the conditions of a
grant.[Footnote 12] For example, transit agencies must spend 1 percent
of their urbanized area formula funds on security
improvements.[Footnote 13] FTA is to verify that agencies comply with
this requirement and may withhold funding if it finds agencies that are
not in compliance.[Footnote 14] FTA officials stated that FTA‘s
authority to sponsor nonregulatory activities and to stipulate the
conditions of grants is sufficient for the safety and security work
they need to accomplish.[Footnote 15]
Despite its limited authority, FTA established a number of safety and
security programs prior to September 11. For example, FTA offered
voluntary security assessments, sponsored training at the
Transportation Safety Institute, issued written guidelines to improve
emergency response planning, and partially funded a chemical detection
demonstration project, called PROTECT, at the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority. Although FTA maintained both safety and
security programs prior to September 11, its primary focus was on the
safety rather than the security programs. This focus changed after
September 11.
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, FTA launched a
multipart transit security initiative last fall. The initiative
includes security assessments, planning, drilling, training, and
technology:
* Security assessments: FTA deployed teams to assess security at 36
transit agencies. FTA chose the 36 agencies on the basis of their
ridership, vulnerability, and the potential consequences of an
attack.[Footnote 16] Each assessment is to include a threat and
vulnerability analysis, an evaluation of security and emergency plans,
and a focused review of the agency‘s unified command structure with
external emergency responders. FTA plans to extend the assessments to
additional agencies after the first 36 assessments are complete.
* Emergency response planning: FTA is providing technical assistance to
the top 60 transit agencies on security and emergency plans, and
emergency response drills.
* Emergency response drills: FTA offered transit agencies grants (up to
$50,000) for organizing and conducting emergency preparedness drills.
According to FTA officials, FTA has awarded $3.4 million to over 80
transit agencies through these grants.
* Security training: FTA is offering free emergency preparedness and
security training to transit agencies through its Connecting
Communities Forums. These forums are being offered throughout the
country and are designed to bring together small and medium-sized
transit agency personnel with their local emergency responders, like
local fire and police. The purpose of the forums is to give the
participants a better understanding of the roles played by transit
agencies and emergency responders and allow the participants to begin
developing the plans, tools, and relationships necessary to respond
effectively in an emergency. In addition, FTA is working with the
National Transit Institute and the Transportation Safety Institute to
expand safety and security course offerings. For example, the National
Transit Institute is now offering a security awareness course to front
line transit employees free of charge.
* Research and development: FTA increased the funding of its safety-and
security-related technology research and has accelerated the deployment
of the PROTECT system.
FTA also increased the funding of its safety and security activities
after the attacks of September 11. For example, FTA reprioritized
fiscal year 2002 funds from its other programs to its safety and
security activities after the attacks. In addition, the Department of
Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2002 (DOD
supplemental) provided $23.5 million for (1) the replacement of buses
and kiosks in New York destroyed in the terrorist attacks, (2)
emergency response drills, (3) security training for transit operators,
and (4) the acceleration and expansion of chemical detection technology
for transit stations.[Footnote 17] Specifically, $4.8 million of the
DOD supplemental was provided for new buses and kiosks in New York and
$4 million was allocated to the continued development of chemical
detection technology. FTA used the remainder of the DOD supplemental to
fund its multipart security initiative. Finally, FTA sought additional
funding for its safety and security activities in its fiscal year 2003
budget request. As figure 4 shows, if FTA receives the amount of
funding it requested for fiscal year 2003, its funding of safety and
security activities will have increased over 100 percent from fiscal
year 2000 through fiscal year 2003--increasing from $8.1 million to
$17.9 million.[Footnote 18]
Figure 4: Funding of FTA‘s Safety and Security Activities, 2000 to
2003:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Data include FTA‘s funding of its safety and security activities
and oversight.
Source: GAO‘s analysis of FTA budget data.
[End of figure]
TSA‘s Role In Transit Security Has Yet to Be Defined:
TSA is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation,
including transit. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created
TSA within the Department of Transportation and defined its primary
responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The
act also provides TSA regulatory authority over transit security, which
FTA currently does not possess. Since its creation last November, TSA
has primarily focused on improving aviation security in order to meet
the deadlines established in the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act.[Footnote 19] As a result, TSA has not yet assumed full
responsibility for security in other modes of transportation, such as
transit.
TSA‘s role in transit security is evolving. For transit security, the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act does not specify TSA‘s role
and responsibilities as it did for aviation security. For example, the
act does not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain transit
security requirements. Similarly, although the President‘s National
Strategy for Homeland Security states that the federal government will
work with the private sector to upgrade security in all modes of
transportation and utilize existing modal relationships and systems to
implement unified, national standards for transportation security, it
does not outline TSA‘s or the proposed Department of Homeland
Security‘s role in transit security.[Footnote 20] The strategy only
states that TSA is responsible for securing our nation‘s transportation
systems and that under the President‘s proposal TSA will become part of
the Department of Homeland Security.
To help define its role in transit security, TSA is currently working
with FTA to develop a memorandum of understanding. The memorandum of
understanding will define the roles and responsibilities of each agency
in transit security. TSA and FTA officials expect the memorandum of
understanding to be completed by mid-September. According to a TSA
official, the memorandum of understanding between FTA and TSA would
likely remain intact if TSA moves to the proposed Department of
Homeland Security, although the final decision would be up to the new
Secretary of Homeland Security.
Transit Agencies Said the Federal Government Should Provide More
Information and Assistance:
The transit agencies we visited were generally pleased with the
assistance FTA has provided since September 11. However, officials from
these agencies said the federal government could do more in helping
them secure their transit systems. They suggested, for example, that
the federal government provide additional information on a number of
issues; help with security clearances; supply increased funding for
security improvements; and invest more in security-related research and
development.
Officials from the transit agencies we visited reported a need for the
federal government to disseminate additional information on topics
ranging from available federal grants to appropriate security levels
for individual agencies. A recurring theme was for the federal
government to establish a clearinghouse or similar mechanism that
maintains and disseminates the identified information. Specifically,
officials expressed a need for the federal government to provide
additional information on the following topics:
* Federal grants: Officials from several transit agencies stated that
information on available grants that can be used for transit safety and
security improvements would be useful, noting that it is challenging
and time consuming to locate these grants. For example, an assistant
general manager stated that she spends too much of her time searching
the internet for grants available for transit.
* Cutting-edge technology: Officials from a number of agencies said the
federal government should provide information on the latest security
technologies. For example, officials from one agency said this is
needed because they have been bombarded by vendors selling security
technology since September 11; however, the officials said they were
unsure about the quality of the products, whether the products were
needed, or whether the products would be outdated next year.
* Best practices: A number of officials said that information on
transit security best practices would be beneficial. According to FTA
officials, the assessments of the 36 transit agencies are helping them
identify best practices and FTA plans to develop a mechanism to share
such practices with the transit industry.
* Intelligence: Transit officials from a number of agencies stated that
the federal government should provide additional information on threats
to their transit agencies or cities. Officials also commented that
’real time“ information on attacks against other transit agencies would
be useful. According to an FTA official, FTA is currently developing a
system to share timely intelligence with transit agencies.
* Level of security: Transit officials from a few agencies told us that
it would be helpful for the federal government to provide information
on the appropriate level of security for their agencies. For example,
officials at one agency questioned whether they needed to continue to
post guards--24 hours a day, 7 days a week--at the entrance and exit of
their tunnel, a practice instituted when the Department of
Transportation issued a threat advisory to the transit industry in May
2002. Similarly, our preliminary survey results indicate that
uncertainty about what level of security is appropriate is a challenge
for transit agencies.
* Decontamination practices: Several transit agency officials stated
that they need information on decontamination protocols. For example,
one agency official noted that information is needed on how to
determine if the system is ’clean“ after a chemical or biological
attack.
A number of transit officials also expressed a need for the federal
government to help them obtain security clearances. As we have reported
in our previous work on homeland security, the lack of security
clearances among state and local officials has been reported as a
barrier to obtaining critical intelligence information. The inability
to receive any classified threat information could hamper agencies‘
emergency preparedness capability. This was illustrated by an incident
at one of the transit agencies we visited. In this incident, a bomb
threat was made against a major building in the transit agency‘s city.
However, because the transit agency officials did not have necessary
security clearances, the FBI did not inform them of this threat until
about 40 minutes before the agency was requested to help evacuate the
building. According to transit agency officials, the lack of advance
notice negatively affected their agency‘s ability to respond.
Fortunately, in this case, the threat was not carried out. Proposed
legislation (H.R 3483) provides that the Attorney General expeditiously
grant security clearances to governors who apply for them and to state
and local officials who participate in federal counterterrorism working
groups or regional task forces.[Footnote 21]
Officials from the transit agencies we visited also said additional
federal funding is needed. As noted earlier, many of the transit
agencies we visited are experiencing tightened budget environments,
which makes it more difficult to fund safety and security needs.
Moreover, according to our preliminary survey results, insufficient
funding is the most significant obstacle agencies face in trying to
make their systems more safe and secure. Congress has already made
additional funding available for transit security purposes--about $24
million through the fiscal year 2002 DOD supplemental. The majority of
this amount--about $18 million--funded FTA‘s multipart security
initiative.
On a similar note, officials from several of the agencies we met with
said the federal government should be investing more in security-
related research and development. Agency officials noted that
individual transit agencies do not have the resources to devote to
research and development. Moreover, the officials said this is an
appropriate role for the federal government, since the products of
research and development endeavors will likely benefit the entire
transit community, not just individual agencies. Currently, FTA‘s
Office of Technology is the agency‘s focal point for research and
development and is responsible for identifying and supporting
technological innovations, including safety and security innovations.
According to FTA documents, the Office of Technology‘s obligations for
safety and security technologies have increased from $680,000 in fiscal
year 2000 to an estimated $1.1 million in fiscal year 2002. FTA‘s
fiscal year 2003 budget request includes about $4.2 million for the
Office of Technology‘s safety and security technologies, representing a
272 percent increase from fiscal year 2002.
Critical Decisions Remain About Federal Government‘s Role in Funding
Transit Security Improvements:
Important funding decisions for transit safety and security initiatives
remain. As discussed earlier, some transit security enhancements are
expensive, and transit agencies have limited funds to pay for these
improvements. Consequently, the federal government will likely be
viewed as a source of funding for at least some of these improvements.
These improvements join the growing list of security initiatives
competing for federal assistance. In considering the federal
government‘s role in funding transit safety and security initiatives,
policymakers will need to address several issues. These issues include
developing federal funding criteria, determining the roles of
stakeholders in funding transit security, and selecting the appropriate
federal policy instrument to deliver assistance.
Because requests for federal dollars for transit security improvements
may exceed available resources, criteria for distributing federal funds
will also be needed. The total cost of all the needed transit security
improvements throughout the country is unknown. However, given the size
of the nation‘s transit systems, it could easily cost billions of
dollars. Transit agency officials we met with identified a number of
possible federal funding criteria that could be used to distribute
federal funding, including ridership levels, the population of the city
the transit agency serves, identified vulnerabilities of the agency,
potential for mass casualties, and assets of the agency (e.g., tunnels
and bridges). In general, the transit agency officials we spoke to
believed the funding criteria should direct federal dollars to agencies
that are most at risk and/or most vulnerable to a terrorist attack. The
identified criteria are in line with using a risk management approach-
-a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the
criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key
decisions linking resources with prioritized efforts for results. We
have advocated using a risk management approach to guide federal
programs and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other
threats and to better direct finite national resources to areas of
highest priority.[Footnote 22] FTA has not developed criteria or an
approach to distribute federal funds for transit security improvements.
The roles of stakeholders in funding transit safety and security will
also need to be established. Because all levels of government and the
private sector are concerned about transit safety and security, it may
be difficult to determine who should finance security activities. Given
the importance of transit to our nation‘s economic infrastructure, some
have argued that the federal government should pay for protective
measures for transit. Transit officials we spoke with said that the
federal government should provide additional funding for security
needs. In contrast, some of the benefits of transit systems, such as
employment and reduced congestion, remain within the locality or
region. In addition, private companies that own transit systems could
directly benefit from security measures because steps designed to
thwart terrorists could also prevent others from stealing goods or
causing other kinds of economic damage.
Another important consideration is the design of policy instruments to
deliver assistance. Our previous work on federal programs suggests that
the choice and design of policy instruments have important consequences
for performance and accountability. The federal government has a
variety of policy tools, including grants, loan guarantees, tax
incentives, and partnerships, to motivate or mandate other lower levels
of government or the private sector to help address security concerns.
The choice and design of policy tools can enhance the government‘s
capacity to (1) target the areas of highest risk to better ensure that
scarce federal resources address the most pressing needs, (2) promote
shared responsibilities by all parties, and (3) track and assess
progress toward achieving national goals. Regardless of the tool
selected, however, specific safeguards and clear accountability
requirements, such as establishing the terms and conditions of federal
participation, are needed to protect federal interests.
Observations:
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, securing the nation‘s transit system is
not a short-term or easy task. Many challenges must be overcome. FTA
and the transit agencies we visited have made a good start in enhancing
transit security, but more work is needed. Transit agencies‘ calls for
increased funding join the list of competing claims for federal dollars
and difficult trade-offs will have to be made to ensure that finite
resources are directed to the areas of highest priority. Next year‘s
reauthorization of TEA-21 provides an opportunity to examine the
federal government‘s role in funding transit security improvements.
Because requests for federal assistance will probably exceed available
resources, criteria will be needed for determining which transit
security improvements merit federal funds. In addition, the federal
government could take additional actions to assist transit agencies as
they press forward with their security improvements, such as providing
additional information on security matters and removing the prohibition
on using urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. We will
continue to monitor these issues for the committee and expect to issue
our final report in January 2003, which may include recommendations on
actions that the federal government and/or the other transit
stakeholders can take to improve transit security.
Scope and Methodology:
To address our objectives, we visited 10 transit agencies across the
country, including the Bay Area Rapid Transit in Oakland; Municipal
Railway in San Francisco; Metropolitan Transportation Authority in Los
Angeles; Regional Transportation District in Denver; Metro Transit in
Minneapolis; Chicago Transit Authority in Chicago; Capital Metro in
Austin; New York City Transit in New York; Central Florida Regional
Transit Authority in Orlando; and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority in the District of Columbia. We selected these agencies
because they represent different geographical areas and operate transit
systems of different sizes and modes. During our site visits, we
interviewed key officials from the transit agencies and the respective
cities‘ government and reviewed the transit agencies‘ emergency plans.
In addition, we surveyed a random sample (about 200) of all transit
agencies throughout the nation that are eligible to receive federal
urbanized area formula funds[Footnote 23] to obtain additional
information on safety and security issues. To date, we have
a response rate of over 70 percent. We are currently analyzing our
survey results; therefore,survey data presented in this statement are
preliminary.[Footnote 24] Additionally, we analyzed FTA budget data,
safety and security documents, and applicable statutes and regulations.
We also reviewed research on terrorism and attended transit security
forums sponsored by the American Public Transportation Association and
FTA. Finally, we interviewed FTA, TSA, and Department of Transportation
officials and representatives from the American Pubic Transportation
Association, National Governors Association, the Mineta Transportation
Institute, RAND, the University of California at Los Angeles, and the
Amalgamated Transit Union.
We conducted our review from May 2002 through September 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to
any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.
For information about this testimony, please contact Peter Guerrero,
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, on (202) 512-2834.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Karin
Bolwahnn, Nikki Clowers, Michelle Dresben, Elizabeth Eisenstadt,
Michele Fejfar, Susan Fleming, David Hooper, Wyatt Hundrup, Hiroshi
Ishikawa, and Sara Ann Moessbauer.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Homeland Security:
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to
Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Chemical Safety: Emergency Response Community Views on the Adequacy of
Federally Required Chemical Information. GAO-02-799. Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2002.
Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO-02-
957T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.
Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. GAO-
02-927T. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002.
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships
Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 1,
2002.
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting. GAO-02-893T. Washington, D.C.: June 28,
2002.
Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, but
Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. Washington,
D.C.: June 25, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy. GAO-
02-811T. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving
National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and
Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy
for Homeland Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership
Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-and
Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7,
2001.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO-02-
150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation‘s Issues. GAO-
01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Combating Terrorism:
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-955T.
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development
of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-
550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships through a National
Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to
Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T.
Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2002.
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.: October 17,
2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD‘s Antiterrorism
Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington, D.C.:
September 19, 2001.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Congressional Research Service, Transportation Issues in the 107TH
Congress, (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2002).
[2] See ’Related GAO Products“ at the end of this testimony.
[3] For more information about our ongoing work, see ’Scope and
Methodology“ at the end of this testimony.
[4] Data are preliminary.
[5] 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5330.
[6] P.L. No. 105-178 (1998).
[7] 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5307 (d)(1)(J)(i) and (ii).
[8] P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[9] The Mineta Transportation Institute was established by Congress as
part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
(ISTEA). The Mineta Transportation Institute focuses on international
surface transportation policy issues as related to three primary
responsibilities: research, education, and technology transfer.
[10] See ’Related GAO Products“ at the end of this testimony.
[11] 49 U.S.C. sec. 5324(c).
[12] 49 U.S.C. sec. 5324(c) and 49 U.S.C. sec. 5327(c)(2).
[13] 49 U.S.C. sec. 5307 (d)(1)(J)(i) and (ii).
[14] According to FTA officials, FTA verifies that agencies spend at
least 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds on security
improvements during its triennial review. FTA‘s triennial review is a
full review and evaluation of grantees‘ performance in carrying out
projects, including specific references to compliance with statutory
and administration requirements.
[15] FTA also has authority to enter into ’other agreements“ with
transit agencies to introduce innovative methods for safety and
security on negotiated terms and conditions more favorable to
nonfederal participants than are authorized under FTA contracts,
grants, or cooperative agreements under 49 U.S.C. sec. 5312(d), and FTA
may work with other federal agencies in developing defenses and
responses to terrorist incidents.
[16] A professional team of antiterrorism, transit operations, and
emergency response experts conducts each assessment.
[17] Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States Act 2002 (P.L. 107-117, H.R. Conference Report 107-350). The DOD
supplemental also provided $39.1 million to the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority for region-wide security requirements, including
$5 million for protective clothing and breathing apparatus, $2.2
million for completion of the fiber optic network project, $15 million
for a chemical emergency sensor program and $16.9 million for increased
employee and facility security. On August 2, 2002, the president signed
into law the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery
From and Response To Terrorist Attacks on the United States (P.L.107-
206, H.R. 4775), which set aside $15 million for grants to enhance
security for intercity bus operations.
[18] Includes FTA‘s funding of its safety and security activities and
oversight.
[19] For more information on TSA‘s role in aviation security, see: U.S.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Transportation Security
Administration Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T.
Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002.
[20] The strategy states that the proposed Department of Homeland
Security will coordinate closely with the Department of Transportation,
which will remain responsible for transportation safety.
[21] According to the Department of Transportation, the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act gives TSA the authority to disclose
sensitive security information to approved officials from federal,
state, and local governments and the private sector on a ’need to know“
basis, even if the officials do not have clearances.
[22] U.S. General Accounting Office. Homeland Security: A Risk
Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T.
Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001; and U.S. General Accounting Office.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize
and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:
April 9, 1998.
[23] The urbanized area formula program provides federal funds to
urbanized areas (jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more) for
transit capital investments, operating expenses, and transportation-
related planning.
[24] We plan to issue our written report, including complete survey
results, to the full committee in January 2003.
