Transportation Security
Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges Gao ID: GAO-03-843 June 30, 2003The economic well being of the U.S. is dependent on the expeditious flow of people and goods through the transportation system. The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the threats and vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11, Congress created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it primary responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation. TSA was recently transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO was asked to examine the challenges in securing the transportation system and the federal role and actions in transportation security.
Securing the nation's transportation system is fraught with challenges. The transportation system crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The extensiveness of the system as well as the sheer volume of passengers and freight moved makes it both an attractive target and difficult to secure. Addressing the security concerns of the transportation system is further complicated by the number of transportation stakeholders that are involved in security decisions, including government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, and thousands of private sector companies. Further exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has weakened the transportation industry's financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional amounts made available. It will take a collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet existing and future transportation challenges. Since September 11, transportation stakeholders have acted to enhance security. At the federal level, TSA primarily focused on meeting aviation security deadlines during its first year of existence and DOT launched a variety of security initiatives to enhance the other modes of transportation. For example, the Federal Transit Administration provided grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the largest transit agencies, among other things. TSA has recently focused more on the security of the maritime and land transportation modes and is planning to issue security standards for all modes of transportation starting this summer. DOT is also continuing their security efforts. However, the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system have not been clearly defined, which creates the potential for overlap, duplication, and confusion as both entities move forward with their security efforts.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-843, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
June 2003:
Transportation Security:
Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges:
GAO-03-843:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-843, a report to Congressional Requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
The economic well being of the U.S. is dependent on the expeditious
flow of people and goods through the transportation system. The
attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the threats and
vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to September 11,
the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary responsibility for
the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September
11, Congress created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
within DOT and gave it primary responsibility for the security of all
modes of transportation. TSA was recently transferred to the new
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO was asked to examine the
challenges in securing the transportation system and the federal role
and actions in transportation security.
What GAO Found:
Securing the nation‘s transportation system is fraught with
challenges. The transportation system crisscrosses the nation and
extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of
freight each day. The extensiveness of the system as well as the sheer
volume of passengers and freight moved makes it both an attractive
target and difficult to secure. Addressing the security concerns of
the transportation system is further complicated by the number of
transportation stakeholders that are involved in security decisions,
including government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels,
and thousands of private sector companies. Further exacerbating these
challenges are the financial pressures confronting transportation
stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has weakened the
transportation industry‘s financial condition by decreasing ridership
and revenues. The federal government has provided additional funding
for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far
outstripped the additional amounts made available. It will take a
collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet existing
and future transportation challenges.
Since September 11, transportation stakeholders have acted to enhance
security. At the federal level, TSA primarily focused on meeting
aviation security deadlines during its first year of existence and
DOT launched a variety of security initiatives to enhance the other
modes of transportation. For example, the Federal Transit
Administration provided grants for emergency drills and conducted
security assessments at the largest transit agencies, among other
things. TSA has recently focused more on the security of the maritime
and land transportation modes and is planning to issue security
standards for all modes of transportation starting this summer. DOT is
also continuing their security efforts. However, the roles and
responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system
have not been clearly defined, which creates the potential for
overlap, duplication, and confusion as both entities move forward with
their security efforts.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DHS and DOT use a mechanism, such as a memorandum
of agreement, to clarify and delineate DOT‘s and TSA‘s roles and
responsibilities in transportation security matters. DHS and DOT
generally agreed with the report‘s findings; however, they disagreed
with the recommendation. Based on the uncertainty in the entities‘
roles and responsibilities that transportation stakeholders surfaced
to us, we continue to believe our recommendation is valid and would
help address transportation security challenges.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-843.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Peter Guerrero at
(202) 512-2834 or guerrerop@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Transportation System as a Whole Faces Numerous Challenges:
Transportation Operators and State and Local Governments Have Taken
Steps to Improve Security:
Congress and Federal Agencies Have Taken Numerous Actions to Enhance
Security, but Roles Remain Unclear:
Experts and Associations Identified Future Actions to Advance the
Security of the Transportation System:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Transportation:
GAO Comments:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
GAO Comments:
Appendix IV: Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
Transportation Security:
Appendix V: Organizational Chart of the Transportation Security
Administration:
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Transportation Security Reports and Testimonies:
Terrorism and Risk Management:
Tables:
Table 1: Comparison of Transportation Security Grant Requests to
Federal Funding Available, 2002 to 2003:
Table 2: Key Actions Taken By DOT Modal Administrations to
Secure the Different Transportation Modes, September 2001 to May 2003:
Table 3: Elements of a Risk Management Approach:
Table 4: List of Interviewees:
Table 5: Authorizations:
Table 6: Appropriations:
Table 7: Regulations:
Figures
Figure 1: Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes
of Transportation:
Figure 2: Illustration of Possible Freight Movements within the
Transportation System:
Figure 3: Intermodal Activity at a U.S. Port:
Figure 4: Key Stakeholders in Transportation Security:
Figure 5: Emergency Drill in Progress:
Figure 6: Photograph of Inspection Equipment in Use:
Figure 7: Organizational Chart of TSA‘s Office of Maritime and Land
Security, June 2003:
Figure 8: Illustration of How Risk Management Approach Can
Guide Decision-Making:
Abbreviations:
ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act:
AASHTO: American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials:
CBP: Bureau of Customs and Border Protection:
CSI: Container Security Initiative:
C-TPAT: Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FHWA: Federal Highway Administration:
FTA: Federal Transit Administration:
Amtrak: National Railroad Passenger Corporation:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TWIC: Transportation Workers Identification Card:
Letter June 30, 2003:
Congressional Requesters:
The attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the vulnerabilities of
the nation's transportation system to the terrorist threat. Terrorist
events around the world have also shown that transportation systems are
often targets of attack--roughly one-third of terrorist attacks
worldwide target transportation systems.[Footnote 1] While most of the
early attention following the September 11 attacks focused on airport
security, emphasis on the other modes of transportation has since grown
as concerns are voiced about possible vulnerabilities, such as
introducing weapons of mass destruction into this country through ports
or launching chemical attacks on mass transit systems. The entire
transportation industry has remained on a heightened state of alert
since the attacks. For example, as of May 2003, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) had issued over 15 terrorist threat advisories to
different segments of the transportation industry since September 11.
As requested, this report examines (1) challenges in securing the
nation's transportation system; (2) actions transportation
operators,[Footnote 2] as well as state and local governments, have
taken since September 11 to enhance security; (3) the federal role in
securing the transportation system and actions the federal government
has taken to enhance transportation security since September 11; and
(4) future actions that are needed to further enhance the security of
the nation's transportation system. To address these objectives, we
analyzed the Federal Bureau of Investigation's recent threat assessment
and the administration's security strategies.[Footnote 3] We also
analyzed the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and DOT
security-related documents and reports as well as relevant statutes and
regulations. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOT, the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), and TSA as well as
representatives from numerous transportation industry associations and
transportation security experts. We selected transportation industry
and state and local government associations that represent the
different modes of transportation and levels of government. We selected
transportation security experts based on their knowledge/expertise and
reputation as being an expert in the transportation security arena. We
also consulted with the National Academy of Sciences in identifying
appropriate transportation security experts. Finally, we reviewed our
past reports on homeland, port, transit, and aviation security and
other research on terrorism and transportation security. (See app. I
for a more detailed discussion of our report's scope and methodology.):
Results in Brief:
Transportation stakeholders face numerous challenges in securing the
nation's transportation system. Some of these challenges are common to
all modes of transportation while other challenges are specific to
aviation, maritime, or land transportation modes. Common security
challenges include the extensiveness of the transportation system, the
interconnectivity of the system, funding limitations, and the number of
stakeholders involved in transportation security. For example, the
transportation system includes about 3.9 million miles of roads, over
100,000 miles of rail, almost 600,000 bridges, over 300 ports, 2.2
million miles of pipelines, 500 train stations, and over 5,000 public-
use airports. The size of the system simultaneously provides a
substantial number of potential targets for terrorists and makes it
difficult to secure. Additionally, the number of stakeholders--
including over 20 federal entities, state and local governments, and
hundreds of thousands of private businesses--can lead to coordination,
communication, and consensus-building challenges. Further exacerbating
these challenges are the financial pressures confronting transportation
stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has weakened the
transportation industry's financial condition by decreasing ridership
and revenues. The federal government has provided additional funding
for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far
outstripped the additional amounts made available. The aviation,
maritime, and land transportation modes also face particular challenges
in enhancing security. For instance, maritime and land transportation
systems generally have open access designs so that users can enter the
systems at multiple points; however, this openness leaves them
vulnerable because transportation operators cannot monitor or control
who enters or leaves the systems.
Despite these challenges, transportation operators and state and local
governments have implemented numerous actions to enhance security since
September 11. Although security was always a priority, the terrorist
attacks elevated the importance and urgency of security. According to
representatives from a number of industry associations we interviewed,
transportation operators have implemented new security measures or
increased the frequency or intensity of existing activities. For
example, many transportation operators conducted risk or security
assessments, undertook emergency drills, and developed security plans.
State and local governments, which play a critical role in securing the
system because they own a large portion of the transportation system as
well as serve as first responders to incidents involving transportation
assets, have also acted to improve the security of the transportation
system. Some examples of their actions since September 11 include
deploying additional law enforcement personnel and participating in
emergency drills with the transportation industry.
The roles of federal government agencies in securing the nation's
transportation system are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had
primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system.
In the wake of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it
responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation. During
TSA's first year of existence, TSA's primary focus was on aviation
security. While TSA was focusing on aviation security, DOT modal
administrations[Footnote 4] launched various initiatives to enhance the
security of the maritime and land transportation modes. For example,
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) launched a multipart security
initiative to enhance transit security, which included grants for
emergency drills, security assessments, and training. TSA has recently
started to assert a greater role in securing the maritime and land
transportation modes and is launching a number of new security
initiatives. For example, TSA is planning to issue security standards
for all modes of transportation, starting this summer. However, a
number of representatives from transportation industry and state and
local government associations that we contacted expressed concerns
about not being adequately involved in TSA's decision-making, such as
the development of security standards. DOT modal administrations are
also continuing their transportation security efforts. For example, the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is coordinating a series of
workshops this year on emergency response and preparedness for state
departments of transportation and other agencies. The roles and
responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security have yet to
be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating and/
or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward with their
security efforts.
Transportation security experts and representatives from
transportation industry and state and local government associations
that we spoke with identified a number of actions that they said should
be implemented to enhance the security of the nation's transportation
system. In general, they believe that the transportation system is
generally more secure today than it was prior to September 11; however,
all noted that more work is needed to improve the security of the
system. Transportation security experts and representatives from
transportation industry and state and local government associations
identified a number of future actions needed; and stated that the
identified actions are primarily the responsibility of the federal
government. For instance, representatives from industry and state and
local government associations told us that clarifying federal roles and
coordinating federal efforts is important because their members are not
clear about which agency to contact for their various security concerns
and which agency has oversight for certain issues. Some representatives
from the transportation industry and state and local government
associations also noted that they have received conflicting messages
from the different federal entities.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of Transportation develop mechanisms, such as a memorandum of
agreement, to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of TSA and
DOT in transportation security matters. We provided draft copies of
this report to Amtrak, DOT, and DHS for their review and comment.
Amtrak generally agreed with our findings and recommendation and
provided some technical comments, which we incorporated where
appropriate. DOT and DHS generally agreed with the report's findings;
however, they disagreed with the conclusions and recommendation that
their roles and responsibilities in transportation security matters
need to be clarified. We continue to believe our recommendation would
help address transportation security challenges, based on our
discussions with transportation security stakeholders. For example,
representatives from several associations stated that their members
were unclear as to which agency to contact for their various security
concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues.
Furthermore, both entities are moving forward with their security
efforts, and both entities have statutory responsibilities for
transportation security. Therefore, we continue to recommend that DOT
and DHS clarify and delineate their roles and responsibilities in
security matters and communicate this information to stakeholders. (See
app. II and app. III for DOT and DHS comments and our responses.):
Background:
The nation's transportation system is a vast, interconnected network of
diverse modes. Key modes of transportation include aviation; highways;
motor carrier (i.e., trucking); motor coach (i.e., intercity bus);
maritime; pipeline; rail (passenger and freight); and transit (e.g.,
buses, subways, ferry boats, and light rail). The transportation modes
work in harmony to facilitate mobility through an extensive network of
infrastructure and operators, as well as through the vehicles and
vessels that permit passengers and freight to move within the system.
For example, the nation's transportation system moves over 30 million
tons of freight and provides approximately 1.1 billion passenger trips
each day. The diversity and size of the transportation system make it
vital to our economy and national security, including military
mobilization and deployment.
Given the important role the transportation system plays in our
economy, security, and every-day life, the transportation system is
considered a critical infrastructure. The USA PATRIOT Act defines
critical infrastructure as those "systems and assets, whether physical
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economy security, national public health or
safety, or combination of those matters."[Footnote 5] In the National
Strategy for Homeland Security, the administration identifies the
transportation system as one of the 13 critical infrastructure sectors
that must be protected. The administration's National Strategy for the
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets defines
the administration's plan for protecting our critical infrastructures
and key assets, including the transportation system, from terrorist
attacks. This strategy also outlines the guiding principles that will
underpin the nation's efforts to secure the infrastructures vital to
national security, governance, the economy and public confidence. The
strategy is designed to serve as a foundation for building and
fostering the necessary cooperation between government, private
industry and citizens in protecting critical infrastructures.
Private industry, state and local governments, and the federal
government all have roles and responsibilities in securing the
transportation system. Private industry owns and operates a large share
of the transportation system. For example, almost 2,000 pipeline
companies and 571 railroad companies own and operate the pipeline and
freight railroad systems, respectively. Additionally, 83 passenger air
carriers and 640,000 interstate motor coach and motor carrier companies
operate in the United States. State and local governments also own
significant portions of the highways, transit systems, and airports in
the country. For example, state and local governments own over 90
percent of the total mileage of highways. State and local governments
also administer and implement regulations for different sectors of the
transportation system and provide protective and emergency response
services through various agencies. Although the federal government owns
a limited share of the transportation system, it issues regulations,
establishes policies, provides funding, and/or sets standards for the
different modes of transportation. The federal government uses a
variety of policy tools, including grants, loan guarantees, tax
incentives, regulations, and partnerships, to motivate or mandate state
and local governments or the private sector to help address security
concerns.
Prior to September 11, DOT was the primary federal entity involved in
transportation security matters. However, in response to the attacks on
September 11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary
responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of
transportation.[Footnote 6] The act also gives TSA regulatory authority
over all transportation modes. Since its creation in November 2001, TSA
has focused primarily on meeting the aviation security deadlines
contained in ATSA. With the passage of the Homeland Security Act on
November 25, 2002, TSA, along with over 20 other agencies, was
transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).[Footnote
7]
Throughout the world, all modes of transportation have been targets of
terrorist attacks. For example, aviation has long been an attractive
target for terrorists. Aircraft hijackings became a regular occurrence
in the 1970s, leading to the first efforts in aviation security. In
1988, a Pan Am flight was bombed over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all
259 on board. In 1995, a plot to bomb as many as 11 U.S. airliners was
discovered. Most recently, U.S. aircraft were hijacked on September 11,
2001, and crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City, the
Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a field in Pennsylvania, killing
about 3,000 people and destroying billions of dollars' worth of
property.
Public surface transportation systems have also been a common target
for terrorist attacks around the world. For example, the first large-
scale terrorist use of a chemical weapon occurred in 1995 on the Tokyo
subway system. In this attack, a terrorist group released sarin gas on
a subway train, killing 11 people and injuring 5,500. According to the
Mineta Transportation Institute,[Footnote 8] surface transportation
systems were the target of more than 195 terrorist attacks from 1997
through 2000.
The Transportation System as a Whole Faces Numerous Challenges:
The United States maintains the world's largest and most complex
national transportation system. Improving the security of such a system
is fraught with challenges for both public and private entities. To
provide safe transportation for the nation, these entities must
overcome issues common to all modes of transportation as well as issues
specific to the individual modes of transportation.
All Modes of Transportation Face Common Challenges:
Although each mode of transportation is unique, they all face some
common challenges in trying to enhance security. Common challenges stem
from the extensiveness of the transportation system, the
interconnectivity of the system, funding security improvements, and the
number of stakeholders involved in transportation security.
:
Size and Diversity of Transportation Modes Create Security Challenges:
The size of the transportation system makes it difficult to adequately
secure. The transportation system's extensive infrastructure
crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions
of passengers and tons of freight each day. (See fig. 1 for maps of the
different transportation modes.) The extensiveness of the
infrastructure as well as the sheer volume of freight and passengers
moved through the system creates an infinite number of targets for
terrorists. Furthermore, as industry representatives and
transportation security experts repeatedly noted, the extensiveness of
the infrastructure makes it impossible to equally protect all assets.
Figure 1: Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of
Transportation:
[See PDF for image]
Note: This map shows the location of all airports with Federal Security
Directors except for the nine airports in Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, the American Samoa, and the Mariana Islands. Federal Security
Directors are TSA employees who oversee federal security operations at
the nation's airports. A total of 433 airports are shown in this map.
[End of figure]
Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of
Transportation (Continued):
[See PDF for image]
Note: This map shows the location of all U.S. ports for eight ports
located in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. A total of 353 ports are
shown.
[End of figure]
Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of
Transportation (Continued):
[See PDF for image]
Note: This map shows the National Highway Planning Network. It does not
show all urban and rural roads in the United States.
[End of figure]
Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of
Transportation (Continued):
[See PDF for image]
Note: This map shows the rail lines of Class I railroads, which are the
largest railroads, as defined by operating revenue. Class I railroads
represent the majority of rail freight activity.
[End of figure]
Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of
Transportation (Continued):
[See PDF for image]
Note: This map shows the location of all mass transit agencies that
were eligible to receive federal urbanized area formula funding in
2001, except for 13 transit agencies located in Puerto Rico. A total of
589 transit agencies are shown.
[End of figure]
Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of
Transportation (Continued):
[See PDF for image]
Note: This map shows the location of pipelines that are at least 12
inches in diameter, which accounts for the majority of all pipeline
capacity.
[End of figure]
Protecting transportation assets from attack is made more difficult
because of the tremendous variety of transportation operators. Some are
multibillion-dollar enterprises, while others have very limited
facilities and very little traffic. Some are public agencies, such as
state departments of transportation, while some are private businesses.
The type of freight moved through the different modes is similarly
varied. For example, the maritime, motor carrier, and rail operators
haul freight as diverse as dry bulk (grain) and hazardous materials.
Additionally, some transportation operators carry passengers while
others haul freight.
Interconnectivity and Interdependency Also Present Challenges:
Additional challenges are created by the interconnectivity and
interdependency among the transportation modes and between the
transportation sector and nearly every other sector of the economy. The
transportation system is interconnected or intermodal because
passengers and freight can use multiple modes of transportation to
reach a destination. For example, from its point of origin to its
destination, a piece of freight, such as a shipping container, can move
from ship to train to truck. (See fig. 2.) The interconnective nature
of the transportation system creates several security challenges.
First, events directed at one mode of transportation can have ripple
effects throughout the entire system. For example, when the port
workers in California, Oregon, and Washington went on strike in 2002,
the railroads saw their intermodal traffic decline by almost 30 percent
during the first week of the strike, compared with the year before.
Second, the interconnecting modes can contaminate each other--that is,
if a particular mode experiences a security breach, the breach could
affect other modes.[Footnote 9] An example of this would be if a
shipping container that held a weapon of mass destruction arrived at a
U.S. port where it was placed on a truck or train. In this case,
although the original security breach occurred in the port, the rail or
trucking industry would be affected as well. Thus, even if operators
within one mode established high levels of security they could be
affected because of the security efforts, or lack thereof, of the other
modes. Third, intermodal facilities where a number of modes connect and
interact--such as ports--are potential targets for attack because of
the presence of passenger, freight, employees, and equipment at these
facilities. (See fig. 3.):
Figure 2: Illustration of Possible Freight Movements within the
Transportation System:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Intermodal Activity at a U.S. Port:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Interdependencies also exist between transportation and nearly every
other sector of the economy. Consequently, an event that affects the
transportation sector can have serious impacts on other industries. For
example, when the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the rail
industry stated that it restricted the movement of many hazardous
materials, including chlorine, because of a heightened threat of a
terrorist attack. However, within days, many major water treatment
facilities reported that they were running out of chlorine, which they
use to treat drinking water, and would have to shut down operations if
chlorine deliveries were not immediately resumed. Additionally, the
transportation system can be affected by other sectors. For example,
representatives of the motor coach industry told us that the drop in
the tourism industry has negatively affected motor coach profits.
The Number of Stakeholders Creates Challenges:
Securing the transportation system is made more difficult because of
the number of stakeholders involved. As illustrated in figure 4,
numerous entities at the federal, state, and local levels, including
over 20 federal entities and thousands of private sector businesses,
play a key role in transportation security. For example, the
Departments of Energy, Transportation, and Homeland Security, state
governments, and about 2,000 pipeline operators are all responsible for
securing the pipeline system. The number of stakeholders involved in
transportation security can lead to communication challenges,
duplication, and conflicting guidance. Representatives from several
state and local government and industry associations told us that their
members are receiving different messages from the various federal
agencies involved in transportation security. For instance, one
industry representative noted that both TSA and DOT asked the industry
to implement additional security measures when the nation's threat
condition was elevated to orange at the beginning of the Iraq
War;[Footnote 10] however, TSA and DOT were not consistent in what they
wanted done--that is, they were asking for different security measures.
Moreover, many representatives commented that the federal government
needs to better coordinate its security efforts. These representatives
noted that dealing with multiple agencies on the same issues and topics
is frustrating and time consuming for the transportation sector.
Figure 4: Key Stakeholders in Transportation Security:
[See PDF for image]
[A] "Other" includes private, public, or quasi-public entities.
[End of figure]
The number of stakeholders also makes it difficult to achieve the
needed cooperation and consensus to move forward with security efforts.
As we have noted in past reports, coordination and consensus-building
is critical to successful implementation of security efforts.[Footnote
11] Transportation stakeholders can have inconsistent goals or
interests, which can make consensus-building challenging. For example,
from a safety perspective, vehicles that carry hazardous materials
should be required to have placards that identify the contents of a
vehicle so that emergency personnel know how best to respond to an
incident. However, from a security perspective, identifying placards on
vehicles that carry hazardous materials make them a potential target
for attack.
Funding Is A Key Challenge:
According to transportation security experts and state and local
government and industry representatives we contacted, funding is the
most pressing challenge to securing the nation's transportation system.
While some security improvements are inexpensive, such as removing
trash cans from subway platforms, most require substantial funding.
Additionally, given the large number of assets to protect, the sum of
even relatively less expensive investments can be cost prohibitive. For
example, reinforcing shipping containers to make them more blast
resistant is one way to improve security, which would cost about
$15,000 per container. With several million shipping containers in use,
however, this tactic would cost billions of dollars if all of them were
reinforced. The total cost of enhancing the security of the entire
transportation system is unknown; however, given the size of the
system, it could amount to tens of billions of dollars. The magnitude
of the potential cost is illustrated by several examples:
* The President's fiscal year 2004 budget request for TSA includes
about $4.5 billion for aviation security. According to TSA, this
funding will be used for security screeners, air marshals, aviation
related research and development, and surveillance detection
techniques, among other things.
* The total estimated cost of the identified security improvements at
eight mass transit agencies we visited was about $711 million.[Footnote
12]
* The Coast Guard estimates the cost of implementing the new
International Maritime Organization security code[Footnote 13] and the
security provisions in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002[Footnote 14] to be approximately $1.5 billion for the first year
and $7.4 billion over the succeeding decade.
* The American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials (AASHTO)[Footnote 15] estimates that enhancing highway and
transit security will cost $2 billion annually in capital costs and $1
billion in operating costs.
The current economic environment makes this a difficult time for the
private industry or state and local governments to make security
investments. According to industry representatives and experts we
contacted, most of the transportation industry operates on a very thin
profit margin, making it difficult to pay for additional security
measures. The sluggish economy has further weakened the transportation
industry's financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues.
For example, airlines are in the worst fiscal crisis in their history
and several have filed for bankruptcy. Similarly, the motor coach and
motor carrier industries and Amtrak report decreased revenues because
of the slow economy. In addition, nearly every state and local
government are facing a large budget deficit for fiscal year 2004. For
example, the National Governors Association estimates that states are
facing a total budget shortfall of $80 billion this upcoming year.
Given the tight budget environment, state and local governments and
transportation operators must make difficult trade-offs between
transportation security investments and other needs, such as service
expansion and equipment upgrades. According to the National Association
of Counties, many local governments are planning to defer some
maintenance of their transportation infrastructure to pay for some
security enhancements.
Further exacerbating the problem of funding security improvements is
the additional costs the transportation sector incurs when the federal
government elevates the national threat condition. Industry
representatives stated that operators tighten security, such as
increasing security patrols, when the national threat condition is
raised or intelligence information suggests an increased threat against
their mode. However, these representatives stated that these additional
measures drain resources and are not sustainable. For example, Amtrak
estimates that it spends an additional $500,000 per month for police
overtime when the national threat condition is increased.
Transportation industry representatives also noted that employees are
diverted from their regular duties to implement additional security
measures, such as guarding entranceways, in times of increased
security, which hurts productivity.
The federal government has provided additional funding for
transportation security since September 11, but demand has far
outstripped the additional amounts made available. For example,
Congress appropriated a total of $241 million for grants for ports,
motor carriers, and Operation Safe Commerce in 2002.[Footnote 16]
However, as table 1 shows, the grant applications received by TSA for
these security grants totaled $1.8 billion--7 times more than the
amount available. Due to the costs of security enhancements and the
transportation industries' and state and local governments' tight
budget environments, the federal government is likely to be viewed as a
source of funding for at least some of these enhancements. However,
given the constraints on the federal budget as well as competing claims
for federal assistance, requests for federal funding for transportation
security enhancements will likely continue to exceed available
resources.
Table 1: Comparison of Transportation Security Grant Requests to
Federal Funding Available, 2002 to 2003:
Dollars in millions.
Port security grants[A]; Amount appropriated:
$93.3; Total amount requested in all grant applications: $697.
Port security grants[B]; Amount appropriated: 105;
Total amount requested in all grant applications: 996.
Intercity bus grants[B]; Amount appropriated: 15;
Total amount requested in all grant applications: 45.6.
Operation Safe Commerce grants[B]; Amount
appropriated: 28; Total amount requested in all grant applications:
97.9.
Total; Amount appropriated: $241.3; Total amount requested in all
grant applications: $1,836.5.
Source: TSA.
Note: Both the Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. No. 107-117) and the Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. No. 107-206) provided funding for port
security grants.
[A] P.L. No. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002).
[B] P.L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820 (2002).
[End of table]
Balancing Potential Economic Impacts and Security Enhancements Is Also
Challenging:
Another challenge is balancing the potential economic impacts of
security enhancements with the benefits of such measures. While there
is broad support for greater security, this task is a difficult one
because the nation relies heavily on a free and expeditious flow of
goods. Particularly with "just in time" deliveries, which require a
smooth and expeditious flow through the transportation system, delays
or disruptions in the supply chain could have serious economic impacts.
As the Coast Guard Commandant stated about the flow of goods through
ports, "even slowing the flow long enough to inspect either all or a
statistically significant random selection of imports would be
economically intolerable."[Footnote 17]
Furthermore, security measures may have economic and competitive
ramifications for individual modes of transportation. For instance, if
the federal government imposed a particular security requirement on the
rail industry and not on the motor carrier industry, the rail industry
might incur additional costs and/or lose customers to the motor carrier
industry. Striking the right balance between increasing security and
protecting economic vitality of the national economy and individual
modes will remain an important and difficult task.
Individual Transportation Modes Also Confront Unique Challenges:
In addition to the overarching challenges that transportation
stakeholders will face in attempting to improve transportation
security, they also face a number of challenges specific to the
aviation, maritime, and land transportation modes. Although aviation
security has received a significant amount of attention and funding
since September 11, more work is needed. In general, transportation
security experts believe that the aviation system is more secure today
than it was prior to September 11. However, aviation experts and TSA
officials noted significant vulnerabilities remain,
including:[Footnote 18]
* Perimeter security: Terrorists could launch attacks, such as
launching shoulder-fired missiles, from a location just outside an
airport's perimeter. Since September 11, airport operators have
increased their patrols of airport perimeter areas, but industry
officials state that they do not have enough resources to completely
protect against these attacks.
* Air cargo security: Although TSA has focused much effort and funding
on ensuring that bombs and other threat items are not carried onto
planes by passengers or in their luggage, vulnerabilities exist in
securing the cargo carried aboard commercial passenger and all-cargo
aircraft. For example, employees of shippers and freight forwarders are
not universally subject to a background check. Theft is also a major
problem in air cargo shipping, signifying that unauthorized personnel
may still be gaining access to air cargo shipments. Air cargo shipments
pass through several hands in going from sender to recipient, making it
challenging to implement a system that provides adequate security for
air cargo. According to TSA officials, TSA is developing a strategic
plan to address air cargo security and has undertaken a comprehensive
outreach process to strengthen security programs across the industry.
* General aviation security: While TSA has taken several actions
related to general aviation[Footnote 19] since September 11, this
segment of the industry remains potentially more vulnerable than
commercial aviation. For example, general aviation pilots are not
screened prior to taking off and the contents of a plane are not
examined at any point. According to TSA, solutions that can be
implemented relatively easily at the nation's commercial airports are
not practical at the 19,000 general aviation airports. It would be very
difficult to prevent a general aviation pilot who is intent on
committing a terrorist attack with his or her aircraft from doing so.
The vulnerability of the system was illustrated in January 2002, when a
Florida teenage flight student crashed his single-engine airplane into
a Tampa skyscraper.[Footnote 20] TSA is working with the appropriate
stakeholders to close potential security gaps and to raise the security
standards across this diverse segment of the aviation industry.
Maritime and land transportation systems have their own unique security
vulnerabilities. For example, maritime and land transportation systems
generally have an open design, meaning the users can access the system
at multiple points. The systems are open by design so that they are
accessible and convenient for users. In contrast, the aviation system
is housed in closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The
openness of the maritime and land transportation systems can leave them
vulnerable because transportation operators cannot monitor or control
who enters or leaves the systems. However, adding security measures
that restrict the flow of passengers or freight through the systems
could have serious consequences for commerce and the public.
Individual maritime and land transportation modes also have unique
challenges and vulnerabilities. For example, representatives from the
motor carrier industry noted that the high turnover rate (about 40 to
60 percent) of drivers means that motor carrier operators must be
continually conducting background checks on new drivers, which is
expensive and time consuming. Additionally, representatives from the
motor coach industry commented that the number of used motor coaches on
the market coupled with the lack of guidance or requirements on buying
or selling these vehicles is a serious vulnerability. In particular,
there are approximately 5,000 used motor coaches on the market;
however, there is very little information on who is selling and buying
them, nor is there any consistency among motor coach operators in
whether they remove their logos from the vehicles before they are sold.
These vehicles could be used as a weapon or to transport a weapon.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration officials told us they have
not issued guidance to the industry on this potential vulnerability
because TSA is responsible for security and therefore would be
responsible for issuing such guidance.
Transportation Operators and State and Local Governments Have Taken
Steps to Improve Security:
Since September 11, transportation operators and state and local
governments have been working to strengthen security, according to
associations we contacted. Although security was a priority before
September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency
of transportation security for transportation operators and state and
local governments. The industry has been consistently operating at a
heightened state of security since September 11. State and local
governments have also made transportation security investments since
September 11.
Transportation Operators Have Undertaken a Variety of Security-
Enhancing Actions:
According to representatives from a number of industry associations we
interviewed,[Footnote 21] transportation operators have implemented
new security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of
existing activities. Some of the most common measures cited include:
* Conducted vulnerability or risk assessments: Many transportation
operators conducted assessments of their systems to identify potential
vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure or assets, and corrective
actions or needed security improvements. For example, the railroad
industry conducted a risk assessment, that identified over 1,300
critical assets and served as a foundation for the industry's security
plan.
* Tightened access control: Many transportation operators have
tightened access control to their facilities and equipment by
installing fences and requiring employees to display identification
cards, among other things. For example, some motor carrier operators
have installed fences around truck yards and locked inventory at night.
* Intensified security presence: Some transportation operators have
increased the number of police or security who patrol their systems.
For example, transit agencies have placed surveillance equipment,
alarms, or security personnel at access points to subway tunnels, bus
yards, and other nonpublic places and required employees to wear
brightly colored vests for increased visibility.
* Increased emergency drills: Many transportation operators have
increased the frequency of emergency drills. For example, Amtrak
reported that it has conducted two full-scale emergency drills in New
York City and is currently trying to arrange a drill at Union Station
in Washington, D.C. The purpose of emergency drilling is to test
emergency plans, identify problems, and develop corrective actions.
Figure 5 is a photograph from an annual emergency drill conducted by
the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
Figure 5: Emergency Drill in Progress:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* Developed or revised security plans: Transportation operators
developed security plans or reviewed existing plans to determine, what
changes, if any, needed to be made. For example, DOT's Office of
Pipeline Safety worked with the industry to develop performance
oriented security guidance. The Office of Pipeline Safety also
encouraged all pipeline operators to develop security plans and
directed operators with critical facilities to develop security plans
for these facilities.
* Provided additional training: Many transportation operators have
either participated in and/or conducted additional training on security
or antiterrorism. For example, the United Motorcoach Association is
developing an online security training program for motor coach
operators, using funds from the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program.
Similarly, many transit agencies attended seminars conducted by FTA or
by the American Public Transportation Association.
Some transportation industries have also implemented more innovative
security measures, according to associations we contacted. For example,
the natural gas industry modeled the impact of pipeline outages on the
natural gas supply in the Northeast, which helped to identify
vulnerabilities and needed improvements. The motor carrier industry
developed a program called the Highway Watch Program, supported by the
American Trucking Associations.[Footnote 22] The program is a driver-
led, state-organized safety system that since September 11 has included
a security component. Specifically, drivers are provided terrorism
awareness training and are encouraged to report suspicious activities
they witness on the road to a Highway Watch Program call center, which
is operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The call center then directs
the call to appropriate authorities.
State and Local Governments Have Also Increased Security-Related
Efforts:
As we have previously reported, state and local governments are
critical stakeholders in the nation's homeland security
efforts.[Footnote 23] This is equally true in securing the nation's
transportation system. State and local governments play a critical
role, in part, because they own a significant portion of the
transportation infrastructure, such as airports, transit systems,
highways, and ports. For example, state and local governments own over
90 percent of the total mileage of the highway system. Even when state
and local governments are not the owners or operators, they nonetheless
are directly affected by the transportation modes that run through
their jurisdictions. Consequently, the responsibility for protecting
this infrastructure and responding to emergencies involving the
transportation infrastructure often falls to state and local
governments.
Security efforts of local and state governments have included
developing counter terrorist plans, participating in training and
security-related research, participating in transportation operators'
emergency drills and table-top exercises, conducting vulnerability
assessments of transportation assets, and participating in emergency
planning sessions with transportation operators. Some state and local
governments have also hired additional law enforcement personnel to
patrol transportation assets. Much of the funding for these efforts has
been covered by the state and local governments, with a bulk of the
expenses going to personnel costs, such as additional law enforcement
officers and overtime.
Congress and Federal Agencies Have Taken Numerous Actions to Enhance
Security, but Roles Remain Unclear:
The Congress, DOT, TSA, and other federal agencies, took numerous steps
to enhance transportation security since September 11. The roles of the
federal agencies in securing the nation's transportation system,
however, are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had primary
responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the
wake of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility
for the security of all modes of transportation. However, DOT and TSA
have not yet formally defined their roles and responsibilities in
securing all modes of transportation. Furthermore, TSA is moving
forward with plans to enhance transportation security. For example, TSA
plans to issue security standards for all modes. DOT modal
administrations are also continuing their security efforts for
different modes of transportation.
Congress and Federal Agencies Have Acted to Enhance Transportation
Security:
Congress has acted to enhance the security of the nation's
transportation system since September 11. In addition to passing the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),[Footnote 24] Congress
passed numerous pieces of legislation aimed at improving transportation
security. For example, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001,[Footnote 25] which mandates federal background checks of
individuals operating vehicles carrying hazardous materials and the
Homeland Security Act,[Footnote 26] which created DHS and moved TSA to
the new department.[Footnote 27] Congress also provided funding for
transportation security enhancements through various appropriations
acts. For example, the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act, in part,
provided (1) $738 million for the installation of explosives detection
systems in commercial service airports, (2) $125 million for port
security activities, and (3) $15 million to enhance the security of
intercity bus operations. (See app. IV for a listing of the key pieces
of transportation security-related legislation that has been passed
since September 11.):
Federal agencies, notably TSA and DOT, have also taken steps to enhance
transportation security since September 11. In its first year of
existence, TSA worked to establish its organization and focused
primarily on meeting the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA.
In January 2002, TSA had 13 employees to tackle securing the nation's
transportation system--1 year later, TSA had about 65,000 employees.
TSA reports that it met over 30 deadlines during 2002 to improve
aviation security, including two of its most significant deadlines--to
deploy federal passenger screeners at airports across the nation by
November 19, 2002, and to screen every piece of checked baggage for
explosives by December 31, 2002.[Footnote 28] According to TSA, other
completed TSA activities included the following:
* recruiting, hiring, training, and deploying about 56,000 federal
screeners.
* awarding grants for port security; and:
* implementing performance management system and strategic planning
activities to create a results-oriented culture.
As TSA worked to establish itself and improve the security of the
aviation system, DOT modal administrations acted to enhance security of
air, land, and maritime transportation. As table 2 shows, the actions
taken by DOT modal administrations varied. For example, FTA launched a
multipart initiative for mass transit agencies, which provided grants
for emergency drills, offered free security training, conducted
security assessments at 36 transit agencies, provided technical
assistance, and invested in research and development. The Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration developed three courses for motor coach
drivers. The response of various DOT modal agencies to the threat of
terrorist attacks on the transportation system has varied due to
differences in authority and resource limitations.
Table 2: Key Actions Taken By DOT Modal Administrations to Secure the
Different Transportation Modes, September 2001 to May 2003:
Mode: All (transport of hazardous materials); DOT modal administration:
Research and Special Programs Administration (Office of Hazardous
Materials Safety); Examples of actions taken: * Established regulations
for shippers and transporters of certain hazardous materials to develop
and implement security plans and to require security awareness training
for hazmat employees; * Developed hazardous materials transportation
security awareness training for law enforcement, the industry, and the
hazmat community; * Published security advisory, which identifies
measures that could enhance the security of the transport of hazardous
materials; * Investigated the security risks associated with
placarding hazardous materials, including whether removing placards
from certain shipments improve shipment security, and whether
alternative methods for communicating safety hazards could be
deployed.
Mode: Aviation; DOT modal administration: Federal Aviation
Administration; Examples of actions taken: * Established rule for
strengthening cockpit doors on commercial aircraft; * Issued guidance
to flight school operators for additional security measures; *
Assisted Department of Justice in increasing background check
requirements for foreign nationals seeking pilot certificates; *
Increased access restrictions at air traffic control facilities; *
Developed computer security strategy.
Mode: Highways; DOT modal administration: Federal Highway
Administration; Examples of actions taken: * Provided vulnerability
assessment and emergency preparedness workshops; * Developed and
prioritized list of highway security research and development
projects; * Convened blue ribbon panel on bridge and tunnel
vulnerabilities.
Mode: Maritime; DOT modal administration: U.S. Coast Guard[A];
Examples of actions taken:
* Activated and deployed port security units to help support local port
security patrols in high threat areas; * Boarded and inspected ships
to search for threats and confirmed the identity of those aboard; *
Conducted initial assessments of the nation's ports to identify vessel
types and facilities that pose a high risk of being involved in a
transportation security incident; * Established a new centralized
National Vessel Movement Center to track the movement of all foreign-
flagged vessels entering U.S. ports of call; * Established new
guidelines for developing security plans and implementing security
measures for passenger vessels and passenger terminals; * Used the
pollution and hazardous materials expertise of the Coast Guards'
National Strike Force to prepare for and respond to bioterrorism and
weapons of mass destruction;
Maritime Administration; * Increased port security and
terrorism emphasis at National Port Readiness Network Port Readiness
Exercises; * Provided port security training and developed standards
and curriculum to educate and train maritime security personnel; *
Increased access restrictions and established new security procedures
for the Ready Reserve Force; * Provided merchant mariner background
checks for Ready Reserve Force and sealift vessels in support of
Department of Defense and Coast Guard requirements; * Provided
merchant mariner force protection training.
Mode: Motor carrier; DOT modal administration: Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration; Examples of actions taken: * Conducted 31,000
on-site security sensitivity visits for hazardous materials carriers;
made recommendations after visits; * Initiated a field operational
test to evaluate different safety and security technologies and
procedures, and identify the most cost effective means for protecting
different types of hazardous cargo for security purposes; * Provided
free training on trucks and terrorism to law enforcement officials and
industry representatives; * Conducted threat assessment of the
hazardous materials industry.
Mode: Motor coach; DOT modal administration: Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration; Examples of actions taken: * Developed three
courses for drivers on security-related information including,
different threats, how to deal with packages, and how to respond in the
case of an emergency.
Mode: Pipeline; DOT modal administration: Research and Special Programs
Administration (Office of Pipeline Safety); Examples of actions taken:
* Developed contact list of operators who own critical systems; *
Convened blue ribbon panel with operators, state regulators, and unions
to develop a better understanding of the pipeline system and coordinate
efforts of the stakeholders; * Worked with TSA to develop inspection
protocols to use for pipeline operator security inspections. The Office
of Pipeline Safety and TSA have begun the inspection of major
operators; * Created email network of pipeline operators and a call-in
telephone number that pipeline operators can use to obtain
information; * Directed pipeline operators to identify critical
facilities and develop security plans for critical facilities that
address deterrence, preparedness, and rapid response and recovery from
attacks; * Worked with industry to develop risk-based security
guidance, which is tied to national threat levels and includes
voluntary, recommended countermeasures.
Mode: Rail; DOT modal administration: Federal Railroad Administration;
Examples of actions taken: * Shared threat information with railroads
and rail labor; * Reviewed Association of American Railroads' and
Amtrak's security plans; * Assisted commuter railroads with their
security plans; * Provided funding for security assessments of three
commuter railroads, which were included in FTA's assessment efforts; *
Reached out to international community for lessons-learned in rail
security.
Mode: Transit; DOT modal administration: Federal Transit
Administration; Examples of actions taken: * Awarded $3.4 million in
grants to over 80 transit agencies for emergency response drills; *
Offered free security training to transit agencies; * Conducted
security assessments at the largest 36 transit agencies; * Provided
technical assistance to 19, with a goal of 60, transit agencies on
security and emergency plans and emergency response drills; *
Increased funding for security research and development efforts.
Source: GAO presentation of information provided by DOT modal
administrations.
[A] The U.S. Coast Guard was transferred to DHS in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (P.L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)).
[End of table]
In addition to TSA and DOT modal administrations, other federal
agencies have also taken actions to improve security.[Footnote 29] For
example, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), previously
known as the U.S. Customs Service, has played a key role in improving
port security.[Footnote 30] Since September 11, the agency has launched
a number of initiatives to strengthen the security of the U.S. border,
including ports. The initiatives are part of a multilayered approach,
which rely on partnerships between foreign nations and the U.S. to
identify problems at their source, cooperation from the global trade
community to secure the flow of goods, and collaboration between
federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
ensure that information is analyzed and used to target scarce resources
on the highest risk issues. Some of the specific initiatives that CBP
has implemented to interdict high risk cargo before it reaches the U.S.
include the following:
* Developing and deploying of a strategy for the detection of nuclear
and radiological weapons and materials. The elements of this strategy-
-equipment, training, and intelligence--are focused on providing
inspectors with the tools to detect weapons of mass destruction in
cargo containers and vehicles. In the maritime environment, this
includes the deployment of radiation portal monitors, personal
radiation detectors, large-scale nonintrusive inspection technology,
such as truck and container x-rays and mobile x-ray vans. Much of the
development of this equipment has been done in partnership with the
Department of Energy. Figure 6 shows new mobile gamma ray imaging
devices at ports to help inspectors examine the contents of cargo
containers and vehicles.
Figure 6: Photograph of Inspection Equipment in Use:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* Establishing the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT), which is a joint government business initiative aimed at
securing the supply chain of global trade against terrorist
exploitation. According to CBP, this initiative has leveraged the
cooperation of the owners of the global supply chain by working with
this community to implement and share standard security best practices.
The members of C-TPAT include importing businesses, freight forwarders,
carriers, and U.S. port authorities and terminal operators. According
to CBP, C-TPAT members bring 96 percent of all containers coming into
the U.S. After the initial application and training phase of this
program, CBP conducts foreign and domestic validations to verify that
the supply chain security measures contained in C-TPAT participants'
security profiles are reliable, accurate, and effective. C-TPAT members
are strongly encouraged to self-police such areas as personnel
screening, physical security procedures and personnel, and the security
of service providers.
* Launching the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which is designed
specifically to secure the ocean-going sea container. The key elements
of CSI include using advance information to identify high-risk
containers; inspecting containers identified through the prescreening
process as high-risk before they are shipped to the U.S; using
detection technology to quickly inspect containers identified as high-
risk; and developing and using smarter, more secure containers.
According to CBP, the U.S. has signed agreements with 18 of the
countries with the world's largest seaports, which allows for the
deployment of U.S. inspectors and equipment to these foreign seaports,
and is beginning the expansion of CSI to other global ports with
significant volume or strategic locations.
TSA Moves Forward as Its Role in Transportation Security Evolves:
TSA is moving forward with efforts to secure the entire transportation
system. TSA has adopted a systems approach--that is, a holistic rather
than a modal approach--to securing the transportation approach. In
addition, TSA is using risk management principles to guide its
decision-making. To help TSA make risk-based decisions, TSA is
developing standardized criticality, threat, and vulnerability
assessment tools. TSA is also planning to establish security standards
for all modes of transportation and is launching a number of new
security efforts for the maritime and land transportation modes.
TSA Adopts a Systems Approach to Securing All Modes of Transportation:
TSA is taking a systems approach to securing the transportation system.
Using this approach, TSA plans to address the security of the entire
transportation system as a whole, rather than focusing on individual
modes of transportation. According to TSA officials, using a systems
approach to security is appropriate for several reasons. First, the
transportation system is intermodal, interdependent, and
international. Given the intermodalism of the system, incidents in one
mode of transportation could affect other modes. Second, it is
important not to drive terrorism from one mode of transportation to
another mode because of perceived lesser security--that is, make a mode
of transportation a more attractive target because another mode is
"hardened" with additional security measures. Third, it is important
that security measures for one mode of transportation are not overly
stringent or too economically challenging compared with others. Fourth,
it is important that the attention on one aspect of transportation
security (e.g., cargo, infrastructure, or passengers) does not leave
the other aspects vulnerable.
The systems approach is reflected in the organizational structure of
TSA's Office of Maritime and Land Security, which is responsible for
the security of the maritime and land modes of transportation. Rather
than organize around the different modes of transportation, such as
DOT's modal administrations, the office is organized around cross-modal
issues. As figure 7 shows, the Office of Maritime and Land Security has
six divisions, including Cargo Security and Passenger Security. The
director of each division will be responsible for a specific aspect of
security of multiple modes. For example, the Director of Cargo Security
will be responsible for cargo security for all surface modes of
transportation.
Figure 7: Organizational Chart of TSA's Office of Maritime and Land
Security, June 2003:
[See PDF for image]
Note: See appendix V to view the organizational chart for TSA and where
the Office of Maritime and Land Security is located within the
organization.
[End of figure]
TSA Applies Risk Management Principles:
TSA has adopted a risk management approach for its efforts to enhance
the security of the nation's transportation system. A risk management
approach is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities,
and the criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better
support key decisions in order to link resources with prioritized
efforts. Table 3 describes this approach. As figure 8 illustrates, the
highest priorities emerge where the three elements of risk management
overlap. For example, transportation infrastructure that is determined
to be a critical asset, vulnerable to attack, and a likely target would
be at most risk and therefore would be a higher priority for funding
compared with infrastructure that was only vulnerable to attack.
According to TSA officials, risk management principles will drive all
decisions--from standard setting to funding priorities to staffing.
Table 3: Elements of a Risk Management Approach:
A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the
basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities.
This assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying
potential threats before they materialize. However, even if updated
often, a threat assessment might not adequately capture some emerging
threats. The risk management approach, therefore, uses vulnerability
and criticality assessments as additional input to the decision-making
process.
A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited
by identified threats and suggests options to address those
weaknesses.
A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions
in terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to public
safety and the economy. The assessment provides a basis for identifying
which structures or processes are relatively more important to protect
from attack. As such, it helps managers to determine operational
requirements and target resources to the highest priorities while
reducing the potential for targeting resources to lower priorities.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Figure 8: Illustration of How Risk Management Approach Can Guide
Decision-Making:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Using risk management principles to guide decision-making is a good
strategy, given the difficult trade-offs TSA will likely have to make
as it moves forward with its security efforts. We have advocated using
a risk management approach to guide federal programs and responses to
better prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct
finite national resources to areas of highest priority. As
representatives from local government and industry associations and
transportation security experts repeatedly noted, the size of the
transportation system precludes all assets from being equally
protected; moreover, the risks vary by transportation assets within
modes and by modes. In addition, requests for funding for
transportation security enhancements will likely exceed available
resources. Risk management principles can help TSA determine security
priorities and identify appropriate solutions.
Other transportation stakeholders are also using risk management
principles. For example, the rail industry conducted a comprehensive
risk analysis of its infrastructure, which included an assessment of
threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality. The results of the risk
analysis formed the basis for the rail industry's security management
plan, which identified countermeasures for the different threat levels.
Similarly, the pipeline industry is using a risk management approach in
securing its infrastructure. The Office of Pipeline Safety and industry
associations noted that the pipeline industry had adopted a risk
management approach for safety prior to September 11. As a result, the
industry extended this approach to its security efforts after September
11.
TSA Is Developing Standard Assessment Tools to Help Make Risk-Based
Decisions:
To help TSA make risk based decisions, TSA's Office of Threat
Assessment and Risk Management is developing two assessment tools that
will help assess threats, criticality, and vulnerabilities. The first
tool will assess the criticality of a transportation asset or facility.
TSA is working with DHS' Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) Directorate to ensure that TSA's criticality tool
will be consistent with the IAIP's approach for managing critical
infrastructure. TSA's criticality tool will incorporate multiple
factors, such as fatalities, economic importance, and socio-political
importance, to arrive at a criticality score. The score will enable
TSA, in conjunction with transportation stakeholders, to rank assets
and facilities within each mode. According to TSA, by identifying and
prioritizing assets and facilities, TSA can focus resources on that
which is deemed most important.
The second tool is referred to as the Transportation Risk Assessment
and Vulnerability Evaluation Tool (TRAVEL). This tool will assess
threats and analyze vulnerabilities for all transportation modes.
According to TSA officials, TSA has worked with a number of
organizations in developing TRAVEL, including the Department of
Defense, Sandia National Laboratories, and AASHTO. TSA is also working
with economists on developing the benefit/cost component of this model.
TSA officials believe that a standard threat and vulnerability
assessment tool is needed so that TSA can identify and compare threats
and vulnerabilities across the modes. If different methodologies are
used in assessing the threats and vulnerabilities, comparisons can be
problematic. A standard assessment tool would ensure consistent
methodology. Using TRAVEL, TSA plans to gather comparable threat and
vulnerability information across all modes of transportation, which
would inform TSA's risk-based decision-making.
TSA Plans to Issue National Security Standards:
TSA plans to issue national security standards for all modes of
transportation. The federal government has historically set security
standards for the aviation sector. For instance, prior to the passage
of ATSA, FAA set security standards that the airlines were required to
follow in several areas including screening equipment, screener
qualifications, and access control systems. In contrast, prior to the
September 11 attacks, limited statutory authority existed to require
measures to ensure the security of the maritime and land transportation
systems. According to a TSA report, the existing regulatory framework
leaves the maritime and land transportation systems unacceptably
vulnerable to terrorist attack. For example, the rail, transit, and
motor coach transportation systems are subject to no mandatory security
requirements, resulting in little or no screening of passengers,
baggage, or crew. Additionally, seaborne passenger vessel and seaport
terminal operators have inconsistent levels and methods of screening,
and are largely free to set their own rules about the hiring and
training of security personnel. Hence, TSA will set standards to ensure
consistency among modes and across the transportation system and to
reduce the transportation system's vulnerability to attacks. TSA plans
to begin rolling out the standards starting summer 2003.[Footnote 31]
According to TSA officials and documents, TSA's standards will be
performance-, risk-, and threat-based, and mandatory. More
specifically:
* Standards will be performance-based. Rather than prescriptive
standards, TSA standards will be performance-based, which will allow
transportation operators to determine how best to achieve the desired
level of security. TSA officials believe that performance-based
standards provide for operator flexibility, allow for operators to use
their professional judgment in enhancing security, and encourage
technology advancement.
* Standards will be risk-based. Standards will be set for areas for
which assessments of the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality
indicate that an attack would have a national impact. A number of
factors could be considered in determining "national impact," such as
fatalities and economic damage.
* Standards will be threat-based. The standards will be tied to the
national threat condition and/or local threats. As the threat condition
escalates, the standards will require transportation operators to
implement additional countermeasures.
* Standards may be mandatory. The standards will be mandatory when the
risk level is too high or unacceptable. TSA officials stated that in
these cases, mandatory standards are needed to ensure accountability.
In addition, according to TSA officials, voluntary requirements put
security-conscious transportation operators that implement security
measures at a competitive disadvantage--that is, they have spent money
that their competitors may have not spent. This creates a disincentive
for transportation operators to implement voluntary requirements. TSA
officials believe that mandatory standards will reduce this problem. In
determining whether mandatory standards are needed, TSA will review the
results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current best
practices, and voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with
the private sector and other government agencies.
Although TSA officials expect some level of resistance to the standards
by the transportation industry, they believe that their approach of
using risk-, threat-, and performance-based standards will increase the
acceptance of the standards. For example, performance-based standards
allow for more operator flexibility in implementing the standards,
compared with rigid, prescriptive standards. Moreover, TSA plans to
issue only a limited number of standards--that is, standards will be
issued only when assessments of the threats, vulnerabilities, and
criticality indicate that the level of risk is too high or
unacceptable.
TSA also expects some level of resistance to the standards from DOT
modal administrations. Although TSA will establish the security
standards, TSA expects that they will be administered and implemented
by existing agencies and organizations. DOT modal administrations may
be reluctant to assume this role because it could alter their
relationships with the industry. Historically, DOT surface
transportation modal administrations' missions have largely focused on
maintaining operations and improving service and safety, not regulating
security. Moreover, the authority to regulate security varies by DOT
modal administration. For example, FTA has limited authority to
regulate and oversee security at transit agencies. In contrast, FRA has
regulatory authority for rail security, and DOT's Office of Pipeline
Safety has responsibility for writing safety and security regulations
on liquefied natural gas storage facilities. In addition, DOT modal
administrations may be reluctant to administer and implement standards
because of resource concerns. FHWA officials commented that, given the
current uncertainty about the standards and their impacts, FHWA is
reluctant to commit, in advance, to staff or funding to enforce new
security standards.
Because transportation stakeholders will be involved in administering,
implementing, and/or enforcing TSA standards, stakeholder buy-in is
critical to the success of this initiative. Compromise and consensus on
the part of stakeholders is also necessary. However, achieving such
consensus and compromise may be difficult, given the conflicts between
some stakeholders' goals and interests.
Stakeholders Are Concerned About Pending Standards:
Transportation stakeholders expressed concerns about TSA's plan to
issue mandatory security standards for all modes of transportation. A
common concern raised by associations was that standards represent
unfunded mandates, unless the federal government pays for the standards
that it promulgates. According to the industry and state and local
government associations we spoke to, unfunded mandates create
additional financial burdens for transportation operators, who are
already experiencing financial difficulties. TSA officials said they
hope to provide grants to implement the standards; however, it is
unclear at this time if grants will be available.
Another common concern expressed by transportation security experts and
industry associations is that TSA does not have the necessary expertise
or knowledge to develop appropriate security standards for the
industry. In a 2003 report to Congress, TSA recognizes that each
transportation mode has unique characteristics that make various
security measures more or:
less feasible or appropriate.[Footnote 32] However, a number of
industry associations, transportation security experts, and DOT modal
administrations expressed concern that TSA does not have a good
understanding of the unique challenges of the modes, such as the need
to maintain accessibility in transit systems, or the possible negative
ramifications--both operationally and financially--of standards.
Officials from one DOT modal administration noted that industry
representatives left a meeting with TSA officials with serious concerns
regarding TSA officials' understanding of their industry. Senior TSA
officials stated that TSA employees have extensive subject matter
expertise in transportation and security issues. Moreover, TSA
officials stated that they will draw on the expertise and knowledge of
the transportation industry and other DHS agencies, such as the Coast
Guard, as well as all stakeholders in developing the standards.
A number of representatives from industry associations also expressed
concerns that TSA may issue mandatory or regulatory standards,
especially since their industries have taken proactive steps to enhance
security since September 11. Industry associations also noted that the
majority of transportation infrastructure in some modes is privately
owned. As such, transportation operators have an economic incentive to
ensure the security of their infrastructure; hence, operators are
voluntarily implementing increased security measures. For example, the
pipeline industry worked with DOT's Office of Pipeline Safety to
develop industry-wide security guidelines. These guidelines are risk-
based and identify countermeasures that pipeline operators should
implement at different threat levels. The pipeline guidelines are also
voluntary. According to pipeline industry associations, the pipeline
industry is implementing these security guidelines. Representatives
from industry associations stated that TSA should wait to see if
industry-developed, voluntary measures are working before issuing
mandatory standards. TSA officials noted that TSA will review the
results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current best
practices, and voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with
the private sector and other government agencies before issuing
mandatory standards.
Finally, industry representatives expressed concern that TSA has not
adequately included the transportation industry in its development of
standards. Many industry representatives and some DOT officials we met
with were unsure of whether TSA was issuing standards, what the
standards would entail, or the time frames for issuing the standards.
The uncertainty about the pending standards can lead to confusion and/
or inaction. For example, Amtrak officials noted that they are
reluctant to spend money to implement certain security measures because
they are worried that TSA will subsequently issue standards that will
require Amtrak to redo its efforts. TSA officials repeatedly told us
they understand the importance of gaining stakeholder buy-in and
partnering with the industry. They also stated that they have conducted
outreach to transportation stakeholders and plan to continue their
outreach efforts in the future. TSA is developing a strategy that will
serve as its framework for communicating with transportation
stakeholders and obtaining stakeholders' input in TSA's decision-
making. TSA plans to finalize this strategy in July 2003.
TSA Is Launching Other Security Initiatives:
TSA is also working on a number of additional security efforts, such as
establishing the Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC)
program, developing the next generation of the Computer Assisted
Passenger Pre-Screening System, developing a national transportation
system security plan, and exploring methods to integrate operations and
security, among other things. The TWIC program is intended to improve
access control for the 12 million transportation workers that require
unescorted physical or cyber access to secure areas of the nation's
transportation modes by establishing a uniform, nationwide standard for
secure identification of transportation workers. Specifically, TWIC
will combine standard background checks and biometrics so that a worker
can be positively matched to his/her credential. Once the program is
fully operational, the TWIC would be the standard credential for
transportation workers and would be accepted by all modes of
transportation. According to TSA, developing a uniform, nationwide
standard for identification will minimize redundant credentialing and
background checks.
DOT Modal Agencies Are Continuing Forward with Their Security Efforts:
As TSA moves forward with new security initiatives, DOT modal
administrations are also continuing their security efforts and, in some
cases, launching new security initiatives. For example, FHWA is
coordinating a series of workshops this year on emergency response and
preparedness for state departments of transportation and other
agencies. FTA also has a number of current initiatives under way in the
areas of public awareness, research, training, technical assistance,
and intelligence sharing. For example, FTA developed a list of the top
20 security actions transit agencies should implement and is currently
working with transit agencies to assist them in implementing these
measures. FTA's goal is to have the largest 30 agencies implement at
least 80 percent of these measures by the end of fiscal year 2003.
FAA is also continuing its efforts to enhance cyber security in the
aviation system. Although the primary responsibility for securing the
aviation system was transferred to TSA, FAA remains responsible for
protecting the nation's air traffic control system--both the physical
security of its air traffic control facilities and the computer
systems. The air traffic control system's computers help the nation's
air traffic controllers safely direct and separate traffic--sabotaging
this system could have disastrous consequences. FAA is moving forward
with efforts to increase the physical security of its air traffic
control facilities and ensure that contractors who have access to the
air traffic control system undergo background checks.
TSA's and DOT's Roles and Responsibilities Have Not Been Clearly
Defined:
The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation
security have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential
for duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward
with their security efforts. DOT modal administrations were primarily
responsible for the security of the transportation system prior to
September 11. In November 2001, Congress passed ATSA, which created TSA
and gave it primary responsibility for securing all modes of
transportation.[Footnote 33] However, during TSA's first year of
existence, TSA's main focus was on aviation security--more
specifically, on meeting ATSA deadlines. While TSA was primarily
focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations launched
various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and land
transportation modes. With the immediate crisis of meeting many
aviation security deadlines behind it, TSA has been able to focus more
on the security of all modes of transportation.
Legislation has not defined TSA's role and responsibilities in securing
all modes of transportation. In particular, ATSA does not specify TSA's
role and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land
transportation modes in detail as it does for aviation security. For
instance, the act does not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain
transit security requirements. Instead, the act simply states that TSA
is responsible for ensuring security in all modes of transportation.
The act also did not eliminate DOT modal administrations' existing
statutory responsibilities for securing the different transportation
modes. Moreover, recent legislation indicates that DOT still has
security responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland Security Act of
2002 states that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the
security as well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous
materials by all modes.
To clarify their roles and responsibilities in transportation security,
DOT modal administrations and TSA were planning to develop memorandums
of agreement. The purpose of these documents was to define the roles
and responsibilities of the different agencies as they relate to
transportation security and address a variety of issues, including
separating safety and security activities, interfacing with the
transportation industry, and establishing funding priorities. TSA and
the DOT modal administrations worked for months to develop the
memorandums of agreement. The draft agreements were presented to senior
DOT and TSA management for review in early spring of this year.
According to DOT's General Counsel, with the exception of the
memorandum of agreement between FAA and TSA, the draft memorandums were
very generic and did not provide much clarification. Consequently, DOT
and TSA decided not to execute or sign the memorandums of agreement,
except for the memorandum of agreement between FAA and TSA, which was
signed on February 28, 2003.[Footnote 34]
The General Counsel suggested several reasons why the majority of draft
memorandums of agreement were too general. First, as TSA's departure
date approached--that is, the date that TSA transferred from DOT to
DHS, TSA and DOT modal administration officials may have grown
concerned about formally binding the organizations to specific roles
and responsibilities. Second, the working relationships between TSA and
most of the DOT modal administrations is still very new; as a result,
all of the potential issues, problem areas, or overlap have yet to be
identified. Thus, identifying items to include in the memorandums of
agreement was more difficult.
Rather than execute memorandums of agreement, the Secretary of
Transportation and the Administrator of TSA exchanged correspondence
that commits each entity to continued coordination and collaboration on
security measures. In the correspondence, the Secretary and
Administrator also agreed to use the memorandum of agreement between
TSA and FAA as a framework for their interactions on security matters
for all other modes. TSA and DOT officials stated that they believe
memorandums of agreement are a good strategy for delineating roles and
responsibilities and they would be open to using memorandums of
agreement in the future.
Experts and Associations Identified Future Actions to Advance the
Security of the Transportation System:
Transportation security experts and representatives of state and local
government and industry associations we contacted generally believe
that the transportation system is more secure today than it was prior
to September 11. Transportation stakeholders have worked hard to
strengthen the security of the system. Nevertheless, transportation
experts, industry representatives, and federal officials all recommend
that more work be done. Transportation experts and state and local
government and industry representatives identified a number of actions
that, in their view, should be implemented to enhance security,
including clarifying federal roles and coordinating federal efforts,
developing a transportation security strategy, funding security
enhancements, investing in research and development, and providing
better intelligence information and related guidance. The experts and
representatives generally believe that these actions are the
responsibility of the federal government.
Clear federal roles and responsibilities is a core issue in
transportation security, according to transportation experts and
associations that we contacted. The lack of clarity about the roles and
responsibilities of federal actors in transportation security creates
the potential for confusion, duplication, and conflicts. Understanding
roles, responsibilities, and whom to call is crucial in an emergency.
However, representatives from several associations stated that their
members were unclear of which agency to contact for their various
security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues.
Furthermore, they do not have contacts within these agencies. As
mentioned earlier, several industry representatives reported that their
members are receiving different messages from various federal agencies
involved in transportation security, which creates confusion and
frustration among the industry. They said the uncertainty about federal
roles and the lack of coordination is straining intergovernmental
relationships, draining resources, and raising the potential for
problems in responding to terrorism. One industry association told us,
for instance, that it has been asked by three different federal
agencies to participate in three separate studies of the same issue.
According to transportation experts and associations we contacted, a
national transportation strategy is essential to moving forward with
transportation security. It is crucial for helping stakeholders
identify priorities, leveraging resources, establishing stakeholder
performance expectations, and creating incentives for stakeholders to
improve security. Currently, local government associations view the
absence of performance expectations--coupled with limited threat
information--as a major obstacle in focusing their people and resources
on high priority threats, particularly at elevated threat levels. The
experts also noted that modal strategies--no matter how complete--
cannot address the complete transportation security problem and will
leave gaps in preparedness. As mentioned earlier, TSA is in the process
of developing a national transportation system security plan,[Footnote
35] which according to the Deputy Administrator of TSA, will provide an
overarching framework for the security of all modes.
Transportation security experts and association representatives we
contacted believe that the federal government should provide funding
for needed security improvements. While an overall security strategy is
a prerequisite to investing wisely, providing adequate funding also is
essential. Setting security goals and strategies without adequate
funding diminishes stakeholders' commitment and willingness to absorb
initial security investments and long-term operating costs, an expert
emphasized. Industry and state and local government associations also
commented that federal funding should accompany any federal security
standards; otherwise these standards will be considered unfunded
mandates that the industry and state and local governments have to
absorb.
The federal government needs to play a strong role in investing in and
setting a research and development agenda for transportation security,
according to most transportation security experts and associations we
contacted. They view this as an appropriate role for the federal
government, since the products of research and development endeavors
would likely benefit the entire transportation system, not just
individual modes or operators. TSA is actively engaged in research and
development projects, such as the development of the next generation
explosive detection systems for baggage, hardening of aircraft and
cargo/baggage containers, biometrics and other access control methods,
and human factors initiatives to identify methods to improve screener
performance, at its Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic
City, New Jersey. However, TSA noted that continued adequate funding
for research and development is paramount in order for TSA to be able
to meet security demands with up-to-date and reliable technology.
Transportation security experts and representatives from state and
local government and industry associations stated that the federal
government needs to play a vital role in sharing information--
specifically, intelligence information and related guidance.
Representatives from numerous associations commented that the federal
government needs to provide timely, localized, actionable intelligence
information. General threat warnings are not helpful. Rather,
transportation operators want more specific intelligence information so
that they can understand the true nature of a potential threat and
implement appropriate security measures. Without more localized and
actionable intelligence, stakeholders said they run the risk of wasting
resources on unneeded security measures or not providing an adequate
level of security. Moreover, local government officials often are not
allowed to receive specific intelligence information because they do
not have appropriate federal security clearances. Also, there is little
federal guidance on how local authorities should respond to a specific
threat or general threat warnings. For example, San Francisco police
were stationed at the Golden Gate Bridge to respond to the elevated
national threat condition. However, without information about the
nature of the threat to San Francisco's large transportation
infrastructure or clear federal expectations for a response, it is
difficult to judge whether actions like this are the most effective use
of police protection, according to representatives from a local
government association.
Conclusions:
During TSA's first year of existence, TSA met a number of challenges,
including successfully meeting many congressional deadlines for
aviation security. With the immediate crisis of meeting key aviation
security deadlines behind TSA, it can now examine the security of the
entire transportation system. As TSA becomes more active in securing
the maritime and land transportation modes, it will become even more
important that the roles of TSA and DOT modal administrations are
clearly defined. Lack of clearly defined roles among the federal
entities could lead to duplication and confusion. More importantly, it
could hamper the transportation sector's ability to prepare for and
respond to attacks.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To clarify and define the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT
modal administrations in transportation security matters, we recommend
that the Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of Homeland Security
use a mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement to clearly delineate
their roles and responsibilities. At a minimum, this mechanism should
establish the responsibilities of each entity in setting,
administering, and implementing security standards and regulations,
determining funding priorities, and interfacing with the transportation
industry as well as define each entity's role in the inevitable overlap
of some safety and security activities. After the roles and
responsibilities of each entity are clearly defined, this information
should be communicated to all transportation stakeholders.
Agency Comments:
We provided DOT, DHS, and Amtrak with a draft of this report for review
and comment. Amtrak generally agreed with our findings and
recommendation and provided some technical comments, which we have
incorporated into this report where appropriate.
DOT and DHS generally agreed with the report's findings. However, they
disagreed with the conclusion and recommendation that their roles and
responsibilities need to be clarified and defined. The two departments
stated that the roles and responsibilities of each entity is clear--
that is, DHS has primary responsibility for transportation security and
DOT will play a supporting role in such matters. We agree that the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act[Footnote 36] (ATSA) gave TSA
primary responsibility for securing all modes of transportation.
However, neither this act, nor other legislation defined TSA's roles
and responsibilities in securing all modes of transportation.
Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA's role and responsibilities in
securing the maritime and land transportation modes in detail as it
does for aviation security. The act also did not eliminate DOT modal
administrations' existing statutory responsibilities for securing the
different modes of transportation. Moreover, recent legislation
clarifies that DOT still has transportation security responsibilities.
In particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that the
Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the security as well as
the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all
modes.
In addition, although DOT and DHS believe their roles and
responsibilities are clearly defined, transportation security
stakeholders we contacted are not as certain. For example,
representatives from several associations stated that their members
were unclear as to which agency to contact for their various security
concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues.
Representatives from several associations also told us that their
members are receiving different messages from the various federal
agencies involved in transportation security.
Furthermore, as noted in the report, both TSA and DOT are moving
forward with transportation security efforts. As both entities continue
with their security efforts, it is important that the roles and
responsibilities of each entity are coordinated and clearly defined.
The lack of clarity can lead to duplication, confusion, and/or gaps in
preparedness. We therefore continue to recommend that DOT and DHS use a
mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement, to clarify and define DOT
modal administration's and TSA's roles and responsibilities in
transportation security. After the roles and responsibilities of each
entity are clearly defined, this information should be communicated to
all transportation stakeholders.
DOT and DHS also noted that the title of the draft report,
Transportation Security: More Federal Coordination Needed to Help
Address Security Challenges, as well as our conclusions and
recommendations place too much emphasis on coordination. To better
capture our conclusions and recommendations--that is, that the roles
and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in security matters should be
clearly delineated and communicated to all transportation security
stakeholders--we have changed the report's title to Transportation
Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges.
However, we disagree that the report places too much emphasis on the
lack of coordination between DOT and DHS. As noted above,
representatives from several associations told us that their members
have received conflicting messages from the federal agencies involved
in transportation security. Moreover, there appears to be a break down
in communication between TSA and DOT about current security
initiatives. For example, although TSA officials stated that they have
informed DOT about their plans to issue security standards, some DOT
officials we met with were unsure as to whether TSA was issuing
standards, what the standards would entail, or the time frames for
issuing the standards.
In addition to their written comments, DHS and DOT provided technical
comments to our draft, which we have incorporated into the report where
appropriate.
See appendixes II and III for DOT's and DHS' comments and our
responses.
As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of
this report to the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Amtrak,
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and interested
congressional committees. We will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on our
Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at guerrerop@gao.gov. Individuals
making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Peter Guerrero
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Signed by Peter Guerrero:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable John McCain
Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ernest Hollings
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate:
The Honorable James Jeffords
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Environment and Public Works
United States Senate:
The Honorable Harry Reid
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee on Environment and Public Works
United States Senate:
The Honorable Thomas Carper
United States Senate:
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
United States Senate:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
United States Senate:
The Honorable Gordon Smith
United States Senate:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To address our four objectives, we conducted structured interviews with
officials from TSA, Amtrak, and DOT, representatives from the major
transportation industry associations and state and local government
associations, and select transportation security experts. We selected
transportation security experts based on their knowledge/expertise and
reputation as being an expert in the transportation security arena. We
also consulted with the National Academy of Sciences in identifying
appropriate transportation security experts. Table 4 shows the federal
agencies, industry associations, transportation security experts, and
state and local government associations that were interviewed. Through
these structured interviews we collected information on the challenges
that exist in securing the transportation system, vulnerabilities of
different modes, actions that transportation stakeholders--including
the federal, state, and local governments and the operators--have taken
to enhance security since September 11, TSA's and DOT's ongoing and
planned security efforts, roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in
securing the transportation system, and future security actions that
industry associations and security experts believe are needed. We
synthesized and analyzed the information from the structured
interviews.
Table 4: List of Interviewees:
Federal agencies:
Amtrak.
Department of Transportation (DOT):
* General Counsel.
* Intermodal Hazardous Materials Program.
* Office of Emergency Transportation.
* Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST).
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA):
* Office of the Chief Information Officer.
* Office of Security and Investigations (ASI).
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA).
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).
Federal Transit Administration (FTA).
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS).
Transportation Security Administration (TSA):
* Assistant Administrator for Aviation Operations.
* Chief Financial Officer (CFO).
* Office of Maritime and Land Security.
* Office of Policy (Aviation).
* Risk Management/Strategic Planning.
* Support Systems Directorate.
United States Coast Guard.
Industry associations:
Air Transport Association (ATA).
American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE).
American Bus Association (ABA).
American Gas Association (AGA).
American Petroleum Institute (API).
American Road and Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA).
American Trucking Associations (ATA).
Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL).
Association of American Railroads (AAR).
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA).
Consolidated Safety Services (CSS).
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA).
National Academy of Sciences (NAS).
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC).
National Private Truck Council (NPTC).
United Motorcoach Association (UMA).
Transportation security experts:
Annabelle Boyd, President and Senior Consultant, Boyd, Caton & Grant
Transportation Group, Inc.
Mortimer L. Downey III, PB-Consult, Inc.
Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D., Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National
Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations.
Yacov Y. Haimes, Director, Center for Risk Management of Engineering
Systems, University of Virginia.
Arnold M. Howitt, Ph.D., Executive Director, Taubman Center for State
and Local Government, Director, Executive Session on Domestic
Preparedness, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
Brian M. Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the President, RAND Corporation.
Douglas R. Laird, Principal, Laird & Associates, Inc.
James Wilding, Executive Director (Retired), Metropolitan Washington
Airport Authority.
State and local government associations:
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO).
National Association of Counties (NACO).
National Emergency Management Association (NEMA).
National League of Cities (NLC).
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
In addition to the structured interviews, we analyzed the
administration's National Strategy for Homeland Security and the
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: An FBI Assessment. We also
reviewed current transportation security-related research as well as
transportation security-related reports and documents from TSA, Amtrak,
and DOT, including strategic planning documents, memorandums, program
descriptions, and budget and financial documents. We also analyzed
security-related documents from industry associations, including
action plans, operational information, and reports, and the U.S. Code
and the Code of Federal Regulations. We also incorporated the findings
of previous GAO reports on port, transit, aviation, and homeland
security.[Footnote 37]
We conducted our work from February 2003 through May 2003, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Transportation:
The Deputy Secretary of Transportation:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Room 10200
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590:
June 10, 2003:
Mr. Peter Guerrero:
Director, Physical Infrastructure U.S. General Accounting Office 441 G
Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Guerrero:
The Department of Transportation (DOT) recognizes that the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) has primary responsibility for transportation security policy.
DOT now plays only a supporting role, assisting DHS as requested with
implementation of its security policies, and as allowed by DOT
statutory authorities and available resources.
There is much solid work in the draft report prepared by GAO showing
the important challenge to strengthen transportation security for all
modes of transportation in the United States. I think, however, that
the very title of this report and its chief recommendation
unfortunately detract from GAO's overall findings by advancing an
overly simplistic conclusion that "more Federal coordination" is
somehow a meaningful problem or a key to meeting transportation
security challenges.
As DHS forms federal transportation security policy, both TSA and DOT
have committed to broad and routine consultations through numerous
formal and informal mechanisms operating at all levels within the two
organizations. These consultative mechanisms are working, and both
departments will continuously evaluate how to promote effective
cooperation.
The principles of this cooperation are laid out in several interagency
memoranda of understanding signed by TSA and DOT and, most importantly,
by the exchange of letters between Secretary Mineta and Administrator
Loy in February 2003. At Secretary Mineta's request, since March 1 of
this year I have served as DOT's liaison to TSA Administrator Jim Loy
for the coordination of all non-routine policy issues, intelligence
analysis, public and transportation industry communication and
operational planning.
At this time, DOT does not see an immediate need for additional legal
mechanisms to coordinate responsibilities between the two agencies. Nor
does DOT agree with GAO's conclusion that the roles and
responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system
are ill defined. The law that created TSA gave it extensive authority
to set federal policy for transportation security for all
transportation modes.
As TSA works to strengthen its capabilities beyond aviation, and after
consultation with Administrator Loy, DOT has continued for now a few of
our pre-existing programmatic efforts. For example, we continue to work
with transit operators and state transportation executives to inform
and educate them regarding security awareness and best practices to
enhance security. These efforts are not policy-making activities.
Instead, they are intended during the transition to augment and
complement TSA's work, as the new agency continues to grow its staff,
programs and experience in working with diverse transportation sectors.
In the months ahead, DOT's role in such security educational efforts
will likely decrease.
In sum, DHS clearly has the lead for the Administration in
transportation security matters. DOT will, when requested, continue to
coordinate effectively and support the vital mission of DHS --and we
will reinforce the primacy of TSA's role regarding transportation
security with all of our transportation constituencies. We are grateful
for the opportunity to comment of GAO's draft report.
Sincerely,
Michael P. Jackson:
Signed by Michael P. Jackson:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Transportation
letter dated June 10, 2003.
GAO Comments:
1. We agree that the title of the report should be changed. Our
conclusions and recommendation call for the roles and responsibilities
of TSA and DOT in security matters to be clearly delineated and
communicated to all transportation security stakeholders. To more fully
capture our conclusions and recommendations, we have changed the
report's title to Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed To
Help Address Security Challenges.
However, we disagree that our recommendation advances an "overly
simplistic conclusion that 'more Federal coordination' is somehow a
meaningful problem or a key to meeting transportation security
challenges." Although coordination does not solve all security
challenges, it is a key element in meeting transportation security
challenges. As we have noted in previous reports, coordination among
all levels of the government and the private industry is critical to
the success of security efforts. The lack of coordination can lead to
problems such as duplication and/or conflicting efforts, gaps in
preparedness, and confusion. Moreover, the lack of coordination can
strain intergovernmental relationships, drain resources, and raise the
potential for problems in responding to terrorism. The administration's
National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for
the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets also
emphasize the importance of and need for coordination in security
efforts. In particular, the National Strategy for the Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets notes that
protecting critical infrastructure, such as the transportation system,
"requires a unifying organization, a clear purpose, a common
understanding of roles and responsibilities, accountability, and a set
of well-understood coordinating processes." (Italics added for
emphasis.):
2. We disagree that the commitment of TSA and DOT to broad and routine
consultations through numerous formal and informal mechanisms is
working. As we noted throughout the report, representatives from
several associations told us that they have received conflicting
messages from the federal agencies involved in transportation security.
Representatives from several associations also stated that their
members were unclear as to which agency to contact for their various
security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues.
Moreover, there appears to be a break down in communication between TSA
and DOT about current security initiatives. For example, although TSA
officials stated that they have informed DOT about their plans to issue
security standards, some DOT officials we met with were unsure as to
whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards would entail, or
the time frames for issuing the standards.
3. We do not believe the correspondence exchanged by Secretary Mineta
and Admiral Loy adequately defines the roles and responsibilities of
TSA and DOT in security issues. Rather than delineate the roles and
responsibilities of each entity in security matters, such as
determining funding priorities and interfacing with stakeholders, the
correspondence primarily commits each entity to continued coordination
and collaboration on security measures. In the correspondence, the
Secretary and Administrator also agreed to use the memorandum of
agreement between TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as
a framework for their interactions on security matters for all other
modes. Given the complexities and unique challenges in securing the
different modes of transportation, we do not believe using the
memorandum of agreement between TSA and FAA as a framework is
sufficient. The lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities can
lead to duplication, confusion, conflicts, and most importantly, gaps
in preparedness.
Although designating a DOT liaison to TSA is a step in the right
direction, the roles and responsibilities of each entity and the
coordinating processes need to be documented. Departures of key
individuals within each entity, such as the designated DOT liaison to
TSA, have the potential to erode informal networks. Given the
importance of security efforts, coordinating processes between TSA and
DOT need to be documented so that they span the terms of various
administrations and individuals.
4. We agree that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act[Footnote
38] (ATSA) gave TSA primary responsibility for securing all modes of
transportation. However, neither this act, nor other legislation, has
defined TSA roles and responsibilities in securing all modes of
transportation. Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA's roles and
responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation modes
in detail as it does for aviation security. The act also did not
eliminate DOT modal administrations' existing statutory
responsibilities for securing the different modes of transportation.
Moreover, recent legislation clarifies that DOT still has
transportation security responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of Transportation is
responsible for the security as well as the safety of rail and the
transport of hazardous materials by all modes.
To clarify and define DOT's and TSA's roles and responsibilities in
transportation security, we believe that these entities should
establish a mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement. Using such a
mechanism would serve to clarify, delineate, and document the roles and
responsibilities of each entity. It would also serve to hold each
entity accountable for its transportation security responsibilities.
Finally, it could serve as a vehicle to communicate the roles and
responsibilities of each entity to transportation security
stakeholders.
The mechanism--whether it is a memorandum of agreement or other
document--used to clarify and define DOT's and TSA's roles and
responsibilities should not be static. Rather, it should be a living
document that changes as each entity's roles and responsibilities in
transportation security matters evolve and events occur.
5. We disagree that all of DOT's ongoing security efforts are nonpolicy
making activities. For example, the Research and Special Programs
Administration issued regulations in March 2003 that requires shippers
and carriers of hazardous materials to develop and implement security
plans and to include a security component in their employee training
programs.
While DOT's role in security efforts may decrease in the future, it
seems unlikely that DOT will be devoid of any security responsibilities
in the future. For example, as noted in the report, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of Transportation is
responsible for the security as well as the safety of rail and the
transport of hazardous materials by all modes. In addition, the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002[Footnote 39] authorizes
the Secretary of Transportation to train and certify maritime security
professionals and establish a grant program to fund the implementation
of Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans and facility security
plans. Further, although the primary responsibility for securing the
aviation system was transferred to TSA, FAA remains responsible for
protecting the nation's air traffic control system--both the physical
security of its air traffic control facilities and computer systems.
Although DOT recognizes that DHS has the lead in transportation
security matters, it could be difficult to distinguish its role in
maintaining transportation operations and improving transportation
service and safety from DHS' role in securing the transportation
system. Security is often intertwined with transportation operations
and safety. For example, installing a fence around truck yards could be
considered both a safety and security measure. Further security
measures that restrict the flow of passengers or freight through the
transportation system could have serious consequences on transportation
operations. Because of these interactions and overlap, the roles and
responsibilities of DOT and DHS in transportation safety and security
can be blurred. Consequently, we continue to believe the entities
should establish a mechanism to help clarify and delineate their roles
and responsibilities in security matters.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
38578:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
June 11, 2003:
Mr. Peter Guerrero:
Director, Physical Infrastructure U.S. General Accounting Office 441 G
Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Guerrero:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled,
"Transportation Security: More Federal Coordination Needed to Help
Address Security Challenges," GAO-03-843.
The Department of Homeland Security appreciates the work done in this
report to identify areas where transportation security in the United
States may be improved. Specifically, DHS would like to commend GAO for
recognizing the interdependence of the various modes of transportation
systems and the potential impacts a terrorist incident in one mode
would have on the other modes and the economy at large. The Department
also believes that GAO's identification of areas where communications
among the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of
Transportation (DOT), and transportation stakeholders may be improved
will contribute to the Department's ability to work more cooperatively
with these entities. However, there are a number of areas within the
report about which the Department would like to comment:
The Department believes that this draft overstates the perceived lack
of coordination between DHS and DOT. DHS is aligned with and supports
the comments submitted by DOT, in which DOT expressed recognition that
DHS has primary responsibility for transportation security policy and
that the Department of Transportation plays a supporting role in
implementing that policy. In addition, DHS agrees with DOT that
developing additional legal mechanisms to ensure coordination of
responsibilities between the departments is unnecessary, since
coordination is already robust. TSA and DOT officials at all levels
meet and consult with each other regularly and informally on a number
of matters, both general and specific. Examples of recent collaboration
include development of regulations governing the transport of hazardous
materials under the Safe Explosives Act, consideration and award of
port security grants, and ongoing discussions regarding development of
the Transportation Worker Identity Card (TWIC), among others.
The report appropriately points out that DOT modal administrations
developed a number of new initiatives after 9/11 and continue many of
those initiatives today. However, the report seems to miss the very
basic point that continuation of security
programs by the modal administrations does not necessarily entail a
lack of coordination. Rather, it indicates appropriate stewardship of
federal resources, in that it would be wasteful for DOT to curtail
security-related activities planned and developed when TSA was a
component of DOT simply because TSA became part of the Department of
Homeland Security. DHS and DOT are committed to maintaining and
strengthening the close, cooperative relationship that currently exists
between the two departments and their component organizations.
I would also like to respond to the TSA stakeholder outreach concerns
outlined in the draft report. Industry and stakeholder outreach has
been a priority for the TSA Administrator, Admiral James Loy, since his
first days in office. His belief that effective collaboration with the
transportation community is critical has translated into a newly
created office charged with realizing those relationships. The office
of Transportation Security Policy is responsible for ensuring that
industry is consulted and engaged as TSA formulates strategic policy
and develops new programs. It is also responsible for promoting
existing public-private relationships and developing new ones to
provide for cooperation and mutual support to address transportation
security challenges.
Further, the report's emphasis on a perceived lack of progress by TSA
in the non-aviation modes creates the impression that the federal
government has done less than it has to provide security in these
modes. To the contrary, when TSA was created, many agencies in the
federal government, including the Coast Guard and the former Customs
Service, were providing additional security in the maritime arena,
including port assessments, regulatory guidance, the Container Security
Initiative and the "24-Hour" rule. This holds true for other DOT
surface modal administrations as well, and their activities formed a
multi-layered approach for securing the transportation system.
Appropriately, TSA's strategy was not to duplicate these efforts, but
to support and augment them where possible and appropriate. TSA, now
part of DHS, will continue that approach by working with its sister
agencies at DHS and with the modal administrations at DOT to develop
the National Transportation System Security Plan, provide risk analysis
and regulatory guidance, and set standards for non-aviation modes of
transportation. Furthermore, where private industry has taken steps to
improve maritime and land security, the Department and its components
recognize the value of industry security initiatives, and will work to
augment and complement industry's efforts as appropriate.
Finally, the report missed an excellent opportunity to highlight the
important role DHS will play in bringing the federal government's
transportation security efforts under one roof, streamlining them, and
ultimately, strengthening them. Congress wisely recognized that the
transportation security programs of DHS agencies - including the Coast
Guard, TSA, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, and the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate - should
be fully integrated to be most effective. Although the Department is
relatively new and significant additional effort will be required to
integrate its parts, the possibilities for improved coordination,
streamlining, and creation of efficiencies are already visible. The
report would form a
more accurate picture of the state of transportation security by
emphasizing that these programs make up a comprehensive whole overseen
by DHS, rather than individual and seemingly uncoordinated components.
The Department of Homeland Security looks forward to building on the
transportation security efforts of its component agencies, DOT, state
and local governments, and various transportation owners and operators.
DHS will collaborate closely with each DOT modal administration in the
development of the National Transportation System Security Plan to
articulate a clear path forward for ensuring the safety and security of
all modes of transportation.
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute comments to GAO's draft.
Gordon England
Deputy Secretary:
Signed by Gordon England:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland Security
letter dated June 11, 2003.
GAO Comments:
1. We disagree that the report overstates the lack of coordination
between DHS and DOT and that mechanisms to ensure coordination of
responsibilities is unnecessary. Although DHS and DOT report that they
are coordinating on security matters, based on our discussions with
representatives from state and local government and industry
associations, it appears that there is a need to improve such efforts.
As we noted throughout the report, representatives from several
associations told us that they have received conflicting messages from
the federal agencies involved in transportation security.
Representatives from several associations also stated that their
members were unclear as to which agency to contact for their various
security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues.
Moreover, there appears to be a break down in communication between TSA
and DOT about current security initiatives. For example, although TSA
officials stated that they have informed DOT about their plans to issue
security standards, some DOT officials we met with were unsure as to
whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards would entail, or
the time frames for issuing the standards.
We agree that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act[Footnote 40]
(ATSA) gave TSA primary responsibility for securing all modes of
transportation. However, neither this act, or other legislation, has
defined TSA's roles and responsibilities in securing all modes of
transportation. Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA's role and
responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation modes
in detail as it does for aviation security. The act also did not
eliminate DOT modal administrations' existing statutory
responsibilities for securing the different modes of transportation.
Moreover, recent legislation clarifies that DOT still has
transportation security responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of Transportation is
responsible for the security as well as the safety of rail and the
transport of hazardous materials by all modes.
To clarify and define DOT's and TSA's roles and responsibilities in
transportation security, we believe that these entities should
establish a mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement. Using such a
mechanism would serve to clarify, delineate, and document the roles and
responsibilities of each entity. It would also serve to hold each
entity accountable for its transportation security responsibilities.
Finally, it could serve as a vehicle to communicate the roles and
responsibilities of each entity to transportation security
stakeholders.
The mechanism--whether it is a memorandum of agreement or other
document--used to clarify and define DOT's and TSA's roles and
responsibilities should not be static. Rather, it should be a living
document that changes as each entity's roles and responsibilities in
transportation security matters evolve and events occur.
2. We disagree that the report suggests that the continuation of
security efforts by the DOT modal administrations represents a lack of
coordination. The report credits TSA for meeting a number of aviation
security deadlines during its first year of existence and highlights
the efforts of DOT modal administrations and other federal agencies to
improve the security of all modes since September 11. We also note that
TSA is beginning to assert a greater role in securing all modes of
transportation and DOT modal administrations are continuing or
launching new security efforts. We did not suggest that the
continuation of such efforts by DOT modal administrations represents a
lack of coordination. Rather, we noted that as both entities move
forward with security efforts, it is increasingly important that the
roles of TSA and DOT modal administrations are clearly defined. The
lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities can lead to
duplication, confusion, conflicts, and most importantly, gaps in
preparedness.
3. Our intention is not to suggest that the federal government's
efforts to secure the non-aviation modes of transportation have been
insufficient. To the contrary, we highlight the efforts by DOT modal
administrations and other federal agencies to secure the maritime and
land modes of transportation. We also recognize that TSA's aviation
security focus during its first year of existence was primarily due to
the ATSA deadlines.
4. We agree that the newly created DHS brings a number of agencies
responsible for transportation security under one roof, which could
ultimately improve coordination and streamline and strengthen security
efforts. However, this does not solve all the potential coordination
problems we highlight in the report because important transportation
stakeholders--specifically, the DOT modal administrations--are housed
in another department. Because both DHS agencies and DOT modal
administrations are moving forward with transportation security
initiatives, it is critical that the roles and responsibilities of each
entity are clearly delineated and communicated to all stakeholders and
that they coordinate their security efforts. The lack of such
clarification, communication, and coordination could create problems,
such as duplication of efforts and gaps in preparedness.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
Transportation Security:
Table 5: Authorizations:
Public law - Authorization: Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 et seq. (2001); November 19, 2001;
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Established Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), responsible for, inter alia, security in
all modes of transportation; Related target dates for
compliance: 11/19/2001.
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Established a more
comprehensive federal air marshals program for international and
domestic flights; Related target dates for compliance:
[Empty].
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Deployment of federal law
enforcement officers at airports to meet aviation safety and security
concerns; Related target dates for compliance: [Empty].
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Directed FAA, in consultation
with TSA, to develop security-training programs for flight and cabin
crew; Related target dates for compliance: 1/18/02.
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Deployment of federal
personnel for the screening of passengers and baggage at airports;
Related target dates for compliance: 11/19/02.
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Appointed Federal Security
Managers to oversee the screening of passengers and baggage at each
airport; Related target dates for compliance: 11/19/02.
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Authorizes TSA to deploy
explosive detection systems (EDS) or equivalent measures allowed by law
at all U.S. airports; Related target dates for compliance:
12/31/2002.
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Authorized $500,000,000 (FY
2002) for FAA to provide federal grants to fortify cockpit doors and
for other aircraft security measures; Related target dates
for compliance: 4/1/2003.
Public law - Authorization: Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 et seq. (2002); November 25, 2002; Modes
impacted: All; Key provisions: Creates the Department of Homeland
Security; Related target dates for compliance: [Empty].
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Creates Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, responsible for maintaining the security of
borders and transportation systems; Related target dates for
compliance: [Empty].
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Training and deputizing
pilots to be Federal Flight Deck Officers to defend the flight decks of
aircrafts in flight; Related target dates for compliance: 2/
25/2003.
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Transferred Transportation
Security Administration and Coast Guard from Department of
Transportation to Department of Homeland Security; Related
target dates for compliance: 3/1/2003.
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Moved date for EDS
installation in all U.S. airports; Related target dates for
compliance: 12/31/2003.
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Requires all companies that
transport or ship explosives to give the ATF the names and identifying
information of all employees authorized to possess explosive
materials; Requires the ATF to conduct background checks of employees
to determine if they are prohibited from possessing explosive
materials; Related target dates for compliance: [Empty].
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Expands the responsibilities of
the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), within the
Department of Transportation, for regulating hazardous materials to
include hazardous materials transportation security; Related
target dates for compliance: [Empty].
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Protects critical infrastructure
information voluntarily submitted to a covered federal agency from the
Freedom of Information Act and other federal and state disclosure
requirements; Related target dates for compliance: [Empty].
Public law - Authorization: Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002); November 25, 2002;
Modes impacted: Seaport; Key provisions: Set up a National Maritime
Transportation Security Plan; Related target dates for
compliance: [Empty].
Key provisions: Implement Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans
and coordinate area plans; Related target dates for
compliance: [Empty].
Key provisions: Develop and maintain an antiterrorism cargo
identification, tracking, and screening system for containerized
cargo; Related target dates for compliance: [Empty].
Key provisions: To assign Coast Guard personnel as sea marshals to
deter or respond to acts of terrorism; Related target dates
for compliance: [Empty].
Key provisions: Authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to train and
certify maritime security professionals; Related target dates
for compliance: [Empty].
Key provisions: Establishes a program to evaluate and certify systems
of international intermodal transportation; Related target
dates for compliance: [Empty].
Key provisions: The Coast Guard shall conduct a vulnerability
assessment of facilities and vessels that may be involved in a
transportation security incident at least every 5 years;
Related target dates for compliance: [Empty].
Key provisions: The Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue
biometric transportation security cards and enhanced crew-member
identification for individuals who require access to secure areas of
vessels and port facilities; Related target dates for
compliance: [Empty].
Key provisions: The Secretary of Transportation, acting through the
Maritime Administration, shall establish a grant program to fund the
implementation of Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans and
facility security plans; Related target dates for compliance:
[Empty].
Public law - Authorization: USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); October 26, 2001; Modes impacted: All; Key
provisions: Mandates federal background checks of individuals operating
vehicles carrying hazardous materials; Related target dates
for compliance: [Empty].
Key provisions: Criminalizes terrorist attacks and other acts of
violence against mass transportation systems; Related target
dates for compliance: 10/26/2001.
Public law - Authorization: Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-355, 116 Stat. 2985 (2002); December 17, 2002; Modes
impacted: Pipeline; Key provisions: Authorizes the Secretary of
Transportation to reinforce pipeline facilities deemed potentially
unsafe or vulnerable to terrorist attacks; Related target
dates for compliance: [Empty].
Public law - Authorization: Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116
Stat. 933 (2002); August 6, 2002; Modes impacted: All; Key provisions:
Authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to create an electronic data
interchange system to ensure transportation safety and security of
cargo; Related target dates for compliance: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code.
[End of table]
Table 6: Appropriations:
Public law - appropriation: 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States, Pub. L. No. 107-38, 115 Stat. 220 (2001); September 18, 2001;
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Provided funding for increased
transportation security. Provided funding for repairing public
facilities and transportation systems damaged by the attacks;
Funding appropriated: Specific appropriations are found in the Pub. L.
No. 107-117.
Public law - appropriation: 2002 Department of Transportation
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-87, 115 Stat. 833 (2001); December
18, 2001; Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Provided funding
for TSA for civil aviation security services pursuant to the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act; Funding appropriated:
$1,250,000,000 (app. FY 2002).
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Provided funding for FAA
operations for civil aviation security program activities;
Funding appropriated: $150,154,000 (app. FY 2002).
Public law - appropriation: Department Of Defense And Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery; From and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117,
115 Stat. 2230 (2002); January 10, 2002; Modes impacted: Seaport; Key
provisions: Funding for a port security program; Funding
appropriated: $93,300,000 (app. FY 2002).
Modes impacted: Seaport; Key provisions: Funding for Coast Guard for
their response to 9/11 terrorist attacks; Funding
appropriated: $209,150,000 (app. FY 2002).
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Funding for FAA for their
response to 9/11 terrorist attacks; Funding appropriated:
$535,500,000 (app. FY 2002).
Modes impacted: Highway; Key provisions: Funding for Federal Highway
Administration for their response to 9/11 terrorist attacks;
Funding appropriated: $175,000,000 (app. FY 2002).
Modes impacted: Transit; Key provisions: Funding for Federal Transit
Administration for their response to 9/11 terrorist attacks;
Funding appropriated: $123,000,000 (app. FY 2002).
Modes impacted: Rail; Key provisions: Funding for Federal Railroad
Administration for their response to 9/11 terrorist attacks;
Funding appropriated: $106,000,000 (app. FY 2002).
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Funding for Research and Special
Programs Administration; Funding appropriated: $2,500,000
(app. FY 2002).
Public law - appropriation: 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820 (2002); August 2, 2002;
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Provides for the installation
of explosives detection systems in commercial service airports;
Funding appropriated: $738,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: Seaport; Key provisions: Provides funds for port
security activities, including Port Security Grants; Funding
appropriated: $125,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: Seaport; Key provisions: Appropriates funds for the
port security pilot program, Operation Safe Commerce; Funding
appropriated: $28,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: Motor Coach; Key provisions: Appropriates grants and
contracts to enhance security for intercity bus operations;
Funding appropriated: $15,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Funds for procurement of air-
ground communications systems and devices for the Federal Air Marshal
Program; Funding appropriated: $15,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Funds for grants and contracts for
radiation detection system test and evaluation; Funding
appropriated: $4,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Funds for grants to airport
authorities for pilot projects to improve airport terminal security;
Funding appropriated: $17,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Funds for grants and contracts for
security, research, development and pilot projects; Funding
appropriated: $10,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Funds for replacement of
magnetometers at airport passenger screening locations in commercial
service airports; Funding appropriated: $23,000,000 (app. FY
2003).
Public law - appropriation: Consolidated Appropriation Resolution for
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11 (2003); February 20, 2003; Modes
impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Provides for aviation security
(screening activities, airport support, and enforcement presence)
including:; Funding appropriated: $4,516,300,000 (app. FY
2003) including:.
Key provisions: additional funding from FAA appropriations for
explosives detections systems; Funding appropriated:
$144,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Key provisions: additional funding for terminal modifications needed
for the installation of EDS equipment; Funding appropriated:
$265,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Key provisions: additional funding for the procurement of checked
baggage EDS equipment; Funding appropriated: $174, 500,000
(app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Funds administrative, including
intelligence, activities of the Transportation Security
Administration; Funding appropriated: $308,700,000 (app. FY
2003).
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Enhances maritime and land
security including:; Funding appropriated: $244,800,000 (app.
FY 2003) including:.
Key provisions: provides additional funding for port security grants;
Funding appropriated: $150,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Key provisions: funds for radiation detection and monitoring system
evaluation and procurement; Funding appropriated: $4,000,000
(app. FY 2003).
Key provisions: funds for the purpose of deploying Operation Safe
Commerce; Funding appropriated: $30,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: All; Key provisions: Appropriates funds for research
and development related to transportation security including:;
Funding appropriated: $110, 200,000 (app. FY 2003) including:.
Key provisions: funds for grants for port security; Funding
appropriated: $10,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Public law - appropriation: Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Appropriations Act for FY 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-11, 117 Stat. 559
(2003); Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Provides financial
assistance to US flag air carriers for expenses and revenue forgone
related to aviation security; Funding appropriated:
$2,395,750,000 of which the first $100 million is to reimburse carriers
for strengthening cockpit doors. (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: Seaport; Key provisions: Appropriates funds for the
Coast Guard to support Operation Liberty Shield; Funding
appropriated: $228,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Appropriates additional funds
to TSA for the installation of explosive detection systems at
airports; Funding appropriated: $235,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: Seaport; Key provisions: Appropriates additional funds
to TSA for port security; Funding appropriated: $20,000,000
(app. FY 2003).
Modes impacted: Aviation; Key provisions: Appropriates additional funds
to TSA for passenger screener hiring, training, and related costs;
Funding appropriated: $280,000,000 (app. FY 2003).
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code.
[End of table]
Table 7: Regulations:
Regulations[A]: Criminal History Records Checks, 66 Fed. Reg. 63474
(Dec. 6, 2001); Effective December 6, 2001; Modes impacted: Aviation;
Issuing: agency: FAA; Key provisions: Requires airport operators and
aircraft operators to conduct fingerprint-based criminal history
records checks (CHRC's) of individuals with unescorted access authority
to secured areas.
Regulations[A]: Civil Aviation Security Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 8340 (Feb.
22, 2002); Effective February 17, 2002; Modes impacted: All; Issuing:
agency: TSA; Key provisions: Transfers rules governing civil aviation
security to TSA.
Key provisions: Provides screener qualifications and training.
Key provisions: Defines and governs the release of "sensitive security
information.".
Regulations[A]: Security Programs for Aircraft 12,500 Pounds or More,
67 Fed. Reg. 8205 (Feb. 22, 2002); Effective June 24, 2002; Modes
impacted: Aviation; Issuing: agency: TSA; Key provisions: Requires
aircraft operators of aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of 12,500
lbs. or more to conduct criminal history records checks on flightcrew
members.
Key provisions: Requires access to the flight deck of such aircraft be
restricted.
Regulations[A]: Passenger Name Record Information Required for
Passengers on Flights in Foreign Air Transportation to or from the
United States, 67 Fed. Reg. 42710 (June 25, 2002); Effective June 25,
2002; Modes impacted: Aviation; Issuing: agency: Customs Service; Key
provisions: Requires air carriers, upon request, to electronically
provide U.S. Customs Service with access to Passenger Name Record (PNR)
information concerning the identity and travel plans of passengers for
any international flight to or from the United States.
Regulations[A]: Picture Identification Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg. 65858
(Oct. 28, 2002); Effective October 28, 2002; Modes impacted: Aviation;
Issuing: agency: FAA; Key provisions: Requires all certified pilots to
carry photo identification subject to inspection upon request from the
FAA or any federal, state, or local law enforcement officer.
Regulations[A]: Discretionary Bridge Candidate Rating Factor, 67 Fed.
Reg. 63539 (Oct. 15, 2002); Effective November 14, 2002; Modes
impacted: Highways; Issuing: agency: Federal Highway Administration;
Key provisions: Allows discretionary bridge funds to be used for
security improvements on eligible bridges, subject to 23 USC 144
requirements.
Regulations[A]: Presentation of Vessel Cargo Declaration to Customs
Before Cargo Is Laden Aboard Vessel at Foreign Port for Transport to
the United States, 67 Fed. Reg. 66318 (Oct. 31, 2002); Effective
December 2, 2002; Modes impacted: Seaport; Issuing: agency: Customs
Service; Key provisions: Requires the advance and accurate presentation
of certain manifest information prior to lading at the foreign port, in
order to enable Customs to evaluate the risk of smuggling weapons of
mass destruction.
Regulations[A]: Aviation Security: Private Charter Security Rules, 67
Fed. Reg. 79881 (Dec. 31, 2002); Effective February 1, 2003; Modes
impacted: Aviation; Issuing: agency: TSA; Key provisions: Requires
private charter operators using aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight
of at least 100,000 lbs. or which can seat at least 61 passengers to
ensure that passengers and their carry-on baggage are screened prior to
boarding.
Regulations[A]: Coast Guard Transition to Department of Homeland
Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 9533 (Feb. 28, 2003); Effective March 1, 2003;
Modes impacted: Seaport; Issuing: agency: Coast Guard; Key provisions:
Transfers the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the
newly created Department of Homeland Security.
Regulations[A]: Organization and Delegation of Powers and Duties,
Update of Secretarial Delegations, 68 Fed. Reg. 10988 (March 7, 2003);
Effective March 7, 2003; Modes impacted: Motor Carrier; Issuing:
agency: Office of the Secretary,; DOT; Key provisions: Transfers
authority of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to
determine security risks to the Transportation Security
Administration.
Regulations[A]: Screening of Aliens and Other Designated Individuals
Seeking Flight Training, 68 Fed. Reg. 7313 (Feb. 13, 2003); Effective
March 17, 2003; Modes impacted: Aviation; Issuing: agency: DOJ; Key
provisions: Prohibits aviation training providers to train aliens or
other designated individuals without prior approval by the Attorney
General.
Regulations[A]: Security Requirements for Motor Carriers Transporting
Hazardous Materials, 68 Fed. Reg. 13250 (March 19, 2003); Effective
March 19, 2003; Modes impacted: Motor Carrier; Issuing: agency: Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA); Key provisions: Transfers
rulemaking authority addressing the security of motor carrier shipments
of hazardous materials to the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA) from the FMCSA.
Regulations[A]: Hazardous Materials: Security Requirements for
Offerors and Transporters of Hazardous Materials, 68 Fed. Reg. 14510
(March 25, 2003); Effective March 25, 2003; Modes impacted: All;
Issuing: agency: RSPA; Key provisions: Requires shippers and carriers
of certain highly hazardous materials to develop and implement security
plans.
Key provisions: Requires all shippers and carriers of hazardous
materials to include a security component in their employee training
programs.
Regulations[A]: Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports, 68 Fed. Reg.
9537 (Feb. 28, 2003); Effective April 1, 2003; Modes impacted:
Seaport; Issuing: agency: Coast Guard; Key provisions: Makes permanent
changes in notification of arrival and departure requirements to ensure
public safety and security, including requiring electronic submission
of cargo manifest information to the U.S. Customs Service, and
requiring additional crew and passenger information.
Regulations[A]: Organization and Delegation of Powers and Duties;
Delegation to the Administrator, Maritime Administrator, 68 Fed. Reg.
16215 (April 3, 2003); Effective April 3, 2003; Modes impacted:
Seaport; Issuing: agency: Office of the Secretary, DOT; Key provisions:
Transfers authority to the Maritime Administrator to develop standards
and curriculum for the training and certification of maritime security
professionals.
Regulations[A]: Implementation of the Safe Explosives Act, 68 Fed. Reg.
13768 (March 20, 2003); Effective May 24, 2003; Interim Final Rule;
Modes impacted: All; Issuing: agency: ATF; Key provisions: Requires
applicants for licenses and permits to provide with the application the
names and appropriate identifying information regarding employees
authorized to possess explosive materials.
Key provisions: Requires applicants for licenses and permits to provide
with the application fingerprints and photographs of "responsible
persons" (for example, site managers, sole proprietors, partners,
corporate officers and directors, and majority shareholders).
Key provisions: Requires the ATF to conduct background checks on
responsible persons and employees authorized to possess explosive
materials.
Regulations[A]: Limitations on the Issuance of Commercial Driver's
Licenses with a Hazardous Materials Endorsement, 68 Fed. Reg. 23844
(May 5, 2003); Effective May 5, 2003; Interim Final Rule; Modes
impacted: Motor Carrier; Issuing: agency: FMCSA; Key provisions:
Prohibits States from issuing, renewing, transferring, or upgrading a
commercial driver's license (CDL) with a hazardous material endorsement
unless TSA has conducted a background check of the applicant, including
administering a hazardous materials knowledge test.
Regulations[A]: Hazardous Materials: Enhancing Hazardous Materials
Transportation Security 68 Fed. Reg. 23832 (May 5, 2003); Effective May
5, 2003; Interim Final Rule; Modes impacted: Motor Carrier, Seaport;
Issuing: agency: RSPA; Key provisions: Requires shippers and
transporters to comply with Federal security regulations that apply to
motor carrier and vessel transportation.
Key provisions: Requires applicants for exemptions from the Hazardous
Materials Regulations compliance with applicable Federal
transportation security laws and regulations.
Regulations[A]: Security Threat Assessment for Individuals Applying for
a Hazardous Materials Endorsement for a Commercial Drivers License 68
Fed. Reg. 23852 (May 5, 2003); Effective May 5, 2003; Interim Final
Rule; Modes impacted: Motor Carrier; Issuing: agency: TSA; Key
provisions: Establishes security threat assessment standards for
determining whether an individual poses a security threat warranting
denial of a hazardous materials endorsement for a CDL. Also established
appeals and waiver procedures.
Source: GAO analysis of Code of Federal Regulations.
[A] All regulations listed are final rules unless otherwise noted.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Organizational Chart of the Transportation Security
Administration:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cathleen Berrick, (202) 512-8777 Susan Fleming, (202) 512-4431 Peter
Guerrero, (202) 512-2834:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Steven Calvo, Nikki Clowers, Michelle
Dresben, Glenn Dubin, Scott Farrow, Libby Halperin, David Hooper,
Hiroshi Ishikawa, Ray Sendejas, and Glen Trochelman made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Transportation Security Reports and Testimonies:
Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and
Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments, GAO-03-502
(Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2003).
Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
Homeland Security, GAO-03-594T (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003).
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges, GAO-03-616T (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003).
Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot
Certification Process, GAO-03-248NI (Washington, D.C.: February 3,
2003). (Not for Public Dissemination):
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Transportation, GAO-03-108 (Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003):
High Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal
Government and the Nation's Critical Infrastructure, GAO-03-121
(Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003).
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's
Enforcement Approach, GAO-03-22 (Washington, D.C.: January 10, 2003).
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the
Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344 (Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002).
Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address
Security Challenges, GAO-03-263 (Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002).
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and
Implementation Issues, GAO-03-253 (Washington, D.C.: November 22,
2002).
Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical Federal Operations and
Assets Remain at Risk, GAO-03-303T (Washington, D.C.: November 19,
2002).
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New
Initiatives, and Challenges, GAO-03-297T (Washington, D.C.: November
18, 2002).
Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of
Effort for All Missions, GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: November 12,
2002).
Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, GAO-02-1075T
(Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002).
Pipeline Safety and Security: Improved Workforce Planning and
Communication Needed, GAO-02-785 (Washington, D.C.: August 26, 2002).
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T (Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002).
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges, GAO-02-971T (Washington, D.C.: July
25, 2002).
Critical infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be
Addressed, GAO-02-961T (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports, GAO-02-955TNI
(Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002). (Not for Public Dissemination):
Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots, GA0-02-822R
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002).
Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection
Equipment, GAO-02-713C (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002). (Classified):
Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond, GAO-
02-538T (Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2002).
Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation's Air
Transportation System, GAO-01-1164T (Washington, D.C.: September 26,
2001). (Not for Public Dissemination):
Aviation Security: Information on the Nation's Air Transportation
System Vulnerabilities, GAO-01-1174T (Washington, D.C.: September 26,
2001). (Not for Public Dissemination):
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations, GAO-01-1171T (Washington, D.C.:
September 25, 2001).
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities, GAO-01-1165T (Washington, D.C.:
September 21, 2001).
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security, GAO-01-1166T (Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001).
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation's Airports, GAO-01-1162T (Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2001).
Terrorism and Risk Management:
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges,
and Key Management Issues, GAO-03-715T (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2003).
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a
Results-Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: January 17,
2003).
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership,
GAO-03-260 (Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002).
Homeland Security: Information Technology Funding and Associated
Management Issues, GAO-03-250 (Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002).
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued
Management Challenges, GAO-02-1122T (Washington, D.C.: October 1,
2002).
National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges,
GAO-02-1048R (Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002).
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success, GAO-02-1013T (Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More
Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach for Protecting Information
Systems, GAO-02-474 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security
Challenges Need to Be Addressed, GAO-02-918T (Washington, D.C.: July 9,
2002).
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will
Be Critical to Success, GAO-02-901T (Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002).
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting, GAO-02-893T (Washington, D.C.: June 28,
2002).
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy, GAO-
02-811T (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002).
Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving
National Goals, GAO-02-627T (Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002).
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and
Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy
for Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T (Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development
of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-
550T (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National
Preparedness Strategy, GAO-02-549T (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to
Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-548T (Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-547T
(Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002).
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership
Sought, GAO-02-490T (Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-473T (Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2002).
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-and
Long-Term National Needs, GAO-02-160T (Washington, D.C.: November 7,
2001).
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness, GAO-02-162T (Washington, D.C.: October 17,
2001).
Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure
Protection, GAO-02-24 (Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001).
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach, GAO-02-
150T (Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001).
Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and Inventory
Management Are Needed, GAO-01-667 (Washington, D.C.: September 28,
2001).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in
Safeguarding Government and Privately Controlled Systems from Computer-
Based Attacks, GAO-01-1168T (Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2001).
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts,
GAO-01-1158T (Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations,
GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001).
(545030):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Congressional Research Service, Transportation Issues in the 107TH
Congress, (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2002).
[2] Transportation operators may be private, public, or quasi-public
entities that provide transportation services.
[3] The White House, National Strategy for The Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003; Federal Bureau
of Investigation, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: An FBI
Assessment, January 2003; and The White House, National Strategy for
Homeland Security, July 2002.
[4] DOT's modal administrations are the departmental units responsible
for the different modes of transportation, such as the Federal Railroad
Administration or the Federal Highway Administration.
[5] P.L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
[6] P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[7] P.L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[8] Congress, as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), established the Mineta Transportation
Institute. The Institute focuses on international surface
transportation policy issues as related to three primary
responsibilities: research, education, and technology transfer.
[9] Similarly, there are opportunities for cross contamination within
the same mode. For example, a bag containing an explosive device could
be placed on one airline and then transferred to another airline where
it explodes.
[10] DHS created the Homeland Security Advisory System. The system has
five threat conditions--ranging from low to severe--representing
different levels of risk for terrorist attacks.
[11] See "Related GAO Products."
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Federal Action Could
Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-263
(Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002).
[13] The International Maritime Organization, an United Nations agency
devoted exclusively to maritime matters, adopted international measures
for port and shipping security in December 2002.
[14] P.L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
[15] AASHTO is a nonprofit, nonpartisan association representing
highway and transportation departments in the 50 states, the District
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
[16] Operation Safe Commerce focuses on using new technology, such as
container seals, to help shippers ensure the integrity of the cargo
included in containers being sent to the United States.
[17] Meeting the Homeland Security Challenge: A Principled Strategy for
a Balanced and Practical Response (September 2001); and Global Trade:
America's Achilles' Heel (February 2002) by Admiral James M. Loy and
Captain Robert G. Ross, U.S. Coast Guard.
[18] See "Related GAO Products" at the end of this report for
information on GAO reports that examine aviation security issues.
[19] General aviation includes more than 200,000 corporate-and
privately-owned aircraft at over 19,000 airports.
[20] It should be noted that this event was not a terrorist attack.
[21] Some of the industry associations we contacted include the
American Bus Association, American Gas Association, American Trucking
Associations, and Association of American Railroads. See appendix I for
a complete list of industry associations we contacted.
[22] The Highway Watch Program is funded by a $500,000 grant from the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
[23] See "Related GAO Products" at the end of this report.
[24] P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[25] P.L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
[26] P.L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[27] The U.S. Coast Guard was also transferred to DHS. In the Terms of
Reference Regarding the Respective roles of the U.S. Coast Guard and
the Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard is
designated as the lead DHS agency for maritime security and is directed
to coordinate as appropriate with other agencies. The document further
notes that a supporting memorandum of agreement between the Commandant
of the Coast Guard and the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration is being developed.
[28] The Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107-296 (November 25, 2002) the
legislation that created DHS, amended this deadline to allow some
airports up to an extra year (December 31, 2003) to deploy all of the
necessary explosive detection equipment to enable TSA to screen all
checked baggage. TSA reported that as of December 31, 2002, about 90
percent of all checked baggage were screened with an explosive
detection system or explosives trace detection equipment and the
remaining checked baggage was screened using alternative means as is
allowed under the law.
[29] See appendix IV for highlights of final regulations issued since
September 11 that govern transportation security.
[30] The U.S. Customs Service was transferred from the Department of
Treasury to DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135 (2002)) and renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection.
[31] The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
within DHS is working with TSA, Coast Guard, and other federal agencies
on developing a set of national standards that would apply to all
ports. These efforts are well under way. The Coast Guard has been
developing a set of standards since May 2002 as part of its efforts to
conduct vulnerability assessments for all U.S. Ports. The standards
will go into effect on July 1, 2004, as part of the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) amendments and the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) that was
adopted by the International Maritime Organization conference in
December 2002. The Coast Guard considers that the implementation of
these standards is best done through mandating compliance with the
SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code. According to TSA, because of Coast
Guard's significant role in securing maritime transportation, TSA will
likely play a coordination role in the maritime arena.
[32] Transportation Security Administration, Report to Congress on
Transportation Security, (March 31, 2003).
[33] P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[34] DOT and TSA have signed other memorandums of agreement that are
narrow in scope and address a specific issue. For example, TSA and DOT
signed a memorandum of agreement regarding the processing of civil
rights complaints.
[35] TSA hopes to have a draft of the national transportation system
security plan prepared by the end of this year.
[36] P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[37] In preparing these previous reports, we contacted numerous
transportation security stakeholders, including transit agencies, port
authorities, and local and state governments as well as representatives
from the chemical and maritime industries. We also contacted various
federal departments including the Departments of Defense, Energy,
Homeland Security, Justice, and Health and Human Services.
[38] P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[39] P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[40] P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
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General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.
20548:
