Passenger Rail Security
Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts Gao ID: GAO-06-181T October 20, 2005The July 2005 bombing attacks on London's subway system dramatically highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to terrorist attacks, and the need for an increased focus on security for these systems. This testimony provides information on how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), have assessed risks posed by terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail system using risk management principles; actions federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of U.S. rail systems; and rail security practices implemented by domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators and differences among these practices.
Within DHS, ODP has completed numerous risk assessments of passenger rail systems around the country, and TSA has begun to conduct risk assessments as well as establish a methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize risks that have been identified. Until TSA completes these efforts, however, the agency will not be able to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investment decisions. At the department level, DHS has begun developing, but has not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks to transportation and other sectors. Until this framework is finalized and shared with stakeholders, it may not be possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly. In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security conducted by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit Administration and Federal Railroad Administration, such as providing security training to passenger rail operators, TSA issued emergency security directives in 2004 to domestic rail operators after terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid and piloted a test of explosive detection technology for use in passenger rail systems. However, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with the security directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have taken a range of actions to help secure their systems. Most, for example, had implemented customer awareness programs to encourage passengers to report suspicious activities, increased the number and visibility of their security personnel, upgraded security technology, and improved rail system design to enhance security. We also observed security practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or their governments not currently used by the domestic rail operators we contacted, or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the United States. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or utilize covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats, and some foreign governments maintain centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies. While introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they may nevertheless warrant further examination.
GAO-06-181T, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts
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Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, October 20, 2005:
Passenger Rail Security:
Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security
Efforts:
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues:
GAO-06-181T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-181T, a testimony before the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The July 2005 bombing attacks on London‘s subway system dramatically
highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to
terrorist attacks, and the need for an increased focus on security for
these systems.
This testimony provides information on how the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), including the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), have assessed
risks posed by terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail system using risk
management principles; actions federal agencies have taken to enhance
the security of U.S. rail systems; and rail security practices
implemented by domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators
and differences among these practices.
What GAO Found:
Within DHS, ODP has completed numerous risk assessments of passenger
rail systems around the country, and TSA has begun to conduct risk
assessments as well as establish a methodology for determining how to
analyze and characterize risks that have been identified. Until TSA
completes these efforts, however, the agency will not be able to
prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investment
decisions. At the department level, DHS has begun developing, but has
not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector
develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks to
transportation and other sectors. Until this framework is finalized and
shared with stakeholders, it may not be possible to compare risks
across different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources
accordingly.
In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail
security conducted by the Department of Transportation‘s (DOT) Federal
Transit Administration and Federal Railroad Administration, such as
providing security training to passenger rail operators, TSA issued
emergency security directives in 2004 to domestic rail operators after
terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid and piloted a test of
explosive detection technology for use in passenger rail systems.
However, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the
feasibility of implementing and complying with the security directives,
citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that
industry best practices were incorporated.
Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have taken a
range of actions to help secure their systems. Most, for example, had
implemented customer awareness programs to encourage passengers to
report suspicious activities, increased the number and visibility of
their security personnel, upgraded security technology, and improved
rail system design to enhance security. We also observed security
practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or their
governments not currently used by the domestic rail operators we
contacted, or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use
in the United States. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly
screen passengers or utilize covert testing to help keep employees
alert to security threats, and some foreign governments maintain
centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies. While
introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system
may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they may
nevertheless warrant further examination.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO‘s September 2005 report on passenger rail security recommended,
among other things, that TSA develop a timeline for completing its
methodology for conducting risk assessments, and develop rail security
standards that reflect industry best practices and can be measured and
enforced. GAO also recommended that the Secretary of DHS determine the
feasibility of implementing certain security practices used by foreign
rail operators. DHS, DOT, and Amtrak generally agreed with the report‘s
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-181T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick at
(202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on
passenger and freight rail security. The London rail bombings that took
place in July--resulting in over 50 fatalities and more than 700
injuries--made clear that even when a variety of security precautions
are put in place, passenger rail systems that move high volumes of
passengers on a daily basis remain vulnerable to terrorist attack.
While securing the U.S. passenger rail system is a daunting task--a
shared responsibility requiring coordinated action on the part of
federal, state, and local governments and the private sector--it is
important nonetheless to take the necessary steps to identify and
mitigate risks to passenger rail systems.
As we have reported previously, the sheer number of stakeholders
involved in securing these systems can lead to communication
challenges, duplication of effort, and confusion about roles and
responsibilities. Key federal stakeholders with critical roles to play
within the rail sector include the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), which is responsible for transportation security
overall, and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), which provides
grant funds to rail operators and conducts risk assessments for
passenger rail agencies, both within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS); and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), both within the Department of
Transportation (DOT). One of the critical challenges facing these
federal agencies, and rail system operators they oversee or support, is
finding ways to protect rail systems from potential terrorist attacks
without compromising the accessibility and efficiency of rail travel.
At the federal level, another significant challenge to securing rail
systems involves allocation of resources. The U.S. passenger rail
systems represent one of many modes of transportation--along with
aviation, maritime, and others--competing for limited federal security
resources. Within the passenger rail sector itself, there is
competition for resources, as federal, state, and local agencies and
rail operators seek to identify and invest in appropriate security
measures to safeguard these systems while also investing in other
capital and operational improvements. Moreover, given competing
priorities and limited homeland security resources, difficult policy
decisions have to be made by Congress and the executive branch to
prioritize security efforts and direct resources to areas of greatest
risk within the passenger rail system, among all transportation modes,
and across other nationally critical sectors.
In this regard, to help federal decision makers determine how to best
allocate limited resources, we have advocated, the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) has
recommended, and the subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 requires, that a risk management approach be
employed to guide security decision making.[Footnote 1] A risk
management approach entails a continuous process of managing risks
through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and
objectives, assessing and quantifying risks, evaluating alternative
security measures, selecting which measures to undertake, and
implementing and monitoring those measures. In July 2005, in announcing
his proposal for the reorganization of DHS, the Secretary of DHS
declared that as a core principle of the reorganization, the department
must base its work on priorities driven by risk.
My testimony today focuses on the progress federal agencies and
domestic passenger rail operators have made in setting and implementing
security priorities in the wake of September 11 and terrorist attacks
on rail systems, and the security practices implemented by foreign
passenger rail operators. In particular, my testimony highlights three
key areas: (1) the actions that DHS and its component agencies have
taken to assess the risks posed by terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail
system in the context of prevailing risk management principles; (2) the
actions that federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the
U.S. passenger rail system; and (3) the security practices that
domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators have implemented
to mitigate risks and enhance security, and any differences in these
practices. My comments today are based upon our recently issued report
to Senators Snowe and Boxer of this committee, the chairman of the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Railroads, and
Representative Castle.[Footnote 2]
In summary:
* Within DHS, ODP has completed numerous risk assessments of passenger
rail systems around the country, and TSA has begun to conduct risk
assessments as well as establish a methodology for determining how to
analyze and characterize risks that have been identified. Until TSA
completes these efforts, however, or sets timelines for doing so, the
agency will not be able to prioritize passenger rail assets and help
guide security investment decisions. At the department level, DHS has
begun developing, but has not yet completed a framework to help
agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for
analyzing and comparing risks to transportation and other sectors.
Until this framework is finalized and shared with stakeholders, it may
not be possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize
them, and allocate resources accordingly.
* In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail
conducted by the FTA and FRA, in 2004, TSA issued emergency security
directives to domestic rail operators after terrorist attacks on the
rail system in Madrid and piloted a test of explosive detection
technology for use in passenger rail systems. However, federal and rail
industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of
implementing and complying with these directives, citing limited
opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best
practices were incorporated. In September 2004, DHS and DOT signed a
memorandum of understanding to improve coordination between the two
agencies, and are developing agreements to delineate specific security-
related roles and responsibilities, among other things, for the
different modes. An agreement for transit security was signed in
September 2005.
* Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have taken
a range of actions to help secure their systems. Most, for example, had
implemented customer awareness programs to encourage passengers to
remain vigilant and report suspicious activities, increased the number
and visibility of their security personnel, increased the use of canine
teams to detect explosives, enhanced employee training programs,
upgraded security technology, tightened access controls, and made rail
system design improvements to enhance security. We also observed
security practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or
their governments that are not currently used by the domestic rail
operators we contacted, or by the U.S. government, which could be
considered for use in the United States. For example, some foreign rail
operators randomly screen passengers or utilize covert testing to help
keep employees alert to security threats, and some foreign governments
maintain centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies and
best practices. While introducing any of these security practices into
the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural
challenges, they may nevertheless warrant further examination.
In our September 2005 report on passenger rail security, we
recommended, among other things, that to help ensure that the federal
government has the information it needs to prioritize passenger rail
assets based on risk, and in order to evaluate, select, and implement
commensurate measures to help the nation's passenger rail operators
protect their systems against acts of terrorism, TSA should establish a
plan with timelines for completing its methodology for conducting risk
assessments and develop security standards that reflect industry best
practices and can be measured and enforced, by using the federal rule-
making process. In addition, we recommended that the Secretary of DHS,
in collaboration with DOT and the passenger rail industry, determine
the feasibility, in a risk management context, of implementing certain
security practices used by foreign rail operators. DHS, DOT, and Amtrak
generally agreed with the report's recommendations.
Background:
Overview of the Passenger Rail System:
Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22
states use some form of rail transit (commuter, heavy, or light
rail).[Footnote 3] Commuter rail systems typically operate on railroad
tracks and provide regional service (e.g., between a central city and
adjacent suburbs). Commuter rail systems are traditionally associated
with older industrial cities, such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia,
and Chicago. Heavy rail systems--subway systems like New York City's
transit system and Washington, D.C.'s Metro--typically operate on fixed
rail lines within a metropolitan area and have the capacity for a heavy
volume of traffic. Amtrak operates the nation's primary intercity
passenger rail service over a 22,000-mile network, primarily over
leased freight railroad tracks.[Footnote 4] Amtrak serves more than 500
stations (240 of which are staffed) in 46 states and the District of
Columbia, and it carried more than 25 million passengers in 2004.
Figure 1 identifies the geographic location of rail transit systems and
Amtrak within the United States.
Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Amtrak and Rail Transit Systems:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Passenger Rail Systems Are Inherently Vulnerable to Terrorist Attacks:
According to passenger rail officials and passenger rail experts,
certain characteristics of domestic and foreign passenger rail systems
make them inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and therefore
difficult to secure. By design, passenger rail systems are open (i.e.,
have multiple access points, hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in
some cases, no barriers) so that they can move large numbers of people
quickly. In contrast, the U.S. commercial aviation system is housed in
closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The openness of
passenger rail systems can leave them vulnerable because operator
personnel cannot completely monitor or control who enters or leaves the
systems. In addition, other characteristics of some passenger rail
systems--high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance,
and location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)--
also make them attractive targets for terrorists because of the
potential for mass casualties and economic damage and disruption.
Moreover, some of these same characteristics make passenger rail
systems difficult to secure. For example, the numbers of riders that
pass through a subway system--especially during peak hours--may make
the sustained use of some security measures, such as metal detectors,
difficult because they could result in long lines that could disrupt
scheduled service. In addition, multiple access points along extended
routes could make the cost of securing each location prohibitive.
Balancing the potential economic impacts of security enhancements with
the benefits of such measures is a difficult challenge.
Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Security Passenger Rail
Systems:
Securing the nation's passenger rail systems is a shared responsibility
requiring coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local
governments; the private sector; and rail passengers who ride these
systems. Since the September 11 attacks, the role of federal government
agencies in securing the nation's transportation systems, including
passenger rail, have continued to evolve. Prior to September 11, DOT--
namely FTA and FRA--was the primary federal entity involved in
passenger rail security matters. In response to the attacks of
September 11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary
responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of
transportation.[Footnote 5] The act also gave TSA regulatory authority
for security over all transportation modes. ATSA does not specify TSA's
roles and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land
transportation modes at the level of detail it does for aviation
security. Instead, the act broadly identifies that TSA is responsible
for ensuring the security of all modes of transportation. With the
passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, TSA was transferred,
along with over 20 other agencies, to the Department of Homeland
Security.[Footnote 6]
With the creation of DHS in 2002, one of its components, ODP, became
primarily responsible for overseeing security funding for passenger
rail systems.[Footnote 7] ODP is the principal component of DHS
responsible for preparing the United States for acts of terrorism and
has primary responsibility within the executive branch for assisting
and supporting DHS, in coordination with other directorates and
entities outside of the department, in conducting risk analysis and
risk management activities of state and local governments.[Footnote 8]
In carrying out its mission, ODP provides training, funds for the
purchase of equipment, support for the planning and execution of
exercises, technical assistance, and other support to assist states,
local jurisdictions, and the private sector to prevent, prepare for,
and respond to acts of terrorism. Through the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) grant program, ODP has provided grants to urban areas
to help enhance their overall security and preparedness level to
prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. The DHS
Appropriations Act of 2005 appropriated $150 million for rail transit,
intercity passenger rail, freight rail, and transit agency security
grants.[Footnote 9] With this funding, ODP created and is administering
two grant programs focused specifically on transportation security, the
Transit Security Grant Program and the Intercity Passenger Rail
Security Grant Program. These programs provide financial assistance to
address security preparedness and enhancements for transit (to include
commuter, heavy, and light rail systems; intracity bus; and ferry) and
intercity rail systems.
While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the security of all
transportation modes, FTA conducts nonregulatory safety and security
activities, including safety and security-related training, research,
technical assistance, and demonstration projects. In addition, FTA
promotes safety and security through its grant-making authority. FRA
has regulatory authority for rail safety over commuter rail operators
and Amtrak, and employs over 400 rail inspectors that periodically
monitor the implementation of safety and security plans at these
systems.[Footnote 10]
State and local governments, passenger rail operators, and private
industry are also important stakeholders in the nation's rail security
efforts. State and local governments may own or operate a significant
portion of the passenger rail system. Even when state and local
governments are not owners and operators, they are directly affected by
passenger rail systems that run within and through their jurisdictions.
Consequently, the responsibility for responding to emergencies
involving the passenger rail infrastructure often falls to state and
local governments. Passenger rail operators, which can be public or
private entities, are responsible for administering and managing
passenger rail activities and services. Passenger rail operators can
directly operate the service provided or contract for all or part of
the total service. Although all levels of government are involved in
passenger rail security, the primary responsibility for securing
passenger rail systems rests with the passenger rail operators.
Assessing and Managing Risks to Rail Infrastructure Using a Risk
Management Approach:
In recent years, we, along with Congress (most recently through the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004),[Footnote 11]
the executive branch (e.g., in presidential directives), and the 9/11
Commission have required or advocated that federal agencies with
homeland security responsibilities utilize a risk management approach
to help ensure that finite national resources are dedicated to assets
or activities considered to have the highest security priority. We have
concluded that without a risk management approach, there is limited
assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism are properly
prioritized and focused. Thus, risk management, as applied in the
homeland security context, can help to more effectively and efficiently
prepare defenses against acts of terrorism and other threats.
A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing
risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and
objectives, performing risk assessments, evaluating alternative actions
to reduce identified risks by preventing or mitigating their impact,
management selecting actions to undertake, and implementing and
monitoring those actions. Figure 2 depicts a risk management cycle that
is our synthesis of government requirements and prevailing best
practices previously reported.
Figure 2: Risk Management Cycle:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Setting strategic goals, objectives, and constraints is a key first
step in implementing a risk management approach and helps to ensure
that management decisions are focused on achieving a strategic purpose.
These decisions should take place in the context of an agency's
strategic plan that includes goals and objectives that are clear,
concise, and measurable.
Risk assessment, a critical element of a risk management approach,
helps decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that
countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate
the effects of the risks. Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or
quantitative determination of the likelihood of an adverse event
occurring and the severity, or impact, of its consequences. Risk
assessment in a homeland security application often involves assessing
three key elements--threat, criticality, and vulnerability:
* A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the
basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities.
* A criticality or consequence assessment evaluates and prioritizes
assets and functions in terms of specific criteria, such as their
importance to public safety and the economy, as a basis for identifying
which structures or processes are relatively more important to protect
from attack.
* A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be
exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address those
weaknesses.
* Information from these three assessments contributes to an overall
risk assessment that characterizes risks on a scale such as high,
medium, or low and provides input for evaluating alternatives and
management prioritization of security initiatives.[Footnote 12] The
risk assessment element in the overall risk management cycle may be the
largest change from standard management steps and is central to
informing the remaining steps of the cycle.
The next step in a risk management approach--alternatives evaluation--
considers what actions may be needed to address identified risks, the
associated costs of taking these actions, and any resulting benefits.
This information is then to be provided to agency management to assist
in the selection of alternative actions best suited to the unique needs
of the organization. An additional step in the risk management approach
is the implementation and monitoring of actions taken to address the
risks, including evaluating the extent to which risk was mitigated by
these actions. Once the agency has implemented the actions to address
risks, it should develop criteria for and continually monitor the
performance of these actions to ensure that they are effective and also
reflect evolving risk.
Federal Agencies with Risk Management Responsibilities:
A number of federal departments and agencies have risk management and
critical infrastructure protection responsibilities stemming from
various requirements. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created
DHS, directed the department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) Directorate to utilize a risk management approach in
coordinating the nation's critical infrastructure protection efforts.
This includes using risk assessments to set priorities for protective
and support measures by the department, other federal agencies, state
and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and
other entities. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7)
defines critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for DHS,
sector-specific agencies (those federal agencies given responsibility
for transportation, energy, telecommunications, and so forth), and
other departments and agencies. The President instructs federal
departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the
protection of critical infrastructure to prevent, deter, and mitigate
the effects of terrorist attacks. The Secretary of DHS is assigned
several responsibilities by HSPD-7, including establishing uniform
policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies for integrating
federal infrastructure protection and risk management activities within
and across sectors. To ensure the coverage of critical sectors, HSPD-7
designated sector-specific agencies for 17 critical infrastructure
sectors.[Footnote 13] These agencies are responsible for infrastructure
protection activities in their assigned sectors, including coordinating
and collaborating with relevant federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the private sector to carry out their responsibilities
and facilitating the sharing of information about vulnerabilities,
incidents, potential protective measures, and best practices.
Pursuant to HSPD-7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP), DHS was designated as the sector-specific agency for the
transportation sector, a responsibility the department has delegated to
TSA.[Footnote 14] As the sector-specific agency for transportation, TSA
is required to develop a transportation sector-specific plan (TSSP) for
identifying, prioritizing, and protecting critical transportation
infrastructure and key resources that will provide key input to the
broader National Infrastructure Protection Plan to be prepared by IAIP.
DHS issued an interim NIPP in February 2005 that was intended to serve
as a road map for how DHS and stakeholders--including other federal
agencies, the private sector, and state and local governments--should
use risk management principles for determining how to prioritize
activities related to protecting critical infrastructure and key
resources within and among each of the 17 sectors in an integrated,
coordinated fashion. DHS expects the next iteration of the NIPP to be
issued in November 2005, with the sector-specific plans, including the
TSSP, being incorporated into this plan in February 2006. HSPD-7 also
requires DHS to coordinate with DOT on all transportation security
matters.
DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but
Additional Work Is Needed to Guide Security Investments:
DHS component agencies have taken various steps to assess the risk
posed by terrorism to U.S. passenger rail systems. ODP has developed
and implemented a risk assessment methodology intended to help
passenger rail operators and others enhance their capacity to respond
to terrorist incidents and identify and prioritize security
countermeasures. As of July 2005, ODP had completed 7 risk assessments
with rail operators and 12 others were under way. Further, TSA
completed a threat assessment for mass transit and rail and has begun
to identify critical rail assets, but it has not yet completed an
overall risk assessment for the passenger rail industry. DHS is
developing guidance to help these and other sector-specific agencies
work with stakeholders to identify and analyze risk.
ODP Has Worked with Passenger Rail Operators to Develop Risk
Assessments to Help Prioritize Rail Security Needs and Investments:
In 2002, ODP began conducting risk assessments of passenger rail
operators through its Mass Transit Technical Assistance program. These
assessments are intended to help passenger rail operators and port
authorities enhance their capacity and preparedness to respond to
terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and identify
and prioritize security countermeasures and emergency response
capabilities. ODP's approach to risk assessment is generally consistent
with the risk assessment component of our risk management approach. The
agency has worked with passenger rail operators and others to complete
several risk assessments. As of July 2005, ODP had completed 7 risk
assessments in collaboration with passenger rail operators.[Footnote
15] Twelve additional risk assessments are under way, and an additional
11 passenger rail operators have requested assistance through this
program. The results developed in the threat, criticality,
vulnerability, and impact assessments are then used to develop an
overall risk assessment in order to evaluate the relative risk among
various assets, weapons, and modes of attack. This is intended to give
operators an indication of which asset types and threat scenarios carry
the highest risk that, accordingly, are likely candidates for early
risk mitigation action.
According to rail operators who have used ODP's risk assessment
methodology and commented about it to DHS or us, the method has been
successful in helping to devise risk reduction strategies to guide
security-related investments. For example, between September 2002 and
March 2003, ODP's technical assistance team worked with the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) to conduct a risk
assessment of all of its assets--its Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH)
passenger rail system, as well as airports, ports, interstate highway
crossings, and commercial properties.[Footnote 16] According to PANYNJ
officials, the authority was able to develop and implement a risk
reduction strategy that enabled it to identify and set priorities for
improvements in security and emergency response capability that are
being used to guide security investments. According to authority
officials, the risk assessment that was conducted was instrumental in
obtaining management approval for a 5-year, $500 million security
capital investment program, as it provided a risk-based justification
for these investments.
The six other passenger rail operators that have completed ODP's risk
assessment process also stated that they valued the process.
Specifically, operators said that the assessments enabled them to
prioritize investments based on risk and are already allowing or are
expected to allow them to effectively target and allocate resources
toward security measures that will have the greatest impact on reducing
risk across their system.
ODP Has Sought to Promote Risk-Based Decision Making among Federal
Agencies and Rail Operators:
On the basis of its own experience with conducting risk assessments in
the field, and in keeping with its mission to develop and implement a
national program to enhance the capacity of state and local agencies to
respond to incidents of terrorism, ODP has offered to help other DHS
components and federal agencies to develop risk assessment tools,
according to ODP officials. For example, ODP is partnering with FRA,
TSA, the American Association of Railroads (AAR), and others to develop
a risk assessment tool for freight rail corridors.[Footnote 17] In a
separate federal outreach effort, ODP worked with TSA to establish a
Federal Risk Assessment Working Group to promote interagency
collaboration and information sharing. In addition, in keeping with its
mission to deliver technical assistance and training, ODP has partnered
with the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) to inform
passenger rail operators about its risk assessment technical assistance
program.[Footnote 18] Since June 2004, ODP has attended five APTA
conferences or workshops where it has set up information booths, made
the tool kit available, and conducted seminars to educate passenger
rail operators about the risk assessment process and its benefits.
ODP has leveraged its grant-making authority to promote risk-based
funding decisions for passenger rail. For example, passenger rail
operators must have completed a risk assessment to be eligible for
financial assistance through the fiscal year 2005 Transit Security
Grant program administered by ODP. To receive these funds, passenger
rail operators are also required to have a security and emergency
preparedness plan that identifies how the operator intends to respond
to security gaps identified by risk assessments. This plan, along with
a regional transit security strategy prepared by regional transit
stakeholders, will serve as the basis for determining how the grant
funds are to be allocated.
Risk assessments are also a key driver of federal funds distributed
through ODP's fiscal year 2005 Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program.
This $7.1 million program provides financial assistance to Amtrak for
the protection of critical infrastructure and emergency preparedness
activities along Amtrak's Northeast Corridor and its hub in Chicago.
Amtrak is required to conduct a risk assessment of these areas in
collaboration with ODP, in order to receive the grant funds.[Footnote
19] A recent review of Amtrak's security posture and programs conducted
by the RAND Corporation and funded by FRA in 2004 found that no
comprehensive terrorism risk assessment of Amtrak has been conducted
that would provide an empirical baseline for investment prioritization
and decision making for Amtrak's security policies and investment
plans. As another condition for receiving the grant funds, Amtrak is
required to develop a security and emergency preparedness plan that,
along with the risk assessment, is to serve as the basis for proposed
allocations of grant funding. According to an Amtrak security official,
it welcomes the risk assessment effort and plans to use the results of
the assessment to guide its security plans and investments. According
to ODP officials, as of July 2005, the Amtrak risk assessment was
nearly 50 percent complete.
TSA Has Begun to Assess Risks to Passenger Rail:
In October 2004, TSA completed an overall threat assessment for both
mass transit and passenger and freight rail modes.[Footnote 20] TSA
began conducting a second risk assessment element--criticality
assessments of passenger rail stations--in the spring of 2004, but the
effort had not been completed at the time of our review. According to
TSA, a criticality assessment tool was developed that considers
multiple factors, such as the potential for loss of life or effects on
public health; the economic impact of the loss of function of the asset
and the cost of reconstitution; and the local, regional, or national
symbolic importance of the asset. These factors were to be used to
arrive at a criticality score that, in turn, would enable the agency to
rank assets and facilities based on relative importance, according to
TSA officials.
To date, TSA has assigned criticality scores to nearly 700 passenger
rail stations. In May 2005, TSA began conducting assessments for other
passenger rail assets such as bridges and tunnels. TSA officials told
us that as of July 2005, they had completed 73 criticality assessments
for bridge and tunnel assets and expect to conduct approximately 370
additional assessments in these categories. Once TSA has completed its
criticality assessment, a senior group of transportation security
experts will review these scores and subsequently rank and prioritize
them. As of July 2005, TSA had not established a time frame for
completing criticality assessments for passenger rail assets or for
ranking assets, and had not identified whether it planned to do so.
In 2003, TSA officials stated that they planned to work with
transportation stakeholders to rank assets and facilities in terms of
their criticality. HSPD-7 requires sector-specific agencies such as TSA
to collaborate with all relevant stakeholders, including federal
departments and agencies, state and local governments, and others. In
addition, DHS's interim NIPP states that sector-specific agencies, such
as TSA, are expected to work with stakeholders--such as rail operators-
-to determine the most effective means of obtaining and analyzing
information on assets. While TSA's methodology for conducting
criticality assessments calls for "facilitated sessions" involving TSA
modal specialists, DOT modal specialists, and trade association
representatives, these sessions with stakeholders have not been held.
According to TSA officials, their final methodology for conducting
criticality assessments did not include DOT modal specialists and trade
associations. With respect to rail operators, TSA officials explained
that their risk assessment process does not require operators'
involvement. TSA analysts said they have access to a great deal of
information (such as open source records, satellite imagery, and
insurance industry data) that can facilitate the assessment process.
However, when asked to comment on TSA's ability to identify critical
assets in passenger rail systems, APTA officials and 10 rail operators
we interviewed told us it would be difficult for TSA to complete this
task without their direct input and rail system expertise.
TSA plans to rely on asset criticality rankings to prioritize which
assets it will focus on in conducting vulnerability assessments. That
is, once an asset, such as a passenger rail station, is deemed to be
most critical, then TSA would focus on determining the station's
vulnerability to attacks. TSA plans to conduct on-site vulnerability
assessments for those assets deemed most critical. For assets that are
deemed to be less critical, TSA has developed a software tool that it
has made available to passenger rail and other transportation operators
for them to use on a voluntary basis to assess the vulnerability of
their assets. As of July 2005, the tool had not yet been used.
According to APTA officials, passenger rail operators may be reluctant
to provide vulnerability information to TSA without knowing how the
agency intends to use such information. According to TSA, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to project any timelines regarding
completion of vulnerability assessments in the transportation sector
because rail operators are not required to submit them. In this regard,
while the rail operators are not required to submit this information,
as the sector-specific agency for transportation, TSA is required by
HSPD-7 to complete vulnerability assessments for the transportation
sector. Figure 3 illustrates the overall progress TSA had made in
conducting risk assessments for passenger rail assets as of July 2005.
Figure 3: Status of TSA's Passenger Rail Risk Assessment Efforts, as of
July 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
We recognize that TSA's risk assessment effort is still evolving and
TSA has had other pressing priorities, such as meeting the legislative
requirements related to aviation security. However, until all three
assessments of rail systems--threat, criticality, and vulnerability--
have been completed in sequence, and until TSA determines how to use
the results of these assessments to analyze and characterize risk
(e.g., whether high, medium, or low), it may not be possible to
prioritize passenger rail assets and guide investment decisions about
protecting them.
Finalizing a methodology for assessing risk to passenger rail and other
transportation assets and conducting the assessments are key steps
needed to produce the plans required by HSPD-7 and the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. DHS and TSA have missed
both deadlines for producing these plans. Specifically, DHS and TSA
have not yet produced the TSSP required by HSPD-7 to be issued in
December of 2004, though a draft was prepared in November 2004. DHS and
TSA also missed the April 1, 2005, deadline for completing the national
strategy for transportation security required by the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. In an April 2005 letter to
Congress addressing the missed deadline, the DHS Deputy Secretary
identified the need to more aggressively coordinate the development of
the strategy with other relevant planning work such as the TSSP, to
include further collaboration with DOT modal administrations and DHS
components. The Deputy Secretary further stated that DHS expected to
finish the strategy within 2 to 3 months. However, as of July 31, 2005,
the strategy had not been completed. In April 2005, senior DHS and TSA
officials told us that in addition to DOT, industry groups such as APTA
and AAR would also be more involved in developing the TSSP and other
strategic plans. However, as of July 2005, TSA had not yet engaged
these stakeholders in the development of these plans.
As TSA, other sector-specific agencies, and ODP move forward with risk
assessment activities, DHS is concurrently developing guidance intended
to help these agencies work with their stakeholders to assess risk.
HSPD-7 requires DHS to establish uniform policies, approaches,
guidelines, and methodologies for integrating federal infrastructure
protection and risk management activities within and across sectors. To
meet this requirement, DHS has, among other things, been working for
nearly 2 years on a risk assessment framework through IAIP.[Footnote
21] This framework is intended to help the private sector and state and
local governments to develop a consistent approach to analyzing risk
and vulnerability across infrastructure types and across entire
economic sectors, develop consistent terminology, and foster consistent
results. The framework is also intended to enable a federal-level
assessment of risk in general, and comparisons among risks, for
purposes of resource allocation and response planning. DHS has informed
TSA that this framework will provide overarching guidance to sector-
specific agencies on how various risk assessment methodologies may be
used to analyze, normalize, and prioritize risk within and among
sectors. The interim NIPP states that the ability to rationalize, or
normalize, results of different risk assessments is an important goal
for determining risk-related priorities and guiding investments. One
core element of the DHS framework--defining concepts, terminology, and
metrics for assessing risk--had not yet been completed. The completion
date for this element--initially due in September 2004--has been
extended twice, with the latest due date in June 2005. However, as of
July 31, 2005, this element has not been completed.
Because neither this element nor the framework as a whole has been
finalized or provided to TSA or other sector-specific agencies, it is
not clear what impact, if any, DHS's framework may have on ongoing risk
assessments conducted by, and the methodologies used by, TSA, ODP, and
others, and whether or how DHS will be able to use these results to
compare risks and prioritize homeland security investments among
sectors. Until DHS finalizes this framework, and until TSA completes
its risk assessment methodology, it may not be possible to determine
whether different methodologies used by TSA and ODP for conducting
threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments generate disparate
qualitative and quantitative results or how they can best be compared
and analyzed. In addition, TSA and others will have difficulty taking
into account whether at some point TSA may be unnecessarily duplicating
risk management activities already under way at other agencies and
whether other agencies' risk assessment methodologies, and the data
generated by these methodologies, can be leveraged to complete the
assessments required for the transportation sector. In the future, the
implementation of DHS's departmentwide proposed reorganization could
affect decisions relating to critical infrastructure protection as new
directorates are established, such as the directorates of policy and
preparedness, and other preparedness assets are consolidated from
across the department.
Multiple Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail
Security:
FTA and FRA were the primary federal agencies involved in passenger
rail security matters prior to the creation of TSA. Before and after
September 11, these two agencies launched a number of initiatives
designed to strengthen passenger rail security. TSA also took steps to
strengthen rail security, including issuing emergency security
directives to rail operators and testing emerging rail security
technologies for screening passengers and baggage. Rail industry
stakeholders and federal agency officials raised questions about how
effectively DHS had collaborated with them on rail security issues. DHS
and DOT have signed a memorandum of understanding intended to identify
ways that collaboration with federal and industry stakeholders might be
improved.
DOT Agencies Led Initial Efforts to Enhance Passenger Rail Security:
Prior to the creation of TSA in November 2001, DOT agencies (i.e.,
modal administrations)--notably FTA and FRA--were primarily responsible
for the security of passenger rail systems. These agencies undertook a
number of initiatives to enhance the security of passenger rail systems
after September 11. FTA, using an $18.7 million appropriation by the
Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
2002, launched a multipart transit security initiative, much of which
is still in place. The initiative included security readiness
assessments, technical assistance, grants for emergency response
drills, and training. For example, in 2003, FTA instituted the Transit
Watch campaign--a nationwide safety and security awareness program
designed to encourage the active participation of transit passengers
and employees in maintaining a safe transit environment. The program
provides information and instructions to transit passengers and
employees so that they know what to do and whom to contact in the event
of an emergency in a transit setting. FTA plans to continue this
initiative, in partnership with TSA and ODP, and offer additional
security awareness materials that address unattended bags and emergency
evacuation procedures for transit agencies. In addition, FTA has issued
guidance, such as its Top 20 Security Program Action Items for Transit
Agencies, which recommends measures for passenger rail operators to
implement into their security programs to improve both security and
emergency preparedness.
FTA has also used research and development funds to develop guidance
for security design strategies to reduce the vulnerability of transit
systems to acts of terrorism. In November 2004, FTA provided rail
operators with security considerations for transportation
infrastructure. This guidance provided recommendations intended to help
operators deter and minimize attacks against their facilities, riders,
and employees by incorporating security features into the design of
rail infrastructure.
FRA has also taken a number of actions to enhance passenger rail
security since September 11. For example, it has assisted commuter
railroads in developing security plans, reviewed Amtrak's security
plans, and helped fund FTA security readiness assessments for commuter
railroads. More recently, in the wake of the Madrid terrorist bombings,
nearly 200 FRA inspectors, in cooperation with DHS, conducted multi-day
team inspections of each of the 18 commuter railroads and Amtrak to
determine what additional security measures had been put into place to
prevent a similar occurrence in the United States. FRA also conducted
research and development projects related to passenger rail security.
These projects included rail infrastructure security and trespasser
monitoring systems and passenger screening and manifest projects,
including explosives detection.
Although DOT modal administrations now play a supporting role in
transportation security matters since the creation of TSA, they remain
important partners in the federal government's efforts to improve rail
security, given their role in funding and regulating the safety of
passenger rail systems. Moreover, as TSA moves ahead with its passenger
rail security initiatives, FTA and FRA are continuing their passenger
rail security efforts.
TSA Issued Mandatory Security Directives to Rail Operators but Faces
Challenges Related to Compliance and Enforcement:
In response to the March 2004 commuter rail attacks in Madrid and
federal intelligence on potential threats against U.S. passenger rail
systems, TSA issued security directives to the passenger rail industry
in May 2004. TSA issued these security directives to establish a
consistent baseline standard of protective measures for all passenger
rail operators, including Amtrak.[Footnote 22] The directives were not
related to, and were issued independent of, TSA's efforts to conduct
risk assessments to prioritize rail security needs. TSA considered the
measures required by the directives to constitute mandatory security
standards that were required to be implemented within 72 hours of
issuance by all passenger rail operators nationwide. In an effort to
provide some flexibility to the industry, the directives allowed rail
operators to propose alternative measures to TSA in order to meet the
required measures. Table 1 contains examples of security measures
required by these directives.
Table 1: Examples of Measures Required by TSA Security Directives
Issued to Passenger Rail Operators and Amtrak:
TSA directives require passenger rail operators to:
* designate coordinators to enhance security-related communications
with TSA;
* provide TSA with access to the latest security assessments and
security plans;
* reinforce employee watch programs;
* ask passengers and employees to report unattended property or
suspicious behavior;
* remove trash receptacles at stations determined by a vulnerability
assessment to be at significant risk and only to the extent practical,
except for clear plastic or bomb-resistant containers;
* install bomb- resistant trash cans to the extent resources allow;
* utilize canine explosive detection teams, if available, to screen
passenger baggage, terminals, and trains;
* utilize surveillance systems to monitor for suspicious activity, to
the extent resources allow;
* allow TSA- designated canine teams at any time or place to conduct
canine operations;
* conduct frequent inspections of key facilities, stations, terminals,
or other critical assets for persons and items that do not belong;
* inspect each passenger rail car for suspicious or unattended items,
at regular periodic intervals;
* ensure that appropriate levels of policing and security are provided
that correlate to DHS threat levels and threat advisories;
* lock all doors that allow access to train operators' cab or
compartment, if equipped with locking mechanisms;
* require Amtrak to request that adult passengers provide
identification at the initial point where tickets are checked.
Source: TSA.
[End of table]
Although TSA issued these directives, it is unclear how TSA developed
the required measures contained in the directives, how TSA plans to
monitor and ensure compliance with the measures, how rail operators are
to implement the measures, and which entities are responsible for their
implementation. According to the former DHS Undersecretary for Border
and Transportation Security, the directives were developed based upon
consultation with the industry and a review of best practices in
passenger rail and mass transit systems across the country and were
intended to provide a federal baseline standard for security. TSA
officials stated to us that the directives were based upon FTA and APTA
best practices for rail security. Specifically, TSA stated that it
consulted a list of the top 20 actions FTA identified that rail
operators can take to strengthen security, FTA-recommended protective
measures and activities for transit agencies that may be followed based
on current threat levels, and an APTA member survey. While some of the
directives correlate to information contained in the FTA guidance, such
as advocating that rail personnel watch for abandoned parcels,
vehicles, and the like, the source for many of the directives is
unclear. For example, the source material TSA consulted does not
support the requirement that train cabs or compartment doors should be
kept locked. Furthermore, the sources do not necessarily reflect
industry best practices, according to FTA and APTA officials. FTA's
list of recommended protective measures and the practices identified in
the APTA survey are not necessarily viewed as industry best practices.
For example, the APTA member survey that TSA used reports rail security
practices that are in use by operators but which are not best practices
endorsed by the group or other industry stakeholders.
TSA officials have stated that they understood the importance of
partnering with the rail industry on security matters, and that they
would draw on the expertise and knowledge of the transportation
industry and other DHS agencies, as well as all stakeholders, in
developing security standards for all modes of transportation,
including rail. TSA officials held an initial meeting with APTA, AAR,
and Amtrak officials to discuss the draft directives prior to their
issuance and told them that they would continue to be consulted prior
to their final issuance. However, these stakeholders were not given an
opportunity to comment on a final draft of the directives before their
release because, according to TSA, DHS determined that it was important
to release the directives as soon as possible to address a current
threat to passenger rail. In addition, TSA stated that because the
directives needed to be issued quickly, there was no public comment as
part of the rule-making process. Shortly after the directives were
issued, TSA's Deputy Assistant Administrator for Maritime and Land
Security told rail operators at an APTA conference we attended in June
2004 that if TSA determined that there is a need for the directives to
become permanent, they would undergo a notice-and-comment period as
part of the regulatory process. As of July 2005, TSA had not yet
determined whether it intends to pursue the rule-making process with a
notice and comment period.
APTA and AAR officials stated that because they were not consulted
throughout the development of the directives, the directives did not,
in their view, reflect a complete understanding of the passenger rail
environment or necessarily incorporate industry best practices. For
example, APTA, AAR, and some rail operators raised concerns about the
feasibility of installing bomb-resistant trash cans in rail stations
because they could direct the force of a bomb blast upward, possibly
causing structural damage in underground or enclosed stations. DHS's
Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
recently conducted tests to determine the safety and effectiveness of
13 models of commercially available bomb-resistant trash receptacles.
At the time of our review, the results of these tests were not yet
available.
Amtrak and FRA officials raised concerns about some of the directives,
as well, and told us they questioned whether the requirements reflected
industry best practices. For example, before the directives were
issued, Amtrak expressed concerns to TSA about the feasibility of the
requirement to check the identification of all adult passengers
boarding its trains because it did not have enough staff to perform
these checks. However, the final directive included this requirement,
and after they were released, Amtrak told TSA it could not comply with
this requirement "without incurring substantial additional costs and
significant detrimental impacts to its operations and revenues." Amtrak
officials told us that since passenger names would not be compared
against any criminal or terrorist watch list or database, the benefits
of requiring such identification checks were open to debate. To resolve
its concern, and as allowed by the directive, Amtrak proposed, and TSA
accepted, random identification checks of passengers as an alternative
measure. FRA officials further stated that current FRA safety
regulations requiring engineer compartment doors be kept unlocked to
facilitate emergency escapes[Footnote 23] conflicts with the security
directive requirement that doors equipped with locking mechanisms be
kept locked. This requirement was not included in the draft directives
provided to stakeholders. TSA did call one commuter rail operator prior
to issuing the directives to discuss this potential proposed measure,
and the operator raised a concern about the safety of the locked door
requirement. TSA nevertheless included this requirement in the
directives.
With respect to how the directives were to be enforced, rail operators
were required to allow TSA and DHS to perform inspections, evaluations,
or tests based on execution of the directives at any time or location.
Upon learning of any instance of noncompliance with TSA security
measures, rail operators were to immediately initiate corrective
action. Monitoring and ensuring compliance with the directives has
posed challenges for TSA. In the year after the directives were issued,
TSA did not have dedicated field staff to conduct on-site inspections.
When the rail security directives were issued, the former DHS
Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security stated that TSA
planned to form security partnership teams with DOT, including FRA rail
inspectors, to help ensure that industry stakeholders complied with the
directives. These teams were to be established in order to tap into
existing capabilities and avoid duplication of effort across agencies.
As of July 2005, these teams had not yet been utilized to perform
inspections. TSA has, however, hired rail compliance inspectors to,
among other things, monitor and enforce compliance with the security
directives. As of July 2005, TSA had hired 57 of up to 100 inspector
positions authorized by Congress.[Footnote 24] However, TSA has not yet
established processes or criteria for determining and enforcing
compliance, including determining how rail inspectors or DOT
partnership teams will be used in this regard.
Establishing criteria for monitoring compliance with the directives may
be challenging because the language describing the required measures
allows for flexibility and does not define parameters. In an effort to
acknowledge the variable conditions that existed in passenger rail
environments, TSA designed the directives to allow flexibility in
implementation through the use of such phrases as "to the extent
resources allow," "to the extent practicable," and "if available." The
directives also include nonspecific instructions that may be difficult
to measure or monitor, telling operators to, for example, perform
inspections of key facilities at "regular periodic intervals" or to
conduct "frequent inspections" of passenger rail cars. When the
directives were issued, TSA stated that it would provide rail operators
with performance-based guidance and examples of announcements and signs
that could be used to meet the requirements of the directives,
including guidance on the appropriate frequency and method for
inspecting rail cars and facilities. However, as of July 2005, this
information had not been provided.
Industry stakeholders we interviewed raised questions about how they
were to comply with the measures contained in the directives and which
entities were responsible for implementing the measures. According to
an AAR official, in June 2004, AAR officials and rail operators held a
conference call with TSA to obtain clarification on these issues.
According to AAR officials, in response to an inquiry about what would
constitute compliance for some of the measures, the then-TSA Assistant
Administrator for Maritime and Land Security told participants that the
directives were not intended to be overly prescriptive but were
guidelines, and that operators would have the flexibility to implement
the directives as they saw fit. The officials also asked for
clarification on who was legally responsible for ensuring compliance
for measures where assets, such as rail stations, were owned by freight
railroads or private real estate companies. According to AAR officials,
TSA told them it was the responsibility of the rail operators and asset
owners to work together to determine these responsibilities. However,
according to AAR and rail operators, given that TSA has hired rail
inspectors and indicated its intention to enforce compliance with the
directives, it is critical that TSA clarify what compliance entails for
measures required by the directives and which entities are responsible
for compliance with measures when rail assets are owned by one party
but operated by another--such as when private companies that own
terminals or stations provide services for commuter rail operations.
The challenges TSA has faced in developing security directives as
standards that reflect industry best practices--and that can be
measured and enforced--stem from the original emergency nature of the
directives, which were issued with limited input and review. TSA told
rail industry stakeholders when the directives were issued 15 months
ago that the agency would consider using the federal rule-making
process as a means of making the standards permanent. Doing so would
require TSA to hold a notice-and-comment period, resulting in a public
record that reflects stakeholders' input on the applicability and
feasibility of implementing the directives, along with TSA's rationale
for accepting or rejecting this input. While there is no guarantee that
this process would produce more effective security directives, it would
be more transparent and could help TSA in developing standards that are
most appropriate for the industry and can be measured, monitored, and
enforced.
TSA Has Begun Testing Rail Security Technologies:
In addition to issuing security directives, TSA also sought to enhance
passenger rail security by conducting research on technologies related
to screening passengers and checked baggage in the passenger rail
environment. Beginning in May 2004, TSA conducted a Transit and Rail
Inspection Pilot (TRIP) study, in partnership with DOT, Amtrak, the
Connecticut Department of Transportation, the Maryland Transit
Administration, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA). TRIP was a $1.5 million, three-phase effort to test the
feasibility of using existing and emerging technologies to screen
passengers, carry-on items, checked baggage, cargo, and parcels for
explosives. Figure 4 summarizes TRIP's three-phased approach.
Figure 4: Summary Information on TSA's Transit and Rail Inspection
Pilot Program Phases:
[See PDF for image] --graphic text:
Phase I: Screen commuter rail passengers and carry-on baggage before
trains are boarded using an explosive detection device similar in
appearance to an airport metal detector and other explosive screening
technologies.
Phase II: Screen passenger baggage including checked baggage, unclaimed
baggage, and cargo on longhaul Amtrak trains prior to departure.
Phase III: Screen passengers and their carry-on baggage on board a
moving commuter rail train. All passengers are required to enter the
train in the specially designed screening car, which was a commuter
rail passenger car that been reconfigured to hold screening equipment
and security personnel.
Source: TSA.
[End of figure]
According to TSA, all three phases of the TRIP program were completed
by July 2004. However, TSA has not yet issued a planned report
analyzing whether the technologies could be used effectively to screen
rail passengers and their baggage. According to TSA officials, a report
on results and lessons learned from TRIP is under review by DHS. TSA
officials told us that based upon preliminary analyses, the screening
technologies and processes tested would be very difficult to implement
on more heavily used passenger rail systems because these systems carry
high volumes of passengers and have multiple points of entry. However,
TSA officials stated to us that the screening processes used in TRIP
may be useful on certain long-distance intercity train routes, which
make fewer stops. Further, officials stated that screening could be
used either randomly or for all passengers during certain high-risk
events or in areas where a particular terrorist threat is known to
exist. For example, screening technology similar to that used in TRIP
was used by TSA to screen certain passengers and belongings in Boston
and New York during the Democratic and Republican national conventions,
respectively, in 2004.
APTA officials and the 28 passenger rail operators we interviewed--all
who are not directly involved in the pilot--agreed with TSA's
preliminary assessment. They told us they believed that the TRIP
screening procedures could not work in most passenger rail systems,
given the number of passengers using these systems and the open nature
(e.g., multiple entry points) of the systems. For example, as one
operator noted, over 1,600 people pass through dozens of access points
in New York's Penn Station per minute during a typical rush hour,
making screening of all passengers very challenging, if not impossible.
Passenger rail operators were also concerned that screening delays
could result in passengers opting to use other modes of transportation.
APTA officials and some rail operators we interviewed said that had
they been consulted by TSA, they would have recommended alternative
technologies to explore and indicated that they hoped to be consulted
on security technology pilot programs in the future. FRA officials
further stated that TSA could have benefited from earlier and more
frequent collaboration with them during the TRIP pilot than occurred,
and could have tapped their expertise to analyze TRIP results and
develop the final report. TSA research and development officials told
us that the agency has begun to consider and test security technologies
other than those used in TRIP, which may be more applicable to the
passenger rail environment. For example, TSA's and DHS's Science and
Technology Directorate are currently evaluating infrared cameras and
electronic metal detectors, among other things.
DHS and DOT Are Taking Steps to Improve Coordination and Collaboration
with Federal Agencies and Industry Stakeholders:
In response to a previous recommendation we made in a June 2003 report
on transportation security, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) to develop procedures by which the two departments
could improve their cooperation and coordination for promoting the
safe, secure, and efficient movement of people and goods throughout the
transportation system. The MOU defines broad areas of responsibility
for each department. For example, it states that DHS, in consultation
with DOT and affected stakeholders, will identify, prioritize, and
coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure. The MOU between
DHS and DOT represents an overall framework for cooperation that is to
be supplemented by additional signed agreements, or annexes, between
the departments. These annexes are to delineate the specific security-
related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for mass
transit, rail, research and development, and other matters. The annex
for mass transit security was signed in September 2005.[Footnote 25]
According to DHS and DOT officials, this annex is intended to ensure
that the programs and protocols for incorporating stakeholder feedback
and making enhancements to security measures are coordinated. For
example, the annex requires that DHS and DOT consult on such matters as
regulations and security directives that affect security and identifies
points of contact for coordinating this consultation.
In addition to their work on the MOU and related annexes, DHS and TSA
have taken other steps in an attempt to improve collaboration with DOT
and industry stakeholders. In April 2005, DHS officials stated that
better collaboration with DOT and industry stakeholders was needed to
develop strategic security plans associated with various homeland
security presidential directives and statutory mandates, such as the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which
required DHS to develop a national strategy for transportation security
in conjunction with DOT. Responding to the need for better
collaboration, DHS established a senior-level steering committee in
conjunction with DOT to coordinate development of this national
strategy. In addition, senior DHS and TSA officials stated that
industry groups will also be involved in developing the national
strategy for transportation security and other strategic plans.
Moreover, according to TSA's assistant administrator for intermodal
programs, TSA intends to work with APTA and other industry stakeholders
in developing security standards for the passenger rail
industry.[Footnote 26]
U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure
Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security
Actions May Exist:
U.S. passenger rail operators have taken numerous actions to secure
their rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, in the
United States, and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. These actions
included both improvements to system operations and capital
enhancements to a system's facilities, such as track, buildings, and
train cars. All of the U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted have
implemented some types of security measures--such as increased numbers
and visibility of security personnel and customer awareness programs--
that were generally consistent with those we observed in select
countries in Europe and Asia. We also identified three rail security
practices--covert testing, random screening of passengers and their
baggage, and centralized research and testing--utilized by foreign
operators or their governments that are not currently utilized by
domestic rail operators or the U.S. government.[Footnote 27]
Actions Taken by U.S. and Foreign Passenger Rail Operators to
Strengthen Security Reflect Security Assessments, Budgetary
Constraints, and Other Factors:
All 32 of the U.S. rail operators we interviewed or visited reported
taking specific actions to improve the security and safety of their
rail systems by, among other things, investing in new security
equipment, utilizing more law enforcement personnel, and establishing
public awareness campaigns. Passenger rail operators we spoke with
cited the 1995 sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system and the
September 11 terrorist attacks as catalysts for their security actions.
After the attacks, many passenger rail operators used FTA's security
readiness assessments of heavy and passenger rail systems as a guide to
determine how to prioritize their security efforts, as well as their
own understanding of their system's vulnerabilities, to determine what
actions to take to enhance security. Similarly, as previously
mentioned, the rail systems that underwent ODP risk assessments are
currently using or plan to use these assessments to guide their
security actions. In addition, 20 of the 32 U.S. operators we contacted
or visited had conducted some type of security assessment internally or
through a contractor, separate from the federally funded assessments.
For example, some assessments evaluated vulnerabilities of physical
assets, such as tunnels and bridges, throughout the passenger rail
system. Passenger rail operators stated that security-related spending
by rail operators was also based, in part, on budgetary considerations,
as well as other practices used by other rail operators that were
identified through direct contact or during industry association
meetings.[Footnote 28] Passenger rail operators frequently made capital
investments to improve security, and these investments often are not
part of federal funding packages for new construction unless they are
part of new facilities being constructed. According to APTA, 54 percent
of transit agencies are facing increasing deficits, and no operator
covers expenses with fare revenue; thus, balancing operational and
capital improvements with security-related investments has been an
ongoing challenge for these operators. Several foreign rail operators
we interviewed also stated that funding for security enhancements was
limited in light of other funding priorities within the rail system,
such as personnel costs and infrastructure and equipment maintenance.
Foreign rail operators we visited also told us that risk assessments
played an important role in guiding security-related spending for rail.
For example, one foreign rail operator with a daily ridership of 2.3
million passengers used a risk management methodology to assess risks,
threats, and vulnerabilities to rail in order to guide security
spending. The methodology is part of the rail operator's corporate
focus on overall safety and security and is intended to help protect
the operator's various rail systems against, among other things,
terrorist attacks, as well as other forms of corporate loss, such as
service disruption and loss of business viability.
U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices:
Both U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have
implemented similar improvements to enhance the security of their
systems.[Footnote 29] A summary of these efforts follows.
Customer awareness: Customer awareness programs we observed used
signage and announcements to encourage riders to alert train staff if
they observed suspicious packages, persons, or behavior. Of the 32
domestic rail operators we interviewed, 30 had implemented a customer
awareness program or made enhancements to an existing program. Foreign
rail operators we visited also attempt to enhance customer awareness.
For example, 11 of the 13 operators we interviewed had implemented a
customer awareness program. Similar to programs of U.S. operators,
these programs used signage, announcements, and brochures to inform
passengers and employees about the need to remain vigilant and report
any suspicious activities. Only one of the European passenger rail
operators that we interviewed has not implemented a customer security
awareness program, citing the fear or panic that it might cause among
the public.
Increased number and visibility of security personnel: Of the 32 U.S.
rail operators we interviewed, 23 had increased the number of security
personnel they utilized since September 11, to provide security
throughout their system or had taken steps to increase the visibility
of their security personnel. In addition to adding security personnel,
many operators stated that increasing the visibility of security was as
important as increasing the number of personnel. For example, several
U.S. and foreign rail operators we spoke with had instituted policies
such as requiring their security staff, in brightly colored vests, to
patrol trains or stations more frequently, so they are more visible to
customers and potential terrorists or criminals. These policies make it
easier for customers to contact security personnel in the event of an
emergency, or if they have spotted a suspicious item or person. At
foreign sites we visited, 10 of the 13 operators had increased the
number of their security officers throughout their systems in recent
years because of the perceived increase in risk of a terrorist attack.
Increased use of canine teams: Of the 32 U.S. passenger rail operators
we contacted, 21 had begun to use canine units, which include both dogs
and human handlers, to patrol their facilities or trains or had
increased their existing utilization of such teams. Often, these units
are used to detect the presence of explosives, and may be called in
when a suspicious package is detected. Some operators that did not
maintain their own canine units stated that it was prohibitively
expensive to do so and that they could call in local police canine
units if necessary. In foreign countries we visited, passenger rail
operators' use of canines varied. In some Asian countries, canines were
not culturally accepted by the public and thus were not used for rail
security purposes. As in the United States, and in contrast to Asia,
most European passenger rail operators used canines for explosive
detection or as deterrents.
Employee training: All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we
interviewed had provided some type of security training to their staff,
either through in-house personnel or an external provider. In many
cases, this training consisted of ways to identify suspicious items and
persons and how to respond to events once they occur. For example, the
London Underground and the British Transport Police developed the "HOT"
method for its employees to identify suspicious items in the rail
system. In the HOT method, employees are trained to look for packages
or items that are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and not Typical of the
environment. Items that do not meet these criteria would likely receive
a lower security response than an item meeting all of the criteria.
However, if items meet all of these criteria, employees are to notify
station managers, who would call in the authorities and potentially
shut down the station or take other action. According to London
Underground officials, the HOT method has significantly reduced the
number of system disruptions caused when a suspicious item was
identified. Several passenger rail operators in the United States and
abroad have trained their employees in the HOT method. Several domestic
operators had also trained their employees in how to respond to
terrorist attacks and provided them with wallet-size cards highlighting
actions they should take in response to various forms of attack. It is
important to note that training such as the HOT method is not designed
to prevent acts of terrorism like the July 2005 London attacks, where
suicide bombers killed themselves rather than leaving bombs behind.
Passenger and baggage screening practices: Some domestic and foreign
rail operators have trained employees to recognize suspicious behavior
as a means of screening passengers. Eight U.S. passenger rail operators
we contacted were utilizing some form of behavioral screening. For
example, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), which
operates Boston's T system, has utilized a behavioral screening system
to identify passengers exhibiting suspicious behavior. The
Massachusetts State Police train all MBTA personnel to be on the
lookout for behavior that may indicate someone has criminal intent, and
to approach and search such persons and their baggage when appropriate.
Massachusetts State Police officers have been training rail operators
on this behavior profiling system, and WMATA and New Jersey Transit
were among the first additional operators to implement the system.
According to MBTA personnel, several other operators have expressed
interest in this system. Abroad, we found that 4 of 13 operators we
interviewed had implemented forms of behavioral screening similar to
MBTA's system.
All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we contacted have ruled
out an airport-style screening system for daily use in heavy traffic,
where each passenger and the passenger's baggage are screened by a
magnetometer or X-ray machine, based on cost, staffing, and customer
convenience factors, among others. For example, although the Spanish
National Railway screens passenger baggage using an X-ray machine on
certain long-distance trains that it believes could be at risk, all of
the operators we contacted stated that the cost, staffing requirements,
delay of service, and inconvenience to passengers would make such a
system unworkable in highly trafficked, inherently open systems like
U.S. and foreign passenger rail operations. In addition, one Asian rail
official stated that his organization was developing a contingency plan
for implementing an airport-style screening system, but that such a
system would be used only in the event of intelligence information
indicating suicide bomb attacks were imminent, or if several attacks
had already occurred during a short period of time. According to this
official, the plan was in the initial stages of development, and the
organization did not know how quickly such a system could be
implemented.
Upgrading technology: Many rail operators we interviewed had embarked
on programs designed to upgrade their existing security technology. For
example, we found that 29 of the 32 U.S. operators had implemented a
form of CCTV to monitor their stations, yards, or trains. While these
cameras cannot be monitored closely at all times, because of the large
number of staff they said this would require, many rail operators felt
the cameras acted as a deterrent, assisted security personnel in
determining how to respond to incidents that have already occurred, and
could be monitored if an operator has received information that an
incident may occur at a certain time or place in their system. One rail
operator, New Jersey Transit, had installed "smart" cameras, which were
programmed to alert security personnel when suspicious activity
occurred, such as if a passenger left a bag in a certain location or if
a boat were to dock under a bridge. According to the New Jersey Transit
officials, this technology was relatively inexpensive and not difficult
to implement. Several other operators stated they were interested in
exploring this technology. Abroad, all 13 of the foreign rail operators
we visited had CCTV systems in place. As in the United States, foreign
rail operators use these cameras primarily as a crime deterrent and to
respond to incidents after they occur, because they do not have enough
staff to continuously monitor all of these cameras.
In addition, 18 of the 32 U.S. rail operators we interviewed had
installed new emergency phones or enhanced the visibility of the
intercom systems they already had. Passengers can use these systems to
contact train operators or security personnel to report suspicious
activity, crimes in progress, or other problems. Furthermore, while
most rail operators we spoke with had not installed chemical or
biological agent detection equipment because of the costs involved, a
few operators had this equipment or were exploring purchasing it. For
example, WMATA, in Washington, D.C., has installed these sensors in
some of its stations, thanks to a program jointly sponsored by DOT and
the Department of Energy that provided this equipment to WMATA because
of the high perceived likelihood of an attack in Washington, D.C. Also,
at least three other domestic rail operators we spoke with are
exploring the possibility of partnering with federal agencies to
install such equipment in their facilities on an experimental basis.
Also, as in the United States, a few foreign operators had implemented
chemical or biological detection devices at these rail stations, but
their use was not widespread. Two of the 13 foreign operators we
interviewed had implemented these sensors, and both were doing so on an
experimental basis. In addition, police officers from the British
Transport Police--responsible for policing the rail system in the
United Kingdom--were equipped with pagers to detect chemical,
biological, or radiological elements in the air, allowing them to
respond quickly in case of a terrorist attack using one of these
methods. The British Transit Police also has three vehicles carrying
devices to determine if unattended baggage contains explosives--these
vehicles patrol the system 24 hours per day.
Access control: Tightening access procedures at key facilities or
rights-of-way is another way many rail operators have attempted to
enhance security. A majority of domestic and selected foreign passenger
rail operators had invested in enhanced systems to control unauthorized
access at employee facilities and stations. Specifically, 23 of the 32
U.S. operators had installed a form of access control at key facilities
and stations. This often involved installing a system where employees
had to swipe an access card to gain access to control rooms, repair
facilities, and other key locations. All 13 foreign operators had
implemented some form of access control to their critical facilities or
rights-of-way. These measures varied from simple alarms on doors at
electrical substations on one subway system we visited to infrared
sensors monitoring every inch of right-of-way along the track on three
of the high-speed interurban rail systems.
Rail system design and configuration: In an effort to reduce
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and increase overall security,
passenger rail operators in the United States and abroad have been, or
are now beginning to, incorporate security features into the design of
new and existing rail infrastructure, primarily rail stations. For
example, of the 32 domestic rail operators we contacted, 22 of them had
removed their conventional trash bins entirely, or replaced them with
transparent or bomb-resistant trash bins, as TSA instructed in its May
2004 security directives. Foreign rail operators had taken steps to
remove traditional trash bins from their systems. Of the 13 operators
we visited, 8 had either removed their trash bins entirely or replaced
them with blast-resistant cans or transparent receptacles.
Many foreign rail operators are also incorporating aspects of security
into the design of their rail infrastructure. Of the 13 operators we
visited, 11 have attempted to design new facilities with security in
mind and have attempted to retrofit older facilities to incorporate
security-related modifications. For example, one foreign operator we
visited is retrofitting its train cars with windows that passengers
could open in the event of a chemical attack. In addition, the London
Underground, one of the oldest rail systems in the world, incorporates
security into the design of all its new stations as well as when
existing stations are modified. We observed several security features
in the design of Underground stations, such as using vending machines
that have no holes that someone could use to hide a bomb, and sloped
tops to reduce the likelihood that a bomb can be placed on top of the
machine. In addition, stations are designed to provide staff with clear
lines of sight to all areas of the station, such as underneath benches
or ticket machines, and station designers try to eliminate or restrict
access to any recessed areas where a bomb could be hidden.
In one London station, we observed the use of netting throughout the
station to help prevent objects, such as bombs, from being placed in a
recessed area, such as beneath a stairwell or escalator. In this
station and other stations we visited, Underground officials have
installed "help posts" at which customers can call for help if an
incident occurs. When these posts are activated, CCTV cameras display a
video image of the help post and surrounding area to staff at a central
command center. This allows the staff to directly observe the situation
and respond appropriately. See figure 5 for a photograph of a help
post.
Figure 5: Security Design Elements Incorporated into London's
Underground:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Underground officials stated that the incorporation of security
features in station design is an effective measure in deterring some
terrorists from attacking the system. For example, officials told us
that CCTV video recorded the efforts by Irish Republican Army
terrorists attempting to place an explosive device inside a station--
and when they could not find a suitable location to hide the device,
they placed it outside in a trash can instead, thereby mitigating the
impact of the explosion.
In the United States, several passenger rail operators stated that they
were taking security into account when designing new facilities or
remodeling older ones. Twenty-two of 32 rail operators we interviewed
told us that they were incorporating security into the design of new or
existing rail infrastructure. For example, New York City Transit and
PATH officials told us they are incorporating security into the design
of its new stations, including the redesigned Fulton Street station and
the World Trade Center Hub that were damaged or destroyed during the
September 11 attacks. In addition, in June 2005, FTA issued guidelines
for use by the transit industry encouraging the incorporation of
particular security features into the design of transit infrastructure.
These guidelines include, for example, increasing visibility for
onboard staff, reducing the areas where someone could hide an explosive
device on a transit vehicle, and enhancing emergency exits in transit
stations.
Figure 6 shows a diagram of several security measures that we observed
in passenger rail stations both in the United States and abroad. It
should be noted that this represents an amalgam of stations we visited,
not any particular station.
Figure 6: Composite of Selected Security Practices in the Passenger
Rail Environment:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Amtrak Faces Challenges Specific to Intercity Passenger Rail in
Securing Its System:
In securing its extensive system, Amtrak faces its own set of security-
related challenges, some of which are different from those facing a
commuter rail or transit operator. First, Amtrak operates over
thousands of miles, often far from large population centers. This makes
its route system much more difficult to patrol and monitor than one
contained in a particular metropolitan region, and it causes delays in
responding to incidents when they occur in remote areas. Also, outside
the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak operates almost exclusively on tracks
owned by freight rail companies. Amtrak also utilizes stations owned by
freight rail companies, transit and commuter rail authorities, private
corporations, and municipal governments. This means that Amtrak often
cannot unilaterally make security improvements to others' rights-of-way
or station facilities and that it is reliant on the staff of other
organizations to patrol their facilities and respond to incidents that
may occur. Furthermore, with over 500 stations, only half of which are
staffed, screening even a small portion of the passengers and baggage
boarding Amtrak trains is difficult. Last, Amtrak's financial condition
has never been strong--Amtrak has been on the edge of bankruptcy
several times.
Amid the ongoing challenges of securing its coast-to-coast railway,
Amtrak has taken some actions to enhance security throughout its
intercity passenger rail system. For example, Amtrak has initiated a
passenger awareness campaign, similar to those described elsewhere in
this report. Also, Amtrak has begun enforcing existing restrictions on
carry-on luggage that limit passengers to two carry-on bags, not
exceeding 50 pounds. All bags also must have identification tags on
them. Furthermore, Amtrak has begun requiring passengers to show
positive identification after boarding trains when asked by staff to
ensure that tickets have not been transferred or stolen, although
Amtrak officials acknowledge their onboard staffs only sporadically
enforce this requirement because of the numerous tasks these staff
members must perform before a train departs. However, in November 2004,
Amtrak implemented the Tactical Intensive Patrols (TIPS) program, under
which its security staff flood selected platforms to ensure Amtrak
baggage and identification requirements are met by passengers boarding
trains. In addition, Amtrak increased the number of canine units
patrolling its system, most of which are located in the Northeast
Corridor, looking for explosives or narcotics and assigned some of its
police to ride trains in the Northeast Corridor. Also, Amtrak has
instituted a policy of randomly inspecting checked luggage on its
trains. Finally, Amtrak is making improvements to the emergency exits
in certain tunnels to make evacuating trains in the tunnels easier in
the event of a crash or terrorist attack.
To ensure that security measures are applied consistently throughout
Amtrak's system, Amtrak has established a series of Security
Coordinating Committees, which include representatives of all Amtrak
departments. These committees are to review and establish security
policies, in coordination with Amtrak's police department, and have
worked to develop countermeasures to specific threats. According to
Amtrak, in the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings, these
committees met with Amtrak police and security staff to ensure
additional security measures were implemented. Also in the wake of the
London attacks, Amtrak began working with the police forces of several
large east coast cities, allowing them to patrol Amtrak stations to
provide extra security. In addition, all Amtrak employees now receive a
"Daily Security Awareness Tip" and are receiving computer-based
security training. Amtrak police officers are also now receiving
specialized counterterrorism training.
While Amtrak has taken the actions outlined above, it is difficult to
determine if these actions appropriately or sufficiently addressed
pressing security needs. As discussed earlier, Amtrak has not performed
a comprehensive terrorism risk assessment that would provide an
empirical baseline for investment prioritization and decision making
for Amtrak's security policies and investment plans. However, as part
of the 2005 Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program, Amtrak is required
to produce a security and emergency preparedness plan, which is to
include a risk assessment that Amtrak currently expects to finish by
December 31, 2005. Upon completing this plan, Amtrak management should
have a more informed basis regarding which security enhancements should
receive the highest priority for implementation.
Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used in the
United States:
While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail
systems are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are
implementing, we encountered three practices in other countries that
were not currently in use among the domestic passenger rail operators
we contacted as of June 2005, nor were they performed by the U.S.
government. These practices are discussed below.
Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited utilize
covert testing to keep employees alert about their security
responsibilities. Covert testing involves security staff staging
unannounced events to test the response of railroad staff to incidents
such as suspicious packages or setting off alarms. In one European
system, this covert testing involves security staff placing suspicious
items throughout their system to see how long it takes operating staff
to respond to the item. Similarly, one Asian rail operator's security
staff will break security seals on fire extinguishers and open alarmed
emergency doors randomly to see how long it takes staff to respond.
Officials of these operators stated that these tests are carried out on
a daily basis and are beneficial because their staff know they could be
tested at any moment, and they, therefore, are more likely to be
vigilant with respect to security.
Random screening: Of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed, 2 have
some form of random screening of passengers and their baggage in place.
In the systems where this is in place, security personnel can approach
passengers either in stations or on the trains and ask them to submit
their persons or their baggage to a search. Passengers declining to
cooperate must leave the system. For example, in Singapore, rail agency
officials rotate the stations where they conduct random searches so
that the searches are carried out at a different station each day.
Prior to the July 2005 London bombings, no passenger rail operators in
the United States were practicing a form of random passenger or baggage
screening on a continuing daily basis. However, during the Democratic
National Convention in 2004, MBTA instituted a system of random
screening of passengers, where every 11th passenger at certain stations
and times of the day was asked to provide his or her bags to be
screened. Those who refused were not allowed to ride the system. MBTA
officials recognized that it is impossible to implement such a system
comprehensively throughout the rail network without massive amounts of
additional staff, and that even doing random screening on a regular
basis would be a drain on resources. However, officials stated that
such a system is workable during special events and times of heightened
security but would have to be designed very carefully to ensure that
passengers' civil liberties were not violated. After the July 2005
London bombings, four passenger rail operators--PATH, New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New Jersey Transit, and Utah
Transit Authority in Salt Lake City--implemented limited forms of
random bag screening in their system. In addition, APTA, FTA, and the
National Academy of Science's Transportation Research Board are
currently conducting a study on the benefits and challenges that
passenger rail operators would face in implementing a randomized
passenger screening system. The study is examining such issues as the
legal basis for conducting passenger screening or search, the
precedence for such measures in the transportation environment, the
human resources required, and the financial implications and cost
considerations involved.
National government maintains clearinghouse on technologies and best
practices: According to passenger rail operators in five countries we
visited, their national governments have centralized the process for
performing research and developing passenger rail security technologies
and maintaining a clearinghouse on these technologies and security best
practices. According to these officials, this allows rail operators to
have one central source for information on the merits of a particular
passenger rail security technology, such as chemical sensors, CCTVs,
and intrusion detection devices. Some U.S. rail operators we
interviewed expressed interest in there being a more active centralized
federal research and development authority in the United States to
evaluate and certify passenger rail security technologies and make that
information available to rail operators. Although TSA is the primary
federal agency responsible for conducting transportation security
research and development, and has conducted the TRIP as previously
mentioned, most of the agency's research and development efforts to
date have focused on aviation security technologies. As a result,
domestic rail operators told us that they rely on consultations with
industry trade associations, such as APTA, to learn about best
practices for passenger rail security technologies and related
investments. Several rail operators stated that they were often unsure
of where to turn when seeking information on security-related products,
such as CCTV cameras or intrusion detection systems. Currently, many
operators said they informally ask other rail operators about their
experiences with a certain technology, perform their own research via
the Internet or trade publications, or perform their own testing.
No federal agency has compiled or disseminated best practices to rail
operators to aid in this process. We have previously reported that
stakeholders have stated that the federal government should play a
greater role in testing transportation security technology and making
this information available to industry stakeholders.[Footnote 30] TSA
and DOT agree that making the results of research testing available to
industry stakeholders could be a valuable use of federal resources by
reducing the need for multiple rail operators to perform the same
research and development efforts, but they have not taken action to
address this.[Footnote 31]
Implementing these three practices--covert testing, random screening,
and a government-sponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best
practices--in the United States could pose political, legal, fiscal,
and cultural challenges because of the differences between the United
States and these foreign nations. For instance, many foreign nations
have dealt with terrorist attacks on their public transportation
systems for decades, compared with the United States, where rail
transportation has not been specifically targeted during terrorist
attacks. According to foreign rail operators, these experiences have
resulted in greater acceptance of certain security practices, such as
random searches, which the U.S. public may view as a violation of their
civil liberties or which may discourage them from using public
transportation. The impact of security measures on passengers is an
important consideration for domestic rail transit operators, since most
passengers could choose another means of transportation, such as a
personal automobile. As such, security measures that limit
accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause
inconvenience could push people away from transit and into their cars.
In contrast, the citizens of the European and Asian countries we
visited are more dependent on public transportation than most U.S.
residents and therefore, according to the rail operators we spoke with,
may be more willing to accept more intrusive security measures, simply
because they have no other choice for getting from place to place.
Nevertheless, in order to identify innovative security measures that
could help further mitigate terrorism-related risk to rail assets--
especially as part of a broader risk management approach discussed
earlier--it is important to at least consider assessing the feasibility
and costs and benefits of implementing the three rail security
practices we identified in foreign countries in the United States.
Officials from DHS, DOT, passenger rail industry associations, and rail
systems we interviewed told us that operators would benefit from such
an evaluation. Furthermore, the passenger rail association officials
told us that such an evaluation should include practices used by
foreign rail operators that integrate security into infrastructure
design.
Differences in the business models and financial status of some foreign
rail operators could also affect the feasibility of adopting certain
security practices in the United States. Several foreign countries we
visited have privatized their passenger rail operations. Although most
of the foreign rail operators we visited--even the privatized systems-
-rely on their governments for some type of financial assistance, two
foreign rail operators generated significant revenue and profits in
other business endeavors, which they said allowed them to invest
heavily in security measures for their rail systems. In particular, the
Paris Metro system is operated by the RATP Corporation (Régie Autonome
des Transports Parisiens), which also contracts with other cities in
France and throughout the world to provide consulting and project
management services. RATP's ability to make a profit, according to its
officials, through its consulting services allows the agency to
supplement government funding in order to support expensive security
measures for the Paris mass transit system. For example, RATP recently
installed a computer-assisted security control system that uses CCTV,
radio, and global positioning technology that it says has significantly
reduced the amount of time it takes for security or emergency personnel
to respond to an incident or emergency, such as a terrorist attack.
Because of RATP's available funding for security, the corporation also
purchased an identical system for the Metropolitan Paris Police, so the
RATP and the police system would be compatible. In contrast, domestic
rail operators do not generate a profit and therefore are dependent on
financial assistance from the federal, state, and local levels of
government to maintain and enhance services, including funding security
improvements.
Another important difference between domestic and foreign rail
operators is the structure of their police forces. In particular,
England, France, Belgium, and Spain all have national police forces
patrolling rail systems in these countries. The use of a national
police force is a reflection that these foreign countries often have
one nationalized rail system, rather than over 30 rail transit systems
owned and operated by numerous state and local governments, as is the
case in the United States. For example, in France, the French National
Railway operates all intercity passenger rail services in the country
and utilizes the French Railway police to provide security. According
to foreign rail operators, the use of one national rail police force
allows for consistent policing and security measures throughout the
country. In the United States, in contrast, there is not a national
police force for the rail transit systems.[Footnote 32] Rather, some
transit agencies maintain individual polices forces, while others rely
on their city or county police forces for security.
Conclusions:
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged by the steps DHS
components have taken to use elements of a risk management approach to
guide critical infrastructure protection decisions for the passenger
rail industry. However, enhanced federal leadership is needed to help
ensure that actions and investments designed to enhance security are
properly focused and prioritized, so that finite resources may be
allocated appropriately to help protect all modes of transportation and
secure other national critical infrastructure sectors. Leadership on
this issue should reflect the shared responsibilities required to
coordinate actions on the part of federal, state, and local
governments; the private sector; and rail passengers who ride these
systems.
Specifically, both DHS and TSA could take additional steps to help
ensure that the risk management efforts under way clearly and
effectively identify priority areas for security-related investments in
rail and other sectors. We recognize that TSA has had many aviation
security-related responsibilities and has implemented many security
initiatives to meet legislative requirements. Notwithstanding, TSA has
not yet completed its methodology for determining how the results of
threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments will be used to
identify and prioritize risks to passenger rail and other
transportation sectors. In order to complete and apply its methodology
as part of the forthcoming transportation sector-specific plan, TSA
needs to more consistently involve industry stakeholders in the overall
risk assessment process and collaborate with them on collecting and
analyzing information on critical infrastructure and key resources in
the passenger rail industry. Without consistent and substantive
stakeholder input, TSA may not be able to fully capture critical
information on rail assets--information that is needed to properly
assess risk. In addition, as part of the process to complete its risk
assessment methodology, TSA needs to consider whether other proven
approaches, such as ODP's risk assessment methodology, could be
leveraged for rail and other transportation modes, such as aviation.
Until the overall risk to the entire transportation sector is
identified, TSA will not be able to fully benefit from the outcome of
risk management analysis--including determining where and how to target
the nation's limited resources to achieve the greatest security gains.
Once risk assessments for the passenger rail industry have been
completed, it will be critical to be able to compare assessment results
across all transportation modes as well as other critical sectors and
make informed, risk-based investment trade-offs. The framework that DHS
is developing to help ensure that risks to all sectors can be analyzed
and compared in a consistent way needs to be completed and shared with
TSA and other sector-specific agencies. The delay in completing the
element of the framework that defines concepts, terminology, and
metrics for assessing risk limits DHS's ability to compare risk across
sectors as sector-specific agencies are concurrently conducting risk
assessment activities without this guidance. Until this framework is
complete, it will not be possible for information from different
sectors to be reconciled to allow for a meaningful comparison of risk-
-a goal outlined in DHS's interim NIPP.
Apart from its efforts to formally identify risks, TSA has taken steps
to enhance the security of the overall passenger rail system. The
issuance of security directives in the wake of the Madrid bombings was
a well-intentioned effort to take swift action in response to a current
threat. However, because these directives were issued under emergency
circumstances, with limited input and review by rail industry and
federal stakeholders--and no public comment period--they may not
provide the industry with baseline security standards based on industry
best practices. Nor is it clear how these directives are to be measured
and enforced. Consequently, neither the federal government nor rail
operators can be sure they are requiring and implementing security
practices proven to help prevent or mitigate disasters. Collaborating
with rail industry stakeholders to develop security standards is an
important starting point for strengthening the security of passenger
rail systems.
While foreign passenger rail operators face similar challenges to
securing their systems and have generally implemented similar security
practices as U.S. rail operators, there are some practices that are
utilized abroad that U.S. rail operators or the federal government have
not studied in terms of the feasibility, costs, and benefits. For
example, an information clearinghouse for new passenger rail
technologies that are available and have been tested might allow rail
operators to efficiently implement technologies that had already
received approval. In addition, while FTA plans to require rail
operators to consider its security infrastructure design guidelines
when renovating or constructing rail systems or facilities,
opportunities may still exist to further research and evaluate ways of
integrating security into design, as some foreign rail operators have
done. Another rail security practice--covert testing of rail security
procedures--is being used in two foreign rail systems we visited and is
considered by them as an effective means of keeping rail employees
alert to their surroundings and potential security threats. And
finally, random searches of passengers and baggage are being used by
two foreign rail operators and this practice has recently been adopted
by four domestic rail operators in the wake of the London attacks.
Introducing these security practices into the United States may involve
cultural, financial, and political challenges, owing to differences
between the United States and foreign nations. Nonetheless, as part of
the overall risk management approach, there may be compelling reasons
for exploring the feasibility, costs, and benefits of implementing any
of these practices in the United States. Doing so could enable the
United States to leverage the experiences and knowledge of foreign
passenger rail operators and help identify additional innovative
measures to secure rail systems against terrorist attack in this
country.
In our recently issued report on passenger rail security, we
recommended, among other things, that to help ensure that the federal
government has the information it needs to prioritize passenger rail
assets based on risk, and in order to evaluate, select, and implement
commensurate measures to help the nation's passenger rail operators
protect their systems against acts of terrorism, TSA should establish a
plan with timelines for completing its methodology for conducting risk
assessments and develop security standards that reflect industry best
practices and can be measured and enforced, by using the federal rule-
making process. In addition, we recommended that the Secretary of DHS,
in collaboration with DOT and the passenger rail industry, determine
the feasibility, in a risk management context, of implementing certain
security practices used by foreign rail operators. DHS, DOT, and Amtrak
generally agreed with the report's recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at
this time.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.
Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or JayEtta Z. Hecker at (202) 512-2834.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Seto
Bagdoyan, Amy Bernstein, Leo Barbour, Christopher Currie, Nikki
Clowers, David Hooper, Kirk Kiester, and Ray Sendejas.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
[2] GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 9, 2005).
[3] The American Public Transportation Association compiled this fiscal
year 2003 ridership data from FTA's National Transit Database. These
are the most current data available. Rail transit systems in the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are included in these statistics.
[4] The Alaska Railroad Corporation also operates intercity passenger
rail service.
[5] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[6] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[7] The Department of Justice established ODP in 1998 within the Office
of Justice Programs. ODP was subsequently transferred to DHS's
Directorate of Border and Transportation Security upon DHS's creation
in March 2003 (Homeland Security Act of 2002, section 403(5), 6 U.S.C.
203(5)). In March 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security consolidated
ODP with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination to form
the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
(SLGCP). SLGCP, which reports directly to the DHS Secretary, was
created to provide a "one-stop shop" for the numerous federal
preparedness initiatives applicable to state and local governments.
[8] At the time of our review, DHS was undertaking a departmentwide
reorganization that will affect both the structure and the functions of
DHS directorates and component agencies.
[9] Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298 (2004).
[10] FRA administers and enforces the federal laws and related
regulations that are designed to promote safety on railroads, such as
track maintenance, inspection standards, equipment standards, and
operating practices. FRA exercises jurisdiction over all areas of
railroad safety under 49 U.S.C. 20103.
[11] Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
[12] GAO, Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to
Optimize Resources, GAO-05-357T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2005);
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001); and Combating
Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target
Program Investments, GAO/NSIAD-98-74 (Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1998).
[13] Sector-specific agencies have been designated for the following
sectors: transportation; agriculture and food; public health and health
care; drinking water and wastewater treatment; energy; banking and
finance; national monuments and icons; defense industrial base;
information technology; telecommunications; chemical; emergency
services; postal and package shipping; dams; government facilities;
commercial facilities; and nuclear reactors, materials, and waste.
[14] The transportation sector includes mass transit; aviation;
maritime; ground/surface; and rail and pipeline systems.
[15] ODP has completed risk assessments with the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey, New Jersey Transit, Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, Tri-
County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon, and the Delaware
River Port Authority.
[16] PANYNJ is a bistate public agency that manages and maintains
bridges, tunnels, bus terminals, airports, the PATH passenger rail
system, and seaports in the greater New York/New Jersey metropolitan
area. PANYNJ was also the property owner and operator of the World
Trade Center site and the PATH passenger rail station underneath the
site that was destroyed by the September 11 terrorist attacks. At the
request of PANYNJ, ODP's technical assistance team worked with
authority personnel to conduct the first risk assessment using ODP's
model. This collaborative effort provided the means for ODP to test and
refine its methodology and develop the tool kit now in use.
[17] The Association of American Railroads is an association
representing the interests of the rail industry, focused mostly at the
federal level. Its members are primarily freight rail operators in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico. However, it also represents some
passenger rail interests, including Amtrak.
[18] The American Public Transportation Association is a nonprofit
trade association representing over 1,500 public and private member
organizations, including transit systems and commuter rail operators;
planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product and service
providers; academic institutions; transit associations; and state
departments of transportation.
[19] Up to 30 percent of the available funds will be available to
assist Amtrak in meeting its most pressing security needs in the
Northeast Corridor and Chicago (as identified through previously
conducted site-specific assessments) prior to completion of the risk
assessment. However, the remainder of the grant funds will not be
released until Amtrak has completed the risk assessment and also
submitted a security and emergency preparedness plan. Amtrak is also
required to demonstrate that its planning process and allocations of
funds are fully coordinated with regional planning efforts in the
National Capitol Region, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Chicago.
Amtrak is using approximately $700,000 of the grant funds for the ODP
risk assessment.
[20] The results of TSA's passenger and freight rail threat assessments
contain information that is security sensitive or classified and
therefore cannot be disclosed in this testimony.
[21] DHS refers to this framework as a Risk Analysis and Management for
Critical Asset Protection.
[22] According to TSA, in issuing the passenger rail and mass transit
security directives, TSA exercised its authorities under 49 U.S.C. 114.
We are currently examining whether TSA met all relevant legal
requirements in the promulgation of the directives.
[23] 49 CFR 238.235.
[24] These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act of
2005 and its accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with
$12 million in funding for rail security activities.
[25] Congress required that an annex to the MOU be signed that would,
among other things, define and clarify the respective transit security
roles and responsibilities of each department. Pub. L. 109-59, § 3028
(2005).
[26] APTA is a standards development organization recognized by DOT
that has set standards for commuter rail, mass transit, and bus safety
and operations.
[27] At the time we completed our work in June 2005, these three
practices were not utilized. However, as discussed later in this
report, some rail operators began using random screening in the
aftermath of the July bomb attacks on the London subway system.
[28] As we have previously reported, since the mid-1990s, federal
funding for transit and commuter rail operators has generally been
limited to assistance with capital projects involving building new
transit service, extensions of existing lines, or rehabilitation of
existing transit infrastructure, such as tracks, rolling stock, or
stations. See GAO-03-263.
[29] Actions taken by Amtrak to enhance security are discussed later in
this testimony.
[30] GAO-03-843.
[31] See GAO-03-843.
[32] Unlike domestic rail transit agencies, Amtrak maintains a 342-
member police force for its national network.
