Transportation Security R&D
TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management Gao ID: GAO-04-890 September 30, 2004Conducting research and development (R&D) on technologies for detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation's transportation system. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted legislation to strengthen homeland security, in part by enhancing R&D. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are the two federal agencies with primary responsibility for transportation security. GAO was asked to assess the transportation security R&D projects that TSA, DHS, and other agencies have funded and assess how TSA and DHS are managing their transportation security R&D programs according to applicable laws and best practices.
For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA and DHS funded over 200 R&D projects designed to develop technologies for enhancing security in most modes of transportation. In fiscal year 2003, TSA spent 81 percent of its $21 million transportation security R&D budget for aviation projects, and DHS spent about half of its $26 million for projects related to more than one mode of transportation. In fiscal year 2004, TSA continued to budget most of its $159 million for aviation, and DHS also budgeted most of its $88 million for aviation. According to the National Research Council, federal R&D programs should include some basic research, but TSA and DHS do not appear to be funding any basic research for transportation security. TSA and DHS have not estimated deployment dates for the vast majority of their R&D projects. Other federal agencies, such as the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, also funded some transportation security R&D projects. Several members of an expert panel on transportation security and technology that GAO convened believed the distribution of R&D projects by transportation mode was reasonable, while others believed that aviation has been overemphasized at the expense of maritime and land modes. TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best practices, but neither agency has fully complied with the laws or implemented the best practices. For example, neither agency has prepared a strategic plan for R&D that contains measurable objectives. In addition, although TSA has completed threat assessments for all modes, it has not completed vulnerability and criticality assessments. DHS also has not completed risk assessments of the infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, both TSA and DHS lack complete, consolidated data for managing their R&D projects. Finally, although TSA and DHS have made some efforts to coordinate R&D with other federal agencies, their outreach to consider the concerns of the transportation industry has been limited.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-890, Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
September 2004:
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY R&D:
TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing Technologies, but Need to
Improve R&D Management:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-890]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-890, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Conducting research and development (R&D) on technologies for
detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to
enhancing the security of the nation‘s transportation system. Following
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted legislation
to strengthen homeland security, in part by enhancing R&D. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) are the two federal agencies with primary
responsibility for transportation security.
GAO was asked to assess the transportation security R&D projects that
TSA, DHS, and other agencies have funded and assess how TSA and DHS are
managing their transportation security R&D programs according to
applicable laws and best practices.
What GAO Found:
For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA and DHS funded over 200 R&D
projects designed to develop technologies for enhancing security in
most modes of transportation. In fiscal year 2003, TSA spent 81 percent
of its $21 million transportation security R&D budget for aviation
projects, and DHS spent about half of its $26 million for projects
related to more than one mode of transportation. In fiscal year 2004,
TSA continued to budget most of its $159 million for aviation, and DHS
also budgeted most of its $88 million for aviation, as shown in the
table below. According to the National Research Council, federal R&D
programs should include some basic research, but TSA and DHS do not
appear to be funding any basic research for transportation security.
TSA and DHS have not estimated deployment dates for the vast majority
of their R&D projects. Other federal agencies, such as the Department
of Transportation (DOT) and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, also funded some transportation security R&D projects.
Several members of an expert panel on transportation security and
technology that GAO convened believed the distribution of R&D projects
by transportation mode was reasonable, while others believed that
aviation has been overemphasized at the expense of maritime and land
modes.
TSA‘s and DHS‘s Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004:
Aviation;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $17,101 (81.1%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $126,487 (79.5%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $3,709 (14.3%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $63,240 (71.9%).
Highway;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $0 (0.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $1,052 (4.1%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $3,000 (3.4%).
Maritime;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $9,350 (5.9%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $3,474 (13.4%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $1,626 (1.8%).
Multimodal;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $3,819 (18.1%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $22,242 (14.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $12,630 (48.8%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $20,117 (22.9%).
Pipeline;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $0 (0.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $0 (0.0%).
Rail;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $169 (0.8%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $1,096 (0.7%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $0 (0.0%).
Transit;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $0 (0.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $5,000 (19.3%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $0 (0.0%).
Total;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $21,089 (100.0%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $159,175 (100.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $25,865 (100.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $87,983 (100.0%).
Source: GAO analysis of TSA and DHS data.
[End of table]
TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation
security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best
practices, but neither agency has fully complied with the laws or
implemented the best practices. For example, neither agency has
prepared a strategic plan for R&D that contains measurable objectives.
In addition, although TSA has completed threat assessments for all
modes, it has not completed vulnerability and criticality assessments.
DHS also has not completed risk assessments of the infrastructure
sectors. Furthermore, both TSA and DHS lack complete, consolidated
data for managing their R&D projects. Finally, although TSA and DHS
have made some efforts to coordinate R&D with other federal agencies,
their outreach to consider the concerns of the transportation industry
has been limited.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that TSA and DHS improve their transportation
security R&D management by conducting some basic research, completing
their strategic planning and risk assessment efforts, developing a
management information system, and better coordinating with other
federal agencies and reaching out to the transportation industry. DHS,
TSA, and DOT generally agreed with the report‘s findings and
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-890.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Kate Siggerud at (202)
512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
TSA, DHS, and Others Are Funding Transportation Security R&D Projects
and Experts Had Mixed Views about Some Projects:
TSA and DHS Have Made Some Progress in Managing Their R&D Programs but
Have Not Yet Fully Completed Their Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Industry Is Independently Developing New and Emerging
Transportation Security Technologies:
Appendix III: GAO's Panel of Transportation Security and Technology
Experts:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
GAO Comments:
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: TSA's and DHS's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode,
Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004:
Table 2: TSA's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004:
Table 3: DHS's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004:
Table 4: DOT's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004:
Table 5: TSA's and DHS's Implementation of Statutory Requirements and
Best Practices for Managing Their R&D Programs:
Figures:
Figure 1: Major Events in the Establishment of TSA and DHS:
Figure 2: A Walk-through Explosives Trace Detection Portal:
Figure 3: Distribution of TSA's R&D Funding by Phase, Fiscal Years 2003
and 2004:
Figure 4: Photograph of a MANPADS:
Figure 5: A Mobile Search X-ray Inspection System for Detecting Truck
Bombs:
Figure 6: Distribution of DHS's R&D Funding by Phase, Fiscal Years 2003
and 2004:
Abbreviations:
CAPPS II: Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FHWA: Federal Highway Administration:
HSARPA: Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency:
MANPADS: man-portable air defense systems:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
R&D: research and development:
TRIP: Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TSWG: Technical Support Working Group:
Letter September 30, 2004:
Congressional Requesters:
Researching and developing technologies to detect, prevent, and
mitigate terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the
nation's transportation system. Following the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, Congress enacted legislation to strengthen homeland
security, in part by enhancing research and development (R&D) for
transportation security--especially for aviation. The recent bombings
of the rail system in Madrid, Spain, have heightened concern about the
security of all modes of transportation in the United States, and
concern is growing in Congress about whether the Transportation
Security Administration's (TSA) and the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) efforts to counter terrorist threats to the nation's
transportation systems are proceeding fast enough and are focused on
the appropriate technologies.
To enhance the nation's transportation security, including its R&D
capabilities, in November 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, which created TSA within the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and made TSA responsible for security in all modes
of transportation (aviation, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, and
transit). The Homeland Security Act of 2002, passed a year later,
established DHS; transferred TSA and many other federal agencies to
DHS; and made DHS responsible for homeland security, including
transportation security. The act specified, however, that TSA would
remain a distinct entity within DHS until November 25, 2004. Both laws
authorized funding for homeland and transportation security R&D and
established requirements for its management, including requirements for
planning and coordination, but neither law includes deadlines for
implementing these requirements. As you requested, we are reporting on:
* the transportation security R&D projects that TSA, DHS, and other
agencies funded in fiscal year 2003 and have budgeted for in fiscal
year 2004; the status of these projects; and experts' views on the
reasonableness of the distribution of these projects by mode and:
* the extent to which TSA and DHS are managing their transportation
security R&D programs according to applicable laws and best practices
recommended by the National Academy of Sciences and the National
Research Council.
In addition, we are reporting on some new and emerging technologies for
screening passengers, baggage, and cargo (see app. II). For this
review, we considered transportation security R&D to encompass the
research, development, testing, and evaluation of technologies to
protect the nation's transportation system from terrorist attacks or
major crimes. The transportation system consists largely of (1)
infrastructure, such as airports, seaports, border crossings, rail
stations, transit stations, highways, bridges, tunnels, and pipelines,
and (2) vehicles, such as aircraft, ships, ferry boats, trucks, buses,
automobiles, and trains. We refer to the key modes of transportation as
aviation, highways, maritime, pipeline, rail (passenger and freight),
and transit (buses and subways). Because TSA and DHS each has its own
R&D portfolio, we discuss the two agencies' transportation security-
related R&D programs separately in this report. When we discuss TSA's
R&D portfolio, we include projects funded by TSA's Office of Security
Technologies, Office of Maritime and Land Security, and Office of
Aviation Operations. Our discussion of DHS's transportation security
R&D portfolio includes projects funded by DHS's Science and Technology
Directorate, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and
U.S. Secret Service.
To describe the types of transportation security R&D projects that TSA
and DHS are funding in fiscal year 2003 and plan to fund in fiscal year
2004, we analyzed detailed information on their transportation security
R&D projects. Detailed information on the transportation security R&D
projects that TSA and DHS plan to fund in fiscal year 2005 was not yet
available. Although TSA and DHS are the primary federal agencies
responsible for conducting transportation security R&D, DOT and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) also fund some
transportation security R&D projects, and we included information on
those agencies' projects in this report. We discussed the reliability
of project and budgetary information with TSA and DHS officials and
determined that the data they provided were sufficiently reliable for
us to complete our review. To determine the extent to which TSA and DHS
are managing their transportation security R&D programs according to
applicable laws and best practices, we analyzed applicable legal
requirements for TSA and DHS and best practices for managing R&D
identified by the National Academy of Sciences and the National
Research Council; analyzed documentation relating to both agencies'
programs; and interviewed TSA and DHS officials about their strategic
planning and risk management. We also interviewed TSA and DHS
officials, as well as other stakeholders, about the agencies'
coordination with other federal agencies and outreach to technology
providers and the transportation industry. To help evaluate the
reasonableness of the distribution of transportation security R&D
funding by mode and the challenges that TSA and DHS are facing in
managing their programs, we convened a panel of transportation security
and technology experts on March 2, 2004. At our request, the National
Research Council selected the experts, who were affiliated with state
transportation departments, universities, national laboratories,
private industry, and other organizations and were knowledgeable about
transportation security technologies.
We conducted our review at TSA, DHS, and DOT in Washington, D.C; at
TSA's Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New Jersey;
and at the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Laboratories in Los
Alamos, New Mexico, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Appendix I contains
detailed information about our scope and methodology, and appendix III
lists the transportation security and technology experts who assisted
us in our review. We conducted our review from July 2003 through
September 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
TSA and DHS are funding transportation security R&D projects that are
aimed at developing technologies to enhance security in most modes of
transportation. For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA funded 146
transportation security R&D projects, and DHS funded 56 projects. As
shown in table 1, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about $21 million on
transportation security R&D projects and budgeted about $159 million
for fiscal year 2004. In both years, TSA spent or budgeted most of its
R&D funding for aviation security. TSA's funding for aviation security
R&D increased from about $17 million in fiscal year 2003 to about $126
million for fiscal year 2004, partly because of an appropriation of $55
million for air cargo security R&D. Also as shown in table 1, in fiscal
year 2003, DHS spent about $26 million on transportation security R&D
projects and budgeted about $88 million for fiscal year 2004. In
contrast to TSA, in fiscal year 2003, DHS spent almost $13 million, or
about 49 percent, of its R&D funding on projects related to more than
one mode. However, similar to TSA, for fiscal year 2004, DHS budgeted
the majority of its R&D funding for aviation security, increasing the
amount from about $4 million in fiscal year 2003 to about $63 million.
The majority of this increase is for a program to develop technical
countermeasures to minimize the threat posed to commercial aircraft by
shoulder-fired missiles, also known as man-portable air defense
systems.
Table 1: TSA's and DHS's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode,
Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004:
Dollars in thousands.
Aviation;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $17,101 (81.1%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $126,487 (79.5%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $3,709 (14.3%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $63,240 (71.9%).
Highway;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $0 (0.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $1,052 (4.1%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $3,000 (3.4%).
Maritime;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $9,350 (5.9%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $3,474 (13.4%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $1,626 (1.8%).
Multimodal;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $3,819 (18.1%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $22,242 (14.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $12,630 (48.8%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $20,117 (22.9%).
Pipeline;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $0 (0.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $0 (0.0%).
Rail;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $169 (0.8%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $1,096 (0.7%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $0 (0.0%).
Transit;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $0 (0.0%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $0 (0.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $5,000 (19.3%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $0 (0.0%).
Total;
TSA: Fiscal year 2003 (obligated): $21,089 (100.0%);
TSA: Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted): $159,175 (100.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2003: (obligated): $25,865 (100.0%);
DHS: Fiscal year 2004: (budgeted): $87,983 (100.0%).
Source: GAO analysis of TSA and DHS data.
Note: The figures in this table represent transportation security R&D
projects funded by TSA's Office of Security Technologies. Other TSA
offices also funded several transportation security R&D projects in
fiscal years 2003 and 2004, such as Operation Safe Commerce, the
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II, and the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential program. However, TSA
was not able to provide us with funding information for these projects.
[End of table]
Although TSA and DHS have not decided what additional projects they
will fund in fiscal year 2005 and beyond, the President's fiscal year
2005 budget requests $154 million for TSA's R&D program and about $1
billion for DHS's Science and Technology Directorate, which includes
some transportation security R&D.[Footnote 1] DOT spent $8 million in
fiscal year 2003 and has budgeted about $31 million for transportation
security R&D projects during fiscal year 2004. For example, in 2003,
DOT spent about $2 million to develop and field-test a system to track
trailers containing hazardous materials when they are not attached to a
tractor; for fiscal year 2004, it budgeted $20 million to develop a
secure information network to share air traffic control information
with DHS and others. NASA did not fund any transportation security R&D
projects in fiscal year 2003, but it has budgeted about $18 million for
aviation security R&D projects during fiscal year 2004. Although the
National Research Council has stated that federal R&D programs should
include some basic research, project information provided by TSA and
DHS did not show that any of the transportation security R&D projects
funded in fiscal year 2003 and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in
the basic research phase. TSA and DHS also have not estimated
deployment dates for the vast majority of the projects that they funded
in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Of the 24 projects for which the two
agencies were able to estimate deployment dates, 8 are scheduled for
deployment as early as this fiscal year, and the remaining 16 are
scheduled for deployment during fiscal years 2005 to 2014. According to
a TSA official, deployment dates are not always predictable because
deployment is dependent on other factors, such as funding for
purchasing and installing equipment. Several members of our panel of
transportation security and technology experts believed that the
distribution of R&D projects by transportation mode was reasonable,
while others believed that aviation has been overemphasized at the
expense of maritime and land modes. Finally, some panelists also
questioned whether some projects should be funded.
TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation
security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best
practices, but they have not fully complied with these laws or
implemented best practices. For example:
* The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to prepare a strategic plan
that identifies goals and includes annual measurable objectives for
coordinating the federal government's civilian efforts in developing
countermeasures to terrorist threats. Similarly, the National Research
Council has indicated that research programs should be described in
strategic and performance plans and evaluated in performance reports.
TSA and DHS have prepared strategic plans for their agencies, and TSA
has prepared a strategic plan for its R&D program, but these plans do
not contain measurable objectives for tracking the progress of
projects. According to DHS officials, the department is preparing a
separate strategic plan for its R&D program that will include more
specific goals and measurable objectives.
* The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires TSA to use risk
management principles in making its R&D funding decisions. Furthermore,
under the Homeland Security Act, DHS is required to prepare
comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the nation's key
resources and critical infrastructure sectors, which include
transportation. Although both TSA and DHS have established processes to
select and prioritize R&D projects that include risk management
principles, they have not yet completed vulnerability and criticality
assessments, which we have identified as key elements of a risk
management approach, for all modes of transportation.[Footnote 2] In
the absence of completed risk assessments, for example, TSA and DHS
officials are using available threat intelligence, expert judgment, and
information about past terrorist incidents to select and prioritize
their R&D projects.
* The National Research Council has emphasized the need for R&D
programs to have adequate databases that will provide managers with key
project management information. TSA's and DHS's R&D managers were not
able to provide us with complete information on all projects in their
R&D portfolios. For example, for the 146 projects that it funded in
2003 and 2004, TSA was not able to provide information on anticipated
deployment dates for 91 percent of these projects, the current phase of
development for 49 percent, and the amounts obligated and/or budgeted
for 8 percent. DHS was not able to provide information on anticipated
deployment dates for 68 percent of its projects, the current phase of
development for 14 percent, and the amounts obligated and budgeted for
9 percent. Although the National Research Council has stated that
federal R&D programs should include some basic research, project
information provided by TSA and DHS did not show that any of the
transportation security R&D projects that they funded in fiscal year
2003 and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in the basic research
phase.
* The Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Homeland
Security Act require TSA and DHS to coordinate their R&D efforts with
those of other government agencies. Similarly, the Transportation
Research Board, a division of the National Research Council, indicates
that while TSA should have its own analysis and research capability, it
should also coordinate with the transportation sector, the federal
government, and the science and technology community. Although TSA and
DHS have made some efforts to coordinate R&D with each other and with
other federal agencies, their coordination with DOT has been limited.
Specifically, officials from the modal administrations of DOT, which
continue to conduct some transportation security R&D, said that they
had not provided any input into TSA's and DHS's transportation security
R&D project selections, nor had TSA or DHS provided any input into
DOT's transportation security R&D project selections. In addition,
TSA's and DHS's outreach to the transportation industry has been
limited. An air cargo association official said that TSA contacted his
association about the air cargo industry's security R&D needs. However,
most transportation officials we interviewed said that TSA and DHS had
not contacted them about their security R&D needs. Consequently, the
transportation industry's security R&D needs may not be adequately
reflected in TSA's and DHS's R&D portfolios.
We recognize that TSA and DHS are relatively new agencies that are
operating in a changing environment. However, until TSA and DHS prepare
R&D strategic plans with measurable objectives and complete all of
their risk assessments, Congress and other stakeholders will not have a
reliable means of assessing TSA's and DHS's progress toward achieving
their R&D goals or determining whether the millions of dollars that are
being invested in transportation security R&D projects are being spent
cost-effectively and address the highest transportation security risks.
We are recommending that TSA and DHS (1) conduct some basic research,
(2) complete their strategic planning and risk assessment efforts, (3)
develop a management information system, and (4) better coordinate with
other federal agencies and reach out to the transportation industry. We
provided TSA, DHS, and DOT with draft copies of this report for their
review and comment. DHS and TSA generally concurred with the draft
report's findings and recommendations, agreed that the recommendations
are key to a successful R&D program, and commented that they would
continue to evaluate their R&D processes in light of the report's
findings and recommendations. However, DHS believed that the report did
not sufficiently recognize recent changes that have taken place,
particularly at TSA. In particular, DHS said that TSA has made great
strides in defining R&D projects and linking them to mission needs and
identified gaps. In response to these and other technical comments that
DHS provided, we have made changes to the report as appropriate. DOT
agreed with our findings and a recommendation that to improve R&D
coordination, a memorandum of agreement that defines roles and
responsibilities be developed between it and DHS. DOT also provided
some technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. See
appendix IV for DHS's comments and our responses.
Background:
The nation's transportation system is vast and complex, consisting of
about 3.9 million miles of roads, over 100,000 miles of rail, almost
600,000 bridges, over 300 ports, over 2 million miles of pipeline,
about 500 train stations, and over 5,000 public-use airports. The size
of the transportation system, which moves millions of passengers and
tons of freight every day, makes it both an attractive target for
terrorists and difficult to secure. Moreover, transportation systems
can be used as weapons themselves as was done on September 11, 2001.
As we indicated in our June 2003 report on transportation security
challenges,[Footnote 3] transportation experts, state and local
governments, and industry representatives generally believe that
investing in transportation security R&D is the federal government's
responsibility. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
Congress enacted legislation that resulted in changes in the federal
organization and funding for transportation security R&D. In November
2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act created TSA within
DOT and transferred the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
aviation security R&D program to TSA. The act also required TSA to meet
a December 31, 2002, deadline for deploying explosives detection
systems to screen all checked baggage. One year later, the Homeland
Security Act created DHS and transferred TSA from DOT to DHS. This
legislation also transferred to DHS several other agencies that
conducted transportation security R&D, including the U.S. Customs
Service (now part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection) and the U.S.
Secret Service from the Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Coast
Guard from DOT.[Footnote 4] In addition, the Homeland Security Act
extended the deadline for deploying new checked baggage screening
equipment for certain airports to December 31, 2003, and transferred
certain chemical and biological research programs that have potential
transportation security applications from the Department of Defense and
DOE to DHS. Although TSA and DHS have their own research facilities,
most of their transportation security R&D is conducted by contractors.
Figure 1 identifies major events in the establishment of TSA and DHS.
Figure 1: Major Events in the Establishment of TSA and DHS:
[See PDF for image]
[A] This deadline was extended to December 31, 2003, by the Homeland
Security Act.
[End of figure]
Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA is required to:
* secure all modes of transportation;
* coordinate transportation security countermeasures with other federal
government agencies; and:
* accelerate the research, development, testing, and evaluation of
explosives detection technology for checked baggage and of new
technology to screen for threats in carry-on items and other items
being loaded onto aircraft, including cargo, and on persons.
TSA's Office of Security Technologies is responsible for the research,
development, testing, and deployment of security technology
countermeasures employed to protect the transportation system against
criminal and terrorist threats. It organizes its R&D projects according
to the different approaches through which threats can reach a target,
such as on a person; in carry-on items, vehicles, checked baggage, or
cargo; or through access points at airports or at marine ports. The
Office of Security Technologies operates the Transportation Security
Laboratory, located in Atlantic City, New Jersey, which conducts
transportation security R&D and tests products submitted by potential
vendors for compliance with TSA standards.
Although FAA's aviation security R&D program was moved to TSA and TSA
has since initiated R&D related to other modes of transportation,
several DOT administrations[Footnote 5] conducted transportation
security R&D before TSA was created and continue to do so. However,
security is not the primary focus of DOT's R&D programs.
The Homeland Security Act brought 22 separate federal agencies under
DHS's umbrella and provided a framework for organizing DHS into five
directorates, giving the Science and Technology Directorate
responsibility for DHS's research, development, testing, and evaluation
activities and the Border and Transportation Security Directorate
responsibility for security along the nation's borders and in all modes
of transportation. The act also requires TSA to remain a distinct
entity within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate until
November 25, 2004. Consequently, TSA's R&D program office--the Office
of Security Technologies--currently operates outside of DHS's Science
and Technology Directorate.
Under the Homeland Security Act, DHS's Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate is required to prepare risk
assessments of the nation's key resources and critical
infrastructure,[Footnote 6] which includes transportation. In
addition, the Homeland Security Act requires the Science and Technology
Directorate to:
* coordinate with the appropriate executive branch agencies in
developing and carrying out the science and technology agenda of the
department to reduce duplication and identify unmet needs;
* accelerate the prototyping and development of technologies to address
homeland security vulnerabilities; and:
* coordinate and integrate all research, development, demonstration,
testing, and evaluation activities of the department.
The Science and Technology Directorate's programs are organized by the
type of threat (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
cyber, and high explosives) or by the end-users of the technologies
within and outside of DHS (e.g., borders and transportation, critical
infrastructure protection, and emergency preparedness and response).
The directorate's four offices, as discussed below, are involved in
conducting, coordinating, or soliciting some transportation-security-
related R&D projects.
* The Office of Programs, Plans, and Budgets establishes overall
priorities, oversees R&D activities across the Science and Technology
Directorate, and provides policy guidance for the directorate's
interactions with other DHS components. The office is organized into
R&D portfolios that are focused on various types of terrorist threats
or DHS components. The portfolios involving transportation-security-
related R&D include Border and Transportation Security, High Explosives
Countermeasures, Biological and Chemical Countermeasures, Radiological
and Nuclear Countermeasures, the Coast Guard, and the Secret Service.
* The Office of Research and Development executes research,
development, testing, and evaluation of technologies at DOE and other
federal laboratories; supports university and fellowship programs; and
provides an R&D capability dedicated to homeland security.
* The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)
serves as the department's R&D external funding arm by engaging
industry, academia, government, and other sectors in R&D, rapid
prototyping,[Footnote 7] and technology transfer.
* The Office of Systems Engineering and Development takes technologies
developed by the Office of Research and Development or HSARPA and
prepares deployment strategies to transfer technologies to federal,
state, and/or local government users.
TSA, DHS, and Others Are Funding Transportation Security R&D Projects
and Experts Had Mixed Views about Some Projects:
As the primary federal agencies responsible for enhancing the security
of all modes of transportation, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about
$21 million and DHS spent about $26 million on transportation security
R&D projects; for fiscal year 2004, TSA and DHS have budgeted about
$159 million and $88 million, respectively. In addition, DOT spent
about $8 million on transportation security R&D projects in fiscal year
2003 and has budgeted about $31 million for fiscal year 2004. NASA did
not fund any transportation security R&D projects in fiscal year 2003
but has budgeted about $18 million for aviation security R&D projects
during fiscal year 2004. TSA and DHS were not able to estimate
deployment dates for the vast majority of projects that they funded in
fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Although TSA and DHS have not decided what
additional projects they will fund in fiscal year 2005 and beyond, the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests $154 million for TSA's R&D
program and about $1 billion for the Science and Technology
Directorate, which includes some transportation security R&D.[Footnote
8] Overall, members of our panel of transportation security and
technology experts had mixed views about the reasonableness of the
distribution of transportation security R&D projects by mode and raised
questions about the types of projects that were funded and not funded
by TSA and DHS.
TSA Has Used a Majority of Its R&D Funding for Aviation Security:
Overall, TSA increased its funding for transportation security R&D from
$21 million in fiscal year 2003 to $159 million in fiscal year 2004, as
shown in table 2. Although TSA is responsible for addressing the
security needs of all modes of transportation, in fiscal year 2003, TSA
spent about $17 million, or about 81 percent, of its R&D funding for
projects related to aviation security. For fiscal year 2004, TSA has
budgeted about $126 million on aviation security, or about 79 percent
of its R&D budget. This increase reflects, in part, a $55 million
appropriation for R&D related to air cargo screening. According to TSA,
it has spent the majority of its R&D funding on aviation security
because aviation was the greatest concern following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks and because Congress directed TSA to use R&D
funding to enhance aviation security. In fiscal year 2004, TSA
increased its budget for multimodal R&D projects from about $4 million
in fiscal year 2003 to about $22 million. This increase is due, in
part, to a $5.6 million increase for the Manhattan II project[Footnote
9] and about $6.4 million for development of a walk-through trace
portal for detecting explosives on aviation, maritime, and rail
passengers. In fiscal year 2004, TSA also increased its budget for rail
security R&D projects from $169,000 in fiscal year 2003 to about $1.1
million. This increase reflects the $1.1 million that was budgeted for
the Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot (TRIP).[Footnote 10] TSA also
increased maritime security R&D funding from zero in fiscal year 2003
to about $9 million in fiscal year 2004; this increase is due, in part,
to $3.6 million for a project to develop equipment to screen vehicles
on ferries. Finally, TSA did not spend any money for highway, pipeline,
or transit R&D projects. Several members of our panel of transportation
security and technology experts commented that R&D for rail and transit
security warrants additional funding. Congress is considering
legislation to increase funding for these as well as other modes of
transportation in fiscal year 2005. For example, the Rail Security Act,
S. 2273, which has been passed by the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, would authorize $50 million in each of
fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for an R&D program for improving freight and
intercity passenger rail security.
Table 2: TSA's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004:
Dollars in thousands.
Aviation;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $17,101;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 81.1%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $126,487;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 79.5%.
Highway;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $0;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 0.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $0;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 0.0%.
Maritime;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $0;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 0.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $9,350;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 5.9%.
Multimodal;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $3,819;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 18.1%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $22,242;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 14.0%.
Pipeline;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $0;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 0.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $0;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 0.0%.
Rail;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $169;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 0.8%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $1,096;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 0.7%.
Transit;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $0;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 0.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $0;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 0.0%.
Total;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $21,089;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 100.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $159,175;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 100.0%.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: The figures in this table represent transportation security R&D
projects funded by TSA's Office of Security Technologies. Other TSA
offices also funded several transportation security R&D projects in
fiscal years 2003 and 2004, such as Operation Safe Commerce, the
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II, and the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential program. However, TSA
was not able to provide us with funding information for these projects.
[End of table]
Aviation Security R&D Projects Funded by TSA:
In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA spent or budgeted R&D funds for
projects in several aviation security program areas, including the
following:
* Aviation Checked Baggage: To improve the detection capability and
operational efficiency of its current checked baggage-screening
program, TSA has both near-term (1 to 3 years) and long-term R&D
programs. To date, TSA has spent most of its checked baggage screening
R&D funds on the near-term programs. In fiscal year 2003, it obligated
about $12 million, and, for fiscal year 2004, it budgeted about $27
million for near-term activities; whereas for long-term activities
under the Manhattan II project, it obligated $75,000 in fiscal year
2003 and has budgeted $5.6 million for fiscal year 2004. Most of the
near-term activities are to develop next-generation checked baggage
screening equipment through the Phoenix project, which is funded
jointly by government and industry. As part of the Phoenix project, in
September 2003, TSA awarded $9.4 million to enter into five cooperative
agreements with private sector firms to enhance existing systems and
develop new screening technologies. For example, in fiscal year 2003,
TSA spent almost $2.4 million to have a contractor develop a new
computed tomography explosives detection system[Footnote 11] that is
smaller and lighter than systems currently deployed in airport lobbies.
The new system is intended to replace the systems currently placed in
airport lobbies, including both larger, heavier explosives detection
systems and explosives trace detection equipment. The smaller size of
the system creates opportunities for TSA to transfer screening
operations to other locations, such as airport check-in counters. TSA
expects to certify this equipment later this year. TSA is also working
with a contractor to integrate technologies, such as quadrupole
resonance,[Footnote 12] with its existing explosives detection systems
to improve processing speed and detection capability and to reduce
false alarm rates and human resource requirements.
* Aviation Checkpoint: To address the limitations of its current metal
detectors for screening passengers and of X-ray machines for screening
carry-on baggage, TSA, in fiscal year 2003, obligated about $1 million
and has budgeted $18 million for fiscal year 2004. For example, during
the summer of 2004, TSA installed and began testing explosives trace
detection portals at four airports and had scheduled to test the portal
at a fifth airport in the near future. Passengers who enter a
checkpoint lane with a trace portal machine will proceed through the
metal detector while their carry-on baggage is being screened by X-ray.
Each passenger will then be asked to step into the trace portal and to
stand still for a few seconds while several quick puffs of air are
released, as shown in figure 2. The portal will analyze the air for
traces of explosives as the passenger walks through, and a computerized
voice will tell the passenger when to exit the portal.
Figure 2: A Walk-through Explosives Trace Detection Portal:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
To help focus its screening resources on the highest risk passengers,
in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA worked to develop the Computer
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II).[Footnote 13]
CAPPS II is intended to identify terrorists and other high-risk
individuals before they board commercial airplanes. Originally, TSA
intended to conduct a risk assessment of each passenger using national
security information, commercial databases, and information provided by
the passenger during the reservation process--specifically, the
passenger's name, date of birth, home address, and home telephone
number. In our February 2004 report on CAPPS II, we found that TSA was
behind schedule in testing and developing initial increments of CAPPS
II and had not yet completely addressed other issues, including
concerns about privacy and the accuracy of the data used for CAPPS
II.[Footnote 14] In August 2004, a DHS official said that DHS was
revising the program with an emphasis on fully protecting passengers'
privacy and civil liberties.
* Aviation Cargo: To enhance the security of the nation's air cargo
system, TSA obligated about $700,000 in fiscal year 2003 for cargo
security R&D and has budgeted about $53 million for fiscal year 2004.
For example, as part of its Air Cargo Strategic Plan, TSA plans to
develop a prescreening system to identify high-risk cargo and to work
with the appropriate stakeholders to ensure that all such cargo is
inspected. To complete its inspection of high-risk cargo, TSA has a
number of R&D projects, one of which is a project budgeted at $19.5
million for fiscal year 2004 to research and develop equipment for the
detection of threats in containerized air cargo and mail. Under this
project, TSA is considering funding several technologies, including
high-power computed tomography and X-ray combined with pulsed fast
neutron analysis.[Footnote 15]
In its July 2004 report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States expressed concerns about checked baggage,
checkpoint, and cargo security.[Footnote 16] The commission recommended
that TSA and Congress give priority attention to improving the ability
of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. The
commission also stated that TSA should (1) expedite the installation of
advanced in-line baggage screening equipment; (2) require that every
passenger aircraft carrying cargo deploy at least one hardened
container to carry any suspect cargo; and (3) intensify its efforts to
identify, track, and appropriately screen potentially dangerous cargo
in both aviation and maritime modes.
Maritime and Land Security R&D Projects Funded by TSA:
In addition to its R&D projects to enhance aviation security, in fiscal
years 2003 and 2004, TSA spent or budgeted R&D funds for projects to
improve security for maritime and land transportation, including the
following:
* The Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot will assess the feasibility of
using emerging technologies to screen passengers and their checked
baggage and carry-on items for explosives at rail stations and aboard
trains. In May 2004, TSA completed a 30-day test to screen Amtrak and
commuter rail passengers for explosives at a Maryland train station by
having them walk through a trace detection portal that TSA is also
considering for use at airports. According to TSA officials, the test
provided useful information about customer-screening wait times, the
effectiveness of screening equipment in a non-climate-controlled
environment, and the cost and impact of using the technology for Amtrak
and commuter rail operations. In addition, in June and July 2004, TSA
tested the screening of Amtrak passengers' checked baggage for
explosives at a Washington, D.C., train station, and in July 2004, TSA
tested the screening of passengers and their carry-on items for
explosives on a Connecticut commuter rail train while the train was in
motion.
* The Transportation Worker Identification Credential is intended to
establish a uniform, nationwide standard for the secure identification
of as many as 12 million public-and private-sector workers who require
unescorted physical or cyber access to secure areas at airports and
other transportation facilities, such as seaports and railroad
terminals. TSA was not able to provide funding information for the
program for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. As we have previously reported,
airport and seaport officials have expressed concern about how much the
program would cost and who would pay to implement it.[Footnote 17] We
have recently completed a separate review that looked at pilot tests of
the program at maritime ports and expect to issue a report to the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee by September 30, 2004.
* The Conveyance Tracking Program is investigating the capability of
technologies that are or are nearly available for the secure tracking
of hazardous materials shipments by rail and truck. TSA budgeted about
$1 million for this program for fiscal year 2004.
* Operation Safe Commerce is designed to improve container supply chain
security by testing practices and commercially available technologies
in an operational environment, including technologies for tracking and
tracing containers, nonintrustive detection of threats, and sealing
containers. In June 2003, TSA awarded grants to the ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach, California; Seattle and Tacoma, Washington; and
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. TSA was not able to
provide funding information for the program for fiscal years 2003 and
2004.
TSA Spent or Budgeted Most of Its R&D Funding for Projects That Are
Beyond the Basic Research Phase:
For our review, we classified R&D projects according to the following
four phases:
* Basic research includes all scientific efforts and experimentation
directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields
of physical, engineering, environmental, social, and life sciences
related to long-term national needs.
* Applied research includes all efforts directed toward the solution of
specific problems with a view toward developing and evaluating the
feasibility of proposed solutions.
* Advanced development includes all efforts directed toward projects
that have moved into the development of hardware for field experiments
and tests.
* Operational testing includes the evaluation of integrated
technologies in a realistic operating environment to assess the
performance or cost reduction potential of advanced technology.
In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA spent or budgeted the majority of
its transportation security R&D funding for projects in the last three
phases of R&D, but the agency agrees that it needs to spend more for
basic research. Figure 3 shows TSA's allocation of R&D funding by phase
of R&D. In fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about 88 percent of its $21
million budget on applied research, advanced development, and
operational testing. For fiscal year 2004, TSA budgeted about 82
percent of its $159 million budget for projects in those three phases.
In contrast, according to project information provided by TSA, none of
the transportation security R&D projects that it funded in fiscal year
2003 and budgeted in fiscal year 2004 were in the basic research phase.
According to the National Research Council, R&D organizations should
consistently fund some basic research because although it typically
entails higher risks, it also offers higher payoffs than R&D in later
phases. Thus far, TSA has focused its R&D efforts on making
improvements to deployed technologies and testing and evaluating near-
term technologies, and a senior TSA official acknowledged that the
agency needs to do more basic research.
Figure 3: Distribution of TSA's R&D Funding by Phase, Fiscal Years 2003
and 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: TSA provided the R&D phase for 74 of the 146 projects that it
funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. TSA officials did not explain why
the information was not available on the R&D phase for the remaining 72
projects.
[End of figure]
TSA Has Not Estimated Deployment Dates for Most of Its R&D Projects:
Although many of TSA's projects are in later phases of development, the
agency has not estimated deployment dates for 133 of the 146 projects
that it funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. According to TSA
officials, deployment dates are not always predictable because
deployment is dependent on factors such as the manufacturing capacity
of the private sector or the availability of funds for purchasing and
installing equipment. However, we generally believe that R&D program
managers should estimate deployment dates for projects that are beyond
the basic research phase because deployment dates can serve as goals
that the managers can use to plan, budget, and track the progress of
projects. For the 13 projects for which TSA had estimated deployment
dates, deployment is scheduled for fiscal years 2004 through 2014. Nine
of the 13 projects are scheduled for deployment in fiscal years 2005 or
2006, including the Phoenix project, which is intended to enhance
existing checked baggage screening systems and develop new screening
technologies. One of the remaining 4 projects, the Manhattan II
project, is scheduled for deployment from fiscal years 2009 through
2014.
Transferring R&D Funds to Other Programs Delayed TSA's Progress on Some
R&D Projects:
Progress on some R&D projects was delayed in fiscal year 2003 when TSA
transferred about $61 million, more than half of its $110 million R&D
appropriation, to operational needs, such as personnel cost for
screeners. As a result, TSA delayed several key R&D projects related to
checked baggage screening, checkpoint screening, and air cargo
security. For example, TSA delayed the development of a device to
detect weapons, liquid explosives, and flammables in containers found
in carry-on baggage or passengers' effects, as well as the development
and testing of a walk-through portal for detecting traces of explosives
on passengers. According to a TSA official, the agency does not plan to
transfer R&D funds to other programs in fiscal year 2004.
DHS Spent the Majority of Its Fiscal Year 2003 and Budgeted the
Majority of Its Fiscal Year 2004 Transportation Security R&D Funding
for Multimodal and Aviation Projects:
Overall, DHS increased its funding for transportation security R&D from
about $26 million in fiscal year 2003 to about $88 million in fiscal
year 2004, as shown in table 3.[Footnote 18] The President's fiscal
year 2005 budget request includes about $1 billion for the Science and
Technology Directorate, which includes some transportation security
R&D.
Table 3: DHS's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004:
Dollars in thousands.
Aviation;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $3,709;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 14.3%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $63,240;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 71.9%.
Highway;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $1,052;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 4.1%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $3,000;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 3.4%.
Maritime;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $3,474;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 13.4%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $1,626;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 1.8%.
Multimodal;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $12,630;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 48.8%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $20,117;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 22.9%.
Pipeline;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $0;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 0.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $0;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 0.0%.
Rail;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $0;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 0.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $0;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 0.0%.
Transit;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $5,000;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 19.3%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $0;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 0.0%.
Total;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $25,865;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 100.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $87,983;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 100.0%.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of table]
In fiscal year 2003, DHS spent $12.6 million, or almost half, of its
$26 million transportation security R&D budget for projects related to
multiple modes of transportation. For fiscal year 2004, DHS increased
its budget for multimodal projects to $20 million; this increase
reflects the costs of funding pilot programs with the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey to test radiation and nuclear detection
devices. For fiscal year 2004, DHS budgeted almost $63 million, or 72
percent of its $88 million, on aviation projects, compared with almost
$4 million spent in fiscal year 2003. This increase provides about $60
million in fiscal year 2004 funds to develop technical countermeasures
to minimize the threat posed to commercial aircraft by shoulder-fired
missiles, also known as man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADS).[Footnote 19] Figure 4 shows a MANPADS that could be used to
attack a commercial aircraft.
Figure 4: Photograph of a MANPADS:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DHS decreased its budget for transit security R&D projects from $5
million in fiscal year 2004 to $0 in fiscal year 2004; this decrease
reflects the completion of a project to test chemical detectors in
subway stations. DHS also increased its budget for highway security R&D
projects from $1 million in fiscal year 2003 to $3 million in fiscal
year 2004. This increase funds a project to research and develop
technology for detecting truck bombs. Figure 5 shows an example of a
truck bomb detection system.
Figure 5: A Mobile Search X-ray Inspection System for Detecting Truck
Bombs:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DHS Spent or Budgeted Most of Its R&D Funding for Projects That Are in
Advanced Development:
In fiscal year 2003, DHS spent 25 percent and 60 percent of its $26
million transportation security R&D budget for projects in advanced
development and multiple phases, respectively, as shown in figure 6.
For fiscal year 2004, DHS budgeted $61 million, or 69 percent, of its
$88 million budget for advanced development, including $60 million for
the counter-MANPADS program. According to project information provided
by DHS, none of the transportation security R&D projects it funded in
fiscal year 2003 and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in the basic
research phase. Although DHS has focused its initial R&D efforts on the
near-term development and deployment of technologies, it recognizes the
importance of basic research and, according to a senior DHS official,
intends to do more basic research in fiscal year 2006 and beyond.
Figure 6: Distribution of DHS's R&D Funding by Phase, Fiscal Years 2003
and 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Of the 56 projects that DHS funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, DHS
has deployed technologies related to 7, has estimated deployment dates
for 11, and has not estimated deployment dates for the remaining 38.
Estimated deployment dates for the 11 projects range from fiscal years
2004 to 2007.
DOT and NASA Funded Some Transportation Security R&D Projects:
In addition to the transportation security R&D projects funded by TSA
and DHS, DOT and NASA funded some such projects. In fiscal year 2003,
DOT spent about $8 million and has budgeted about $31 million for
fiscal year 2004 on transportation security R&D, as shown in table 4.
For example, in fiscal year 2003, DOT spent about $2 million to develop
and field-test a system to track trailers containing hazardous
materials when they are not attached to a tractor; for fiscal year
2004, it budgeted $20 million to develop a secure information network
to share air traffic control information with DHS and others.
Table 4: DOT's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004:
Dollars in thousands.
Aviation;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $0;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 0.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $20,000;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 65.0%.
Highway;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $3,531;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 43.8%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $400;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 1.3%.
Maritime;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $0;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 0.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $0;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 0.0%.
Multimodal;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $906;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 11.2%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $7,858;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 25.5%.
Pipeline;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $900;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 11.2%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $412;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 1.3%.
Rail;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $400;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 5.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $400;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 1.3%.
Transit;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $2,325;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 28.8%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $1,694;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 5.5%.
Total;
Fiscal year 2003: Obligated: $8,062;
Fiscal year 2003: Percent: 100.0%;
Fiscal year 2004: Budgeted: $30,764;
Fiscal year 2004: Percent: 100.0%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOT data.
[End of table]
Although NASA did not fund any transportation security R&D in fiscal
year 2003, it has budgeted about $18 million for fiscal year 2004 for
aviation security R&D projects. For example, NASA budgeted about $5
million for technologies and methods to provide accurate information so
that pilots can avoid protected airspace, continually verify identity,
and prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access to flight
controls.
Experts Had Mixed Views on the Reasonableness of Distribution of
Transportation Security R&D Projects, and Some Experts Questioned
Decisions to Fund Some Projects:
Members of our panel of transportation security and technology experts
had mixed views on whether the distribution of transportation security
R&D projects by mode was reasonable and raised questions about whether
some projects should be funded. According to several panelists, the
distribution of transportation security R&D projects by mode and
program area was reasonable. However, several other panelists said that
aviation has been overemphasized at the expense of maritime and land
modes; two panelists felt that R&D is focused too heavily on threats
that were prominent in the 1970s and 1980s, such as airplane hijackings
and bombings; and one panelist said that the selection of projects
seemed to be inappropriately based on the most recent terrorist event
or perceived threat. While the panelists had different and sometimes
conflicting views about the reasonableness of the distribution of
projects, many of them said that project selections should be based on
current risk assessments. As explained in the next section of this
report, TSA and DHS plan to select their R&D projects on the basis of
risk assessments, which have not yet been completed for all modes of
transportation.
When asked whether they thought there were any transportation security
R&D projects in the agencies' portfolios that did not merit funding,
the panelists identified several funded by TSA that they believed did
not qualify as R&D projects. For example, one panelist did not agree
with funding projects that were designed to enhance existing
technologies, such as a $30,000 project to test a prototype of a new,
handheld ion mobility spectrometry explosives trace detector. According
to this panelist, at least two very good ion mobility spectrometry
handheld units can be purchased off the shelf. In commenting on a draft
of this report, DHS said that TSA funded this project because the
vendor demonstrated a promising technology.
When asked if there were any important areas of transportation security
R&D that TSA and DHS were not addressing, individual panelists
suggested that the following projects be considered for future funding:
* A project for combining neutron inspection technology with
traditional transmission X-ray and backscatter X-ray technologies could
enhance air cargo security by providing a thorough look at places
where explosives might be concealed in containers.[Footnote 20] A
ground-based system to scan trucks carrying cargo bound for passenger
aircraft, ships, and highways could also be tested.
* A multifunctional portal that tests for metals, explosives,
narcotics, and chemicals in near real time could help to address the
limitations of current checkpoint screening equipment.
* A standard piece of luggage for testing deployed explosives detection
systems could be developed to ensure that the systems maintain
acceptable performance capabilities.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS addressed several
technologies and projects, including neutron inspection technology, a
multifunctional portal project, and a project to develop a standard
piece of luggage for testing explosives detection systems.
Specifically, DHS said that TSA is looking at pulsed fast neutron
analysis, a technology that uses X-ray images in conjunction with
neutron interrogation and substance identification. According to DHS,
TSA considers the development of a multifunctional portal critical
because it creates opportunities for fusing or integrating
technologies--a long-standing transportation goal. Finally, DHS said
that a standard piece of luggage had been developed to validate the
performance of two different explosives detection systems to ensure
that the systems are performing to their certification levels.
Moreover, DHS noted in its comments that TSA has two advisory
committees--the National Academy of Sciences and the Security Advisory
Panel--whose members have expertise in various modes of transportation.
TSA and DHS Have Made Some Progress in Managing Their R&D Programs but
Have Not Yet Fully Completed Their Efforts:
TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation
security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best
practices,[Footnote 21] but their efforts are incomplete in the
following areas:
* preparing strategic plans that contain goals and measurable
objectives,
* preparing and using risk assessments to select and prioritize their
R&D projects,
* maintaining a comprehensive database of R&D projects,
* coordinating their R&D programs with those of other government
agencies,
* reaching out to transportation stakeholders to help identify R&D
needs, and:
* accelerating R&D.
The Homeland Security Act also authorizes DHS to solicit R&D proposals
for security technologies from outside entities and requires DHS to
integrate the department's R&D programs. Although the laws do not
contain deadlines for TSA and DHS to complete these requirements, it is
difficult to determine, until the agencies do, whether they are making
R&D investments cost-effectively and addressing the highest
transportation risks. In commenting on their progress in managing TSA's
R&D program, TSA officials said that the agency was focusing initially
on hiring new airport screeners and meeting statutory requirements to
install new screening equipment. They further noted that a substantial
transfer of R&D funds in fiscal year 2003 delayed certain projects. DHS
officials said that the department is a start-up organization. Table 5
shows the progress TSA and DHS have made in complying with statutory
requirements and best practices for managing their R&D programs.
Table 5: TSA's and DHS's Implementation of Statutory Requirements and
Best Practices for Managing Their R&D Programs:
Requirement/Best practice: The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to
prepare a strategic plan that identifies goals and includes annual
measurable objectives for coordinating the federal government's
civilian efforts in developing countermeasures to terrorist threats.
In addition, the National Academy of Sciences indicates that research
programs should be described in strategic and performance plans;
TSA's implementation: Partial--TSA prepared strategic plans for the
agency and its R&D program, but the plans did not contain goals or
measurable objectives;
DHS's implementation: Partial--DHS prepared a strategic plan for the
department, but the plan does not contain measurable objectives. DHS
is in the process of preparing a strategic plan for its R&D program.
Requirement/Best practice: The Aviation and Transportation Security
Act requires TSA to use risk management principles to make R&D
decisions. The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to prepare
comprehensive risk assessments for the nation's key resources and
critical infrastructure sectors. In addition, GAO has advocated the
use of a risk management approach in responding to national security
and terrorism challenges;
TSA's implementation: Partial--According to TSA officials, threat
assessments were completed for all modes of transportation, but
vulnerability and criticality assessments have not been completed;
DHS's implementation: Partial--DHS is working in a pilot phase toward
preparing national comparative risk assessments for infrastructure
sectors with critical vulnerabilities.
Requirement/Best practice: The National Research Council indicates
that R&D organizations should maintain a complete database of projects
to help prioritize and justify expenditures;
TSA's implementation: Partial--TSA's database of projects does not
provide key information on all projects;
DHS's implementation: Partial--DHS's database of projects does not
provide key information on all projects.
Requirement/Best practice: The Aviation and Transportation Security
Act and the Homeland Security Act require TSA and DHS to coordinate
their R&D efforts with those of other government agencies;
TSA's implementation: Partial--TSA's efforts to coordinate with other
federal agencies have been limited;
DHS's implementation: Partial--DHS's efforts to coordinate with other
federal agencies have been limited.
Requirement/Best practice: The Transportation Research Board indicates
that R&D organizations should reach out to stakeholders to obtain input
on their R&D decisions;
TSA's implementation: Partial--TSA's efforts to reach out to the
transportation industry have been limited;
DHS's implementation: Partial--DHS's efforts to reach out to the
transportation industry have been limited.
Requirement/Best practice: The Aviation and Transportation Security Act
requires TSA to accelerate R&D on aviation security technologies, and
the Homeland Security Act requires DHS to accelerate R&D on homeland
security technologies;
TSA's implementation: Unable to assess because of the absence of
measurable objectives;
DHS's implementation: Unable to assess because of the absence of
measurable objectives.
Requirement/Best practice: The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to
integrate the department's various R&D activities;
TSA's implementation: Not applicable;
DHS's implementation: DHS is drafting an integration plan and has been
directed by the Secretary of Homeland Security to integrate the
department's R&D activities by 2005.
Source: GAO analysis of applicable laws, best practices, and
information provided by TSA and DHS.
Note: Analysis of implementation status is based on agency officials'
comments and our review of applicable documents and databases.
[End of table]
Strategic Plans for TSA's and DHS's R&D Programs Do Not Yet Contain
Measurable Objectives:
The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to prepare a strategic plan that
identifies goals and includes annual measurable objectives for
coordinating the federal government's civilian efforts in developing
countermeasures to terrorist threats. Similarly, R&D best practices
identified by the National Academy of Sciences indicate that research
programs should be described in strategic and performance plans and
evaluated in performance reports. TSA has prepared strategic plans for
both the agency[Footnote 22]and its R&D program that contain
performance goals, such as deterring foreign and domestic terrorists
and other individuals from causing harm or disrupting the nation's
transportation system. Although we reported in January 2003[Footnote
23] that TSA had established an initial set of 32 performance measures,
none of them are contained in TSA's strategic plans or directly pertain
to R&D.
DHS has prepared a strategic plan for the department, but the plan's
broad objective--to develop technology and capabilities to detect and
prevent terrorist attacks--is not supported by more specific R&D
performance goals and measures in any program area, including
transportation. A DHS official said that the department is preparing a
separate strategic plan for its R&D program that will include more
specific goals and measurable objectives. Another DHS official said
that the plan will include input from the leaders of the Science and
Technology Directorate's functional areas, one of which is
transportation. DHS has indicated that the Science and Technology
Directorate's strategic planning process includes (1) determining
strategic goals for the next 5 years, threats, and vulnerabilities and
(2) developing a list of prioritized projects for fiscal years 2005
through 2010. In a May 2004 report on DHS's use of the DOE national
laboratories for research on technologies for detecting and responding
to nuclear, biological, and chemical threats, we recommended that DHS
complete a strategic plan for R&D.[Footnote 24] Until TSA and DHS
prepare R&D strategic plans with goals and measurable objectives,
Congress and other stakeholders do not have a reliable means of
assessing TSA's and DHS's progress toward achieving their R&D goals.
TSA and DHS Plan to Use Risk Assessments to Prioritize and Select Their
R&D Programs, but Many Assessments Have Not Been Completed:
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires TSA to use risk
management principles in making R&D funding decisions.[Footnote 25] The
Homeland Security Act requires DHS to establish R&D priorities for
detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist
attacks[Footnote 26] and to prepare comprehensive assessments of the
vulnerabilities of the nation's key resources and critical
infrastructure sectors, one of which is transportation.[Footnote 27] In
addition, under the Homeland Security Act, DHS's Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate is responsible for receiving
and analyzing information from multiple sources, including local,
state, and federal government agencies and private sector entities, and
integrating the information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments to
identify protective priorities.[Footnote 28]
We have consistently advocated using a risk management approach in
responding to national security and terrorism challenges. In the
context of homeland security, risk management is a systematic and
analytical process of (1) considering the likelihood that a terrorist
threat will endanger an asset, individual, or function and (2) reducing
the risk and mitigating the consequences of an attack. In our work on
homeland security issues, we have identified threat, vulnerability, and
criticality assessments as key elements of a risk management
approach.[Footnote 29] These elements are defined as follows:
* A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the
basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities.
This assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying
potential threats before they materialize and is based on threat
information gathered from both the intelligence and the law enforcement
communities.[Footnote 30]
* A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be
exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address those
weaknesses.
* A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and
functions in terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to
public safety and the economy. The assessment provides a basis for
identifying which structures or processes are relatively more important
to protect from attack.
To select and prioritize their R&D projects, TSA and DHS have
established processes that include risk management principles.
According to TSA officials, TSA has completed threat assessments for
all modes of transportation but has yet to complete vulnerability and
criticality assessments. A DHS official told us that the department has
started to conduct risk assessments of critical infrastructure sectors
but does not plan to start its assessment of the transportation sector
until 2005. Without complete risk assessments, Congress and other
stakeholders are limited in their ability to assess whether the
millions of dollars that are being invested in transportation security
R&D projects are being spent cost-effectively and to address the
highest transportation security risks.
In the absence of completed risk assessments, TSA and DHS officials are
using available threat intelligence, expert judgment, congressional
mandates, mission needs, and information about past terrorist incidents
to select and prioritize their R&D projects. TSA and DHS officials said
that they obtain threat intelligence from the government's intelligence
community to help make R&D decisions. TSA officials said that TSA's
Chief Technology Officer receives daily intelligence briefings, and
that the agency is using threat information to select R&D projects but
is not yet using formal threat assessments to make those R&D decisions.
In addition, DHS's Inspector General reported in March 2004 that
although many Science and Technology officials agreed on the importance
of maintaining a relationship with the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate, staff below them were not
actively involved in obtaining terrorist threat information from this
directorate and using the information to help select new homeland
security technologies.[Footnote 31]
In May 2004, TSA prepared terrorist threat assessments for all modes of
transportation. In addition, in June 2004, a TSA official said that TSA
is in the process of preparing vulnerability and criticality
assessments for all modes of transportation. For example, in 2003, TSA
supported the government's strategy to reduce the threat that shoulder-
fired missiles pose to commercial aircraft by conducting vulnerability
assessments at all major airports to identify major launch sites around
the airports using information from local agencies and FAA. In addition
to these assessments, officials in DHS's Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate said they were working in a pilot
phase toward preparing national comparative risk assessments with
critical vulnerabilities that would allow comparisons to be made across
different infrastructure sectors, such as transportation. The officials
said the pilot program would focus on other infrastructure sectors,
such as chemical and nuclear plants, before addressing the
transportation sector, which they expected to work on in fiscal year
2005. However, they did not know when risk assessments would be
completed for all modes of transportation.
TSA has agreed with a recommendation in our past work that it should
apply a risk management approach to strengthen security in aviation and
in other modes of transportation.[Footnote 32] TSA indicated that it is
developing four tools, including software, that will help assess
threats, criticalities, and vulnerabilities, and that it plans to
create risk assessment models for all modes of transportation during
fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 33]
In its July 2004 report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States also pointed out the importance of risk
management and recommended that the government identify and evaluate
the transportation assets that need to be protected; set risk-based
priorities for defending them; select the most practical and cost-
effective ways of doing so; and then develop a plan, a budget, and
funding to implement the effort. The plan should assign roles and
missions to the relevant federal, state, and local authorities and to
private stakeholders. We agree with the commission's recommendations
and are making similar recommendations.
TSA and DHS Do Not Have Adequate Databases to Effectively Manage Their
R&D Portfolios:
R&D best practices identified by the National Research Council indicate
that a research program should maintain a complete database of projects
to help prioritize and justify program expenditures. Similarly, we have
stated that an R&D program should use a management information system
that readily provides information to track the performance of projects.
TSA's and DHS's R&D managers were not able to provide us with complete
information on all projects in their R&D portfolios. For example, for
the 146 projects that it funded in 2003 and 2004, TSA was not able to
provide information on anticipated deployment dates for 91 percent, the
current phase of development for 49 percent, and the amounts obligated
and budgeted for 8 percent--including 3 TSA projects, CAPPS II, the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, and Operation Safe
Commerce, that were appropriated tens of millions of dollars in both
fiscal years 2003 and 2004. For the 56 projects that it funded in 2003
and 2004, DHS was not able to provide information on anticipated
deployment dates for 68 percent, the current phase of development for
14 percent, and the amounts obligated and budgeted for 9 percent.
Although TSA's and DHS's databases contain some information, it is
scattered among several computer files and paper documents and cannot
be easily retrieved or analyzed. Consequently, additional staff time is
needed to prepare documents from different reports, and compiling the
information could result in errors and omissions. Without accurate,
complete, and timely information, TSA and DHS managers are limited in
their ability to effectively monitor their R&D programs and ensure that
R&D funds are being used to address the highest priority transportation
security risks. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS said that
TSA had recently developed a database that will allow it to track
milestones, funding, and deployment information for individual
projects.
Coordination with Other Federal Agencies and Outreach to Transportation
Industry Associations Has Been Limited:
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Homeland Security
Act require DHS to coordinate its R&D efforts with those of other
government agencies. Similarly, R&D best practices indicate that R&D
organizations should coordinate to help fill research gaps and leverage
resources. In addition, R&D best practices indicate that TSA and DHS
should reach out to stakeholders, such as the transportation industry,
to identify their security R&D needs. However, TSA's and DHS's efforts
to coordinate with other federal agencies on transportation security
R&D and reach out to transportation industry associations on the
industry's security R&D needs have been limited.
The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to coordinate with other
executive agencies in developing and carrying out the Science and
Technology Directorate's agenda to reduce duplication and identify
unmet needs.[Footnote 34] In addition, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act gives TSA responsibility for coordinating terrorism
countermeasures with "departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of
the United States Government."[Footnote 35] For TSA and DHS to select
the best technologies to enhance transportation security, it is
important that they have a clear understanding of the R&D projects
currently being conducted, both internally and externally. TSA and DHS
have coordinated with each other on some of their transportation
security R&D programs, such as efforts to counter the threat posed to
commercial aircraft by MANPADS; develop technologies for detecting
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear programs; and develop
explosives detection systems. However, TSA and DHS did not coordinate
their R&D portfolios in fiscal year 2003. A DHS official said that the
department reviewed TSA's fiscal year 2004 R&D portfolio. The official
said that it was not DHS's intention to change TSA's R&D portfolio but
to learn what TSA was doing and to leverage resources.
R&D best practices also emphasize the importance of coordinating R&D in
the transportation security field. A 2002 Transportation Research
Board study[Footnote 36] on the role of science and technology in
transportation concluded that while TSA should have its own analysis
and research capability, it should also have the ability to draw on the
"rich and varied R&D capabilities within the transportation sector, as
well as those of the federal government and the science and technology
community at large." Furthermore, the report said that if TSA views the
R&D activities of DOT's modal agencies from a broader systems
perspective, it can help fill research gaps, monitor the progress of
these activities, and observe where additional investments might yield
large benefits. A member of our transportation security and technology
panel suggested that TSA and DHS could be more effective if they
systematized and formalized their R&D coordination efforts at the
highest levels and included other organizations, such as DOT and the
Transportation Research Board of the National Research Council.
Coordinating with DOT:
Coordination is limited between TSA and DOT and between DHS and DOT,
which continues to conduct some transportation security R&D. Although
DOT modal administration officials said that limited communication was
occurring between DOT and TSA and between DOT and DHS about ongoing DOT
R&D projects, none of these officials said that TSA or DHS had provided
any input about which R&D projects they should conduct or had asked the
modal administrations for input on which transportation security R&D
projects TSA and DHS should conduct. An official from one modal
administration said that TSA should consult DOT agencies about their
R&D plans because, in some cases, they have expertise about the various
transportation modes and are more aware than TSA of the R&D needs and
concerns of the transportation industry. For example, a Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) R&D official told us that FHWA has conducted
extensive research on tracking freight movement and has mapped out the
movement of freight across transportation modes. This official said
these efforts could help improve freight security. Other DOT R&D
officials expressed similar views about their R&D programs and said
they need to coordinate their security R&D programs with TSA and DHS to
leverage resources and knowledge and to avoid duplication. An official
from one DOT modal administration (the Federal Railroad Administration)
said that although TSA and DHS had no formal input into the agency's
R&D plans, all of the security-related R&D projects it had conducted
since 2001 were at the request of TSA or DHS. DOT R&D officials also
said that the DOT modal administrations should continue to conduct some
security R&D because they have research personnel who are experts in
various transportation modes and could help TSA and DHS with their
security R&D efforts.
Coordinating with NASA and Other Federal Agencies:
Because we found during the course of our review that NASA was also
conducting some transportation security R&D, we asked NASA officials
about the extent of coordination between NASA and TSA and between NASA
and DHS. NASA officials said that they have effective coordination with
TSA on the transportation security R&D they conduct.[Footnote 37] They
said that TSA and NASA coordinated on identifying the types of R&D
projects that NASA should undertake to best help meet TSA's needs. NASA
officials also said that at DHS's request, NASA provided input to the
Science and Technology Directorate during the directorate's strategic
planning process. In addition, NASA officials said that they are
working with TSA on a memorandum of agreement for their R&D programs.
TSA and DHS officials said that coordination with other agencies and
R&D organizations is occurring at the project level and that some
coordination is based on personal relationships. In discussing DHS's
coordination with other agencies in July 2004, a DHS official said that
DHS relies heavily on the Office of Science and Technology Policy, a
component of the Executive Office of the President, to coordinate R&D.
He also noted that the department was only a year old, and that as it
matured, DHS would know more about the R&D activities of other
agencies.
Coordinating with the DOE National Laboratories:
In creating DHS, Congress intended that DHS draw on the scientific
expertise of the DOE national laboratories, which make up the world's
largest system of laboratories for advanced research in support of
national energy and defense needs. The Homeland Security Act requires
DHS to establish an Office of National Laboratories to coordinate its
R&D with that:
of DOE's national laboratories.[Footnote 38] DHS has established this
office, and in February 2003, DHS and DOE entered into an agreement
allowing DOE to accept and perform work for DHS on an equal basis with
other laboratory work. DHS and TSA are sponsoring transportation
security-related R&D at several national laboratories, including
Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and the
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. Overall,
laboratory officials told us they have an adequate level of
communication and coordination with TSA and DHS about their ongoing R&D
projects, but some officials believe TSA and DHS could use the
laboratories more as resources for transportation security R&D and
would like more information about TSA's research needs.
Reaching Out to the Transportation Industry:
In a 2001 report, the Transportation Research Board recommended that
research be closely connected to its stakeholders, such as
transportation providers, to help ensure relevance and program
support.[Footnote 39] According to the report, stakeholders are more
likely to use the research results if they are involved in the process
from the beginning. However, most transportation industry association
officials we interviewed said that TSA and DHS have not reached out to
them to obtain information on their security R&D needs. Consequently,
the transportation industry's security R&D needs may not be adequately
reflected in TSA's and DHS's R&D portfolios.
An air cargo association official said that TSA contacted them to
participate in an air cargo security working group of the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee, a TSA-sponsored advisory group, where they
were able to discuss the air cargo industry's security R&D needs. Some
transportation association officials said that TSA and DHS should
contact them to obtain input on their research priorities to determine
whether the proposed technologies would be useful, avoid duplication of
research that they are sponsoring, and leverage resources. Officials
from another aviation association commented that, in contrast to their
relationship with TSA, they had an effective relationship with FAA. The
official noted that information-sharing and communication occurred more
frequently with FAA, partly because FAA management recognized the
importance of obtaining input from the users of FAA's services, whereas
TSA and DHS have not. An official from a state highway association said
that although TSA and DHS officials have participated in transportation
research projects that the Transportation Research Board is conducting
for the association, TSA and DHS have not directly contacted the
association about its security R&D needs. A TSA official said that TSA
reaches out to aviation associations and other organizations on R&D but
has not formalized this process.
TSA and DHS Have Made Efforts to Reach Out to Technology Providers, but
Some Potential Providers Have Expressed Concern about the Process:
The Homeland Security Act authorizes DHS to solicit proposals to
address vulnerabilities and award grants, cooperative agreements, and
contracts with public or private entities, including businesses,
federally funded R&D centers, and universities.[Footnote 40] TSA and
DHS have taken some actions to use this authority, but some potential
technology providers believe that more information and communication
are needed.
One way that TSA and DHS have reached out to the private sector is
through their membership in the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG),
a joint program of the Departments of State and Defense that
identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency R&D requirements
to combat terrorism. TSA and DHS have used TSWG to issue broad agency
announcements, which request proposals from private and/or public
entities for projects that address specific R&D needs.[Footnote 41]
These solicitations have generated substantial numbers of responses.
For example, TSWG received more than 3,340 responses to a broad agency
announcement that it issued for DHS in May 2003 soliciting proposals
for multiple homeland security R&D projects, including a system for
screening rail passengers and baggage. A DHS official said that as DHS
matures, it intends to rely less on TSWG and more on the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), DHS's external
funding arm.
TSA and DHS have also reached out to the private sector by linking
their Web sites to the Federal Business Opportunities Web site, which
informs potential technology providers about opportunities for
conducting homeland security R&D projects. In addition, TSA's Web site
invites potential technology providers and others to submit their ideas
about innovative security technologies that could contribute to TSA's
work on aircraft hardening, baggage and cargo screening, credentialing,
physical security, and electronic surveillance. According to TSA, it
has evaluated over 1,000 proposals submitted in response to this
invitation. However, representatives of several private companies told
us of difficulties they had experienced in trying to communicate with
TSA, navigate its Web site, obtain information about its R&D program,
and understand its current transportation security R&D priorities. For
example, a company official told us that his company was forced into
guessing about TSA's long-term R&D strategy, and that manufacturers do
not want to make a large investment in developing new technologies
without knowing whether TSA will embrace those technologies. This
company official suggested that TSA should communicate its R&D goals
promptly to vendors. Similarly, some private company representatives
told us that they did not have sufficient information about DHS's
transportation security R&D priorities and requirements to adequately
respond to solicitations. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS
noted that TSA recently established a working group to update and
improve the current Web site's discussion of technology ideas,
products, and services to make it more user-friendly and plans to
implement the improvements early next year.
HSARPA has also conducted various forms of outreach with potential
technology providers. In September 2003, for example, it conducted a
bidders' conference to discuss the release of a solicitation on
detection systems for biological and chemical countermeasures. In
addition, in November 2003, HSARPA conducted a best practices workshop
that allowed potential technology providers to comment on how DHS could
best keep industry informed about its priorities, make industry aware
of agency solicitations, and manage the relationship between industry
and the agency. The industry participants also stressed the importance
of communication between them and DHS. In addition, some participants
suggested that DHS issue early drafts of solicitations to allow
industry to gain a better understanding of DHS's needs.[Footnote 42]
Following the workshop, in January 2004, DHS issued a draft
solicitation, for technologies to detect radiological and nuclear
materials, for industry comment before issuing the final version.
TSA and DHS have used universities to conduct some of their R&D. For
example, in June 2004, TSA indicated that it had 24 grants with
colleges and universities. In addition, the Homeland Security Act
requires DHS to establish university-based centers for homeland
security.[Footnote 43] According to DHS, the centers will conduct
multidisciplinary research on homeland security. In November 2003, DHS
announced that it had selected the University of Southern California as
its first Homeland Security Center of Excellence.[Footnote 44] DHS will
provide $12 million over 3 years for the university to conduct a risk
analysis on the economic consequences of terrorist threats and events.
The study will address both the targets and means of terrorism, with an
emphasis on protecting the nation's critical infrastructure, such as
transportation systems.
TSA and DHS Have Taken Steps to Accelerate Congressionally Mandated
Transportation Security Technologies:
Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA is required to
accelerate the research, development, testing, and evaluation of, among
other things, explosives detection technology for checked baggage and
new screening technology for carry-on items and other items being
loaded onto aircraft, including cargo, and for threats carried on
persons.[Footnote 45] The Homeland Security Act requires DHS's HSARPA
to accelerate the prototyping and development of technologies that
"would address homeland security vulnerabilities."[Footnote 46]
Although the Homeland Security Act authorized a $500 million
acceleration fund in fiscal year 2003,[Footnote 47] a DHS official said
that no funds were specifically appropriated for that purpose.
Both TSA and DHS have taken steps to address congressionally mandated
requirements to accelerate security technologies, but they are
operating without goals and measurable objectives. As a result, it is
difficult to determine what progress the agencies have made toward
accelerating R&D projects. Although TSA does not yet have goals and
objectives for measuring acceleration, the agency has funded the
Phoenix project, among others, to accelerate baggage screening
technologies in the near term. For fiscal year 2004, DHS budgeted $75
million for accelerating technologies through its Rapid Prototyping
Program. For example, DHS, in coordination with TSWG, issued a broad
agency announcement in May 2003 to support the development of
technologies that can be rapidly prototyped and deployed to the field.
Furthermore, in January 2004, DHS issued a broad agency announcement to
rapidly develop detection systems for radiological and nuclear
countermeasures.
DHS Plans to Integrate the Department's R&D Programs:
Although the Homeland Security Act requires TSA to remain a distinct
entity until at least November 2004,[Footnote 48] another provision of
the Homeland Security Act requires DHS to integrate all of the
department's R&D activities.[Footnote 49] Until that integration
occurs, TSA and other DHS components that conduct transportation
security R&D are operating separately. However, DHS has made some
efforts to promote R&D coordination within the department, such as
holding meetings with the different components to discuss R&D
activities and preparing inventories of the DHS components' R&D
capabilities and ongoing projects. DHS officials said they are
preparing a plan to meet a directive from the Secretary of Homeland
Security to integrate the department's R&D activities by 2005.
Conclusions:
The nation's transportation systems, many of which are open and
accessible, are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. Whether new
technologies can be researched, developed, and deployed to reduce the
vulnerability of these systems depends largely on how effectively DHS
and TSA manage their transportation security R&D programs. The National
Research Council has stated that effectively managing federal R&D
programs should include consistently funding basic research because it
offers opportunities for significant improvements in capabilities.
However, project information provided by TSA and DHS did not show that
any of the transportation security R&D projects that they funded in
fiscal year 2003 and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in the basic
research phase. While TSA and DHS recognize the importance of basic
research, they are focusing their efforts on the near-term development
and deployment of technologies.
Although DHS is working toward complying with legal requirements and
implementing best practices for managing its R&D program, it is
operating without a strategic plan for its R&D program. Furthermore,
although TSA and DHS officials have said that they plan to use risk
assessments to select and prioritize R&D projects, TSA has not
completed vulnerability and criticality assessments, which are key
components of risk assessments, for all modes of transportation. In
addition, DHS has not yet completed risk assessments of the
infrastructure sectors, such as transportation. As a result, Congress
does not have reasonable assurance that the hundreds of millions of
dollars that are being invested in transportation security R&D are
being spent cost-effectively to address the highest priority
transportation security risks. In addition, the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States recommended that the
government identify and evaluate the transportation assets that need to
be protected; set risk-based priorities for defending them; select the
most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so; and then develop a
plan, a budget, and funding to implement the effort.
TSA and DHS also do not have adequate databases to monitor and manage
their spending of the hundreds of millions of dollars that Congress has
appropriated for R&D. As DHS integrates its R&D programs, including
TSA's, it will be important for the department to have accurate,
complete, current, and readily accessible project information that it
can use to effectively monitor and manage its R&D portfolios.
The limited evidence of coordination between TSA and DHS that we found,
as well as between each of these agencies and other agencies such as
DOT, does not provide assurance that R&D resources are being leveraged,
research gaps are being identified and addressed, and duplication is
being avoided. In our June 2003 report on transportation security
challenges, we recommended that DHS and DOT use a mechanism such as a
memorandum of agreement to clearly delineate their respective roles and
responsibilities. DHS and DOT disagreed with this recommendation
because they believed that their roles and responsibilities were
already clear. However, we continue to believe that DHS's and DOT's
roles and responsibilities for transportation security, including their
respective security R&D programs, should be clarified because the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act gives TSA responsibility for
securing all modes of transportation but does not eliminate the DOT
modal administrations' existing statutory responsibilities for the
security of different modes of transportation.
Finally, because most transportation industry associations told us that
TSA and DHS have not contacted them about their security R&D needs, the
security R&D needs of transportation providers may not have been
adequately considered.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To support efforts by TSA and DHS to maximize the advantages offered by
basic research, help select and prioritize R&D projects, better monitor
and manage their R&D portfolios, enhance coordination with one another
and with other organizations that conduct transportation security R&D,
and improve their outreach to transportation, we are making five
recommendations. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for
the Transportation Security Administration:
* ensure that their transportation security R&D portfolios contain
projects in all phases of R&D, including basic research;
* complete (1) strategic plans containing measurable objectives for
TSA's and DHS's transportation security R&D programs and (2) risk
assessments--threat, vulnerability, and criticality--for all modes of
transportation, and use the results of the risk assessments to help
select and prioritize R&D projects;
* develop a database that will provide accurate, complete, current, and
readily accessible project information for monitoring and managing
their R&D portfolios;
* develop a process with DOT to coordinate transportation security R&D,
such as a memorandum of agreement identifying roles and
responsibilities and designating agency liaisons, and share information
on the agreed-upon roles and responsibilities with transportation
stakeholders; and:
* develop a vehicle to communicate with the transportation industry to
ensure that its R&D security needs have been identified and considered.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided TSA, DHS, and DOT with drafts of this report for their
review and comment. DHS's written comments, which incorporated comments
from TSA, are provided in appendix IV, along with our responses to
specific points. DOT also provided comments on the draft report, which
we have incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DHS generally concurred with the report's findings and commented that
the recommendations are key to a successful R&D program and that the
department would continue to evaluate its R&D processes in light of the
report's findings and recommendations. However, DHS believed that the
report did not sufficiently recognize recent changes that have taken
place, particularly at TSA. According to DHS, TSA has made great
strides in defining R&D projects and linking them to mission needs and
identified gaps. In response to these and other technical comments that
DHS provided, we revised the report as appropriate.
DHS also provided additional perspectives on our recommendations:
* Recommendation: TSA and DHS should ensure that their transportation
security R&D portfolios contain projects in all phases of R&D,
including basic research. DHS said that TSA's Transportation Security
Laboratory currently conducts basic research and that TSA's human
factors program, Manhattan II project, and air cargo security projects
include basic research. However, information provided by TSA in July
2004 in response to our request for data on projects, including their
current phase of research, identified no projects in the basic research
phase. This information from TSA covered the agency's R&D work on human
factors, Manhattan II, and air cargo security. In addition, a senior
TSA official said that the agency needed to do more basic research. In
light of this information from TSA, we did not change our
recommendation.
* Recommendation: TSA and DHS should (1) complete strategic plans
containing measurable objectives for TSA's and DHS's transportation
security R&D programs and (2) complete risk assessments for all modes
of transportation, and use the results of the risk assessments to help
select and prioritize R&D projects. DHS said that in 2004, it finalized
its strategic plan, which defined missions and goals for all of the
agencies under it, including TSA. DHS also said that the strategic plan
being developed by TSA's Office of Security Technology would include
measurable goals and milestones for R&D projects. However, DHS's
strategic plan does not specifically address transportation security
R&D and neither TSA nor DHS has completed an R&D strategic plan
containing measurable objectives. Therefore, we did not revise this
recommendation.
* Recommendation: TSA and DHS should develop a database that will
provide accurate, complete, current, and readily accessible project
information for monitoring and managing their R&D portfolios. DHS said
that TSA had developed a system to track R&D projects' goals and
milestones, acquisition, funding, testing, and deployment information.
While such a project tracking system could address our recommendation,
TSA struggled as recently as of August 2004 to provide us with basic
information on many of its R&D projects and, in the end, was unable to
do so for a significant number. Therefore, we retained this
recommendation.
* Recommendation: TSA should develop a process with DOT to coordinate
transportation security R&D, such as a memorandum of agreement
identifying roles and responsibilities, and share this information with
transportation stakeholders. DHS said that TSA is already working with
DOT to avoid duplicative R&D efforts. In addition, DHS said that TSA
would assess the benefits associated with a memorandum of agreement
with DOT to determine whether one should be initiated. We continue to
believe that a memorandum of agreement between TSA and DHS is the
proper vehicle for coordinating R&D--not only to avoid duplication, but
also to leverage resources and identify unmet needs. Furthermore, DOT
concurred with our finding that there is room for significant
improvement in coordination between DOT and TSA and between DOT and
DHS. DOT also agreed with our recommendation that a memorandum of
agreement with DHS is the appropriate vehicle for improving the
coordination of transportation security R&D.
* Recommendation: TSA and DHS should develop a vehicle to communicate
with the transportation industry to ensure that their R&D needs have
been identified and considered. DHS said that TSA does and will
continue to communicate with the transportation industry. Although DHS
noted some actions that TSA is taking to reach out to the
transportation industry, as we reported, most transportation industry
officials we interviewed said that TSA and DHS had not reached out to
them to obtain information about their transportation security R&D
needs. Therefore, we did not change this recommendation.
Finally, DHS commented on the draft report's conclusion that Congress
has no reasonable assurance that the hundreds of millions of dollars
that are being invested in transportation security R&D are being
invested cost-effectively to address the highest priority
transportation risks. According to DHS, this conclusion is contradicted
by evidence contained in our report, namely, that the report
underscores the difficulties of integrating multiple new agencies
missions, resources, and approaches. However, we believe that the
report's evidence of incomplete strategic planning and risk assessment,
inadequate information management, and insufficient coordination
supports the conclusion. Given that DHS generally concurred with all of
the recommendations, which address these issues, and said they were key
to a successful R&D program, we believe that implementing them will
strengthen TSA's and DHS's ability to provide Congress with reasonable
assurance that the hundreds of millions of dollars that are being
invested in transportation security R&D are being invested cost-
effectively to address the highest priority transportation security
risks.
In its comments on the draft report, DOT said that its efforts to
coordinate research planning with DHS and TSA support our finding that
there is room for significant improvement. According to DOT, it offers
substantial transportation expertise that could provide critical input
for identifying and prioritizing the transportation security R&D
agenda. DOT also said that it is anxious to work with DHS and TSA to
create a mutually beneficial working environment that taps its
transportation experience and expertise while the department benefits
from DHS's security expertise. DOT believes that through effective
interagency coordination, it could work with DHS and TSA to ensure that
important research needs are met in areas such as critical
transportation infrastructure protection, as well as in responding to,
and recovering from, a terrorist attack on the transportation system.
Finally, DOT said that coordinating R&D activities represents an area
that could benefit by being included in an annex to an overall
memorandum of agreement between DOT and DHS such as we recommended. DOT
said it fully supports the completion of a comprehensive memorandum of
agreement with DHS and is working to bring one to fruition.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of
Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the
Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation
Security Administration, and the Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. We will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no
charge on our Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. If you have
any questions about this report, please contact me on (202) 512-2834 or
at [Hyperlink, siggerudk@gao.gov].
Signed by:
Katherine Siggerud:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
List of Congressional Addressees:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert:
Chairman, Committee on Science:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings:
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation:
United States Senate:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of this report were to review (1) the transportation
security research and development (R&D) projects that the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies funded in fiscal year 2003
and have budgeted for in fiscal year 2004; the status of these
projects; and the reasonableness of the distribution of these projects
by mode and (2) the extent to which TSA and DHS are managing their
transportation security R&D programs according to applicable laws and
best practices recommended by the National Academy of Sciences and the
National Research Council.
To complete our first objective, we obtained and analyzed information
from TSA, DHS, and the Department of Transportation (DOT) on the
transportation security R&D projects that they were funding and are
planning to fund. Within DHS, in addition to TSA and the Science and
Technology Directorate, we collected this information from the U.S.
Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency, and the
U.S. Secret Service, which DHS officials identified as also conducting
transportation security R&D. Information on the transportation security
R&D projects that TSA and DHS plan to fund in fiscal year 2005 was not
yet available. Because we found during our review that DOT was
continuing to conduct some transportation security R&D, we obtained and
analyzed information on the transportation security R&D projects that
it was funding in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. At DOT, we obtained this
information from the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal
Transit Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal
Motor Carriers Safety Administration, the Office of Pipeline Safety,
and the Research and Special Projects Administration. Regarding their
transportation security R&D projects, we asked these agencies to
provide project descriptions and information on who was performing the
research (such as private contractors or national laboratories); their
phase of research; anticipated dates of completion, initial deployment,
and deployment; and funding data for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. We
then aggregated these data to determine the focus of TSA's and DHS's
transportation security projects in terms of the modes of
transportation and program areas. On the basis of interviews with TSA,
DHS, DOT, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
officials regarding how their agencies ensure that these data are
complete and accurate, we determined that these data were sufficiently
reliable for purposes of this report. To gain a better understanding of
the types of technologies involved in transportation security, we
reviewed reports prepared by GAO, the DOT Inspector General, the
Homeland Security Research Corporation (a private research
organization), and others and attended conferences where transportation
security R&D-related technologies were discussed. To help evaluate the
reasonableness of the R&D projects that TSA, DHS, and DOT have funded
in terms of the modes of transportation and program areas addressed, we
convened a meeting of transportation security and technology experts.
At our request, the National Research Council selected the experts, who
were affiliated with state transportation departments, universities,
national laboratories, private industry, and other organizations and
were knowledgeable about transportation security technologies.
To complete our second objective, we first identified and reviewed the
laws relevant to the management of TSA's and DHS's R&D programs,
including the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Homeland
Security Act, and the Government Performance and Results Act. We also
identified and reviewed best practices applicable to R&D programs
identified by leading research organizations, such as the National
Research Council and the National Academy of Sciences. In addition, we
interviewed TSA and DHS officials about their strategic planning,
coordination, and R&D acceleration efforts. We also reviewed GAO
reports on TSA's strategic planning, on DHS's interaction with the
Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories, on risk management
principles, on implementing the Government Performance and Results Act,
and on transportation security challenges and a DHS Inspector General
report on the Science and Technology Directorate's operations. We then
compared these laws and best practices with TSA's and DHS's management
of their R&D programs. To determine the extent to which TSA and DHS
were coordinating with each other and other federal agencies, we
interviewed officials at TSA, DHS, DOT, NASA, the Technical Support
Working Group, five DOE national laboratories that were conducting
transportation security R&D for TSA or DHS, and three universities that
were conducting R&D for TSA. We visited the national laboratories in
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Los Alamos, New Mexico, because the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory was conducting more transportation security R&D
projects for TSA, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory was conducting
more transportation security projects for DHS, compared with the other
national laboratories. To determine the extent to which TSA and DHS had
outreached to the transportation industry and potential technology
providers, we interviewed officials from transportation industry
associations and attended DHS industry workshops. In addition, we
interviewed a number of members of the Homeland Security Industries
Association, an organization of homeland security technology vendors,
to obtain their views on TSA's and DHS's technology solicitation
processes and outreach efforts. The association identified the members
who chose to discuss their views with us. At our request, the
transportation security and technology experts also provided comments
on TSA's and DHS's management of their R&D programs.
We conducted our review in Washington, D.C; Arlington, Virginia;
Atlantic City, New Jersey; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Los Alamos, New
Mexico, from July 2003 through September 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Industry Is Independently Developing New and Emerging
Transportation Security Technologies:
According to a TSA official, private industry and universities are
researching and developing several new and emerging technologies that
are applicable to transportation security, in some cases without any
funding from TSA or DHS. The official said that TSA has focused most of
its R&D on making improvements to deployed technologies and testing and
evaluating near-term technologies. However, the official stated that
TSA needs to start devoting more funding to researching and developing
long-term, high-risk, but potentially high-payoff technologies.
Examples of new and emerging technologies include the following:
* Terahertz imaging uses terahertz radiation[Footnote 50] to create
images of concealed objects or to reveal their chemical composition.
The rays can be directed at a person or an object from a source, with
reflected rays captured by a detection device. The Homeland Security
Research Corporation (a private research organization) reports that
terahertz imaging will be an excellent tool for screening baggage.
Terahertz imaging has been used in the laboratory to detect explosives
on people through several layers of clothing. TSA is considering
funding the development of this technology for detecting explosives in
containerized air cargo.
* Nuclear resonance fluorescence imaging uses a high-intensity light
source to identify the atomic composition of a target object. Nuclear
resonance fluorescence imaging has the potential to detect explosives
and nuclear materials in baggage, trucks, and cargo containers.
According to a TSA official, TSA may fund R&D on this technology in the
future.
* Microsensors are miniature devices that convert information about the
environment into an electrical form that can be read by instruments.
There are many types of microsensors, some of which have the potential
to detect explosives. In fiscal year 2003, TSA funded R&D at two
national laboratories and NASA on several different types of
microsensors. A TSA official said that several universities are
currently doing work on other types of microsensors that have potential
to meet TSA's needs, but that TSA did not fund any of this work in
2004.
* Automated detection algorithms are computer software that processes
data obtained by detection systems and automatically indicates the
presence of an explosive or weapon. Although TSA has funded the
development of such software for its currently deployed computed
tomography explosives detection systems, it has not yet funded the
development of such software to process images produced by emerging
detection technologies, such as X-ray backscatter and millimeter
wave.[Footnote 51] A TSA official believes that incorporating
automated detection algorithms could substantially reduce the
operational cost of future detection systems by reducing the need for
screeners. According to this official, TSA may fund the development of
these algorithms in the future.
* Raman spectroscopy uses laser light to determine the chemical
composition of an object and can be used to screen passengers, carry-on
and checked baggage, cargo, and boarding passes for explosives.
* Nuclear magnetic resonance directs radio waves at an object that has
been placed in a magnetic field to determine the presence of
explosives. Nuclear magnetic resonance can be used to screen liquids in
containers in carry-on and checked baggage for explosives.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO's Panel of Transportation Security and Technology
Experts:
Name: Norm Abramson - Chair;
Affiliation: Southwest Research Institute;
Expertise: Research policy.
Name: David Albright;
Affiliation: New Mexico Department of Transportation;
Expertise: Surface transportation.
Name: Cheryl Bitner;
Affiliation: AAI Corporation;
Expertise: Human factors, passenger screening technologies.
Name: Joedy Cambridge;
Affiliation: National Research Council, Transportation Research Board;
Expertise: Transportation policy.
Name: Robert Gallamore;
Affiliation: Northwestern University;
Expertise: Railroads, cybersecurity.
Name: Patrick Griffin;
Affiliation: Sandia National Laboratories;
Expertise: Transportation security technologies, neutron spectroscopy.
Name: Yacov Haimes;
Affiliation: University of Virginia;
Expertise: Risk analysis.
Name: Daniel Hall;
Affiliation: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority;
Expertise: Mass transit.
Name: Douglas Harris;
Affiliation: Anacapa Sciences;
Expertise: Human factors.
Name: William Harris;
Affiliation: Consultant;
Expertise: Commissioner - President's Council on Critical
Infrastructure Protection.
Name: Thomas Hartwick;
Affiliation: Consultant;
Expertise: Transportation security technologies.
Name: Sandra Hyland;
Affiliation: Tokyo Electron Massachusetts;
Expertise: Transportation security technologies.
Name: James Killian;
Affiliation: National Research Council, National Materials Advisory
Board;
Expertise: Transportation security.
Name: Eva Lerner-Lam;
Affiliation: Palisades Consulting Group;
Expertise: Maritime/Land security.
Name: Len Limmer;
Affiliation: Consultant;
Expertise: Airports, passenger screening technologies.
Name: Terry Lowe;
Affiliation: Los Alamos National Laboratory;
Expertise: Organization.
Name: Toni Marechaux;
Affiliation: National Research Council, National Materials Advisory
Board;
Expertise: Transportation security technologies.
Name: Harry Martz;
Affiliation: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
Expertise: X-ray technologies, nondestructive evaluation.
Name: Emily Ann Meyer;
Affiliation: National Research Council, National Materials Advisory
Board;
Expertise: Technology policy.
Name: Dan Murray;
Affiliation: American Transportation Research Institute;
Expertise: Trucking and freight transportation security and
technologies.
Name: Daniel O'Neil;
Affiliation: CRADA International;
Expertise: Chair, Transportation Research Board Committee on Critical
Transportation Infrastructure Protection.
Name: Clint Oster;
Affiliation: Indiana University, School of Public & Environmental
Affairs;
Expertise: Cargo/Baggage Screening, Aviation, Transportation
Infrastructure.
Name: Joseph Schofer;
Affiliation: Northwestern University;
Expertise: Incident response and management on transportation networks.
Name: Eric Schwartz;
Affiliation: The Boeing Company;
Expertise: Aviation and aircraft technology.
Name: Edmund Soliday;
Affiliation: Consultant;
Expertise: Airlines, passenger screening technologies.
Name: Mike Story;
Affiliation: Consultant;
Expertise: Mass spectrometry, passenger screening technologies.
Name: Joyce Wenger;
Affiliation: Science Applications International Corporation;
Expertise: Freight, intelligent transportation, traffic modeling.
Name: Jeffery Western;
Affiliation: Wisconsin Department of Transportation;
Expertise: Surface Transportation - Highways.
Source: National Research Council.
Note: These experts either attended the March 2, 2004, meeting or
provided written comments after reviewing information that we provided
to them.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
September 10, 2004:
Ms. Katherine Siggerud:
Director, Physical Infrastructure:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Re: GAO-04-890, Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching
and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management,
September 2004, GAO Case 540068:
Dear Ms. Siggerud:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report referenced
above. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the work
done in this report to identify areas where transportation security R&D
management can be improved. DHS believes that GAO's identification of
areas for improvements will contribute to the efficiency and
effectiveness of R&D management at TSA and throughout the DHS. We
generally concur with the report and its recommendations and appreciate
the discussion of challenges and next steps this report contains.
However, there are areas within the report about which we would like to
comment.
DHS believes that the report does not provide sufficient recognition of
recent changes that have taken place, particularly at TSA. In March of
2003, the TSA took over the operational management of the R&D program
previously operated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Since
that transition, TSA has made great strides in defining R&D projects
and linking them to mission needs and identified gaps. While we
recognize that there is a great deal of work ahead, it is important to
bear in mind that designing a program that will support the many needs
of DHS and TSA cannot happen in a haphazard manner and must be built
over time. While immediate needs were associated with the aviation
sector, since 2003, TSA's R&D and operational testing and evaluation
programs have expanded to include the other transportation modes,
recognizing that the role of TSA is much different for those modes than
it is for aviation.
Comments on GAO Recommendations:
GAO made the following five recommendations regarding Transportation
Security R&D:
1. Ensure that their transportation security R&D portfolios include all
phases of R&D including some basic research;
2. Complete (1) strategic plans containing measurable objectives for
TSA's and DHS's transportation security R&D programs and (2) risk
assessments-threat, vulnerability and criticality-for all modes of
transportation and that they use the results of the risk assessments to
help select and prioritize R&D priorities;
3. Develop a database/management information system that will provide
accurate, complete, current, and readily accessible project information
for monitoring and managing their R&D portfolios;
4. Develop a process with DOT to coordinate transportation security
R&D, such as memorandums of understanding identifying roles and
responsibilities with transportation stakeholders; and:
5. Develop a vehicle to communicate with the transportation industry to
ensure that its R&D security needs have been identified and considered.
We agree that these recommendations are key to a successful R&D
program. Since its inception, TSA has been conducting R&D using these
processes and philosophies and continues to improve on them as TSA and
DHS mature.
1. TSA's Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) currently conducts
basic research and has done so over the years it was operating under
the Department of Transportation (DOT) umbrella. A number of our
projects under the Human Factors Program are basic research and the
results apply to several of our transportation security programs.
Additionally, the TSL issues numerous grants per year that support
basic research. We also recognize we need to expand basic research to
include technology, and have done so in our Next Generation EDS
Manhattan II project, and our air cargo security R&D.
2. In 2004, DHS finalized their strategic plan. The plan defined the
missions and goals for all of the agencies under DHS to include the
TSA. Based on the DHS strategic plan, TSA is currently finalizing its
strategic plan, and TSA's Office of Security Technology (OST)
specifically is developing its strategic plan that outlines measurable
objectives. The OST plan will include measurable goals and milestones
regarding R&D projects.
3. The TSA OST developed a Project Tracking System built specifically
to track R&D projects goals and milestones, acquisition, funding,
testing, and deployment information. This system will allow TSA to more
accurately track R&D initiatives. To establish the overall framework
for OST technology programs and to set the stage for the implementation
of the processes and mechanisms described above, higher-level
management documents are developed. The highest-level OST technical
document is this Technology Master Plan. At the next level, Product
Area Master Plans are developed to provide a framework for all of the
programs within a product area. Each Product Area Master Plan outlines
the scope of the product area, summarizes the programs defined under
the product area, presents high-level schedules for the programs and
provides high-level budgetary information for the programs.
4. TSA works with the DOT to ensure there are no duplicative R&D
efforts. TSA will assess the benefits associated with an MOU with DOT
to determine if in fact one should be initiated.
5. TSA does and will continue to communicate with the transportation
industry. In addition to the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
discussed by the GAO, TSA also works directly with industry
stakeholders on specific R&D efforts. The TSA OST is also a presenter
and participant in the weekly Intermodal Conference Call held by the
TSA's Assistant Secretary to provide an update on technology, and
solicit input from industry. This call typically attracts Federal
Railroad Administration, Federal Transit Administration, DOT, and
multiple industry leaders ranging from the National Association for
School Buses, to AMTRAK, to the American Trucking Association.
General Comments on the GAO Report:
* The GAO commented that TSA used a majority of its R&D funding on
aviation security versus other modes of transportation. While aviation
security is currently the primary focus of TSA's R&D projects, many
aviation projects provide data that is useful for other transportation
security programs. Much of what is learned from these projects is
easily adapted for other modes of transportation. For example, funding
was categorized as aviation security for explosive trace portals and
these portals were recently used in a rail security initiative.
* GAO outlined three projects that panelists from their transportation
and security panel suggested be considered for future funding.
- The first recommendation is for a project that combines neutron
inspection technology with traditional transmission x-ray and
backscatter x-ray technologies to enhance air cargo security. The TSA
is already looking at pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA), which is a
technology that utilizes x-ray images in conjunction with neutrons
interrogation and substance identification. TSA has already spent close
to $3 million supporting this technology, and is currently working with
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol and the Department of Defense to
demonstrate the utility of this technology.
- The second recommendation was for a multifunctional portal that tests
for metal, explosives, narcotics, and chemicals in near real-time. The
TSA agrees with this recommendation. Pursuing technology fusion is
critical, and this has certainly been an R&D goal for security
transportation for some time. TSA has prototypes from two different
vendors, with whom TSA is working to integrate automated metal/
explosives detection portals. These next generation portals will
demonstrate true integration. At this point in their R&D program, TSA
is in the process of identifying and addressing the strengths and
weaknesses of subcomponent technology before trying to integrate two
systems into one. TSA is examining quadruple resonance, x-ray
backscatter, and millimeter wave technology as sub-elements to metal
and trace explosives detection portals now commercially available.
- Lastly, the panelists recommended the development of a standard piece
of luggage for testing deployed explosives detection systems (EDS) to
ensure that they maintain acceptable performance capabilities. TSA does
implement a system validation process for all technology it deploys,
including EDS.
* We believe that the report should indicate that TSA does have two
overview committees, the National Academy of Sciences and the Security
Advisory Panel, that contain experts from elements of transportation.
* GAO reported that one of their security expert panelists did not agree
with funding a $30,000 project to test a prototype of a new, hand-held
ion mobility spectrometry explosives trace detector because, according
to the panelist, at least two very good ion mobility spectrometry hand-
held units can be purchased off the shelf. The reason TSA funded this
project was that the vendor demonstrated a novel vortex sampler that
showed promise as an advanced sample collector. TSA is actively seeking
automated trace sampling technology that can be used with any detection
platform. In this instance the detector happened to be an ion mobility
spectrometer, but the focus of this R&D effort was to demonstrate a
device that could find explosives residues in an automated fashion.
The report states that TSA has focused its R&D efforts on near-term
development, however, during FY 2004 TSA embarked on several long-term
research projects. Specifically, TSA will go to award on some proposals
received for the Manhattan II project. Manhattan II is designed to
explore next-generation technology to create revolutionary approaches
to screening checked baggage. TSA expects to award Phase I feasibility
studies in September to a number of bidders who submitted proposals
under a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) for next generation technology.
Additionally, the TSA will go to award under some proposals for
development of air cargo screening technologies. Although to date,
still in the procurement-sensitive stage, the TSA is exploring a number
of approaches with varying levels of technical risk but potential high
payoff.
* The report states that "Strategic Plans for TSA's and DHS's R&D
Programs do not yet contain measurable objectives." TSA has adopted a
strategic planning process that allows it to sharpen its organizational
and operational focus, providing the basis for establishing and
maintaining a performance-driven organization. The process begins with
the formulation of a strategic mission, vision, and values. After
assessing the internal and external environment, strategic goals,
objectives, and activities are formulated and written in a Strategic
Plan to help guide TSA's efforts in achieving its mission and values.
The general goals and objectives in the Strategic Plan are linked to
the annual performance goals in the budget.
A critical component of the TSA planning process is the monitoring and
reporting of progress in achieving strategic goals. TSA has established
performance measures that link directly to the goals and objectives in
the Strategic Plan. Currently, these measures are not included in the
strategic plan. However, TSA has developed performance monitoring and
reporting systems that collect performance measures and other data
continuously and report periodically. Progress on achieving performance
targets are reported periodically to DHS, external policy makers, and
the public.
Results are used to evaluate programs and to determine if any
corrective actions need to be taken.
The report states that Congress has no reasonable assurances that the
hundreds of millions of dollars that are being invested in
transportation security R&D are being spent as cost-effectively as
possible to address the highest-priority transportation security risks.
This reference contradicts this two-year study by GAO on this very
issue, as described in the report. Taken in total, this report does not
paint a picture of irresponsibility; rather, we believe it paints a
picture of the difficulties of integrating multiple new agencies'
missions, resources, and approaches. TSA has established databases that
are used to track individual projects, critical milestones, and funding
spent. Additionally, as mentioned in the response to recommendation 3,
TSA OST has adopted a Project Tracking System built specifically to
track R&D projects, goals, milestones, acquisitions, funding, testing,
and deployment information. This is a web-based system, which can be
accessed by both the Tech Lab in Atlantic City and TSA headquarters in
Arlington, VA.
GAO reported that several private companies commented that they had
experienced difficulty in navigating TSA's website regarding
communicating innovative technology ideas. TSA recently established a
working group tasked to update and improve the current website
regarding Technology Ideas, Products, and Services to make it more
user-friendly and provide more information to users. The improvements
will be implemented early next year.
We appreciate your review of transportation security R&D management at
DHS and thank you for the thorough analysis and discussion that
comprises this report. We will continue to reevaluate our R&D processes
in light of the findings and recommendations of this report.
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute comments to the draft
report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Anna F. Dixon:
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland
Security's letter dated August 31, 2004.
GAO Comments:
1. We agree with DHS that aviation security is currently the primary
focus of TSA's R&D projects, and that many aviation projects provide
data that are useful for other transportation security programs.
Because these topics were discussed in the draft report, we made no
change.
2. DHS provided comments on three projects that members of our panel of
transportation security experts suggested should be considered for
future funding. We added this information to the report.
3. DHS said that the report should indicate that TSA has two advisory
committees--the National Academy of Sciences and the Security Advisory
Panel--that contain experts from various modes of transportation. We
added this information to the report.
4. DHS commented on a project that one of our panelist believed should
not be funded (a $30,000 project to test a prototype of a new, handheld
ion mobility spectrometry explosives trace detector) because it could
be purchased off the shelf. According to DHS, TSA funded this project
because the vendor demonstrated a promising technology. We added this
comment to our report.
5. We continue to believe that DHS's and TSA's R&D strategic plans
should contain measurable objectives. Similarly, the National Academy
of Science indicated that research programs should be described in
strategic and performance plans. Therefore, we made no changes to the
report in response to this comment.
6. DHS noted that TSA recently established a working group to update
and improve the current Web site that addresses technology ideas,
products, and services to make it more user-friendly. TSA plans to
implement the improvements early next year. We added this information
to the report.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-2834 or [Hyperlink, siggerudk@gao.gov],
Tammy Conquest, (202) 512-5234 or [Hyperlink, conquestt@gao.gov].
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individuals named above, other key contributors to
this report were Dennis Amari, Carol Anderson-Guthrie, Nancy Boardman,
Gerald Dillingham, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, David Goldstein, Brandon
Haller, Bob Homan, Dave Hooper, Andrew Huddleston, Michael Mgebroff,
Claire van der Lee, and Don Watson.
(542046):
FOOTNOTES
[1] The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for TSA's R&D
program is for R&D in TSA's Office of Security Technologies only and
does not include R&D in other TSA offices, such as the Office of
Maritime and Land Security and the Office of Aviation Operations.
[2] GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach,
GAO-02-150T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001).
[3] GAO, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).
[4] Under the Homeland Security Act, the Secret Service and Coast Guard
remained distinct entities within DHS. The Secret Service and Coast
Guard portfolio managers said that DHS's Science and Technology
Directorate does not direct the types of transportation security R&D
projects that they conduct.
[5] These include the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal
Highway Administration, the Federal Motor Carriers' Safety
Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal
Transit Administration, and the Research and Special Programs
Administration.
[6] The Homeland Security Act refers to the USA Patriot Act for a
definition of critical infrastructure, which defines it as systems and
assets that are so vital to the United States that their incapacity or
destruction would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, or national public health or safety. See Pub.L. No.
107-56, § 1016(e) (2001).
[7] Rapid prototyping is a process that uses computer-aided design and
fabrication to create and build a prototype more quickly than through
traditional means.
[8] The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for TSA's R&D
program is for R&D in TSA's Office of Security Technologies only and
does not include R&D in other TSA offices, such as the Office of
Maritime and Land Security and the Office of Aviation Operations.
[9] Manhattan II is TSA's long-term approach for improving checked
baggage screening systems for aviation as well as maritime and land
modes. This program seeks to achieve revolutionary improvements in
detection capability and operational efficiency in 5 to 10 years using
new screening technologies. TSA plans to award this project's first
"proof of concept" grants in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004.
[10] TRIP is intended to assess the feasibility of the screening of
people and their carry-on baggage traveling on U.S. trains.
[11] A computed tomography explosives detection system uses an X-ray
source that rotates around a bag, obtaining a large number of cross-
sectional images that are integrated by a computer, which displays the
densities of objects in the bag. The system automatically triggers an
alarm when objects with high densities, which are characteristic of
explosives, are detected.
[12] Quadrupole resonance uses radio frequency pulses to probe bags by
eliciting unique responses from explosives based on their chemical
characteristics.
[13] TSA was not able to tell us how much it had obligated and budgeted
for CAPPS II in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, respectively.
[14] GAO, Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges, GAO-04-385
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).
[15] Pulsed fast neutron analysis probes targets, using high-energy
neutrons, for the presence of explosives.
[16] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: 2004).
[17] GAO, Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security,
GAO-04-315R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2003), and Aviation Security:
Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead, GAO-03-
1150T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003).
[18] Some of DHS's transportation security R&D projects are funded and
managed by DHS's Science and Technology Directorate, while others are
funded and managed by other DHS agencies, namely the Coast Guard,
Customs and Border Protection, and the Secret Service.
[19] In our January 2004 report on DHS's effort, we found that DHS
faces significant challenges in adapting a military counter-MANPADS
system to commercial aircraft, including establishing system
requirements, developing the technology and design to a mature level,
and developing reliable cost estimates. (GAO, The Department of
Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-based Approach to
Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program, GAO-04-341R (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).)
[20] Neutron inspection techniques use neutron beams that penetrate an
object and react with concealed explosives. Traditional transmission X-
ray images create a "shadowgram" image, similar to the result of a
medical X-ray, when X-rays pass through an object and are absorbed,
rather than scattered. While transmission technology can reveal fine
details such as wires and other bomb components, the more objects or
clutter in the path of the beam, the less object differentiation is
achieved. Backscatter X-ray detects reflected X-ray energy, providing
an image that highlights organic materials such as explosives--
materials that traditional transmission-only systems can miss.
[21] National Academy of Sciences, Evaluating Federal Research
Programs: Research and the Government Performance and Results Act
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999), and National Research
Council, World-Class Research and Development: Characteristics for an
Army Research, Development, and Engineering Organization (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996).
[22] As of August 2004, TSA's September 2003 strategic plan was still
in draft form.
[23] GAO, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to
Build a Results-Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
17, 2003).
[24] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's
Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Detection and Response Technologies, GAO-04-653 (Washington, D.C.: May
24, 2004).
[25] Pub.L. No. 107-71, § 112(b)(1)(B) (2001).
[26] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 302(5)(B) (2002).
[27] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 201(d)(2) (2002).
[28] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 201(d)(2)-(d)(3) (2002).
[29] GAO-02-150T.
[30] As we noted in our October 2001 report on risk management, while
threat assessments are a key decision support tool, it should be
recognized that, even if updated often, threat assessments might not
adequately capture emerging threats posed by some terrorist groups. No
matter how much we know about potential threats, we will never know
whether we have identified every threat or whether we have complete
information even about the threats of which we are aware. Consequently,
we believe that a risk management approach to preparing for terrorism
that supplements threat assessments with vulnerability and criticality
assessments can provide better assurance of preparedness for a
terrorist attack.
[31] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General,
Survey of the Science and Technology Directorate, OIG-04-24
(Washington, D.C.: March 2004).
[32] GAO, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements
for the Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002).
[33] For an explanation of TSA's four assessment tools, see GAO,
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges, GAO-04-232T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003).
[34] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 302(13) (2002).
[35] Pub.L. No. 107-71, § 101 (2001).
[36] Transportation Research Board, Deterrence, Protection, and
Preparation: The New Transportation Security Imperative, Special Report
270 (Washington, D.C.: 2002). The Transportation Research Board is a
division of the National Research Council, which serves as an
independent adviser to the federal government and others on scientific
and technical issues.
[37] NASA's transportation security R&D focuses on aviation security,
such as technologies and methods to provide accurate information so
that pilots can avoid protected airspace, continually verify identity,
and prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access to flight
controls.
[38] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 309(g) (2002).
[39] Transportation Research Board, The Federal Role in Highway
Research and Technology, Special Report 261 (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 2001).
[40] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 307(b)(3)-(b)(4) (2002).
[41] A broad agency announcement is a competitive R&D contracting
approach described in the Federal Acquisition Regulation in 48 C.F.R.
35.016. Broad agency announcements are used for the acquisition of
basic and applied research and development that fulfill requirements
for scientific study, experimentation, and demonstration and that
direct advancement of state-of-the-art technology.
[42] We are conducting a separate review of DHS's use of its R&D
procurement authorities.
[43] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 308(b)(2)(A) (2002).
[44] In April 2004, DHS announced that it had selected two other
universities as Homeland Security Centers of Excellence, which will
focus on the security of agricultural products.
[45] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 137(a) (2002).
[46] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 307(b)(3)(C) (2002).
[47] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 307(c)(2) (2002).
[48] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 424(a) (2002).
[49] Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 302(12) (2002).
[50] Terahertz radiation is the part of the electromagnetic spectrum
between microwave radiation and infrared radiation. With wavelengths of
between 30 micrometers and 1 millimeter, it is non-ionizing and
harmless to living tissue.
[51] Backscatter X-ray detects reflected X-ray energy, providing an
image that highlights organic materials, such as explosives. Millimeter
wave energy analysis provides a 360-degree image of a person or object
in order to detect weapons and explosives.
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