National Airspace System
Current Efforts and Proposed Changes to Improve Performance of FAA's Air Traffic Control System Gao ID: GAO-03-542 May 30, 2003To accelerate the modernization and improve the performance of the air traffic control system, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) created the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee (subcommittee) to over see the air traffic control system and help the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) address long-standing weaknesses in its modernization program. The subcommittee is part of an aviation advisory council and consists of five private sector members with business expertise. AIR-21 gave the subcommittee the authority to approve strategic plans, budgets, and procurements over $100 million. In addition, AIR-21 required the FAA to hire a chief operating officer to manage the day-to-day operations. AIR-21 mandated that GAO report on the success of the subcommittee in improving the performance of the air traffic control system. Accordingly, as we agreed with the congressional committees' offices, GAO reviewed the (1) actions taken by the subcommittee to carry out its oversight responsibilities and the obstacles that it encountered in doing so and (2) changes to the subcommittees' organization and oversight responsibilities that have been proposed to improve the performance of the air traffic control system.
To carry out its oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee has focused on bringing performance management, accountability, and a more businnesslike struture to the air traffic control system. It is working with FAA managers to refine and implement performance measures that will track safety indicators, such as operational errors and runway incursions, as well as the cost to provide air traffic control services. The subcommittee also has taken some specific actions, as provided in AIR-21, including reviewing and approving a budget request and five large procurements that FAA had initiated for the air traffic control system. However, the subcommittee has encountered obstacles in carrying out its responsibilities, the greatest of which has been FAA's inability to hire a chief operating officer. Without a chief operating officer to initiate actions that the subcommittee is responsible for reviewing and approving, the subcommittee's influence has been limited. According to the subcommittee, a major difficulty in hiring a chief operating officer has been uncertainty about the postion's responsibilities, reporting relationships, and performance measures. The Congress, the administration, the subcommittee, and other stakeholders have proposed changes to the subcommittee's organization and oversight responsibilities that they believe would improve the performance of the air traffic control system. These changes could clarify uncertainties in the law or would modify the subcommittee's approval authority. For example, three legislative proposals would designate the FAA administrator as the chair of the subcommittee. While this change could eliminate any uncertainty about the chief operation officer's reporting relationships, and could make it easier to hire a chief operating officer, it also would reduce the number of private sector member and give the greatest authority to the FAA member. Two of these proposals also would alter the subcommittee's approval authority. For example, one would make the subcommittee an advisory rather than oversight body. The merits of these proposals depend on the extent to which the approval authority is considered necessary or desirable to bring about improvements in the air traffic control system.
GAO-03-542, National Airspace System: Current Efforts and Proposed Changes to Improve Performance of FAA's Air Traffic Control System
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
May 2003:
National Airspace System:
Current Efforts and Proposed Changes to Improve Performance of FAA's
Air Traffic Control System:
GAO-03-542:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-542, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
To accelerate the modernization and improve the performance of the air
traffic control system, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) created the Air Traffic
Services Subcommittee (subcommittee) to oversee the air traffic
control system and help the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
address long-standing weaknesses in its modernization program. The
subcommittee is part of an aviation advisory council and consists of
five private sector members with business expertise. AIR-21 gave the
subcommittee the authority to approve strategic plans, budgets, and
procurements over $100 million. In addition,
AIR-21 required FAA to hire a chief operating officer to manage the
system‘s day-to-day operations.
AIR-21 mandated that GAO report on the success of the subcommittee in
improving the performance of the air traffic control system.
Accordingly, as agreed with the congressional committees‘ offices, GAO
reviewed the (1) actions taken by the subcommittee to carry out its
oversight responsibilities and the obstacles that it encountered in
doing so and (2) changes to the subcommittee‘s organization and
oversight responsibilities that have been proposed to improve the
performance of the air traffic control system.
What GAO Found:
To carry out its oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee has
focused on bringing performance management, accountability, and a more
businesslike structure to the air traffic control system. It is
working with FAA managers to refine and implement performance measures
that will track safety indicators, such as operational errors and
runway incursions, as well as the cost to provide air traffic control
services. The subcommittee also has taken some specific actions, as
provided in AIR-21, including reviewing and approving a budget request
and five large procurements that FAA had initiated for the air traffic
control system. However, the subcommittee has encountered obstacles
in carrying out its responsibilities, the greatest of which has been
FAA‘s inability to hire a chief operating officer. Without a chief
operating officer to initiate actions that the subcommittee is
responsible for reviewing and approving, the subcommittee‘s influence
has been limited. According to the subcommittee, a major difficulty
in hiring a chief operating officer has been uncertainty about the
position's responsibilities, reporting relationships, and performance
measures.
The Congress, the administration, the subcommittee, and other
stakeholders have proposed changes to the subcommittee‘s organization
and oversight responsibilities that they believe would improve the
performance of the air traffic control system. These changes could
clarify uncertainties in the law or would modify the subcommittee's
approval authority. For example, three legislative proposals would
designate the FAA Administrator as the chair of the subcommittee.
While this change could eliminate any uncertainty about the chief
operating officer‘s reporting relationships and could make it easier
to hire a chief operating officer, it also would reduce the number of
private sector members and give the greatest authority to the FAA
member (see figure). Two of these proposals also would alter the
subcommittee‘s approval authority. For example, one would make the
subcommittee an advisory rather than an oversight body. The merits of
these proposals depend on the extent to which approval authority is
considered necessary or desirable to bring about improvements in the
air traffic control system.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-542.
To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham at (202) 512-2834
or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Subcommittee Has Emphasized Performance-based Management and Carried
Out Some Responsibilities, but Obstacles Have Hampered Its Progress:
Proposed Changes to the Subcommittee's Organization and Oversight
Responsibilities Could Clarify Uncertainties and Would Modify the
Subcommittee's Authority:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Subcommittee's Progress in Implementing Specific
Responsibilities:
Appendix III: Proposed Legislative Changes Affecting the Subcommittee and
the Chief Operating Officer Responsibilities:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Organizational Structure Created by AIR-21 and Executive
Order 13180:
Figure 2: Current and Proposed Oversight and Management Structure:
Abbreviations:
AIR-21: Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
IRS: Internal Revenue Service:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 30, 2003:
Congressional Committees:
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) manages the busiest, most
complex air traffic control system in the world. But the agency has had
difficulty modernizing this system to improve its safety and efficiency
and expand its capacity to accommodate projected increases in air
traffic. Over the past two decades, FAA's air traffic control
modernization program has had a history of cost overruns and schedule
delays. For over a decade, bipartisan commissions, oversight
organizations, and others have documented problems with the air traffic
control modernization program and have made numerous recommendations,
yet the problems continue.
In 2000, the Congress enacted legislation and the administration issued
an executive order that, together, established a new, three-component
structure to accelerate the modernization and improve the performance
of the air traffic control system. The legislation--the Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21)--
defines the air traffic control system as the equipment, policies,
procedures, and personnel required to deliver air traffic
services.[Footnote 1] AIR-21 established two of the new components: (1)
a board of five private sector members, called the Air Traffic Services
Subcommittee (subcommittee), to oversee the air traffic control system
and (2) a chief operating officer to manage the air traffic control
system. Executive Order 13180, issued December 7, 2000, created the
third component, a new performance-based organization within FAA, to be
known as the Air Traffic Organization, to operate the air traffic
control system. The subcommittee is part of the Aviation Management
Advisory Council (council), which is responsible for advising FAA on
the perspectives of its aviation industry customers.[Footnote 2] Under
the act, the subcommittee oversees "the administration, management,
conduct, direction, and supervision of the air traffic control system"
and has the authority to, among other things, "review and approve"
strategic plans, large contracts, and budget requests for the air
traffic control system. Under both the act and the executive order, the
chief operating officer reports to the FAA Administrator and, under the
executive order, heads the new performance-based organization.
The subcommittee members were sworn in on January 31, 2001, and the
subcommittee, which is required to meet at least quarterly, has since
held eight working meetings. The FAA Administrator, who is responsible
for hiring the chief operating officer, has retained two recruiting
firms, but the chief operating officer position has not been filled.
Because FAA has decided to involve the chief operating officer in
establishing and implementing the new performance-based organization,
FAA is waiting for an appointment to be approved before putting the new
organization in place.
Since the enactment of AIR-21, the Congress, the administration, FAA,
and other stakeholders have raised questions about the implementation
of the legislation and have proposed changes to the subcommittee's
organization and oversight responsibilities that they believe would
address these questions. In the spring of 2003, the administration, the
Senate, and the House proposed legislation to amend AIR-21 that would,
among other things, change the organization and responsibilities of the
subcommittee.
AIR-21 requires us to report on the success of the subcommittee in
improving the performance of the air traffic control system. However,
because the success of the subcommittee is linked to its interactions
with the chief operating officer and the new air traffic organization,
neither of which is yet in place, our analysis was limited to the
actions of the subcommittee, and we could not assess the performance of
the new structure as a whole. Accordingly, as agreed with your offices,
this report addresses the following questions:
* What has the subcommittee done to carry out its oversight
responsibilities, and what obstacles has it encountered in attempting
to do so?
* What changes to the subcommittee's organization and oversight
responsibilities have been proposed to improve the performance of the
air traffic control system?
To address both of these questions, we analyzed AIR-21 and its
legislative history, the executive order, and the three legislative
proposals that would amend provisions of AIR-21 relating to the
subcommittee. We also analyzed the subcommittee's August 2002
report[Footnote 3] and interviewed stakeholders, including the past and
present FAA Administrators; other FAA officials; past and present
members of the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee; and representatives
of several aviation industry organizations, public policy research
organizations, and the two firms hired to recruit the chief operating
officer. We did not address changes to FAA's--as opposed to the
subcommittee's--organization that some stakeholders maintain are
essential to improve the performance of the air traffic control system.
See appendix I for a more detailed discussion of our scope and
methodology.
Results in Brief:
To carry out its oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee has
focused on bringing performance-based management to the air traffic
control system and has taken some of the actions specified in AIR-21,
but several obstacles have hampered its progress. Defining its role as
bringing measurements, accountability, and a more businesslike
structure to air traffic services, the subcommittee has worked with FAA
managers to refine and implement performance measures that will track
safety indicators, such as operational errors and runway incursions, as
well as track the cost to provide air traffic control services so that
FAA can better monitor, improve, and hold its managers accountable for
the performance of the air traffic control system. The subcommittee
also has accomplished some of the specific responsibilities set forth
in the act, such as reviewing and approving budget requests and five
large procurements that FAA initiated for the air traffic control
system. However, the subcommittee has encountered several obstacles
that have impeded its progress, the greatest of which, according to our
analysis and discussions with stakeholders, has been FAA's inability to
hire a chief operating officer. Without a chief operating officer to
initiate actions that the subcommittee is responsible for reviewing and
approving, the subcommittee's influence has been limited. According to
the subcommittee, a major difficulty in hiring a chief operating
officer has been uncertainty about how the chief operating officer
would interact with the FAA Administrator and the subcommittee and how
the incumbent's performance would be measured. Other obstacles that the
subcommittee has encountered include its members' limited experience
with aviation and with FAA's acquisition and budget processes; turnover
on the subcommittee; and, according to the subcommittee, FAA's lack of
flexibility to move funds between and within accounts.
The Congress, the administration, the subcommittee, and other
stakeholders have proposed changes to the subcommittee's organization
and oversight responsibilities that they believe would improve the
performance of the air traffic control system. These changes could
clarify uncertainties in the law or would modify the subcommittee's
approval authority. For example, the administration, the Senate, and
the House have proposed legislation to separate the subcommittee from
and make it independent of its parent organization, the Aviation
Management Advisory Council. These three legislative proposals also
would designate the FAA Administrator as the chair of the subcommittee.
While this change could make it easier to hire a chief operating
officer by eliminating any uncertainty about how the incumbent would
interact with the Administrator and the subcommittee, it also would
reduce the number of private sector members from five to four and give
the greatest authority to the FAA member. Two of the three proposals
also would alter the subcommittee's approval authority: the
administration's proposal would eliminate the subcommittee's approval
authority entirely and make the subcommittee an advisory body, while
the House proposal would eliminate the subcommittee's authority to
approve the budget request for the air traffic control system but would
retain the subcommittee's other approval authorities. The Senate
proposal would make no changes in the subcommittee's approval
authority. Our analysis indicates that the merits of the proposed
changes depend, in large part, on the extent to which approval
authority is viewed as necessary or desirable to bring about
improvements in the performance of the air traffic control system. The
upcoming reauthorization of FAA creates opportunities to consider the
merits of these and other proposed changes and to determine whether or
how changes should be made.
Department of Transportation officials generally agreed with the facts
presented in this report and made technical and clarifying comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate. The Air Traffic Services
Subcommittee did not provide comments beyond those provided by
department officials.
Background:
More than 20 years ago, FAA began a modernization program to replace
and upgrade the nation's air traffic control equipment and facilities
to meet expected increases in air traffic, enhance aviation safety, and
increase efficiency. We and others have identified shortcomings in
FAA's management of the air traffic control modernization program,
primarily problems in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals.
For example, the centerpiece of FAA's modernization program--the
Advanced Automation System--was restructured in 1994 after (1) the
costs of developing the system, estimated in 1983 to be $2.5 billion,
tripled to $7.6 billion and (2) the implementation of significantly
less-than-promised capabilities was projected to take 8 years or longer
than originally estimated. FAA attributed many of these problems to
federal procurement and personnel constraints. In 1995, the Congress
exempted FAA from many federal procurement and personnel statutes and
allowed the agency to develop its own systems, which FAA implemented in
1996. However, problems with the management of the air traffic control
modernization program continue.[Footnote 4] Recently, for example, we
reported that the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System,
which was estimated in 1996 to cost $940 million, was expected in March
2002 to cost $1.33 billion, take 4 years longer than originally
scheduled to be implemented, and be deployed at 74 rather than 172
facilities.[Footnote 5]
To better understand and resolve these problems, the Congress created a
number of bipartisan commissions to review aspects of FAA's operations,
including the provision of air traffic services. These commissions made
recommendations to the Congress to help FAA accelerate the
modernization and improve the performance of the air traffic control
system. For example, in 1997, the National Civil Aviation Review
Commission, also known as the Mineta Commission, reported that FAA must
become a performance-based organization to make the best possible use
of the personnel and procurement flexibilities that the Congress had
granted to it.[Footnote 6] The Commission said that air traffic
services should be overseen by a board of directors and managed by a
chief operating officer.
AIR-21 incorporated key suggestions from the Mineta Commission,
including creating both the subcommittee to oversee the air traffic
control system and the position of chief operating officer within FAA
to manage the system. The subcommittee is generally responsible for
overseeing the administration and management of the air traffic control
system and is specifically responsible for reviewing and approving (1)
strategic and major organizational plans, (2) methods of accelerating
the modernization of the air traffic control system and improvements in
aviation safety related to air traffic control, (3) contracts of more
than $100 million, (4) the FAA Administrator's appointment of a chief
operating officer, (5) cost accounting and financial management
systems, and (6) budget requests.[Footnote 7] The chief operating
officer is responsible for implementing the tasks delegated by the
Administrator.
Executive Order 13180, issued on December 7, 2000, directed FAA to
merge two of its organizations--Research and Acquisitions, which
develops and acquires air traffic modernization equipment, and Air
Traffic Services, which uses the equipment to provide air traffic
services--to form the new performance-based Air Traffic Organization
and designated the chief operating officer as the head of that
organization. Under the executive order as well as the act, the chief
operating officer reports to the FAA Administrator. According to the
executive order, the new organization would improve FAA's ability to
make use of its procurement and personnel flexibilities and would focus
on achieving results through consultation with its customers (the
traveling public), direct users (e.g., airlines and airports), and
federal and local agencies (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Organizational Structure Created by AIR-21 and Executive
Order 13180:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The provisions of AIR-21 that apply to the subcommittee are modeled on
1998 legislation that created the Internal Revenue Service Oversight
Board to oversee the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) administration,
management, conduct, direction, supervision, execution, and
application of tax laws. The Congress established the board to help IRS
overcome long-standing difficulties in modernizing its information
systems and improving customer service--difficulties that were viewed
as broadly analogous to those affecting the air traffic control system.
However, the board differs from the subcommittee in that it includes
the Secretary of the Treasury and the IRS Commissioner, whereas the
subcommittee, as provided in AIR-21, consists entirely of private
sector representatives.
In July 2002, the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, held a hearing on FAA's progress in
hiring a chief operating officer and the role of the subcommittee.
During this hearing, the former FAA Administrator and the former
subcommittee chairman testified that a lack of clarity in the act on
the relationship of the chief operating officer to the subcommittee and
the FAA Administrator had made it difficult to hire a chief operating
officer. This spring, the administration, the Senate, and the House
have proposed legislation to reauthorize FAA's programs that would
amend AIR-21 to, among other things, clarify this
relationship.[Footnote 8]
Subcommittee Has Emphasized Performance-based Management and Carried
Out Some Responsibilities, but Obstacles Have Hampered Its Progress:
Under AIR-21, the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee has multiple
responsibilities, but it thus far has focused on assisting FAA in
moving toward performance-based management. Specifically, the
subcommittee has defined its role as bringing measurements,
accountability, and a more businesslike structure to air traffic
services. It also has accomplished some of the specific
responsibilities set out in the act, such as approving budgets and
large procurements, but it has encountered obstacles that have limited
its progress. The greatest obstacle has been the lack of a chief
operating officer to provide senior leadership for implementing change.
Other obstacles include the subcommittee members' general inexperience
with aviation and with FAA's acquisition and budget processes; turnover
on the subcommittee; and, according to the subcommittee, FAA's lack of
flexibility to move funds between and within accounts.
Subcommittee Is Moving FAA toward Performance-based Management:
In its first annual report, issued in August 2002, the subcommittee
expressed the view that "setting the proper performance measures and
then accurately and relentlessly using them to improve the quality and
safety of the air traffic system will form the foundation of the new
organization." Even without a chief operating officer to develop a
strategic plan for the air traffic control system, including measures
of safety, efficiency, and productivity, as provided in the act, the
subcommittee has been working with FAA to identify appropriate measures
in each area. Specifically, in March 2002, the subcommittee tentatively
approved draft performance measures outlined by the FAA Administrator
in 10 areas, including operational errors, runway incursions, delays,
and financial performance.[Footnote 9] The subcommittee's report noted
that FAA has developed more detailed and useful performance measures in
some areas, such as runway incursions, and therefore can collect better
data for measuring its performance. For example, FAA now measures the
severity as well as the number of runway incursions, and it is better
able to target and take action to prevent the serious incursions that
could cause accidents. The subcommittee is continuing to emphasize
performance measures, making sure that they measure outcomes that are
within FAA's control and can be used to hold FAA managers accountable.
The subcommittee's goal is to help FAA refine and link its performance
measures to FAA's and the Department of Transportation's strategic
plans.
Subcommittee Has Carried Out Other Specific Responsibilities, but Its
Input Has Been Limited:
In addition to focusing on performance management, the subcommittee has
carried out several of the specific responsibilities assigned to it
under AIR-21. For example, to date, the subcommittee reviewed and
approved:
* five air traffic procurement projects of more than $100
million,[Footnote 10]
* the FAA Administrator's implementation of a cost accounting system,
and
* the Administrator's plans to reorganize major parts of the air
traffic control system.
In each of these areas, the subcommittee's input was limited because
the work was largely completed before the subcommittee became involved.
For example, all of the key acquisition milestones had been completed
for two of the five procurements, and for the other three, the
subcommittee did not make any substantive changes. Similarly, the
subcommittee noted with approval in its report that the cost accounting
system implemented by the Administrator was tracking 70 percent of
FAA's personnel, overhead, and other costs for the air traffic control
system, but the subcommittee did not address problems with tracking the
remaining 30 percent of these costs, most of which are for labor. As
Transportation's Office of Inspector General has reported, problems
with FAA's labor distribution system, which is part of the cost
accounting system, limit FAA's ability to monitor air traffic
controllers' productivity.[Footnote 11] Because of the problems with
this system, FAA cannot track the hours worked by individual
controllers or assign the hours worked to specific functions or
facilities. According to the Inspector General, the Administrator has
directed that appropriate internal controls be incorporated into the
labor distribution system to track the hours worked by all employees.
While noting that most of the important decisions on reorganizing the
air traffic control functions will not be made until a chief operating
officer is hired, the subcommittee approved FAA's preliminary plans for
merging the acquisition and operating functions of the agency.
AIR-21 gives the subcommittee broad authority to influence the budget
for the air traffic control system, but the subcommittee has not fully
exercised that authority. Specifically, the act makes the subcommittee
responsible for reviewing and approving the annual air traffic control
budget request, submitting this budget request to the Secretary of
Transportation, and ensuring that it supports the annual and long-range
strategic plans for the air traffic control system. Additionally, the
act requires the Secretary to transmit the budget request approved by
the subcommittee to the President, who is then directed to transmit
that request to the House and Senate authorizing and appropriations
committees "without revision," together with the President's annual
budget request for the rest of FAA. It is not clear what role this
process allows for Transportation and the Office of Management and
Budget in developing the budget request for the air traffic control
system. The IRS Oversight Board has similar authority over the IRS
budget. The fiscal year 2003 budget for the air traffic control system
was already under development when the subcommittee was established.
The subcommittee's first annual report makes no mention of actions
taken on that budget; however, discussions with FAA officials indicated
that the subcommittee reviewed and approved the budget requests
prepared by the FAA Administrator for fiscal years 2003 and 2004.
Nevertheless, to our knowledge, the subcommittee did not recommend any
changes to these budget requests or determine whether the budget
requests supported the long-range plans for the air traffic control
system.
In a few other areas, the subcommittee did not need to carry out its
specific responsibilities because FAA did not initiate an action. For
example, the subcommittee could not review and approve the
Administrator's appointment of a chief operating officer because no
candidate was appointed, and it could not review and approve bonus
payments for the Administrator and senior FAA executives because no
bonus payments were made for fiscal year 2001.[Footnote 12] Appendix II
summarizes our analysis of the subcommittee's progress in carrying out
its specific responsibilities.
Now that the subcommittee has been in place for more than 2 years, it
is beginning to exercise more influence. For example, according to FAA
officials, the subcommittee raised questions about the funding, timing,
and intellectual property rights for one recent procurement it
approved.[Footnote 13] Applying its private sector knowledge of
intellectual property rights, the subcommittee asked FAA staff about
the potential for the government to earn money from equipment or
materials it has furnished to developers of the system. According to an
FAA official, these questions led to informal discussions about the
feasibility of exploring this option.
Not Having a Chief Operating Officer Has Been the Greatest Obstacle to
the Subcommittee's Progress:
Not having a chief operating officer has hindered the subcommittee in
carrying out its responsibilities. For example, without a chief
operating officer, FAA has not moved forward with the new air traffic
organization that is supposed to bring together the air traffic control
system's acquisition and operating functions. To date, the subcommittee
has spent a portion of each of its working meetings discussing the
effort to hire a chief operating officer. In addition, it recently
worked with FAA and the current recruiting firm to revise and
streamline the position description, but until the position is filled,
the new three-component structure will not be fully functional. For the
subcommittee, the chief operating officer is the "lynchpin" of the new
performance-based air traffic organization--the "change agent"
responsible for improving the performance and delivery of air traffic
services. The subcommittee believes that not having a chief operating
officer has seriously impeded its progress.
The subcommittee and FAA agreed that uncertainties about the position's
responsibilities, reporting relationships, and measurement criteria
for performance are major factors that have hampered the hiring of a
chief operating officer. Under AIR-21, the FAA Administrator "may"
delegate responsibility to the chief operating officer for developing a
strategic plan and a budget request for the air traffic control system
and for "reviewing" operational functions, including the modernization
of the air traffic control system, measures for increasing productivity
or controlling costs, and training and education. Candidates were
unsure what specific duties the Administrator would delegate to the
chief operating officer or what the chief operating officer should do
to implement the delegated duties. Additionally, it was unclear how the
chief operating officer would interact with the Administrator and the
subcommittee, especially if there were differences of opinion between
them. Although the chief operating officer reports to the Administrator
under the act, the subcommittee also "has broad powers to oversee the
work and budget of the air traffic organization." This, according to
the subcommittee's first annual report, "creates organizational
confusion that has been a factor in dissuading some candidates from
accepting the position." Furthermore, candidates expressed concern
about a lack of criteria for measuring and evaluating the chief
operating officer's performance. Without specific criteria, some
stakeholders suggested, the chief operating officer could be working at
odds with the Administrator and the subcommittee. Candidates also
wanted to know what criteria would be used to determine their
eligibility for a bonus of up to 30 percent of their salary. While the
act spells out the specific duties of the chief operating officer, and
the criteria for evaluating his or her performance would be spelled out
in the annual performance agreement between the Administrator and the
chief operating officer, candidates wanted a better idea, in advance,
of what they would be doing and how their performance would be judged.
Other factors have also made it difficult to hire a chief operating
officer, some of which have now been resolved or are no longer
relevant. One ongoing factor is the reservation that candidates and
stakeholders have expressed about the likelihood of cultural change in
FAA's air traffic services organization. According to one of the
recruiting firms retained by FAA, candidates have questioned whether a
regulatory agency with an entrenched bureaucracy will embrace the
cultural change necessary to transform air traffic services into a
performance-based organization in which individuals will be held
accountable for specific goals, such as implementing timely
technological improvements.
In response to the revised, streamlined position description that it
developed with the subcommittee and the second recruiting firm, FAA
received several applications for the chief operating officer position.
In March 2003, the recruiting firm gave the Administrator a slate of
candidates for the position. However, the administration's proposal
narrows the scope of the chief operating officer's responsibilities, so
that the position would now be responsible for "implementing" the
Administrator's direction and for managing the day-to-day operations of
the air traffic control system, but not for "developing" policy tools,
such as strategic plans and budget proposals. FAA considers such
policy-making functions appropriate for a chief executive officer--that
is, for the Administrator--but not for a chief operating officer. Other
stakeholders have agreed with FAA, maintaining that AIR-21 created
confusion by bestowing policy-making functions on the chief operating
officer position. While these changes, if implemented, may eliminate
this confusion in the future, it is unclear how the candidates who
applied for the position as described in the act and the executive
order will respond to FAA's proposed changes to the position's
responsibilities. According to FAA officials, proposed changes were
discussed with prospective candidates.
Other Obstacles Have Slowed the Subcommittee's Progress:
Inexperience with FAA's acquisition and budget processes has further
hampered the subcommittee's progress. AIR-21 requires the subcommittee
members, collectively, to have experience and expertise in the
management of large service organizations, customer service, the
management of large procurements, information and communications
technology, organizational development, and labor relations so that the
subcommittee can help FAA address long-standing weaknesses in its air
traffic modernization program. Additionally, the act prohibits the
subcommittee members from having any financial ties to any aviation or
aeronautics business or lobbying firm. As a result, the subcommittee
members have faced a steep and time-consuming learning curve to
understand FAA's acquisition and budget processes as they relate to the
air traffic control system. To acquire the basic understanding they
needed to carry out their review and approval functions, for example,
they initially spent portions of their quarterly or bimonthly meetings
on briefings from FAA staff and others on these processes.
Turnover on the subcommittee also has slowed its progress. Since the
original five subcommittee members were sworn in, in January 2001,
three have resigned and two of the three have been replaced, leaving
four current members. The new members have had to go through a time-
consuming learning process, just as the original members did. The
Secretary of Transportation has not appointed a fifth member to the
subcommittee because he is waiting to see whether the administration's
reauthorization proposal, which would make the FAA Administrator the
chair of the subcommittee, is approved. The congressional proposals
would likewise make the Administrator the chair of the subcommittee.
Still another obstacle to the subcommittee's progress, according to the
subcommittee, is FAA's lack of flexibility to move funds within and
between accounts. The subcommittee told us that project oversight
requires the ability to recommend such moves, but congressional budget
guidelines restrict FAA's ability to move funds. Therefore, according
to the subcommittee, these guidelines hinder FAA's ability to take
advantage of the subcommittee's expert business advice and counsel.
Both FAA and the subcommittee agree that acquisition project management
is an area in which FAA could use flexibility. For example, FAA
officials indicated that they would like the flexibility to adjust to
changing circumstances by shifting money within the facilities and
equipment account from a project that is delayed to a project that is
on track and could be cost-effectively accelerated. The agency is
putting together a paper that will expand on the need for this
flexibility.
In general, the Congress restricts an agency's ability to move funds
within and between accounts to help ensure that funds are spent on the
programs and activities for which they were appropriated. Guidelines
from FAA's Senate Committee on Appropriations require FAA to seek
congressional approval for any reprogramming that would increase or
decrease funding for a project within the facilities and equipment
account by more than 15 percent.[Footnote 14] Transfers between
appropriations accounts must be specifically authorized by law. If the
Appropriations Committee saw a need to provide FAA with more
flexibility, it could consider raising the reprogramming threshold or
the Congress could enact legislation to allow FAA to transfer money
between accounts on a trial basis.
Proposed Changes to the Subcommittee's Organization and Oversight
Responsibilities Could Clarify Uncertainties and Would Modify the
Subcommittee's Authority:
The Congress, the administration, and other stakeholders have proposed
changes to the subcommittee's organization and oversight
responsibilities that they believe would improve the performance of the
air traffic control system. These changes could clarify some
uncertainties in AIR-21 and would modify the subcommittee's approval
authority. According to our analysis, the merits of the proposed
changes depend, in large part, on the extent to which the
subcommittee's current approval authority is viewed as necessary or
desirable to improve the performance of the air traffic control system.
Legislative Proposals Agree on Organizational Changes:
The three legislative proposals that addressed the subcommittee's
organization and responsibilities would separate the subcommittee from
the Aviation Management Advisory Council and rename the subcommittee.
Under the Senate proposal, the new organization would be called the Air
Traffic Services Committee; under the House and the administration
proposals, it would be called the Air Traffic Services Board. This
change would elevate the subcommittee from a subordinate organization
to an organization independent of the council to oversee air traffic
services, just as the Mineta Commission envisioned. The new
organization also would be structurally similar to the IRS Oversight
Board and to a board of directors for a private organization. According
to the administration proposal, this change would improve the
functioning of both the council and the subcommittee by "simplifying
and clarifying their respective missions," enabling the council to
focus on providing "user/customer" input and the subcommittee to
"target the safe and efficient operation of the air traffic control
system.":
The three legislative proposals also would make the FAA Administrator a
member and the chair of the new organization. According to FAA and
other proponents, this change would streamline and clarify the lines of
authority between the chief operating officer, the Administrator, and
the subcommittee, eliminating the "confusion" and "blurring" of the
lines of authority that, according to the subcommittee's first annual
report, was a factor in dissuading some candidates from accepting the
job of chief operating officer (see fig. 2). Hence, this change could
make it easier to hire a chief operating officer. According to the
subcommittee, which also recommended in its first annual report that
the FAA Administrator chair the subcommittee, the "outside oversight"
envisioned under the statute would be preserved by this proposal
because the four private sector members would still constitute a
majority and the Administrator would need two of their votes for
approval of any items. However, this change also would reduce the
number and influence of the private sector members and could affect the
subcommittee's potential for accomplishing change.
Figure 2: Current and Proposed Oversight and Management Structure:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Proposals Would Alter the Subcommittee's Approval Authority to Varying
Degrees:
Two of the three legislative proposals and some stakeholders' proposals
would, to varying degrees, curtail the subcommittee's authority to
approve strategic plans, contracts, and budget requests for the air
traffic control system. These proposals are designed to address
challenges to the administration's policy-making functions that the
administration and some other stakeholders see in the subcommittee's
approval authority--especially in the subcommittee's authority to
approve a budget request for the air traffic control system.
Specifically, the administration has proposed to eliminate all of the
subcommittee's approval authority, making the new body strictly
advisory, and the House and other stakeholders have proposed to
eliminate some of the subcommittee's approval authority. Neither the
Senate nor the subcommittee has recommended any changes in the
subcommittee's approval authority.
Under the administration proposal, the subcommittee would no longer
approve strategic plans, contracts, and budget requests for the air
traffic control system. Instead, it would "make recommendations"
consistent with its expertise in management, customer service,
information and communications technology, organizational development,
and labor relations. Furthermore, the Secretary of Transportation would
no longer be responsible for initiating any process that would transmit
a document reflecting the subcommittee's views on the budget to the
congressional authorizing and appropriating committees. These changes
would alleviate concerns about the subcommittee's usurping the
executive branch's policy-making responsibilities, especially the
executive branch's prerogative to submit a budget that reflects its
priorities. According to the administration's reauthorization
proposal, the subcommittee's review and recommendations on the budget
for the air traffic control system would then be "based on Department
of Transportation and Office of Management and Budget budget levels and
within the normal procedures for developing the President's Budget." We
are not aware of any efforts by the subcommittee to challenge the
executive branch's authority. However, the former chairman of the
subcommittee noted that AIR-21, as written, could be interpreted as
enabling the subcommittee to circumvent major policy decisions of the
administration through its authority to approve the air traffic
organization's budget, major contracts, and major personnel decisions.
According to the former chairman, the possibility of such an
interpretation, while probably not intended, pointed to a need for
greater clarity in the law.
Under the House proposal, the subcommittee would lose its authority to
approve the budget request for the air traffic control system, but it
would retain its other approval authorities. The subcommittee could
make recommendations on the budget request, which the Secretary of
Transportation would be responsible for submitting to the President.
The President would then be responsible for transmitting these
recommendations to the congressional authorizers and appropriators.
While this proposal appears to respond, in part, to the
administration's concerns about challenges to the executive branch's
policy-making authority, especially the executive branch's prerogative
to submit a budget that reflects its priorities, it retains AIR-21's
means of communicating views on an executive branch agency's budget
directly to the Congress. Even with the Administrator as chair, if at
least three members of the subcommittee disagreed with the
administration, they could formally communicate their views to the
congressional committees. Appendix III summarizes the changes that the
three proposals would make to the subcommittee's organization and
oversight responsibilities and to the chief operating officer's
responsibilities.
Several stakeholders have proposed to eliminate the subcommittee's
authority to approve a budget request and large contracts but to
preserve its authority to approve strategic plans and performance
measures. This proposal reflects the view that the subcommittee's
authority should be aligned with its expertise and that the
subcommittee cannot realistically be expected to make meaningful
contributions to all of the areas under its purview, given that most of
its members lack experience with aviation issues. However, eliminating
the subcommittee's authority to approve a budget request and large
contracts could limit its ability to (1) help ensure that FAA's
strategic plan for the air traffic control system is aligned with the
budget and (2) oversee procurement costs and schedules. While
acknowledging that the scope of the subcommittee's responsibilities is
very large, others maintain that with a staff to provide technical
support, including analyses of budgets and procurements, the
subcommittee could be expected to carry out its current
responsibilities.
The proposals for eliminating or curtailing the subcommittee's approval
authority could strengthen the accountability of the Administrator and
of the chief operating officer by increasing their responsibility for
improving the performance of the air traffic control system. These
proposals also would remove any ambiguity about the reporting
relationship of the chief operating officer and the Administrator.
However, eliminating the subcommittee's approval authority also would
limit the subcommittee's power and fundamentally alter its role. It is
unclear how the subcommittee without approval authority could carry out
its "general responsibility" for "oversight" under AIR-21--to "oversee
the administration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision of
the air traffic control system.":
Stakeholders Have Proposed Other Changes That Would Affect the
Subcommittee's Organization and Ability to Carry Out Its
Responsibilities:
The head of the Aviation Management Advisory Council proposed to
eliminate the subcommittee's approval authority and merge the
subcommittee with the council. The rationale for this proposal is that
the resulting expanded advisory council could provide the FAA
Administrator with both aviation industry and management expertise, as
the Mineta Commission recommended, and that this cross pollination
could lead to a fertile exchange of ideas and prevent aviation
representatives from being too insular and nonindustry representatives
from being too naïve. However, like the administration proposal, it
would eliminate the subcommittee's approval authority.
To help the subcommittee better understand aviation issues, some
stakeholders have suggested that at least one member should have
expertise in aviation. Other stakeholders have disagreed, noting that
FAA is expected to serve as a resource for the subcommittee, and that
the members of the council have experience in aviation. These
stakeholders believe that having a member with expertise in aviation
would, therefore, be redundant and could dilute the subcommittee's
potential to bring expertise in performance management to air traffic
services.
Other stakeholders have suggested that the subcommittee hire a staff to
provide them with expertise in aviation technology, federal budgeting,
finance, and contracting. The purpose of such a staff would be to give
the subcommittee an independent perspective and to ensure continuity
when turnover in the subcommittee's membership occurs. AIR-21
authorizes the chair of the subcommittee to appoint "any personnel that
may be necessary to enable the subcommittee to perform its duties," but
the act does not authorize an appropriation for a staff. To date, the
subcommittee has relied on FAA staff for information and analysis. The
original subcommittee members voted to hire staff, and the fiscal year
2002 budget provided about $850,000 for that purpose. However, with the
resignation of two of the original members and the first chairman's
imminent departure, the hiring did not occur. According to FAA's
records, the money was divided between the council and the
subcommittee, and a portion of the funding that remained with the
subcommittee was used to pay part of the salary and benefits of the FAA
staff who assisted both the council and the subcommittee.
According to FAA officials, neither the fiscal year 2003 budget nor the
fiscal year 2004 budget request provides any funds for a staff or other
outside resources for the subcommittee. FAA officials stated that when,
and if, it became necessary for the subcommittee to have staff, FAA
would seek the necessary funds. Until then, FAA will staff the
subcommittee. According to FAA officials and the current subcommittee
chairman, hiring a staff would be an unnecessary expense at this time.
In addition, the current chairman views the work that FAA staff do for
the subcommittee as educational for the staff, improving their ability
to understand the subcommittee's approach to performance management.
We agree that FAA is the logical source of much of the information that
the subcommittee may need. However, relying exclusively on FAA for
information and analysis may not provide the subcommittee with an
independent perspective. Moreover, as our work has shown, FAA's
information may not always be reliable or complete. For example, our
recent work on the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System, one
of FAA's major modernization projects, showed that the reliability of
FAA's life-cycle cost estimates is uncertain, in part because FAA was
relying on data from the contractor that did not reflect the current
status of the project and had not been independently analyzed as FAA's
guidance requires.[Footnote 15] Because the subcommittee members are
generally not experts in aviation technology, federal budgeting,
finance, and contracting, they may not be ideally qualified to evaluate
the independence, reliability, and completeness of the information they
are provided for overseeing the air traffic control system.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation
and the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee for review and comment. On
May 16, 2003, we received E-mail comments from the department.
Department officials generally agreed with the facts presented in the
draft report and made technical and clarifying comments, which we
incorporated in this report as appropriate. The Air Traffic Services
Subcommittee did not provide comments beyond those provided by
department officials.
We are sending copies of this report to interested Members of Congress,
the Secretary of Transportation, and the FAA Administrator. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-2834. I can also be reached by E-mail at
dillinghamg@gao.gov. Key contacts and contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Gerald L. Dillingham
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Signed by Gerald L. Dillingham:
List of Committees:
The Honorable John McCain
Chairman
The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate:
The Honorable Trent Lott
Chairman
The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Aviation
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate:
The Honorable Don Young
Chairman
The Honorable James Oberstar
Ranking Democratic Member
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John Mica
Chairman
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio
Ranking Democratic Member
Subcommittee on Aviation
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century (AIR-21) requires us to report on the success of the Air
Traffic Services Subcommittee in improving the performance of the air
traffic control system. Accordingly, this report addresses the (1)
actions the subcommittee has taken to carry out its oversight
responsibilities and the obstacles it has encountered in attempting to
do so and (2) changes to the subcommittee's organization and oversight
responsibilities that have been proposed to improve the performance of
the air traffic control system.
To accomplish both of our objectives, we analyzed AIR-21 and its
legislative history; Executive Order 13180; and proposals of the
administration, the Senate, and the House that would amend provisions
of AIR-21 relating to the subcommittee and the chief operating officer.
We also reviewed the initial and the revised profiles for the chief
operating officer's position and legislation and other documents that
created a similar oversight structure at the Internal Revenue Service.
We analyzed the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee's annual report and
the minutes from the subcommittee's meetings, as well as congressional
testimony on the status of the subcommittee and our reports on
transforming federal agencies. In addition, we interviewed Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) officials, including the past and present
Administrators; past and present members of the subcommittee; the head
of the Aviation Management Advisory Council; and representatives of
aviation industry organizations, including the American Association of
Airport Executives, Airport Council International-North America,
National Association of State Aviation Officials, Air Transportation
Association, National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Airline
Pilots Association, and Cargo Airline Association. We also analyzed
documentation from FAA officials, research organizations, and the two
firms hired to recruit the chief operating officer. We did not address
changes to FAA's--as opposed to the subcommittee's--organization that
some stakeholders maintain are essential to improve the performance of
the air traffic control system.
We performed our work from October 2002 through May 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Subcommittee's Progress in Implementing Specific
Responsibilities:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Because of the events of September 11, 2001, the FAA Administrator
did not give bonuses to executives; therefore, the Air Traffic Services
Subcommittee did not review this issue.
[B] The subcommittee was formed after the fiscal year 2003 budget
process was under way.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Proposed Legislative Changes Affecting the Subcommittee
and the Chief Operating Officer Responsibilities:
Legislative proposal: Modify subcommittee's structure:
Legislative proposal: * Separate subcommittee from the Aviation
Management Advisory Council; Yes; Initiator of proposed change:
Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's structure: Yes; Initiator of proposed
change: House[C]: Modify subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Legislative proposal: * Designate the FAA Administrator as chairperson;
Yes; Initiator of proposed change: Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's
structure: Yes; Initiator of proposed change: House[C]: Modify
subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Legislative proposal: * Reduce the number of private sector members
from five to four; Yes; Initiator of proposed change: Senate[B]: Modify
subcommittee's structure: Yes; Initiator of proposed change: House[C]:
Modify subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Legislative proposal: Modify subcommittee's approval authority:
Legislative proposal: * Eliminate all approval authority, but allow
recommendations; Yes; Initiator of proposed change: Senate[B]: Modify
subcommittee's structure: [Empty]; Initiator of proposed change:
House[C]: Modify subcommittee's structure: [Empty].
Legislative proposal: * Eliminate budget approval authority, but allow
recommendations on the budget; [Empty]; Initiator of proposed change:
Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's structure: [Empty]; Initiator of
proposed change: House[C]: Modify subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Legislative proposal: * Eliminate budget transmittal requirement; Yes;
Initiator of proposed change: Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's
structure: [D]; Initiator of proposed change: House[C]: Modify
subcommittee's structure: [E].
Legislative proposal: * Eliminate additional reporting requirement;
[Empty]; Initiator of proposed change: Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's
structure: Yes; Initiator of proposed change: House[C]: Modify
subcommittee's structure: [Empty].
Legislative proposal: Make other changes to subcommittee:
Legislative proposal: * Rename subcommittee; Yes; Initiator of proposed
change: Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's structure: Yes; Initiator of
proposed change: House[C]: Modify subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Legislative proposal: * Eliminate compensation for members; Yes;
Initiator of proposed change: Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's
structure: [F]; Initiator of proposed change: House[C]: Modify
subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Legislative proposal: * Authorize an appropriation for activities; Yes;
Initiator of proposed change: Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's
structure: [Empty]; Initiator of proposed change: House[C]: Modify
subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Legislative proposal: Modify chief operating officer's
responsibilities:
Legislative proposal: * Oversee day-to-day operations rather than
review operations; Yes; Initiator of proposed change: Senate[B]: Modify
subcommittee's structure: Yes; Initiator of proposed change: House[C]:
Modify subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Legislative proposal: * Implement rather than develop strategic plan;
Yes; Initiator of proposed change: Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's
structure: Yes; Initiator of proposed change: House[C]: Modify
subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Legislative proposal: * Report performance to authorizing committees
rather than entire Congress; Yes; Initiator of proposed change:
Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's structure: Yes; Initiator of proposed
change: House[C]: Modify subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Legislative proposal: * Review management of
cost-reimbursable contracts; [Empty]; Initiator of proposed change:
Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's structure: [Empty]; Initiator of
proposed change: House[C]: Modify subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Legislative proposal: * Submit budget to subcommittee/board rather than
Secretary of Transportation; [Empty]; Initiator of proposed change:
Senate[B]: Modify subcommittee's structure: [Empty]; Initiator of
proposed change: House[C]: Modify subcommittee's structure: Yes.
Source: GAO.
[A] As of March 25, 2003.
[B] S. 824.
[C] H.R. 2115.
[D] Specifies that the budget request for the air traffic control
system that is to be transmitted without revision by the President to
the congressional authorizing and appropriating committees is the pre-
Office of Management and Budget budget request for the air traffic
control system.
[E] Requires the transmission without revision of budget
recommendations related to the air traffic control system, rather than
transmission of a budget request for the system, to the congressional
authorizing and appropriating committees along with the annual budget
request of FAA.
[F] Eliminates compensation for the chair and vice chair but retains
compensation of $25,000 per year for members.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Contacts:
Gerald Dillingham (202) 512-2834
Belva Martin (202) 512-2834:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those individuals named above, Geraldine Beard,
Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Dave Hooper, Elizabeth Marchak, Kieran McCarthy,
and Richard Scott made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Public Law 106-181, April 5, 2000.
[2] The Congress authorized the council in 1996 and amended its
appointment process and composition through AIR-21.
[3] Air Traffic Services Subcommittee, Report of the Air Traffic
Services Subcommittee (Aug. 28, 2000).
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Traffic Control: FAA's
Modernization Investment Management Approach Could Be Strengthened,
GAO-99-88 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 1999).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System: Better
Cost Data Could Improve FAA's Management of the Standard Terminal
Automation Replacement System, GAO-03-343 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,
2003).
[6] National Civil Aviation Review Commission, A Consensus for Change:
Avoiding Aviation Gridlock and Reducing the Accident Rate (Washington,
D.C.: December 1997).
[7] The subcommittee also has meeting and reporting requirements and is
compensated at the rate of $40,000 a year for the chairperson and
$25,000 a year for the other members.
[8] The administration submitted its reauthorization proposal to the
Congress on March 25, 2003; S. 824 was introduced in April 2003; and
H.R. 2115 was introduced in May 2003.
[9] Operational errors can occur when a controller does not maintain
the required separation between two aircraft or between an aircraft and
terrain and/or obstacles. A runway incursion is an incident on the
runway, involving an aircraft, vehicle, or object, which creates a
collision hazard.
[10] Next-Generation Air/Ground Communication, Oceanic Air Traffic
Control Services, En Route Communications Gateway, En Route Automation
Modernization, and User Request Evaluation Tool.
[11] Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General,
Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration, CC-2003-058
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2003).
[12] According to the FAA officials, the subcommittee has reviewed
bonuses for fiscal year 2002.
[13] FAA is implementing the En Route Automation Modernization program,
which replaces the HOST computer system software and hardware and the
backup system hardware and software.
[14] Current guidelines for reprogramming are included in Senate Report
101-398, July 27, 1990.
[15] GAO-03-343.
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