Large Truck Safety
Federal Enforcement Efforts Have Been Stronger Since 2000, but Oversight of State Grants Needs Improvement Gao ID: GAO-06-156 December 15, 2005About 5,000 people die and more than 120,000 are injured each year from crashes involving large trucks. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has several enforcement programs to improve truck safety and funds similar enforcement programs in states through its Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP). Following concern by Congress and others in 1999 that FMCSA's enforcement approach was ineffective, the agency committed to take stronger actions. This study reports on how FMCSA's enforcement approach has changed, how it makes decisions about its enforcement approach, and how it ensures that its grants to states contribute to the agency's mission of saving lives.
FMCSA has made considerable strides in strengthening its enforcement programs and actions. For example, it almost doubled the number of on-site safety reviews (called compliance reviews) at carriers' bases of operations, from approximately 6,400 in 1998 to 11,300 in 2004. Further, it has increased the average civil penalty by about 75 percent (from $820 to $1,400) over the same period. FMCSA generally maintained its firmer approach to enforcement at a time when it took on the additional responsibilities of conducting homeland security-related reviews of hazardous materials carriers and safety reviews of new carriers. To a large extent, FMCSA follows key effective management practices in making decisions about its enforcement approach. For example, its enforcement approach addresses major risk areas that contribute to (or cause) crashes, and targets its enforcement resources at the motor carriers with the greatest crash risk. FMCSA also has a broad range of enforcement goals and performance measures that it uses to provide direction to--and track the performance of--its enforcement programs. Furthermore, FMCSA is working to obtain additional information on crash risk factors and on the costs and effectiveness of its enforcement programs, as well as alternative approaches that it needs to further refine and set priorities for its programs. However, because FMCSA does not measure the effect that one of its key enforcement tools--civil penalties--has on carriers' compliance with safety regulations, it lacks the information needed to make sound decisions about any changes to its use of civil penalties. MCSAP is designed to improve safety by employing a performance-based approach; however, FMCSA's oversight for these grants is inadequate. In reviewing the 61 program goals set by the seven states that received the largest MCSAP grants, we could not determine whether states substantially met almost two-thirds of these goals due to missing performance information, among other reasons. Further, although FMCSA requires that its various offices periodically review grant activities for adequacy of oversight, few of these reviews are being completed. For example, in the past 3 years, FMCSA's service centers have assessed only 15 of the agency's 52 field division offices (29 percent). FMCSA did not conduct these reviews for various reasons, including a curbed oversight role for service centers and markedly reduced headquarters staffing for MCSAP.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-156, Large Truck Safety: Federal Enforcement Efforts Have Been Stronger Since 2000, but Oversight of State Grants Needs Improvement
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Report to Congressional Committees:
December 2005:
Large Truck Safety:
Federal Enforcement Efforts Have Been Stronger Since 2000, but
Oversight of State Grants Needs Improvement:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-156]
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-156, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
About 5,000 people die and more than 120,000 are injured each year from
crashes involving large trucks. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) has several enforcement programs to improve
truck safety and funds similar enforcement programs in states through
its Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP). Following concern
by Congress and others in 1999 that FMCSA‘s enforcement approach was
ineffective, the agency committed to take stronger actions.
This study reports on how FMCSA‘s enforcement approach has changed, how
it makes decisions about its enforcement approach, and how it ensures
that its grants to states contribute to the agency‘s mission of saving
lives.
What GAO Found:
FMCSA has made considerable strides in strengthening its enforcement
programs and actions. For example, it almost doubled the number of on-
site safety reviews (called compliance reviews) at carriers‘ bases of
operations, from approximately 6,400 in 1998 to 11,300 in 2004.
Further, it has increased the average civil penalty by about 75 percent
(from $820 to $1,400) over the same period. FMCSA generally maintained
its firmer approach to enforcement at a time when it took on the
additional responsibilities of conducting homeland security-related
reviews of hazardous materials carriers and safety reviews of new
carriers.
To a large extent, FMCSA follows key effective management practices in
making decisions about its enforcement approach. For example, its
enforcement approach addresses major risk areas that contribute to (or
cause) crashes, and targets its enforcement resources at the motor
carriers with the greatest crash risk. FMCSA also has a broad range of
enforcement goals and performance measures that it uses to provide
direction to”and track the performance of”its enforcement programs.
Furthermore, FMCSA is working to obtain additional information on crash
risk factors and on the costs and effectiveness of its enforcement
programs, as well as alternative approaches that it needs to further
refine and set priorities for its programs. However, because FMCSA does
not measure the effect that one of its key enforcement tools”civil
penalties”has on carriers‘ compliance with safety regulations, it lacks
the information needed to make sound decisions about any changes to its
use of civil penalties.
MCSAP is designed to improve safety by employing a performance-based
approach; however, FMCSA‘s oversight for these grants is inadequate. In
reviewing the 61 program goals set by the seven states that received
the largest MCSAP grants, we could not determine whether states
substantially met almost two-thirds of these goals due to missing
performance information, among other reasons. Further, although FMCSA
requires that its various offices periodically review grant activities
for adequacy of oversight, few of these reviews are being completed.
For example, in the past 3 years, FMCSA‘s service centers have assessed
only 15 of the agency‘s 52 field division offices (29 percent). FMCSA
did not conduct these reviews for various reasons, including a curbed
oversight role for service centers and markedly reduced headquarters
staffing for MCSAP.
FMCSA‘s progress on initiatives to improve truck safety enforcement:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO makes several recommendations to improve FMCSA‘s ability to
determine the effectiveness of its enforcement approach and strengthen
the agency‘s oversight of MCSAP, such as measuring the effectiveness of
its civil penalties and ensuring that existing planning and oversight
mechanisms are carried out.
GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation
for its review and comment. The department generally agreed with the
report‘s findings and agreed to consider our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-156.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud at
(202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
FMCSA's Enforcement Programs and Actions Have Been Stronger Since 2000:
FMCSA Has a Well-Defined Enforcement Approach and Has Efforts Underway
to Help It Refine and Set Priorities for Its Enforcement Programs:
MCSAP Is Designed to Improve Safety but Program Oversight Is
Inadequate:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
Tables:
Table 1: FMCSA's Enforcement Programs:
Table 2: FMCSA's Enforcement Actions:
Table 3: How FMCSA's Enforcement Approach Addresses Many of the Major
Factors that Cause or Contribute to Truck Crashes:
Table 4: Examples of FMCSA's Enforcement Program Goals and Performance
Measures:
Figures:
Figure 1: Growth in the Number of Interstate Motor Carriers, 1995
through 2004
Figure 2: Fatality Rates Involving Large Truck and Passenger Vehicle
Crashes, 1995 through 2004
Figure 3: Number of Compliance Reviews Conducted and Percentage of the
Motor Carrier Industry Receiving Compliance Reviews, 1995 through 2004
Figure 4: Roadside Inspections Conducted and Planned, 1996 through 2006
Figure 5: Number of Serious Violations Found and Rate of Enforcement,
1995 through 2004
Figure 6: Number of Carriers Prohibited from Operating in Interstate
Commerce by FMCSA, 1995 through 2004
Figure 7: Average Civil Penalty Assessed per Violation, by Type of
Violation, Fiscal Years 1995 through 2004 (In 2004 Dollars)
Figure 8: Final Assessment as Compared to Initial Assessment, Fiscal
Years 1995 through 2004
Figure 9: Logic Model of How FMCSA's Enforcement Approach Contributes
to Truck Safety:
Abbreviations:
FMCSA: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration:
MCSAP: Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program:
PRISM: Performance Registration and Information System Management:
Letter December 15, 2005:
The Honorable Christopher Bond:
Chairman:
The Honorable Patty Murray:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, Housing and
Urban Development, and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joe Knollenberg:
Chairman:
The Honorable John W. Olver:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban
Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
About 5,000 people die each year as a result of crashes involving large
trucks,[Footnote 1] and over 120,000 more are injured. Compared to a
crash involving only cars, a crash involving a car and a truck is more
likely to result in a fatality because of the difference in weight
between the two vehicles. In this respect, although large trucks are
involved in only 4 percent of all accidents, they are involved in 12
percent of all fatalities from vehicle crashes. These crashes may
result from errors by truck and passenger vehicle drivers, vehicle
condition, and other factors.
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) within the U.S.
Department of Transportation shoulders the primary federal
responsibility for reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities involving
large trucks.[Footnote 2] FMCSA's primary means of preventing these
crashes is to develop and enforce regulations to help ensure that
drivers and motor carriers are operating in a safe manner. FMCSA uses
several enforcement activities to improve truck safety, such as
conducting inspections of motor carriers' operations at their places of
business--and of drivers and vehicles at the roadside--to ensure
compliance with safety regulations. FMCSA also funds and oversees
similar enforcement activities at the state level through its Motor
Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP). MCSAP was appropriated $188
million, or about 38 percent, of FMCSA's $501 million appropriation for
fiscal year 2006.
FMCSA was created in 2000 in response to concerns raised by Congress,
the Department of Transportation's Inspector General, and us. One of
the Inspector General's concerns was over the lax enforcement of safety
regulations by FMCSA's predecessor, the Office of Motor Carriers,
within the Federal Highway Administration, in the late 1990s.[Footnote
3] FMCSA publicly committed to increasing both the amount of effort
devoted to enforcement against carriers and the severity of action when
safety problems are found. In addition, in 1999 we reported that FMCSA
did not have sufficient information about the factors that contribute
to truck crashes to help the agency set priorities for its activities.
In a similar vein, in 2000, we found that the agency's ability to set
priorities for its safety activities was limited, in part, by the
agency's lack of knowledge about the safety impact of its activities.
In fiscal year 2003, the Office of Management and Budget identified
challenges to program accountability within MCSAP.
The Senate report for the Department of Transportation's fiscal year
2005 appropriation directed us to examine the effectiveness of FMCSA's
truck safety enforcement activities. Accordingly, and as discussed with
Senate Appropriations Committee staff members, this report focuses on:
* how FMCSA's safety enforcement approach, programs, and actions have
changed since 2000;
* the extent to which FMCSA follows key effective management practices
in making decisions about its safety enforcement approach; and:
* the extent to which FMCSA ensures that its grants to states
contribute to the agency's mission of saving lives and reducing
injuries by preventing truck crashes.
To examine how FMCSA's enforcement approaches, programs, and actions
have changed since 2000, we reviewed legislation and FMCSA regulations,
program guidance, and plans. We also reviewed congressional reports
related to the creation of FMCSA, and assessments of the agency's
enforcement efforts by the Department of Transportation's Office of
Inspector General and by us. We analyzed data from FMCSA on its
enforcement activities, such as the number of reviews of carrier
compliance with safety regulations (referred to as "compliance
reviews"). We also analyzed FMCSA data on enforcement actions, such as
civil penalties assessed from fiscal year 1995 (before FMCSA committed
to be more aggressive) through 2004 (the latest full year for which
data are available). Finally, we discussed these issues with industry
and safety advocates.
To determine the extent to which FMCSA follows key effective management
practices in making decisions about its enforcement approach, we
determined the extent to which the agency incorporated several key
elements that are important for effective program management: (1) use
of program goals, including goals that describe the intended outcomes
of programs; (2) a well-defined approach for achieving goals; and (3)
performance measures that demonstrate contributions to program goals.
We identified elements of effective program management by reviewing our
reports on this topic, Office of Management and Budget guidance, and
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. We reviewed FMCSA
documents about the agency's activities and plans related to each of
these elements, and we also interviewed agency officials.
To assess the extent to which FMCSA ensures that its MCSAP grants
contribute to the agency's mission, we reviewed regulations and FMCSA
guidance relating to the design of the grant program. We also discussed
with FMCSA officials how accountability is built into the grant
program. We assessed FMCSA's planning and oversight of seven state
MCSAP grantees in fiscal year 2004 (the latest full year for which
information was available), including whether FMCSA obtained sufficient
information to be able to determine whether grantees substantially met
their objectives. We then discussed our assessment with FMCSA officials
responsible for grant activities in those states. The seven states
represent about 27 percent of MCSAP grant funding in fiscal year 2004.
Because we chose these states judgmentally (representing the largest
grantees), we cannot project our findings nationwide. Reviewing a
larger number of grantees would not have been practical due to resource
constraints.
As part of our review, we assessed internal controls and the
reliability of FMCSA's data on its program activities and enforcement
actions that were pertinent to this effort. We determined that the data
elements were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted our
work from October 2004 to December 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. (See app. I for additional
information on our scope and methodology.)
Results in Brief:
FMCSA has increased both its enforcement activities and actions in
response to criticism in 1999 that it was ineffective at improving
safety. The agency more than doubled the number of carrier reviews from
about 6,400 in 1998 to about 13,200 in 2000, and increased the average
civil penalty per violation by more than 80 percent from about $820 to
about $1,500 over the same time period (in constant 2004 dollars). In
the 5 years since FMCSA implemented these changes, some of FMCSA's
enforcement activities and actions have remained relatively steady,
while others have fallen slightly, in part because FMCSA's statutory
responsibilities have expanded to include conducting homeland security-
related reviews of hazardous materials carriers and educating new
carriers about their responsibilities under the safety regulations.
FMCSA has also begun to reduce civil penalties for first-time offenders
in cases where the carrier agrees to come into compliance and make
additional safety-related improvements. At the same time, FMCSA
officials told us that the agency is committed to applying strict
enforcement to egregious offenders.
To a large extent, FMCSA follows key effective management practices in
making decisions about its enforcement approach. For example:
* FMCSA has a well-defined enforcement approach that addresses major
risk areas that contribute to (or cause) crashes, such as motor carrier
operations and driver behavior, and targets resources at the motor
carriers that FMCSA assesses as having the greatest crash risk;
* FMCSA has a broad range of goals and performance measures that it
uses to provide direction to--and track the performance of--its
enforcement programs, including measures of the impact of its
enforcement programs on the level of carrier compliance with safety
regulations and on the frequency of crashes, injuries, and fatalities;
and:
* FMCSA has made several refinements to its enforcement programs, such
as placing more emphasis on drivers during roadside inspections based
on preliminary results from a study indicating that driver errors
contribute to crashes much more frequently than vehicle defects.
FMCSA is also working to obtain additional information on crash risk
factors, and on the costs and effectiveness of its enforcement programs
and alternative approaches. This information will help FMCSA further
refine and set priorities for its programs, thereby addressing
deficiencies that we identified in 1999 and 2000. Although FMCSA has a
broad range of goals and performance measures for its enforcement
programs, it does not measure the effect that one of its key
enforcement actions--civil penalties against motor carriers--has on
carriers' compliance with safety regulations. Civil penalties comprised
81 percent of FMCSA's enforcement actions against motor carriers
following compliance reviews--which FMCSA considers to be its key
enforcement program--during fiscal years 2002 through 2004. Without a
measure of the effectiveness of civil penalties, FMCSA does not know
whether or how much they are increasing carriers' compliance; therefore
it lacks the information needed to make sound decisions about any
changes to its use of civil penalties.
While MCSAP is designed to ensure that its grants to states contribute
to the agency's mission of saving lives and reducing injuries by
preventing truck crashes, FMCSA's oversight of state grantees is
lacking. MCSAP employs a performance-based approach that requires
states to analyze their commercial vehicle data; target their grant
activities to reduce crashes, deaths, and injuries; and use performance
information to demonstrate how safety improvement goals are being met.
However, in reviewing the safety goals of the seven states that
received the largest MCSAP grants, we could not determine whether
states substantially met 37 of their 61 goals (61 percent) to improve
truck safety. We could not make this determination because (1) FMCSA's
grant planning meetings--in which it communicates priorities and how to
develop plans with quantifiable goals--were conducted for about one-
fourth of the state grantees in fiscal year 2004, and even fewer state
grantees had their safety plans reviewed by service centers that year;
(2) many of the safety goals were missing key elements, such as
quantifiable performance measures and targets, and some safety plans
were missing evaluations of whether goals were substantially met; and
(3) FMCSA division offices that work with states did not sufficiently
monitor and ensure states' progress towards safety goals. In addition,
although FMCSA requires its field division offices, its four regional
service centers that support division offices, and headquarters to
periodically review grant program activities for adequacy of oversight
(among other issues), these reviews are only being partially completed.
In this regard, FMCSA division offices reviewed 19 of the 56 state
grantees (34 percent) in the past 3 years. For those division offices
that did not conduct reviews, reasons included restructuring occurring
within the lead agency in the state that is responsible for the
grant[Footnote 4] and uncertainty about whether conducting smaller
"process" reviews fulfilled the state review requirement. Furthermore,
service centers conducted 15 division office reviews (29 percent) and
headquarters did not review any service centers in the past 3 years.
FMCSA did not conduct these reviews for a variety of reasons, including
a weakened oversight role for service centers, and an almost two-thirds
reduction in headquarters staffing for MCSAP activities.
We are making several recommendations to improve FMCSA's ability to
determine and demonstrate the effectiveness of its enforcement
approach, and to make adjustments to this approach when needed. For
example, we are recommending that FMCSA measure the effectiveness of
its civil penalties against motor carriers. We are also making
recommendations to improve FMCSA's oversight of MCSAP grants to help
ensure they lead to safety improvements. For example, we are
recommending that FMCSA ensure that existing planning and oversight
mechanisms are carried out.
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation
for review and comment and received comments from FMCSA officials.
FMCSA generally agreed with the report's findings and agreed to
consider our recommendations. FMCSA offered several corrections, which
we incorporated in this report.
Background:
The trucking industry is an important component of the nation's
economy. Of all manufactured goods and raw materials shipped across the
country, close to three-fourths of their value and nearly two-thirds of
their tonnage are transported by trucks. In 2002, trucks transported
more than $6.2 trillion and 7.8 billion tons of goods and materials
(these are the latest data available). The increased demand for
transporting freight and the deregulated nature of the trucking
industry have resulted in a growing industry. In recent years, the
numbers of carriers, trucks, drivers, and vehicle miles traveled have
been increasing. (See fig. 1.) The motor carrier industry comprises
approximately 677,000 interstate carriers operating some 7.9 million
large trucks and employing several million drivers. Carriers frequently
enter and exit the industry; in 2004, the industry had a net gain of
approximately 31,000 interstate carriers.
Figure 1: Growth in the Number of Interstate Motor Carriers, 1995
through 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The numbers of carriers are estimates.
[End of figure]
There are more fatalities each year resulting from passenger vehicle
crashes than from truck crashes; however, the likelihood that a
fatality will occur is greater for crashes that involve large trucks.
In 2004, 5,190 fatalities resulted from large truck crashes while
38,531 fatalities resulted from passenger vehicle crashes (based on
preliminary data). Although large trucks are involved in 4 percent of
all accidents, they contribute to 12 percent of the fatalities. As a
result, fatality rates--the number of fatalities per 100 million
vehicle miles traveled--involving truck crashes are consistently higher
when compared to passenger-vehicle-only crashes. (See fig. 2.)
Figure 2: Fatality Rates Involving Large Truck and Passenger Vehicle
Crashes, 1995 through 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Fatality rates for 2004 are based on preliminary data.
[End of figure]
Large-truck fatality rates have generally been falling since the mid-
1990s--from 2.76 in 1995 to 2.29 in 2004 (based on preliminary data).
Although there has been a reduction in the fatality rate, the number of
fatalities has increased in each of the last two years, reaching 5,190
in 2004. According to FMCSA, truck crashes result in costs totaling
more than $20 billion annually.
In an attempt to reduce the number and severity of crashes involving
large trucks, FMCSA was created by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement
Act of 1999. FMCSA assumed almost all of the responsibilities and
personnel of the Federal Highway Administration's Office of Motor
Carriers. The agency's primary mission is to reduce crashes, injuries,
and fatalities involving large trucks by (1) issuing, administering,
and enforcing federal motor carrier safety regulations and hazardous
materials regulations; (2) providing education and outreach for motor
carriers and drivers regarding the federal motor carrier safety
regulations and hazardous materials regulations; (3) gathering and
analyzing data on motor carriers, drivers, and vehicles; (4) developing
information systems to improve the transfer of data; and (5)
researching new methods and technologies to enhance motor carrier
safety.
FMCSA's goal is to reduce the fatality rate for crashes involving
trucks by 41 percent between 1996 and 2008, from 2.81 to 1.65
fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled. FMCSA was on track
to meet this goal through 2002, when the fatality rate of 2.30 was
slightly below the agency's interim target of 2.32. However, the 2003
fatality rate of 2.31 was higher than the agency's interim target of
2.19, and in 2004 the gap between the fatality rate (based on
preliminary data)--2.29--and the agency's interim target--2.07--grew.
FMCSA has an additional goal to reduce the number of serious,
reportable hazardous materials incidents involving trucks by 20 percent
(from 463 to 370) between 2000 and 2010.[Footnote 5]
FMCSA programs are intended to contribute to these goals by addressing
safety in motor carrier operations through identifying and enforcing
safety regulations that target high-risk carriers and large-commercial-
truck drivers, improving safety information systems and commercial
motor vehicle technologies, strengthening commercial motor vehicle
equipment and operating standards, and increasing safety awareness.
Although each of these activities plays a role in FMCSA's overall
safety approach, FMCSA considers enforcement to be its primary approach
for reducing the number of crashes, fatalities, and injuries involving
trucks. Most of FMCSA's enforcement programs focus on two parties that
greatly influence the safety of truck operations--motor carriers and
truck drivers. (See table 1.) In each fiscal year from 1996 through
2004, FMCSA, on average, initiated 3,800 enforcement cases against
motor carriers following compliance reviews, and FMCSA and its MCSAP
partners placed, on average, about 180,000 drivers and about 450,000
vehicles out of service following roadside inspections. In addition to
its traditional enforcement approach, FMCSA, in conjunction with the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, recently funded a pilot
program in Washington state that combined education and enforcement
with the purpose of improving the driving behavior of passenger-vehicle
drivers when in the vicinity of trucks.
Table 1: FMCSA's Enforcement Programs:
Commercial carriers:
Program: Compliance reviews;
Description: On-site reviews of carriers' records and operations to
determine compliance with safety regulations that address areas such as
alcohol and drug testing of drivers, insurance, crashes, driver
qualifications, drivers' hours of service, vehicle maintenance and
inspections, and transportation of hazardous materials.
Program: New entrant safety audits;
Description: Audits conducted on new interstate carriers within their
first 18 months of registration to ensure that they are knowledgeable
about the safety regulations prior to receiving permanent registration.
Although the emphasis of new entrant safety audits is on education,
FMCSA can apply enforcement actions when new entrants are found to not
be in compliance with safety regulations.
Program: Border safety audits;
Description: Audits conducted on all Mexican-domiciled carriers within
their first 18 months of registration to certify that they are
following safety practice and performance guidelines prior to receiving
permanent certificates of registration.
Commercial vehicles and drivers:
Program: Roadside inspections;
Description: Inspections of drivers or vehicles conducted at the
roadside to determine compliance with safety regulations that address
such areas as driver's license, alcohol and drug use, hours of service,
brakes, turn signals, head lights, and tires.
Program: Traffic enforcement;
Description: Enforcement against truck drivers who violate traffic
safety laws.
Program: Passenger vehicle drivers.
Program: Share the Road Safely[A];
Description: A pilot program in Washington state that combines
education and enforcement activities to increase the safety of
passenger vehicle drivers when driving in proximity to commercial
vehicles.
Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA data.
[A] Prior to the pilot program, Share the Road Safely relied solely on
education to increase the safety of passenger vehicle drivers.
[End of table]
In addition, FMCSA has several information systems and a program to
help it identify high-risk carriers and drivers and to assist it in
enforcing safety regulations.[Footnote 6]
* The Safety Status Measurement System evaluates the safety of carriers
by analyzing four broad categories--accidents, drivers, vehicles, and
safety management--and assigns an overall score to the carrier. FMCSA
then targets its compliance reviews at carriers that pose the greatest
risk.
* The Performance and Registration Information Systems Management
program (PRISM), a grant-funded program, is a federal and state
cooperative effort that, by revoking or denying registration of
carriers' vehicles, aims to ensure that carriers placed out of service
by FMCSA do not operate.
* The Enforcement Management Information System is a database used by
FMCSA to monitor, track, and store information related to enforcement
actions.
* The Motor Carrier Management Information System is an information
system used by FMCSA as a central repository to compile inspection,
crash, compliance review, safety audit, and registration data.
* Gotham is a web-based system that compiles information from the Motor
Carrier Management Information System, the Enforcement Management
Information System, and field offices to supply information and
performance measures to field managers.
When FMCSA discovers a violation of the safety regulations, it may use
one of several enforcement actions depending on the nature of the
violation. (See table 2.) An enforcement action may require the
violating party to correct the unsafe practice or operation, pay a
civil penalty, or suspend operations.
Table 2: FMCSA's Enforcement Actions:
Enforcement action: Compliance order;
Description: Directs a carrier to comply with the safety regulations.
Enforcement action: Civil penalty;
Description: Imposes a monetary penalty on a carrier that violates a
safety regulation.
Enforcement action: Out-of-service order;
Description: Orders a driver or vehicle out of service for posing an
imminent hazard to safety, or orders a carrier to cease all or part of
its operation for having imminently hazardous conditions or operations,
or for being unfit.
Enforcement action: Order-to-cease operations;
Description: Prohibits a carrier from operating in interstate commerce
for failing to pay a civil penalty assessed by FMCSA.
Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA data.
[End of table]
FMCSA has approximately 1,050 full-time equivalent employees, of which
nearly 850 work at 52 division offices throughout the U.S. and its
territories. The division offices oversee 56 MCSAP grantees--one
grantee in each of the fifty states, one in the District of Columbia,
and one each in the U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam, the
Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.[Footnote 7]
Much of the work carried out in the field involves conducting reviews
either at the roadside or at a carrier's place of business. For fiscal
year 2006, FMCSA was appropriated $501 million. Over half of these
funds are slated for distribution to states in the form of grants, the
largest under MCSAP.
MCSAP provides financial assistance to states to reduce commercial
motor vehicle-involved accidents, fatalities, and injuries through
consistent, uniform, and effective commercial motor vehicle safety
activities. Initially, MCSAP primarily funded state roadside
inspections as a method of improving commercial motor vehicle safety.
However, the program has evolved over the past two decades to fund
several other safety initiatives in support of its goal, including
compliance reviews, traffic enforcement, new entrant safety audits,
border grants, and other safety initiatives.[Footnote 8] The recently-
enacted Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users authorized an average annual funding level of
$200 million for MCSAP--more than twice the amount available in the
previous authorization.
The responsibility for the administration and the oversight of MCSAP is
shared among the various levels of FMCSA. Division offices in each
state have the primary responsibility for overseeing state programs.
They work closely with the states to develop commercial vehicle safety
plans and monitor the states' activities to ensure program goals are
being met, and are also responsible for ensuring that grant funds are
spent for reimbursable expenses. MCSAP responsibilities of the regional
service centers and headquarters differ from those of the division
offices. The service centers act as an intermediary between the
division office and headquarters. They assist in clarifying policy for
the division offices and they organize training and goal-setting
meetings related to the grant program. Headquarters responsibilities
center on establishing and communicating agency priorities for MCSAP,
issuing and updating MCSAP policy guidance, and carrying out financial
management activities.
FMCSA's Enforcement Programs and Actions Have Been Stronger Since 2000:
In response to criticisms in 1999 that its enforcement programs were
ineffective at improving safety, FMCSA has strengthened its enforcement
approach. Its enforcement approach has evolved to supplement strong
enforcement with additional measures to encourage carriers to comply
with safety regulations.
FMCSA Committed to a Stronger Enforcement Approach:
During the 1990s, FMCSA believed that adopting a partnering approach
with the trucking industry--marked by an increased emphasis on
education and less emphasis on traditional enforcement programs--would
lead to improved large truck safety. However, while implementing this
approach, the fatality rate from crashes involving large trucks
continued to increase. The Department of Transportation's Inspector
General criticized FMCSA in a report stating that the approach was
ineffective and that the agency needed to emphasize traditional
enforcement programs.[Footnote 9] Moreover, we reported then that FMCSA
lacked an understanding of the effectiveness of its enforcement
programs.[Footnote 10]
In response to the criticism, FMCSA publicly committed to strengthen
its enforcement approach by committing to increase its emphasis on
enforcement programs and actions. Through the Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century in 1998 and the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement
Act of 1999, Congress broadened the government's enforcement authority,
allowing it to implement this new emphasis. This legislation made it
easier for FMCSA to revoke carriers' operating authority. Furthermore,
the legislation increased the allowable civil penalty from $1,000 to
$10,000 for certain violations.
Subsequently, the agency has come to believe that combining strict
enforcement with education and outreach will lead to greater
improvements in safety. This approach seeks to identify higher risk
operators and apply education and enforcement where needed. For
example, the agency has a program--geared toward new entrants to the
industry--to encourage awareness of the federal motor carrier safety
regulations. However, FMCSA officials told us that the agency is
committed to applying strict enforcement to egregious offenders who
demonstrate non-compliance with the regulations or unsafe driving
practices. FMCSA has also made progress in assessing the effects of its
enforcement programs on safety in terms of reducing crashes, injuries,
and fatalities. We discuss these efforts in more detail below.
Finally, FMCSA has restructured its organization to allow enforcement
and education programs to work more closely together. For example,
FMCSA moved the program manager for education and outreach from the
Office of Communications to the Office of Enforcement and Program
Delivery in order to increase collaboration between FMCSA's education
and enforcement staff. FMCSA officials have emphasized that although
they are taking steps to increase the role of education, they do not
plan to return to the partnering approach--i.e., in which education is
the primary focus--that characterized the mid-1990s.
FMCSA's Programs Have Mirrored Its Stronger Enforcement Approach:
The number of compliance reviews was higher in 2004 than in 1998.
Before the creation of FMCSA, the number of compliance reviews
conducted dropped 31 percent between fiscal years 1995 and 1998--from
approximately 9,200 to 6,400. (See fig. 3.) Demonstrating its
commitment in 1999 to follow a stronger enforcement approach, FMCSA set
and met its goal of doubling the number of compliance reviews. In this
respect, the number of compliance reviews more than doubled from
approximately 6,400 in 1998 to more than 13,400 in 2001.[Footnote 11]
The number of compliance reviews began to decrease in fiscal year 2002,
largely as the result of additional homeland security responsibilities
to review hazardous materials carriers in the wake of the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The agency completed
almost 31,000 homeland security-related visits in fiscal year 2002. The
number of these visits decreased to less than 2,000 in fiscal year
2003, when FMCSA began targeting the reviews at the most vulnerable
carriers as identified by the agency's risk assessment.
Figure 3: Number of Compliance Reviews Conducted and Percentage of the
Motor Carrier Industry Receiving Compliance Reviews, 1995 through 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Another factor affecting FMCSA's ability to conduct compliance reviews
was its responsibility for implementing the new entrant audit program
in 2003. From fiscal year 2003 through August 2005, FMCSA conducted
almost 54,500 new entrant audits. Despite these additional
responsibilities of conducting visits of hazardous materials carriers
and new entrants, the agency has still conducted more compliance
reviews than were carried out in the late 1990s. In 2004, the agency
conducted approximately 11,300 compliance reviews, 77 percent more than
in fiscal year 1998.
Despite an increase in the number of compliance reviews, the agency has
still been unable to review a larger proportion of the industry's
carriers. This is because the industry has grown faster than has
FMCSA's ability to conduct compliance reviews. (See figs. 1 and 3.)
* In 1995, FMCSA performed about 9,200 compliance reviews, reaching
about 2.7 percent of the nation's estimated 350,000 carriers.[Footnote
12]
* In 1998, when FMCSA conducted its lowest number of compliance
reviews--about 6,400--the industry had grown almost 40 percent to an
estimated 480,000 carriers. As a result, FMCSA's compliance reviews
covered only about 1.3 percent of the industry.
* Then, in 2000, as FMCSA doubled the number of compliance reviews, the
number of carriers increased by almost 80,000 from the 1998 level,
resulting in 2.4 percent of carriers receiving compliance reviews in
2000.
* In fiscal year 2004, FMCSA reviewed about 1.7 percent of the
carriers--a smaller proportion than the proportion reviewed in the mid-
1990s--despite increasing the number of compliance reviews by 77
percent from the late 1990s. This is because the trucking industry had
continued to grow steadily to about 677,000 carriers in 2004.
In fiscal year 2005, FMCSA expressed its intent to once again increase
the number of compliance reviews. As discussed in more detail later in
this report, FMCSA is also exploring potential changes to its
compliance review program, in part because it is concerned that the
program reaches only about 2 percent of carriers each year.
Roadside inspections have also increased. In the late 1990s, FMCSA and
the states continued to increase the number of roadside inspections,
even as compliance reviews were decreasing. During that time period,
FMCSA and states nearly doubled the number of roadside inspections
conducted from 1.3 million to 2.3 million.[Footnote 13] (See fig. 4.)
The number of roadside inspections increased steadily through 2000,
when FMCSA and state inspectors conducted about 2.5 million
inspections. In its fiscal year 2005 and 2006 budgets, FMCSA set its
goal for roadside inspections at 2 million--about 1 million less than
were conducted in 2004--bringing the number of expected roadside
inspections back to pre-2000 levels. According to an FMCSA official,
FMCSA set these lower goals in 2005 and 2006 with the anticipation that
the number of roadside inspections would decrease as states shifted
resources from roadside inspections to conduct increasing numbers of
audits of new entrant carriers. However, the anticipated decrease in
roadside inspections did not occur because some states hired additional
staff to conduct the audits of new entrants and therefore did not have
to use their roadside inspection staff to conduct these audits. An
FMCSA official also told us that the agency is no longer seeking to
increase the annual number of roadside inspections based on its
analysis indicating that the inspection program is no longer leading to
annual increases in the industry-wide level of compliance with safety
regulations.
Figure 4: Roadside Inspections Conducted and Planned, 1996 through
2006:
[See PDF for image]
Note: 1995 data are not included because FMCSA determined that they are
not reliable. FMCSA does not control the total number of inspections
conducted; states may choose to do more inspections.
[End of figure]
FMCSA intends to make new entrant audits more enforcement-oriented. The
Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act established the new entrant audit
program to educate carriers that are new to the industry about safety
regulations and encourage their compliance. This act was in response to
a 1988 FMCSA-commissioned study that pointed to a higher rate of
violations of safety regulations and higher crash rates among carriers
that had recently entered the motor carrier industry. In fiscal year
2003, the agency began implementing the new entrant audit program and
conducted 7,000 audits. As FMCSA fully implemented the program in 2004,
this number increased to more than 25,000.
FMCSA believes that in the audit's current form, the "pass rate" does
not accurately reflect new entrant carriers' level of safety.
Currently, carriers can fail one-third of the audit sections and still
pass the audit, resulting in a pass rate of more than 99
percent.[Footnote 14] FMCSA plans to improve the program by employing
stricter criteria for carriers and increasing the threshold for
carriers to pass, demonstrating the agency's approach of using strict
enforcement where needed. The agency plans to publish a proposed
regulation for public comment in March 2006.
FMCSA's Enforcement Actions Have Increased:
FMCSA has initiated more enforcement cases and identified higher
numbers of serious violations. FMCSA calculates a "rate of
enforcement," which is the percent of compliance reviews that result in
an enforcement case. Since 2000, the rate of enforcement has increased
from 30 percent to 46 percent of compliance reviews. (See fig. 5.)
Further, the number of serious violations (FMCSA calls these "acute
violations") that FMCSA has identified is consistently higher than in
the 1990s. In 1998, the agency identified approximately 710 serious
violations of the regulations. This number increased by 64 percent to
approximately 1,160 violations in 2000. The number of serious
violations peaked in 2003 when FMCSA identified more than 1,800
violations.
According to an FMCSA official, the increase in the number of serious
violations identified resulted from FMCSA's improved targeting of
compliance reviews of high-risk carriers. In 2004, the number dropped
to about 1,500--out of about 14,800 total violations--but was still
more than double the 1998 number.
Figure 5: Number of Serious Violations Found and Rate of Enforcement,
1995 through 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
FMCSA has applied its authority to place carriers out of service.
Between 2001 and 2004, the number of carriers prohibited from operating
increased from about 170 to about 1,700. (See fig. 6.) Before 2001,
FMCSA prohibited motor carriers from operating if the agency found that
the carrier posed an imminent hazard. FMCSA has explained that because
the definition of "imminent hazard status" was vague and limited in
scope, the agency ordered very few motor carriers to cease operating.
In 2001, based on authorities given it by the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act, FMCSA began prohibiting carriers from operating if
they failed to correct operational problems or pay a civil penalty.
Figure 6: Number of Carriers Prohibited from Operating in Interstate
Commerce by FMCSA, 1995 through 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: This includes carriers that are closed as a result of both
violations to the regulations and failure to pay assessed civil
penalties.
[End of figure]
The size of proposed civil penalties was higher in 2004 than in
1998.[Footnote 15] From 1995 through 1998, the average civil penalty
proposed for each violation decreased by 10 percent from $910 in 1995
to $820 in 1998.[Footnote 16] (See fig. 7. All amounts are in 2004
dollars.) A key criticism by the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General during that time was that carriers had begun to see
these civil penalties as little more than a cost of doing business. In
response, FMCSA pledged to levy larger civil penalties and, in 1999,
implemented the authorities that Congress gave the agency. From 1998 to
2000, the average civil penalty levied per violation increased by more
than 80 percent to almost $1,500. In recent years, FMCSA has modified
its view of civil penalties, citing that they are only one tool to
reach compliance. Accordingly, the average civil penalty for each
violation has dropped slightly to approximately $1,400 in 2004, but
this represents a drop of about 3 percent and does not bring the amount
of civil penalties back to the levels of the late 1990s. While the
civil penalties have been higher since 2000, the agency still has
considerable latitude under law to assess larger civil
penalties.[Footnote 17] As discussed later in this report, FMCSA does
not know whether or how much its civil penalties are increasing
carriers' compliance, and therefore the agency has a limited ability to
determine whether the dollar amounts of the penalties are at the most
effective levels.
Figure 7: Average Civil Penalty Assessed per Violation, by Type of
Violation, Fiscal Years 1995 through 2004 (In 2004 Dollars):
[See PDF for image]
Note: Numbers may differ from those reported by FMCSA because they have
been adjusted for inflation. The category of non-recordkeeping
violations did not exist before 1998.
[End of figure]
FMCSA has assessed higher civil penalties for more serious offenses.
The agency has four categories of violations: acute, critical, non-
record keeping, and record keeping.[Footnote 18]
* Acute violations are so severe that FMCSA will require immediate
corrective actions by a motor carrier regardless of the overall safety
status of the motor carrier. An example of an acute violation is a
carrier failing to implement an alcohol or drug testing program for
drivers.
* Critical violations are serious, but less severe than acute
violations and most often point to gaps in carrier management or
operational controls, such as not maintaining records of driver medical
certificates.
* Non-record keeping violations are related directly to driver or
carrier actions. An example is a driver operating a motor carrier under
the influence of drugs or alcohol.
* Record keeping violations involve a driver or carrier failing to
maintain required documentation. An example of a record keeping
violation is failure of the carrier to maintain a record of all
accidents for one year.
In line with FMCSA's commitment to stricter enforcement for more
serious violations, since 2000, acute violations, which FMCSA
identifies as the most serious violation, and non-record keeping
violations have been assessed penalties that are about five times
higher than record keeping violations, as shown in figure 7. Further,
the average civil penalty per violation of critical violations has
consistently been more than twice the average civil penalty per record
keeping violation.
We also assessed the degree to which FMCSA reduced its initial civil
penalty assessment.[Footnote 19] We found that the average final
assessment has been 80 percent or more of the initial assessment during
this past decade.[Footnote 20] (See fig. 8.) Further, since 2000, the
first fiscal year after FMCSA promised to be stronger on enforcement,
acute violations were reduced slightly less than overall violations.
Figure 8: Final Assessment as Compared to Initial Assessment, Fiscal
Years 1995 through 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In recent years, FMCSA has applied a new approach to civil penalties.
With first-time offenders and other carriers with less serious
violations, FMCSA has reduced civil penalties in cases where the
carrier agrees to come into compliance and make additional safety-
related improvements. The agency has specified that any carrier
receiving a reduction in its civil penalty must remain in compliance
for several years. If the carrier violates safety rules again, it is
then responsible for paying the entire originally assessed civil
penalty or FMCSA will place the carrier out of service. FMCSA does not
currently maintain information on the subpopulation of first time
offenders, and therefore it has not assessed the results of this new
policy. In November 2005, FMCSA began issuing and tracking notices to
first-time offenders and other carriers with less serious violations
that describe the violations and the corrective actions required,
without assessing a civil penalty. This tracking should give FMCSA the
ability to assess the results of the policy.
FMCSA Has a Well-Defined Enforcement Approach and Has Efforts Underway
to Help It Refine and Set Priorities for Its Enforcement Programs:
To a large extent, FMCSA follows key effective management practices in
making decisions about its enforcement approach. FMCSA's enforcement
approach addresses major risk factors that contribute to or cause
crashes, and FMCSA targets its enforcement resources at the motor
carriers that it assesses as having the greatest crash risk. FMCSA has
a broad range of goals and performance measures that it uses to provide
direction to--and track the performance of--its enforcement programs,
but it does not have a measure of the effectiveness of one of its
primary enforcement actions: civil penalties against motor carriers.
FMCSA has made several refinements to its enforcement programs based on
agency studies of factors that affect crash risk and on evaluations of
the effectiveness of the programs themselves. FMCSA is also working to
obtain additional information on crash risk factors, and on the costs
and effectiveness of its enforcement programs, needed to help it
further refine and set priorities for the programs.
FMCSA's Enforcement Approach Addresses Many of the Major Factors that
Cause or Contribute to Truck Crashes and Targets High-Risk Carriers:
FMCSA's enforcement approach includes goals and programs that address
many of the major factors that cause or contribute to truck crashes.
(See table 3.) For example, motor carrier operations--including hiring
unsafe drivers and inadequate vehicle maintenance practices--have been
identified as one of a number of interacting factors that can
contribute to crashes. To address this, FMCSA conducts compliance
reviews of motor carriers' operations and takes enforcement actions
against carriers found to have violations of the safety regulations.
FMCSA also addresses vehicle condition and driver factors (such as
fatigue) by conducting roadside inspections of drivers and their
trucks. Another factor that has been identified is unsafe driving by
passenger-vehicle drivers in the vicinity of trucks. To address this
factor, FMCSA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
are jointly funding a pilot program in Washington state in 2005 to
educate passenger-vehicle drivers about how to drive safely in the
vicinity of trucks and to take enforcement action against drivers who
drive unsafely.[Footnote 21]
Table 3: How FMCSA's Enforcement Approach Addresses Many of the Major
Factors that Cause or Contribute to Truck Crashes:
Major factor that causes or contributes to truck crashes: Motor carrier
operations;
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Goal: Improve the safety performance of
high-risk carriers;
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Program: Compliance reviews; PRISM.
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Goal: Improve the safety performance of
new entrant carriers;
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Program: Safety audits of new entrant
carriers[A].
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Goal: Truck driver performance: Ensure
that Mexican carriers operating in the U.S. comply with safety
regulations;
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Program: Truck driver performance: Safety
audits of Mexican carriers.
Major factor that causes or contributes to truck crashes: Truck driver
performance;
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Goal: Ensure that all commercial motor
vehicle drivers are fully qualified, safe, alert, and healthy;
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Program: Roadside inspections; traffic
enforcement.
Major factor that causes or contributes to truck crashes: Vehicle
performance;
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Goal: Ensure that commercial motor
vehicles have optimum safety performance;
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Program: Roadside inspections.
Major factor that causes or contributes to truck crashes: Passenger-
vehicle driver performance;
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Goal: Improve the safety and performance
of non-commercial drivers with respect to trucks;
FMCSA's enforcement approach: Program: Share the Road Safely.
Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA information.
[A] This program currently emphasizes education of motor carriers over
enforcement, but FMCSA intends to increase the enforcement emphasis of
the program.
[End of table]
Because FMCSA's resources do not allow it to conduct compliance reviews
of each of the estimated 677,000 motor carriers and roadside
inspections of each of the industry's millions of vehicles and drivers,
FMCSA's enforcement approach targets high-risk carriers and their
vehicles and drivers. As discussed above, FMCSA uses information about
carriers' safety performance (including crash history and results of
roadside inspections and compliance reviews) to identify unsafe
carriers that it then targets for additional compliance reviews; many
states also use the information to target their roadside inspections of
drivers and their trucks.[Footnote 22] Because carriers that have
drivers with more convictions tend to have higher crash rates, FMCSA is
working to incorporate these driver conviction histories into its
targeting system.
FMCSA Has a Broad Range of Enforcement Goals and Performance Measures
but It Does Not Measure the Effectiveness of Its Civil Penalties:
FMCSA has a broad range of goals and related performance measures that
it uses to provide direction to--and track the progress of--its
enforcement programs, but it does not measure the effect that one of
its key enforcement actions--civil penalties against motor carriers--
has on carriers' compliance with safety regulations. Without such a
performance measure, FMCSA does not know whether or how much its civil
penalties are increasing carriers' compliance, and it lacks the
information needed to make sound decisions about any changes to its use
of civil penalties.
FMCSA's budget request for fiscal year 2006 includes a "logic model"
that describes how its enforcement programs are expected to result in
the desired end outcome of reductions in truck crashes, injuries, and
fatalities.[Footnote 23] (See fig. 9.) The model follows one type of
structure for such models, in which outputs (in this case, enforcement
activities and actions) result in intermediate outcomes (increased
compliance with safety regulations), which in turn result in end
outcomes (increased safety).
Figure 9: Logic Model of How FMCSA's Enforcement Approach Contributes
to Truck Safety:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
For each component of its enforcement program logic model--outputs,
intermediate outcomes, and end outcomes--FMCSA has various goals and
performance measures. (See table 4.) The Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 calls for agencies to establish goals, including
outcome goals, and performance measures for both outputs and outcomes,
and we have reported that it is a useful practice for federal programs
to set intermediate outcome goals in order to help show a program's
contribution to desired end outcomes.[Footnote 24] FMCSA describes some
of its enforcement goals and performance measures in its annual budget
requests that it submits to Congress, and it describes some of its
other enforcement goals and performance measures in its 2003 report
entitled Measuring the FMCSA's Safety Objectives from Year 2000 to
2002. FMCSA intends to update this report annually beginning in
February 2006. In addition, FMCSA reports its progress on several of
its enforcement performance measures in a quarterly progress report
that it posts on its Web site. Finally, FMCSA uses an information
system to internally track several performance measures related to its
management of enforcement cases.
Table 4: Examples of FMCSA's Enforcement Program Goals and Performance
Measures:
Output:
Goal: Complete 10,000 federally conducted compliance reviews of motor
carriers in fiscal year 2006;
Goal is numerically specified: Yes;
Performance measure(s): Number of federally conducted compliance
reviews of motor carriers completed.
Goal: Reduce the agency's backlog of enforcement cases;
Goal is numerically specified: No;
Performance measure(s): Number of enforcement cases that have remained
open for 6 months or more.
Intermediate outcome:
Goal: Increase the safety performance of the worst offending motor
carriers to meet the norm;
Goal is numerically specified: No[A];
Performance measure(s): FMCSA's performance measures for this goal
include:
* For poor-performing motor carriers collectively, a numerical rating
based on the frequency and severity of violations of driver-related
acute or critical regulations cited at compliance reviews;
* Percentage of carriers previously rated "conditional" that improve
their rating to "satisfactory" on a follow-up compliance review.
Goal: Ensure that all commercial motor vehicle drivers are fully
qualified, safe, alert, and healthy;
Goal is numerically specified: No;
Performance measure(s): FMCSA's performance measures for this goal
include:
* Percentage of inspections that resulted in a driver being placed out
of service;
* Number of driver out-of-service violations per inspection, with more
recent violations receiving more weight and a penalty applied for
instances in which drivers were found to be violating out-of-service
orders.
End outcome:
Goal: Reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities by conducting compliance
reviews;
Goal is numerically specified: No;
Performance measure(s): Number of crashes, injuries, and fatalities
avoided by conducting compliance reviews.
Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA information.
[A] Although the goal suggests that FMCSA could use a numerical measure
of the safety performance of well-performing motor carriers as a target
level of performance for the worst offending motor carriers, the agency
does not do so.
[End of table]
FMCSA has output goals for its enforcement programs that specify how
many of certain types of activities, such as compliance reviews and
roadside inspections, it intends to complete. FMCSA also tracks many
performance measures related to its use of enforcement actions, such as
the number of vehicles, drivers, and motor carriers it places out of
service; the number and average dollar amount of civil penalties that
it assesses against motor carriers; and the average dollar amount of
civil penalties that have been reduced during FMCSA's negotiations with
carriers. FMCSA does not set goals linked to these performance measures
because it believes that such goals could bias the decisions of
enforcement personnel. We agree that such goals could result in
undesirable behavior.
FMCSA has set an output goal related to another aspect of its
enforcement actions--how long it takes the agency to close its
enforcement cases.[Footnote 25] In May 1999, FMCSA set a goal of
eliminating by January 1, 2000, the backlog of 1,200 enforcement cases
that had been forwarded by one of FMCSA's regional offices to FMCSA's
headquarters office.[Footnote 26] As the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General has noted, a large backlog undermines the integrity
of the enforcement process, since (1) FMCSA considers only closed
enforcement cases when targeting motor carriers for a compliance
review, and therefore high-risk motor carriers are less likely to be
selected if they have an open enforcement case, and (2) FMCSA assesses
smaller civil penalties against carriers with open cases than those
with closed cases, and therefore it may not assess appropriate civil
penalty amounts against carriers with multiple enforcement cases. FMCSA
did not meet its goal of eliminating the backlog of cases in
headquarters, but it did reduce the backlog by a commendable 70
percent--to 363 cases in September 1999. As of October 2005, the
backlog in headquarters stood at 140 cases, and the service centers
that replaced FMCSA's regional offices had an additional combined
backlog of 667 cases. Reducing these backlogs is one of FMCSA's four
highest priorities for improving commercial motor vehicle safety in
fiscal years 2005 and 2006. However, FMCSA does not have a goal that
specifies how much it would like to reduce the backlogs or by what
date, as required by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act.
FMCSA has several intermediate outcome goals and performance measures
related to the effects that its enforcement programs have on increasing
carriers' and drivers' compliance with safety regulations. However,
FMCSA does not measure the effect that one of its key enforcement
actions--civil penalties against motor carriers--has on carriers'
compliance or safety.[Footnote 27] In addition, FMCSA's intermediate
goals do not include numerical targets that would help the agency plan
its programs and make adjustments should it not meet the targets.
FMCSA's intermediate outcome goals include: (1) ensuring that
commercial motor vehicles have optimum safety performance; (2) ensuring
that all commercial motor vehicle drivers are fully qualified, safe,
alert, and healthy; and (3) increasing the safety performance of the
worst offending motor carriers to meet the norm. FMCSA has many
performance measures related to these goals, including ones that
reflect the average numbers of vehicle-out-of-service violations and
driver-out-of-service violations per roadside inspection and the
percentage of compliance reviews with no violations of acute or
critical regulations.
The performance measures that address motor carrier performance capture
the effects of FMCSA's compliance reviews, but they do not indicate the
effect on compliance of civil penalties against carriers that result
from compliance reviews. This is because the performance measures do
not distinguish between those compliance reviews that result in a civil
penalty and those that do not, and either type of compliance review can
increase carriers' compliance.[Footnote 28] Without a measure of the
effectiveness of its civil penalties, FMCSA does not know whether or
how much the civil penalties are increasing carriers' compliance, and
it lacks the information needed to make sound decisions about any
changes to its use of civil penalties. Several years ago, FMCSA did
attempt to develop measures of the effectiveness of its enforcement
actions, including civil penalties, but it was not satisfied with the
results of the effort.
FMCSA's performance measures of the end outcomes of its enforcement
programs are crashes, injuries, and fatalities avoided due to
compliance reviews, roadside inspections, and traffic enforcement--the
difference between the actual numbers of crashes, injuries, and
fatalities, and how many would have occurred in the absence of these
enforcement programs. Because the numbers that would have occurred in
their absence cannot be observed, FMCSA uses analytical models to
estimate the programs' impacts.[Footnote 29] Using its compliance
review impact model, FMCSA estimates that about 9,200 compliance
reviews conducted in 2002 prevented about 1,400 crashes, about 1,100
injuries, and about 60 fatalities in the 12 months following the
compliance reviews.[Footnote 30] Using its combined roadside inspection
and traffic enforcement impact model, FMCSA estimates that about 3
million roadside inspections (about 800,000 of which included
enforcement of traffic laws) conducted in 2004 prevented about 19,000
crashes, about 14,000 injuries, and about 700 fatalities. According to
an FMCSA official, FMCSA also plans to develop a model to estimate the
impact of new entrant safety audits.
FMCSA's Enforcement Goals Do Not Describe Expected Contributions to
FMCSA's Fatality Rate Goal:
In addition to goals for its enforcement programs, FMCSA has a primary
safety goal that is agencywide--that is, FMCSA seeks to achieve the
goal through its various efforts, including enforcement, education and
outreach, and research and technology. FMCSA's primary safety goal is
to reduce the rate of fatalities involving large trucks per 100 million
miles of truck travel by 41 percent from 2.81 in 1996 to 1.65 in 2008.
FMCSA expects its enforcement programs, as the agency's primary means
of reducing truck crashes, to help meet the fatality rate goal.
Furthermore, for three of its enforcement programs (compliance reviews,
roadside inspections, and traffic enforcement), FMCSA has goals for
avoiding fatalities, and, as mentioned above, it also has measures of
how many fatalities these programs avoid. However, the goals do not
describe the program's expected contributions to the fatality rate
goal. We have reported that program goals should demonstrate programs'
contributions to meeting agencywide goals.[Footnote 31] Currently, the
goals state that the programs are expected to avoid fatalities, but
they do not include targets that specify how many fatalities are
expected to be avoided each year. However, in order to demonstrate
expected contributions to reducing the fatality rate, the goals would
need to have numerical targets that increase from year to year; these
targets should also be commensurate with the resources the agency
expects to receive.
Similarly, in order to demonstrate the enforcement programs' estimated
contributions to any reductions in the fatality rate, FMCSA would need
to compare its estimates of fatalities avoided from year to year. For
example, based on FMCSA's estimates of fatalities avoided, its
enforcement programs avoided 19 more fatalities in 2002 compared to
2001 (848 fatalities avoided in 2002 compared to 829 fatalities avoided
in 2001). This estimated increase in fatalities avoided represents the
estimated contribution that FMCSA's enforcement programs made to the
overall reduction of 172 truck-crash-related fatalities that occurred
from 2001 to 2002 (from 5,111 fatalities in 2001 to 4,939 fatalities in
2002). Turning to fatalities per 100 million truck miles traveled, the
rate declined from 2.45 in 2001 to 2.30 in 2002. Based on the estimated
increase in fatalities avoided by FMCSA's enforcement programs in 2002
compared to 2001, these programs contributed 0.02 to the total decrease
of 0.14 in the fatality rate.[Footnote 32] Because we did not assess
the quality of these models, we are not suggesting that FMCSA's
enforcement programs had these illustrated results. Rather, this is an
example of the kind of analysis FMCSA could employ in order to
demonstrate its enforcement programs' estimated contributions to any
reductions in the fatality rate.
FMCSA Has Made Several Refinements to Its Enforcement Programs and It
May Make Additional Refinements Depending on the Outcomes of Studies:
FMCSA has made several refinements to its enforcement programs based on
agency studies of factors that affect crash risk, and on evaluations of
the effectiveness of the programs themselves,[Footnote 33] and it is
exploring additional, potentially substantial, refinements to its
enforcement approach. FMCSA plans to conduct additional analyses of
crash risk factors and on the costs and effectiveness of its
enforcement programs to help it further refine and set priorities for
its programs.
FMCSA has made several refinements to its enforcement programs based on
agency studies of factors that affect crash risk. To date, only one
such refinement has been based on the results of FMCSA's most
substantial effort to understand the causes of, and contributing
factors to, large truck crashes--its Large Truck Crash Causation Study,
which FMCSA began in 2001. This study was required by the Motor Carrier
Safety Improvement Act with the intent of providing information that
would help FMCSA and the states identify and set priorities for
programs and other measures likely to lead to significant reductions in
crashes involving commercial motor vehicles. Congress also required
FMCSA, in designing and conducting the study, to consult with experts
on crash causation, research methods, and other relevant topics. To
meet this requirement, FMCSA requested the Transportation Research
Board to form a committee to review the study's design and provide
advice to FMCSA on study methods. The committee expressed several
concerns about FMCSA's design, and FMCSA revised the design in response
to some of these concerns.[Footnote 34] Based on preliminary results
from the study indicating that truck and car driver factors (such as
fatigue, inattention, and misjudgment) are much more likely than
vehicle factors (such as defective brakes and worn tires) to be the
critical reason for crashes involving a truck and a car, FMCSA has
decided to shift the focus of some of its inspections from the truck to
the driver,[Footnote 35] and has called on states to institute "driver
inspection strike forces" in high-crash corridors. FMCSA plans to
conduct more formal analyses of data from the study over the next
several years, and, depending on the results, it may make additional
refinements to its enforcement programs. Other examples of refinements
to its enforcement programs that FMCSA has made based on studies of
factors that affect crash risks include:
* Safety of new entrants: Based on studies indicating that new motor
carriers had higher crash rates and lower rates of compliance with
safety regulations, in 1999 Congress directed FMCSA to develop a
program to ensure that new entrants would operate safely. As discussed
previously, in 2003 FMCSA initiated such a program that emphasizes
educating new entrants about their obligations under the safety
regulations, rather than taking enforcement actions when safety
deficiencies are identified. FMCSA intends to strengthen the
enforcement component of the new entrant program.
* Share the Road Safely: Based on studies indicating that, in fatal
crashes involving a car and a truck, errors by car drivers are more
frequently cited in police reports than are errors by truck
drivers,[Footnote 36] in 1991, Congress directed FMCSA to develop a
program to educate drivers about how to drive safely in the vicinity of
trucks; in 1994, FMCSA initiated the Share the Road Safely program for
this purpose. Many highway safety experts believe that programs such as
Share the Road Safely are more likely to produce substantial changes in
drivers' behaviors if the education efforts are combined with local law
enforcement programs to increase compliance with traffic laws. FMCSA
agrees that enforcement should be a part of the program, and in 2005 it
began to pilot test a combined education and enforcement approach in
Washington state.
To its credit, FMCSA has also made several refinements to its
enforcement programs based on agency evaluations of the effectiveness
of the programs themselves. The Government Performance and Results Act
calls for agencies to evaluate the results of their programs, and we
have suggested that agencies use information on the performance of
their programs to identify opportunities for improvement.[Footnote 37]
Examples of refinements to its enforcement programs that FMCSA has made
based on its evaluations of the effectiveness of the programs include:
* Roadside inspections: Based on its analysis indicating that the
inspection program is no longer leading to annual increases in the
industry-wide level of compliance with safety regulations, an FMCSA
official also told us that the agency is no longer seeking to increase
the number of roadside inspections from year to year.
* Safety of new entrants: Based on (1) its analysis indicating that new
entrant safety audits--which currently emphasize education--have not
had a major impact on crash rates and (2) data showing that less than 1
percent of audited new entrants were failing the audit despite the fact
that many new entrants were operating without comprehensive knowledge
of the requirements and without being in compliance with the safety
regulations, FMCSA intends to increase the level of compliance required
to pass the audit and to avoid an enforcement action. FMCSA plans to
publish a proposed regulation to this effect in March 2006.
* Compliance reviews: Based on its 2002 evaluation indicating that
inconsistencies and bottlenecks in its compliance review process were
reducing its efficiency and effectiveness, FMCSA made several changes
in 2003 aimed at improving compliance review policies, procedures,
training, software, and supporting carrier data. Specific examples
include:
* FMCSA discouraged repeat visits to high-risk motor carriers that had
received unsatisfactory safety ratings during a review conducted within
the past 12 months because the agency believed that not enough time had
elapsed to show whether safety improvements had taken effect.
* FMCSA (1) discouraged safety investigators from their earlier
practice of favoring violations of drug and alcohol regulations over
violations of hours of service regulations when they choose which
violations to document for enforcement because crash data and FMCSA's
survey of its field staff suggest that hours of service compliance is
more important for safety, and (2) revised its operations manual to
encourage FMCSA's state division offices to document the maximum number
of parts of the regulations where major safety violations are
discovered, rather than penalizing motor carriers for a few violations
in a particular part at the expense of other parts.
FMCSA has not evaluated the impact that these and other changes have
had on the efficiency and effectiveness of the compliance review
process, but an FMCSA official told us that the agency believes such an
evaluation would be worthwhile and that it will consider conducting
one.
FMCSA is either conducting, or plans to conduct, several additional
evaluations of its enforcement approach, programs, and supporting
programs. Depending on the results of these evaluations, FMCSA may make
refinements to each of these. For example:
* Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010: Under this initiative, FMCSA is
evaluating its current approach to monitoring and assessing the safety
of the motor carrier industry, including its enforcement approach, with
the intent of developing and implementing new approaches. FMCSA began
the initiative because it believes that the centerpiece of its current
oversight and enforcement approach--the compliance review program--is
resource intensive; reaches only about 2 percent of a growing motor
carrier population each year; does not adequately reflect the impact
that people involved in motor carriers' operations, such as managers,
owners, and drivers, have on safety; and is impeded by delayed,
incomplete, and inaccurate data on the safety performance of carriers.
As a starting point for this initiative, FMCSA developed a preliminary
proposal for a new framework for its oversight and enforcement
programs. In contrast to FMCSA's current enforcement approach, which
considers only the results of compliance reviews in determining whether
to assess civil penalties against carriers, the proposed framework also
considers, among other things, indications of unsafe driving from
traffic violations, crash records, and the results of roadside
inspections. FMCSA intends to refine and begin implementation of the
framework over the next several years.
* Roadside inspections: FMCSA is evaluating the effectiveness of
alternative truck inspection strategies being utilized by states, such
as building temporary inspection sites, using no fixed sites at all,
mobile enforcement using wireless communications technologies, and use
of sophisticated information systems and different kinds of sensing
technologies. FMCSA expects the results of its evaluation to be
published in December 2005. As part of a separate evaluation, FMCSA
plans to review alternatives to its current approach to vehicle
roadside inspections, such as requiring motor carriers to inspect their
vehicles more frequently than the current requirement of once a year
and having third-parties conduct inspections.
* PRISM: FMCSA is evaluating the effectiveness of its PRISM program,
including assessing whether states that have implemented PRISM have
achieved greater safety improvements than states that have not, and
identifying ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
program. FMCSA plans to complete the evaluation in August 2006.
* Monitoring drivers' hours of service: FMCSA is evaluating the costs
and benefits of requiring electronic on-board recorders for monitoring
drivers' hours of service, as required by a July 2004 federal appeals
court ruling that criticized the agency for not having conducted such
an assessment.
* Drug and alcohol testing: In the next several years, FMCSA plans to
study whether the effectiveness of the agency's efforts to ensure
compliance with its regulations prohibiting certain uses of drugs and
alcohol by drivers is being adversely affected by (1) how motor
carriers are selecting drivers for random testing, (2) whether carriers
are actually testing each driver selected, and (3) tests in which bogus
samples are submitted. FMCSA may make policy, regulatory, and
enforcement changes depending on the findings of the study.
* Share the Road Safely: In March 2006, FMCSA plans to complete an
evaluation of the effectiveness of the ongoing Share the Road Safely
pilot program in Washington state that FMCSA is jointly funding with
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The pilot combines
education and enforcement to improve the safety of car drivers' driving
behavior in the vicinity of trucks. If the results of the evaluation
are favorable, FMCSA intends to extend the program to other states.
* Border safety programs: FMCSA plans to conduct an evaluation of its
border safety audit and compliance review programs in 2007. Border
safety audits and compliance reviews can result in revocation of a
motor carrier's authority to operate in the U.S., and FMCSA plans for
its evaluation to cover this enforcement aspect of the program.
In addition to its ongoing and planned program evaluations, FMCSA plans
to develop a tool to help the agency set priorities for its enforcement
programs by comparing their cost-effectiveness. The tool would produce
estimates of cost-effectiveness by combining information from the
models that FMCSA currently uses to estimate the impact of compliance
reviews, roadside inspections, and traffic enforcement in terms of
reductions in crashes, injuries, and fatalities with information on the
costs of these programs. We have reported that considering information
on both the costs and effectiveness of programs gives agencies a basis
for focusing their efforts and improving their performance,[Footnote
38] and the Office of Management and Budget has guidelines for
considering both the costs and benefits when making decisions to
initiate, renew, or expand programs which would result in a series of
measurable benefits or costs extending for three or more years into the
future.[Footnote 39] FMCSA officials told us that the tool could also
cover new entrant safety audits and certain education and outreach
programs. As part of a separate effort, FMCSA has developed preliminary
estimates of the average cost of a compliance review and the average
cost of a roadside inspection. However, the estimates are not based on
consistent assumptions, and an FMCSA official told us that the agency
intends to reassess the costs for purposes of its prioritization
tool.[Footnote 40]
As recommended by the Office of Management and Budget, FMCSA also plans
to start evaluating the costs incurred and the benefits realized by its
existing regulations, beginning with evaluations of two regulations in
2006. Finally, in 2006 FMCSA plans to identify long-term trends in the
motor carrier industry and how these trends could affect the agency's
ability to meet its strategic goals and objectives over the next 20
years. FMCSA intends to use the results of this effort to support its
policy development and strategic planning. We are encouraged by FMCSA's
ongoing and planned efforts to obtain additional information on crash
risk factors and on the costs and effectiveness of its enforcement
programs because these efforts address long-standing core deficiencies
that we identified in 1999 and 2000.[Footnote 41] We believe that the
efforts will, if effectively implemented, provide FMCSA with a sound
basis to refine and set priorities for its enforcement programs.
MCSAP Is Designed to Improve Safety but Program Oversight Is
Inadequate:
MCSAP employs a performance-based approach to truck safety by
encouraging states to analyze data to identify safety problems and
target their grant activities to achieve reductions in truck crashes,
injuries, and fatalities. However, FMCSA has not adequately overseen
the development of states' safety plans. For example, FMCSA's grant
planning meetings, in which it communicates priorities and how to
develop plans with quantifiable goals, were conducted for less than a
third of the states in fiscal year 2004, and FMCSA division offices
that work with states did not sufficiently monitor and ensure states'
progress towards safety goals. As a result, we were unable to determine
whether states substantially met many of their safety goals.
Furthermore, FMCSA has not completed its various oversight reviews of
MCSAP in the past 3 years, as required by agency policy, and which, if
carried out, could have helped to identify problems both with how
states administer and the agency oversees the grant program. The
agency, though, has recently taken steps to improve its grantee review
program and strengthen its oversight of MCSAP.
MCSAP Employs a Performance-Based Approach to Improve Safety:
Since 1997, FMCSA has employed a performance-based approach for funding
state commercial vehicle safety activities through MCSAP. The
performance-based approach entails states analyzing data to identify
commercial vehicle safety problems in their respective jurisdictions
and targeting their grant activities to achieve FMCSA's primary goal of
reducing truck crashes, injuries, and fatalities. As part of this
approach, states must also demonstrate how their proposed goals and
activities further other FMCSA goals, such as improving data quality
and timeliness. In their safety plans, states are required to measure
and evaluate their performance, which fosters accountability.[Footnote
42]
Since 2000, FMCSA has convened several meetings to assist states in
developing their plans. First, every spring, each service center is
expected to hold a planning meeting attended by the state
representatives and division office staff that administer and oversee
the grant program. Service center and headquarters staff are to
communicate the priorities for and changes made to the grant program
for the coming year. The states are to reflect these priorities and
changes in their safety plans. In addition, the Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center is to provide states with training at
planning meetings on analyzing data and developing goals, activities,
and performance measures to address safety problems. Some states, such
as New York and North Carolina, have also partnered with universities
to conduct additional research and analysis on commercial vehicle
safety.[Footnote 43] Finally, FMCSA's National Training Center conducts
a MCSAP grants management training course that addresses, among other
topics, how to develop safety plans, including goals, activities, and
performance measures.
Second, FMSCA conducts two examinations of the states' draft safety
plans to ensure completeness, and that goals and activities are
measurable and support FMCSA's mission. Initially, division office
staff are to use a standardized checklist to ensure that states' safety
plans incorporate the required elements. These elements include an
identification of safety problems based on data analysis; goals,
performance measures and activities that address state and agency
priorities; evaluations of state progress towards the previous year's
goals and activities; and certification of compatibility of state's
motor carrier safety regulations with federal regulations. If any of
the required elements are missing or unclear, the division office staff
are expected to return the safety plan to the state for revision. FMCSA
officials explained that after the division office staff approves the
safety plan, they are to forward it for review by a "technical review
panel" comprised of several service center and division office staff in
that region before it is finalized and forwarded to headquarters.
FMCSA staff at division offices, service centers, and headquarters
consider these planning meetings and safety plan examinations to be
valuable components of the grant program. We did not analyze the degree
to which these meetings and safety plan examinations improved the
states' safety plans.
To further encourage improvements in commercial vehicle safety, FMCSA
awards MCSAP incentive funds over and above the basic program funds to
states that meet agency-specified safety criteria,[Footnote 44] such as
reducing the number of commercial-vehicle-involved fatal accidents or
the commercial vehicle fatal accident rate. States can also receive
incentive funds if they meet other agency-specified safety performance
criteria, such as the timely uploading of accident or inspection data,
or checking the status of commercial driver licenses during all
roadside inspections.[Footnote 45]
FMCSA's Inadequate Planning and Oversight of Its State Grant Program
Resulted in Uncertainty About Whether States Met Many of Their Safety
Goals:
Although MCSAP employs a performance-based approach to improving
safety, it remains unclear whether the states we reviewed substantially
met a majority of their safety goals. Using safety plans, quarterly
reports, evaluations of previous years' efforts, and other monitoring
information on states' activities, we assessed the extent to which
seven state grantees substantially met their safety goals in fiscal
year 2004. Of the 61 goals in states' safety plans, we could not
determine whether 61 percent of these goals were substantially
met.[Footnote 46] Of the remaining goals, we determined that 23 percent
were substantially met, while 16 percent were not.[Footnote 47]
We could not determine whether a majority of states' safety goals were
substantially met because FMCSA did not thoroughly conduct three
important oversight activities intended to help FMCSA make its own
determination of states' progress towards their safety goals. First,
FMCSA did not adequately carry out planning activities for 2004 MCSAP
grants designed to ensure that states' safety plans included all of the
key elements--quantifiable national and state goals, performance
measures, and evaluations--needed to gauge whether state goals had been
met. In this regard, planning meetings--where states receive assistance
in developing goals, activities, and performance measures to address
safety problems--were convened by only one of the four service centers.
The meetings were not convened by three service centers because one did
not have a state programs staff person to convene the meeting, another
interpreted headquarters guidance to suggest that division offices work
on MCSAP planning directly with states without service center
assistance, and the third was constrained by states' budget
restrictions at the time. Headquarters officials told us that they had
expected planning meetings to occur that year. We also found that only
one service center held technical review panels to ensure that safety
plans included all of the key elements described above. One service
center did not have a state programs staff person to convene a panel,
while two service centers did not hold technical review panels because
they believed their curbed oversight role of the service centers from
fiscal years 1999 through 2003 implied that they should not conduct
technical review panels. At the time, agency leadership restructured
the agency to create a more direct relationship between headquarters
and the division offices. Therefore, officials at these two service
centers told us they felt that they did not have the authority to
conduct many of their previous oversight activities. However, agency
officials told us that they did not suspend technical review panels
during that time period. Officials at the fourth service center--which
originated the concept of the technical review panel--also acknowledged
the curbed oversight role of service centers, but that they had
conducted a panel for fiscal year 2004 because of their recognition
that strong management should be maintained in their state grant
programs. According to agency officials, current agency leadership,
however, has encouraged service centers to assume a greater oversight
role.
Second, FMCSA division offices did not follow program guidance that
requires ensuring that state safety plans incorporate key elements to
adequately gauge states' performance. We found that goals or
performance measures were not quantifiable, or were missing from
various portions of the safety plans for the seven states we reviewed.
When asked about this, staff from two of the division offices told us
that quantifiable goals or performance measures in their safety plans
are not always needed. However, we believe these key elements are
critical because, without them, FMCSA would not be able to objectively
assess whether states' goals had been substantially met. In contrast,
staff from the other division offices with whom we spoke responded that
they did not realize that multi-year goals should incorporate annual
performance measures, or that goals and performance measures in the
safety plans were not quantifiable or were missing. These staff agreed
that incorporating such information into the safety plans would be
appropriate and responded that they would consider doing so in the
future.
Finally, because FMCSA division offices did not adequately monitor
states' progress towards safety plan goals, they did not obtain the
information that would have enabled both them and us to determine
whether state safety goals were substantially met. Offices monitor
states' progress by reviewing quarterly reports, safety plan
evaluations, and data reports, and through phone calls, E-mails and in-
person meetings. For example, one of the seven states we examined--the
sixth largest overall grantee in fiscal year 2004--did not submit
required quarterly reports to its respective division office for
several years. This was due to the responsible state staff person's
belief that it was unnecessary to complete them. The division office
followed-up with the state about this issue, but no further corrective
action, such as withholding the state's future grant funding, was taken
by the agency. The division office also reported that because the lead
agency was in the process of changing, a new staff person would be
assuming the responsibility and that they expect the quarterly reports
to once again be submitted. In addition to the omission of quarterly
reports, we found that three of the largest grantees did not include
evaluations of both national and state goals in their safety plans,
despite this being a program requirement. When we asked the respective
division offices about this, they responded that this omission was not
of concern because their office had a general sense of the states'
progress through their monitoring. However, the information that these
offices provided to support their monitoring effort, for the most part,
did not allow us to assess whether the state had met its goals. Agency
officials believe that some of the required information--such as
quarterly progress reports and yearly evaluations--may no longer be
necessary given their regular communication with states and access to
information regarding state activities. However, given that MCSAP
relies on a performance-based approach, the agency would not be able to
adequately measure how grant funds are contributing to improving safety
without this information. All of the division offices provided us with
records of their monitoring, including data reports and E-mails.
However, for the most part, their records did not provide enough
information about states' progress for us to determine whether certain
safety goals had been substantially met. Additionally, only one
division office we reviewed formally tracks its state's activities by
the goals specified in the safety plan, and this office has only
recently begun to do so.
Some division office staff conveyed their concerns regarding states'
safety plans. The staff of two division offices recognized that their
states' 2004 safety plans were not complete in terms of the key
elements we discussed and that future improvements were needed. As a
result, both division offices have explained that they are working more
closely with the states to highlight these key elements in order to
strengthen subsequent safety plans. Furthermore, the staff of all seven
division offices generally understood the inability to gauge state
performance based on the issues we identified and responded that they
would consider our comments in the development of their states' 2006
safety plans.
FMCSA Has Not Completed Various Oversight Reviews of Its Grant Program
but Has Taken Steps to Improve Its State Review Program:
FMCSA guidance states that three MCSAP-related reviews are to be
conducted every 3 years: (1) division offices are to review their
respective state grantees, (2) service centers are to review the
division offices in their region, and (3) headquarters is to review the
four service centers. Agency officials told us that the purpose of
these reviews is to identify any weaknesses in the administration,
monitoring, or oversight of the grant program by a state, division
office, or service center. The reviews also identify best practices
that could be applied to other states, division offices, or service
centers.[Footnote 48]
We found that FMCSA division offices reviewed only 19 of 56 grantees
(34 percent) in the past 3 years. Of the completed reviews, issues
cited include the incompatibility of various state motor carrier safety
regulations with federal regulations, the need to better integrate
performance-based approaches to state safety plans, missing quarterly
reports and narratives that address a prior year's goals, and less-than-
comprehensive annual evaluations of safety plan goals. Among the seven
largest grantees, we followed up with the three division offices that
had not completed reviews in the last 3 years to learn why they were
not conducted. Two of these three division offices did not conduct
reviews due to reorganization of the lead agency within their
respective states. However, given that reviews tend to last between a
week and several weeks and that there is a 3-year period to conduct
state reviews, division offices would have had sufficient time to
complete a review either before or after the reorganization. The third
division office cited conducting a series of smaller "process" reviews
as fulfilling the state review.[Footnote 49] When we asked headquarters
about several division offices not conducting reviews of states, agency
officials responded that they were disappointed many of the reviews had
not been completed. However, they said they are taking steps--such as
creating an implementation schedule of reviews to be conducted--to
ensure that future state grantee reviews are completed in a timely
fashion.
The agency has also not reviewed division offices and service centers,
as required by agency policy. In the past 3 years, the four service
centers reviewed only 15 of 52 division offices (29 percent). We found
that a contributing factor to the lack of reviews was the curbed
oversight role of the service centers (as noted earlier) that was
attributable to agency restructuring. The restructuring was designed to
create a more direct relationship between headquarters and the division
offices. We also learned that, among the four service centers, one did
not conduct any division office reviews during the past 3 years because
it believed that it should not conduct the reviews given the curbed
oversight role of the service centers during part of that time period.
Furthermore, headquarters has also not reviewed any of the service
centers in over 3 years. Staff in headquarters cited a lack of staff
and time as their primary reason for not completing these reviews.
Headquarters staff devoted to MCSAP have steadily decreased over the
past 11 years, from 11 full-time employees in 1995 to 4 full-time
employees in 2005.
In a majority of the 15 division office reviews conducted, service
centers identified gaps in the monitoring and oversight
responsibilities of division offices. Some of the recommendations from
these reviews address commonly identified division office performance
issues, including (1) not tracking, recording, or retaining information
on their monitoring activities; (2) not providing consistent feedback
to states about findings from monitoring activities; (3) not following-
through to ensure improvements were made or tracking or recording any
corrective actions that needed to be, or have been taken, by the state;
and (4) not conducting grantee reviews as required by agency policy.
Furthermore, two of the four service centers did not keep track of the
division offices that have conducted state grantee reviews, and
therefore they did not have the information to know which division
office reviews had not been completed and what types of monitoring
problems had been identified. Although we did not evaluate the extent
to which division office reviews are necessary for the agency to
conduct adequate oversight, we believe that the frequency with which
monitoring problems were identified suggests the usefulness of these
reviews. Lastly, we learned that headquarters does not keep track of
whether division offices conduct state reviews.
In addition to identifying gaps in monitoring and oversight, the agency
also identifies what it considers to be best practices during its
reviews of division offices. We have suggested that the sharing of best
practices can be helpful in improving grantee performance.[Footnote 50]
However, the agency has not fully shared those best practices among
other division offices. Several best practices of division offices were
identified during these reviews. Among them were (1) the development
and use of an automated monitoring of state grant activities, (2) the
convening of regular formal meetings with the state, (3) the
development of a detailed quarterly report format that includes
progress made towards safety plan goals, and (4) the hiring of an
administrative grants manager. However, only two of the four service
centers have actively circulated best practices from state reviews to
division offices. The other two service centers told us that they
intend to circulate these best practices in the future.
In recognizing that the way in which states are reviewed has not been
recently revised to reflect changes in MCSAP, and that it would like
the reviews to have a greater focus on the financial aspects of the
program, FMCSA has taken steps to improve its state grantee review
program. In December 2004, the agency completed a draft plan for the
new review program. The proposed program would be carried out by a
joint team of division office, service center, headquarters, and
contractor staff that would assist the division offices, and is
comprised of three parts: a regulatory review, a financial review, and
a performance review. The performance review would compare states'
activities with the goals specified in their safety plans, and would
emphasize the monitoring of performance. After a review is completed, a
draft report of findings, recommendations, and other information would
undergo review by the division office and the state. FMCSA plans for
this program to follow a 4-year cycle for conducting the reviews.
Agency officials told us that they have piloted this review program in
four states, and officials expect the program will be fully implemented
by the first quarter of fiscal year 2006. To ensure that this improved
review program follows a 4-year cycle, FMCSA officials told us that
they plan to schedule the reviews several years in advance and track
which ones have been completed. Because this proposed review program is
in the planning stage, we did not assess whether it is likely to
address the problems we found.
Further, FMCSA has several other efforts underway to strengthen the
agency's oversight of MCSAP. First, agency officials noted that a newly
created senior position to manage and oversee the service centers was
recently filled, and that FMCSA plans to request three additional MCSAP
staff in headquarters as part of its budget request for fiscal year
2007. Second, agency officials told us that they plan to incorporate an
expectation of completing oversight reviews in the individual
performance plans of all division office, service center, and
headquarters staff that are responsible for MCSAP. Third, recent
legislation requires that the agency report annually to Congress on the
effectiveness of the grant program.[Footnote 51] Finally, FMCSA has two
studies underway that relate to agency oversight of MCSAP: one to
determine the effectiveness of division offices' activities, and the
other to assure the quality of the agency's grant operations.
Conclusions:
In making decisions about its enforcement approach, FMCSA follows many
of the effective management practices we identified related to
performance management. We believe that it is noteworthy that FMCSA has
begun to refine its enforcement approach based on information about the
causes of crashes, that it plans to develop a tool to help it set
priorities for its enforcement programs based on estimates of their
cost-effectiveness, and that it has conducted--and continues to
conduct--program evaluations of its enforcement programs, including
evaluations that are assessing alternative approaches to enforcement.
These efforts, if implemented effectively, should provide FMCSA with a
reasonable basis for setting priorities for--and further refining--its
enforcement programs in ways that reduce crashes, injuries, and
fatalities in a cost-effective manner. However, because the agency's
goals and measures for its enforcement programs do not describe
expected and estimated contributions to FMCSA's overall goal of
reducing the large-truck fatality rate, FMCSA and the public do not
have a sense of how much the programs contribute to any reductions in
the fatality rate that may occur over time. The absence of this kind of
information makes it more difficult for FMCSA to make adjustments to
its enforcement programs that could help achieve its fatality rate
goal. In addition, because FMCSA does not know how much its civil
penalties increase carriers' compliance with safety regulations, it
lacks the information it needs to make sound decisions about any
changes to its use of civil penalties; it also may be missing
opportunities to increase carrier compliance, and ultimately safety,
that could result from such changes. Furthermore, without targets
specifying by how much it expects to reduce its backlog of enforcement
cases and by when, Congress and other interested parties find it more
difficult to hold the agency accountable for achieving this goal--one
of the agency's four highest priorities for improving commercial motor
vehicle safety in fiscal years 2005 and 2006.
FMCSA's overall framework establishing performance and accountability
for MCSAP is sound. It establishes expectations for safety improvements
by grantees to help further the department's goal of saving lives and
contains several mechanisms to help ensure that these expectations will
be met. This is important, as MCSAP represents almost half of FMCSA's
budget and the agency counts on it to materially contribute to saving
lives. However, we found that the execution of these expectations has,
too often, not been met, and aspects of how the agency actually works
with states to oversee performance need strengthening. These conditions
ranged from planning opportunities forgone, to differing perspectives
about performance requirements on the part of division office and
service center staff, to unfulfilled reviews of performance. While
there are various reasons underlying the conditions that we found, all
contributed to the end result of FMCSA not being in a position to
determine whether states focused their attention on, and carried out,
activities that could lead to lives saved. Further, the steps taken by
the agency to strengthen safety plans and improve reviews of states
performance are promising, but FMCSA should also assess its own
oversight of the program.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making five recommendations aimed at improving FMCSA's
enforcement programs and MCSAP oversight:
* To help ensure and demonstrate that FMCSA's enforcement programs
contribute to the agency's goal to reduce the large truck fatality
rate, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the
FMCSA administrator to set goals for its enforcement programs that are
designed to clearly demonstrate these contributions.
* To improve FMCSA's ability to establish the most effective structure
of civil penalties, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation
direct the FMCSA administrator to develop and implement one or more
measures of the effectiveness of its civil penalties against motor
carriers.
* To improve the consistency and effectiveness of FMCSA's truck safety
enforcement, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct
the FMCSA administrator to develop and include in its strategy and
annual plans a specific numeric or measurable goal to eliminate the
agency's backlog of enforcement cases, as required by the Motor Carrier
Safety Improvement Act of 1999.
* To improve accountability for use of MCSAP grant funds, we recommend
that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FMCSA administrator to
ensure that existing mechanisms, such as planning sessions, reviews of
draft state plans, and periodic monitoring of states' progress, to the
extent possible, are carried out and result in clarity of goals and
performance measures and assessments of safety improvements made.
* To improve FMCSA's oversight of MCSAP grantees, we recommend that the
Secretary of Transportation direct the FMCSA administrator to (1)
assess, upon implementation, whether the improved performance review of
state activities are meeting the agency's intended goals; (2)
incorporate MCSAP oversight as a segment of the effectiveness study of
division offices; and (3) assess the oversight activities of service
centers.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation
for review and comment and received comments from FMCSA officials.
FMCSA generally agreed with the report's findings and agreed to
consider our recommendations. FMCSA offered several corrections, which
we incorporated in this report.
We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees and
subcommittees with responsibilities for commercial motor vehicle safety
issues; the Secretary of Transportation; the Administrator, FMCSA; and
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. This report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-2834 or [Hyperlink, siggerudk@gao.gov]. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Staff who made key contributions to this
report are listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Katherine Siggerud:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In determining how the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) used its enforcement authority to address noncompliance with
the federal motor carrier safety regulations, we reviewed legislation,
congressional reports leading to the creation of FMCSA, FMCSA
regulations, manuals, guidance, and assessments of the agency's
enforcement efforts by the Department of Transportation Office of
Inspector General, and our own assessments. In addition, we obtained
information from FMCSA about enforcement policies, the implementation
of these policies and procedures, and analyzed enforcement data; we
focused on fiscal years 1995 through 2004 in our efforts. We chose 1995
because it represented a period in which FMCSA partnered with industry
and provided a 10-year period from which to observe changes in FMCSA's
policies and actions. We discussed these requirements and the agency's
implementation of them with FMCSA, industry and safety advocacy groups,
and transportation researchers.
We also analyzed FMCSA data on compliance reviews, roadside
inspections, new entrant safety audits, homeland security-related
visits of hazardous materials carriers, out-of-service orders and
orders to cease operations, and civil penalties occurring between
fiscal years 1995 and 2004. We used 2004 as the most recent year in our
analysis because it is the most recent year for which complete data are
available.
In calculating the percentage of the motor carrier industry that
receives compliance reviews, we used FMCSA's estimates of the annual
size of the interstate motor carrier industry. This number is an
estimate due to the fact that carriers are not required to report the
closing of their operations to the department. This estimate has
improved with the development of the new entrant audit program because
FMCSA is able to identify non-interstate carriers and remove them from
the total count.
In determining total civil penalties assessed, we used the average
civil penalty per violation, rather than the average civil penalty per
enforcement case. We did this to observe how FMCSA treated different
types of violations, such as recordkeeping and non-
recordkeeping.[Footnote 52] We made several adjustments to FMCSA's
data. First, we removed all motor coach cases from the dataset, because
this report only focuses on large truck safety. During the past decade,
passenger carriers have accounted for slightly more than 1 percent of
enforcement actions. Second, we excluded all cases that the agency
closed without enforcement or that remained open as of July 2005 (the
end of our fieldwork). Between 1995 and 2004, an average of 145 cases
was closed annually without enforcement, and an average of 19 cases was
left open. FMCSA chooses to close a case without enforcement when the
agency decides to cease seeking to collect a civil penalty. This can
happen for several reasons, but frequently it is due to a carrier
declaring bankruptcy. Excluding these cases ensured that the agency had
completed the enforcement process before we analyzed the data. Since in
many cases that are closed without enforcement the carrier is not
formally charged with a civil penalty, the data tend to be skewed by
including these cases. Third, we adjusted all civil penalties for
inflation using 2004 dollars.
In determining the reliability of FMCSA's data, we performed electronic
testing for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, and we
interviewed officials from FMCSA's data analysis division who are
knowledgeable about the data and how they were entered. FMCSA
determined that the 1995 data on roadside inspections were not
reliable. Due to this determination, we did not use these data. For the
remainder of the data, we determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the types of analysis we present in this report.
In assessing the extent to which FMCSA follows key effective management
practices in making decisions about its enforcement approach, we
reviewed our reports on performance management, guidance from the
Office of Management and Budget, and the Government Performance and
Results Act to identify key effective management practices for agency
decision making. The key practices that we identified were related to
strategy, goals, performance measures, and decision making that
considers the factors that contribute to large-truck crashes as well as
the costs and effectiveness of agency programs. We obtained information
on FMCSA's enforcement strategy, goals, and performance measures
through discussions with FMCSA officials, and from FMCSA documents,
including its budget request for fiscal year 2006 (which also serves as
FMCSA's strategic plan, performance plan for fiscal year 2006, and
performance report for fiscal year 2004). We also reviewed a report
entitled Measuring the FMCSA's Safety Objectives from Year 2000 to
2002[Footnote 53] and reports on FMCSA's estimates of the impact of its
enforcement programs. We obtained information on FMCSA's completed and
ongoing crash causation studies and program evaluations, as well as how
the results of some of these studies and evaluations have influenced
FMCSA's decisions about refinements to its enforcement programs,
through discussions with FMCSA officials or from FMCSA documents,
including program evaluation plans and reports, and statements of work
for planned evaluations. We also attended FMCSA's October 2004 public
session in Falls Church, Virginia, designed to obtain input on its
Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010 initiative, which is intended to
develop a new framework for overseeing truck safety.
In assessing the extent to which FMCSA ensures that its Motor Carrier
Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) grants contribute to the agency's
mission, we reviewed regulations and FMCSA guidance relating to the
design of the grant program and discussed with FMCSA officials how
accountability is built into it. We assessed FMCSA's planning and
oversight of seven MCSAP state grantees in fiscal year 2004 (the latest
full year for which information was available). These states--
California, Georgia, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas-
-comprised 27 percent of all MCSAP grants awarded for that year.
Because we chose these states judgmentally (representing the largest
grantees), we cannot project our findings nationwide.[Footnote 54]
Reviewing a larger number of grantees would not have been practical due
to resource constraints. To increase the reliability of our assessment,
two analysts independently assessed whether states substantially met
their goals. They then discussed their results and resolved any
differences. We then discussed our assessment with FMCSA officials
responsible for grant activities in those states. We also reviewed all
four regional service centers to determine how they conduct their
oversight activities. Finally, we attended a planning meeting for the
fiscal year 2006 safety plans to gain a better understanding of how
agency priorities are conveyed and how the agency provides assistance
to the states in developing safety plans.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contact:
Katherine Siggerud (202) 512-2834 or [Hyperlink, siggerudk@gao.gov]:
Acknowledgements:
In addition to the contact named above, James Ratzenberger, Assistant
Director; Mallory Barg Bulman; Craig Fischer; David Goldstein; Tina Won
Sherman; and Gregory Wilmoth made key contributions to this report.
(542049):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Large trucks are those with a gross vehicle weight greater than
10,000 pounds.
[2] FMCSA also has responsibility for improving the safety of
commercial buses. Buses have a much better safety record than trucks;
as a result, this report focuses on FMCSA's large truck enforcement
activities.
[3] For ease of reading, we use FMCSA to refer to the agency under all
prior names.
[4] The governor of the state designates a lead agency, such as the
state police, to carry out grant activities, including developing the
state's safety plans.
[5] Based on data provided by FMCSA, we estimated that the economic
impact resulting from crashes and incidents involving hazardous-
materials vehicles was less than 5 percent of the total economic impact
of truck crashes. Therefore, this report focuses on truck safety
enforcement programs and not hazardous materials safety enforcement
programs.
[6] These information systems and program support FMCSA's enforcement
activities and actions, such as targeting carriers for inspection.
Because they are not enforcement activities, per se, we did not review
their effectiveness.
[7] In this report, we refer to all MCSAP grantees as "states."
[8] These other safety initiatives include the Commercial Vehicle
Information Systems and Networks program, PRISM program, and
Intelligent Transportation Systems for Commercial Vehicle Operations
program. MCSAP used to fund border grants. However, in fiscal year
2005, FMCSA created a separate program to fund border grants.
[9] U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General,
Motor Carrier Safety Program, Federal Highway Administration, TR-1999-
091 (Washington, D.C. April 26, 1999).
[10] GAO, Commercial Motor Vehicles: Effectiveness of Actions Being
Taken to Improve Motor Carrier Safety is Unknown, GAO/RCED-00-189
(Washington, D.C. July 17, 2000).
[11] In assessing FMCSA's actions, we used 1998 data as the benchmark
for the partnering approach because this is the last year of data
before the Department of Transportation's Inspector General released
its report criticizing FMCSA.
[12] Not all carriers are required to be reviewed every year.
[13] Until 1998, state staff conducted all roadside inspections with
partial support from federal funds. FMCSA has conducted an increasing
number of inspections using its own staff; however, state staff still
conduct more than 95 percent of all inspections.
[14] We are assessing FMCSA's new entrant audit program as part of a
separate study which we expect to issue shortly.
[15] FMCSA uses a tool to help it determine the dollar amounts of its
civil penalties. The tool uses nine criteria that consider the gravity
of the violation and offense history of the carrier to develop
recommendations for civil penalties. There have been statutory changes
to this tool over the past decade. In 1998 and 2003, the agency
adjusted all civil penalties for inflation. Further, in 1999,
legislation created new categories of violations, which increased the
allowable civil penalty for more serious violations to $10,000 and
decreased the allowable civil penalty for record keeping violations.
[16] FMCSA and state staff typically found more than one violation per
enforcement case. The average penalty per enforcement case was
approximately $3,700 higher than the average penalty per violation for
each year.
[17] Civil penalties for non-record keeping violations may be imposed
up to $10,000 per violation. In 2004, the average civil penalty for
these violations was slightly more than $2,000.
[18] Violation types are not mutually exclusive; a violation can be
both acute and non-record keeping.
[19] FMCSA may reduce a civil penalty in cases where the motor carrier
presents evidence to refute the violations found during the compliance
review or offers mitigating circumstances to explain why the violations
occurred.
[20] This finding is not consistent with the 1999 report from the
Department of Transportation's Inspector General. The Inspector General
found that final assessments were substantially less than initial
assessments from 1995 through 1998. This discrepancy may be due to
different methodologies. Among other things, the Inspector General
looked at a sample of cases, whereas we reviewed all enforcement cases.
[21] Prior to this pilot program, FMCSA's efforts to improve the
driving behavior of passenger vehicle drivers in the vicinity of
trucks, which it initiated in 1994, were solely educational in nature;
they did not involve an enforcement component. See GAO, Truck Safety:
Share the Road Safely Program Needs Better Evaluation of Its
Initiatives, GAO-03-680 (Washington, D.C. May 30, 2003). In the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy
for Users, Congress required us to update this study by June 30, 2006.
[22] In February 2004, the Department of Transportation's Inspector
General reported that, among other data quality problems, incomplete
crash reporting and late or incomplete roadside inspection reporting by
states adversely affect the reliability of FMCSA's carrier rankings.
See U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General,
Improvements Needed in the Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement
System, MH-2004-034 (Washington, D.C. Feb. 13, 2004). In October 2004,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory reported that while FMCSA's targeting
tool is about twice as effective as random selection in identifying
high-risk carriers, about 90 percent of the carriers that the tool
identifies as "high-risk" are identified due to random variations in
the underlying data rather than because they are consistently high-risk
carriers. See Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Review of the Motor
Carrier Safety Status Measurement System (SafeStat) (Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Oct. 2004). FMCSA has taken some steps to address concerns about its
targeting tool. We recently reported on FMCSA's efforts to improve the
quality of its crash data; see GAO, Highway Safety: Further
Opportunities Exist to Improve Data on Crashes Involving Commercial
Motor Vehicles, GAO-06-102 (Washington, D.C. Nov. 18, 2005).
[23] We have suggested that regulatory programs develop logic models to
better understand how their programs deliver results in order to select
appropriate goals. See GAO, Managing for Results: Strengthening
Regulatory Agencies' Performance Management Practices, GAO/GGD-00-10
(Washington, D.C. Oct. 28, 1999).
[24] See GAO, Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can
Improve Usefulness to Decisionmakers, GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69 (Washington,
D.C. Feb. 26, 1999).
[25] FMCSA considers a case closed when the final penalty amount has
been determined.
[26] The backlog in headquarters consisted of cases that had remained
open for 6 months or more. FMCSA's regional offices also had--and the
service centers that replaced them continue to have--their own backlogs
of cases, but FMCSA did not track the size of these backlogs in 1999
and 2000.
[27] Civil penalties comprised 81 percent of FMCSA's enforcement
actions against motor carriers following compliance reviews during
fiscal years 2002 through 2004. FMCSA considers compliance reviews to
be its key enforcement program.
[28] In fiscal year 2004, 46 percent of FMCSA's compliance reviews
resulted in assessment of a civil penalty.
[29] We did not evaluate the quality of these models because we are not
using estimates produced by the model as a basis for our findings.
[30] Although FMCSA conducted over 12,000 compliance reviews in 2002,
only 9,172 of these reviews met the criteria for inclusion in FMCSA's
model.
[31] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C. June
1996). We have reported that because outcomes, such as reduced fatality
rates, are the result of the interplay of several factors including
agencies' programs and factors external to agencies' efforts, it can be
difficult and expensive to rigorously evaluate the relative
contribution of multiple programs to the accomplishment of agencywide
goals. See GAO, Managing for Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring
Performance, GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138 (Washington, D.C. May 30, 1997).
[32] The total decrease of 0.14 does not equal the difference between
2.45 and 2.30 due to rounding.
[33] We did not evaluate the quality of these studies because (1) we
are not using data or findings from the studies as a basis for our
findings; and (2) we are not evaluating whether the study results that
FMCSA is using to inform its decision-making are based on reliable
data, sound methodology, and appropriate analyses.
[34] We did not evaluate the quality of the committee's review or
FMCSA's changes for the same reasons that we did not evaluate the
quality of any of FMCSA's studies, as described above.
[35] FMCSA intends to achieve this shift by conducting more inspections
that cover only drivers, more inspections that cover drivers and
involve a walk-around check of the truck, and fewer of the more time-
consuming inspections that cover drivers and involve a full inspection
of the truck.
[36] Safety groups have questioned the findings of these studies, while
a major truck industry group agrees with the findings. As discussed
above, we did not evaluate the quality of the studies.
[37] GAO/GGD-96-118.
[38] GAO/GGD-96-118.
[39] Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines and Discount Rates for
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-94 (Washington, D.C. Oct. 29, 1992).
[40] The cost estimate for roadside inspections includes fringe
benefits and overhead associated with staff, whereas the cost estimate
for compliance reviews does not include these costs.
[41] GAO, Truck Safety: Motor Carriers Office Hampered by Limited
Information on Causes of Crashes and Other Data Problems, GAO/RCED-99-
182 (Washington, D.C. June 29, 1999) and GAO/RCED-00-189.
[42] For more information on how management's use of performance
information can improve accountability, see GAO, Managing For Results:
Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for Management Decision
Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, D.C. Sept. 9, 2005).
[43] New York state partners with the State University of New York,
Albany, and North Carolina has a partnership with the University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
[44] In 1995, we reported that financial incentives in a grant program
can spur performance by being tied to states' progress towards
specified national goals. See GAO, Block Grants: Issues in Designing
Accountability Provisions, GAO/AIMD-95-226 (Washington, D.C. Sept. 1,
1995).
[45] In fiscal year 2004--the year for which we reviewed MCSAP
oversight--Congress appropriated approximately $11 million for
incentive funds.
[46] For the purposes of this report, we considered that goals were
substantially met if the state achieved 95 percent of its proposed
goal.
[47] In the instances where safety goals were not substantially met,
division offices reported that states generally provided FMCSA with
reasonable explanations as to why and that these explanations were
usually beyond the control of the state. For example, one state set a
target for its safety investigators to complete 642 compliance reviews
in 2004. This target was set prior to the implementation of a
legislatively-required new entrant safety audit program for which
states had to shift resources from conducting compliance reviews
towards conducting new entrant audits. Therefore, the state was able to
complete only 348 reviews that year. Other explanations included a
change in funding priorities for the state at the gubernatorial level
and a delay in MCSAP funding that limited the amount of available state
staff and time.
[48] The reviews of states focus only on MCSAP and are more
comprehensive in scope than the safety plan development and program
monitoring activities carried out by the agency.
[49] A process review focuses on one of the six review elements that
are covered by the larger state review. While a minimum number of
process reviews are not required to be fulfilled within a certain time
period, program reviews are required to cover at least a 12-month
period and each of the six review elements. In response to several
states not conducting a program review because they had completed
process reviews, agency officials agreed that the MCSAP guidance was
ambiguous regarding this matter and that they would seek to clarify it
as they update this guidance. They expect to complete updating the
MCSAP guidance by the end of 2005.
[50] See GAO, Student Mentoring Programs: Education's Monitoring and
Information Sharing Could be Improved, GAO-04-581 (Washington, D.C.
June 25, 2004).
[51] Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:
A Legacy for Users.
[52] The average civil penalty per enforcement case is about $3,700
higher than the average civil penalty per violation, because each
enforcement case may include several violations.
[53] FMCSA, Measuring the FMCSA's Safety Objectives from Year 2000 to
2002, FMCSA-RI-03-018 (Washington, D.C. July 2003).
[54] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
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