General Aviation Security
Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term Success Gao ID: GAO-05-144 November 10, 2004Federal intelligence agencies have reported that in the past, terrorists have considered using general aviation aircraft (all aviation other than commercial and military) for terrorist acts, and that the September 11th terrorists learned to fly at general aviation flight schools. The questions GAO answered regarding the status of general aviation security included (1) What actions has the federal government taken to identify and assess threats to, and vulnerabilities of, general aviation; and communicate that information to stakeholders? (2) What steps has the federal government taken to strengthen general aviation security, and what, if any, challenges does the government face; and (3) What steps have non-federal stakeholders taken to enhance the security of general aviation?
The federal and state governments and general aviation industry all play a role in securing general aviation operations. While the federal government provides guidance, enforces regulatory requirements, and provides some funding, the bulk of the responsibility for assessing and enhancing security falls on airport operators. Although TSA has issued a limited threat assessment of general aviation, and the FBI identified that terrorists have considered using general aviation to conduct attacks, a systematic assessment of threats has not been conducted. In addition, to assess airport vulnerabilities, TSA plans to issue a self-assessment tool for airport operators' use, but it does not plan to conduct on-site vulnerability assessments at all general aviation airports due to the cost and vastness of the general aviation network. Instead, TSA intends to use a systematic and analytical risk management process, which is considered a best practice, to assess the threats and vulnerabilities of general aviation. However, TSA has not yet developed an implementation plan for its risk management efforts. TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have taken steps to address security risks to general aviation through regulation and guidance, but still face challenges in their efforts to further enhance security. For example, TSA has promulgated regulations requiring background checks of foreign candidates for U.S. flight training schools and has issued security guidelines for general aviation airports. However, we found limitations in the process used to conduct compliance inspections of flight training programs. In addition, FAA, in coordination with TSA and other federal agencies, has implemented airspace restrictions over certain landmarks and special events. However, FAA has not established written policies or procedures for reviewing and revalidating the need for flight restrictions that limit access to airspace for indefinite periods of time and could negatively affect the general aviation industry. Non-federal general aviation stakeholders have partnered with the federal government and have individually taken steps to enhance general aviation security. For example, industry associations developed best practices and recommendations for securing general aviation, and have partnered with TSA to develop security initiatives such as the Airport Watch Program, similar to a neighborhood watch program. Some state governments have also provided funding for enhancing security at general aviation airports, and many airport operators GAO surveyed took steps to enhance security such as installing fencing and increasing police patrols.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-144, General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term Success
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Report to the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2004:
General Aviation Security:
Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but Continued Partnership with
the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term Success:
GAO-05-144:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-144, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Federal intelligence agencies have reported that in the past,
terrorists have considered using general aviation aircraft (all
aviation other than commercial and military) for terrorist acts, and
that the September 11th terrorists learned to fly at general aviation
flight schools. The questions GAO answered regarding the status of
general aviation security included (1) What actions has the federal
government taken to identify and assess threats to, and vulnerabilities
of, general aviation; and communicate that information to stakeholders?
(2) What steps has the federal government taken to strengthen general
aviation security, and what, if any, challenges does the government
face; and (3) What steps have non-federal stakeholders taken to enhance
the security of general aviation?
What GAO Found:
The federal and state governments and general aviation industry all
play a role in securing general aviation operations. While the federal
government provides guidance, enforces regulatory requirements, and
provides some funding, the bulk of the responsibility for assessing and
enhancing security falls on airport operators. Although TSA has issued
a limited threat assessment of general aviation, and the FBI identified
that terrorists have considered using general aviation to conduct
attacks, a systematic assessment of threats has not been conducted. In
addition, to assess airport vulnerabilities, TSA plans to issue a self-
assessment tool for airport operators‘ use, but it does not plan to
conduct on-site vulnerability assessments at all general aviation
airports due to the cost and vastness of the general aviation network.
Instead, TSA intends to use a systematic and analytical risk management
process, which is considered a best practice, to assess the threats and
vulnerabilities of general aviation. However, TSA has not yet developed
an implementation plan for its risk management efforts.
TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have taken steps to
address security risks to general aviation through regulation and
guidance, but still face challenges in their efforts to further enhance
security. For example, TSA has promulgated regulations requiring
background checks of foreign candidates for U.S. flight training
schools and has issued security guidelines for general aviation
airports. However, we found limitations in the process used to conduct
compliance inspections of flight training programs. In addition, FAA,
in coordination with TSA and other federal agencies, has implemented
airspace restrictions over certain landmarks and special events.
However, FAA has not established written policies or procedures for
reviewing and revalidating the need for flight restrictions that limit
access to airspace for indefinite periods of time and could negatively
affect the general aviation industry.
Non-federal general aviation stakeholders have partnered with the
federal government and have individually taken steps to enhance general
aviation security. For example, industry associations developed best
practices and recommendations for securing general aviation, and have
partnered with TSA to develop security initiatives such as the Airport
Watch Program, similar to a neighborhood watch program. Some state
governments have also provided funding for enhancing security at
general aviation airports, and many airport operators GAO surveyed took
steps to enhance security such as installing fencing and increasing
police patrols.
Examples of General Aviation Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) develop a plan for implementing a risk management
approach to strengthen general aviation security, and that the Federal
Aviation Administration establish a documented process to review and
revalidate flight restrictions.
TSA and FAA generally concurred with GAO‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-144.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick,
202-512-8777, Berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Intelligence Information and Industry Characteristics Challenge TSA's
Ability to Identify and Assess Threats and Vulnerabilities and
Communicate with General Aviation Stakeholders:
TSA and FAA Have Taken Actions to Reduce Security Risks Associated with
General Aviation but Face Regulatory and Funding Challenges:
Nonfederal Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Strengthen General Aviation
Security:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Transportation Security Administration:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Some Major Industry Associations Representing General
Aviation:
Table 2: TSA and FAA Regulatory Actions Governing the Screening and
Validation of Pilot and Student Pilot Identities:
Table 3: Examples of Security Measures Used by Aviation Departments of
55 Fortune 500 Corporations:
Figures:
Figure 1: Use Categories of General Aviation:
Figure 2: Composition of the General Aviation Fleet, 2002:
Figure 3: Categories and Numbers of Airports in the United States:
Figure 4: Example of a Rural Turf Runway General Aviation Airport (top)
and a More Complex Urban General Aviation Airport (bottom):
Figure 5: Example of Security Advisory Issued by TSA:
Figure 6: TSA Has Established Regulations that Expand Federal Security
Requirements from Commercial Air Carriers to Include Some Private and
Public Charter Aircraft:
Figure 7: Temporary Flight Restriction over the Crawford Ranch in Texas
when the President Is Present:
Figure 8: Washington, D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone Surrounding
the 15-Nautical-mile Radius Flight Restriction Zone:
Figure 9: Remaining and Cancelled Security TFRs Over Military
Installations:
Figure 10: Violations of Temporary Flight Restrictions Have Increased:
Figure 11: Sign at St. Mary's Airport in Brunswick, Georgia, Warning
General Aviation Pilots to Avoid Restricted Airspace:
Figure 12: Airport Watch Program Signs Distributed to General Aviation
Airports Around the Country:
Figure 13: Examples of Propeller Locks to Prevent Unauthorized Aircraft
Use:
Abbreviations:
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
TFR: temporary flight restrictions:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 11, 2004:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
General aviation accounts for three-quarters of all aircraft that take
off and land in the United States. These aircraft encompass a wide
range of flight operations at nearly 19,000 general aviation airports
nationwide.[Footnote 1] According to the National Air Transportation
Association, the general aviation industry contributes about $100
billion to the U.S. economy each year and accounts for about 1.3
million jobs. Federal intelligence agencies have reported in the past
that terrorists have considered using general aviation aircraft for
terrorist acts and that the September 11 terrorists learned to fly at
flight schools in Florida, Arizona, and Minnesota. In addition, the 9/
11 Commission identified concerns that vulnerabilities continue to
exist in general aviation.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), along with other
federal agencies, state governments, and the general aviation industry,
plays a role in securing general aviation operations. While the federal
government provides guidance on threats and vulnerabilities, enforces
regulatory requirements, and provides some funding assistance, because
of competing needs of commercial aviation security funding and the
vastness and diversity of the general aviation network, the bulk of the
responsibility for assessing and enhancing security falls on airport
operators. This public/private partnership has been strengthened
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, in part, through the
teaming of TSA and general aviation industry associations by means of
the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which, among other things,
helped develop security guidelines for general aviation airports based
on industry best practices.[Footnote 2]
To assess the status of general aviation security, we answered the
following questions: (1) What actions has the federal government taken
to identify and assess threats to, and vulnerabilities of, general
aviation, and communicate that information to stakeholders? (2) What
additional steps has the federal government taken to strengthen general
aviation security, and what, if any, challenges does the government
face in further enhancing security? (3) What steps have non-federal
stakeholders taken to enhance the security of general aviation? Due to
TSA's concerns that the public release of our detailed findings could
compromise aviation security, we issued a separate restricted report to
you detailing the results of our review. This report is intended to
summarize, in a publicly releasable form, our overall findings and
confirm TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) agreement
to take action to better assess the potential for terrorist misuse of
general aviation aircraft, improve the communication of terrorist
threat information to the general aviation community, help manage
security risks associated with access to general aviation aircraft and
airspace, and help ensure that temporary flight restrictions issued for
indefinite periods of time are reviewed, revalidated, and consistently
applied. Information determined to be sensitive has been removed from
this report.
To determine the actions taken by the federal government to assess and
communicate threats and vulnerabilities associated with general
aviation, we reviewed federal agency reports and studies sponsored by
industry associations, and interviewed federal officials and general
aviation industry representatives, including those who provided input
to TSA's Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group on General
Aviation. To identify what additional steps the federal government has
taken to address national security risks from general aviation, we
obtained and analyzed data from the FAA, including the number of flight
restrictions that affect general aviation and information from TSA on
efforts to ensure compliance with general aviation regulations and
provide security guidelines for airport operators. We sought to
determine the reliability of these data by, among other things,
discussing methods of inputting and maintaining data with agency
officials. On the basis of these discussions, we determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. To
identify what steps nonfederal aviation stakeholders have taken to
enhance the security of general aviation, we judgmentally selected 31
general aviation airports to observe security measures implemented
since September 11, 2001, and discuss security-related issues.[Footnote
3] We selected these airports based on characteristics including size,
location, and aviation activity.[Footnote 4] Because of the limited
number of airports in our sample, and because the selected airports did
not constitute a representative sample, the results of our case study
analysis cannot be projected to the universe of general aviation
airports. We also discussed security issues with selected state
aviation officials. In addition, we surveyed a random sample of
publicly accessible general aviation airports that are eligible for
federal funding to obtain airport managers' views on changes in the
security environment in general aviation since September 11.[Footnote
5]
We performed our work between October 2003 and August 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I provides more details about our scope and methodology of our
work.
Results in Brief:
TSA and other federal agencies have not conducted an overall systematic
assessment of threats to, or vulnerabilities of, general aviation to
determine how to better prepare against terrorist threats. Although TSA
issued a limited assessment of threats associated with general aviation
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated that terrorists
have considered using general aviation to conduct attacks, a systematic
assessment of threats has not been conducted. In addition, TSA has
conducted vulnerability assessments at selected general aviation
airports, but agency officials stated that conducting these assessments
is costly and, therefore, impractical to do for the 19,000 general
aviation airports nationwide. TSA intends to implement a risk
management approach to better assess threats and vulnerabilities of
general aviation aircraft and airports and, as part of this approach,
is developing an online vulnerability self-assessment tool to be
completed by individual airport managers. However, we found limitations
in the use of the self-assessment tool. Further, TSA has not yet
developed a plan with specific milestones for implementing these tools
and assessments. Without such a plan, it will be difficult for TSA to
(1) monitor the progress of its efforts, (2) hold responsible officials
accountable for achieving desired results, and (3) ensure that
alternative approaches are considered should the tool not provide
sufficient data to provide a desired security baseline of
vulnerabilities.
TSA has also partnered with industry associations to develop security
guidelines that enable general aviation airport managers to assess
their own vulnerabilities to terrorist attack, and works through
industry associations to communicate threat information. However,
industry and state aviation officials we spoke with stated that
security advisories distributed by TSA were general in nature and were
not consistently received. In part this is understandable because,
among other things, the agency relies on other federal agencies for
threat information. However, we have found that applying these
principles to the extent possible provides organizations like TSA with
the best opportunity to achieve desired results.
TSA and FAA have taken steps to address security risks to general
aviation through regulation and guidance, but still face challenges in
their efforts to further enhance security. For example, TSA has
developed regulations governing background checks of foreign candidates
for U.S. flight training schools and has issued security guidelines for
general aviation airports. However, we found limitations in the process
used to conduct compliance inspections of flight training programs.
Further, should TSA establish new security requirements for general
aviation airports, competing funding needs could challenge the ability
of general aviation airport operators to meet these requirements. In
addition, FAA, in coordination with TSA and other federal agencies, has
implemented airspace restrictions over certain landmarks and special
events to guard against potential terrorist threats. However, FAA has
not established written policies or procedures for reviewing and
revalidating the continuing need for extended flight restrictions that
limit access to airspace for indefinite periods of time and could
negatively affect the general aviation industry. In addition, we found
limitations in the process used to allow pilots to fly through
security-related flight restrictions.
Nonfederal general aviation stakeholders have partnered with the
federal government and one another to enhance general aviation security
and have individually taken a number of steps to address the threat of
misuse of general aviation aircraft. For example, in addition to
developing their own sets of best practices and recommendations for
securing general aviation aircraft and operations, industry
associations have worked with TSA to develop security initiatives such
as the Airport Watch program,[Footnote 6] launched jointly by the
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and TSA, and the TSA Access
Certificate program,[Footnote 7] developed by the National Business
Aviation Association and currently being evaluated at selected airports
by TSA. Some state governments have also provided funding for enhancing
security at general aviation airports and established security
regulations. For example, New Jersey requires that all aircraft stored
at general aviation airports be secured with at least two locks to
prevent unlawful access to the aircraft. In addition, many of the
general aviation airports we visited and surveyed had taken steps to
enhance security such as installing fencing and lighting, and
requesting increased local police patrols.
Because of the importance of securing general aviation operations and
to help address associated challenges, we are making recommendations to
the Department of Homeland Security to take four actions to better
assess the possibility of terrorists' misuse of general aviation
aircraft, better communicate terrorist threat information, and help
mitigate security risks to general aviation operations. We are also
making a recommendation to the Department of Transportation to take
action to ensure that temporary flight restrictions issued for
indefinite periods are reviewed and, if appropriate, revalidated and
consistently applied.
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Transportation, the Assistant
Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security
Administration, and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration who generally concurred with our findings and
recommendations. TSA's written comments are presented in appendix II.
Background:
General aviation encompasses a wide variety of activities, aircraft
types, and airports. About 85 percent of all general aviation hours
flown falls into one of five categories of flying activity, as defined
by FAA and described in figure 1. The largest of these categories is
recreational flying, which is defined as flying for pleasure or
personal transportation and not for business purposes. In 2002,
recreational flying accounted for about 41 percent of all general
aviation hours flown. The remaining categories include activities such
as medical services, aerial advertising, aerial mapping and
photography, and aerial application of seeds or chemicals.[Footnote 8]
Figure 1: Use Categories of General Aviation:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Various types of aircraft can be used in general aviation operations,
including single-engine and multi-engine piston aircraft, turboprops,
turbojets, helicopters, gliders, and experimental aircraft. The general
aviation fleet in the United States consists of about 211,000 active
aircraft. While this fleet is diverse, certain activities are generally
associated with specific types of general aviation aircraft. For
example, corporate flying generally involves the use of turboprop and
turbojet aircraft, while personal and instructional flying generally
involves the use of single-engine propeller-driven aircraft. The
largest category of general aviation aircraft is single-engine
propeller, which in 2002 made up 68 percent of the general aviation
fleet. Types of general aviation aircraft and their uses are described
in figure 2.[Footnote 9]
Figure 2: Composition of the General Aviation Fleet, 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
There are approximately 14,000 private-use and 4,800 public-use general
aviation airports in the United States, and about 550,000 active
general aviation pilots and instructors. [Footnote 10] Non-U.S.
citizens can also possess active student pilot certificates in the
United States, according to FAA. Although general aviation aircraft can
take off and land at almost any airport, including most of the nation's
commercial service airports,[Footnote 11] there is an extensive system
of general aviation airports nationwide. Figure 3 identifies the
categories of airports in the United States.
Figure 3: Categories and Numbers of Airports in the United States:
[See PDF for image]
[A] According to FAA, commercial service airports are those airports
that handle regularly scheduled commercial airline traffic and have at
least 2,500 annual passenger enplanements. TSA considers commercial
service airports to be those subject to security requirements under
49.C.F.R. part 1542 and by that definition, there are approximately 450
commercial service airports.
[End of figure]
Public-use general aviation airports can range in size and complexity
from the short, grass landing strip in rural areas to the very busy
urban airports with multiple paved runways of differing lengths that
can accommodate large jet aircraft. Figure 4 illustrates examples of a
rural general aviation airport with a grass landing strip and a more
complex urban general aviation airport.
Figure 4: Example of a Rural Turf Runway General Aviation Airport (top)
and a More Complex Urban General Aviation Airport (bottom):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
General aviation industry interests are represented by a variety of
national organizations. One of the functions of these organizations is
disseminating information from federal agencies to their members. These
associations also provide their members with security best practices
and recommendations tailored to their members' specific needs. Table 1
provides an overview of some of the largest industry associations and
their role in general aviation.
Table 1: Some Major Industry Associations Representing General
Aviation:
Association: American Association of Airport Executives;
Who they represent: Airport executives at public use airports.
Association: Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association;
Who they represent: Pilots and aircraft owners.
Association: Experimental Aircraft Association;
Who they represent: Recreational aviation enthusiasts and builders.
Association: General Aviation Manufacturers Association;
Who they represent: Companies manufacturing general aviation aircraft,
engines, and component parts.
Association: Helicopter Association International;
Who they represent: Helicopter operators and manufacturers.
Association: National Business Aviation Association, Inc;
Who they represent: Companies that own or operate general aviation
aircraft as an aid to the conduct of their business or are involved
with some other aspect of business aviation.
Association: National Agricultural Aviation Association;
Who they represent: Licensed commercial applicator-operators that use
aircraft to enhance food and fiber production, protect forestry, and
control health-threatening pests.
Association: National Air Transportation Association;
Who they represent: Companies that provide general aviation service
including on-demand air charter, fuel and ground services, aircraft
maintenance, and pilot training.
Association: National Association of State Aviation Officials;
Who they represent: Officials in state government aviation agencies.
Source: Industry associations.
[End of table]
Prior to the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in
November 2001, FAA had primary responsibility for securing all civil
aviation, including general aviation. Although the act transferred much
of that responsibility from FAA to TSA,[Footnote 12] FAA maintains a
security role because of its regulatory authority over the imposition
of temporary flight restrictions (TFR)[Footnote 13] and its
disbursement of grants to fund safety and security enhancements at
commercial and general aviation airports.
Most of the civil aviation security regulations TSA assumed from FAA
did not apply to general aviation, but rather to commercial passenger
air carriers and commercial airports.[Footnote 14] Although the
security of general aviation airports remains largely unregulated, the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act and subsequent laws required
TSA to develop additional regulations that affect specific segments of
general aviation--flight training schools and certain charter flight
operations.[Footnote 15]
Among other things, with regard to all modes of transportation, the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act also required TSA to:
* receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to
transportation security;
* assess threats to transportation security and develop policies,
strategies, and plans for dealing with those threats, including
coordinating countermeasures with other federal organizations;
* enforce security-related regulations and requirements; and:
* oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of security
measures at airports and other transportation facilities.[Footnote 16]
Intelligence Information and Industry Characteristics Challenge TSA's
Ability to Identify and Assess Threats and Vulnerabilities and
Communicate with General Aviation Stakeholders:
TSA and other federal agencies have not conducted an overall,
systematic assessment of threats to, or vulnerabilities of, general
aviation to determine how to better prepare against terrorist threats.
However, in July 2003, TSA issued a limited assessment of threats
associated with general aviation activities. In addition, the FBI
stated that intelligence indicates that terrorists have considered
using general aviation aircraft in the past to conduct attacks. To
determine vulnerabilities, TSA conducted vulnerability assessments at
some general aviation airports based on specific security concerns or
requests by airport officials, and have conducted less intensive
security surveys at selected general aviation airports. To better focus
its efforts and resources, TSA intends to implement a risk management
approach to assess the threats and vulnerabilities of general aviation
aircraft and airports, and conduct on-site vulnerability assessments
only at those airports the agency determines to be nationally critical.
However, TSA has not yet developed a plan with specific milestones for
implementing these tools and assessments.
While TSA has partnered with industry associations to develop security
guidelines for general aviation airports and communicate threat
information to airport operators, we found limitations in the
communication of threat information. Industry and state aviation
officials we spoke with stated that security advisories distributed by
TSA were general in nature and were not consistently received. Risk
communication principles provide that specific information on potential
threats include--to the extent possible--the nature of the threat, when
and where it is likely to occur, over what time period it is likely to
occur, and guidance on actions to be taken. Applying these principles
presents problems for TSA because, among other things, the agency
receives threat information from other federal agencies and that
information is often classified.
Theft of General Aviation Aircraft Has Been a Concern, but Intelligence
on Threats to General Aviation Is Infrequent and Non-specific:
Neither TSA nor FBI has conducted an overall systematic assessment of
threats to, or vulnerabilities of, general aviation to determine how to
better prepare against terrorist threats. In July 2003, TSA issued a
brief summary assessment of the threats associated with general
aviation. However, the assessment was not widely distributed or made
available to general aviation airports or other stakeholders. In 2004,
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security acknowledged that
the department, along with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), FBI,
and other agencies, lacked precise knowledge about the time, place, and
methods of potential terrorist attacks related to general aviation.
Additionally, industry and TSA officials stated that the small size,
lack of fuel capacity, and minimal destructive power of most general
aviation aircraft make them unattractive to terrorists and, thereby,
reduce the possibility of threat associated with their misuse.
Historical intelligence indicates that terrorists have expressed
interest in using general aviation aircraft to conduct attacks. The
following are examples of intelligence information indicating terrorist
interest in general aviation:
* CIA reported that terrorists associated with the September 11 attacks
expressed interest in the use of crop-dusting aircraft (a type of
general aviation aircraft) for large area dissemination of biological
warfare agents such as anthrax.
* CIA reported that one of the masterminds of the September 11 attacks
originally proposed using small aircraft filled with explosives to
carry out the attacks.
* In May 2003, the Department of Homeland Security issued a security
advisory indicating that al Qaeda was in the late stages of planning an
attack, using general aviation aircraft, on the U.S. Consulate in
Karachi, Pakistan, and had also planned to use general aviation
aircraft to attack warships in the Persian Gulf.
The Extent of General Aviation's Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack Is
Difficult to Determine:
TSA and industry stakeholders we spoke with stated that general
aviation airports are vulnerable to terrorist attack. TSA officials
stated also that it would be difficult for the agency to systematically
conduct on-site assessments of the vulnerabilities of individual
general aviation airports to terrorist activities because of the
diversity and large number of airports. Officials cited the nearly
19,000 general aviation airports nationwide, noting that each has
distinct characteristics that may make it more or less attractive to
potential terrorists.
TSA's efforts to assess vulnerabilities at specific general aviation
airports have been limited. At the time of our review, TSA had
conducted vulnerability assessments at selected general aviation
airports based on specific security concerns or requests by airport
officials. TSA officials stated that the resources associated with
conducting vulnerability assessments, and the diverse nature of general
aviation airports, makes it impractical to conduct assessments at the
approximately 19,000 general aviation airports nationwide, or even the
approximately 4,800 public-use general aviation airports. TSA officials
said, however, that they had conducted a less intensive security survey
at additional general aviation airports. TSA selected these airports,
among other things, in preparation for special security events such as
the G-8 summit and national Republican and Democratic political
conventions.
In response to industry requests for federally endorsed security
protocols, TSA issued security guidelines in May 2004 meant to enable
individual general aviation airport managers to assess their own
facility's vulnerability to terrorist attack and suggest security
enhancements.[Footnote 17] Although these guidelines were issued after
we conducted our survey of general aviation airport managers, we found
that the majority of airport managers surveyed stated that they would
use a security review/vulnerability assessment tool if it were
provided. To produce these security guidelines, TSA partnered with
industry associations participating in the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee's Working Group on General Aviation Airports Security. The
guidelines include an airport characteristic measurement tool that
allows airport operators to assess the level of risk associated with
their airport to determine which security enhancements are most
appropriate for their facility. The guidelines also contain security
guidance based on industry best practices. TSA officials emphasized
that, because security at general aviation airports is not currently
regulated by TSA, the security enhancements suggested by the guidelines
are voluntary and are to be implemented at the discretion of the
airport manager. While TSA's and general aviation airport managers'
assessments at specific general aviation airports have been limited,
TSA has identified a number of factors that could make general aviation
aircraft and airports vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists.
Implementing a Risk Management Approach Could Improve the Assessment of
Threats and Vulnerabilities, but TSA Lacks an Implementation Plan:
In order to address challenges in assessing threats and vulnerabilities
to all modes of transportation--including general aviation--and
focusing scarce resources, TSA plans to implement a risk management
approach based on assessments of criticality, threat, and
vulnerability.[Footnote 18] TSA's risk management approach, as it
relates to general aviation security, is summarized below.
* TSA plans to use a criticality tool to provide the basis for
prioritizing which transportation assets and facilities require
additional or special protection. On the basis of a criticality
assessment, TSA intends to provide greater security scrutiny to general
aviation airports that require special protection.
* TSA plans to apply threat scenarios of how terrorists might conduct
attacks in specific situations in airport environments to assess
threats faced by individual general aviation airports.
* TSA is developing an online self-assessment toolintended to help
general aviation airport managers develop a comprehensive security
baseline for their facility.
* TSA is developing a Transportation Risk Assessment and Vulnerability
Evaluation tool for conducting on-site assessments of general aviation
airports that are deemed to be nationally critical.
TSA intends to compile baseline data on security vulnerabilities from
these tools and use the data to conduct a systematic analysis of
security vulnerabilities at general aviation airports nationwide. TSA
officials stated that such an analysis will allow the agency to
establish the need, if any, for minimum security standards; determine
the adequacy of current security regulations; and help the agency and
airports better direct limited resources. They noted that because
airports will not be required to use the tool, the usefulness of the
data gathered will be dependent on the number of airports voluntarily
submitting assessment results to TSA.
Despite these plans, however, TSA has not developed an implementation
plan with specific milestones for conducting its risk management
efforts. These efforts have been under development for over a year and
were originally scheduled to have been completed between June and
August of 2004. Without a plan that establishes specific time frames
for implementation of the tools and assessments, it will be difficult
for TSA to monitor the progress of its efforts and hold responsible
officials accountable for achieving desired results. Similarly, without
a plan that includes estimates of the resources needed to effectively
implement the agency's risk management approach, TSA's ability to
allocate its resources to areas of greatest need could be impaired. A
plan could also address alternative approaches that could be
implemented if the extent of voluntary participation of general
aviation airport managers does not provide sufficient data needed to
establish the desired security baseline of vulnerabilities.
TSA Faces Challenges in Applying Risk Communication Principles to
Improve the Quality of Threat Information Disseminated to General
Aviation Stakeholders:
TSA faces challenges in ensuring that threat information is effectively
communicated to the general aviation community due to the generality of
intelligence information given, and the lack of a current, reliable,
and complete list of airport contacts. In addition, intelligence
information may be classified or sensitive, thus limiting with whom it
can be shared.[Footnote 19] TSA partners with industry associations
that are part of a General Aviation Coalition as a primary means for
communicating threat information and developing security guidelines for
general aviation airport managers.[Footnote 20] Specifically, rather
than notifying general aviation airport operators directly, TSA
communicates threat advisories to these industry associations, which in
turn are to provide it to their members. A majority of general aviation
airport managers we surveyed reported that they had at least some
contact with nonfederal entities such as state aviation officials or
industry associations such as the American Association of Airport
Executives or the National Business Aviation Association.[Footnote 21]
Additionally, a majority indicated that they had established procedures
for disseminating security-related information to airport employees and
tenants.
TSA issued threat advisories for dissemination by general aviation
associations to general aviation airports. However, industry
association representatives and state aviation officials we spoke with
stated that these security advisories were general in nature and were
not consistently received. An example of one of TSA's threat advisories
is shown in figure 5 below.
Figure 5: Example of Security Advisory Issued by TSA:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Timely, specific, and actionable information are three key principles
of effective risk communication. However, TSA faces inherent challenges
in applying risk communication principles because of: (1) the
generality of intelligence information received from the intelligence
community, (2) a limited capability to identify appropriate officials
and airports to receive threat information, and (3) potential
restrictions placed on communicating classified or sensitive security
information to general aviation stakeholders. Providing threat
information to the public or those with a need to know in accordance
with these principles is challenging and extends beyond threat
communications related to general aviation.
The first challenge TSA, along with other federal agencies, faces in
applying risk communication principles is the generality of
intelligence information and the difficulties the government faces in
developing such information. According to TSA, gathering specific
threat information is difficult because the threat posed by a
particular person or group varies over time with changes in the
terrorist organization's structure, objectives, methodologies, and
capabilities. Targets also change depending on the security of the
target in question; likelihood of success; mission complexity; and
potential psychological, emotional, and financial impact of the attack.
These variations in groups and targets make predicting how and when a
terrorist event could occur difficult. Nonetheless, we have reported
that public warning systems should, to the extent possible, include
specific, consistent, accurate, and clear information on the threat at
hand, including the nature of the threat, location, and threat time
frames along with guidance on actions to be taken in response to the
threat.[Footnote 22] According to risk communication principles,
without adequate threat information, the public may ignore the threat
or engage in inappropriate actions, some of which may compromise rather
than promote the public's safety.
A second challenge faced by TSA in communicating threat information to
general aviation airports is the lack of current, reliable, and
complete information about who to contact to facilitate communication.
General aviation airport operators are widely spread among a diverse
range of airports that have historically been subject to little or no
federal regulation or contact. As a result, contact information about
who the owners or operators of individual airports are may not be
complete, current, or readily available. Neither FAA nor TSA maintains
a current database with contact information for all general aviation
airports. Thus, identifying who should receive threat information at
the nearly 19,000 airports poses a significant challenge. While general
aviation industry associations typically maintain contact information
on their members, association officials stated that when they need
contact information on general aviation airports they generally use
data from the FAA.
A third challenge TSA faces in providing classified threat information
to general aviation airport operators is determining which airport
officials have a need and clearance to receive classified or sensitive
intelligence information. In general, the more detailed and specific
the threat information, the more likely the information is classified
and, therefore, not available to those without appropriate security
clearances. TSA officials said they had sanitized threat information in
order to issue the five security advisories to general aviation
industry associations in an unclassified format. TSA officials said
they had also granted security clearances to individuals at certain
industry associations who were willing to undergo the required
background check process. However, although TSA has developed the
ability to communicate classified threat information to some general
aviation industry representatives, the agency still faces limitations
on its ability to ensure that airport operators with a need to know
have access to classified threat information, and have the appropriate
clearances.
According to TSA officials, the agency's approach to risk management
should improve its ability to communicate threat information to the
general aviation community by addressing the three challenges mentioned
above. Specifically, once TSA completes threat and criticality
assessments and--in coordination with general aviation airport
managers--vulnerability assessments, the agency will have a greater
sense of the threats that individual general aviation airport managers
should be aware of and therefore be able to communicate more useful and
specific threat information. Conducting vulnerability and criticality
assessments should also help TSA identify airports for which current
and reliable contact information is needed, and identify airport
officials with a need to know classified threat information.
TSA and FAA Have Taken Actions to Reduce Security Risks Associated with
General Aviation but Face Regulatory and Funding Challenges:
TSA and FAA have taken steps to address security risks associated with
general aviation through regulation, guidance, and funding. However, in
response to the September 11 attacks, TSA has primarily focused on
strengthening the security of commercial aviation and meeting
associated congressional mandates. As a result, TSA has dedicated fewer
resources to strengthening general aviation security, and both TSA and
FAA continue to face challenges in their efforts to further enhance
security. For example, TSA has developed a regulation governing
background checks of foreign candidates for flight training at U.S.
flight schools and issued security guidelines for general aviation
airports.[Footnote 23] However, TSA has not yet developed a schedule
for conducting inspections or determined the resources needed for
monitoring compliance with new regulations. In addition, should TSA
establish security requirements for general aviation airports, it may
be difficult for airport operators to finance security enhancements
independently and federal funding will also be a challenge since
general aviation airports' needs must compete with the needs of
commercial airports for security funding. FAA, in coordination with TSA
and other federal agencies, has implemented airspace restrictions over
certain landmarks and events, among other things, to guard against
potential terrorist threats. FAA officials said that they
intermittently reviewed the continuing need for flight restrictions
limiting access to airspace for indefinite periods of time--those
established at the request of the Department of Defense and for the
defense of the national capital region. However, they had not
established written procedures or criteria for revalidating the need
for restrictions to ensure such reviews were consistently conducted. In
addition, we found limitations in the process used by TSA to review and
make recommendations regarding waivers to allow general aviation pilots
to fly through security related flight restrictions.
DOJ, FAA, and TSA Have Issued Requirements for Student Pilots, but
Limitations Exist:
Recognizing the threat posed by larger aircraft, whether carrying
passengers or cargo, the Department of Justice, in February 2003,
issued a requirement that all non-U.S. citizens seeking flight training
in aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more must undergo a comprehensive
background check.[Footnote 24] Both TSA and FAA subsequently issued
regulations intended to limit access to aircraft for certain segments
of the general aviation community by increasing requirements for
background checks of pilots. As table 2 shows, TSA and FAA promulgated
new regulations governing the screening and validation of pilot and
student pilot identities.
Table 2: TSA and FAA Regulatory Actions Governing the Screening and
Validation of Pilot and Student Pilot Identities:
Date: Feb. 2002;
Agency: TSA[A];
New requirement: Individuals must successfully complete a fingerprint-
based criminal history records check before serving as a flight crew
member.
Date: Feb. 2002;
Agency: FAA[B];
New requirement: Flight crew operating aircraft to or from College Park
Airport, Potomac Airfield, or Washington Executive/Hyde Field must
successfully complete a background check by a law enforcement agency
and that may include a fingerprint- based criminal history records
check. (All three airports are within 15 nautical miles of key
landmarks such as the Washington Monument.)
Date: Oct. 2002;
Agency: FAA[C];
New requirement: All pilots must carry and present picture
identification along with their pilot certificates.
Date: Jan. 2003;
Agency: FAA and TSA[D];
New requirement: FAA may suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue an airman
certificate to anyone (any citizen or noncitizen) when notified by TSA
after TSA's determination that such a person is a threat to
transportation security.
Date: July 2003;
Agency: FAA;
New requirement: FAA began issuing the new certificates made of plastic
and incorporating security features such as a hologram of the FAA seal
to replace the old paper certificates.
Date: Dec. 2003;
Agency: TSA[E];
New requirement: All non-U.S. citizens or nationals seeking flight
training at a U.S. flight school must undergo a comprehensive
background check by TSA, regardless of aircraft weight.
Source: GAO's analysis of regulations.
[A] 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.229 & 1544.230.
[B] 14 C.F.R. Part 91, SFAR 94.
[C] 14 C.F.R. § 61.3.
[D] 14 C.F.R. § 61.18 and 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540.115 & 1540.117.
[E] Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 612, 117 Stat. @ 2572-74 (TSA has yet to
finalize its implementing regulation).
[End of table]
Prior to September 11, FAA did not require background checks of anyone
seeking a pilot license, also referred to as a pilot certificate. In
November 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act required
that foreign student pilots seeking training in aircraft weighing
12,500 pounds or more undergo a background check by the Department of
Justice. Under regulations issued by the Department of Justice, flight
training providers are responsible for ensuring that aliens applying
for flight training in aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more fill out
and submit a Department of Justice Flight Training Candidate Checks
Program form and are fingerprinted.[Footnote 25] The Foreign Terrorist
Tracking Task Force is to perform a criminal history background check
of the foreign candidate and notify the flight training provider
whether or not the foreign candidate is cleared to receive flight
training.[Footnote 26] According to officials from the Foreign
Terrorist Tracking Task Force, a number of foreign student pilot
candidates have been denied from enrolling in a flight training program
between March 17, 2003 and August 18, 2004.[Footnote 27] FAA officials
said that in February 2002 they took additional steps to make sure that
foreign student pilots who already had student pilot certificates when
the new requirements went into effect were checked.
In December 2003, the Vision 100--The Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act (Vision 100)[Footnote 28] transferred
responsibility for conducting background checks from the Department of
Justice to TSA and expanded the background check requirement to include
all foreign student pilots regardless of the aircraft's size in which
they train.[Footnote 29] TSA has developed a regulation implementing
the mandates of Vision 100 and, at the time of our review, planned to
publish the final regulation and assume the background check
responsibilities from the Department of Justice by September 30, 2004.
According to TSA officials, TSA's Alien Flight Student program will be
similar to the Department of Justice's Flight Training Candidate Checks
Program.[Footnote 30] A key challenge for TSA is fulfilling its
responsibility to enforce security related regulations will be
monitoring the compliance of flight training programs in the United
Sates and Puerto Rico with this new requirement. We found limitations
in the monitoring of these flight-training programs.
In addition to the Department of Justice regulations governing foreign
student pilots, FAA, in July 2002, implemented changes to the process
of issuing a U.S. pilot certificate to foreign nationals already
holding a pilot certificate from a foreign country.[Footnote 31]
Historically, FAA issued pilot certificates to pilots who held licenses
issued by nations that are members of the International Civil Aviation
Organization based on their foreign license. Members of the
organization, including the United States and 187 other nations,
(including nations known to sponsor terrorism) agreed to issue private
pilot certificates to those holding pilot licenses from other
organization member nations without requiring them to undergo skills
testing.
Because of the destructive potential of larger aircraft, the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act directed TSA to promulgate new rules
governing security requirements for certain public and private charter
operations. Generally, the "twelve-five rule" requires nonscheduled or
on-demand charter services (for passengers or cargo) using aircraft
weighing 12,500 pounds or more to implement a specific program of
security procedures similar to those required of scheduled commercial
airlines and public charters.[Footnote 32] Similarly, the "private
charter rule" requires private charter services using aircraft weighing
100,309.3 pounds (45,500 kilograms) or more, or that have 61 or more
passenger seats, to implement many of the same security procedures
required of the major airlines. However, we found that TSA faces
challenges in monitoring compliance with these new security
regulations. Figure 6 shows that selected existing security
requirements have been expanded from commercial air carriers to public
and private charter aircraft.
Figure 6: TSA Has Established Regulations that Expand Federal Security
Requirements from Commercial Air Carriers to Include Some Private and
Public Charter Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[A] The sterile area is the portion of an airport defined in the
airport security program that provides passengers access to boarding
aircraft through the screening of persons and property.
[End of figure]
Procedures for Determining Continued Need for Temporary Flight
Restrictions Have Not Been Developed:
Since September 11, 2001, FAA has issued temporary flight restrictions
(TFR) for some Department of Defense facilities and for the protection
of the national capital region for indefinite periods without a
documented process to justify their continuance. FAA imposes TFRs to
temporarily restrict aircraft operations within designated areas. Prior
to September 11, FAA issued TFRs primarily to safely manage airspace
operations during events of limited duration. Since then, however, FAA,
in coordination with TSA, the Department of Defense, and the Secret
Service, among others, has increasingly used TFRs for the purposes of
national security over specific events and critical
infrastructure.[Footnote 33]
FAA has authority over the U.S. National Airspace System and is the
agency responsible for implementing TFRs via the Notice to Airmen
system.[Footnote 34] For security-related TFRs, FAA generally requests
that TSA's Office of Operations Policy evaluate requests received from
federal and nonfederal entities--such as the FBI, the Department of the
Interior, and state or local government entities--associated with
National Special Security Events and selected sporting events.[Footnote
35] TSA evaluates such requests using security related criteria.
Based on their evaluation of requests for selected security-related
TFRs, TSA officials will make recommendations to FAA regarding whether
the TFR should be issued. On the basis of this information, FAA will
make a determination whether to issue the TFR through the Notice to
Airmen system.
The Number, Size, and in Some Cases Duration of TFRs Has Increased
since September 11, 2001:
According to FAA officials, prior to September 11, 2001, TFRs were
rarely issued for security purposes. Since then, however, FAA has
issued numerous TFRs for the purpose of national security as a result
of increased focus on aviation security. FAA officials stated that
Notices to Airmen and other records of TFRs were historically not kept
after the restrictions were removed, thus they were unable to provide
accurate information on the number of TFRs issued for national security
purposes prior to September 11, 2001. Since that time, however, FAA
officials said the agency had issued approximately 220 Notices to
Airmen and associated TFRs.
The size--that is, the amount of airspace restricted both vertically
and laterally--of some TFRs has increased. For example, prior to
September 11, TFRs for presidential visits had a radius of 3 nautical
miles with a ceiling of 3,000 feet.[Footnote 36] Since then,
presidential TFRs have had a radius of 30 nautical miles, with a
ceiling of 18,000 feet.[Footnote 37] The rationale for increasing the
size of presidential TFRs, according to FAA, was based on the
difficulty the military might have in preventing an airborne attack on
the President once an aircraft was within the 3-nautical mile zone.
Figure 7 illustrates the area now covered by a presidential TFR over
the Crawford Ranch in Texas when the President is in residence.
Figure 7: Temporary Flight Restriction over the Crawford Ranch in Texas
when the President Is Present:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In the case of the national capital region and selected military
installations, the duration of TFRs implemented for national security
reasons has been put in place and subsequently extended for indefinite
periods of time. For example, temporary flight restrictions in and
around the national capital region were established shortly after
September 11 and according to FAA officials, no set date has been
established for their removal. These restrictions in and around
Washington, D.C., are the flight-restricted zone and the Washington,
D.C. Metropolitan Air Defense Identification Zone, as shown in figure
8.[Footnote 38]
Figure 8: Washington, D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone Surrounding
the 15-Nautical-mile Radius Flight Restriction Zone:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The Air Defense Identification Zone consists of three overlapping
zones centered on the regions three major airports--Baltimore-
Washington International, Dulles International, and Reagan National
Airport--and extends approximately 30-nautical miles in all directions.
[End of figure]
In addition, FAA issued 21 TFRs around various military facilities
throughout the country because of security concerns at these facilities
after the terrorist attacks of September 11. While 8 of these TFRs have
since been canceled, 13 were still in effect as of July 27, 2004, with
no scheduled date for removal or documented analysis to justify their
continued need. According to FAA officials, the agency plans to convert
11 of these areas to national security areas.[Footnote 39] Once FAA
publishes revised aeronautical charts reflecting the new, permanent
advisories recommending that pilots avoid the airspace, FAA officials
said they plan to cancel the TFRs. In January 2004, FAA issued
proposals for converting the remaining two TFRs to permanently
prohibited airspace (where no flights are permitted). At the time of
our review, FAA was still reviewing comments on the proposal to
permanently restrict the surrounding airspaces. Figure 9 shows the
status of security-related TFRs FAA established over military
installations since September 11.
Figure 9: Remaining and Cancelled Security TFRs Over Military
Installations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
TFRs May Negatively Affect the General Aviation Industry:
TSA, FAA, and general aviation industry stakeholders we spoke with
stated that TFRs negatively affect primarily general aviation operators
and airports. According to aviation industry representatives we
contacted and FAA, the increase in the number, size, and duration of
TFRs and, at times, limited notice given prior to their establishment
since September 11 has resulted in numerous inadvertent violations of
restricted airspace. For example, the Washington, D.C. Air Defense
Identification Zone has been violated over 1,000 times, constituting
over 40 percent of all TFR violations since September 11, 2001. As
figure 10 shows, since September 2001, the number of violations of all
TFRs has increased dramatically. General aviation has accounted for
most TFR violations committed within U.S. airspace. Further, about 95
percent of all TFR violations occurred in airspace secured for either
presidential security or other national security purposes.
Figure 10: Violations of Temporary Flight Restrictions Have Increased:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Although no TFR violations have been shown to be terrorist related,
violators are subject to disciplinary action. According to FAA
officials, violations of a TFR typically result in a suspension of the
pilot's certificate ranging anywhere from 15 days to 90 days. They said
that the most common reason for TFR violations is pilots not reading
the Notices to Airmen for the flight area, a required preflight
procedure. Other reasons for violations included weather problems,
mechanical failures, and pilot in-flight disorientation (i.e., getting
lost). FAA officials stated that the number and severity of
disciplinary actions imposed on pilots violating TFRs have increased
since September 11. However, FAA officials were unable to provide
statistical information on the number and severity of disciplinary
actions for pilots violating TFRs before or since September 11.
The imposition of TFRs can also have an economic impact on general
aviation operations.[Footnote 40] TSA, FAA, and industry associations
we spoke with stated that the costs associated with restricting
airspace can be significant. The National Business Aviation Association
commissioned a study to estimate the economic impact TFRs have had on
general aviation since September 11.[Footnote 41] While we did not
independently assess the validity of the association's assumptions or
calculations, the study estimated that general aviation passengers and
firms lost over $1 billion because of increased costs to passengers and
lost revenues and additional operating costs for general aviation
firms.[Footnote 42]
We visited St. Mary's Airport in Brunswick, Georgia, to discuss the
economic impact of TFRs with an affected general aviation airport
operator.[Footnote 43] St. Mary's is located approximately 3 miles
south of the Kings Bay Naval Base, where FAA issued a security-related
TFR shortly after September 11. The airport operator stated that the
loss of much of the general aviation traffic through his airport
resulting from the TFR had significantly reduced his ability to
generate revenue to sustain operations. According to the operator, the
airport's proximity to the TFR around the base significantly deters
pilots from using the airport. Other airport operators we visited that
were affected by TFRs also cited their negative economic impacts. A
sign warning pilots to avoid restricted airspace near the St. Mary's
Airport is pictured in figure 11.
Figure 11: Sign at St. Mary's Airport in Brunswick, Georgia, Warning
General Aviation Pilots to Avoid Restricted Airspace:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Although TFRs may have economic and other negative impacts on the
general aviation industry, FAA did not establish a systematic process
for periodically reviewing the continuing need for TFRs over the
national capital region and the 13 TFRs over military installation, or
determine the long-term economic or other impacts on general aviation
operations of these restrictions. While FAA officials said they
frequently reviewed TFRs on an informal basis, they did not conduct
routine assessments of the continuing need for indefinite TFRs based on
a consistent, documented set of criteria or determine the impact of
these restrictions on general aviation. In June 2004, FAA officials, in
reporting to Congress on the Air Defense Identification Zone, did not
cite specific criteria or the process used to determine the continuing
need for the restrictions. Instead, FAA based its report primarily on
unspecified security reasons submitted by TSA. TSA officials cited the
continuing threat posed to the national capital region by organizations
such as al Qaeda. While the air defense identification zone around the
national capital region is unique, it is possible that future
circumstances may warrant the issuance of other temporary flight
restrictions of indefinite duration. Without documented procedures and
criteria, FAA cannot ensure that future reviews of flight restrictions
issued for indefinite periods are properly conducted, or consistently
ensure that restrictions on airspace are still needed.
We also found that TSA and FAA were limited in their ability to
mitigate the threat of airborne attack. This is a result of limitations
in airspace restrictions, and the practice of granting pilots waivers
to enter temporarily restricted airspace.
Enhancing Security at General Aviation Airports Is Difficult because of
Funding Challenges:
Enhancing general aviation security is difficult because of funding
challenges faced by the federal government and general aviation airport
operators. General aviation airports have received some federal funding
for implementing security upgrades since September 11, but have funded
most security enhancements on their own. General aviation stakeholders
we contacted expressed concern that they may not be able to pay for any
future security requirements that TSA may establish. In addition, TSA
and FAA are unlikely to be able to allocate significant levels of
funding for general aviation security enhancements, given competing
priorities of commercial aviation and other modes of transportation.
About 3,000 general aviation airports are eligible to receive FAA
Airport Improvement Program grants.[Footnote 44] General aviation
airports can use Airport Improvement Program grant funds for projects
that provide safety and security benefits. For example, 6 of the 31
airport managers we interviewed, including one of the largest general
aviation airports in the country, said they used Airport Improvement
Program grants to pay for some of their security enhancements after
September 11, 2001. In fiscal year 2002, general aviation airports
received $561 million in Airport Improvement Program grants, of which
$3.2 million (or about 0.6 percent) was awarded for security projects,
and in fiscal year 2003, $680 million, of which $1.3 million (or about
0.2 percent) was awarded for security projects.[Footnote 45] Because
general aviation airports are generally not subject to any federal
regulations for security,[Footnote 46] in order to meet eligibility
requirements for their grants, general aviation airport projects are
generally limited to those related to safety but have security
benefits, such as lighting and fencing, as well as the acquisition and
use of cameras, additional lighting, and motion sensors.[Footnote 47]
FAA officials stated that if new security requirements were established
for general aviation airports, security-related enhancement projects
related to these requirements would be eligible and receive priority
for Airport Improvement Program funding. However, given the competing
demands of commercial airports, the large number of general aviation
airports eligible for such funding, and the limitations of the Airport
Improvement Program,[Footnote 48] funding could be uncertain for
general aviation airport operators to meet any new security-related
requirements.
The Office for Domestic Preparedness within the Department of Homeland
Security administers two grant programs that could benefit general
aviation airports--the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the
Urban Areas Security Initiative.[Footnote 49] Under these programs,
states may purchase equipment to protect critical infrastructure,
including equipment for general aviation airports, if the state
declares general aviation airports critical infrastructures. During the
course of our review, we learned of one state that plans to spend a
small amount of Department of Homeland Security grants to improve the
security of general aviation airports. According to officials in
Wisconsin, the state plans to use at least $1.5 million of its $41
million Homeland Security Grant in 2004 to enhance security at general
aviation airports located along the Great Lakes.
Vision 100 also authorized the Department of Homeland Security to
establish a $250 million Aviation Security Capital Fund administered by
TSA to alleviate some of the demand on the Airport Improvement Program
for security enhancement grants. Of this amount, $125 million is
discretionary, with priority given to the installation of baggage-
screening equipment at commercial airports while the balance is
allocated by formula based on airport size and other security
considerations. TSA officials noted that Congress did not provide an
appropriation for fiscal year 2004 for the fund. If Congress decides to
make appropriations in the future for these purposes, general aviation
airports will still have to compete with commercial airports for this
discretionary funding. Given the extent of unmet security funding needs
at commercial airports, it seems unlikely that a significant proportion
of funding would be available for general aviation. For example,
estimates to install explosive detection system machinery with
commercial airport baggage systems range from $3 billion to $5 billion.
At the time of our review, $1.2 billion had been appropriated for this
effort, and according to the House Committee on Appropriations,
airports will be funded, at best, for about half of their installation
needs. Even if funds were available, TSA would face a challenge in
establishing and prioritizing security projects eligible for Aviation
Security Capital Fund grants across a wide spectrum of general aviation
airports with diverse characteristics. Although funding is limited for
airport improvement, someairport managers we spoke with said they had
expended thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars for security in
order to attract more tenants to their facility or to retain their
existing tenants.
Nonfederal Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Strengthen General Aviation
Security:
Nonfederal stakeholders with an interest in general aviation security-
-including industry associations, state governments, general aviation
airport operators (owners and managers), and users of general aviation
airports and aircraft--have taken steps to strengthen the security of
general aviation airports and operations. Industry associations have
developed and provided recommendations on best practices for enhancing
security around general aviation airports, have partnered with the
federal government to develop federally endorsed security guidelines,
and have sponsored and provided training for their own voluntary
security programs. Some states also have suggested best practices,
established regulations, and provided funding to general aviation
airports to reduce security vulnerabilities. General aviation airport
operators and tenants, such as air charter services, have also
implemented policy and procedural measures to restrict access to
airport property and aircraft. Many airports we visited and surveyed
had installed physical security enhancements, such as fencing,
lighting, surveillance cameras, and electronic access control gates,
and had hired additional security guards. General aviation aircraft
owners have also taken steps to protect their aircraft from misuse.
Industry Associations Have Provided General Aviation Airport Operators
Guidance on Security Practices and Made Recommendations to TSA:
Many of the general aviation industry associations we contacted had
developed guidance to help enhance the security of general aviation
operations and airports. For example, the following are some of the
recommendations or best practices designed to strengthen security at
general aviation airports made by some of the members of the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee's Working Group on General Aviation
Airports Security:[Footnote 50]
* Posting signs at general aviation airports warning against
unauthorized use of aircraft.
* Securing aircraft when unattended using existing mechanisms such as
door locks, keyed ignitions, and locked hangars to protect aircraft
from unauthorized use or tampering.
* Controlling vehicle access to areas where aircraft operate by using
signs, fences, or gates.
* Installing effective outdoor lighting to help improve the security of
aircraft parking, hangar, and fuel storage areas, as well as airport
access points.
* Allowing local law enforcement operational space at the airport to
provide a security presence that serves as a natural deterrent to
terrorism.
Several general aviation industry associations, in partnership with
TSA, have also initiated their own voluntary security programs to
address the security of general aviation operations and airports. For
example:
* The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, working with TSA,
established and operates the Airport Watch program. The program was
formed in March 2002--similar in concept to a neighborhood watch
program--to improve general aviation airport community awareness.
Through the program, the association provides warning signs for
airports, informational literature, and training videotapes to educate
pilots and airport employees on how the security of their airports and
aircraft can be enhanced. TSA operates a toll-free hotline (866-GA-
SECURE) where airport operators, managers, and pilots can report
suspicious activity to TSA. In May 2004 the hotline began receiving
calls regarding a variety of airport users' concerns of suspicious
activities or individuals in and around general aviation airports.
Figure 12 shows an example of the posters identifying the hotline TSA
provides to general aviation airports.
Figure 12: Airport Watch Program Signs Distributed to General Aviation
Airports Around the Country:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* The National Business Aviation Association developed a set of
security procedures that corporate aircraft operators can put into
place to increase the security of their operations. In January 2003,
the association, in partnership with TSA, initiated a pilot project,
called the TSA Access Certificate program, at Teterboro Airport in New
Jersey for operators who had established these procedures in a security
program and had their security program reviewed and approved by TSA.
TSA approval allows operators to operate internationally without the
need of a waiver each time they enter the country.[Footnote 51] (In
August 2003, TSA expanded the program to include corporate aircraft
operators based at Morristown, New Jersey, and White Plains, New York.)
According to association officials, the concept of a TSA-approved
security program could be applied to other types of general aviation
operations. Officials also stated that one operator of a single general
aviation aircraft applied for and received a TSA access certificate to
operate internationally.[Footnote 52]
* The National Agricultural Aircraft Association created a program to
educate aerial application pilots on safety and security issues (the
Professional Aerial Applicators Support System).[Footnote 53]
According to association officials, the training program qualifies
operators in most states to meet continuing education requirements
needed to maintain state agricultural aviation licenses.
In addition to providing security guidance and developing security
programs, 10 general aviation industry associations worked together to
make security recommendations to TSA to help prevent the unauthorized
use of general aviation aircraft in a terrorist attack. The group met
throughout the summer of 2003 to review and discuss numerous general
aviation airport security recommendations and evaluated each
recommendation for its appropriateness and effect on enhancing security
at general aviation airports. On the basis of this review, the group
issued a report to TSA on suggested security guidelines.[Footnote 54]
States We Visited Varied in Their Efforts to Address General Aviation
Vulnerabilities:
We visited 10 states and found that their efforts to enhance general
aviation security reflected a range of activities. Some states had
implemented new requirements for security, funded security
enhancements, or provided guidance on best practices. Specifically, 2
of the 10 states we visited had imposed requirements for general
aviation airports and aircraft owners and operators since September 11,
2001.[Footnote 55]
* In July 2002, the Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission issued a
requirement that all airport employees--including general aviation
airport employees--wear special photo identification badges. According
to state officials, the badges enable airport personnel to distinguish
between those who are, and are not, authorized to be on airport
property.
* In March 2003, the Governor of New Jersey issued an executive order
that directed aircraft owners and operators who use the state's 486
licensed general aviation facilities to take steps to limit access to
aircraft. Called the "two-lock rule," the executive order requires that
all aircraft parked or stored at a general aviation facility in New
Jersey for more than 24 hours be protected by a minimum of two locks
that secure or disable the aircraft to prevent illegal or unlawful
operations.
Four of the 10 states we contacted provided funding for security
enhancements at general aviation airports. This funding, however, was
generally limited to matching funds for federal grants used to install
measures that had both a safety and a security benefit, such as airport
perimeter fencing and lighting projects. Some states had grant programs
that could be used strictly for security enhancements:
* For fiscal years 2002 through 2004, Georgia's Department of
Transportation Aviation Programs provided a total of $1,174,000 in
grants to general aviation airports for fencing, lighting, and
electronic card-reader gates.
* In February 2002, Tennessee's Aeronautics Commission issued a policy
that the state would provide 90 percent of the cost (not to exceed a
total of $50 million annually) on security-related projects at general
aviation airports. Eligible projects include security fencing and
gates, signage, security lighting and motion sensors, and surveillance
cameras and monitors.
* In 2003, the State of Washington established a $2 million annual
matching grant program for general aviation airport security
enhancements funded by proceeds from the state's aviation fuel tax.
* In 2004, Virginia appropriated $1.5 million to the state's Department
of Aviation specifically for security upgrades at general aviation
airports.
* California's Aviation Division established a grant program for
research and development projects that could fund security enhancements
at general aviation airports. However, the Aviation Division's budget
has not been sufficient to provide any grants from the program over the
past 3 years.
One of the 10 states we contacted provided guidance on security best
practices, while 2 others provided guidance on preparing airport-
specific security plans and self-assessments of vulnerabilities. In 3
of the 10 states, the incentive for airports to develop security plans
is tied to funding eligibility.
* In March 2003, Virginia's Aviation Department Director issued a set
of best practices and later established a voluntary security
certification program, encouraging airports to assess their
vulnerabilities and develop airport-specific security plans.
* In May 2002, Tennessee's Aeronautics Division issued guidance on
developing an airport emergency and security plan.
* In April 2003, Washington's Aviation Division issued security
guidelines for general aviation airports based on recommendations from
a task force of pilots, general aviation associations, airports, law
enforcement, and government agencies.
General Aviation Airport Managers and Aircraft Owners Are Primarily
Responsible for Security Enhancements:
Unlike commercial service airports, general aviation airports are not
subject to current federal security regulations,[Footnote 56] and,
therefore, general aviation managers and aircraft owners determine what
security measures they will use to protect their assets. To determine
security measures undertaken since September 11, we judgmentally
selected and visited 31 general aviation airports in 10 states open to
the public and part of FAA's National Plan of Integrated
Airports.[Footnote 57] Airport managers we contacted reported spending
as little as $10 for providing forgery-proof identification badges for
airport employees to as much as $3 million on, among other voluntary
measures at one airport, fencing and around-the-clock security guards.
In our survey, about a third (36 percent) of managers reported that
funds to pay for security improvements had come from airport revenues,
while about a fifth reported receiving federal grants (21 percent) and
a fifth reported receiving state grants (22 percent) to finance
security improvements.[Footnote 58]
According to 18 of the 31 airport managers and 3 of 5 tenants (e.g.,
fixed base operators)[Footnote 59] we visited, the security measures
and practices they implemented following the September 11 attacks were
self-initiated, common sense kinds of measures that were expected by
the public and their clients to help protect property from vandalism or
theft. Many of these measures were no-cost or low-cost security
enhancements based primarily on procedural changes. For example, for
those airports that did not have formal written security plans, airport
managers said they generally discussed security issues with their
tenants on a regular basis through meetings and e-mails. Other airports
that had formal written security plans or procedures updated those
security plans and procedures based on recommendations from industry
associations. Some of the 31 airport managers we visited said they had
arranged for more frequent patrols by local law enforcement officers
since September 11, some for no cost to the airports.
Many of the airports we visited had implemented an "airport watch"
program--similar to neighborhood watch programs--and displayed signs
designed and provided by the Airline Owners and Pilots Association, as
discussed above. Other airports absorbed the cost of installing new
signs warning against trespassing. Our survey of airport managers
identified an increase in the use of security awareness training since
September 11. For those aircraft owners who do not store their aircraft
in a hangar, forms of securing their aircraft from unauthorized use
include attaching devices to propellers, known as "prop locks," to
prevent them from rotating; and devices to cover throttle levers, known
as "throttle locks," to prevent someone from being able to start the
aircraft. Figure 13 shows two kinds of prop locks aircraft owners use.
According to airport and state aviation officials, prop locks range in
cost from about $150 to about $300.
Figure 13: Examples of Propeller Locks to Prevent Unauthorized Aircraft
Use:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Several of the airport managers we visited had invested in high-cost
security measures to minimize access by potential criminals and
terrorists to airport property and, thus, tenants' aircraft.
Specifically, airport officials we visited had obtained federal or
state grant assistance for purchasing additional fencing and lighting
or purchasing high-tech surveillance cameras. However, several airport
managers and tenants considered additional security a cost of
conducting business in the post-September 11 environment. Airports
officials generally said that they spent between $25,000 and $500,000
on security enhancements such as fencing, lighting, and electronic
access gates. While airport officials said they would like to add more
security enhancements, they were reluctant to spend much more on
enhancing security until TSA issued guidance on what security measures,
or combination of security measures, TSA considers appropriate. (As
noted previously, TSA issued security guidelines with recommended
enhancements in May 2004, after the majority of our site visits.)
Officials from the National Business Aviation Association said that
corporate aviation departments are more likely to take high-cost
measures to protect their aircraft. For example, some of the large
member corporations had provided information on the types of security
measures they used before September 11, to protect their aircraft from
tampering, theft, or hijacking. According to the association, these
included the types of security initiatives shown in table 3.
Table 3: Examples of Security Measures Used by Aviation Departments of
55 Fortune 500 Corporations:
All aircraft are stored in hangars: All hangars are closed and
monitored with security systems when the area is unattended.
All aircraft are stored in hangars: Mechanics are all company employees
or vetted contractors.
All aircraft are stored in hangars: Visitors are personally escorted.
All aircraft are stored in hangars: Aviation facilities are restricted
by an access control system.
All aircraft are stored in hangars: Aircraft doors are kept closed and
locked when the aircraft is in a secure hangar.
All aircraft are stored in hangars: Comprehensive background
investigations are conducted for flight crew personnel.
Source: National Business Aviation Association.
[End of table]
Conclusions:
From its inception, TSA has primarily focused its efforts on enhancing
commercial aviation security to prevent aircraft from again being used
as weapons. The amount of TSA's resources and the vastness and
diversity of the general aviation airport system mean the bulk of the
responsibility for determining vulnerabilities and instituting
security enhancements has fallen and will likely continue to fall on
airport operators. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, homeland security
and national preparedness often begins with the private sector. While
the federal government can provide guidance and some amount of funding
for security enhancements, long-term success in securing general
aviation depends on a partnership among the federal government, state
governments, and the general aviation industry.
Even with such a partnership, enhancing security at general aviation
airports presents TSA and the general aviation community with
challenges that will not be easily or quickly resolved. For example,
TSA's planned risk management approach for general aviation could
assist the agency in providing guidance and prioritizing funding for
security enhancements by assessing vulnerabilities and threats to
better target its efforts. However, without a documented implementation
plan for assessing threats and vulnerabilities that sets forth time
frames and goals and the resources needed to achieve these goals, there
is limited assurance that TSA will focus its resources and efforts on
areas of greatest need, monitor the progress of its efforts, and hold
responsible officials accountable for achieving desired results. In
addition, completing vulnerability and threat assessments in
partnership with general aviation airports should help TSA better
communicate threat information. However, because TSA must rely on other
federal agencies to provide threat information and follow federal
requirements governing disclosure of classified information, it is
difficult for TSA to adhere to risk communication principles,
particularly in providing specific and actionable information.
Nevertheless, effective communication of threat information is
important because misallocation of limited resources and disruption of
operations are possible effects of communicating nonspecific or
incorrect threat information.
While TSA and FAA have promulgated regulations to help reduce security
risks associated with access to aircraft and airspace, the intended
security benefit of these regulations may be limited for a variety of
reasons. For example, we found limitations in TSA's process for
monitoring flight training providers and operators of private charter
aircraft, and in granting waivers to pilots to fly through security
related flight restrictions. In addition, FAA has not documented its
process for reviewing and revalidating the need for continuing
security-related flight restrictions on airspace that are established
for indefinite periods. Without plans for monitoring compliance or
procedures to document agency processes, TSA and FAA cannot ensure that
these regulations achieve their intended effect or minimize the
negative impacts of the regulations on affected general aviation
industry stakeholders.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To better assess the threat of terrorists' misuse of general aviation
aircraft and to improve the quality of communicating terrorist threat
information to the general aviation community, we recommend that the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant
Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security
Administration to take the following two actions:
* Develop an implementation plan for executing a risk management
approach that will help identify threats and vulnerabilities. Such a
plan should include milestones, specific time frames, and estimates of
funding and staffing needed to focus its resources and efforts on
identified airports.
* After identifying the most critical threats and vulnerabilities,
apply risk communication principles, including to the extent possible
the nature of the threat, when and where it is likely to occur, over
what time period, and guidance on actions to be taken--in developing
and transmitting security advisories and threat notifications.
To help ensure that temporary flight restrictions issued for indefinite
periods are reviewed and, if appropriate, revalidated and consistently
applied, we recommend that the Secretary of the Transportation direct
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to establish a
documented process to justify the initiation and continuance of flight
restrictions for extended periods.
In our restricted report, we also made two recommendations to the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security regarding monitoring
compliance with regulations governing the identification of student
pilots, their training, and the operation of certain general aviation
aircraft; and the process for granting pilots waivers to enter
restricted airspace.
Agency Comments:
We provided draft copies of this report to the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Transportation, the Transportation Security
Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration for their
review and comment. TSA generally concurred with the findings and
recommendations in the report and provided formal written comments that
are presented in appendix II. TSA provided technical comments that we
incorporated as appropriate. FAA also generally concurred with the
findings and recommendations in the report and provided technical
comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of the Department of Transportation, the Assistant Secretary
of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security Administration,
and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration and
interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to
discuss it further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at
berrickc@gao.gov, or Chris Keisling, Assistant Director, at (404) 679-
1917 or at keislingc@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To determine what steps the federal government has taken to identify
and assess threats to and vulnerabilities of general aviation, and
communicate that information to stakeholders, we interviewed
individuals in the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
Office of Transportation Security Policy, Office of Operations Policy,
and General Aviation Operations and Inspections Office on TSA's role in
enhancing general aviation security. Individuals from these offices
provided documentation on TSA's threat assessment efforts as well as
its past vulnerability assessment activities and future vulnerability
assessment plans. We examined documentation on TSA's means of obtaining
intelligence information and disseminating that information to general
aviation stakeholders. We also interviewed individuals from FAA's
Special Operations Division and Airspace and Rules Division on their
roles in securing general aviation. We examined documentation from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) on intelligence regarding potential terrorist misuse of
general aviation. In addition, we examined documentation from TSA and
FBI on the reasons general aviation may be vulnerable to terrorist
misuse. We also spoke to staff in and examined documentation from TSA's
Office of Threat Assessment and Risk Management to obtain information
on plans to implement a risk management approach to further assess
threats and vulnerabilities and to enable the agency to implement risk
communication principles to communicate threat information.
To determine what steps the federal government has taken to strengthen
general aviation security, and what, if any, challenges the government
faces in further enhancing security, we obtained and analyzed
information from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), including data
on the number of flight restrictions that affect general aviation and
the amount of federal funding that has been spent on enhancing general
aviation security. We sought to determine the reliability of these data
by, among other things, discussing methods of inputting and maintaining
data with FAA officials. We spoke to TSA officials about, and examined
related documentation on, security guidelines published by TSA,
including documentation on TSA's activities with the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee's Working Group on General Aviation Airports
Security. We interviewed general aviation industry representatives,
including those who provided input to the TSA-sponsored Aviation
Security Advisory Committee's Working Group on General Aviation
Airports Security, to obtain their views on federal efforts to enhance
general aviation security. We also interviewed individuals from TSA's
Office of Compliance on the promulgation of regulations as a result of
the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, as well as
TSA's plans for ensuring operator compliance with these regulations. We
interviewed personnel from FAA's Special Operations Division regarding
FAA's issuance of temporary flight restrictions, including the criteria
and internal controls FAA uses to examine requests for these
restrictions from federal and nonfederal entities. As part of this
analysis, we took steps to verify the reliability of data from FAA on
the number of violations of temporary flight restrictions. We
interviewed FAA and TSA officials on potential limitations of the
effectiveness of these flight restrictions. We also contacted the
Director of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force on efforts to
screen foreign students applying for flight training in the United
States. We examined potential sources of funding for additional
security measures at general aviation airports, including challenges
associated with limited funding.
To determine the actions individual general aviation airport managers
have taken to enhance security at their airports, we visited 31 general
aviation airports in 10 states. We judgmentally selected these 31
airports to observe a cross section of general aviation airports.
However, we limited our selection of general aviation airports to the
2,829 listed in FAA's National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems,
because these airports are eligible for FAA funding and are open to use
by the general public. The remaining 16,000 general aviation airports
are generally privately owned and not open to use by the public, and/or
are small landing strips with fewer than 10 based aircraft, and are not
eligible for federal funding. To ensure we selected a cross section of
general aviation airports listed in the National Plan, we based our
selection on:
1. Size, using the number of based aircraft as an indicator--100 or
more aircraft we considered large, 25 to 99 medium, and 24 or fewer
small.
2. Regional location--northeast, northwest, southeast, and southwest
areas of the country.
3. Proximity to potential terrorist targets such as large population
centers versus sparse population areas, as well as near to and far from
other critical infrastructures and symbolic landmarks.
4. Airport characteristics, including number, length, and type (turf or
paved) of runways, and primary types of general aviation operations
such as recreational aviation, business and corporate aviation, charter
services, and flight training.
Because we judgmentally selected these general aviation airports, we
cannot draw generalized conclusions based on airport managers'
interview responses. However, the anecdotal information provided is
intended to complement the findings of our random survey of 500 general
aviation airports.
To obtain examples of what some states have done to enhance general
aviation security, we judgmentally selected 10 states with efforts to
enhance general aviation security ranging from issuing new security
requirements to those in the early stages of determining how they would
address general aviation security. To select this range of states, we
conducted a literature search to determine which states had proposed or
enacted new security laws, regulations, or requirements. We also
requested recommendations from the National Association of State
Aviation Officials and other industry associations such as the Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association, and noted which state aviation directors
had participated in the National Association of State Aviation
Officials' Task Group on General Aviation Security. We also considered
whether a state participated in FAA's block grant program in which FAA
provides airport improvement program grant money to a state in a lump
sum and the state determines which airport projects to fund, rather
than each airport applying directly to FAA for grant funds on a
project-by-project basis. Finally, on the basis of our resources, we
considered those states in which we also planned to visit general
aviation airports. Because we did not randomly select the states in
which we obtained information, we cannot draw generalized conclusions
about all states. However, the information obtained from these 10
states serves to provide examples of what some states have done to
enhance general aviation security.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Transportation Security Administration:
Office of the Assistant Secretary:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
601 South 12th Street:
Arlington, VA 22202-4220:
Transportation Security Administration:
OCT 26 2004:
Ms. Cathleen Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security & Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Berrick:
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) would like to thank
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) for the report entitled, "
GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY. Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, But
Continued Partnership with Private Sector is Critical to Long-Term
Success," GAO-05-144 (Job Code 440352). The report offers a welcome
review of the General Aviation community and contributes to the broad
understanding of the security environment for the 19,000 General
Aviation airports, 211,000 active aircraft, and 550,000 active pilots
and instructors.
TSA generally concurs with the GAO findings. TSA would like to
emphasize the vastness of the General Aviation community when
contemplating proposed security initiatives. For example, there are
approximately 300 sea and river ports and 453 commercial airports in
contrast to the 19,000 General Aviation airports. The size and
diversity of this community warrants careful consideration in any
proposed Federal oversight, initiatives, and/or guidelines.
TSA and General Aviation community partnerships are vital to developing
appropriate security initiatives.
TSA carefully considers security initiatives using a threat based, risk
management approach. TSA agrees with GAO that a continued partnership
with the General Aviation community is critical for mutual long-term
success. Here are some highlights of our results in partnering with
private stakeholders:
* General Aviation Security Guidelines: The Aviation Security Advisory
Committee (ASAC) partnered with TSA to develop General Aviation
security recommendations. These recommendations were included in TSA's
Information Publication A-001: "Security Guidelines for General
Aviation Airports."
* AOPA Airport Watch and GA Hotline: Development of the Airport Watch
program, which includes a general aviation "hotline" in coordination
with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA). This program
seeks to improve local awareness through public communications and
promotes the hotline for reporting suspicious behavior in the General
Aviation community.
* NBAA Security Protocol: Partnering with National Business Aviation
Association (NBAA), TSA developed guidelines based on industry best
practices to standardize security procedures for corporate flight
departments. These guidelines, endorsed by the International Business
Aviation Council (IBAC), have applicability to corporate general
aviation aircraft operating internationally.
In addition to the above, TSA also works cooperatively with the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) on requests for Temporary Flight
Restrictions (TFRs) and looks forward to collaborating in the future.
TSA has and will continue to coordinate and answer requests for the
implementation and removal of TFRs with the FAA.
These examples of voluntary, public-private partnership programs
demonstrate how TSA, in a short amount of time, has enhanced the
security of General Aviation by leveraging community networks and the
existing communication infrastructure.
Comments on the Public GAO Recommendations:
GAO recommendation to TSA (1): Develop an implementation plan for
executing a risk management approach that will help identify threats
and vulnerabilities. Such a plan should include milestones, specific
time frames, and estimates of funding and staffing needed to focus its
resources and efforts on identified airports.
TSA concurs. The agency is committed to a threat based, risk management
approach and will continue to apply that approach to General Aviation.
TSA has conducted a General Aviation threat assessment and, through
TSA's Transportation Security Intelligence Service (TSIS),
continuously monitors all-source intelligence and law enforcement
reporting for information relative to General Aviation. TSA
intelligence reporting practices and protocols are consistent
throughout all modes of transportation. TSA also maintains the General
Aviation hotline at the TSA Transportation Security Operations Center
(TSOC) where General Aviation related suspicious activity and threats
may be reported. In addition, TSA has piloted a General Aviation Self
Assessment Risk Module (TSARM). TSARM is a free web-based tool designed
to assist transportation asset owners/operators in developing security
plans and identifying potential vulnerabilities along with security
system upgrades. In addition to providing direct feedback to local
operators, it concurrently provides TSA timely infrastructure data to
consider in criticality assessments.
GAO recommendation to TSA (2): After identifying the most critical
threats and vulnerabilities, apply risk communication principles,
including to the extent possible the nature of the threat, when and
where it is likely to occur, over what time period, and guidance on
action to be taken-in developing and transmitting security advisories
and threat notifications.
TSA concurs. TSA supports the communication protocol as directed by the
Department of Homeland Security based on the methodology of risk
communication principles (see DHS statement GAO-04-682). Currently, TSA
sends out advisories to the General Aviation community that are
disseminated by both national and local General Aviation stakeholders.
In the few instances when there has been a specific threat, TSA has
provided the General Aviation community with information that is
timely, specific, and actionable. In addition, TSA has the ability to
provide SSI and classified information to General Aviation industry
stakeholders as appropriate. TSA does maintain extensive contact lists
of key General Aviation stakeholders, including home contact
information, and with its stakeholder network, TSA is able to respond
to specific threats in a timely manner.
In conclusion, thank you again for the GAO review to assist Congress to
better understand the dynamics of providing security in conjunction
with the General Aviation community. We appreciate your efforts to help
define the efforts and challenges ahead.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
David M. Stone:
Assistant Secretary:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-3404
Chris Keisling (404) 679-1917:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Leo Barbour, Grace Coleman, Chris
Ferencik, Kara Finnegan-Irving, Dave Hooper, Stan Kostyla, Thomas
Lombardi, Mark Ramage, Robert Rivas, Jerry Seigler, and Richard Swayze
were key contributors to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The range of general aviation flight operations encompasses
personal/family transportation, power line inspection and repair,
pipeline patrol, training, transporting medical supplies, emergency
services, rescue operations, wildlife and land surveys, traffic
reporting, agricultural aviation, firefighting, and law enforcement.
[2] The Aviation Security Advisory Committee was formed following the
1988 Pan American World Airways Flight 103 tragedy (Lockerbie,
Scotland) to allow all segments of the population to have input into
future aviation security considerations. The committee was originally
sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration. However, when the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act was signed into law, primary
responsibility for civil aviation security were transferred from the
Federal Aviation Administration to TSA, and accordingly, sponsorship of
the Aviation Security Advisory Committee also was transferred to TSA.
[3] We visited general aviation airports in Alabama, California,
Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.
[4] General aviation activities also take place at some commercial
airports, but we did not include commercial airports in the scope of
this review.
[5] Because this is a probability sample, population estimates based on
this sample data are subject to sampling error. All percentage
estimates based on this sample have 95 percent confidence intervals
that are within +/-6 percentage points of the estimate itself, unless
otherwise noted.
[6] Airport Watch is a program initiated by the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association working with TSA. The program is supported by a TSA-
sponsored toll free hotline (866-GA-SECURE) and warning signs for
airports, informational literature, and training videotapes provided by
the association.
[7] The TSA Access Certificate program is based on a set of security
protocols developed by the National Business Aviation Association. TSA
is testing this program at three airports in the Northeast for possible
use as a national security standard for corporate and business
operators.
[8] TSA considers general aviation aircraft to include all U.S.
registered civil aircraft not (1) operated under 14 C.F.R. Part 121
(scheduled commercial airlines), (2) military operations, and (3) on-
demand air carriers that operate nonscheduled commercial service under
14 C.F.R. Part 135
[9] For a more detailed discussion on the general aviation industry,
see GAO, General Aviation: Status of the Industry, Related
Infrastructure, and Safety Issues, GAO-01-916, (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
31, 2001).
[10] According to FAA's Airmen's Registry as of July 3, 2004.
[11] Airports that handle regularly scheduled commercial airline
traffic and have at least 2,500 annual passenger enplanements.
[12] Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-
71, § 101(a), (g), 115 Stat. 597, 603 (2001).
[13] FAA has sole authority to issue TFRs and other rules to restrict
aircraft from operating within defined areas, on a temporary or
permanent basis, in order to protect persons or property in the air or
on the ground. When time permits, FAA issues security-based TFRs after
consultation with TSA and other federal agencies, as appropriate.
[14] 49 C.F.R. parts 1540, 1542 & 1544 (formerly codified, in part, at
14 C.F.R. parts 107 & 108).
[15] Pub. L. No. 107-71, §§ 113(a) & 132, 115 Stat. at 622 & 635.
[16] Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(a), 115 Stat. at 598.
[17] Transportation Security Administration, Security Guidelines for
General Aviation Airports, Information Publication A-001, (May 2004).
[18] See GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management
Approach,. GAO-02-150T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001).
[19] For example, 49 C.F.R. Part 1520 limits TSA's ability to
distribute sensitive security information to persons with a need to
know, and Executive Order 13292--Further Amendment to Executive Order
12958, as Amended, Classified National Security Information, March 25,
2003, limits the distribution of classified information.
[20] The General Aviation Coalition consists of the major general
aviation organizations and focuses on addressing aviation issues of
common interest and concern. The coalition meets every 6 months with
the FAA Administrator and senior FAA managers to present and update
issues. The industry associations that make up the coalition consists
of the Aircraft Electronics Association, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association, the Experimental Aircraft Association, the General
Aviation Manufacturers Association, the Helicopter Association
International, the International Council of Air Shows, the National
Aeronautics Association, the National Agricultural Aviation
Association, the National Air Transportation Association, the National
Aircraft Resale Association, the National Association of State Aviation
Officials, the National Business Aviation Association, the Professional
Aviation Maintenance Association, the Small Aircraft Manufacturers
Association, the Soaring Society of America, the U.S. Parachute
Association, and the University Aviation Association.
[21] TSA officials said they also conducted outreach programs before
national events requiring special aviation security to educate the
general aviation community on flight restrictions and other planned
security measures and that TSA planned to assign a lead federal
security director in each state as a point of contact for states'
general aviation communities.
[22] GAO, Homeland Security: Risk Communication Principles May Assist
in Refinement of the Homeland Security Advisory System, GAO-04-538T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2004).
[23] TSA has proposed a regulation pursuant to section 612 of the
Vision 100ęCentury of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-
176, 117 Stat. 2490, 2572-74 (2003), to codify TSA's authority in light
of the transfer of responsibilities from the Department of Justice. The
Department of Justice issued and enforced regulations that require
background checks of foreign candidates for flight training pursuant to
section 113 of ATSA, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. at 622-23.
[24] 28 C.F.R. Part 105. Vision 100 subsequently amended this
requirement, transferring responsibility for conducting the background
checks to TSA and applying this requirement to all non-U.S. citizens
seeking flight training in aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds.
TSA has developed, but not yet implemented, regulations to this effect.
[25] 28 C.F.R.Part 105.
[26] The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force was created in response
to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2, Oct. 29, 2001. The
purpose of the task force is to (1) deny entry into the United States
of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting
terrorist activity; and (2) locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any
such aliens already present in the United States. The directive
required that the task force be staffed by personnel from the
Department of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Customs
Service, the intelligence community, military support components, and
other federal agencies as appropriate. The Department of Justice
delegated authority for establishing and administering the Flight
Training Candidate Checks Program to the Foreign Terrorist Tracking
Task Force.
[27] The regulations establishing the Flight Training Candidate Checks
Program became effective on March 17, 2003. 68 Fed. Reg. 7,313 (Feb.
13, 2003) (codified at 28 C.F.R. Part 105).
[28] Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 612, 117 Stat. at 2572-74.
[29] As of July 2004, FAA reported that 3,742 foreign student pilots
had active student certificates and TSA officials estimated that over
200,000 pilots currently licensed by FAA are non-U.S. citizens.
[30] According to TSA officials, most foreign candidates must receive a
U.S. student or work visa to receive flight training in the
United.States. Under the Department of Justice's Flight Training
Candidate Checks Program, the Department of State would not issue such
visas to foreign candidates unless they had received preliminary
approval from the Department of Justice. TSA officials said that TSA
intends to work with the Department of State to continue this process
when the TSA regulation is finalized.
[31] According to TSA officials, responsibility for conducting these
checks will transfer from Department of Justice to TSA in October 2004.
[32] Prior to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, certain
aviation charter services were already subject to security
requirements. For example, charter services using aircraft with 31
seats or more were required to meet security requirements similar to
those in place for scheduled commercial air carriers.
[33] FAA may issue TFRs related to security including TFRs issued for
sporting events and significant national landmarks (14 C.F.R. § 99.7.)
In addition, FAA may issue security-related TFRs by working directly
with the Secret Service for the security of the President and other
dignitaries (14 C.F.R. § 91.141) and the Department of Defense for
protection of certain military facilities (14 C.F.R. § 99.7).
[34] Notices to Airmen are a method by which FAA communicates to pilots
information that is time-critical and is either of a temporary nature
or is not known far enough in advance to permit publication on
aeronautical charts or other operation publications. This can include
the establishment, condition, or change in any facility, service,
procedure, or hazard in the national airspace system. They may be
regulatory (restrictive) or advisory in nature, or both.
[35] The Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the
Homeland Security Council, is responsible for designating events as
National Special Security Events. A recent example was the 2004 G-8
Summit in Sea Island, Georgia.
[36] Presidential TFRs are issued to address security with respect to
airspace over presidential and other parties. No person may operate an
aircraft in the vicinity of an area to be visited or traveled by the
President, Vice President, or other public figures for which this type
of restriction is issued. According to TSA officials, the size of TFRs
issued for dignitaries other than the President did not increase after
September 11, 2001.
[37] The first 10 nautical miles from the center of the TFR constitute
a no-fly zone. The area from 10 to 30 nautical miles of the TFR
constitute an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) where operators
must obtain a unique beacon code to identify themselves and maintain
constant radio contact with air traffic controllers.
[38] 14 C.F.R. § 99.3 defines an air defense identification zone as an
area of airspace over land or water in which the ready identification,
location, and control of civil aircraft is required in the interest of
national security. General aviation aircraft must meet certain
operational requirements; that is, pilots must have an approved flight
plan by FAA, maintain two-way radio communications with air traffic
control, and have a transponder that transmits a unique code. According
to TSA officials, smaller general aviation aircraft are limited in
their ability to access the flight restricted zone because of limited
operational capabilities needed to operate in the air defense
identification zone. FAA officials noted that additional airspace,
extending in places as much as 45 nautical miles from the Washington
Monument, is also included in the zone.
[39] In commenting on the draft report, FAA officials noted that one of
the 11 remaining military TFRs--Anniston, Alabama--was canceled and
established as a national security area after completed we completed
our review. National security areas are established at locations where
there is a requirement for increased security and safety of ground
facilities. For example, FAA designated a national security area over
Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, located in Colorado. Pilots
are advised to avoid flying over these designated areas. During times
of heightened alert levels, FAA may increase the national security area
advisories to TFRs.
[40] These costs may be expected to increase with the number of TFRs,
and with their size and duration. A TFR that encompasses a large area
and is in effect for a long period of time is more likely to cause
flights to be cancelled, delayed, or diverted than is a TFR that covers
a smaller area or is in effect for only a short while.
[41] Key assumptions underlying the study's estimates were that the
typical TFR lasts about 4 hours and affects approximately 15 flights
per hour. Of the affected flights, about 40 percent were assumed to be
delayed, with about 50 percent assumed to be diverted, imposing costs
on passengers and aircraft operators.
[42] HLB Decision Economics INC (HLB Reference 6795) March 2004, "The
Economic Costs of Restricting General Aviation Access to Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport and TFRs (Temporary Flight Restrictions)
Since September 11, 2001." The study estimated that, from September 11,
2001, through March 2004, 2,898 TFRs affected general aviation in the
following ways: approximately 11,101 general aviation flight
cancelations, 74,334 general aviation flight postponements, and 103,162
general aviation flight diversions to more circuitous routes.
[43] St. Mary's would be directly affected by FAA proposals to
permanently prohibit flight operations within airspace under temporary
flight restrictions at the time of our review.
[44] These airports are eligible to receive Airport Improvement grants
because they have submitted applications to be included in and have
been accepted in FAA's National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems.
These grant funds are usually limited to planning, designing, and
constructing projects such as runways, taxiways, aprons, and land
purchases. However, they may also be used for security and safety
purposes. Eligible safety and security projects include improvements or
equipment that is required by federal regulation or, according to FAA
officials, if TSA makes an airport-specific determination that security
enhancements are needed.
[45] The amounts of 2002 and 2003 Airport Improvement Program funds do
not include grants provided to general aviation airports in states that
receive FAA block grants since detailed information about the total
amounts given to general aviation airports or the amounts of those
funds that went for general aviation security are not readily
available, according to FAA officials. Airport Improvement Program
block grant states are Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee Texas, and Wisconsin.
[46] The Potomac, Washington Executive/Hyde Park, and Montgomery County
general aviation airports in Maryland are subject to federal security
regulations.
[47] The Aviation and Transportation Security Act had extended
eligibility for Airport Improvement Program funding to any additional
security-related facilities and equipment required by law or the
Secretary of Transportation after September 11, 2001, and before
October 1, 2002.
[48] GAO, Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to
Meet Airports' Planned Developments, GAO-03-497T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 25, 2003).
[49] The Office of Domestic Preparedness allocated nearly $1.7 billion
in State Homeland Security grants among the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, and five territories for fiscal year 2004, and an additional
$671 million in Urban Area Security Initiative grants among 50
metropolitan areas.
[50] The members of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working
Group on General Aviation Airports Security are the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association, the Airports Consultants Council, the American
Association of Airport Executives, the Experimental Aircraft
Association, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, the
Helicopter Association International, the National Air Transportation
Association, the National Association of State Aviation Officials, the
National Business Aviation Association, and the U.S. Parachute
Association.
[51] According to general aviation industry association officials,
general aviation aircraft operators wishing to fly to the United States
from other countries must stop in one of seven portal countries before
entering the country.
[52] TSA officials noted that all certificate holders are corporations.
[53] According to the association, the majority of its members are
licensed as commercial applicator-operators who use aircraft to enhance
food and fiber production, protect forestry, and control health-
threatening pests.
[54] Report of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group
on General Aviation Airports Security, October 1, 2003, Transportation
Security Administration, Washington, D.C.
[55] In addition, TSA officials said that New York had mandated that
all general aviation airports in the state apply TSA's security
guidelines.
[56] 49 C.F.R. Part 1542.
[57] A primary purpose of the National Plan of Integrated Airports
(NPIAS) is to identify the airports that are important to national
transportation and, therefore, eligible to receive grants under the
Airport Improvement Program. The NPIAS is composed of all commercial
service airports, all reliever airports, and selected general aviation
airports. The word "airport" includes landing areas developed
specifically for helicopters and seaplanes as well as conventional
fixed wing aircraft landing areas.
[58] We conducted a probability sample consisting of 499 or the 2,829
general aviation airports that are open to the public and part of FAA's
National Plan of Integrated Airports (NPIAS). We conducted this survey
between March and May 2004, and obtained 344 eligible responses. From
this sample, estimates are produced for a target population defined as
managers of service level general aviation airports that were included
in the FAA National Plan of Integrated Airports database as of January
2004. Because we used a probability sample, the estimates could be
different for a different random sample. For estimated percentages in
this report, we are 95 percent confident that the actual value is
within +/-6 percentage points of the survey estimate.
[59] Fixed-base operators provide a variety of services to pilots, such
as flight training, aircraft rental, fueling, maintenance, parking, and
the sale of pilot supplies.
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