Rail Safety and Security
Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed Gao ID: GAO-03-435 April 30, 2003In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns have been raised that the nation's shipments of hazardous materials by rail may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Millions of tons of hazardous materials are shipped yearly across the United States. Serious incidents involving these materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or injury. GAO was asked to examine recent steps taken by industry and government to improve the safety and security of these shipments and steps taken by local jurisdictions to prepare to respond to hazardous material rail incidents.
After the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, industry and government took steps to improve the safety and security of hazardous material rail transportation. The railroad and chemical industries assessed their facilities' exposure to attack and developed a security plan to address their risks. The Department of Homeland Security's Transportation Security Administration has begun to address non-aviation security by starting development of an overall intermodal transportation system security plan, but has not yet developed specific plans to address the security of individual surface transportation modes, including rail. Such a plan is needed to determine the adequacy of security measures already in place to protect rail shipments and identify security gaps. Officials from local jurisdictions that GAO visited, as well as other government and private sector experts, identified several unresolved issues pertaining to the safety and security of transporting hazardous materials by rail. These include the need for measures to better safeguard hazardous materials temporarily stored in rail cars while awaiting delivery to their ultimate destination and the advisability of requiring companies to notify local communities on the type and quantities of such materials stored or passing through their communities. While no standardized tool exists to gauge local preparedness, officials from nine of the ten cities that GAO visited said that they are generally prepared to respond to hazardous materials incidents. By the end of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security plans to determine the response capabilities of the nation by developing an assessment tool for use by states in performing assessments of their local communities' emergency response capabilities.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-435, Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
April 2003:
Rail Safety and Security:
Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based
Plan Needed:
GAO-03-435:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-435, a report to Congressional Requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns
have been raised that the nation‘s shipments of hazardous materials by
rail may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Millions of tons of
hazardous materials are shipped yearly across the United States.
Serious incidents involving these materials have the potential to
cause widespread disruption or injury. GAO was asked to examine
recent steps taken by industry and government to improve the safety
and security of these shipments and steps taken by local jurisdictions
to prepare to respond to hazardous material rail incidents.
What GAO Found:
After the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
industry and government took steps to improve the safety and security
of hazardous material rail transportation. The railroad and chemical
industries assessed their facilities‘ exposure to attack and developed
a security plan to address their risks. The Department of Homeland
Security‘s Transportation Security Administration has begun to address
nonaviation security by starting development of an overall intermodal
transportation system security plan, but has not yet developed specific
plans to address the security of individual surface transportation
modes, including rail. Such a plan is needed to determine the adequacy
of security measures already in place to protect rail shipments and
identify security gaps.
Officials from local jurisdictions that GAO visited, as well as other
government and private sector experts, identified several unresolved
issues pertaining to the safety and security of transporting hazardous
materials by rail. These include the need for measures to better
safeguard hazardous materials temporarily stored in rail cars while
awaiting delivery to their ultimate destination and the advisability
of requiring companies to notify local communities on the type and
quantities of such materials stored or passing through their
communities.
While no standardized tool exists to gauge local preparedness,
officials from nine of the ten cities that GAO visited said that they
are generally prepared to respond to hazardous materials incidents.
By the end of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security plans to
determine the response capabilities of the nation by developing an
assessment tool for use by states in performing assessments of their
local communities‘ emergency response capabilities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security work with the
Secretary of Transportation to develop a risk-based plan to
specifically address rail security. The plan should establish time
frames for actions to protect hazardous material rail shipments.
Department of Transportation and Homeland Security officials generally
agreed with the report and acknowledged that no plan to specifically
address rail security has been developed, but noted that they have
taken some actions to enhance the security of hazardous material rail
shipments.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-435.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Peter F. Guerrero at
(202) 512-2834 or guerrerop@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Industry Has Taken Steps to Address the Security of Transportation of
Hazardous Materials by Rail, but TSA Has Not Yet Developed and
Implemented a Rail Security Plan:
Several Issues Regarding the Safety and Security of Hazardous Materials
Transported by Rail Remain Unresolved:
Most Localities Visited Report They Are Generally Prepared to Respond
to Hazardous Material Rail Incidents, but Sufficiency of Actions Taken
Cannot Be Determined:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Organizations Visited and Contacted:
Appendix II: Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the
Department of Transportation and Other Federal Agencies:
DOT and DHS Oversee Rail Safety and Security:
EPA Oversees Fixed Facilities That Handle Hazardous Materials:
OSHA Focuses on the Safety of Plant Workers and Emergency Responders:
NRC and DOE Oversee Shipments of Nuclear Material:
DOD Oversees the Safety and Security of Military Hazardous Material
Shipments:
Appendix III: Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United
States:
Department of Transportation Categorizes Hazardous Materials by Nine
Classes:
Overall Volume of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials for Rail,
Truck, and Water are Similar by Ton-mile:
Rail Shipments Represent a Much Higher Share of Volume for Some
Hazardous Material Classes:
Poisonous Inhalation Hazardous Materials Were Among the Ten Most
Commonly Shipped Hazardous Materials from 1998 to 2001:
Rail Shipments of Radioactive and Military Hazardous Materials
Represent a Small Fraction of All Rail Shipments of Hazardous
Materials:
Appendix IV: Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel:
Proposed Private Fuel Storage and Yucca Mountain Repository Plans Will
Result in Substantial Increases in Rail Shipment of Radioactive
Materials:
Historically Low Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment Volumes Make Risk
Assessment from Increased Shipments Difficult:
Appendix V: Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to
Assist Local First Responders:
General Procedures for Emergency Response:
Multiple Federal Plans and Agencies Provide Additional Resources to
Address Hazardous Material Incidents:
Federal Agencies Provide a Variety of Assistance for Responding to and
Improving Preparedness for Hazardous Material Rail Incidents:
Private Organizations Also Play a Role in Emergency Response to
Hazardous Material Incidents:
Multiple Standards and Guidelines of Preparedness Exist:
Appendix VI: Letter from the Federal Railroad Administration, May 28,
2003:
Appendix VII: GAO Response to Federal Railroad Administration Letter:
Tables:
Table 1: NFPA Levels of Professional Competence for First Responders to
Hazardous Materials Incidents:
Table 2: 1997 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Tons and Ton-miles:
Table 3: Rail Shipments as Percentage of Hazardous Material Shipments by
All Transportation Modes by Hazard Class and Division, 1997:
Table 4: The Top 20 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail by Volume,
1998-2001:
Table 5: Transport of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel, 1979-1996:
Table 6: Federal Agencies Involved in Emergency Response to Hazardous
Material Incidents:
Table 7: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Domestic
Preparedness (Formerly a Department of Justice Program):
Table 8: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Transportation's Research and Special
Programs Administration:
Table 9: Hazardous Material Emergency Response and Assistance Grants
Provided by the Department of Homeland Security's Directorate of
Emergency Preparedness and Response:
Table 10: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Health and Human Services:
Table 11: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Energy:
Figures:
Figure 1: Photos of Rail Facilities:
Figure 2: Components of a Risk Management Approach to Defend Against
Terrorism:
Figure 3: Tons of Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail, 1998-2001:
Abbreviations:
AAR: Association of American Railroads:
CFDA: Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance:
CFS: Commodity Flow Survey:
CHEMTREC: Chemical Transportation Emergency Center:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
DOL: Department of Labor:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
EMAP: Emergency Management Accreditation Program:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
EP&R: Emergency Preparedness and Response :
FRA: Federal Railroad Administration:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
HM: hazardous materials:
LEPC: local emergency planning committee:
MTMC : Military Traffic Management Command:
NFPA: National Fire Protection Association:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board:
ODP: Office of Domestic Preparedness:
OREIS: Operation Respond Emergency Information System:
OSHA: Occupational Safety and Health Administration:
PFS: Private Fuel Storage, LLC:
RSPA: Research and Special Programs Administration:
SNF: spent nuclear fuel:
TRANSCAER: Transportation Community Awareness Emergency Response
Program:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
USCG: U.S. Coast Guard:
WMD: weapons of mass destruction:
Letter April 30, 2003:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
The Honorable Martin T. Meehan
House of Representatives:
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns
have been raised that the nation's shipments of hazardous materials by
rail may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Millions of tons of
hazardous materials are shipped yearly across the continental United
States. Much of this volume is shipped on rail networks that travel
through populated areas, increasing the concern that accidents or
attacks during these shipments could have severe consequences. While
the vast majority of shipments arrive safely at their destination,
serious incidents involving these materials have the potential to cause
widespread disruption or injury. Additionally, the proposed shipments
of spent nuclear fuel at sites from 39 states across the country to the
Yucca Mountain Repository have highlighted the need to safeguard
hazardous materials against both accident and attack.[Footnote 1]
Two federal agencies have primary responsibility for overseeing the
safety and security of hazardous materials shipped by rail--the
Department of Transportation (DOT) and the new Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Though originally a part of DOT, the Transportation
Security Administration is now part of DHS. The Transportation Security
Administration is charged with overseeing the security of all modes of
transportation, including rail. Within DOT, the Federal Railroad
Administration promotes railroad safety and enforces rail safety
regulations, while the Research and Special Programs Administration
regulates the transportation of materials that may pose an unreasonable
risk to health, safety, and property. Other federal agencies having
related responsibilities for the rail shipment of hazardous materials
include the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy,
Department of Defense (DOD), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
and DHS' Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response. See
appendix II for additional information on the oversight roles of DOT
and other federal agencies in the safety and security of hazardous
material rail shipments.
In response to your request that we review the safety and security of
transporting hazardous materials by rail in the United States, we
examined (1) recent steps taken by industry and government for
improving the safety and security of hazardous materials transported by
rail, (2) issues pertaining to the safety and security of rail
transport of hazardous materials identified by federal and private
sector hazardous material transportation experts and local officials as
being unresolved, and (3) the preparedness of ten local jurisdictions
to respond to rail incidents involving hazardous materials, whether
accidental or intentional. To address these issues, we used a variety
of approaches and methodologies, including interviews with regulatory
officials, analyses of hazardous materials volume and incident data, a
panel of experts, and interviews with local officials. To report on the
preparedness of local jurisdictions to respond to a potential terrorist
attack or accident involving the shipment of hazardous materials by
rail, we performed case studies at ten jurisdictions selected because
they varied in size and experienced a recent and significant rail
incident involving hazardous materials or typically experienced large
amounts of hazardous material shipments passing through their
communities. These jurisdictions are not named due to the sensitive
nature of the issues discussed in this report. While providing
information on the preparedness actions taken by these specific
localities to respond to a hazardous material rail incident, results
from these case studies cannot be generalized to other jurisdictions.
We conducted our review from December 2001 through March 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See
appendix I for additional information on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, industry and
government have taken steps to improve the safety and security of the
transportation of hazardous materials by rail. The railroad industry
conducted an industry-wide assessment to identify and prioritize the
exposure of rail facilities to the risk of attack and developed a
security plan to address these risks. The security plan, completed in
December 2001, established four alert levels and described a series of
actions to prevent terrorist threats to railroad personnel and
facilities that could be taken at each alert level, including rail
operations and police actions. In March 2003, DOT's Research and
Special Programs Administration finalized a rule, Hazardous Materials-
-Security Requirements for Offerors and Transporters of Hazardous
Materials--which imposes new security requirements on shippers and
carriers of certain hazardous materials. The Transportation Security
Administration has also begun to address rail security. According to
Transportation Security Administration officials, while much of its
resources have been focused on aviation security, it has assumed
responsibility for transportation security in all modes of
transportation, including rail, and is beginning to develop an overall
intermodal transportation system security plan, which these officials
consider a major component of the National Strategy for Homeland
Security. The Transportation Security Administration has signed a
memorandum of agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration, which
these officials said would serve as a guide for relations between the
Transportation Security Administration and modal administrations
within DOT, including the Federal Railroad Administration and Research
and Special Programs Administration. However, while the Transportation
Security Administration has begun work on an overall intermodal
transportation system security plan, it has not yet developed specific
plans to address the security of individual surface transportation
modes, including rail, and does not have time frames established for
completing such an effort. We are recommending that DHS and DOT work
jointly to develop such a plan to assist the departments in determining
the adequacy of security measures already in place to protect hazardous
material rail shipments and identifying any gaps that need to be
addressed.
Government and private sector hazardous material experts and officials
from some local jurisdictions that we visited identified several issues
pertaining to the safety and security of transporting hazardous
materials by rail that have not been resolved. These issues include the
need for measures to better safeguard hazardous materials temporarily
stored in rail cars while awaiting delivery to their ultimate
destination--a practice commonly called "storage-in-transit," the
advisability of requiring companies to notify local communities of the
type and quantities of materials stored in transit, and the appropriate
amount of information rail companies should be required to provide
local officials regarding hazardous material shipments passing through
their communities. Federal Railroad Administration and Transportation
Security Administration officials recognize that security concerns have
grown since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks regarding the
vulnerability of hazardous materials stored in transit in, or passing
through, local communities. However, they are just beginning to address
this issue.
In our review of the actions taken by the ten local communities that we
visited to prepare and respond to hazardous material rail incidents,
officials from nine of the ten localities told us that they believe
that their cities are generally prepared to respond to these incidents.
Actions taken by these communities include ensuring that emergency
response plans are in place, employing hazardous material response
teams, and planning and conducting training and drills. However,
because no standardized tool currently exists to gauge preparedness, we
were unable to determine the sufficiency of these localities' actions
to prepare for hazardous material rail incidents. Officials from DHS'
Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response[Footnote 2] are in
the process of determining the response capabilities of the nation by
developing a standardized tool for performing self-assessments of local
communities' emergency response capabilities. They estimate that this
effort will be completed by the end of 2004.
DHS and DOT generally agreed with our report and acknowledged that no
plan to specifically address rail security has been developed, but
stressed that they have taken some actions to enhance the security of
hazardous material rail shipments.
Background:
In 2001, over 83 million tons of hazardous materials were shipped by
rail in the United States across a 170,000-mile rail network which
extends through every major city as well as thousands of small
communities. Federal hazardous material transportation law defines a
hazardous material as a substance or material that the Secretary of
Transportation has determined
is capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and
property when transported in commerce.[Footnote 3] It includes
hazardous substances such as ammonia, hazardous wastes from chemical
manufacturing processes, and elevated temperature materials such as
molten aluminum.[Footnote 4]
According to reported incident data from the DOT's Research and Special
Programs Administration (RSPA), the number of hazardous material
incidents occurring during rail transportation declined from 1,128 in
1992 to 894 in 2001 and accounted for approximately 7 percent of all
incidents involving the transportation of these materials in all modes.
For the period 1997 to 2001, hazardous material rail shipments
represented an annual average of approximately 11 incidents and less
than 1 serious incident per million tons of hazardous materials shipped
by rail.[Footnote 5] For 1997, the latest year for which data on
intermodal hazardous material shipment volumes are available, there
were approximately 14 incidents and less than 1 serious incident per
million tons of hazardous materials shipped by truck.
Although rail moves only a small percentage of all hazardous materials,
it is the predominant method of transportation for some types of these
materials, such as flammable solids.[Footnote 6] When measured in ton-
miles,[Footnote 7] hazardous materials shipped by rail are nearly
equivalent to hazardous materials transported by road and
water.[Footnote 8] The vast majority of shipments arrive safely at
their destination. However, recent accidents in urban areas, such as
the 2001 incident in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland,
involving a fire fueled by hazardous materials, and a leak of
hydrochloric acid from a parked tank car in an urban area in Lowell,
Massachusetts, have called attention to the safety of hazardous
materials shipped by rail. The events of September 11, 2001, and
subsequent reviews of the vulnerability of the transportation sector,
including rail, to terrorist attack have further focused attention on
the security of hazardous materials in rail transport.
The proposed plan to ship spent nuclear fuel, as soon as 2010 and most
likely by rail, to the Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada--the
nation's first long-term geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste--has raised concerns about the safety and
security of possible transportation to this site.[Footnote 9] A second
proposal to ship spent nuclear fuel to temporary storage in a private
facility in Utah has heightened these concerns.[Footnote 10] Such
shipments would substantially increase the volume of nuclear material
transported in this country.[Footnote 11]
Two administrations within DOT, RSPA and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), have responsibilities, respectively, for
developing regulations pertaining to the transportation of hazardous
materials and for rail safety. RSPA is responsible for identifying and
regulating the transportation of materials that may pose an
unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in
commerce.RSPA develops the hazardous material regulations,
coordinating its work with other DOT administrations, including FRA.
These regulations specify how shipments must be identified, packaged,
and handled in transit.
RSPA published a final rule in the March 25, 2003, Federal Register--
Hazardous Materials: Security Requirements for Offerors and
Transporters of Hazardous Materials, also known as HM-232--which
imposes new security requirements on shippers and carriers of certain
hazardous materials. The final rule requires people who offer or
transport hazardous materials in amounts that require placarding to
develop and implement a written security plan. The security plan must
include an assessment of possible transportation security risks for the
material(s) to be transported and appropriate measures to address
identified risks. Specific measures established by the plan may vary
depending on the level of threat at a particular time. In addition, the
final rule requires all employees handling hazardous materials to
receive security awareness training, beginning no later than the date
of their first scheduled recurrent training. New employees must receive
security awareness training within 90 days of employment. Employees
handling hazardous materials in companies subject to the security plan
requirement must receive in-depth training concerning the security plan
and its implementation.
FRA oversees the safety of railroad equipment and operating practices
and has authority to enforce compliance with the hazardous material
regulations. DOT's regulation of the transport of hazardous materials
under federal hazardous material transportation law preempts similar
regulation by state and local agencies. States and local jurisdictions
may not establish stricter or less stringent regulations governing
hazardous material transportation.[Footnote 12]
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), created within DOT in
the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
and now part of the newly created DHS, initially focused primarily on
aviation issues but, along with DOT, is responsible for the security of
all modes of transportation, including rail. According to TSA
officials, the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator for
TSA have exchanged letters regarding the ongoing cooperation and
relationship between TSA and the DOT operating administrations after
the March 1, 2003, transfer of TSA from DOT to DHS. This correspondence
sets forth a number of principles to guide this relationship.
Several other federal agencies also play a role in regulating rail
shipments of hazardous materials. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) and Department of Energy (DOE) oversee shipments of nuclear
material. Although DOT regulates the transportation of radioactive
material, including spent fuel, as a hazardous material, NRC also
regulates the transportation of radioactive material by its licensees.
The primary role of NRC, under a memorandum of agreement with DOT, is
the establishment of packaging standards for fissile materials and for
other radioactive materials exceeding certain limits.[Footnote 13] NRC
certifies spent fuel casks and other radioactive material package
designs that meet these standards and requires its licensees to use
certified casks for transport. NRC also plays a significant role
through safety and security requirements and through inspection and
enforcement. In its role as developer of the Yucca Mountain Repository,
DOE is responsible for shipping spent nuclear fuel from nuclear plants.
In addition, DOE coordinates policies and program implementation for
shipments of radioactive waste with DOT and NRC.
The Department of Defense's (DOD) Military Traffic Management Command
is responsible for DOD's surface transportation shipments and requires
that everyone participating in the shipment of DOD hazardous materials
comply with hazardous material regulations. DOD also requires
inspections for sensitive shipments, including hazardous materials, to
be conducted by railroad police officers, trained railroad employees,
or members of private security firms under contract to DOD.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) each have oversight responsibility
regarding facilities that handle hazardous materials and are the source
or destination of many hazardous material rail shipments. EPA, along
with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), has authority for implementing and
enforcing legislation governing the protection of public health and the
environment against chemical and other polluting discharges and for
abating and controlling pollution when spills occur. EPA has provided
training and technical assistance to states and localities to enhance
contingency planning and emergency response capabilities. EPA sometimes
participates with other agencies in responding to hazardous material
transportation incidents. OSHA promulgates and enforces standards to
protect the safety and health of employees, including workers at
facilities that handle hazardous materials and emergency responders to
hazardous material incidents.
The USCG enforces spill prevention regulations on vessels and on the
marine transfer portion of waterfront facilities. Under the National
Contingency Plan, the USCG serves as the federal on scene coordinator
for oil or hazardous substance releases in the coastal zone. All oil
and hazardous material incidents are required to be reported to the
National Response Center, which in turn is to notify state and local
agencies and the appropriate on scene coordinator (either EPA for
inland or USCG for coastal incidents). In each case, the on scene
coordinator is to assess the need for federal involvement and, if
appropriate, may respond, bringing additional response resources (such
as contractors), special teams, and access to federal funding for
hazardous material or oil spills.
The Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate within DHS
provides federal assistance to supplement the resources of state and
local governments in major disasters, which could include emergencies
involving hazardous material releases. Its assistance is governed by
the Federal Response Plan that provides the mechanism for delivery of
federal assistance and resources to augment state and local government
efforts in a major disaster or emergency. In conjunction with NRC, DOE,
DOD, EPA, and other agencies, DHS' EP&R also participates in the
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan to establish an organized
and integrated capability for timely, coordinated response by federal
agencies to peacetime radiological emergencies. For more details on the
roles of various federal agencies in assisting state and local
governments to respond to emergencies, see appendix V.
Industry Has Taken Steps to Address the Security of Transportation of
Hazardous Materials by Rail, but TSA Has Not Yet Developed and
Implemented a Rail Security Plan:
The railroad and chemical industries have taken a number of steps to
enhance the security of transportation of hazardous materials. Some of
these measures include the development of a rail security plan and an
increase in security measures at some facilities. According to TSA
officials, while much of TSA's resources have been focused on aviation
security, TSA has assumed its responsibility for transportation
security in all modes of transportation, including rail, and is
beginning to develop an intermodal national transportation system
security plan, which TSA officials consider to be a major component of
the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Another TSA effort in this
area involves the development of a memorandum of agreement with DOT's
Federal Aviation Administration, which DOT officials said would serve
as a guide for relations between TSA and modal administrations within
DOT, including FRA and RSPA.
Although TSA has begun work on an overall intermodal transportation
system security plan, it has not yet developed a plan to specifically
address the security of individual surface transportation modes,
including rail, and does not have time frames established for
completing such an effort. The development of a security plan
addressing rail transportation of hazardous materials that uses a risk-
based management approach, such as that used by other federal agencies,
government commissions, and multinational corporations to defend
against terrorism, would assist TSA in identifying threats that exist
to the shipment of hazardous materials by rail, vulnerabilities that
may be exploited in the system used to ship these materials, and high-
risk, high-consequence facilities that need protection.
Railroad Industry Has Developed a Security Plan and Taken Other Steps:
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, railroad
companies' security efforts focused primarily on the prevention of
theft at rail facilities. Representatives of several major railroad
companies told us that they had toll-free emergency telephone numbers
to report suspicious activity, including theft, in place before the
terrorist attacks. According to a representative from the Association
of American Railroads (AAR), which represents the major freight
railroads in the United States, Mexico, and Canada, railroad companies
currently employ over 1,000 police officers.
Within two weeks of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, AAR
created a railroad security task force to analyze the industry's risk
from and response to the threat of terrorism. AAR worked jointly with
several chemical industry associations and consultants from a security
firm to develop the industry's security management plan.[Footnote 14]
As part of this effort, AAR created critical action teams to assess the
rail industry's security in five areas: infrastructure, military
operations, information technology and communications, security of
operations, and hazardous materials. The plan that resulted from this
effort was presented to its member railroads and TSA in December 2001.
It established four alert levels and described a graduated series of
actions to prevent terrorist threats to railroad personnel and
facilities that correspond to each alert level. The actions include
progressively rigorous countermeasures to be taken in the areas of
operations, information technology and communications, and police. The
countermeasures include actions to heighten security awareness, limit
the sharing of information about sensitive shipments, and test that
security systems are operating as intended. With U.S. military action
in Iraq, the railroad industry has taken additional security steps,
including real-time monitoring and additional surveillance of
designated trains; increased security at some rail yards; and increased
inspection of priority railroad tracks, tunnels, and bridges.
Representatives of several major railroad companies and the railroad
industry told us that the railroads have implemented a number of new
security measures since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
including the following:
* increasing the awareness of employees about potential security
threats;
* enhancing dispatch command and control centers;
* monitoring hazardous materials with video surveillance;
* restricting access to facilities through the use of key cards;
* installing better lighting, fencing, and barricades at rail
facilities;
* monitoring of critical infrastructure locations by police officers
and contracted security guards;
* employing additional security officers to protect hazardous materials
in storage;
* instituting more threat information sharing with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, as well as state and local government agencies;
* conducting security evaluations of rail facilities;
* limiting access to electronic tracking of shipments of hazardous
materials; and:
* conducting "red team" assault tests in which rail companies send
undercover security officers to test employees' responses to
trespassers.
We visited rail facilities at five locations, in part to observe
security measures there. Overall, we observed more physical security
measures at large rail facilities than at smaller facilities. Both the
small and large facilities we visited had signs indicating that
trespassing was not permitted and that railroad personnel were on duty
part of or all day. In addition, the large facilities had security
video cameras, lights, observation towers staffed by railroad personnel
that can be used as security lookouts, and fencing along some parts of
the facility. However, all of the facilities we visited could be
readily accessed because they are not fenced or fences did not
completely separate the facilities from adjacent areas, and some of the
facilities did not have gates around them. Figure 1 shows photos of
rail facilities in some of the case study locations we visited. We
observed the following during our visits:
* rail companies relied heavily on the vigilance of employees;
* employees provided photo identifications upon request, but were not
required to display them;
* the presence of security guards varied; and:
* at intermodal facilities, where hazardous material products are
transferred between rail cars and trucks for continued shipment,
procedures were in place to check for tampering with the valves of tank
cars transporting hazardous materials.
Figure 1: Photos of Rail Facilities:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Despite reporting that they had implemented enhanced security measures,
railroad industry representatives told us that it is not possible to
eliminate all vulnerabilities and, without government assistance, the
industry lacks the resources to counter a significant terrorist attack.
TSA Is Beginning to Address Rail Security:
Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has primarily focused on
improving aviation security to meet the deadlines established in the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act for TSA to assume civil
aviation security functions and responsibilities, such as implementing
federal passenger screening. As a result, TSA has not yet assumed full
responsibility for security in other modes of transportation, such as
rail.
The establishment of TSA's Office of Maritime and Land Security in
March 2002 marked the beginning of TSA's efforts to address security in
other modal areas, including the security of rail transportation. The
goals for this office are to prevent terrorist attacks, protect
transportation without impeding movement, and respond to transportation
accidents or incidents promptly.
TSA's Office of Maritime and Land Security plans to hire 200 employees
to cover all 50 states by 2004, subject to resource constraints. As of
March 2003, the office had filled 83 of the 200 positions. TSA
officials said that since the office's eventual staff will be
relatively small, the office plans to work jointly with DOT to maximize
resources by relying on other modal administrations to cover day-to-day
security operations. According to TSA officials, the office will focus
on identifying security gaps and improving security plans in each mode.
TSA Has Taken Some Steps to Address the Security of Hazardous Material
Transportation by Rail, but Has Not Yet Developed a Rail Security Plan:
TSA has taken some steps to address the security of hazardous material
rail shipments, including starting the development of an intermodal
transportation system security plan, establishing working
relationships with DOT's modal administrations, and conducting an
initial review of the rail industry's own security rail plan. In March
2003, DHS launched Operation Liberty Shield to help protect the
nation's infrastructure and deter possible terrorist attacks. Among
other things, this national plan calls for (1) state governors to
provide additional police or National Guard forces at selected railroad
bridges; and (2) railroad companies to improve the security of major
rail facilities and hubs, monitor shipments of hazardous materials, and
increase the surveillance of trains carrying these materials.
Nevertheless, TSA has not yet developed a security plan for rail that
systematically determines the adequacy of security measures already in
place and identifies gaps that need to be addressed.
TSA officials told us that they and officials in other components of
DHS are working on a national transportation system security plan to
address the security challenges of the nation's transportation system
using a threat-based and risk management approach. This plan is to
address the intermodal aspects of the transportation system first and
then to provide a strategic framework for future TSA activities in
transportation security. TSA officials said that they hope to have the
key components of this intermodal plan in place by May 2003 and after
that time they will consider security on individual transportation
modes, including rail. TSA has also signed a memorandum of agreement
with DOT's Federal Aviation Administration, which DOT officials said
would serve as a guide for relations between TSA and DOT's modal
administrations, including FRA and RSPA.
TSA's Office of Maritime and Land Security officials told us that they
have reviewed AAR's security plan, and they credited AAR for its
efforts in conducting a very aggressive vulnerability assessment. The
TSA officials said that they are considering using aspects of the AAR
assessment as the basis for a model that TSA plans to develop on how to
conduct vulnerability assessments. However, the officials noted that
some areas of AAR's plan need to be clarified, such as what specific
measures individual railroad companies will be expected to implement.
FRA officials have also reviewed AAR's plan and commented that AAR
needs to identify mitigating actions more specifically.
TSA officials told us they are planning to undertake projects in the
future that we believe could become part of a rail security plan,
including the development of physical security standards and an
assessment of vulnerable hazardous material transportation areas. As a
first step, officials said that they plan to visit seaport facilities,
which face similar threats to protecting hazardous material shipments
as rail facilities do, to determine what physical security standards
could be applied to other modes of transportation, in areas such as
facility lighting levels or monitoring by closed-circuit televisions.
Given their initial focus on aviation security priorities, TSA
officials said they have not yet established time frames for developing
these physical security standards or conducting a vulnerability
assessment of the rail industry. FRA officials told us that they are
working with TSA on their efforts to develop and implement federal
standards for railroad security.
The development of a security plan addressing rail transportation of
hazardous materials that uses a risk-based management approach would
assist TSA by providing a strategy to identify threats to these
shipments, vulnerabilities that may be targeted in the system used to
ship these materials, and high-risk, high consequence facilities that
need protection. Although TSA has taken steps and is considering future
measures to address the security of hazardous material rail shipments,
it does not yet have a risk-based plan to guide its actions
specifically in this area. Until TSA develops such a plan, it will not
know whether resources are being deployed as effectively and
efficiently as possible to reduce the risk of possible terrorist
attacks.
In our previous work on homeland security, we have determined that the
federal government can benefit from a risk management approach to
defend against terrorism.[Footnote 15] This approach can provide
organizations with a process for enhancing their preparedness to
respond to terrorist attacks and to permit better direction of national
finite resources to areas of highest priority. Figure 2 shows the
components of a risk management approach to defend against terrorism.
This approach includes the following:
* a threat assessment to identify and evaluate potential threats on the
basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and impact of an
attack;
* a vulnerability assessment to identify weaknesses that may be
exploited by identified threats and suggest options to address those
weaknesses; and:
* a criticality assessment to evaluate and identify assets and
infrastructure in terms of specific criteria such as their importance
to public safety and the economy.
Figure 2: Components of a Risk Management Approach to Defend Against
Terrorism:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Several Issues Regarding the Safety and Security of Hazardous Materials
Transported by Rail Remain Unresolved:
Our discussions with federal and private sector hazardous material
transportation experts and local community officials identified several
issues that, in their opinion, remain unresolved regarding the safe and
secure transportation of hazardous materials by rail. These issues
include the need for measures to better safeguard hazardous materials
stored in rail cars while awaiting delivery to a final destination--a
practice commonly referred to as "storage-in-transit"--the
advisability of requiring companies to notify local communities of the
type and quantities of materials stored in transit, and the appropriate
amount of information rail companies should be required to provide
local officials regarding hazardous material shipments passing through
their communities.
Concerns about the Safety and Security of Hazardous Materials Stored in
Transit Have Not Yet Been Fully Addressed:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have raised concerns about
the exposure and vulnerability of hazardous materials stored in transit
in chemical rail cars on rail sidings and in rail yards. Emergency
response officials in three of the locations we visited identified
storage-in-transit as a safety and security concern for their
communities.
The local officials said that they were aware of rail cars that were
unsecured and, in some cases, provided photographs or videotape as
evidence of the lack of security. According to these local officials,
unmonitored chemical cars could develop undetected leaks that could
threaten the nearby population and environment. A May 31, 2002,
hydrochloric acid leak from a rail car in Lowell, Massachusetts, is a
recent example of such an incident. In this incident, a rail car parked
on a siding developed a leak that produced a cloud of hazardous vapor
before the 200-gallon leak of hazardous materials was contained.
Local Government Officials Believe Some Shipments Stored in Transit May
Violate a Rule to Expedite Shipments:
Although they could not provide documentation to support their beliefs,
local government officials we interviewed in two locations stated that
they believed that, in some cases, shipments stored in transit in their
local areas might be in violation of DOT's 48-hour rule[Footnote 16]
that generally requires a carrier to move each shipment of hazardous
materials promptly and within 48 hours after its receipt at any yard,
transfer station, or interchange point.
Although local officials believe the 48-hour rule is a safety and
security standard for shipments of hazardous materials stored in
transit, FRA officials told us that the 48-hour rule was not instituted
for storage safety concerns. According to FRA officials, the 48-hour
rule was implemented for economic reasons, not safety reasons. FRA
officials said that the rule was developed in the early 1900s because
oil companies were using rail yards as convenient storage warehouses
and not promptly moving their shipments.[Footnote 17] The rail
companies did not want their property to be used as a storage warehouse
without compensation. FRA officials said that they do not necessarily
encourage rail companies to move rail cars affected by the 48-hour rule
to another destination just to meet the time limit because this might
result in moving a car from a safe to a hazardous location.
FRA Is Beginning to Address Potential Safety and Security Issues
Regarding Storage-in-transit:
FRA officials recognize that the security concerns regarding storage-
in-transit have grown since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
From a security standpoint, the officials said that new regulations for
storage-in-transit materials should be considered. According to these
officials, such measures may include not allowing rail cars containing
certain highly hazardous commodities to be stored in transit.
FRA is currently reviewing the safety and security of hazardous
materials stored in transit through initiatives such as collaboration
with the American Chemistry Council to examine how storage-in-transit
shipments typically move, how the chemical industry can better expedite
these movements, and viable alternatives to storing chemicals in
transit. TSA is leading an initiative to follow chlorine shipments from
origin to destination. Its overall goal is to determine best practices
for shipments as well as the types of measures needed to secure
shipments, including those stored in transit. TSA has reached out to
the Chlorine Institute, American Chemistry Council, FRA, RSPA, and AAR.
TSA hopes to expand the lessons learned from this initiative to other
hazardous material rail shipments.
RSPA Plans to Clarify the Regulatory Oversight of the Safety and
Security of Hazardous Materials Stored in Transit:
In addition to expressing concern about the safety and security of
hazardous materials stored in transit and their need for information on
the types and quantities of these materials, a local official that we
interviewed told us that he was unclear about which federal agency has
regulatory oversight for the safety and security of this area. Some
issues pertaining to the specific scope of DOT and EPA's roles in the
regulatory oversight of hazardous materials stored in transit have not
been fully determined. According to RSPA, confusion exists in the
regulated community and among federal, state, and local agencies with
hazardous material safety responsibilities regarding whether and to
what extent DOT hazardous material transportation safety regulations
apply to particular operations related to the transportation of
hazardous materials in commerce, such as storage-in-transit on tracks
leased to fixed facilities.[Footnote 18]
In response to requests for clarification on whether particular
activities, such as storage-in-transit, should be considered
transportation operations, RSPA has issued a proposed rule--
Applicability of the Hazardous Materials Regulations to Loading,
Unloading, and Storage, also known as HM-223--to clarify the
applicability of DOT's hazardous material regulations to specific
functions and activities, including loading and unloading of hazardous
materials and their storage during transportation. RSPA officials have
concluded that, given the potential for continuing terrorist threats
and the critical need to assure the security of hazardous materials at
fixed facilities and in transportation, it is more important than ever
to clarify its jurisdiction over hazardous materials in transportation.
:
According to RSPA, confusion exists concerning whether EPA or DOT
regulations apply to storage-in-transit on leased tracks because
federal regulations do not clearly articulate whether this operation is
transportation or nontransportation related. Under HM-223, RSPA is
considering two options for regulatory oversight of storage-in-transit
occurring on leased tracks. Under the first option, storage on leased
tracks would be considered as storage after movement in transportation
of the rail car has been completed whether the hazardous material is to
be unloaded at that destination or not. The hazardous material
transportation regulations would not apply under this option and
hazardous material inspectors could not apply DOT's hazardous material
rail safety requirements concerning proper shipping papers, operational
handling of rail cars, or placards to indicate the hazardous content of
rail cars.
According to EPA officials that we interviewed, under this option,
EPA's risk management program regulations under the Clean Air Act might
apply if storage on leased tracks contained more than a threshold
amount of certain regulated highly toxic materials, such as chlorine.
These officials note that EPA has stated that the Clean Air Act is not
preempted by DOT's authority. They said that while EPA generally does
not regulate activities regulated by DOT, there are circumstances where
both agencies' authorities might apply, for example, with respect to
long-term storage or facility equipment involved in loading or
unloading.
Under the second option being considered, storage on leased tracks
would be considered storage related to transportation and thus subject
to all the applicable requirements of the DOT hazardous material
regulation, even if the leased tracks were the final destination
identified on the shipping papers. This would ensure that rail cars
would be subject to all pertinent DOT hazardous material requirements.
While RSPA's efforts to propose rule making on the applicability of the
hazardous material transportation regulations to loading, unloading,
and storage of hazardous materials began with an advanced notice of
public rule making in 1996, RSPA officials said that HM-223, which
culminates those efforts, will be not be finalized until June 2003.
Over this period, to address issues involved in clarifying jurisdiction
in this area, RSPA published another advanced notice of public rule
making in 1999 and held public meetings to obtain proposals and
recommendations on the applicability of hazardous material regulations
from the regulated community, which includes shippers, carriers,
warehouses, and federal, state, and local public safety agencies. In
2001, RSPA published a notice of proposed rule making requesting
written comments on proposals from these organizations.
Notifying Local Communities on the Type and Quantities of Hazardous
Materials Stored in Transit Has Not Been Addressed:
While chemical manufacturers are required to notify their communities
of the existence of hazardous materials at their facilities, the
advisability of requiring companies to notify local communities on the
type and quantities of materials stored in transit has not been
similarly addressed by DOT. Based on their observations, local
officials from two of the 10 jurisdictions that we visited told us that
they believe storage-in-transit shipments remain in rail yards for
periods longer than 48 hours. To ensure adequate safety and security
for hazardous materials stored in transit, the officials at one
location suggested that the 48-hour rule be more strongly enforced to
expedite shipments or, if hazardous material shipments remain
stationary for extended periods of time (beyond the 48-hour period),
these shipments should be regulated in a manner similar to hazardous
materials stored in fixed facilities--with reporting requirements for
companies to provide information to emergency response officials on the
types and quantities of materials stored in transit.
The local officials said that, because these hazardous materials stored
in transit are parked in their community for extended periods of time,
they present a risk similar to the potential health and safety risk
posed by chemicals at a fixed facility. They expressed a need to have
information on the types and quantities of hazardous materials stored
in transit in their communities to ensure that they have the proper
training and equipment to respond to incidents involving these
materials, and told us that they had experienced difficulty in
obtaining information on these materials stored in transit. The local
officials that we interviewed in one location feel that companies
should be required to provide information on the contents of the rail
cars in a manner similar to that required of fixed facilities under the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986.[Footnote
19] Under the requirements of this act, chemical manufacturers are
required to notify their communities of the existence, as well as some
routine and accidental releases, of hazardous materials at their
facilities to aid in emergency planning.
While some local officials that we interviewed cited the need to
receive information on the types and quantities of hazardous materials
stored in transit, FRA officials told us that they were not in favor of
sharing real-time data on these shipments. FRA officials said that it
would be a significant logistical challenge for railroads to share
real-time data regarding individual freight movements stored in
transit. These officials said that providing advance notification
information could also create new security concerns as detailed
information on the whereabouts of hazardous materials becomes known in
great detail by a large number of individuals. In addition, FRA
officials commented that it would be inappropriate to require railroads
to report to local communities on all hazardous materials stored in
transit because the railroads have limited advance knowledge of what
will be stored at these locations.
Opinions Differ on Adequacy of Hazardous Material Shipment Information
Provided to Communities, but No Determination Has Been Made on
Appropriate Amount of Disclosure:
While differing opinions exist concerning the adequacy of hazardous
material shipment information currently provided to local communities,
no determination has been made at a federal level on the appropriate
amount of information rail companies should be required to provide to
communities regarding overall hazardous material shipments to enhance
their emergency preparedness. Officials from five of the ten
communities that we visited said they did not need advance notification
information on specific shipment types and quantities. Due to the high
volume and variety of hazardous material shipments through his area, an
official from one of these communities said that they employ an
approach to respond to all types of chemical emergencies. He believes
that this approach is more effective for his community's circumstances
rather than trying to prepare for specific chemicals that might be
involved in incidents. However, some officials from two of these five
communities told us that they would like to receive advance
notification of special shipments, such as high-level radioactive
materials or explosives. Officials from the other five communities that
we visited said that they would like to receive advance notification of
certain shipments for emergency planning purposes.
AAR suggests to its member railroads that, as a voluntary policy, they
provide, when requested, historical information on hazardous materials
that have been shipped through a community. Officials from AAR member
railroads that we interviewed said that they complied with this
voluntary policy. For example, a railroad, when asked, will inform a
community of the types of hazardous materials most frequently shipped
through that community over the past year. This policy covers AAR
member railroads, which account for more than 96 percent of intercity
rail freight service and 100 percent of intercity passenger service in
the United States.[Footnote 20]
Emergency response officials that we spoke to at one of our site visits
said that they had experienced difficulty in obtaining limited
historical information about shipments of hazardous materials from a
railroad that was not an AAR member. The local officials told us that
it took 4 years of requests before the company agreed to provide this
information to assist them in their emergency management planning. In
the interim, the locality had to respond to a hazardous material
incident on the company's tracks
involving a tank car leaking hydrochloric acid, which emergency
responders were unaware had been stored on rail tracks in the
community. Officials that we spoke to from national rail industry
organizations offered their opinions on the subject of advance
notification. An official from one organization said that he does not
support providing advance notification information on specific upcoming
shipments to local communities because of the high volume of materials
shipped and the low probability of release. An official from another
organization said that his organization is not in favor of providing
advance notification because it would be too much information sent on a
daily basis and would soon be ignored. He further cautioned that
releasing information about planned shipments could pose a security
risk because such information could be used to identify
vulnerabilities.
FRA officials told us that careful consideration needs to be given to
the full implications of advance notification. They said that this
includes security implications, community capability to make
constructive use of the data, the potential costs and benefits of such
requirements, and whether these requirements should be applied to other
modes of transportation, such as motor carriers. Furthermore, in
commenting on the overall consideration of new security measures for
the rail industry, FRA officials told us that whatever security
enhancements might be required for rail shipments of hazardous
materials should be accompanied by appropriate security requirements
for truck shipments so that shippers not switch to a potentially more
vulnerable but less expensive alternative.
Most Localities Visited Report They Are Generally Prepared to Respond
to Hazardous Material Rail Incidents, but Sufficiency of Actions Taken
Cannot Be Determined:
Even though a host of voluntary standards and self-assessment tools are
available to assist localities in assessing aspects of their emergency
response capabilities, no standardized tool currently exists to
objectively determine a locality's level of preparedness to respond to
hazardous material incidents. As such, the localities that we visited
provided information on their preparedness based on their own self-
assessments rather than on uniform national criteria. These localities
took actions to prepare for and respond to hazardous material incidents
based on self-assessments formed from a variety of factors. For the
most part, these localities said that they found themselves prepared to
respond to hazardous material rail incidents based on their own
selected criteria. Due to the absence of a standardized tool to gauge
the level of preparedness, we were unable to determine the sufficiency
of local community actions to prepare for hazardous material rail
incidents given the risk factors that they face.[Footnote 21]
Case Study Findings Show Varying Preparedness Actions Taken by Local
Communities:
To assess local community capability to prepare for and respond to
potential terrorist attacks or accidents involving rail shipments, we
visited 10 localities in the United States. Each of these localities
was judgmentally selected based on at least one of following three
criteria:
* experienced a recent and significant rail incident involving
hazardous materials,
* had a large population and flow of hazardous materials shipped
through it by rail, and:
* had a small population and large flow of hazardous materials shipped
through it by rail.
Officials from most localities that we visited reported that their
cities are generally prepared to respond to these incidents. Officials
from the localities told us that they have emergency response plans in
place, access to either their own or another hazardous material
response team, and that they plan and conduct training and drills. In
addition, these localities report that they have most of the basic
equipment necessary to respond to a hazardous material incident on
hand. Although officials said they were generally prepared to respond
to incidents involving hazardous chemical materials, they said that
they were less prepared to deal with incidents involving radioactive
materials, with some locations citing a lack of equipment and training
needed to respond. Also, local officials that we interviewed said that
technical communication compatibility could be improved, but they have
developed ways to accommodate communication needs, such as the use of
cellular phones. Finally, local officials from over half of the
locations that we visited said that their communities lacked sufficient
funds to cover the positions left temporarily vacant by personnel
taking training.
Self-assessments Show That Most Locations Are Prepared to Respond to
Hazardous Materials Incidents, but Not to Incidents Involving
Radioactive Materials:
Based on their own self-assessments, local fire department officials
from most of the cities that we visited said that they are generally
prepared to respond to a hazardous material incident. A few officials
whom we interviewed said that although their city is prepared to
respond to a hazardous material incident, their in-house capability
would depend on the types of hazardous materials involved and the scope
of the incident. For example, one fire department official said that he
is comfortable with his city's capabilities to respond to chemical
accidents such as leaking tank cars, spills, and derailments. He
believed that his city could adequately respond to a hazardous material
incident unless it was a catastrophic event, such as a major derailment
involving multiple cars. This official stated, however, that in the
event of a large-scale hazardous material incident, his city would use
additional resources from private, state, and federal organizations, as
well as mutual aid plans, where neighboring jurisdictions agree to
provide emergency response resources to one another in the event that
they are needed to augment their own response capabilities.
When asked if they were prepared to respond to a hazardous material
incident involving radioactive materials, officials from most of the
locations we visited said that they were less capable of responding to
such incidents, with some locations citing a lack of equipment and
training to respond. To prepare for the increase in spent nuclear fuel
shipments expected with the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository, which
is scheduled to begin operations in 2010, the federal government has
begun preliminary planning to ensure local preparedness for the safe
transport of spent nuclear fuel. If the Yucca Mountain Repository is
licensed, DOE will be required, under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982,[Footnote 22] to implement a program to train local public safety
officials through whose jurisdictions DOE plans to ship radioactive
materials to the repository. According to DOE, this program will be
funded 5 years prior to the start of Yucca Mountain operations.
Emergency Response Plans Are in Place at All Locations:
Emergency response plans are in place at all the localities we visited.
These plans address all the hazards applicable to each location and
include emergency responses to hazardous material incidents, including
rail incidents. The plans vary according to the resources that each
locality relies on and the specific courses of action each identifies
to be taken in the event of an emergency. For example, the plans
document which city agency is designated as a lead response agency in
the event of an incident,[Footnote 23] identify support agencies that
can be called in, such as police and health departments, and outline
civil defense procedures. Plans also vary on how often they are
updated. In light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
officials from half of the locations we visited told us that they have
incorporated new terrorism response procedures into their emergency
planning, including training or response protocols.
Most Cities We Visited Have Dedicated Hazardous Material Teams and All
Have Access to Public Hazardous Material Teams:
More than half of the cities we visited have their own dedicated
hazardous material teams to respond to incidents involving the release
of hazardous materials, including those occurring at fixed facilities
or in rail transportation. These are all large or medium-sized
cities.[Footnote 24] Cities that do not have their own hazardous
material teams have access to a local, regional, state, or private
hazardous material response team. For example, an official from one
small city said that the city has access to the resources of the state
police hazardous material team. As part of their emergency response
plans, other cities have access to chemists from private industry or
universities to provide technical assistance in identifying chemicals
and their hazards in the event of an incident.
All Fire Department Personnel Have at Least Some Hazardous Material
Response Training:
Local fire department officials that we interviewed in all the
locations we visited said that their fire department personnel have
received at least awareness-level training, the lowest level of
training recommended in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Standard 472, Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
Materials Incidents. However, a representative of a national emergency
response organization suggested that the minimum level of training for
first responders should actually be at the operations level, the second
highest level of training described in NFPA Standard 472. Fire
departments in the locations we visited varied in providing operations
level training for their fire fighting personnel. However, for the
locations with specialized hazardous material teams, all hazardous
material team personnel received technician level training, the third
highest level of training recommended by NFPA Standard 472. Table 1
lists the four levels of training recommended by NFPA Standard 472.
Table 1: NFPA Levels of Professional Competence for First Responders to
Hazardous Materials Incidents:
Level: Awareness; Definition: The basic competency developed by the
NFPA for first responders to a hazardous materials incident. The
training includes providing first responders with the knowledge and
skills to identify a hazardous materials incident and to contact the
appropriate response resource in accordance with local standard
operating procedures.
Level: Operational; Definition: The second level of competency
developed by the NFPA for first responders to hazardous materials
incidents. First responders trained at this level will meet the
competency of the NFPA's awareness level training as well as any
additional competency designed to allow the responder to plan and
initiate a response to the incident.
Level: Technician; Definition: The third level of competency developed
by the NFPA for first responders to hazardous materials incidents.
First responders trained at this level will meet the competency of the
NFPA's awareness and operational standards. Additional training
includes appropriate measures to meet federal and other state, local,
or provincial occupation health and safety regulator requirements.
Level: Incident Commander; Definition: The highest level of competency
developed by the NFPA for first responders to hazardous materials
incidents. First responders trained at this level will meet all NFPA
standards for awareness and operational levels. In addition, responders
trained at the command level will have the necessary knowledge to
analyze a hazardous material incident and plan for and mitigate
incidents.
Source: National Fire Protection Association. Reprinted with permission
from NFPA 472-2002, Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
Materials Incidents, Copyright © 2002, National Fire Protection
Association, Quincy, MA 02269.
Note: This reprinted material is not the complete and official position
of the NFPA on the referenced subject, which is represented only by the
standard in its entirety.
[End of table]
In addition to fire departments, officials in some cities we visited
told us that they have trained other departmental personnel, such as
police, health, and public works, for response to hazardous material
incidents. The officials we interviewed said that, while these other
agencies are not expected to serve a primary role in the containment of
hazardous material incidents, this training familiarizes these
personnel with response procedures in the event that they are the first
on the scene to an incident or are required to assist responding fire
fighters, such as by rerouting traffic.
More Than Half of The Cities We Visited Have Conducted Hazardous
Material Response Drills and Cited Lessons Learned:
Officials from more than half of the case study locations that we
visited said that they conducted response drills to prepare for
hazardous material incidents. These cities have had at least one
hazardous material drill within the last 3 years. Officials from some
cities said that they have conducted rail-specific hazardous material
response drills.
Among the cities that have conducted drills or experienced prior
hazardous material rail accidents, officials told us that these
experiences had highlighted the need for:
* better communication and coordination, including the use of the
incident command system, among departments or mutual aid districts
during an emergency;
* joint training;
* better dissemination of information to the public including better
public awareness of civil defense procedures; and:
* better crowd control in a mass decontamination situation.
Equipment Is Lacking in Some Locations:
In addition to a firefighter's standard turnout gear, several pieces of
equipment are commonly used to respond to hazardous material
incidents.[Footnote 25] These include airborne chemical detection
equipment, spare turnout gear, protective gear, air hazard detection
equipment, and chemical identification kits. While officials that we
interviewed said that they have the majority of this equipment on hand
to use in response to a hazardous material incident, some locations
said they lacked some additional equipment that was not on this list,
such as patient extraction equipment and hazardous material response
vehicles to carry equipment to the scene. More than half the locations
specifically cited a need for additional radiological response
equipment, such as detectors, decontamination equipment, and personal
protective equipment.
Compatibility of Communication Equipment Varies by Location:
Officials in half of the case study locations we visited told us that
communication systems are not compatible between city agencies. In
addition, officials in most of the case study locations we visited said
that they could not communicate with other jurisdictions without the
use of an intermediary communication device, such as a dispatch center.
While officials we interviewed said that communication compatibility
could be improved, most said that they have developed ways to
accommodate communication needs, such as the use of cellular phones.
However, in one location that had experienced a recent rail accident
involving hazardous materials, officials cited radio communication
incompatibility as a problem. These local officials said that they did
not have the compatibility to speak by radio to officials from other
agencies outside the city. Officials from some case study locations
also told us that communication systems do not work as well
underground.
Officials Said That Training Can Be Difficult to Access Because of
Personnel Funding Constraints:
Officials from over half of the case study locations we visited said
that they had difficulty accessing hazardous material response training
opportunities because of the cost of providing replacements for those
first responders taking training. In addition, one national response
organization stated it visits localities to provide training to help
alleviate costs that may be associated with travel to off-site training
courses.
DHS' Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response Is Beginning
Work on a Baseline Assessment Tool to Determine Preparedness Levels:
With the development of a national homeland security strategy, DHS'
EP&R Directorate has also recognized a need for the federal government
to conduct an assessment of state emergency response preparedness
levels that would allow it to determine a baseline to measure
preparedness across the country. Since most local emergency response
standards and procedures are voluntary in nature and states employ a
wide variety of guides in their planning, the EP&R Directorate chose to
adopt one of these assessment tools--the Emergency Management
Accreditation Program (EMAP) criteria--to standardize the data
collection process and help the agency ascertain factors in
vulnerabilities on a national level. EP&R Directorate officials
characterized EMAP standards as being very rigorous.
In fiscal year 2003, as a first step toward developing a preparedness
baseline, EP&R Directorate officials plan to request that all 50 states
complete a self-assessment of their level of preparedness to respond to
emergencies using EMAP standards as a guide. From the assessment
program, EP&R Directorate officials said that they hope that
communities evaluate their own capabilities, identify deficits, and
establish performance standards to improve emergency response. EP&R
Directorate officials also plan to work with a team of EMAP peer
reviewers to validate the operability of state emergency response plans
as an additional tool in gauging preparedness. This information would
then be used to determine the EP&R Directorate's baseline of national
preparedness levels.
To validate state emergency response planning, the EP&R Directorate
plans to train assessment teams to evaluate preparedness using a common
methodology. These teams would spend from 3 to 8 days evaluating each
state. Their methodology would include checks of state emergency plan
resources. For example, if a certain organization within a state is
expected to provide a specific resource or serve a role in the plan,
the reviewers would contact that organization and verify that the
resource contacts know what is expected of them and can perform the
tasks. EP&R Directorate officials said that assessments of all states
are due to be completed by the end of 2004. The EP&R Directorate plans
on assessing about half the states annually in this program and issuing
a midprogram assessment report.
Conclusions:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have focused attention on
the security and potential vulnerabilities of the nation's
transportation infrastructure. In response to heightened awareness, the
railroad industry took action to develop a security plan using a risk
management approach to address perceived vulnerabilities. The adequacy
of this industry plan to protect communities and the railroad
infrastructure is still unclear since TSA, which is responsible for the
security of all modes of transportation, including rail, has not yet
developed a plan to specifically address the security of rail
transportation, even though it has started developing a risk-based
intermodal transportation system security plan. Without such a specific
plan, TSA lacks a framework for systematically evaluating and
prioritizing actions needed to ensure the safety and security of the
transportation of hazardous materials by rail.
Some of the communities that participated in our case studies expressed
concerns regarding the safety and security of hazardous materials in
rail cars passing through or stored in their communities. They wanted
additional information on the types and quantities of these materials
since, without this information, it is difficult for communities to
know how to prepare for possible incidents involving hazardous
releases. However, this need for information must be balanced against
the security risks that disclosure could pose.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To help meet the requirement to secure all modes of transportation
under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, we recommend that
the Secretary of Homeland Security work jointly with the Secretary of
Transportation to develop a risk-based plan that specifically addresses
the security of the nation's rail infrastructure. This plan should
build upon the railroad industry's experience with rail infrastructure
and the transportation of hazardous materials and establish time frames
for implementing specific security actions necessary to protect
hazardous material rail shipments. Among the areas that should be
addressed in developing this plan are:
* the appropriate roles of the private sector and federal, state, and
local governments;
* minimum security standards for hazardous materials stored in transit
in rail cars; and:
* the appropriate level of disclosure to local communities of the types
and quantities of hazardous materials passing through or stored in
transit in these communities.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human
Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Labor, and Transportation, as
well as the Environmental Protection Agency, National Transportation
Safety Board, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with copies of a draft
of this report for their review and comment. The Departments of
Defense, Justice, and Labor, as well as the National Transportation
Safety Board, did not provide comments. The Departments of Health and
Human Services and Energy, as well as the Environmental Protection
Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provided technical comments
and generally agreed with our report. The Departments of Transportation
and Homeland Security provided oral comments. They generally agreed
with our report and acknowledged that no plan to specifically address
rail security has been developed, but stressed that they have taken
some actions to enhance the security of hazardous material rail
shipments. We incorporated these comments where appropriate. In
addition, the Department of Transportation raised other issues
regarding rail security, which are discussed below.
The Administrator of FRA commented that our report gave the impression
that, in the absence of explicit federal security requirements,
railroad companies were paying insufficient attention to security
risks. This was not our intention. Rather, our report credits the
timely effort to address rail hazardous material risk by the
Association of American Railroads, which was performed with a number of
chemical manufacturers. It further lists security measures reported by
individual railroads in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.
FRA officials also commented that the safety risks associated with the
storage-in-transit of hazardous materials received inappropriate
emphasis in the report, suggesting that the concern is based only on
anecdotal information. We did not attempt to define the magnitude of
the safety risks associated with storage-in-transit. Rather, we
reported the concerns expressed by some local communities about this
practice without attempting to determine the extent of the problem at a
national level.
On May 28, 2003, we subsequently received from FRA a clarification of
their views on the risk-based plan for rail security that we
recommended. FRA wanted to be on record as recognizing the merits of
risk-based management and supportive of its use in day-to-day business.
The agency's position is contained in a letter to GAO that we have
included as appendix VI. Our response to this letter is contained in
appendix VII.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the agencies listed above. We also will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to this report included
Colin J. Fallon, Bert Japikse, Jane S. Kim, Victoria E. Miller, John W.
Mingus Jr., Thomas M. Phan, Maria J. Santos, Michael J. Simon, and
Robert E. White.
Peter F. Guerrero
Director
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Signed by Peter F. Guerrero:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We used a combination of approaches and methodologies to examine (1)
recent steps taken by industry and government to improve the safety and
security of hazardous materials transported by rail, (2) issues
pertaining to the safety and security of rail transport of hazardous
materials that, in the opinion of the hazardous material experts,
remain unresolved, and (3) the preparedness of local jurisdictions to
respond to rail incidents involving hazardous materials. We completed
interviews with regulatory officials and representatives of private
industry, analyses of hazardous material volume and incident data, and
case study interviews with local officials.
To obtain the views of experts on the safety and security of rail
transportation of hazardous materials, we sponsored a 1-day panel
through the National Academy of Sciences that brought together
representatives from academia, industry, and local government. The
views of panel members were used to identify issues and perspectives on
the current system, policies, and practices for transporting hazardous
materials by rail. Specifically, we asked the panel members to discuss
their opinions on: (1) the effectiveness of current industry policies
for the safe and secure shipment of hazardous materials by rail, (2)
the effectiveness of current federal regulatory and assistance
programs, and (3) suggestions for improved industry and government
cooperation. Their views served to support our identification of issues
that still remain to be addressed in ensuring the safety and security
of hazardous materials shipped by rail.
We did our work at 10 federal agencies, several private organizations
representing the railroad and chemical industries and emergency
responders, private rail companies, and state and local government
agencies in 10 locations nationwide. A complete list of the agencies
and organizations visited and contacted follows. We do not list the
local community case study locations that we visited because of the
sensitive nature of our review in light of homeland security concerns.
Organizations Visited and Contacted:
Cabinet Departments:
* Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.; and Fort Eustis, Virginia:
* Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.; and Albuquerque, New Mexico:
* Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C.
* Department of Homeland Security (including the Transportation
Security Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, Directorate of Emergency
Preparedness and Response), Washington, D.C.
* Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
* Department of Transportation (including the Federal Railroad
Administration and the Research and Special Programs Administration),
Washington, D.C.
* Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.
Other Agencies:
* Environmental Protection Agency, Washington D.C.
* National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D.C.
* Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville, Maryland:
National Organizations:
* International Association of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, Virginia:
* International Association of Emergency Managers, Falls Church,
Virginia:
* International Association of Fire Chiefs, Fairfax, Virginia:
* International Association of Fire Fighters, Washington, D.C.
* National Emergency Management Association, Lexington, Kentucky:
* National Volunteer Fire Council, Washington, D.C.
Private Sector:
* American Chemistry Council, Arlington, Virginia:
* Association of American Railroads, Washington, D.C.
* American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, Washington,
D.C.
* American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C.
* The Chlorine Institute, Washington, D.C.
* Dangerous Goods Advisory Council, Washington, D.C.
* CSX Transportation, various locations:
* Burlington Northern-Santa Fe Railroad, various locations:
* Union Pacific Railroad, various locations.
To examine the current safety and security infrastructure of the rail
industry, we conducted a series of interviews with agency officials,
local first responders, railroad companies, and industry and trade
groups. We then examined supporting documentation from these
interviews, Department of Transportation databases, federal laws and
regulations, and previous GAO findings. We also conducted site visits
of rail facilities to record observations about security and safety
practices.
To report on local jurisdictions' capability to respond to potential
terrorist attacks or chemical accidents, we performed case studies of
10 localities in the United States. We judgmentally selected two small
cities, four medium-sized cities, and four large cities. The localities
met at least one of following three criteria:
* had experienced a recent and significant rail incident involving
hazardous materials,
* had a large population and flow of hazardous materials shipped
through it by rail, and/or:
* had a small population and large flow of hazardous materials shipped
through it by rail.
We obtained locations of recent and significant hazardous material
incidents by researching available reports and information from the
National Transportation Safety Board. We analyzed the Surface
Transportation Board's carload Waybill Sample, an annual stratified
sample of national rail flows within the United States, to determine
flows of hazardous materials by rail.[Footnote 26] To estimate carload
and tonnage data, we also used the Waybill Sample. We analyzed the
waybill origin and destination data using the Department of Energy's
Transportation Routing Analysis Geographic Information System to
identify localities with a high level of hazardous material flows. We
reviewed documentation provided with the waybill sample and the data we
received from the sample, and determined that these data were
sufficiently accurate for our purposes.
To obtain information about our case study localities and their
preparedness to respond to incidents involving rail transportation of
hazardous materials, we interviewed officials from city government
agencies such as the fire, police, public works, transportation,
emergency management, and public health departments. We also
interviewed local emergency planning committees and state environmental
and emergency response agencies. In addition, we obtained and examined
supporting documentation from interviews with local officials as part
of the study. As discussed in the report, no standardized tool exists
to gauge the preparedness of a community for a hazardous material
incident.
The report encompasses all aspects of rail transport of hazardous
materials, including loading, unloading, and storage, as well as the
time these materials spend in motion. This report uses the definition
of hazardous materials in federal hazardous material transportation
law, which includes flammable and radioactive materials.[Footnote 27]
Although some hazardous materials enter the United States overland by
rail from Canada and Mexico, this report does not address issues that
may be associated with international shipments. Further, this report
does not directly address issues associated with computer security and
possible cyber attacks.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the
Department of Transportation and Other Federal Agencies:
In addition to the Department of Transportation (DOT), several federal
agencies have authority over certain aspects of rail shipments of
hazardous materials. These include the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), Department of Energy (DOE), and Department
of Defense (DOD).
DOT and DHS Oversee Rail Safety and Security:
Two administrations within DOT--the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)--have
responsibilities for developing regulations pertaining to the
transportation of hazardous materials and rail safety. Under the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Department of Transportation shares
responsibility with the Transportation Security Administration, within
DHS, for rail security.[Footnote 28]
RSPA is responsible for discharging the responsibilities of the
Secretary of Transportation under federal hazardous material
transportation law to identify and regulate the transportation of
materials that may pose an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and
property when transported in commerce. RSPA develops hazardous material
regulations, coordinating its work with other DOT administrations,
including FRA. These regulations specify how shipments must be
identified, packaged, and handled in transit. RSPA also sets hazardous
material transportation training requirements, helps enforce the
hazardous material regulations, and funds hazardous material emergency
preparedness grants to assist localities. RSPA has the authority to
pursue civil and criminal penalties for deliberate violations of
hazardous material transportation regulations, focusing primarily on
packaging standards and shippers of hazardous materials. According to
RSPA officials, RSPA conducts some, but not many, radioactive material
inspections.
FRA oversees the safety of track, signal and train controls, motive
power and equipment, operating practices, highway-rail grade crossing
safety, and hazardous materials. To ensure compliance with railroad
safety regulations, FRA conducts thousands of inspections annually in
these six areas. FRA has several enforcement tools, such as civil and
criminal penalties, if railroad companies do not comply with safety
regulations.
For the shipment of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
materials, FRA has developed a safety compliance and oversight plan to
examine the safety and security of prospective shipping routes, rail
crews, and equipment prior to shipment of these materials and to
provide an additional level of inspection for such shipments. To ensure
the safety and security of these shipments, FRA performs several
procedures such as inspections of rail cars and locomotives and
coordination with federal intelligence and local law enforcement
agencies to identify where shipments could be stored temporarily en
route if needed. FRA, in conjunction with the Association of American
Railroads, DOE, and rail representatives, is updating its safety
compliance and oversight plan to address security concerns related to
terrorism.
Within DHS, TSA, created in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, has focused primarily on aviation
issues, but it is responsible for the security of all modes of
transportation, including rail. Though originally a part of DOT, TSA
became a part of DHS, along with 22 other agencies in an effort to
better coordinate the federal government's resources to prevent and
protect the United States from domestic terrorism. In addition, the
U.S. Coast Guard has the responsibility for preventing spills from
vessels and waterfront facilities. The Coast Guard also serves as the
federal on scene coordinator under the National Contingency Plan for
oil or hazardous substance releases in the coastal zone.
EPA Oversees Fixed Facilities That Handle Hazardous Materials:
EPA has authority for implementing and enforcing legislation governing
the protection of public health and the environment against chemical
and other polluting discharges and for abating and controlling
pollution when spills occur. The regulatory focus of EPA's Chemical
Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office is on fixed facilities,
such as chemical factories, that handle large quantities of hazardous
materials. Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
of 1986,[Footnote 29] EPA helps coordinate preparedness among federal,
state, and local emergency responders. The purpose of this act is to
encourage and provide support for emergency planning efforts at the
state and local levels and provide the public and local governments
information concerning potential chemical hazards present in their
communities. As part of its responsibilities under this act, EPA
identifies substances and quantities that qualify as extremely
hazardous. EPA has also provided training and technical assistance to
states and localities to enhance contingency planning and emergency
response capabilities. Under the Clean Air Act,[Footnote 30] as
amended, EPA implements a risk management program that requires
stationary chemical facilities to prevent and mitigate accidental
releases of extremely hazardous chemicals. EPA also has
responsibilities concerning oil spills. EPA's Office of Air and
Radiation sometimes participates with other agencies in responding to
hazardous material transportation incidents involving radioactive
materials.
OSHA Focuses on the Safety of Plant Workers and Emergency Responders:
The Occupational Safety and Health Act, administered by OSHA, requires
employers, including chemical and railroad companies, to provide safe
workplaces. It requires that OSHA promulgate standards to protect the
safety and health of employees. Additionally, the statute and
implementing regulations require employers to, among other things,
inform employees about potential hazards, provide safety training, keep
records of workplace injuries, notify government administrators of
serious accidents, and post notices informing workers about their
rights to complain about safety and health violations. OSHA establishes
hazardous material training and safety requirements for emergency
responders through its general industry standards, including its
hazardous waste operations and emergency response standard.
NRC and DOE Oversee Shipments of Nuclear Material:
Although DOT regulates the transportation of nuclear material,
including spent fuel, as hazardous material, NRC also regulates the
transportation of nuclear material by its licensees. The primary role
of NRC, under a memorandum of agreement with DOT, is the establishment
of packaging standards for fissile materials and for other radioactive
materials exceeding certain limits. NRC certifies spent fuel casks and
other radioactive material package designs that meet these standards
and requires its licensees to use certified casks for transport. NRC
also plays a significant role through safety and security requirements
and through inspection and enforcement.
The responsibilities of DOE regarding spent nuclear fuel are related to
its role as an operator of nuclear facilities, including its role in
developing the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository. DOE's Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management is responsible for shipping spent
nuclear fuel and oversees nuclear waste fund activities related to the
Yucca Mountain Repository, which include the transportation of spent
nuclear fuel. The shipping is done in accordance with NRC packaging and
advance notification requirements and DOT's hazardous material
regulations. Both DOE and NRC have authority to approve packages, such
as casks as suitable for transport under the hazardous material
regulations, NRC's rule for the packaging and transportation of
radioactive material,[Footnote 31] and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended.[Footnote 32] DOE's authority is for defense or DOE-owned
materials, while NRC's authority is for shipments by its licensees. In
addition, DOE's Office of Environmental Management coordinates policies
and program implementation for shipments of environmental radioactive
waste for DOE, coordinating its operations with DOT. NRC also performs
inspections to determine whether companies that transport radiological
materials take appropriate safety measures to package these materials.
For the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, NRC performs inspections
of shipments by its licensees to ensure that this material is
physically protected against acts of sabotage.
DOD Oversees the Safety and Security of Military Hazardous Material
Shipments:
DOD's Military Traffic Management Command, which oversees the shipments
of DOD hazardous materials by rail companies and ensures that they are
shipped according to DOD's safety and security standards, requires that
everyone participating in the shipment of hazardous materials comply
with the hazardous material regulations. This includes compliance with
requirements for labeling, placarding, and transportation. DOD also
requires inspections for sensitive shipments, including hazardous
materials, to be conducted by railroad police officers, trained
railroad employees, or members of private security firms under contract
to DOD.
:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United
States:
Millions of tons of hazardous materials are shipped yearly on a
170,000-mile rail network that crisscrosses the continental United
States. The Class I railroads, the largest of the railroad companies,
operate more than 120,000 miles of this road.[Footnote 33] The rail
network touches every major urban center and hundreds of smaller
communities in between. While the vast majority of shipments arrive
safely at their destination, serious incidents involving these
materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or injury.
In July 2001, the derailment of a CSX Transportation train in an
underground tunnel and the ensuing fire fueled by hazardous materials
disrupted the city of Baltimore, Maryland, for several days. In January
2002, a Canadian Pacific Railway derailment outside Minot, North
Dakota, ruptured seven tank cars carrying anhydrous ammonia, creating a
vapor plume approximately 5 miles long and 2 ½ miles wide. The
hazardous material release affected approximately 15,000 people,
causing one death and more than 300 injuries.
Department of Transportation Categorizes Hazardous Materials by Nine
Classes:
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) hazardous material regulations
classify hazardous materials into nine hazard classes. Among other
things, the classification system helps communicate the hazards of
these materials to emergency responders and transportation workers. The
nine classes of hazardous materials are:
* Class 1, explosives;
* Class 2, gases;
* Class 3, flammable liquids;
* Class 4, flammable and solids;
* Class 5, oxidizing substances and organic peroxides;
* Class 6, poisonous and infectious substances;
* Class 7, radioactive materials;
* Class 8, corrosives; and:
* Class 9, miscellaneous materials.
Some of these nine classes are further divided into subclasses to
denote different hazards. For example, Class 2 is divided into three
divisions: 2.1, flammable gases; 2.2, nonflammable, nonpoisonous
compressed gases; and 2.3, poison gases. Any hazardous materials that
are properly packaged and labeled and suitable for transportation by
rail are eligible for shipment on any class of railroad track.
Overall Volume of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials for Rail,
Truck, and Water are Similar by Ton-mile:
DOT estimates that there are over 800,000 shipments of hazardous
materials daily by all modes of transportation in quantities varying
from several ounces to many thousands of gallons. For comprehensive
data related to flows of hazardous materials for all modes of
transportation, DOT and the Department of Commerce jointly conduct the
Commodity Flow Survey (CFS). To examine the flow across modes, we used
data from the 1997 CFS, the most recently completed survey. We reviewed
the published methodology and determined that the data were
sufficiently accurate for our purposes.
The 1997 CFS data, shown in table 2, estimated that approximately 97
million tons of hazardous materials were shipped by rail during that
year, fourth among all modes behind truck, water, and pipeline.
However, rail-transported commodities travel a far greater average
distance, with the result that the shipments by ton-mile for rail,
truck, and water are similar.
Peter F. Guerrero
While the 1997 CFS provides the most recent comprehensive data across
modes, total tonnage shipped on rail can also be obtained through
analysis of Waybill Sample data. Figure 3 shows tons of hazardous
materials shipped by rail for 1998-2001 based on Waybill Sample data.
Figure 3: Tons of Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail, 1998-2001:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Estimates from the Waybill Sample have sampling errors associated
with them. The 95 percent confidence level associated with the 1998
estimate of approximately 95 million tons ranges from approximately 93
million tons to approximately 97 million tons. Except as noted in the
text, all percentage estimates have sampling errors not exceeding plus
or minus 5 percentage points, and all numerical estimates other than
percentages have sampling errors not exceeding 5 percent of the value
of those estimates.
[End of figure]
Rail Shipments Represent a Much Higher Share of Volume for Some
Hazardous Material Classes:
When data from the 1997 CFS is examined according to hazard classes and
across transportation modes, it becomes clear that, despite accounting
for only 6 percent of the overall hazardous material tonnage and 27
percent of ton-miles, rail has a much higher share for other hazard
classes for which data are available. The reason for this divergence is
the predominance of flammable liquids, such as gasoline and diesel
fuel, in hazardous material shipments.[Footnote 34] When the
commodities are looked at individually, the large role that rail plays
in shipping other hazardous materials becomes apparent. For example,
rail moves 55 percent of Class 4, flammable solids, and 31 percent of
Class 6, toxic materials.
If volume data are further separated by division within hazard class,
the prevalence of rail as a shipment mode for some specific
subcategories of materials comes into even sharper focus. For example,
as shown in table 3, 59 percent of the tonnage of toxic-by-inhalation
gases moves by rail, representing 95 percent of the ton-miles of these
gases.
Table 3: Rail Shipments as Percentage of Hazardous Material Shipments
by All Transportation Modes by Hazard Class and Division, 1997:
Class[A]: 1-Explosives:
Class[A]: Division: 1-Explosives: 1.1; 1-Explosives: Hazard
division[A]: 1-Explosives: Explosives with a mass explosion hazard;
Tons (thousands): N/A; Tons (percent): N/A; Ton-miles (millions): N/A;
Ton-miles (percent): N/A.
Class[A]: Division: 1-Explosives: 1.2; 1-Explosives: Hazard
division[A]: 1-Explosives: Explosives with a projection hazard; Tons
(thousands): < 1; Tons (percent): < 1%; Ton-miles (millions): < 1; Ton-
miles (percent): < 1%.
Class[A]: Division: 1-Explosives: 1.3; 1-Explosives: Hazard
division[A]: 1-Explosives: Explosives with predominantly a fire hazard;
Tons (thousands): < 1; Tons (percent): < 1%; Ton-miles (millions): < 1;
Ton-miles (percent): < 1%.
Class[A]: Division: 1-Explosives: 1.4; 1-Explosives: Hazard
division[A]: 1-Explosives: Explosives with no significant blast hazard;
Tons (thousands): N/A; Tons (percent): N/A; Ton-miles (millions): N/A;
Ton-miles (percent): N/A.
Class[A]: Division: 1-Explosives: 1.5; 1-Explosives: Hazard
division[A]: 1-Explosives: Very insensitive explosives, blasting
agents; Tons (thousands): < 1; Tons (percent): < 1%; Ton-miles
(millions): < 1; Ton-miles (percent): < 1%.
Class[A]: 2-Gases; Tons (thousands): 15,203; Tons (percent): 13%; Ton-
miles (millions): 11,447; Ton-miles (percent): 52%.
Class[A]: Division: 1-Explosives: 2.1; 1-Explosives: Hazard
division[A]: 1-Explosives: Flammable gases; Tons (thousands): 6,362;
Tons (percent): 10%; Ton-miles (millions): 4,671; Ton-miles (percent):
50%.
Class[A]: Division: 1-Explosives: 2.2; 1-Explosives: Hazard
division[A]: 1-Explosives: Nonflammable, nontoxic compressed gases;
Tons (thousands): 3,075; Tons (percent): 8%; Ton-miles (millions):
1,836; Ton-miles (percent): 25%.
Class[A]: Division: 1-Explosives: 2.3; 1-Explosives: Hazard
division[A]: 1-Explosives: Gases toxic by inhalation; Tons (thousands):
5,766; Tons (percent): 59%; Ton-miles (millions): 4,940; Ton-miles
(percent): 95%.
Class[A]: 3-Flammable liquids; Tons (thousands): 26,642; Tons
(percent): 2%; Ton-miles (millions): 19,548; Ton-miles (percent): 12%.
Class[A]: 4-Flammable solids; Tons (thousands): 6,477; Tons (percent):
55%; Ton-miles (millions): 8,639; Ton-miles (percent): 90%.
Class[A]: Division: 1-Explosives: 4.1; 1-Explosives: Hazard
division[A]: 1-Explosives: Flammable solids; Tons (thousands): 5,904;
Tons (percent): 58%; Ton-miles (millions): 7,815; Ton-miles (percent):
93%.
Class[A]: Division: 1-Explosives: 4.2; 1-Explosives: Hazard
division[A]: 1-Explosives: Spontaneously combustible materials; Tons
(thousands): 390; Tons (percent): 46%; Ton-miles (millions): 613; Ton-
miles (percent): 82%.
Class[A]: Division: 1-Explosives: 4.3; 1-Explosives: Hazard
division[A]: 1-Explosives: Dangerous when wet materials; Tons
(thousands): 183; Tons (percent): 22%; Ton-miles (millions): 211; Ton-
miles (percent): 50%.
Class[A]: 5-Oxidizers and organic peroxides; Tons (thousands): 3,182;
Tons (percent): 34%; Ton-miles (millions): 2,820; Ton-miles (percent):
63%.
Class[A]: 6-Toxic (poison); Tons (thousands): 1,949; Tons (percent):
31%; Ton-miles (millions): 1,446; Ton-miles (percent): 51%.
Class[A]: 7-Radioactive materials; Tons (thousands): N/A; Tons
(percent): N/A; Ton-miles (millions): N/A; Ton-miles (percent): N/A.
Class[A]: 8-Corrosive materials; Tons (thousands): 24,427; Tons
(percent): 27%; Ton-miles (millions): 16,998; Ton-miles (percent): 41%.
Class[A]: 9-Miscellaneous dangerous goods; Tons (thousands): 18,334;
Tons (percent): 28%; Ton-miles (millions): 13,064; Ton-miles (percent):
58%.
Class[A]: Total; Tons (thousands): 96,626; Tons (percent): 6%; Ton-
miles (millions): 74,711; Ton-miles (percent): 28%.
Legend:
N/A = Data do not meet publication standards because of high sampling
variability or other reasons.
Source: GAO analysis of DOT data.
[A] The 1997 CFS uses different names for hazard classes than DOT
currently uses.
[End of table]
Poisonous Inhalation Hazardous Materials Were Among the Ten Most
Commonly Shipped Hazardous Materials from 1998 to 2001:
The quantities of specific chemicals shipped by rail can be determined
by analyzing the Waybill Sample data. Table 4 shows the top 20
materials shipped by rail from 1998 to 2001 and the average number of
carloads shipped annually during this period. Nonbulk cargoes such as
freight forwarder traffic and freight rate shipments, both of which may
consist of mixed materials, were the top two types of hazardous
materials shipped. The top bulk hazardous material cargoes can be in
the form of solids, liquids, or liquefied gases, and include flammable,
corrosive, and toxic hazardous materials. Poison-by-inhalation
hazardous materials, such as ammonia and chlorine, are in the top 10
carloads shipped for this time period.
Table 4: The Top 20 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail by Volume,
1998-2001:
Hazardous materials: 1. Freight forwarder traffic[B]; Estimated total
carloads[A]: 1,188,109; Estimated average annual number of carloads:
297,027.
Hazardous materials: 2. All freight rate shipments, not elsewhere coded
(NEC), or trailer on flat car shipments, commercial, except where
identified by commodity; Estimated total carloads[A]: 716,177;
Estimated average annual number of carloads: 179,044.
Hazardous materials: 3. Sulfur liquid or molten nonmetallic minerals
except fuels; Estimated total: carloads[A]: 273,005; Estimated average
annual number of carloads: 68,251.
Hazardous materials: 4. Liquefied petroleum gas, NEC, compressed;
Estimated total carloads[A]: 253,234; Estimated average annual number
of carloads: 63,308.
Hazardous materials: 5. Sodium (soda), caustic (sodium hydroxide);
Estimated total carloads[A]: 236,455; Estimated average annual number
of carloads: 59,114.
Hazardous materials: 6. Asphalt pitches or tars, from petroleum, coal
tar, coke oven, or natural gas; Estimated total carloads[A]: 222,163;
Estimated average annual number of carloads: 55,541.
Hazardous materials: 7. Sulfuric acid or oil of vitriol; Estimated:
total: carloads[A]: 200,875; Estimated average annual number of
carloads: 50,219.
Hazardous materials: 8. Ammonia, anhydrous; Estimated total
carloads[A]: 163,057; Estimated average annual number of carloads:
40,764.
Hazardous materials: 9. Chlorine gas, liquefied; Estimated total
carloads[A]: 128,600; Estimated average annual number of carloads:
32,150.
Hazardous materials: 10. Gasolines, blended, consisting of motor fuels
containing 50% or more of gasolines[C]; Estimated total carloads[A]:
97,192; Estimated average annual number of carloads: 24,298.
Hazardous materials: 11. Ethyl alcohol, anhydrous denatured in part
with petroleum products and/or chemicals (not to exceed 5%); Estimated:
total: carloads[A]: 95,333; Estimated average annual number of
carloads: 23,833.
Hazardous materials: 12. Phosphatic fertilizer solution, containing not
more than 77% of phosphoric anhydride by weight; Estimated total
carloads[A]: 90,779; Estimated average annual number of carloads:
22,695.
Hazardous materials: 13. Chemicals, NEC; Estimated total carloads[A]:
86,854; Estimated average annual number of carloads: 21,713.
Hazardous materials: 14. Vinyl chloride (chloroethane or
chloroethylene); Estimated total carloads[A]: 73,033; Estimated
average annual number of carloads: 18,258.
Hazardous materials: 15. Methanol (methyl or wood alcohol) liquid;
Estimated total carloads[A]: 67,903; Estimated average annual number
of carloads: 16,976.
Hazardous materials: 16. Propane gas, liquefied; Estimated total
carloads[A]: 65,702; Estimated average annual number of carloads:
16,425.
Hazardous materials: 17. Carbon dioxide gas, liquefied, or carbonic
acid gas; Estimated total carloads[A]: 63,020; Estimated average
annual number of carloads: 15,755.
Hazardous materials: 18. Ammonium nitrate fertilizer; Estimated total
carloads[A]: 62,563; Estimated average annual number of carloads:
15,641.
Hazardous materials: 19. Muriatic (hydrochloric) acid; Estimated:
total: carloads[A]: 58,165; Estimated average annual number of
carloads: 14,541.
Hazardous materials: 20. Styrene (liquid); Estimated total
carloads[A]: 55,910; Estimated average annual number of carloads:
13,977.
Source: GAO analysis of DOT data.
[A] Because the waybill sample data is extrapolated from a 1 percent
sample, there will be uncertainties associated with the totals in this
table.
[B] Nonbulk shipments that may consist of mixed materials.
[C] The sampling error for this estimate is approximately 25 percent of
the value of the estimate. The sampling errors for all other estimates
in this table do not exceed 5 percent of the value of those estimates.
[End of table]
Rail Shipments of Radioactive and Military Hazardous Materials
Represent a Small Fraction of All Rail Shipments of Hazardous
Materials:
Rail shipments of radioactive and military hazardous materials are few
compared with overall rail shipments of hazardous materials. Through
its Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Department of
Defense (DOD) contracts with U.S. rail companies for the shipment of
arms, ammunition, explosives, and other hazardous materials. The
Department of the Navy and the Department of Energy (DOE) each ship
radioactive material, including high-level spent nuclear fuel.
DOD Hazardous Materials Rail Shipments Include Arms, Ammunition,
Explosives, Spent Nuclear Fuel, and Other Materials:
From 1997 to 2001, MTMC shipped 728,000 tons of hazardous materials by
rail, which represents a very small percentage of the 459 million tons
of all hazardous materials shipped by rail during this time period.
Although some DOD hazardous materials are shipped on dedicated trains,
more often they are shipped in one-or two-car shipments and attached to
trains with other nonmilitary cargoes. The dedicated shipments are
usually done in conjunction with a planned exercise where a large
amount of materials are needed.
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, a joint organization within both
the Department of Navy and Energy, ships naval spent nuclear fuel from
shipyards to DOE's Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory for examination and temporary storage. According to program
data, spent nuclear fuel from nuclear-powered warships accounts for
approximately 0.05 percent of all spent nuclear fuel in the United
States. From 1957 to 2001, the program shipped 738 containers of
radioactive material without a harmful release of radiation. According
to the Department of the Navy, naval reactor components are designed
robustly to withstand combat conditions.
DOE Ships Radioactive Waste Materials from Its Own Operations by Rail:
DOE ships its own radioactive waste material shipments, including low-
level radioactive material, transuranic waste, and spent nuclear
fuel.[Footnote 35] Within DOE, the Office of Environmental Management
coordinates policies and program implementation for shipments of
environmental radioactive waste. DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management would have responsibility for the proposed shipments
to the Yucca Mountain Repository. Shipments made under the Office of
Environmental Management are currently made mostly by truck; however,
DOE is exploring the possibility of increasing rail shipments in the
future. DOE officials estimate that of the approximately 500 shipments
a month of low-level radioactive material made by DOE, less than 1
percent are made by rail.
Volume of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments Is Expected to
Increase Substantially if the Yucca Mountain Repository Is Approved:
According to Nuclear Regulatory Commission statistics, approximately 2
million pounds of spent nuclear fuel were transported by rail in the
United States between 1979 and 1996. These amounts will increase
greatly if a proposed private fuel storage facility in Utah is licensed
for operation and will increase again if the proposed Yucca Mountain
Repository is approved. Total shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the
private fuel storage facility are estimated to be 88 million pounds,
and the estimated total shipment to Yucca Mountain is 154 million
pounds over a 24-year period. All the shipments to the private fuel
storage facility would be by rail, while shipments to Yucca Mountain
will be by both rail and truck.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel:
Proposed Private Fuel Storage and Yucca Mountain Repository Plans Will
Result in Substantial Increases in Rail Shipment of Radioactive
Materials:
If the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada is licensed and
begins operation, the number of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments by
rail would greatly increase in the future. Even without the operation
of Yucca Mountain, there may be a substantial increase in the shipment
of SNF from private efforts to ship and temporarily store SNF.
The most common method for storing SNF is in dry or wet fuel storage
facilities on-site at nuclear plants. Some plants, however, are
concerned about reaching full capacity for storage on-site and the
ongoing expense associated with this type of storage. Under the Nuclear
Waste Fund provision of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the
operators of nuclear plants have been paying fees for a fund maintained
by the Department of Energy (DOE) to pay for the proper disposal of SNF
in a national repository,[Footnote 36] proposed for Yucca
Mountain.[Footnote 37] To date, operators have not been able to ship
any of their spent fuel off-site to the repository.
To address SNF on-site storage capacity issues, private power companies
with more than one nuclear plant may ship SNF by rail from one plant to
the storage facility of another if available storage capacity exists.
Such intrautility transfers have constituted most commercial spent fuel
shipments in the past. According to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
statistics, 1,057 metric tons of SNF were commercially transported by
rail in the United States between 1979 and 1996 in 147 separate
shipments. According to NRC data, no radioactive releases above the
regulatory limit have occurred during any of these shipments. Table 5
shows the total metric tons and shipments of commercial spent nuclear
fuel transported by rail and truck from 1979 to 1996.
Table 5: Transport of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel, 1979-1996:
Mode: Rail; Metric tons: of spent fuel: 1,057; Shipments: 147; Average
metric: tons per shipment: 7.2.
Mode: Truck; Metric tons: of spent fuel: 356; Shipments: 1,172; Average
metric: tons per shipment: 0.3.
Mode: Total; Metric tons: of spent fuel: 1,413; Shipments: 1,319;
Average metric: tons per shipment: 1.1.
Source: Congressional Research Service.
[End of table]
DOE Estimates That 70,000 Metric Tons of SNF Would Be Shipped to the
Proposed Yucca Mountain National Repository over a 24-Year Period:
The proposed Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada would be the largest
to hold SNF in the country. Although the repository is not yet
licensed, and would not be scheduled to begin operations until 2010,
studies and preparations for these shipments have been under way for
some time. According to DOE's Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca
Mountain, approximately 70,000 metric tons of SNF would be shipped to
the repository over a 24-year period. DOE officials currently favor the
use of trains versus trucks as the primary mode of transporting SNF to
Yucca Mountain. This decision, however, has not been finalized. The use
of rail would require fewer overall shipments than the use of trucks
due to the larger transport capacity of trains. If trains are chosen as
the primary mode of transportation for SNF to Yucca Mountain, DOE
estimates that, on average, 130 trains carrying approximately 400 casks
would transport SNF every year for 24 years.[Footnote 38] A rail
shipment may include up to three rail casks.
If trains were to be used, a new rail line would need to be constructed
to connect the repository to main line railroad tracks. The rail line
would be approximately 100 to 300 miles in length depending on the
corridor selected. In addition, specific routes for SNF shipments would
also have to be selected. Finally, DOE would have to determine whether
or not to use dedicated trains to make these shipments.
Association of American Railroads Endorses the Use of Dedicated Trains
for SNF Shipments to Yucca Mountain:
The Association of American Railroads (AAR) has endorsed the use of
dedicated trains for shipments of SNF to Yucca Mountain. Dedicated
trains would allow shipments to travel from origin to destination as
quickly as possible, thereby minimizing exposure en route and time
spent in rail yards. AAR's position is that advanced technology that is
not routinely used in regular trains, such as that used for derailment
prevention, could be incorporated in a dedicated train. The Department
of Transportation (DOT) is currently drafting a report on the safety of
using dedicated trains for the rail shipment of spent nuclear fuel.
Proposed Shipment of Spent Nuclear Fuel by Private Fuel Storage, LLC,
Would Also Result in a Substantial Increase in Shipments:
In order to gain additional storage capacity for SNF, a consortium of
eight private utility companies, called Private Fuel Storage (PFS),
LLC, working with the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute tribe, is
pursuing a storage facility on tribal land. The Goshute reservation is
located approximately 50 miles west of Salt Lake City, Utah. This
proposed storage facility would also result in a substantial increase
in SNF shipments.
If licensed, the facility would receive up to 40,000 tons of SNF for
storage. Unlike the Yucca Mountain repository, the PFS facility would
be a temporary storage site rather than a permanent repository. An NRC
license to store SNF lasts 20 years and is renewable. After the license
expires, the facility would be decommissioned and the material taken
off of the reservation. If the Yucca Mountain repositorywere in
operation at that time, Yucca Mountain would be the likely recipient of
this material. Provisions would need to be made to safely transport
material to and from the Goshute Reservation.[Footnote 39]
PFS anticipates receiving one to two trains weekly, each carrying two
to four shipping casks containing 10 metric tons of uranium. Dedicated
trains, stopping only for crew changes, refueling, and periodic
inspections, would ship the material. A 32-mile rail line would be
constructed by PFS on federal government owned land to connect the
facility with the nearest railroad.
Historically Low Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment Volumes Make Risk
Assessment from Increased Shipments Difficult:
It is difficult to assess the risk from the shipment of SNF using
historic data, since the SNF shipments to date amount to only a small
fraction of those proposed for shipment to the Yucca Mountain
Repository and PFS. The 1,057 metric tons of spent fuel that was
shipped by rail between 1979 and 1996 is small compared to proposed
shipments to the Yucca Mountain Repository and PFS.
Even though no harmful radiation releases have occurred in past
shipments of SNF, several questions still remain regarding the
potential risk posed by these shipments, including:
* whether the past safety record is indicative of potential future
accidents given the difference in volume of materials shipped,
* what type of potential release is possible given cask design and
proposed shipping practices, and:
* what harm could be done by attacks on SNF shipments.
In addressing concerns about the potential for future accidents given
the expected increase in spent nuclear fuel shipments, NRC officials
told us that they believe that historical transport data for accident
rates, in general, and for spent fuel shipments, in particular, support
the conclusion that current regulatory programs result in a high degree
of safety, even if applied to a larger shipment campaign. The officials
said that NRC has sponsored risk studies that address the potential
impacts related to changes in shipment parameters for future shipments
to a waste facility.[Footnote 40] They said that they believe there is
an adequate technical basis to conclude current shipments are safe and
that future compliant shipments will be safe.
Studies Suggest That There is a Low Probability of Accidental Release
of Radiation during Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel:
Past federal studies have examined risks to the safety of the shipment
of SNF and suggest that there is a low probability of accidental
release of radiation during its transportation. To address safety
issues associated with the shipment of SNF, NRC sponsored a series of
studies to develop a predictive model of shipment risk. These include a
study conducted by the Livermore National Laboratory. In addition, we
convened a National Academy of Sciences panel of rail industry experts
to identify issues involved in the safe and secure transport of
hazardous materials by rail, including SNF.
Livermore National Laboratory Study:
The Livermore National Laboratory "Modal Study," completed in 1987 and
updated in 1995, concluded that 99.8 percent of all accidents involving
SNF would not result in a harmful release of radiation. The Livermore
Study relied on existing accident data to develop:
* accident rates for trains and trucks,
* a distribution of accident speeds, and:
* a distribution of types of accidents.
All of these data were then applied against the structural
characteristics of SNF shipment casks to determine whether the type of
accident described would result in a harmful release of radiation.
The Livermore Study is consistent with Research and Special Programs
Administration data, which indicate that less than 0.10 percent of all
current carloads of hazardous materials are involved in an accident
that causes a release of hazardous material. This study also examined
the effects of four severe scenarios derived from actual transportation
accidents and concluded that in only one of the scenarios, which
included an engulfing fire lasting several days, would the casks have
failed to prevent package radiation levels from exceeding NRC limits.
The state of Nevada sponsored an assessment of the Livermore Study
criticizing its findings on several counts. According to the
assessment, (1) the methodology for deriving the accident rates may not
have considered all the potential causes for cask failure, (2) the
study does not take into consideration the possibility for human error
in SNF cask construction and the effects that this could have in the
severity of an accident, and (3) the computer simulation used in the
Livermore study did not account for all potential effects from high
heat fires such as the breakdown of spent fuel pellets into gases or
vapors.
In March 2000, NRC sponsored another study to update these earlier
findings, entitled Re-examination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk
Estimates. The 2000 NRC study confirmed the results of an earlier 1977
NRC study and quantified the expected risk of transporting SNF. The
2000 study concluded that the rail accident risk was only 2 percent of
the risk estimate in the prior study.
National Academy of Sciences Panel Expressed Confidence in the Safety
and Security of Hazardous Material Rail Shipments:
Experts at the GAO-sponsored National Academy of Sciences panel on the
safety and security of hazardous material rail shipments also expressed
that the risks of the transport of SNF were low relative to the risks
of transporting other hazardous materials. An AAR representative at the
panel, for example, did not cite SNF when discussing the hazardous
materials that are of special concern for security in shipment. Panel
participants noted that radioactive and nuclear material has
historically been a source of anxiety in the United States, and that
this public perception makes the shipment of radioactive material seem
more of a problem than it is. One panelist noted that, although an
attack on radioactive material in transit would be sure to attract a
lot of media attention, the hardness of the cask would minimize damage
and the potential for a radiation release. In comparison with SNF, he
noted, other materials have the potential for a much greater lethal
effect. One panelist, an emergency first responder, stated that he
would rather have SNF going through his town than a shipment of
gasoline because of the strength of the SNF container.
DOE Rebuts Aspects of Study on Safety Issues Regarding the
Transportation of SNF Casks:
In the aftermath of the July 2001 incident in the Howard Street Tunnel
in Baltimore, Radioactive Waste Management Associates prepared a study
that concluded that, had SNF casks been part of the train involved in
that accident, the fire in the tunnel would have resulted in a release
of contaminating radiation throughout a section of the city. This
report stated that there are currently no requirements that SNF be
transported separately from other hazardous cargo, and that the tunnel
is part of a route identified as a potential rail corridor for SNF
shipments, concluding that it is feasible that a cask could have been
part of the burning train in the tunnel. DOE provided us with a
criticism of the study prepared by staff from Sandia National
Laboratory disputing the conclusions of the report. According to DOE
officials, at least one buffer car must separate a SNF car from a car
containing any hazardous materials. DOE officials said because of the
separation of at least one car length and the slow, rather than
catastrophic, leak of the tripropylene, the most intense fire heat
would have been localized at the tripropylene car and not at adjacent
cars.
In March 2003, NRC also released a report that examined the Baltimore
tunnel fire incident and evaluated what the consequences would have
been had a spent nuclear fuel transportation cask been in the train
accident in the tunnel.[Footnote 41] NRC concluded in its report that,
for a spent nuclear fuel transportation cask approved under NRC rules
for packaging and transportation of radioactive materials[Footnote 42]
and subjected to the conditions encountered in the Howard Street tunnel
fire, no release of radioactive materials would have resulted from this
postulated event. In addition, the health and safety of the public
would have been maintained.
Safety and Security Issues Posed by the Substantial Increase in Future
SNF Shipments and Potential New Threats for These Shipments Are Being
Studied:
Since the 1970s, DOE and NRC have conducted several studies of the
effect of sabotage on the transportation of SNF. These studies found
that a successful sabotage attack on spent nuclear fuel being
transported would have a limited effect on human health. A study
published by DOE's Sandia National Laboratory in 1999 confirmed earlier
studies that, under certain worst-case scenarios, NRC-certified
transportation containers could be penetrated by armor-piercing weapons
and release small quantities of radioactive materials.[Footnote 43]
Nevertheless, despite their general confidence in the safety of current
regulations for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel shipments,
federal regulators are preparing to address new safety and security
issues posed by the substantial increase in the number of these
shipments in the future and new threats posed after the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001. DOE's Sandia National Laboratory is
currently conducting a cask sabotage investigation project. Upon its
completion, DOE plans to use results of the project to support its
decisions with regard to proposed SNF safeguard and security
procedures. According to DOE, closer estimates of the consequence of a
successful sabotage attack would support policy decisions relating to
the safeguard levels required for SNF shipments, and a better-defined
consequence might also be expected to reduce the cost of safeguards.
DOE and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) are also reexamining
the potential need for routing requirements for SNF rail shipments
given the increase in the expected volume of shipments traveling
through heavily populated rail corridors. NRC is also studying the
potential vulnerabilities to the security of spent fuel and has ongoing
work related to the performance of spent nuclear fuel containers in
accident scenarios.
Finally, we are currently undertaking a study assessing the findings of
federally-sponsored studies of sabotage and severe accidents involving
spent nuclear fuel.
:
[End of section]
Appendix V: Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to
Assist Local First Responders:
General Procedures for Emergency Response:
The recognized method for managing an emergency response is the
incident command system, an on-site management system applicable to all
types of emergencies. It includes a standard organizational structure,
training requirements, procedures, and terminology that enable
participating agencies to function together effectively and efficiently
in response to an emergency. Hazardous material rail incidents involve
a multidiscipline emergency management response approach. While the
immediate response is primarily local, both state and federal
governments also provide additional resources if the need arises.
Typically, at the local level, fire, law enforcement, public works,
emergency medical service, and railroad personnel would be the first
responders to a hazardous material rail incident. For these incidents,
a locality's fire department is the lead agency in a hazardous material
incident response. Within fire departments that have hazardous material
teams, these teams lead the response to a hazardous material rail
incident. Chemical experts or responders from private industry may
provide additional response assistance.
In response to any suspected hazardous material incident, responders
near or first arriving at the event do an initial reconnaissance to
determine the materials involved and the need for additional resources.
Initial responders determine if an evacuation or shelter in place is
needed based on recommendations from the Emergency Response
Guidebook.[Footnote 44] If hazardous material incidents are major
events, the response would also include an activation of an emergency
operations command center (if one is in place), the Red Cross, state
environmental protection agencies, state emergency management agencies
and, in some cases, federal agencies.
To prepare for responding to hazardous material incidents, local
communities--frequently with state, federal, and industry partners--
often conduct preparedness drills, develop emergency response plans,
obtain technical training, and procure specialized equipment for first
responders. Although there is no difference in an emergency response to
a hazardous material incident whether it is the result of an accident
or terrorist attack, in cases of terrorism, law enforcement would play
a greater role in a locality's overall response and coordinate a
criminal investigation. Local law enforcement would make a
determination whether federal law enforcement assistance is necessary
for an investigation.
At the state level, a hazardous material response team typically
assists those localities needing additional resources. In the states
that we visited, such teams provided hazardous material response
capability for locations that did not have their own hazardous material
teams. In addition, state environmental agencies provide assistance in
incident mitigation and monitoring of the environment.
In some instances, federal emergency response assistance may be called
for by state and local governments or by the circumstances of the
hazardous material incident. For example, the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate
may be requested to provide federal disaster assistance to an area. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
which is now housed within DHS, are required by the National
Contingency Plan to be notified and may send representatives to the
incident scene to assist in evaluating the environmental damage
resulting from a hazardous material release. However, more robust state
and federal resources are generally reserved for more serious
incidents, such as the July 2001 derailment in Baltimore that involved
a release of hazardous materials in a populated area.
Multiple Federal Plans and Agencies Provide Additional Resources to
Address Hazardous Material Incidents:
Three federal response plans address emergencies involving hazardous
material releases during rail transport: the Federal Response Plan, the
National Contingency Plan (part of the National Response System), and
the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. These plans all
involve multiple federal agencies in their administration. The primary
federal agencies with a role in emergency response for hazardous
material incidents are DHS' Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), EP&R Directorate, and USCG, EPA, DOT, Department of Energy
(DOE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The Office of
Domestic Preparedness (ODP)--formerly part of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and now in DHS--, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), and OSHA provide funding for equipment procurement, planning, or
training activities. HHS and OSHA also provide consultations in
emergencies when requested.
Federal Response Plan Addresses All Types of Hazards:
The Federal Response Plan is an all hazard response plan carried out by
the DHS EP&R Directorate and 26 other partner federal organizations.
The plan provides the mechanism for delivery of federal assistance and
resources to augment state and local government efforts in a major
disaster or emergency. The plan provides for response with initial
resources such as food, water, and emergency generators. The plan also
provides additional resources to state and local governments to recover
from an emergency.
The plan categorizes the types of federal assistance that a state is
most likely to need into 12 emergency support functions. These
functions are: transportation, communications, public works and
engineering, firefighting, information and planning, mass care,
resource support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue,
hazardous materials, food, and energy. Each emergency support function
is headed by a primary agency designated on the basis of its capability
in that area.
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan Coordinates Federal
Response to Radiological Emergencies:
The objective of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, also
published by DHS' EP&R Directorate, is to establish an organized and
integrated capability for a timely, coordinated response by federal
agencies to peacetime radiological emergencies. According to the plan,
the lead federal agency for incidents involving the transportation of
radioactive materials varies by circumstance: the NRC is the lead
federal agency for an emergency that involves radiological material
licensed by the NRC or an agreement state, DOD or DOE are the lead
federal agencies when radiological material is shipped by these
agencies at the time of an accident, and EPA is the lead federal agency
when an emergency involves radiological material that is not licensed
or owned by a federal agency or an agreement state.[Footnote 45]
National Contingency Plan Addresses Oil Spills and Hazardous Substance
Releases:
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan,
more commonly called the National Contingency Plan, is the federal
government's plan for responding to both oil spills and hazardous
substance releases. The lead federal agencies for responding to
hazardous substance releases under the National Contingency Plan are
EPA for inland zones and the USCG for coastal zones, although DOD, DOE,
and other federal agencies are the lead agencies in certain
circumstances.
The National Response Center, created by the National Contingency Plan,
receives notifications of chemical, radiological, oil, and biological
releases. Transportation accidents involving hazardous materials must
be reported to the National Response Center by the carrier involved if
the accident meets one or more of the criteria developed by the center.
Some of these criteria include the following: a person is killed, a
person receives injuries requiring hospitalization, property damage
exceeds $50,000, an evacuation of the general public is required
lasting 1 hour or more, and there is a release of marine pollutant in a
quantity exceeding 119 gallons for liquids or 882 pounds for solids. In
addition, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 requires that all releases of hazardous
substances exceeding reportable quantities be reported by the
responsible party to the center.
National Contingency Plan Has Three Organizational Levels: National
Response Team, Regional Response Teams, and On scene Coordinators:
The National Response Team's membership consists of 16 federal agencies
with expertise in various aspects of emergency response to pollution
incidents. EPA serves as the chair agency and the USCG serves as the
vice-chair agency of the National Response Team. The team is a national
planning, policy, and coordinating body and does not physically respond
to incidents.
The National Contingency Plan has 13 regional response teams that are
also planning, policy, and coordinating bodies and do not physically
respond to the scene of an incident. The regional response teams
provide assistance to state and local governments in preparedness,
planning, and training for emergency response. Another function of the
teams is to provide technical assistance to local and state emergency
planning committees to enhance local emergency response planning. The
teams also coordinate the regional deployment of assets.
On scene coordinators are federal officials predesignated by EPA for
inland areas and by the USCG for coastal areas. The on scene
coordinators have the authority to coordinate containment, removal and
disposal efforts, and resources during an oil spill or hazardous
substance release. On scene coordinators for the USCG handle incidents
within or threatening the coastal zone, while their EPA counterparts
are responsible for discharges into, or threatening, the inland zone.
This responsibility includes coordinating federal, state, local, and
responsible party efforts. The USCG National Strike Force, which
consists of three strike teams and a coordination center equipped to
respond to major oil spills and chemical releases, assists on scene
coordinators in incident response. On scene coordinators also have
access to special teams, both those listed in the National Contingency
Plan, such as the USCG National Strike Force and EPA Environmental
Response Teams, and those not specifically listed in the plan, such as
Department of Defense teams.
National Contingency Plan is Part of the National Response System to
Prepare and Respond to Oil and Hazardous Material Incidents:
The National Contingency Plan is a component of the National Response
System, a structure for preparedness and response to oil and hazardous
material incidents that has been in place for over 30 years. The
National Response System consists of a network of interagency
coordinating groups at the national, regional, area, and local levels
that are responsible for preparedness activities. The system
establishes a network of contingency plans with different levels of
geographical scope that form the federal government's efforts to
prepare and coordinate responses to emergency incidents. In addition to
the National Contingency Plan, there are regional and area contingency
plans that coordinate effective responses within each of the 10
standard federal regions and other designated areas covering Alaska,
the Caribbean, and several islands in the Pacific. These plans include
preparedness information on a regional level and identify useful
response facilities and resources available from government,
commercial, academic, and other sources. At the local level, the
National Response System includes local contingency plans to prepare
and organize local resources in the event of accidental releases of
hazardous substances. :
USCG officials told us that the National Response System's coordinating
bodies strive for continual improvement through an ongoing process of
plan development, exercises, and evaluation. Plans and capabilities are
tested through exercises; exercise evaluations provide lessons learned
which, in turn, may result in changes to the plan or modifications to
resource capability. USCG officials told us that, while there currently
exists no national assessment tool to measure preparedness, the
National Response System's process provides a mechanism for evaluation
and improvement.
Federal Agencies Provide a Variety of Assistance for Responding to and
Improving Preparedness for Hazardous Material Rail Incidents:
Many federal agencies are responsible for providing either on-scene
response assistance or offering technical expertise in the event of a
hazardous material rail incident. As discussed above, many of these
agencies play a role in the administration of federal response plans.
Table 6 lists the agencies responsible for providing either on-scene
assistance or technical expertise in the event of a hazardous material
rail incident and outlines their roles.
Table 6: Federal Agencies Involved in Emergency Response to Hazardous
Material Incidents:
Agency: DHS:
Role: TSA; TSA is involved in managing transportation
security in the event of a threat via hazardous materials. TSA also has
emergency powers in the event of a national emergency.[A];
Role: EP&R
Directorate; The EP&R Directorate is responsible for implementing and
managing federal disaster assistance. Federal assistance is available
to supplement the resources of state and local governments in major
disasters, such as emergencies involving hazardous material releases.
Most federal assistance becomes available only following a declaration
by the President under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act at the request of a state governor or the
immediate declaration by the President;
Role: USCG; USCG maintains the
National Strike Force, which is comprised of three strike teams and the
National Strike Force Coordination Center. The strike force is
responsible for providing highly-trained responders and equipment in
support of the USCG and EPA federal on scene coordinators who respond
to oil discharges and hazardous substances releases. The USCG's
Emergency Response Notification System database also records releases.
The USCG maintains this database. The USCG can respond to a hazardous
material rail incident in the coastal zone whenever there is a threat
to public health or the environment. The National Contingency Plan
outlines the appropriate response in the event of a spill.
Agency: DOT:
Role: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA);
RSPA issues the Emergency Response Guidebook to assist first
responders by identifying the potential effects of hazardous materials
by type. RSPA has been issuing this guidebook in various formats since
the late 1970s, and it recently distributed over 1.5 million copies of
the latest edition. In 1997, RSPA, in conjunction with the Canadian and
Mexican governments, issued a joint North American copy of the
guidebook.
Agency: EPA; Role: EPA can respond to a hazardous material rail
incident whenever there is a threat to public health or the
environment. Typically, EPA is invited to incident scenes by first
responders or local emergency management agencies. The National
Contingency Plan outlines appropriate responses by EPA in the event of
an oil spill or hazardous substance release; Under the Federal
Radiological Emergency Response Plan, EPA is the lead agency when the
source of the radioactivity is unknown. Examples of unknown sources
include scrap shipped from overseas and materials with unknown owners.
Agency: DOE:
Role: DOE participates in the Federal Radiological
Emergency Response Plan that coordinates the federal government
response to radiological emergencies. DOE participates in the Federal
Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee. DOE is the lead
federal agency for response to an emergency involving materials that
are in DOE custody. DOE also has the initial responsibility for
coordinating off-site federal radiological monitoring and assessment
assistance during response to a radiological emergency. DOE may respond
to a state or lead federal agency request for assistance by dispatching
a Radiological Assistance Program team. According to DOE officials, if
the situation requires more assistance than a team can provide, DOE
will alert or activate additional resources, including the Aerial
Measuring System, Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability, Accident
Response Group, Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center,
Nuclear Emergency Search Team, and Radiation Emergency Assistance
Center and Training Site.
Agency: NRC:
Role: NRC is the lead federal agency for emergency
response to radiological events involving NRC-licensed facilities and
the transportation of licensed materials. Although state and local
governments would be the actual responders to an accident or incident
involving radioactive material, NRC's response teams follow events as
they unfold in a radiological shipment incident and provide federal
resources to responders. When the source of shipments of radioactive
materials cannot be identified during an incident, NRC would assist the
EPA's Radiological Response Teams to identify the source.
Agency: OSHA:
Role: OSHA is a member of the National Response Team and
provides assistance to ensure the safety and health of personnel
deployed at emergency response sites.
Sources: GAO analysis of DHS' EP&R Directorate, USCG, DOT, EPA, DOE,
and NRC data.
[A] Per 49 U.S.C. § 114(g).
[End of table]
In addition to providing on-scene assistance or technical expertise in
the event of a hazardous material incident, some of the same federal
agencies listed above provide training or grant assistance to local
communities to improve their emergency preparedness for hazardous
material incidents. Tables 7 to 11 list the federal agencies that have
some role in providing a variety of assistance and grants to emergency
responders.
Table 7: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Domestic
Preparedness (Formerly a Department of Justice Program):
Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) number[A]: 16.007;
Assistance program grant title: State Domestic Preparedness Equipment
Support Program; Purpose: Funding provided to states to plan for and
execute a comprehensive threat and needs assessment to develop a three-
year plan to enhance first responder capabilities, and to provide for
equipment purchases and the provision of specialized training; FY 2002
funding[B]: $481 million.
Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) number[A]: 16.008;
Assistance program grant title: Domestic Preparedness Training and
Technical Assistance Program; Purpose: Funding to train state and
local jurisdictions to respond to weapons of mass destruction domestic
terrorist incidents, involving nuclear, biological, chemical, and
explosive devices; FY 2002 funding[B]: $62 million.
Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) number[A]: 16.580;
16.597; 16.599[C]; Assistance program grant title: Purpose:
Organizations, rather than state and local entities, are the one-time
recipients of these funds. Grants are used for a multitude of purposes
including, but not limited to, meetings to share best practices and
facilitate discussion on public and private partnerships; FY 2002
funding[B]: $17 million.
Sources: GAO analysis of DHS and CFDA data.
[A] CFDA is the governmentwide source document of federal domestic
assistance program information produced by the executive branch.
[B] According to ODP officials, the total amount awarded in fiscal year
2002 does not include contracts or interagency agreements, which is
approximately $24 million.
[C] According to ODP officials, this program includes multifunding for
different purposes.
[End of table]
Table 8: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Transportation's Research and Special
Programs Administration:
CFDA Number: 20.703; Assistance program grant title: Hazardous
material emergency preparedness training and planning grants; Purpose:
Intended to provide financial and technical assistance as well as
national direction and guidance to enhance state, territorial, tribal,
and local hazardous material emergency planning and training. This
program distributes fees collected from shippers and carriers of
hazardous materials to emergency responders for training and to local
emergency planning committees (LEPCs) for planning.[A]; FY 2002
funding: $13.05 million[B].
Sources: GAO analysis of DOT and CFDA data.
[A] Established under the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know
Act of 1986, LEPCs must develop an emergency plan and review it at
least annually. LEPC membership includes representatives from police,
fire, civil defense, public health, transportation, environmental
agencies, as well as representatives from facilities subject to
emergency planning requirements, community groups, and the media.
[B] $7.8 million of this funding is for the training of emergency
responders, $5 million is for LEPC
planning, and $250,000 is for International Association of Fire Fighter
instructor training in hazardous material response operations.
[End of table]
Table 9: Hazardous Material Emergency Response and Assistance Grants
Provided by the Department of Homeland Security's Directorate of
Emergency Preparedness and Response:
CFDA number: 83.012; Assistance program grant title: Hazardous
materials assistance program; Purpose: Provides technical and financial
assistance through the states to support state, local, and American
Indian tribal governments in oil and hazardous materials emergency
planning and exercising and to enhance state, tribal, and local
governments capabilities to interoperate with the National Response
System; FY 2002 funding: $264,000.
CFDA number: 83.547; Assistance program grant title: First responder
counter-terrorism training assistance; Purpose: Designed to enhance the
capabilities of first responders in managing the consequences of
terrorist acts; FY 2002 funding: $4 million.
CFDA number: 83.552; Assistance program grant title: Emergency
management performance grants; Purpose: Designed to develop
comprehensive emergency management, including terrorism consequence
management preparedness, at the state and local levels and to improve
emergency planning, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery
capabilities; FY 2002 funding: $134 million.
CFDA number: 83.554; Assistance program grant title: Assistance to
firefighters grant; Purpose: Designed to enhance abilities with respect
to fire and fire-related hazards. This program seeks to identify
departments that lack the basic tools and resources necessary to
protect the health and safety of the public and their firefighting
personnel; FY 2002 funding: $144 million.
CFDA number: 83.009; 83.010; Assistance program grant title: Hazardous
materials/weapons of mass destruction (WMD) training standards and
requirements; guidance and training quality control technical
assistance; (under interagency agreement with DOT); Purpose: Provides
guidance and technical assistance to state and major metropolitan
training departments on managing and implementing hazardous material
and WMD responder training. Purpose is to improve the quality of
hazardous material/WMD responder training nationally and the cost-
effectiveness of state and local use of federal training funds in
hazardous material and WMD response training; FY 2002 funding: $1.5
million.
CFDA number: 83.527; 83.530; Assistance program grant title: Hazardous
materials/WMD; responder; training; curriculum; Purpose: The National
Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute offer complete and
definitive curricula for all facets of local responder training for
hazardous material and WMD incidents; FY 2002 funding: $1.2 million.
CFDA number: 83.549; Assistance program grant title: Chemical
stockpile emergency preparedness program; Purpose: To enhance emergency
preparedness capabilities of the states and local communities at each
of the chemical agent stockpile storage facilities. The purpose of the
program is to assist states and local communities in efforts to improve
their capacity to plan for and respond to accidents associated with the
storage of chemical warfare materials; FY 2002 funding: $82 million.
CFDA number: 83.562; 83.563; 83.564; Assistance program grant title:
FY 2002 supplemental grants for state and local preparedness; Purpose:
Provide funding assistance to state and local governments to update
their emergency operations plans for all hazards with special emphasis
on WMD terrorism preparedness. Funds will also be used to support the
formation of citizen corps councils, expansion of the community
emergency response team program, and to improve state emergency
operations centers; FY 2002 funding: $181 million.
Sources: GAO analysis of DHS, CFDA, and National Volunteer Fire Council
data.
[End of table]
Table 10: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Health and Human Services:
CFDA number: 93.003; Assistance program grant title: Metropolitan
Medical Response System Program (part of the Public Health and Social
Services Emergency Fund); Purpose: Provides assistance to U.S. cities,
via contracts, to prepare for a rapid, coordinated medical response to
large-scale public emergencies. The contracts enable cities to
coordinate emergency first responders, public health systems, and
hospitals to better respond to the needs of their citizens in times of
crisis; FY 2002 funding: $10 million.
CFDA number: 93.204; Assistance program grant title: Surveillance of
hazardous substance emergency events; Purpose: To assist state health
departments in developing a state-based surveillance system to monitor
hazardous substance emergency events and public health impact. The
Hazardous Substances and Emergency Events Surveillance Program, managed
by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry's Division of
Health Studies, provides data to show what the health impacts have been
of previous hazardous material releases, which could be used in
preparing threat assessments; FY 2002 funding: $1.5 million.
Sources: GAO analysis of HHS and CFDA data.
[End of table]
Table 11: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Energy[A]:
CFDA Number: 81.106; Assistance program grant title: Transport of
Transuranic wastes to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: States and
tribal concerns, proposed solutions; Purpose: Financial assistance is
provided to support cooperation among the tribes, the southern,
western, and midwestern states on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
corridors, and DOE in developing plans and procedures for the safe and
uneventful transportation of transuranic waste from current temporary
storage facilities to the plant. Restrictions on the use of funds
depends on the specific collaborative agreement. According to DOE
officials, applicants must meet the guidelines established by DOE; FY
2002 funding: $3.2 million.
Sources: GAO analysis of DOE and CFDA data.
[A] In addition to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant program, DOE
officials said that the Transportation Emergency Planning Program
provides tools, including training materials and access to go-kits for
instructors, and assists states and tribes in developing their
transportation emergency capabilities through plans, procedures and
training. DOE officials said that this is not a grant program and does
not provide funding directly to states or tribes for emergency
preparedness.
[End of table]
Private Organizations Also Play a Role in Emergency Response to
Hazardous Material Incidents:
Rail and chemical companies, both through their member organizations
and individually, participate in a variety of outreach efforts to
better prepare local emergency responders for hazardous material
transportation incidents. Key private efforts include the
Transportation Community Awareness Emergency Response Program
(TRANSCAER), the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC),
and the Operation Respond Emergency Information System (OREIS).
Individual rail and chemical companies also work with local communities
to prepare for hazardous material rail incidents through their
participation in drills and sharing of emergency response plans.
Transportation Community Awareness Response Program Helps Prepare Local
Communities for Hazardous Material Transportation Incidents:
The American Chemistry Council; the Association of American Railroads;
Chemical Education Foundation; National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.; and
the Chlorine Institute sponsor the TRANSCAER program to provide support
to communities in preparation for transportation emergencies involving
hazardous materials. TRANSCAER is supported through sponsor resources
as well as monetary and in-kind contributions. TRANSCAER sponsors are
directed to engage in a variety of activities with local communities to
improve response capabilities in the event of a hazardous material
transportation incident, including establishing contact with LEPCs,
reviewing existing LEPC emergency response plans, assisting LEPCs with
the establishment of transportation advisory groups, assisting LEPCs
with the implementation of transportation flow studies, and
participating in local emergency response training exercises.
24-hour Emergency Response Information Is Available to First
Responders:
CHEMTREC is a public service of the chemistry industry that provides
services to shippers of hazardous materials, including a 24-hour, 7-day
a week emergency call center that provides emergency response
information in the event of a hazardous material incident. CHEMTREC was
established in 1971 by the chemical industry as a public service
hotline for firefighters, law enforcement, and other emergency
responders to obtain information and assistance for emergency incidents
involving chemicals and hazardous materials. If an accident occurs, an
emergency responder can call CHEMTREC for information on the product
being shipped.
First Responders Can Access Database of Rail Carriers in the Event of a
Hazardous Material Incident:
The rail transportation industry supports OREIS, a software system
designed for use in passenger train and hazardous material incidents
that connects first responders to the databases of railroad and motor
carriers to allow them to obtain information quickly and accurately on
the specific types of hazardous materials that may be involved in an
incident and how these materials should be handled. All Class I
railroads in the United States and Canada and several short line and
regional railroads participate in the program. The program can be
accessed over the Internet or with a computer software package.
Operation Respond is a not-for-profit institution that distributes
OREIS software and assists localities and transportation companies
during a transportation emergency.
Individual Rail and Chemical Shipping Companies Participate in Local
Emergency Response Activities:
In addition to the industry-wide outreach initiatives discussed above,
individual rail and chemical shipping companies work with local
communities to develop preparedness for hazardous material incidents.
For example, rail company officials that we interviewed said that they
participated in preparedness drills, provided communities with
emergency response guidelines, and participated in local emergency
planning committee activities. Rail and chemical shipping company
representatives also told us that they have hazardous material teams
available on an on-call basis to travel to the scene of an incident to
assist local communities in response.
Cooperative relationships between private sector industry and local
communities to improve preparedness may be formalized or ad hoc. For
example, in some cities, mutual aid agreements are used to leverage
industry technical expertise to assist a community in responding in the
event of an incident. In some cases, there are less formal
relationships where rail companies provide copies of their emergency
response plans to communities and meet with local officials only as the
need arises. Overall, in our case study visits to 10 cities, we found
that most cities had informal emergency response relationships with
private sector industry, where resources were leveraged when needed.
Multiple Standards and Guidelines of Preparedness Exist:
A variety of standards and self-assessment tools are available for
local communities to address their own preparedness needs for hazardous
material incidents. Some standards are focused on general emergency
preparedness, while others are specific to preparing for and responding
to hazardous material incidents or weapons of mass destruction events.
These standards come from several federal agencies and private
organizations. However, the use of these standards is voluntary and not
required by federal regulations, and local communities adopt their use
based on individual needs. Our research identified a variety of
emergency preparedness standards that have been adopted by local
communities to respond to and prepare for hazardous material incidents
by rail. These standards are described in the next section.
National Fire Protection Association Standards:
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is an international
nonprofit organization that promotes fire safety through the consensus
development of scientifically-based codes, standards, training, and
education. There are three NFPA standards related to hazardous material
incident response, with a fourth related standard for emergency
management. The standards are as follows:
* Recommended Practices for Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents
(NFPA Standard 471) outlines recommended procedures for all
organizations responsible for responding to incidents involving
hazardous materials. These recommended practices include conducting
annual training exercises to determine the adequacy and effectiveness
of hazardous material emergency plans and updating hazardous material
emergency response plans on an annual basis.
* Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
Materials Incidents (NFPA Standard 472) identifies the levels of
competency required of responders to hazardous materials incidents. The
standard defines four different levels of first responders, including
the awareness level, operational level, technician level, and incident
commander level as well as the types of competencies expected at each
of these first responder levels.
* Standard for Competencies for Emergency Medical Services Personnel
Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents (NFPA Standard 473)
identifies the levels of competency required of emergency medical
service personnel who respond to hazardous material incidents.
* Standards on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity
Programs (NFPA Standard 1600) establishes minimum criteria for
disaster/emergency management. The standards provide common program
elements, techniques, and processes for disaster/emergency management
planning and operations in the private and public sectors.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration Worker Protection
Standard:
The OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard
establishes worker protection standards for emergency responders to
hazardous material incidents. The standard provides:
* procedures for handling emergency response,
* training requirements (including refresher training), and:
* procedures for postemergency response operation.
EPA Hazardous Material Team Planning Guidance:
EPA's hazardous material team-planning guidance provides assistance to
local fire departments in identifying, acquiring, and maintaining the
hazardous material response equipment and trained personnel appropriate
for their locale. This manual provides guidance on:
* determining requirements for hazardous material response,
* establishing the necessary level of expertise to meet those
requirements,
* developing cost estimates for emergency response budget needs, and:
* preparing emergency response and standard operating procedures to
include all participants in a local response community.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Vulnerability Assessment and Training
Standards:
In order to receive grant funds from DHS' Office of Domestic
Preparedness (which was formerly part of the Department of Justice) for
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) preparedness, states are required to
complete a vulnerability assessment to benchmark a current
vulnerability profile with regard to a WMD terrorist incident. In
addition, in August 2002, the Office of Domestic Preparedness issued
new guidelines to assist first responders in determining their training
needs and improve their performance to respond to a WMD terrorist
incident.
HHS Guidance on Managing Hazardous Materials Incidents:
HHS has developed a three-volume series of guidelines entitled Managing
Hazardous Materials Incidents to help emergency response and health
care professionals plan for and respond to hazardous material
emergencies. Volumes I and II are generic planning guides to assist
first responders and hospital personnel to plan for incidents that
involve hazardous materials. Examples of the types of guidance offered
include appropriate personal protection equipment and suggested patient
decontamination procedures. HHS is also developing training in incident
stress management. Volume III is a guide for health care professionals
who treat individuals who have been exposed to hazardous materials.
Volume III describes 51 specific chemical protocols that provide
recommendations for the on-scene and hospital medical management of
patients exposed during a hazardous material incident.
State Capability Assessment for Readiness:
In 1996, the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations asked the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is now part of DHS' EP&R
Directorate, to develop a system of performance criteria that measures
emergency management capabilities and operational readiness throughout
the United States. The State Capability Assessment for Readiness is the
EP&R Directorate's yearly status report on this effort. States self-
assess their level of capability for 13 emergency management functions,
such as hazard identification, risk assessment, and hazard mitigation,
and the results are aggregated.
Officials from the EP&R Directorate told us they are working with the
National Emergency Management Association and the International
Association of Emergency Management to develop a local assessment tool
that will provide local emergency managers the opportunity to evaluate
their emergency management programs. According to EP&R Directorate
officials, the local assessment tool is designed to complement a
state's assessment tool to provide more accurate results. The EP&R
Directorate has completed a draft of this document and it is currently
under review by the National Emergency Management Association, the
International Association of Emergency Management, states, and other
organizations.
Emergency Management Accreditation Program Standards:
The Emergency Management Accreditation Program is a voluntary
accreditation process for state and local programs responsible for
disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. An
independent team of emergency managers assesses states and local
communities to determine whether their emergency response programs meet
national standards. These standards are based on NFPA Standard 1600 for
emergency management and business continuity programs and adapts them
specifically for state and local use.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Letter from the Federal Railroad Administration, May 28,
2003:
U.S. Department Of Transportation
Federal Railroad Administration:
Administrator
1120 Vermont Ave., NW.
Washington, DC 20590:
May 28, 2003:
Mr. Michael Gryszkowiec Managing Director,
Physical Infrastructure Team
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Gryszkowiec,
It is with concern that I am writing this letter regarding GAO's
report, "Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to
Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed." While the report
was released on Friday, May 23, and we have not had the opportunity to
complete our internal review of the document, we are concerned about a
significant mischaracterization of our position regarding the use of
risk-based management. The "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation,"
section of the report quotes FRA officials as saying, "A risk-based
management approach to rail security would circumvent the regulatory
cost-benefit approach." The report goes on to rebut this statement,
expressing the positive attributes associated with risk-based
management.
Please understand that the Department and FRA in particular recognize
the merits of risk-based management, and utilize it in our day-to-day
business. In the statement that the report attempted to characterize,
we were explaining that the use of risk-based management, enables the
Department to regulate aspects of the transportation industry that we
would otherwise not be able to address if we relied on cost-benefit
alone. However, the statement in the report conveys that FRA is opposed
to the use of this approach. It is apparent that GAO misunderstood and
misreported our position on this very important issue.
In reviewing the specific wording of documents exchanged with GAO, we
recognize that our wording could have been clearer. In discussing this
with your staff on the project, they indicated that in fact they were
confused by the language, and tried to make the best of it. We would
ask that if a similar situation arises in the future, that the staff
contact us to ensure that the interpretation they are making is indeed
the correct one. Further, when oral comments are provided, we have in
other instances had a brief opportunity to verify the accuracy of GAO's
written characterization of our comments. We would suggest that
providing such an opportunity for review represents a best practice,
which if adopted for use as a standard procedure, could have prevented
this situation.
We ask that GAO rectify this situation to the best of its ability in
light of the fact that the report has already been issued. While it is
difficult to revise the hard copies of the report, we would suggest
that GAO consider inclusion of an errata document and delete this
paragraph from the web-based copies of the report. We would welcome any
other suggestions from GAO regarding how we can ensure that our
position on this important matter is clear to the Congress.
We appreciate your assistance in this matter, and look forward to
working with you in the future. Please contact my office at 202-493-
6100 or Martin Gertel, in the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation, at 202-366-5145 if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Allan Rutter
Administrator:
Signed by Allan Rutter:
cc: Martin Gertel:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Response to Federal Railroad Administration Letter:
Accountability * Integrity * Reliability:
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548:
June 18, 2003:
Mr. Allan Rutter Administrator Federal Railroad Administration 1120
Vermont Ave, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20590:
Dear Mr. Rutter:
I am writing in response to your letter of May 28, 2003, in which you
expressed concern that the views of the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) on a recommended risk-based plan for rail security were not
accurately characterized in our report, Rail Safety and Security. Some
Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan
Needed (GAO-03-435), dated April 30, 2003. It is a matter of utmost
importance to GAO that we fairly and accurately represent the views of
the agencies we work with. GAO has established a number of procedures
that we follow during our report preparation to ensure that we
accomplish this goal.
After reviewing our actions in preparing this report, we have concluded
that we followed our procedures. On January 21, 2003, we provided the
Department of Transportation (DOT) with a preliminary statement of the
facts we planned on presenting in the report. On March 31, 2003, we
provided DOT a copy of the draft report for agency comment. We met with
you and other DOT officials to discuss your views on the draft report
on April 14, 2003, and, also on that date, we received a written list
of suggestions from FRA for modifications to the draft report. We
incorporated these suggestions into the draft report and on April 16,
2003, returned the revised report draft, including our characterization
of FRA's comments to DOT. On April 18, 2003, we received notes from the
Office of the Secretary and FRA thanking us for incorporating their
comments. Subsequently, the report was edited and minor changes were
made to the report's summary of FRA comments. It is this final edit
that resulted in the inadvertent mischaracterization of FRA's views on
a risk-based management plan.
We feel it is important that the report's agency comments section
fairly reflect FRA's views. Your letter states that FRA recognizes the
merits of risk-based management and uses it in its day-to-day business.
You felt that our "Agency Comments and Evaluation Section" incorrectly
conveyed the view that FRA was opposed to the use of risk-based
management. To make the report as accurate as possible, we will remove
the agency comment discussion of the risk-based plan from the version
of the
report on the GAO Web site and will include your May 28th letter that
clarifies the agency's position on this subject as an appendix in the
report. We also plan to include this letter as an appendix in the
report to explain why the original report is being revised.
I look forward to a continued cooperative working relationship with
FRA.
Sincerely yours,
Michael Gryszkowiec
Managing Director Physical Infrastructure Team:
Signed by Michael Gryszkowiec:
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] The proposed Yucca Mountain Repository is not scheduled to begin
operations until 2010. For information on the safety and security
issues posed by possible future rail shipments of spent nuclear fuel,
see appendix IV.
[2] This Directorate includes the entire functions of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, formerly an independent federal agency.
[3] 49 U.S.C. § 5103.
[4] Where specific references to flammable, radioactive, or other
subsets of material are needed, the distinction will be made in the
report.
[5] RSPA defines an incident as an unintentional release of hazardous
materials during the course of transportation. A serious incident is
defined as an incident that involves a fatality or major injury,
substantial property damage, closure of a major transportation artery
or facility, or evacuation due to a hazardous material release.
[6] Appendix III contains additional information on the amounts and
types of hazardous materials shipped by rail throughout the United
States.
[7] A ton-mile is a measure of volume that accounts for the distance a
commodity is shipped. One ton-mile is equal to one ton shipped one
mile.
[8] See appendix III for additional discussion on ton-mile shipments by
transportation mode.
[9] Nuclear fuel is generally used in a nuclear reactor for a number of
years before losing its ability to efficiently create energy. When the
fuel can no longer effectively produce energy, it is considered "spent"
and is replaced, but the spent fuel remains radioactive and hazardous.
[10] In March 2003, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing board
blocked, for the time being, the issuance of a license to this private
facility because of the risks that military aircraft operations
conducted near the facility might pose.
[11] Appendix IV contains additional information on safety issues
associated with Yucca Mountain and the Utah facility. We are also
currently undertaking a study assessing the findings of federally-
sponsored studies of sabotage and severe accidents involving spent
fuel.
[12] Preemption occurs when Congress enacts a statute intending to
preclude inconsistent state or local law. Depending upon the
circumstances, Congress may choose to preempt all or only some forms of
state or local rulemaking. The law preempts any inconsistent state or
local rulemaking.
[13] Fissile material is any material fissionable by slow neutrons.
This involves splitting a nucleus into at least two other nuclei and
the release of a relatively large amount of energy. The three primary
fissile materials are uranium-233, uranium-235, and plutonium-239.
[14] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Voluntary
Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of
Security Preparedness Is Unknown, GAO-03-439 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
14, 2003) for information on voluntary actions that the chemical
industry has taken to address security preparedness and the challenges
that it faces in protecting its assets and operations.
[15] For additional information on the applicability of risk management
to homeland security, see: U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland
Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts,
GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001).
[16] 49 CFR §174.14, Movements To Be Expedited.
[17] We were not able to corroborate FRA's explanation. What became the
48-hour requirement for expedited movement is found in the 1914
published rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Regulations for
the Transportation of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles by
Freight and Express and Specifications for Shipping Containers,
Interstate Commerce Commission, ¶¶ 1433, 1714, (GPO eff. October 1,
1914). The origin of the rules themselves can be traced from even
earlier Interstate Commerce Commission rules, which grew out of the
need to regulate the safe transportation of explosives. The 1914
regulations appear to have remained largely unchanged until 1939, when
they were included in the first version of the Code of Federal
Regulations. At that time, 49 C.F.R. § 80.262 (1939), provided:
"Movement to be expedited. Carriers must forward shipments of
explosives and other dangerous articles promptly and within 48 hours
after acceptance at originating point or receipt at any yard, transfer
station, or interchange point."
[18] Leased tracks are railroad tracks in rail yards or railroad
sidings that manufacturers, such as chemical companies, lease from
railroad companies to temporarily store their commodities until needed.
Commodities are stored in rail cars on these "leased" tracks. Leases
may be "fixed," when a company enters into a lease of specific track,
or "rolling," when the company pays a storage fee for whatever track
the car may be sitting on. The location where the car is held may be
the destination identified on the shipping papers but not the final
destination where the hazardous materials will be unloaded. Fixed
facilities are business premises where extremely hazardous materials
are produced, stored, or used in amounts exceeding legally proscribed
threshold quantities.
[19] P.L. 99-499.
[20] AAR's membership includes the major Class I railroads, two of the
larger short line railroads, and 500 smaller railroads represented
through an AAR operating committee.
[21] Appendix V contains additional information on the federal
government and private sector resources available to localities for
emergency response to rail incidents involving the transportation of
hazardous materials.
[22] 42 U.S.C. § 10175(c).
[23] For hazardous material incidents, a locality's fire department is
the lead designated agency.
[24] We defined a small city as one having a population of less than
100,000 people, a medium-sized city as one having a population between
100,000 and 500,000 people, and a large city as one having a population
of over 500,000 people. The population figures are based on the 2000
U.S. Census.
[25] Typically, a firefighter's standard turnout gear includes a
helmet, coat, gloves, pants, boots, and a self-contained breathing
apparatus, which provides the user with respiratory protection in a
toxic or oxygen deficient environment.
[26] The Waybill Sample is a stratified random 1 percent sample of
waybills prepared by railroads. This sample is stratified by the
collection method (electronic vs. hardcopy) and number of carloads
included in a given waybill. Because the Surface Transportation Board
has different sampling rates for each stratum, each stratum has its own
weight. These weights are applied to the sample calculations of
carloads and tonnage to estimate population values.
[27] The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5103(a),
defines a hazardous material as a substance or material that the
Secretary of Transportation has determined is capable of posing an
unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in
commerce. It includes hazardous substances, hazardous wastes, marine
pollutants, and elevated temperature materials.
[28] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), § 1711(a)(1) and
(2) directed the Secretary of Transportation to regulate transportation
security and safety (49 U.S.C. 5103), and § 1711(a)(3) and (b)(1)
through (3) of the act directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to
issue transportation security regulations.
[29] P.L. 99-499.
[30] P.L. 84-159.
[31] 10 C.F.R. 71.
[32] P.L. 83-703.
[33] DOT's Surface Transportation Board designates three classes of
freight railroads based on annual operating revenues. Class I railroads
are the largest of these, with annual operating revenues of $261.9
million or more (in 2000 dollars). Class II and III railroads are
defined by their revenues, but are often referred to as regional, short
line, or switching railroads.
[34] Flammable liquids are approximately 81 percent of all hazardous
materials shipped, about 2 percent of which are transported by rail.
[35] Transuranic waste is a type of radioactive waste created from the
processing of nuclear materials. Transuranic elements include
plutonium, americium, curium, and neptunium, all of which are created
during nuclear reactor operations. Some transuranic elements are used
in production of nuclear weapons, spacecraft batteries, and consumer
products. The remaining unusable material containing transuranic
elements is transuranic waste. Transuranic waste includes not only the
transuranic elements themselves, but also ordinary items contaminated
with transuranic elements: tools, gloves, protective suits, tarpaulins,
soil, and sludge.
[36] For storage purposes, SNF material is put into water pools to
cool, both thermally and radioactively. The pools are known as wet
storage. Dry storage is a newer technology that uses concrete and steel
to allow heat and radioactivity to dissipate.
[37] 42 U.S.C. § 10222.
[38] A cask is a hardened container designed specifically for holding
SNF. NRC certifies cask designs.
[39] In March 2003, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing board
blocked for the time being the issuance of a license to PFS because of
the risks that military aircraft operations conducted near the facility
might pose.
[40] NUREG/CR-6672, Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk
Estimates, March 2000, which is also discussed in this appendix.
[41] NUREG/CR-6799, Analysis of Rail Car Components Exposed to a Tunnel
Fire Environment, March 2003.
[42] 10 C.F.R. 71.
[43] Sandia National Laboratories, Projected Source Terms for Potential
Sabotage Events Related to Spent Fuel Shipments, SAND99-0963
(Albuquerque, New Mexico: 1999).
[44] The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Transport Canada, and
the Secretariat of Transport and Communications of Mexico developed the
Emergency Response Guidebook jointly for use by fire fighters, police,
and other emergency services personnel who respond to hazardous
material incidents.
[45] Agreement states are states establishing programs under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(b) to permit states to exercise some of NRC's authority.
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