Federal Aviation Administration
Reauthorization Provides Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges Gao ID: GAO-03-653T April 10, 2003Much has changed since the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) reauthorized the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) programs 3 years ago. At that time, air traffic was increasing, and concerns about congestion and flight delays were paramount. Since then, the downturn in the nation's economy, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and, most recently, the war in Iraq have taken a heavy toll on aviation. Analysts nonetheless expect the demand for air travel to rebound, and the nation's aviation system must be ready to accommodate the projected growth safely and securely. The current reauthorization of FAA's programs provides an opportunity for the Congress and the administration to focus on challenges in increasing aviation capacity, efficiency, and safety and in controlling aviation program costs.
Increasing capacity and service in the national airspace system poses several challenges. While airports currently receive enough funding to cover FAA's estimate of their planned capital development costs, a declining surplus in the trust fund that helps to support development and the need to spend up to $5 billion over the next 5 years for security-related capital improvements make the financial outlook for the next 5 to 8 years uncertain. Runway development, the principal means of increasing capacity, is now taking 10 to 14 years to complete, in large part because of time-consuming environmental reviews and community concerns. Providing air service for small communities is also becoming more difficult as costs increase and passenger ticket revenues decline. Intermodal alternatives may hold promise. Efforts to improve the efficiency of the national airspace system by modernizing the air traffic control system face challenges despite actions taken by the Congress and the administration to eliminate the cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued FAA's modernization efforts. Overall, FAA is improving its management of the air traffic modernization program and has implemented some systems, but key projects continue to experience problems. To enhance aviation safety, FAA and the aviation industry have undertaken an initiative to reduce the fatal accident rate, and FAA is working to strengthen its safety inspections of airlines' operations. Interagency coordination of aviation safety and aviation security activities has emerged as a challenge with the transfer of aviation security responsibilities from FAA to the Transportation Security Administration. FAA faces challenges in implementing controls over its costs. Although it has partially implemented a new cost accounting system that enables it to track 70 percent of its air traffic services costs, this system lacks internal controls over $3.1 billion in labor costs, according to the Department of Transportation's Inspector General. Congressional oversight is important to ensure that FAA implements controls and spends its resources effectively.
GAO-03-653T, Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S.
Senate:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 10, 2003:
Federal Aviation Administration:
Reauthorization Provides Opportunities to Address Key Agency
Challenges:
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham
Director, Civil Aviation Issues:
GAO-03-653T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-653T, a testimony before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Why GAO Did This Study:
Much has changed since the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) reauthorized the Federal
Aviation Administration‘s (FAA) programs 3 years ago. At that time,
air traffic was increasing, and concerns about congestion and flight
delays were paramount. Since then, the downturn in the nation‘s
economy, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and, most
recently, the war in Iraq have taken a heavy toll on aviation. Analysts
nonetheless expect the demand for air travel to rebound, and the
nation‘s aviation system must be ready to accommodate the projected
growth safely and securely.
The current reauthorization of FAA‘s programs provides an opportunity
for the Congress and the administration to focus on challenges in
increasing aviation capacity, efficiency, and safety and in controlling
aviation program costs.
What GAO Found:
Increasing capacity and service in the national airspace system poses
several challenges. While airports currently receive enough funding to
cover FAA‘s estimate of their planned capital development costs, a
declining surplus in the trust fund that helps to support development
and the need to spend up to $5 billion over the next 5 years for
security-related capital improvements make the financial outlook for
the next 5 to 8 years uncertain. Runway development, the principal
means of increasing capacity, is now taking 10 to 14 years to complete,
in large part because of time-consuming environmental reviews and
community concerns. Providing air service for small communities is
also becoming more difficult as costs increase and passenger ticket
revenues decline. Intermodal alternatives may hold promise.
Efforts to improve the efficiency of the national airspace system by
modernizing the air traffic control system face challenges despite
actions taken by the Congress and the administration to eliminate the
cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have
plagued FAA‘s modernization efforts. Overall, FAA is improving its
management of the air traffic modernization program and has implemented
some systems, but key projects continue to experience problems.
To enhance aviation safety, FAA and the aviation industry have
undertaken an initiative to reduce the fatal accident rate, and FAA is
working to strengthen its safety inspections of airlines‘ operations.
Interagency coordination of aviation safety and aviation security
activities has emerged as a challenge with the transfer of aviation
security responsibilities from FAA to the Transportation Security
Administration.
FAA faces challenges in implementing controls over its costs.
Although it has partially implemented a new cost accounting system that
enables it to track 70 percent of its air traffic services costs, this
system lacks internal controls over $3.1 billion in labor costs,
according to the Department of Transportation‘s Inspector General.
Congressional oversight is important to ensure that FAA implements
controls and spends its resources effectively.
What GAO Recommends:
This testimony does not contain recommendations. However, GAO reports
containing relevant recommendations are listed among the Related GAO
Products following the testimony.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-653T.
To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or
dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of report]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We are here today to discuss the reauthorization of federal aviation
programs and issues relevant to ensuring the safe and efficient
operation of the national airspace system.[Footnote 1] Much has changed
since the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the
21st Century (AIR-21) reauthorized the Federal Aviation
Administration‘s (FAA) programs 3 years ago. At that time, as you know,
air traffic was increasing, and concerns about congestion and flight
delays were paramount. Since then, the downturn in the nation‘s
economy, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and, most
recently, the war in Iraq have taken a heavy toll on aviation. Flights
that were once filled are now being canceled for lack of business, and
major air carriers are in serious financial difficulty. Furthermore, as
the federal budget deficit has increased, competition for federal
resources has intensified. Analysts nonetheless expect the demand for
air travel to rebound, and the nation‘s aviation system must be ready
to accommodate the projected growth safely and securely. The current
slowdown in the economy and in the aviation industry has created a
window of opportunity to prepare for this growth without the pressures
of congestion and flight delays. My statement today focuses on the
challenges that the Congress, the administration, and FAA face in
increasing aviation capacity, efficiency, and safety, and maintaining
controls over costs. My statement is based primarily on our published
reports, as well as our ongoing work for this Committee discussed in
the scope and methodology section at the end of the statement.
In summary:
* Increasing capacity and service in the national airspace system poses
several challenges for the Congress and the administration during this
reauthorization process. Chief among them is deciding how much of
airports‘ planned capital development should be funded to increase
capacity and service, as well as improve the efficiency and safety of
the national airspace system. Funds for airports‘ capital development
have increased over the last 5 years, in part because of increases in
the federal grant funding provided to airports under the Airport
Improvement Program. Current funding levels are sufficient to cover
much of the estimated cost of planned capital development. However,
future funding levels may be affected by changes in the allocation of
Airport Improvement Program grant funds and by projected decreases in
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which supports the Airport
Improvement Program and other FAA accounts. Other challenges include
building runways expeditiously to increase capacity and providing air
service to small communities. Runway development now takes 10 to 14
years, primarily because of time-consuming environmental reviews and
community concerns. Two federal programs, the Essential Air Service and
the Small Community Air Service Development Pilot programs, help bring
air service to small communities, but the costs of this service are
increasing while passenger ticket revenues are declining. The
administration is proposing an approach to streamline the environmental
reviews required for runway development, and intermodal alternatives,
such as rail or bus service, could provide access to the national air
transportation system for some small communities.
:
* Efforts to improve the efficiency of the national airspace system by
modernizing its principal component, the air traffic control system,
face ongoing challenges despite actions taken by the Congress and the
administration to eliminate the cost overruns, schedule delays, and
performance shortfalls that have plagued FAA‘s air traffic
modernization program and led us to designate this program as high
risk. These actions include granting FAA acquisition and human capital
flexibilities in 1996 and creating a new, three-component structure to
improve the oversight, management, and operation of the air traffic
control system in 2000. Our work has shown that FAA has responded to
these actions to varying degrees, but more remains to be done. Overall,
FAA is improving its management of the air traffic modernization
program and has implemented some systems, but key projects continue to
experience cost, schedule, and performance problems. Additionally, FAA
has used its acquisition flexibilities to establish an acquisition
management system and its human capital flexibilities to fully or
partially implement human capital reform initiatives. The acquisition
management system has provided FAA with a structured management
approach for selecting and controlling its investments, and the human
capital reform initiatives are affording opportunities for FAA to
manage its workforce more efficiently. However, in implementing both of
these reforms, FAA has not yet incorporated important processes or
elements for evaluating the results of its efforts, modifying these
efforts as necessary, and holding its managers accountable. Finally,
one of the three components of the new structure for improving the
performance of the air traffic control system has been implemented. The
oversight component, the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee, has been
meeting since January 2001 and emphasizing performance management, but
without the management and operating components, the new structure is
not yet functioning as intended. Completing the implementation of, and
continuing to improve, these efforts will be important to enhancing the
efficiency of the air traffic control system.
:
* Important steps have been taken to enhance aviation safety, but some
challenges remain. Safer Skies, an initiative designed by FAA and the
aviation industry to reduce the nation‘s fatal aviation accident rate
by 80 percent by 2007, is the centerpiece of these efforts to improve
aviation safety. This initiative began in 1998, and many preventive
actions are under way but have not yet been fully implemented. Another
key effort to improve aviation safety is FAA‘s Air Transportation
Oversight System, which was redesigned to provide more effective
inspections of the nation‘s airline operations. In reporting on this
system in 1999, we noted that it incorporated important features to
ensure that airlines have systems to control risks and prevent
accidents, but that it had encountered startup problems with data
collection and program guidance.[Footnote 2] Many of these problems
were not yet fully resolved when the Department of Transportation‘s
Inspector General reported on the inspection system last year.[Footnote
3] Finally, because of the often vital link between aviation safety and
aviation security, it will be critical for FAA to ensure that aviation
safety is maintained as the Department of Homeland Security‘s
Transportation Security Administration implements new security
enhancements.
:
* With the decline in revenues to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund--
the principal source of funding for most of FAA‘s operations,
facilities and equipment, and grant programs--it is especially
important that FAA control or reduce costs, run its programs
efficiently, and detect and prevent fraudulent activities. FAA,
however, faces challenges in implementing controls over its costs. For
example, during fiscal year 2000, weaknesses in the internal controls
over FAA‘s purchase card program contributed to $5.4 million in
improper purchases by FAA employees and over $630,000 in purchases that
were considered wasteful or questionable. In addition, FAA has
partially implemented a new cost accounting system that enables it to
track 70 percent of its air traffic services costs; however, according
to the Department of Transportation‘s Inspector General, this system
lacks internal controls over $3.1 billion in labor costs. The Inspector
General further noted that a portion of this system, if implemented as
designed, could provide workforce data that would be helpful in
determining how many controllers are needed and where. These data would
assist FAA in planning for the anticipated retirement of large numbers
of air traffic controllers in the near and long term.
:
Efforts to Increase Aviation Capacity and Service Face Funding and
Other Challenges:
During this reauthorization period, the Congress and the administration
face several key challenges in attempting to increase the capacity of
the national airspace system and expand service to small communities.
These challenges include determining (1) how much airport capital
development is needed, (2) how that development will be funded, (3) how
assistance for enhancing air service to small communities will be
provided, and (4) how the current process for enhancing capacity,
particularly the runway development process, can be expedited.
FAA and the Airport Industry Have Developed Different Estimates of
Airports‘ Planned Capital Development Costs:
FAA and the Airport Council International (ACI), an organization
representing the airport industry, have developed two different
estimates of airports‘ planned capital development costs that are based
on two different sets of projects. According to FAA‘s estimate, which
includes only projects that are eligible for Airport Improvement
Program (AIP) grants, such as runways, taxiways, and noise mitigation
and noise reduction efforts, the total cost of airport development will
be about $46 billion, or over $9 billion per year, for 2001 through
2005. FAA‘s estimate is based on the agency‘s National Plan of
Integrated Airport Systems, which FAA published in August 2002. ACI‘s
estimate includes all of the projects in FAA‘s estimate, plus other
planned airport capital projects that may or may not be eligible for
AIP grants. Projects that are not eligible for AIP funding include
parking garages, hangars, and expansions of commercial space in
terminals. ACI estimates a total cost of almost $75 billion, or nearly
$15 billion per year, for 2002 through 2006. Neither ACI‘s nor FAA‘s
estimate includes funding for the terminal modification projects that
are needed to accommodate the new explosives detection systems required
to screen checked baggage. ACI estimates that these projects will cost
about $3 billion to $5 billion over the next 5 years.
Although there is a difference of $6 billion a year between FAA‘s and
ACI‘s estimates of planned development costs, both estimates cover
projects for every type of airport. As table 1 indicates, the estimates
are identical for all but the large-and medium-hub airports, which are
responsible for transporting about 90 percent of the traveling public.
For these airports, ACI‘s estimate of planned development costs is
about twice as large as FAA‘s. As the Congress moves forward with
reauthorizing FAA‘s programs, it will have to determine what level of
planned capital development is appropriate to increase the capacity,
efficiency, and safety of the national airspace system.
Table 1: Average Annual Planned Development Costs Estimated by FAA and
ACI, by Airport Type, 2001-2006:
Dollars in millions.
Large hub; Number of airports: 31;
Estimated average annual costs: FAA: $4,855;
Estimated average annual costs: ACI: $8,554.
Medium hub; Number of airports: 37;
Estimated average annual costs: FAA: 1,073;
Estimated average annual costs: ACI: 3,109.
Small hub; Number of airports: 71;
Estimated average annual costs: FAA: 675;
Estimated average annual costs: ACI: 675.
Nonhub; Number of airports: 280;
Estimated average annual costs: FAA: 807;
Estimated average annual costs: ACI: 807.
Other commercial service; Number of airports: 124;
Estimated average annual costs: FAA: 142;
Estimated average annual costs: ACI: 142.
Reliever; Number of airports: 260;
Estimated average annual costs: FAA: 526;
Estimated average annual costs: ACI: 526.
General aviation; Number of airports: 2,558;
Estimated average annual costs: FAA: 1,167;
Estimated average annual costs: ACI: 1,167.
Total; Number of airports: 3,364;
Estimated average annual costs: FAA: $9,245;
Estimated average annual costs: ACI: $14,980.
Source: FAA and ACI.
[End of table]
Airports‘ Ability to Fund Planned Capital Development Has Improved:
Over the past 5 years, the ability of airports--especially smaller
airports--to fund their capital development projects has improved, in
part because AIR-21 increased both the total amount of funding for AIP
grants and the proportion of AIP funding that went to smaller airports.
In 1998, we reported that large-and medium-hub airports could fund
about 79 percent of their planned capital development and smaller
airports could fund about 52 percent of their planned capital
development if they continued to receive funding at prior years‘
levels. In 2003, the funding ability of both groups of airports
increased. As shown in figure 1, large-and medium-hub airports could
fund about 80 percent of their planned capital development, an increase
of 1 percentage point, while smaller airports could fund about 73
percent of their planned capital development, an increase of 21
percentage points, assuming the continuation of prior years‘ funding
levels.[Footnote 4]
Figure 1: Ability of Smaller and Larger Airports to Fund Estimated
Planned Capital Development in 1998 and 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The primary reason why smaller airports are able to fund 73 percent of
their planned development in 2003, rather than the 52 percent we
reported in 1998, is that they have benefited significantly from the
increases in AIP grants, which are a larger source of funding for
smaller airports than for larger airports. In addition, smaller
airports have received an increasing share of AIP grants because of
statutorily required changes in the distribution of AIP grants. For
example, in AIR-21, the Congress increased the funding for two grant
categories that primarily or exclusively benefit smaller airports--the
state apportionment fund and the small airport fund--and created
general aviation entitlement grants, which also benefit smaller
airports. The Senate‘s and the administration‘s reauthorization
proposals continue to support increases in the amount of AIP grant
funding awarded to smaller airports. In spite of the progress that has
been made, over 25 percent of planned capital development is not
funded. The Congress needs to be mindful of this situation as it
considers reauthorization issues.
Changes in the Use of AIP Grants and Additional Decreases in Trust Fund
Revenue Could Affect Airports‘ Future Funding Ability:
The use of AIP grants to fund new airport security requirements and
additional decreases in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund‘s[Footnote 5]
revenues could affect the future ability of airports to fund their
planned capital development. In recent fiscal years, airports obtained
most of their funding for planned capital development from bonds, AIP
grants, and passenger facility charges.[Footnote 6] Because the Trust
Fund is the source of funding for AIP grants, its financial condition
is important to the ability of airports to fund capital development,
and decreases in its revenues could reduce the amount of funding for
airport planned capital development. Reductions in AIP grant funds
would have the greatest effect on smaller airports, which derive most
of their planned capital development funding from AIP grants, whereas
large-and medium-hub airports derive most of their funding from bonds.
Continued Use of AIP Grant Funds for Security Projects Would Reduce
Funding for Capacity Projects:
According to FAA officials, FAA plans to allocate the same amount of
AIP grant funds for new security projects at airports in fiscal year
2003 as it allocated in fiscal year 2002--$561 million. As we reported
in October 2002,[Footnote 7] the use of AIP grants for security
projects reduced the funding available for other airport development
projects, such as projects to bring airports up to FAA‘s design
standards and reconstruction projects, and caused FAA to defer three
letter-of-intent payments totaling $28 million to three airports until
fiscal year 2003 or later.[Footnote 8] Among the key reauthorization
issues facing the Congress are how the funding needs for capacity and
security projects will be balanced and how the new security
requirements, including the terminal modification projects that are
expected to cost $3 billion to $5 billion, will be funded.
Additional Declines in Airport and Airway Trust Fund Revenue Could Also
Affect Amount of AIP Grant Funds Available for Future Capital
Development:
The future ability of airports to fund planned capital development may
be affected by uncertainties surrounding the condition of the Trust
Fund. As you know, the Trust Fund is the source of funding not only for
AIP grants but also for other FAA accounts, including facilities and
equipment; research, engineering, and development; and most operations.
Revenues to the Trust Fund come from several types of taxes, including
passenger ticket and fuel taxes. Although projections made in November
2002 indicate that the Trust Fund will be able to meet its traditional
obligations over the next 10 years, the financial outlook for the next
5 to 8 years is uncertain, in part, because passenger traffic has
decreased with the slowdown in the economy. Current estimates indicate
that between fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2007, the Trust Fund‘s
2002 uncommitted balance of about $4.8 billion will decline by about $4
billion, leaving a balance of less than a billion dollars. In addition,
if revenues fall short of current projections, the Trust Fund‘s
uncommitted balance may be zero. Under this scenario, AIP grants and
other FAA accounts supported by the Trust Fund could potentially
receive less funding, and the Congress and the administration would
have to decide how to offset the potential decreases.
As figure 2 shows, from 1999 through 2002, revenues to the Trust Fund
have declined, while expenditures from the fund have increased.
Revenues fell from about $11 billion in 1999 to almost $10 billion in
2002, a decrease of almost 10 percent. During the same period,
expenditures increased from about $8 billion to about $12 billion, an
increase of about 47 percent. As a result, the uncommitted balance
(surplus) has fallen by nearly 35 percent, from $7 billion in 1999 to
almost $5 billion in 2002.
Figure 2: Financial Condition of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The major reason for the decline in Trust Fund revenues was a drop in
passenger ticket tax revenues, which fell by nearly $1.2 billion from
1999 to 2002. The increase in Trust Fund expenditures from 1999 through
2002, amounting to almost $4 billion, can be attributed primarily to
increases in funding for FAA operations and AIP grants, which accounted
for about 47 percent and about 34 percent of the total increase,
respectively.
In addition, the administration is proposing actions that would further
reduce the Trust Fund balance over the next several years.
Specifically, the President‘s fiscal year 2004 budget request would
increase the percentage of FAA operations funded by the Trust Fund from
75 percent[Footnote 9] to 79 percent. The decrease in Trust Fund
revenues and increase in Trust Fund expenditures presents an issue that
the Congress may want to address as it moves forward with the
reauthorization process.
Resolving Challenges to Runway Development Remains an Important Issue:
While there is a general consensus that building runways is one of the
most effective ways to increase capacity in the national airspace
system, resolving the challenges associated with planning and building
runways is an important issue that is directly related to enhancing
capacity. In December 2002, FAA published the most recent version of
its Operational Evolution Plan, a 10-year plan to increase the capacity
and efficiency of the national airspace system, primarily by building
runways.[Footnote 10] Figure 3 illustrates how capacity will be
increased at one airport through runway construction.
Figure 3: Increasing Airport Capacity through Runway Development:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
If successfully carried out, FAA‘s Operational Evolution Plan would
substantially increase capacity and improve efficiency. However, FAA
faces several challenges in implementing the plan. First, the success
of the plan depends on adequate funding and on the consensus of FAA‘s
aviation industry partners. Yet according to the most recent version of
the plan, the timing and implementation of some activities may be in
jeopardy because of the current economic situation and the uncertain
viability of some industry participants. For example, the plan calls
for the airline industry to invest $11 billion in new equipment for
aircraft. FAA is currently reviewing the ability of the airlines to
make this investment. Second, as noted, the plan relies heavily on
runway development to increase capacity, but the most recent version of
the plan reports mixed results in building new runways. While the plan
indicates that one new runway will be built during the next 10 years,
it points out that another runway has been canceled and the
construction of six additional runways has been delayed because of
local situations.
In January 2003, we reported that airports spent about 10 years
planning and building recently completed runways and expect to spend
about 14 years on runways that are not yet completed.[Footnote 11] We
also reported that several external factors affect how much time is
spent planning and building runways, and several airports with
unfinished runway projects identified significant challenges that had
delayed the completion of their projects. While many airports believed
that completing the environmental review phase was a significant
challenge and is an issue that warrants immediate attention, airports
also faced obstacles that some said were as onerous as the
environmental review phase. They identified significant challenges in
reaching agreement with community interest groups during the planning
phase and in mitigating the potential impact of aircraft noise on the
surrounding community. Although there may be no single solution to
resolving all of the issues involved in planning and building runways,
the federal government and airport authorities are taking some action.
For example, the Senate‘s and the administration‘s reauthorization
proposals call for streamlining the environmental review of
transportation infrastructure projects.
Recognizing that building new runways is not always a practicable way
to increase capacity at some airports, we identified three alternatives
to building runways in our December 2001 report:[Footnote 12]
* Find ways to manage and distribute demand within the system‘s
existing capacity at busy airports such as LaGuardia, by, for example,
limiting the number of takeoffs and landings during peak periods or
limiting the ability of general aviation aircraft to use especially
congested airports (under current law, all aircraft have equal access
to even the largest airports). Airports are restricted in using pricing
to reflect the scarcity and congestion of airspace.
:
* Add capacity by using nearby airports that have available capacity.
:
* Examine other modes of intercity travel, such as high-speed rail,
where metropolitan areas are relatively close, to form an integrated,
intermodal transportation network.
:
Accordingly, we recommended that the Department of Transportation (DOT)
begin a more extensive evaluation of initiatives, including intermodal
solutions and a dialogue with transportation stakeholders, as a basis
for developing a comprehensive blueprint for addressing the nation‘s
long-term transportation needs. DOT has recognized the need for more
and better long-range planning on the potential use of such measures
and agreed with our recommendation. The Department‘s evaluation efforts
are in the beginning stages. The current hiatus in air traffic growth
creates an opportunity for the development of long-term transportation
plans.
Federal Programs to Help Small Communities Improve Air Service Face
Budgetary Pressures and Questions about Their Effectiveness:
While the need for greater capacity is a vital issue for some large-and
medium-hub airports, the primary issue at other airports that serve
small communities is to obtain or retain commercial air service. The
reauthorization process provides an opportunity for the Congress to
clarify the federal strategy for helping small communities acquire the
commercial air service they desire. Currently, the challenges that
small communities have long faced in obtaining or retaining commercial
air service are increasing as many U.S. airlines try to stem
unprecedented financial losses through numerous cost-cutting measures,
including reducing or eliminating service in some markets. Small
communities feel such losses disproportionately because they may have
service from only one or two airlines. For them, reductions can mean no
air service at all.
The Essential Air Service (EAS) program, authorized under the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, guarantees that small communities served
before deregulation will continue to receive a certain level of
scheduled air service. Its costs have more than tripled since fiscal
year 1995, and indications are that without changes to the program, the
demand for subsidies will soon exceed the program‘s $113 million
appropriation for fiscal year 2003. At the same time, aggregate
passenger levels at EAS-subsidized airports continue to fall. Often
fewer than 10 percent of a community‘s potential passengers use the
subsidized local service; the rest choose to drive to their destination
or drive to a larger airport that offers lower fares or more frequent
service to more destinations. In 2000, the median number of passengers
on each EAS-subsidized flight was three. The administration‘s budget
proposal for fiscal year 2004 would substantially reduce the federal
subsidy for small community air service and require communities that
wish to retain the service to help subsidize it. Specifically, the
budget proposal would reduce federal EAS funding from $133 million in
2003 to $50 million in 2004, alter the eligibility criteria for
funding, and require nonfederal matching funds. Consistent with its
budget proposal, the administration‘s reauthorization proposal would
restructure the EAS program to direct its resources to the small
communities with the greatest need to maintain access to national air
transportation service. The Senate bill proposes to reauthorize funding
for the program at current levels.
The Small Community Air Service Development Pilot Program, authorized
as part of AIR-21, provides grants to communities to enhance local air
service. In fiscal year 2002, 180 communities requested over $142
million in air service development grants, and $20 million was
appropriated. In March 2003, we reported that the program funded some
innovative approaches.[Footnote 13] For example, Mobile, Alabama,
received about $450,000 to provide ground-handling services to an
airline, and Caspar, Wyoming, received $500,000 to purchase and lease
back an aircraft to an airline to ensure service to the community. The
program also funded the same types of projects that many small
communities have undertaken in recent years, such as evaluations of
marketing activities and the use of financial incentives to encourage
airlines to either start or enhance service. According to our analysis
of similar approaches used by about 100 small communities, financial
incentives offered the most promise for attracting new or additional
service. However, the additional service typically ended with the
incentives. The sustainability of such improvements in air service over
the longer term appeared to depend on the community‘s size and ability
to demonstrate a commitment to that air service, either by providing a
profitable passenger base or through direct financial assistance. As
you know, the administration‘s fiscal year 2004 budget proposal would
eliminate the funding for this pilot program. It is too soon to
determine how effective the various types of initiatives funded through
this program might prove to be. Other options for making the national
air transportation system more accessible to small communities might
include intermodal initiatives such as those we proposed as
alternatives to runway development.
Efforts to Improve the Efficiency of the Air Traffic Control System
Face Ongoing Challenges:
Improving the efficiency of the air traffic control system will be
important to accommodate the expected return to pre-September 11 air
traffic levels. Efforts to achieve this improvement pose continuing
challenges, as FAA attempts to put acquisition management and human
capital reforms in place and establish an effective oversight and
organizational structure to help ensure that resources are spent cost-
effectively and improvements are realized.
FAA‘s Air Traffic Modernization Remains High Risk:
To increase the safety, capacity, and efficiency of the national
airspace system, FAA undertook a major effort in 1981 to modernize and
replace aging air traffic control equipment. This effort, which
includes major projects in such areas as communications, surveillance,
navigation, and weather, has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule
delays, and performance shortfalls. As a result, we designated FAA‘s
air traffic modernization program as high risk in 1995, and we continue
to designate it as such.[Footnote 14] Figure 4 combines our and the DOT
Inspector General‘s analysis of FAA‘s progress in meeting cost and
schedule goals for selected air traffic control projects--the Standard
Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS), Wide Area Augmentation
System (WAAS), Next-Generation Air/Ground Communication (NEXCOM), free
flight, Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), and Integrated Terminal
Weather System (ITWS).
Figure 4: Status of Selected FAA Air Traffic Control Projects:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
FAA is making progress in managing the air traffic control
modernization effort and has implemented some key projects. For
example, the agency has replaced the automated color display equipment
used by air traffic controllers to control traffic in some facilities
(Display System Replacement); installed the initial phase of the
computer that receives, processes, and tracks aircraft movement
throughout the airspace system (HOST computer); and implemented some
free flight technologies that are expected to allow for more efficient
use of the system by improving operations in various segments of
flight. Figure 5 shows an FAA representative using the Display System
Replacement to monitor and handle air traffic.
Figure 5: Air Traffic Controller:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
However, other key projects continue to experience cost, schedule, and
performance problems. The Inspector General has reported that the costs
of five acquisitions have grown by $3 billion--the equivalent of 1
year‘s budget for the modernization program--and the delay in
completing these acquisitions has ranged from 3 to 5 years.[Footnote
15] Problems in implementing the Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System are indicative of the problems that have plagued the
modernization program. Since September 1996, FAA has been developing
the STARS project to replace the outdated computer equipment that air
traffic controllers currently use in some facilities to control air
traffic within 5 to 50 nautical miles of an airport.
The current program presently bears little resemblance to the program
envisioned in 1996. Initially FAA anticipated very little software
development, planned to install STARS in 172 facilities at a cost of
$940 million, and expected implementation to begin in 1998 and end in
2005. In 1999, FAA modified its acquisition approach (from off-the-
shelf software to a combination of customized and off-the-shelf
software) and increased to 188 the number of facilities scheduled to
receive STARS. Then the agency concluded that it did not have adequate
funding to deploy STARS to 188 facilities, and in March 2002, it
received approval to deploy STARS at 74 facilities that had frequent
equipment failures, were new, or had the digital radar needed to
operate STARS.
FAA does not yet know to what extent its estimate of STARS‘s remaining
development costs is reliable because, as we reported in January 2003,
FAA lacks accurate, valid, current data on the STARS program‘s
remaining costs and progress.[Footnote 16] Without such data, FAA is
limited in its ability to effectively oversee the contractor‘s
performance and reliably estimate future costs. Although FAA has
adopted clear procurement management policies and procedures, it did
not consistently apply this guidance in managing the STARS contract.
For example, the development cost estimate is based on the contractor‘s
projections, which FAA had not yet independently analyzed as its
guidance directs. We made several recommendations to improve the
management of STARS and subsequent terminal modernization programs and
to provide the Congress with more reliable information for oversight.
FAA agreed with our recommendations and is implementing them.
Acquisition Management System Is in Place, but Weaknesses Limit FAA‘s
Ability to Manage Its Investments Effectively:
As part of its procurement reforms, FAA introduced an acquisition
management system in 1996 to reduce the time and cost to deploy new
products and services. In 1999, we reported that this system provided a
structured management approach for selecting and controlling
investments, but still had weaknesses, such as incomplete data on
projects‘ costs, schedule, benefits, performance, and risks, that
limited FAA‘s ability to manage its investments effectively. We made
several recommendations to address these weaknesses and FAA has made
changes to better manage its investments. We have since found that FAA
is overseeing investment risk and capturing key information from the
investment selection process in a management information system and is
also developing guidance for validating costs, benefits, and risks.
However, FAA is not yet incorporating actual costs from related system
development efforts in its processes for estimating the costs of new
projects. Moreover, FAA has not yet implemented processes for
evaluating projects after implementation in order to identify lessons
learned and improve the investment management process. These weaknesses
have impeded FAA‘s ability to manage its investments effectively and
make sound decisions about continuing, modifying, or canceling
projects. Because its acquisition reform effort is not complete, major
projects continue to face challenges that could affect their costs,
schedule, and performance.
Human Capital Reform Initiatives Do Not Incorporate Elements Important
for Effective Management:
In response to claims by FAA that burdensome governmentwide human
capital rules impeded its ability to hire, train, and deploy personnel,
the Congress exempted FAA from many federal laws[Footnote 17] governing
human capital, and the agency began implementing sweeping human capital
reforms in 1996.[Footnote 18] These reforms addressed three broad
areas: (1) compensation and performance management, (2) workforce
management, and (3) labor and employee relations. Figure 6 summarizes
our analysis of FAA‘s progress in implementing initiatives in each of
these areas.
Figure 6: Implementation Status of Selected FAA Personnel Reform
Initiatives:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
While FAA has fully or partially implemented the initiatives in each of
its three broad reform areas, it has not fully incorporated elements
that are important to effective human capital management into its
overall reform effort. These elements include data collection and
analysis, performance goals and measures, and links between reform
goals and program goals. Furthermore, as we reported in February 2003,
FAA has not developed specific steps and time frames for building these
missing elements into its human capital management and for using these
elements to evaluate the effects of its personnel reform initiatives,
make strategic improvements, and hold the agency‘s leadership
accountable.
New Structure for Improving the Performance of the Air Traffic Control
System Has Not Been Fully Implemented:
In 2000, AIR-21 and an executive order established a new structure to
accelerate the modernization and improve the performance of the air
traffic control system. This structure was to consist of (1) a five-
member board, called the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee
(Subcommittee), to oversee the air traffic control system, (2) a chief
operating officer to manage the air traffic control system, and (3) a
new performance-based organization, to be known as the Air Traffic
Organization, to operate the air traffic control system. Under the act,
the Subcommittee provides oversight by, among other things, reviewing
and approving strategic plans, large contracts, and budget requests for
the air traffic control system.
The Subcommittee has been meeting since January 2001, but a chief
operating officer has not yet been appointed, and FAA is waiting for an
appointment before putting the new air traffic organization in place.
To date, the Subcommittee has focused on bringing performance
management, accountability, and a more businesslike structure to the
air traffic control system, and it has taken some specific actions,
including reviewing and approving performance metrics, a budget, and
three large procurements that FAA initiated. However, without a chief
operating officer or a performance-based organization, the new
structure is not functioning as intended.
FAA and other stakeholders have suggested reasons for the difficulties
in implementing the new structure and have proposed changes to AIR-21
that they believe would address these reasons. For example, they have
noted that the Subcommittee‘s authority to approve the budget request
for the air traffic control system challenges the administration‘s
prerogative to submit a budget request reflecting its priorities, and
they have cited uncertainties in the responsibilities and reporting
relationships of the chief operating officer, the FAA Administrator,
and the Subcommittee that, they say, have made it difficult to hire a
chief operating officer. To address these issues, the administration‘s
reauthorization proposal would (1) eliminate the Subcommittee‘s
approval authority, making the Subcommittee an advisory body, and (2)
designate the FAA Administrator as the chair of the Subcommittee,
thereby strengthening the Administrator‘s authority over, and
accountability for the performance of, the chief operating officer.
While these changes would eliminate the challenge that the
Subcommittee‘s approval authority poses to the administration‘s
prerogatives; would clarify the lines of authority between the chief
operating officer, the FAA Administrator, and the Subcommittee; and
could make it easier to hire a chief operating officer, they would also
limit the power of the Subcommittee. The Senate‘s reauthorization
proposal would also designate the FAA Administrator as the chair of the
Subcommittee, but it would retain the Subcommittee‘s approval
authority. The merits of these and other proposed changes depend, in
large part, on the extent to which approval authority is viewed as
necessary or desirable to bring about improvements in the performance
of the air traffic control system.
FAA Is Implementing Safety Initiatives and Faces New Challenges in
Ensuring That Security Enhancements Maintain Aircraft Safety:
Safety has always been and continues to be FAA‘s highest priority. FAA
has taken a number of important steps to improve aviation safety;
however, its planning and implementation could sometimes be more
effective. In addition, with the transfer of most aviation security
responsibilities to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
FAA faces the challenge of maintaining close coordination with TSA to
ensure that aircraft safety is maintained as TSA implements new
security enhancements.
FAA and Industry Have Taken Actions to Reduce the Fatal Accident Rate:
Reducing fatal aviation accidents is key to improving aviation safety.
FAA‘s centerpiece for reaching this goal is Safer Skies, an initiative
that dates back to 1998, when FAA and aviation industry representatives
worked together to identify the major causes of fatal accidents and to
design and implement actions to prevent future accidents. Safer Skies
is intended to reduce the fatal accident rate for commercial aviation
by 80 percent and to reduce the number of fatal accidents for general
aviation to 350 a year by 2007.[Footnote 19] Because many preventive
actions have not yet been fully implemented, it may be too early to
assess their effectiveness. Achieving the initiative‘s goals will
require FAA to systematically implement preventive actions, such as
requiring additional safety inspections of aircraft, and to maintain
good data to monitor the progress of these actions and evaluate their
effectiveness. As of February 2003, 44 preventive actions had been
undertaken--of which 16 are completed and 28 are under way, according
to FAA.
FAA‘s New Safety Inspection System Offers Promise, but Problems Still
Need to Be Addressed:
Improving the effectiveness of FAA‘s inspections of airline operations
is key to improving aviation safety. The FAA Administrator has noted
that perhaps the greatest support the agency can provide to the
industry is a robust safety oversight role that will not waver in
difficult times. FAA‘s new inspection program, the Air Transportation
Oversight System, is central to this oversight role. This program,
which was implemented in 1998, aims to ensure not only that airlines
comply with FAA‘s safety requirements but also that they have operating
systems to control risks and prevent accidents. Figure 7 shows an FAA
inspector inspecting an aircraft for compliance with FAA‘s safety
requirements.
Figure 7: FAA Safety Inspection in Progress:
[See PDF for image]
Source: FAA.
[End of figure]:
We reported in 1999 that FAA had not completed many critical steps,
such as developing guidance for inspectors and creating databases to
use in prioritizing inspection resources, before implementing the new
inspection system in 1998.[Footnote 20] As a result, the agency‘s
ability to conduct effective inspections remains limited. FAA has begun
to address some of the problems that we identified with the guidance
and the databases. However, according to a 2002 review by the DOT
Inspector General, many of the problems that we identified persist, and
the program‘s implementation remains inconsistent because FAA has not
established strong oversight and accountability procedures.[Footnote
21] This situation limits FAA‘s ability to conduct more systematic,
structured inspections; analyze the resulting data to identify safety
trends; and target its resources to the greatest aviation safety risks.
Aviation Safety and Security Require Close Coordination between FAA and
TSA:
Some key efforts under way to improve aviation security require
interagency coordination between FAA and TSA because they could also
affect aircraft safety. While TSA is responsible for most issues
related to aviation security, FAA retains responsibility for those
related to aviation safety, including approving the initial aircraft
design, structural modifications, and procedures for emergency
evacuation and the transportation of hazardous cargo.[Footnote 22] For
example, strengthening cockpit doors to increase cockpit security
during flights was one of the government‘s earliest responses to the
September 11 terrorist attacks. Because the modifications could
increase the weight of the doors and change the way they are attached
to the aircraft, FAA has been certifying these modifications to ensure
that they will not cause decompression during flight or affect the
aircraft‘s structural integrity. In addition, new security procedures
require that the cockpit door remain locked during flight and that
access to the cockpit be restricted to the flight crew. As a result,
senior flight attendants will no longer carry keys to the cockpit, and
FAA is approving changes to the procedures for rescuing the flight crew
in an emergency.
FAA is also responsible for the safe transport of dangerous materials
onboard aircraft. Dangerous goods are chemical (including infectious)
substances (or anything containing such substances) that pose a threat
to public safety or the environment during transportation. When these
goods are properly packaged, labeled, and stowed onboard, they can be
transported safely, but when they are not, they can pose significant
threats to people and property. TSA is responsible for screening all
passengers and property, including cargo, that will be carried aboard
an aircraft. If, during the screening of passengers or baggage, TSA
discovers dangerous goods that are not properly packaged or labeled,
TSA will need to coordinate and share information with FAA, which is
responsible for enforcing any regulatory violations.
In addition, aircraft crashes could fall under the jurisdiction of
either FAA or TSA, depending on whether they were the results of
accidents (FAA) or deliberate acts (TSA). It will be important for the
two agencies to work together closely during the initial stages of
crash investigations. To facilitate coordination on these and other
security issues that affect aviation safety, TSA and FAA signed a
memorandum of agreement on February 28, 2003. In addition, on March 4,
2003, the Secretary of Transportation agreed to assign a senior
official within the Office of the Secretary to serve as DOT‘s primary
liaison to TSA. It is important that both FAA and TSA remain committed
to coordinating closely on safety and security issues and that
congressional oversight ensures that the memorandum of agreement is
implemented.
FAA Faces Challenges in Implementing Controls over Its Costs:
As the administration and the Congress focus on increasing aviation
capacity, efficiency, and safety, they do so in an extremely
challenging fiscal environment--the federal budget deficit has
increased and competition for federal resources has intensified.
Moreover, as we mentioned previously in this statement, revenues to the
aviation Trust Fund, which is the source of funding for most of FAA‘s
operations, facilities and equipment, and grant programs, have declined
in recent years while outlays have increased. It is, therefore,
especially important that FAA control or reduce costs, run its programs
efficiently, and detect and prevent fraudulent activities. We and DOT‘s
Inspector General have reported that improvements are needed in these
areas.
For example, in March 2003, we reported that weaknesses in FAA‘s
purchase card[Footnote 23] controls resulted in instances of improper,
wasteful, and questionable purchases, as well as missing and stolen
assets.[Footnote 24] These internal control weaknesses included
inadequate segregation of duties (i.e., the cardholder requested the
purchase, placed the order, and picked up or received the goods without
any other review or approval), lax supervisory review and approval,
missing purchase documents, inadequate training, and insufficient
program monitoring activities, all of which created an environment
vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. During fiscal year 2000, these
weaknesses contributed to $5.4 million in improper purchases by FAA
employees and over $630,000 in purchases that were considered wasteful
or questionable because they were missing a receipt to show what was
actually purchased. To reduce the likelihood of improper and wasteful
purchases, we recommended a number of actions to strengthen the
internal controls over FAA‘s purchase card program, such as developing
detailed procedures that specify the type and extent of review or
approval that is expected. FAA agreed with our recommendations.
In addition, DOT‘s Inspector General reported in January 2003 that FAA
needs to contain increases in its operating costs and improve its
internal controls over costs.[Footnote 25] Over the past 6 years, FAA‘s
operations budget, which is 73 percent personnel costs, increased by
over 41 percent, from $5.3 billion in fiscal year 1998 to $7.5 billion
in fiscal year 2003. The Inspector General noted that FAA has made
extensive use of its human capital flexibilities to substantially
increase salaries, but has done little to reduce operating costs. FAA
has improved its ability to track its costs by partially implementing a
new cost accounting system that the Congress directed it to develop in
1996. The new system, which FAA expects to be fully operational by the
end of 2003, now tracks 70 percent of the personnel, overhead, and
other costs related to air traffic services. However, DOT‘s Inspector
General has reported problems with the labor distribution system, which
is part of the cost accounting system and is used to account for and
distribute air traffic controller labor costs of about $3.1 billion
annually to specific facilities and functions. The Inspector General
noted that the system omitted important internal controls needed to
ensure that the time worked by air traffic controllers would be
accurately recorded in the accounting system and paid from the proper
account. The Inspector General brought these deficiencies to the
attention of FAA, and the Administrator agreed to correct them. The
Inspector General further noted that the system as designed could
provide workforce data that would help determine how many controllers
are needed and where. These data would assist FAA in planning for the
anticipated retirement of large numbers of air traffic controllers in
the near and long term. [Footnote 26] Congressional oversight is
important to ensure that FAA follows through and corrects the problems
that we and the Inspector General have identified so that FAA can spend
its resources on projects and services that will provide the greatest
return on the public‘s investment.
Scope and Methodology:
This statement is based primarily on issued reports that are listed
under Related GAO Products. However, the sections on the Airport and
Airway Trust Fund and the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee reflect our
ongoing work for this Committee. As a result, the results of this work
that we discuss in this testimony are still preliminary.
To assess the current and projected financial status of the Airport and
Airway Trust Fund, we obtained financial data from FAA and interviewed
FAA officials familiar with the information. To assess the status of
efforts to implement the new structure established under AIR-21 to
improve the oversight, management, and operation of the air traffic
control system, we analyzed the legislation and related executive
order, the administration‘s reauthorization proposal, and the first
report of the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee. We also interviewed
officials from FAA, the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee, and aviation
industry organizations. We performed our work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Contact Information:
[End of section]
For further information on this testimony, please contact Gerald
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to
this testimony include Tammy Conquest, Howard Cott, Elizabeth
Eisenstadt, Edward Laughlin, Belva Martin, Maren McAvoy, John W.
Shumann, Teresa Spisak, and Richard Swayze.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
FAA Purchase Cards: Weak Controls Resulted in Instances of Improper and
Wasteful Purchases and Missing Assets. GAO-03-405. Washington, D.C.:
March 21, 2003.
Commercial Aviation: Issues Regarding Federal Assistance for Enhancing
Air Service to Small Communities. GAO-03-540T. Washington, D.C.: March
11, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover
Airports‘ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:
February 25, 2003.
National Airspace System: Reauthorizing FAA Provides Opportunities and
Options to Address Challenges. GAO-03-473T. Washington, D.C.: February
12, 2003.
Aviation Finance: Implementation of General Aviation Entitlement
Grants. GAO-03-347. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2003.
Human Capital Management: FAA‘s Reform Effort Requires a More Strategic
Approach. GAO-03-156. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003.
National Airspace System: Better Cost Data Could Improve FAA‘s
Management of the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System. GAO-
03-343. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2003.
Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges Related to Building Runways and
Actions to Address Them. GAO-03-164. Washington, D.C.: January 30,
2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT‘s
Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10, 2003.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119. Washington, D.C.: January
2003.
Air Traffic Control: Impact of Revised Personnel Relocation Policies Is
Uncertain. GAO-03-141. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has
Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.:
October 15, 2002.
National Airspace System: Status of FAA‘s Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System. GAO-02-1071. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2002.
Options to Enhance the Long-term Viability of the Essential Air Service
Program. GAO-02-997R. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002.
Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Better Prepare for Impending Wave of
Controller Attrition. GAO-02-591. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002.
Aviation Finance: Distribution of Airport Grant Funds Complied with
Statutory Requirements. GAO-02-283. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002.
Department of Transportation, Transportation Security Administration:
Aviation Security Infrastructure Fees. GAO-02-484R. Washington, D.C.:
March 11, 2002.
Applying Agreed-upon Procedures: Airport and Airway Trust Fund Excise
Taxes. GAO-02-380R. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2002.
National Airspace System: Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed Despite
Recent Reduction in Flight Delays. GAO-02-185. Washington, D.C.:
December 14, 2001.
National Airspace System: Free Flight Tools Show Promise, but
Implementation Challenges Remain. GAO-01-932. Washington, D.C.: August
31, 2001.
Air Traffic Control: Role of FAA‘s Modernization Program in Reducing
Delays and Congestion. GAO-01-725T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001.
Aviation Safety: Safer Skies Initiative Has Taken Initial Steps to
Reduce Accident Rates by 2007. GAO/RCED-00-111. Washington, D.C.: June
30, 2000.
National Airspace System: Problems Plaguing the Wide Area Augmentation
System and FAA‘s Actions to Address Them. GAO/T-RCED-00-229.
Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2000.
National Airspace System: Persistent Problems in FAA‘s New Navigation
System Highlight Need for Periodic Reevaluation. GAO/RCED/AIMD-00-130.
Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2000.
Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges in Modernizing the Agency.
GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-87. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2000.
Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA‘s Implementation of the Display
System Replacement Project. GAO/T-RCED-00-19. Washington, D.C.:
October 11, 1999.
Aviation Safety: FAA‘s New Inspection System Offers Promise, but
Problems Need to Be Addressed. GAO/RCED-99-183. Washington, D.C.: June
28, 1999.
General Aviation Airports: Oversight and Funding. GAO/T-RCED-99-214.
Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.
Passenger Facility Charges: Program Implementation and the Potential
Effects of Proposed Changes. GAO/RCED-99-138. Washington, D.C.: May 19,
1999.
Airport Improvement Program: Analysis of Discretionary Spending for
Fiscal Years 1996-98. GAO/RCED-99-160R. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1999.
Air Traffic Control: FAA‘s Modernization Investment Management Approach
Could Be Strengthened. GAO/RCED/AIMD-99-88. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
1999.
Air Traffic Control: Observations on FAA‘s Air Traffic Control
Modernization Program. GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-99-137. Washington, D.C.: March
25, 1999.
Federal Aviation Administration: Financial Management Issues. GAO/T-
AIMD-99-122. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1999.
Airport Financing: Smaller Airports Face Future Funding Shortfalls.
GAO/T-RCED-99-96. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 1999.
Airport Financing: Annual Funding As Much As $3 Billion Less Than
Planned Development. GAO/T-RCED-99-84. Washington, D.C.: February 10,
1999.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See the Aviation Investment and Revitalization Vision Act, a Senate
bill to reauthorize federal aviation programs and the administration‘s
draft reauthorization proposal, the Centennial of Flight Aviation
Authorization Act, or ’Flight 100.“
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Safety: FAA‘s New
Inspection System Offers Promise, but Problems Need to Be Addressed,
GAO/RCED-99-183 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 1999).
[3] U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General,
Report on the Air Transportation Oversight System: Federal Aviation
Administration, AV-2002-088 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2002).
[4] Over the past 5 years, the amount of funding available to airports
for planned capital development ranged from about $7 billion to $13
billion annually.
[5] The Airport and Airway Trust Fund was established by the Airport
and Airway Revenue Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-258) to aid in funding the
development of a nationwide airport and airway system and to fund FAA
investments in air traffic control facilities. The Trust Fund is
supported by a number of excise taxes, including taxes on passenger
tickets, fuel, and cargo.
[6] Under the Passenger Facility Charge program, airports with FAA‘s
approval may charge passengers up to $4.50 for boarding airplanes at
their facilities.
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Finance: Using Airport
Grant Funds for Security Projects, GAO-03-27 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
15, 2002).
[8] Letters of intent represent a nonbonding commitment from FAA to
provide multiyear funding to an airport beyond the current AIP
authorization period.
[9] This was the average for 1998 through 2002.
[10] In addition to runways, the plan addresses capacity enhancements
designed to make more efficient use of the airspace.
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Infrastructure:
Challenges Related to Building Runways and Actions to Address Them,
GAO-03-164 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003).
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System: Long-
term Capacity Planning Needed Despite Recent Reduction in Flight
Delays, GAO-02-185 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2001).
[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, Commercial Aviation: Issues
Regarding Federal Assistance for Enhancing Air Service to Small
Communities, GAO-03-540T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2003).
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update,
GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003).
[15] These five programs are the Wide Area Augmentation System,
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System, Airport Surveillance
Radar-11, Weather and Radar Processor, and Operational, Supportability,
and Implementation System. See U.S. Department of Transportation,
Office of Inspector General, Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation
Administration, CC-2003-058 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2003).
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System: Better
Cost Data Could Improve FAA‘s Management of the Standard Terminal
Automation Replacement System, GAO-03-343 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,
2003).
[17] This is a result of 1995 legislation that granted FAA broad
exemptions from laws governing federal civilian personnel management
found in title 5 of the United States Code.
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital Management: FAA‘s
Reform Effort Requires a More Strategic Approach, GAO-03-156
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2003).
[19] Commercial aviation includes both large air carrier operations and
smaller commuter operations. General aviation includes a wide variety
of aircraft, ranging from corporate jets to small piston-engine
aircraft as well as helicopters, gliders, and aircraft used in
operations such as firefighting and agricultural spraying.
[20] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Safety: FAA‘s New
Inspection System Offers Promise, but Problems Need to Be Addressed,
GAO/RCED-99-183 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 1999).
[21] U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General,
Report on the Air Transportation Oversight System: Federal Aviation
Administration, AV-2002-088 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2002).
[22] FAA has responsibility for maintaining the security of its air
traffic control facilities and computer systems.
[23] As of January 2002, over 8,000 FAA employees (17 percent of its
workforce) had been issued commercial purchase cards. In fiscal year
2001, FAA made over 364,000 purchases using these cards.
[24] U.S. General Accounting Office, FAA Purchase Cards: Weak Controls
Resulted in Instances of Improper and Wasteful Purchases and Missing
Assets, GAO-03-405 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 2003).
[25] Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, DOT‘s
Top Management Challenges (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 21, 2003).
[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to
Better Prepare for Impending Wave of Controller Attrition, GAO-02-591
(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002).
