National Airspace System
FAA Has Made Progress but Continues to Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic Control Systems Gao ID: GAO-05-331 June 10, 2005The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system has suffered from cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls in its system acquisitions for more than two decades and has been on our list of high risk programs since 1995. FAA's performance-based Air Traffic Organization (ATO) was created in February 2004, in part, to address these legacy challenges. In this report, GAO examined (1) FAA's experience in meeting cost, schedule, and performance targets for major ATC system acquisitions; (2) steps taken to address legacy problems with the program and additional steps needed; and (3) the potential impact of the constrained federal budget on this program.
The ATO met its acquisition goal for fiscal year 2004. However, prior to the establishment of the ATO, FAA had experienced more than two decades of cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls in acquiring major systems under its ATC modernization program. For example, 13 of the 16 major system acquisitions that we reviewed in detail have experienced cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls when assessed against their original milestones. These 13 system acquisitions experienced total cost growth from $1.1 million to about $1.5 billion; schedule extensions ranging from 1 to 13 years; and performance shortfalls, including safety problems. We found that one or more of four factors--funding, requirements growth and/or unplanned work, stakeholder involvement, and software complexity--have contributed to these legacy challenges. While FAA met its recent acquisition goal, it is important to note that this goal is based on updated program milestones and cost targets for system acquisitions, not those set at their inception. Consequently, they do not provide a consistent benchmark for assessing progress over time. Also, as indicators of annual progress, they cannot be used in isolation to measure progress over the life of an acquisition. Although additional steps are warranted, FAA has taken some positive steps to address key legacy challenges it has had with acquiring major systems under the modernization program. For example, the ATO has cut funding for some major systems that were not meeting their goals and is reassessing all capital investments to help ensure that priority systems receive needed funding. The ATO has improved its management of software-intensive acquisitions and information technology investments and begun to more actively involve stakeholders. As we recommended, the ATO plans to establish an overall policy to apply its process improvement model to all software-intensive acquisitions. However, additional steps could be taken to improve its management of system acquisitions. For example, the ATO could use a knowledge-based approach to managing system acquisitions, characteristic of best commercial practices, to help avoid cost, schedule, and performance problems. The ATO will also be challenged to modernize the ATC system under constrained budget targets, which would provide FAA with about $2 billion less than it planned to spend through 2009. To fund its major system acquisitions and remain within these targets, the ATO has eliminated planned funding to start new projects and substantially reduced planned funding for other areas. However, when forwarding its budget submission for review by senior officials at FAA, DOT, the Office of Management and Budget, and Congress, the ATO provides no detail on the impact of the planned funding reductions on ATC modernization and related activities to modernize the NAS. Our work shows that the ATO should provide these decision-makers with detailed information in its budget submissions about the impact of funding decisions on modernization efforts. Without this type of information, decision-makers lack important details when considering FAA's annual budget submissions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-331, National Airspace System: FAA Has Made Progress but Continues to Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic Control Systems
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
June 2005:
National Airspace System:
FAA Has Made Progress but Continues to Face Challenges in Acquiring
Major Air Traffic Control Systems:
GAO-05-331:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-331, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Federal Aviation Administration‘s (FAA) multibillion-dollar effort
to modernize the nation‘s air traffic control (ATC) system has suffered
from cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls in its system
acquisitions for more than two decades and has been on our list of high
risk programs since 1995. FAA‘s performance-based Air Traffic
Organization (ATO) was created in February 2004, in part, to address
these legacy challenges.
In this report, GAO examined (1) FAA‘s experience in meeting cost,
schedule, and performance targets for major ATC system acquisitions;
(2) steps taken to address legacy problems with the program and
additional steps needed; and (3) the potential impact of the
constrained federal budget on this program.
What GAO Found:
The ATO met its acquisition goal for fiscal year 2004. However, prior
to the establishment of the ATO, FAA had experienced more than two
decades of cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls in acquiring
major systems under its ATC modernization program. For example, 13 of
the 16 major system acquisitions that we reviewed in detail have
experienced cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls when assessed
against their original milestones. These 13 system acquisitions
experienced total cost growth from $1.1 million to about $1.5 billion;
schedule extensions ranging from 1 to 13 years; and performance
shortfalls, including safety problems. We found that one or more of
four factors”funding, requirements growth and/or unplanned work,
stakeholder involvement, and software complexity”have contributed to
these legacy challenges. While FAA met its recent acquisition goal, it
is important to note that this goal is based on updated program
milestones and cost targets for system acquisitions, not those set at
their inception. Consequently, they do not provide a consistent
benchmark for assessing progress over time. Also, as indicators of
annual progress, they cannot be used in isolation to measure progress
over the life of an acquisition.
Although additional steps are warranted, FAA has taken some positive
steps to address key legacy challenges it has had with acquiring major
systems under the modernization program. For example, the ATO has cut
funding for some major systems that were not meeting their goals and is
reassessing all capital investments to help ensure that priority
systems receive needed funding. The ATO has improved its management of
software-intensive acquisitions and information technology investments
and begun to more actively involve stakeholders. As we recommended, the
ATO plans to establish an overall policy to apply its process
improvement model to all software-intensive acquisitions. However,
additional steps could be taken to improve its management of system
acquisitions. For example, the ATO could use a knowledge-based approach
to managing system acquisitions, characteristic of best commercial
practices, to help avoid cost, schedule, and performance problems.
The ATO will also be challenged to modernize the ATC system under
constrained budget targets, which would provide FAA with about $2
billion less than it planned to spend through 2009. To fund its major
system acquisitions and remain within these targets, the ATO has
eliminated planned funding to start new projects and substantially
reduced planned funding for other areas. However, when forwarding its
budget submission for review by senior officials at FAA, DOT, the
Office of Management and Budget, and Congress, the ATO provides no
detail on the impact of the planned funding reductions on ATC
modernization and related activities to modernize the NAS. Our work
shows that the ATO should provide these decisionmakers with detailed
information in its budget submissions about the impact of funding
decisions on modernization efforts. Without this type of information,
decision-makers lack important details when considering FAA‘s annual
budget submissions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct FAA to
provide detailed information to Congress about the impact of planned
funding cuts on the agency‘s ability to modernize the ATC system, and
the National Airspace System (NAS).
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of
Transportation (DOT), FAA, and ATO said they generally agreed with the
report. They did not comment on the recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-331.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham,
(202) 512-2834, dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
FAA Has Had Difficulty Meeting Cost, Schedule, and/or Performance
Targets for Major System Acquisitions, but Made Progress in Fiscal Year
2004:
FAA Has Taken Some Positive Steps to Address Key Legacy Challenges, but
Additional Steps Are Warranted to Reduce Risk and Strengthen Oversight
A Constrained Budgetary Environment Could Further Challenge the ATO's
Efforts to Modernize the ATC System:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions
We Reviewed in Detail:
Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X):
Airport Surveillance Radar Model-11 (ASR-11):
Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon Interrogator-Replacement (ATCBI-6):
Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP):
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC):
En Route Communications Gateway (ECG):
En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM):
Free Flight Phase 2 (FFP2):
FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI):
Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS):
Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS):
Next Generation Air-to-Ground Communication (NEXCOM):
NAS Infrastructure Management System--Phase 2 (NIMS-2):
Operational and Supportability Implementation System (OASIS):
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS):
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS):
Appendix II: Information on the 39 Additional Systems under the ATC
Modernization Program:
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Changes in Cost and Schedule Targets for 16 Major ATC System
Acquisitions:
Table 2: Four Key Factors Contributing to Cost Growth, Schedule
Extensions, and/or Performance Problems for 13 ATC System Acquisitions:
Table 3: Description and Status of Nine Additional Major ATC System
Acquisitions with Cost, Schedule, and Performance Targets:
Table 4: Cost and Schedule Information for Nine Additional Major
Systems under the ATC Modernization Program:
Table 5: Cost and Schedule Information for the 30 Buy-It-by-the-Pound
Systems under the ATC Modernization Program:
Figures:
Figure 1: Sixteen Major Systems We Examined in Detail by Phase of
Flight:
Figure 2: ASDE-X Screen Depicting an Airport Layout with Active
Aircraft Targets:
Figure 3: Changes to ASDE-X Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 4: ASR-11 Equipment:
Figure 5: Changes to ASR-11 Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 6: ATCBI-6 Screen Display Depicting All Transponder-Equipped
Aircraft:
Figure 7: Changes to ATCBI-6 Cost and Schedule Targets:
Figure 8: ATOP Equipment Reporting Aircraft Position Information:
Figure 9: Changes to ATOP Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 10: CPDLC Text Message on an Aircraft Display:
Figure 11: Changes to CPDLC Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 12: ECG Maintenance Workstation Display:
Figure 13: Changes to ECG Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 14: Changes to ERAM Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 15: Free Flight Phase 2 User Request Evaluation Tool:
Figure 16: Changes to FFP2 Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 17: FTI Primary Network Operations Control Center:
Figure 18: Changes to FTI Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 19: ITWS Situation Display:
Figure 20: Changes to ITWS Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 21: Key Components of LAAS:
Figure 22: Changes to LAAS Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 23: Multimode Digital Radio:
Figure 24: Changes to NEXCOM Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 25: NIMS Infrastructure:
Figure 26: Changes to NIMS-Phase 2 Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 27: OASIS Dual Screen Display:
Figure 28: Changes to OASIS Schedule and Cost Estimates:
Figure 29: STARS Controller Workstation:
Figure 30: Changes to STARS Schedule and Cost Targets:
Figure 31: Key Components of WAAS:
Figure 32: Change to WAAS Schedule and Cost Targets:
Abbreviations:
ACE-IDS: Automated Surface Observing System Controller Equipment
Information Display System:
ADL: Aeronautical Data Link:
ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast:
AFSS: Automated Flight Service Stations:
ALSIP: Approach Lighting System Improvement Program:
AMS: Acquisition Management System:
ARCSCC: FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center:
ARTCC: Air Route Traffic Control Centers:
ARTS: Automated Radar Terminal System:
ASWON: Aviation Surface Weather Observation Network:
ASDE-X: Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X:
ASOS: Automated Surface Observing System:
ASR-9: Airport Surveillance Radar-Model 9:
ASR-11: Airport Surveillance Radar-Model 11:
ATC: Air Traffic Control:
ATCBI-6: Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator Replacement:
ATCT: Air Traffic Control Towers:
ATO: Air Traffic Organization:
ATOP: Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures:
AWOS: Automated Weather Observing System:
AWSS: Automated Weather Sensors Systems:
C3: Command, Control, and Communications:
CARTS: Common Automated Radar Terminal System:
CCS: Command Center Conference Control System:
CDM: Collaborative Decision Making:
CFE: Communications Facilities Enhancements:
CMMI: Capability Maturity Model Integration:
CNS: Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance:
CIWS: Corridor Integrated Weather System:
COTS: Commercial-Off-the-Shelf:
CPDLC: Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications:
CTS: Critical Telecommunications Support:
DME: Distance Measuring Equipment:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DSP: Departure Spacing Program:
E-Scan: Electronic Scan:
ECG: En Route Communication Gateway:
ERAM: En Route Automation Modernization:
ETVS: Enhanced Terminal Voice Switches:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FFP2: Free Flight Phase 2:
FIS: Flight Information Service:
FISDL: Flight Information Service Data Link:
FTI: FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure:
GAO: U.S. Government Accountability Office:
GNSS: Global Navigation Surveillance Systems:
HAATS: Houston Area Air Traffic System:
HOCSR: HOST/Oceanic Computer System Replacement:
IATS: Initial Academy Training System:
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization:
iCMM: integrated Capability Maturity Model:
ILS: Instrument Landing System:
IOC: Initial Operating Capability:
IT: Information Technology:
ITIM: Information Technology Investment Management:
ITWS: Integrated Terminal Weather System:
JRC: Joint Resources Council:
LAAS: Local Area Augmentation System:
LRR: Long-range Radar:
NAS: National Airspace System:
NDI: Non-Developmental Item:
NASR: National Airspace System Resources:
NEXCOM: Next Generation Air-to-Ground Communication System:
NEXRAD: Next Generation Weather Radar:
NIMS-2: National Airspace System Infrastructure Management System-Phase
2:
NOTAM: Notice to Airmen:
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board:
NWS: National Weather Service:
OASIS: Operational and Supportability Implementation System:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
ORD: Operational Readiness Date:
PRM: Precision Runway Monitor:
RFI: Radio Frequency Interference:
RIRP: Runway Incursion Reduction Program:
RTCA: Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics:
RVR: Runway Visual Range:
SAWS: Stand-alone Weather Sensors:
SF-21: Safe Flight 21 Program:
SLEP: Service Life Extension Program:
STARS: Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System:
TDLS: Tower Data Link Services:
TFM-I: Traffic Flow Management-Infrastructure:
TMA: Traffic Management Advisor:
UHF: Ultra High Frequency:
URET: User Request Evaluation Tool:
VOR: Very High Frequency Omni-directional Range:
VORTAC: Very High Frequency Omni-directional Collocated with Tactical
Air Navigation:
VRRP: Voice Recorder Replacement Program:
VSCS: Voice Switching and Control System:
WAAS: Wide Area Augmentation System:
WMSCR:
Letter June 10, 2005:
Congressional Requesters:
In 1981, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began what it
initially envisioned as a 10-year modernization program to upgrade and
replace the National Airspace System's (NAS) facilities and equipment
to meet projected increases in traffic volumes, enhance the system's
margin of safety, and increase the efficiency of the air traffic
control (ATC) system--a principal component of the NAS. To date, FAA
has spent $43.5 billion for its NAS modernization effort[Footnote 1]
and plans to spend an additional $9.6 billion through fiscal year 2009,
primarily to upgrade and replace ATC systems and facilities.[Footnote
2] For more than two decades, ATC system acquisitions under the NAS
modernization program[Footnote 3] have experienced significant cost
growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. As a result, the ATC
modernization program has been on our list of high-risk programs since
1995. To improve FAA's management of the modernization program,
Congress, in 1995, gave the agency acquisition and human capital
flexibilities,[Footnote 4] which FAA has largely implemented.
In 2000, Congress and the administration took further steps to improve
the modernization program's management. Through legislation and an
executive order, they laid the foundation for, among other things, a
performance-based organization to manage FAA's ATC investments and
operations and a chief operating officer to lead it. In response, FAA
hired a chief operating officer in August 2003 and created the Air
Traffic Organization (ATO)[Footnote 5] in February 2004. The ATO
inherited the decades-long legacy of cost, schedule, and/or performance
problems with major ATC system acquisitions and at the same time
received $400 million less for fiscal year 2005 than it had planned to
spend for ATC modernization. In addition, projected funding levels from
the administration are about $2 billion less than FAA had planned to
spend for fiscal years 2005 through 2009.
The ATC modernization program is critical to meeting future air traffic
safety, capacity, and efficiency needs. FAA reported that U.S. airlines
carried nearly 690 million passengers in 2004 and that it expects the
number of passengers to reach 1 billion by 2015. According to FAA, the
agency has spent about 58 percent, or $25.1 billion, of the $43.5
billion total for NAS modernization on system acquisitions designed to
replace or upgrade various ATC systems.
In light of past problems with and continuing concerns about funding
major ATC system acquisitions under the ATC modernization program, you
asked us to examine (1) FAA's experience in meeting cost, schedule,
and/or performance targets for major system acquisitions under its ATC
modernization program; (2) the steps FAA has taken to address long-
standing challenges with the ATC modernization program and additional
steps that are needed; and (3) the potential effects of the constrained
budget environment on FAA's ability to modernize the ATC system. To
address these objectives, we reviewed in detail 16 of the 55 system
acquisitions[Footnote 6] under the ATC modernization program, primarily
by interviewing FAA officials and obtaining and analyzing key
acquisition documents.[Footnote 7] We selected these 16 systems in July
2004, when this review was still a part of our broader work on FAA's
efforts to modernize the NAS.[Footnote 8],[Footnote 9] Specifically, we
selected the 16 ATC system acquisitions with the largest life-cycle
costs that met the following criteria: each system had cost, schedule,
and performance targets; was discussed in prior GAO and Department of
Transportation Inspector General (DOT IG) reports, had not been fully
implemented or deployed by 2004, and received funding in 2004. We
reviewed this list with FAA officials to ensure that we did not exclude
any significant system. In fiscal year 2005, these 16 major ATC system
acquisitions account for about 36 percent of FAA's facilities and
equipment budget.[Footnote 10] (See app. I for additional information
on these 16 systems.) We also collected information on the remaining 39
system acquisitions under this program, which account for about 19
percent of FAA's facilities and equipment account for fiscal year
2005.[Footnote 11] (See app. II for additional information on these 39
systems.) In addition, we reviewed past GAO and DOT IG reports. We
interviewed FAA officials within the recently created ATO and collected
and analyzed the documents they provided. We also interviewed officials
with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Air Transport
Association, Department of Defense (DOD), National Air Traffic
Controllers Association, and RTCA.[Footnote 12] Furthermore, we
convened a panel of international aviation experts.[Footnote 13] Our
review did not focus on FAA's efforts to modernize its airports and
other agency facilities. We conducted our review from November 2004
through May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. (See app. III for additional information on our
objectives, scope, and methodology.)
Results in Brief:
The ATO has shown progress during its first year of operation by
meeting its acquisition goal for fiscal year 2004. However, for more
than two decades, FAA has experienced cost growth, schedule extensions,
and/or performance problems in acquiring major systems under its ATC
modernization program and has been on our list of high-risk programs
since 1995.[Footnote 14] Since their inception, 13 of the 16 major
system acquisitions that we reviewed in detail for this engagement have
experienced cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls when assessed
against their original baselines or performance targets. Specifically,
the total cost for these 13 major system acquisitions ranged from $1.1
million to about $1.5 billion over their original cost targets. In
addition, these 13 system acquisitions also experienced schedule
extensions that ranged from 1 to 13 years[Footnote 15] over their
original schedule targets. Furthermore, several of these 13 system
acquisitions experienced performance shortfalls related to safety. Our
work indicates that one or more of the following four factors have
contributed to the legacy challenges FAA has experienced in meeting
system acquisitions' cost, schedule, and/or performance targets: (1)
receiving funding for acquisitions at lower levels than called for in
agency planning documents, (2) adding requirements and/or unplanned
work, (3) not sufficiently involving stakeholders throughout system
development, and (4) underestimating the complexity of software
development. Three of the major 16 ATC system acquisitions we reviewed
in detail are currently operating within their original cost, schedule,
and performance targets, despite challenges that are symptomatic of
past problems. To its credit, the ATO has reported that it met its
annual acquisition performance goal for fiscal year 2004: to meet 80
percent of designated milestones and maintain 80 percent of critical
program costs within 10 percent of the budget as published in its
Capital Investment Plan. However, in our opinion, having and meeting
such performance goals is commendable, but it is important to note that
these goals are updated program milestones and cost targets, not those
set at the program's inception.[Footnote 16] Consequently, they do not
provide a consistent benchmark for assessing progress over time.
Moreover, as indicators of annual progress, the goals cannot be used in
isolation to measure progress in meeting cost and schedule targets over
the life of an acquisition. Finally, given the problems FAA has had in
acquiring major ATC systems for over two decades, it is too soon to
tell whether meeting these annual performance goals will ultimately
improve the agency's ability to deliver system acquisitions as
promised.
FAA has taken a number of positive steps, primarily through the ATO, to
address key legacy challenges it has had with acquiring major systems
under its ATC modernization program; however, additional steps are
warranted to reduce risk and strengthen oversight. Some of the positive
steps taken directly address the four factors we identified as
contributing to cost, schedule, and/or performance problems, while
others support more general efforts to improve the modernization
program's management. For example, the ATO has demonstrated a
willingness to cut some major acquisitions that are not meeting their
performance targets, even after investments of significant resources,
and is reassessing all of its capital investments to help ensure that
high-priority system acquisitions receive needed funding. The ATO has
also improved its management of information technology investments and
software-intensive acquisitions; these efforts are positive steps
toward minimizing growth in requirements and unplanned work and better
assessing the complexity of software development. For example, on a
number of software-intensive acquisition projects, the ATO has applied
a process improvement model that resulted in positive outcomes such as
enhanced productivity and greater ability to predict schedules and
resources. As we recommended, FAA plans to institutionalize the use of
this model by establishing a policy to define the ATO's expectations
for process improvements and a plan to address and coordinate process
improvement activities throughout the organization.[Footnote 17] The
ATO has also begun to include stakeholders in all phases of system
development, so that they can provide input in response to technical or
financial developments. However, we have identified additional steps
that are needed to reduce risk and strengthen oversight. For example,
we found that the ATO does not use a knowledge-based approach to system
acquisitions, characteristic of best commercial practices for managing
commercial and DOD product developments, which would help avoid cost,
schedule, and/or performance problems.[Footnote 18] We recommended,
among other things, that FAA take several actions to more closely align
its acquisition management system with commercial best practices. FAA
said that our recommendations would be helpful to them as they continue
to refine this system. Continued improvement and management attention
will be crucial if the organization is to succeed in addressing key
legacy challenges.[Footnote 19]
The current constrained budget environment, which includes lower future
budget targets than those of recent years, poses further challenges to
the ATO as it attempts to modernize the ATC system. FAA plans to spend
$4.4 billion from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009 to fund key
modernization efforts; however, this funding level is about $2 billion
less than the agency had expected in appropriations for this 5-year
period. To fund its major system acquisitions while remaining within
the budget targets, the ATO has eliminated planned funding to start new
projects and reduced planned funding for other areas. However, when
forwarding its budget submission for review by senior FAA, DOT, and OMB
officials and by Congress, the ATO provides no detail on the impact of
the planned funding reductions on ATC modernization and related
activities to modernize the NAS. Our work shows that the ATO should
provide these officials and Congress with detailed information in its
budget submissions about the impact of reduced budgets on both ATC and
NAS modernization. To do so, the ATO should explicitly identify the
trade-offs it is making to reach budget targets, highlighting those
programs slated for increased funding and those slated for reduced
funding. Without this type of information, decision-makers lack
important details when considering FAA's annual budget submissions. We
are recommending that FAA provide this information to Congress
annually.
In commenting on draft of this report, DOT, FAA, and ATO generally
agreed with the report and provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate. The FAA officials said they are continuing
to consider our recommendation and indicated they would provide a
written statement required by 31 U.S.C. 720.[Footnote 20]
Background:
The mission of FAA, as a DOT agency, is to provide the safest, most
efficient aerospace system in the world. To fulfill its mission, FAA
must rely on an extensive use of technology, including many software-
intensive systems. FAA constantly relies on the adequacy and
reliability of the nation's ATC system, which comprises a vast network
of radars; automated data processing, navigation, and communications
equipment; and ATC facilities.[Footnote 21] Through this system, FAA
provides services such as controlling takeoffs and landings and
managing the flow of traffic between airports.
FAA is organized into several staff support offices and five lines of
business, which include Airports, Aviation Safety, Commercial Space
Transportation, the Office of Security and Hazardous Materials, and the
newly formed ATO.[Footnote 22] The ATO was formed in February 2004 to,
among other things, improve the provision of air traffic services and
accelerate modernization efforts. To create the ATO, FAA combined its
Research and Acquisition and Air Traffic Services into one performance-
based organization, bringing together those who acquire systems and
those who use them, respectively. The ATO is led by FAA's chief
operating officer, consists of 10 service units,[Footnote 23] and has
36,000 of FAA's 48,000 employees.
The ATO is the principal FAA organizational unit responsible for
acquiring ATC systems through the use of the agency's Acquisition
Management System (AMS). Because FAA formerly contended that some of
its modernization problems were caused by federal acquisition
regulations, Congress enacted legislation in November 1995 that
exempted the agency from most federal procurement laws and regulations
and directed FAA to develop and implement a new acquisition management
system that would address the unique needs of the agency. In April
1996, FAA implemented AMS. AMS was intended to reduce the time and cost
of fielding new system acquisitions by introducing (1) a new investment
system that spans the life cycle of an acquisition, (2) a new
procurement system that provides flexibility in selecting and managing
contractors, and (3) organizational and human capital reforms that
support the new acquisition system.
AMS provides high-level acquisition policy and guidance for selecting
and controlling ATC system acquisitions through all phases of the
acquisition life cycle, which is organized into a series of phases and
decision points that include (1) mission analysis, (2) investment
analysis, (3) solution implementation, and (4) in-service management.
To select system acquisitions, FAA has two processes--mission analysis
and investment analysis-that together constitute a set of policies and
procedures, as well as guidance, that enhance the agency's ability to
screen system acquisitions submitted for funding. Also through these
two processes, FAA assesses and ranks each system acquisition according
to its relative costs, benefits, risks, and contribution to FAA's
mission; a senior, corporate-level decision-making group then selects
system acquisitions for funding. After a system acquisition has been
selected, FAA officials are required to formally establish the life-
cycle cost, schedule, benefits, and performance targets--known as
acquisition program baselines,[Footnote 24] which are used to monitor
the status of the system acquisition throughout the remaining phases of
its life cycle.
Through its NAS modernization program, FAA is upgrading and replacing
ATC facilities and equipment to help improve the system's safety,
efficiency, and capacity. These systems involve improvement in the
areas of automation, communication, navigation and landing,
surveillance, and weather to support the following five phases of
flight (see fig. 1):
* Preflight-The pilot performs flight checks and the aircraft is pushed-
back from the gate. For preflight, we looked at Collaborative Decision
Making (CDM) and OASIS.
* Airport Surface-The aircraft taxis to the runway for takeoff or,
after landing, to the destination gate to park at the terminal. For
airport surface, we examined the Airport Surface Detection Equipment-
Model X (ASDE-X).
* Terminal Departure-The aircraft lifts off the ground and climbs to a
cruising altitude. For terminal departure, we examined the following
systems: Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR-11), Integrated Terminal
Weather System (ITWS), Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), Standard
Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS), and Traffic Management
Advisor (TMA).
* En route/Oceanic--The aircraft travels through one or more center
airspaces and approaches the destination airport. For en route and
oceanic, we examined the following systems: Air Traffic Control Radar
Beacon Interrogator-Replacement (ATCBI-6), Advanced Technologies and
Oceanic Procedures (ATOP), Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications
(CPDLC), and User Request Evaluation Tool (URET).
* Terminal Arrival--The pilot lowers, maneuvers, aligns, and lands the
aircraft on the destination airport's designated landing runway. For
terminal arrival, we looked at the systems already listed under
terminal departure: ASR-11, ITWS, LAAS, STARS, and TMA.
In addition, for the major ATC systems that support multiple phases of
flight, we examined the following systems: En Route Communications
Gateway (ECG), En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM), Next-
Generation Air-to-Ground Communication (NEXCOM), and Wide Area
Augmentation System (WAAS). Furthermore, for major ATC systems that
support NAS infrastructure, we examined FAA Telecommunications
Infrastructure (FTI) and NAS Infrastructure Management System (NIMS)-
Phase Two.[Footnote 25] (See app. I for additional information on these
16 systems.)
Figure 1: Sixteen Major Systems We Examined in Detail by Phase of
Flight:
[See PDF for image]
[A] CDM, TMA, and URET are decision support tools that fall under the
Free Flight program, which is currently called Free Flight Phase 2
(FFP2). We reviewed FFP2 as a single system acquisition.
[End of figure]
FAA Has Had Difficulty Meeting Cost, Schedule, and/or Performance
Targets for Major System Acquisitions, but Made Progress in Fiscal Year
2004:
For more than two decades, FAA has experienced cost growth, schedule
extensions, and/or performance problems in acquiring major systems
under its ATC modernization program and has been on our list of high-
risk programs since 1995. For example, 13 of the 16 major system
acquisitions we reviewed in detail continue to experience cost,
schedule, and/or performance shortfalls when assessed against their
original baselines. The three other major system acquisitions that we
reviewed in detail are currently operating within their original cost,
schedule, and performance targets, but are experiencing challenges
symptomatic of past problems. Of the remaining 39 system acquisitions
within the ATC modernization program, few have had problems meeting
cost and schedule targets.[Footnote 26] However, the ATO made progress
during its first year of operation by meeting its acquisition goal for
fiscal year 2004.
Thirteen of the 16 Major ATC System Acquisitions We Reviewed in Detail
Continue to Experience Shortfalls When Assessed against Original
Performance Targets:
Thirteen of the 16 major system acquisitions that we reviewed in detail
for this engagement under the ATC modernization program have continued
to experience cost growth, schedule delays, and/or performance problems
when assessed against their original performance targets (see table 1).
These major system acquisitions had total cost growth ranging from $1.1
million to about $1.5 billion over their original cost targets. In
addition, these systems required extensions in their initial deployment
schedules ranging from 1 to 13 years. Furthermore, several systems
experienced safety-related performance problems.
Table 1: Changes in Cost and Schedule Targets for 16 Major ATC System
Acquisitions:
Dollars in millions.
ATC system: Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X);
Original date: September 2001;
Cost targets: Original cost: $424.3;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $510.2;
Change: $85.9[A];
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2007;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2009[B];
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): 2.
ATC system: Airport Surveillance Radar Model-11 (ASR-11);
Original date: November 1997;
Cost targets: Original cost: $743;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $916;
Change: $173;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2005;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2013;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): 8.
ATC system: ATC Radar Beacon Interrogator-Replacement (ATCBI-6);
Original date: August 1997;
Cost targets: Original cost: $281.8;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $282.9;
Change: $1.10;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2004;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2008;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): 4.
ATC system: Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP);
Original date: June 2001;
Cost targets: Original cost: $548.2;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $548.2;
Change: None;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2006;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2006;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): None.
ATC system: Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC);
Original date: 1999;
Cost targets: Original cost: $166.7;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): To be determined;
Change: N/A;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: June 2005;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: To be determined;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): N/A.
ATC system: En Route Communications Gateway (ECG);
Original date: March 2002;
Cost targets: Original cost: $245.2;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $245.2;
Change: None;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2005;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2005;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): None.
ATC system: En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM);
Original date: June 2003;
Cost targets: Original cost: $2,150;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $2,150;
Change: None;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: December 2010;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: December 2010;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): None.
ATC system: Free Flight Phase 2 (FFP2);
Original date: June 2002;
Cost targets: Original cost: $546.2;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $546.2;
Change: None;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2006;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2007;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): 1.
ATC system: FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI);
Original date: July 1999;
Cost targets: Original cost: $205.7;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $310.2;
Change: $104.5[C];
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2008;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2008;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): None.
ATC system: Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS);
Original date: June 1997;
Cost targets: Original cost: $276.1;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $286.1;
Change: $10.0;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: July 2003;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2009+;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): 6+.
ATC system: Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS);
Original date: January 1998;
Cost targets: Original cost: $530.1;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $696.1;
Change: $166.0;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2006;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: To be determined;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): N/A.
ATC system: Next Generation Air-to-Ground Communication (NEXCOM);
Original date: September 1998;
Cost targets: Original cost: $405.7; (First segment only);
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $986.4; (First segment
only);
Change: $580.7;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2008;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: To be determined;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): N/A.
ATC system: NAS Infrastructure Management System-Phase 2 (NIMS-2);
Original date: May 2000;
Cost targets: Original cost: $172.9;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $172.9;
Change: None;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2005;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2010[D];
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): 5.
ATC system: Operational and Supportability Implementation System
(OASIS);
Original date: April 1997;
Cost targets: Original cost: $174.7;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $155.50;
Change: ($19.2);
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2001;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2004;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): 3.
ATC system: Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS);
Original date: February 1996;
Cost targets: Original cost: $940;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $1,460; (Phase 1 only);
Change: $520;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: 2005;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2008;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): 3.
ATC system: Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS);
Original date: 1994;
Cost targets: Original cost: $509;
Cost targets: Current cost (as of March 2005): $2,036[E];
Change: $1,527;
Last-site implementation targets: Original date: December 2000;
Last-site implementation targets: Current date: 2013;
Last-site implementation targets: Change (in years): 13.
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
N/A: Not applicable.
[A] According to FAA officials, the change in cost target for ASDE-X
was due to an increase in the scope of the project.
[B] FAA plans to extend ASDE-X's current deployment target from 2007 to
2009 because the project's budgets were cut in fiscal years 2004 and
2005.
[C] The increased costs were for requirements which, while included in
the original baseline, were unknown at the time the original baseline
was prepared.
[D] In light of reduced funding, FAA is revising NIMS-2's targets;
a Joint Resource Council decision is planned for May 2005.
[E] September 1999 and May 2004 estimates for WAAS development exclude
$1.3 billion in satellite communications leases.
[End of table]
For 12 of the 13 major system acquisitions[Footnote 27] we reviewed in
detail with cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls, one or more of
the following four key factors contributed to these shortfalls:
(1) The funding level received was less than called for in agency
planning documents. Most major ATC system acquisitions have cost,
schedule, and performance baselines that are approved by FAA's Joint
Resources Council--the agency's body responsible for approving and
overseeing major system acquisitions. Each baseline[Footnote 28]
includes annual funding levels that the council agrees are needed for a
system acquisition to meet its cost, schedule, and/or performance
targets. The estimated cost for a given year assumes that the program
received all funding for prior fiscal years as described in the
baseline. In practice, however, this is not always the case. For
example, when FAA's budget level does not allow all system acquisitions
to be fully funded at the levels approved in their baselines, FAA may
elect to fully fund higher-priority acquisitions and provide less
funding for lower-priority acquisitions than called for in their
baselines. When a system acquisition does not receive the annual
funding levels called for in its baseline, its ability to meet cost,
schedule, and/or performance targets can be jeopardized, for example,
by requiring the agency to defer funding for essential development or
deployment activities until sufficient funding becomes available,
which, in turn, could require FAA to maintain costly legacy systems
until a new system is deployed. Receiving less funding than the agency
approved for a given acquisition was a factor contributing to the
inability of 8 of the 16 major system acquisitions we reviewed in
detail to meet their cost, schedule, and/or performance targets. The
ASR-11 acquisition, a digital radar system, illustrates how reduced
funding has resulted in schedule delays. FAA officials stated that
because of funding reductions and reprogramming, the program received
$46.45 million less than requested for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and
program officials plan to request that the program's deployment
schedule be extended to 2013.[Footnote 29] According to FAA officials,
in general, schedules for system acquisitions may slip under such
circumstances (e.g., the rate of software development may be reduced
and planned hardware and software deployments may be delayed). The
ATO's chief operating officer testified in April 2005 that receiving
multiyear rather than annual funding from Congress for system
acquisitions would help FAA to address this problem by providing
funding stability for system acquisitions. In addition, according to a
senior DOT official, 50 percent of cost growth is a result of an
unstable funding stream.
(2) The system acquisition experienced requirements growth and/or
unplanned work. Requirements that are inadequate or poorly defined
prior to developing a system may contribute to the inability of system
acquisitions to meet their original cost, schedule, and/or performance
targets. In addition, unplanned development work can occur when the
agency misjudges the extent to which commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS)/nondevelopmental item (NDI)[Footnote 30] solutions, such as
those procured by another agency, will meet FAA's needs. Requirements
growth and/or unplanned work contributed to the inability of 7 of the
16 major system acquisitions we reviewed in detail to meet their cost,
schedule, and/or performance targets.
(3) Stakeholders were not sufficiently involved in design and
development: Insufficient involvement of relevant stakeholders, such as
air traffic controllers and maintenance technicians, throughout the
development and approval processes for a system acquisition can lead to
costly changes in requirements and unplanned work late in the
development process. Not involving stakeholders sufficiently
contributed to the inability of 4 of the 16 major system acquisitions
to meet their cost, schedule, and/or performance targets.
(4) The complexity of software development was underestimated.[Footnote
31] Underestimating the complexity of developing software for system
acquisitions or the difficulty of modifying available software to
fulfill FAA's mission needs may contribute to unexpected software
development, higher costs, and schedule delays. Underestimation
contributed to the inability of 3 of the 16 major system acquisitions
we reviewed in detail to meet their cost, schedule, and/or performance
targets. (See table 2.)
Table 2: Four Key Factors Contributing to Cost Growth, Schedule
Extensions, and/or Performance Problems for 13ATC System Acquisitions:
Name of system: ASDE-X;
The funding level received was less than called for in agency planning
documents.
Name of system: ASR-11;
The funding level received was less than called for in agency planning
documents;
The system acquisition experienced requirements growth and/or unplanned
work.
Name of system: ATCBI-6;
The funding level received was less than called for in agency planning
documents.
Name of system: CPDLC;
The system acquisition experienced requirements growth and/or unplanned
work.
Name of system: FFP2;
The funding level received was less than called for in agency planning
documents.
Name of system: ITWS;
The funding level received was less than called for in agency planning
documents;
The system acquisition experienced requirements growth and/or unplanned
work;
The complexity of software development was underestimated.
Name of system: LAAS;
The system acquisition experienced requirements growth and/or unplanned
work;
The complexity of software development was underestimated;
Stakeholders were not sufficiently involved.
Name of system: NEXCOM;
The funding level received was less than called for in agency planning
documents;
The system acquisition experienced requirements growth and/or unplanned
work.
Name of system: NIMS-2;
The funding level received was less than called for in agency planning
documents;
The system acquisition experienced requirements growth and/or unplanned
work.
Name of system: OASIS;
The funding level received was less than called for in agency planning
documents;
The system acquisition experienced requirements growth and/or unplanned
work;
Stakeholders were not sufficiently involved.
Name of system: STARS;
The system acquisition experienced requirements growth and/or unplanned
work;
Stakeholders were not sufficiently involved.
Name of system: WAAS;
The complexity of software development was underestimated;
Stakeholders were not sufficiently involved.
Name of system: FTI[A]; N/A.
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
Note: Blank spaces in the chart denote that the specific factor was not
a key contributor to a program's inability to meet cost, schedule, or
performance targets.
[End of table]
AFTI was not directly impacted by any of these four factors, but did
experience cost growth.
Several of the 16 major systems acquisitions we reviewed in detail
effectively illustrate how these four factors can interact to
contribute to cost growth, schedule extensions, and performance
problems. For example, for WAAS, a precision approach and landing
system augmented by satellites, two of the four key factors came into
play: underestimation of software complexity and insufficient
stakeholder involvement. Specifically, FAA underestimated the
complexity of the software that would be needed to support this system
when it accelerated the implementation of performance targets, which
included moving up the commissioning of WAAS by 3 years. FAA originally
planned to commission WAAS by 2000; however, at the urging of
government and aviation industry groups in the 1990s, it decided to
change the commissioning date to 1997. FAA then tried to develop, test,
and deploy WAAS within 28 months, although the software development
alone was expected to take 24 to 28 months.
In retrospect, FAA acknowledged that the agency's in-house technical
expertise was not sufficient to address WAAS's technical challenges and
that expert stakeholders should have been involved earlier. Although
WAAS was being developed by an integrated product team that included
representatives from several FAA offices, the team did not effectively
resolve problems in meeting a required performance capability--that
pilots be warned in a timely manner when a system may be giving them
potentially misleading and therefore hazardous information.
Consequently, in 2000, FAA convened a panel of expert stakeholders to
help it meet this requirement. These actions resulted in unplanned work
and contributed to the rise in WAAS's cost from the original estimate
of $509 million in 1994 to $2.036 billion in 2005, and to a 6-year
extension in its commissioning date. According to FAA, adding 6 years
to the program's life cycle also contributed to increased
costs.[Footnote 32]
Another example involves STARS, a joint program of FAA and DOD that
replaced outdated monochromatic controller workstation monitors with
multicolor monitors in ATC facilities. While joint FAA and DOD
acquisitions offer the opportunity to leverage federal resources, in
the case of STARS, the interaction of insufficient stakeholder
involvement and subsequent unplanned work contributed to cost growth
and schedule extensions. Specifically, FAA and DOD decided to acquire
COTS equipment, rather than developing a new system. This strategy
envisioned immediately deploying STARS to the highest priority ATC
facilities and making further improvements later, thereby avoiding the
increasing cost of maintaining the legacy system. However, this
strategy provided for only limited evaluation by FAA and DOD
controllers and maintenance technicians during the system's development
phase, although these employees were identified as stakeholders in
developing the system's requirements. While DOD controllers adopted and
began using the original COTS version of STARS, FAA elected to modify
the acquisition strategy and suspended the STARS deployment to address
FAA controller and technician concerns with the new system. These
concerns included, for example, that many features of the old equipment
could be operated with knobs, allowing controllers to focus on the
screen. By contrast, STARS was menu-driven and required the controllers
to make several keystrokes and use a trackball, diverting their
attention from the screen. The maintenance technicians also identified
differences between STARS and its backup system that made it difficult
to monitor the system. For example, the visual warning alarms and the
color codes identifying problems were not the same for the two systems.
According to FAA, the original COTS acquisition strategy that limited
the involvement of controllers and maintenance technicians to just
prior to deployment caused unplanned work for the agency because it had
to revise its strategy for acquiring and approving STARS;
this contributed to an increase in the overall cost of STARS of $500
million and a schedule extension of 5 years to deploy the system to its
first site. The interaction of these factors also contributed to the
agency's ability to deploy STARS at only 47 of the 172 facilities
initially planned. As of February 2005, FAA was developing a long-term
acquisition plan to modernize or upgrade the highest-priority Terminal
Radar Approach Control facilities that direct aircraft in the airspace
that extends from the point where the tower's control ends to about 50
nautical miles from the airport. The plan consists of alternatives to
STARS, including the existing Common Automated Radar Terminal System
(CARTS), which STARS was designed to replace.[Footnote 33] Finally, to
help avoid similar problems in the future, stemming from the
insufficient involvement of stakeholders during critical phases of a
system's design, development, and implementation, FAA has been more
proactive in involving the stakeholders that will operate and maintain
system acquisitions.
A final example of how these factors can interact is FAA's acquisition
of OASIS, which is designed to replace outdated technology in FAA's
automated flight service stations. The new system is intended to
improve the ability of air traffic specialists[Footnote 34] to process
flight plans, deliver weather information, and provide search and
rescue services to general aviation pilots. In August 1997, FAA awarded
a contract to replace the Flight Service Automation System and console
workstations. However, unplanned work, insufficient involvement of
stakeholders, and lower funding than the agency had determined was
needed to meet cost, schedule, and performance targets have together
contributed to cost growth and schedules extensions. For example, the
agency saw the system acquisition schedule slip because of a larger-
than-planned development effort. According to the DOT IG, FAA
identified a number of significant concerns, including the inadequate
weather graphics capabilities for air traffic specialists. In our view,
this indicates that stakeholders were not sufficiently involved
throughout the system's design and development phases. As a result, FAA
eliminated the option of COTS procurement. In addition, the OASIS
program was rebaselined in March 2000, when the system acquisition
received only $10 million of the $21.5 million called for in its
baseline for that year. This reduction in funding reduced the rate of
software development, delayed and reduced the rate of planned hardware
and console deployments, and led to the incremental deployment of
operational software. This contributed to a delay in the first-site
implementation from July 1998 to July 2002. According to FAA officials,
because OASIS received less funding than the agency had approved for
fiscal year 2004 and 2005, its deployment to automated flight service
stations was postponed.
As of February 2005, FAA had deployed 19 OASIS units: 16 at automated
flight service stations and 3 at other sites. Software upgrades that
are under way will be completed by June 2005. FAA plans neither
installations nor software upgrades beyond those at the automated
sites, because the agency awarded a contract to a private vendor in
February 2005 to operate flight service stations. Until then, FAA has
directed the program to remain within its current Capital Investment
Plan funding levels for fiscal years 2004 through 2006.[Footnote 35]
According to FAA, since it completed its evaluation of OASIS in
February 2005, planning for the program's implementation and baseline
remain unchanged. FAA plans to phase out OASIS between March 2006 and
March 2007 in accordance with the new service provider's transition
plan.
Three of the Major ATC System Acquisitions We Reviewed in Detail
Currently Operate within Their Original Cost, Schedule, and Performance
Targets, Despite Challenges:
Three of the 16 major ATC system acquisitions we reviewed in detail are
currently operating within their original cost, schedule, and
performance targets; however they have experienced challenges,
including symptoms of one or more of the four factors cited earlier,
such as requirements growth. These system acquisitions include (1) ECG,
a communications system gateway that serves as the point of entry and
exit for data used by FAA personnel to provide air traffic control at
20 en route facilities; (2) ERAM, a replacement for the primary
computer system used to control air traffic; and (3) ATOP, an
integrated system for processing flight data for oceanic flights.
While ECG has not exceeded its original cost, schedule, and performance
targets, it encountered requirements growth when FAA added a new
capability to address a security weakness. According to FAA officials,
correcting this weakness cost about $25,000, and an additional $480,000
will likely be needed to improve the monitoring capability for this
system's operation. However, these cost increases will not exceed the
system's cost or schedule targets. ERAM and ATOP also have areas that
warrant attention. For example, ERAM is a high-risk effort because of
its size and the amount of software that needs to be developed--over 1
million lines of code are expected to be written for this effort. In
addition, the DOT IG reports that, to date, ERAM has experienced
software growth of about 70,000 lines of code. While the DOT IG
considers this amount of software growth to be modest, given FAA's long-
standing difficulties with developing this volume of software for
system acquisitions while remaining within cost, schedule, and/or
performance targets, sustained management attention is warranted. For
ATOP, when FAA tried to accelerate the initial deployment of this
system by 14 months, it was unable to do so, because of poorly defined
requirements, unrealistic schedule estimates, and inadequate evaluation
by the contractor. In addition, according to contract provisions, FAA
assumed responsibility in February 2005 for the cost of resolving any
additional software problems it identifies.
Overall, although these system acquisitions are currently operating
within their cost, schedule, and performance targets, the challenges
they have experienced thus far indicate that they will require the
sustained attention of FAA's senior managers to help ensure that they
stay on track.[Footnote 36]
FAA Has Experienced Cost Growth and Schedule Extensions for the
Remaining 39 System Acquisitions under the ATC Modernization Program:
For the 39 system acquisitions that make up the balance of FAA's ATC
modernization program, only 9 are considered "major" or directly
comparable to the 16 major ATC system acquisitions we reviewed in
detail.[Footnote 37](See table 3.) Of these 9 major systems, 2 have
required changes in their cost targets. For example, for an automated
weather observation system, the Aviation Surface Weather Observation
Network,[Footnote 38] the cost has increased by 15 percent because of
system capacity issues, among other things. For another system that
will be used on an interim basis for managing air traffic until the new
primary computer system is available, the Host and Oceanic Computer
System Replacement, the cost has decreased by 13 percent because the
agency determined that parts of the existing system could be sustained
through fiscal year 2008, which is within the scope of the
program.[Footnote 39] The remaining 30 systems are not directly
comparable, because they do not involve acquiring a new system.
Instead, they are what FAA terms "buy-it-by-the pound" purchases--
systems that are commercially available and ready for FAA to use
without modification, such as a landing system purchased to replace one
that has reached the end of its useful life. (See app. II for
additional information on these 39 systems.)
Table 3: Description and Status of Nine Additional Major ATC System
Acquisitions with Cost, Schedule, and Performance Targets:
Dollars in millions.
HOST/Oceanic Computer System Replacement (HOCSR) - The HOCSR program
replaces the main ATC computer processor and some peripherals, while
ensuring the supportability of other peripherals until they are
replaced by En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM);
Development costs: Original: $424.10;
Development costs: Current: $368.50;
Deployment schedule: Original: Start: December 1998;
Finish: June 2004;
Deployment schedule: Current: Start: December 1998;
Finish: April 2004.
Command Center Conference Control System (CCS)-Replace OTS-This ongoing
program involves replacing the existing telephone system at the FAA Air
Traffic Control System Command Center (ARCSCC) in Herndon, Va. The
existing telephone system is becoming unsupportable and can no longer
perform ARCSCC command functions;
Development costs: Original: $12.70;
Development costs: Current: $12.70;
Deployment schedule: Original: Start: Fiscal Year 2005;
Finish: Fiscal Year 2005;
Deployment schedule: Current: Start: Fiscal Year 2005;
Finish: Fiscal Year 2005.
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Radio Replacement-The UHF radio replacement
project replaces aging equipment used to communicate with DOD aircraft.
FAA maintains the UHF air and/or ground communication service for air
traffic control of military operations in the United States;
Development costs: Original: $85.15;
Development costs: Current: $85.15;
Deployment schedule: Original: Start: Fiscal Year 2003;
Finish: Fiscal Year 2010;
Deployment schedule: Current: Start: Fiscal Year 2010;
Finish: Fiscal Year 2010.
Capstone Phase 1-Capstone is a congressionally directed demonstration
program primarily intended to improve aviation system safety in Alaska
through the introduction of new communications, navigation, and
surveillance technologies. The Capstone program is a part of a larger
program known as the Safe Flight 21 Program (SF-21), which is designed
to establish pockets of broadcast service technology enhancements to
support the demonstration of new technology-driven safety and
efficiency benefits;
Development costs: Original: $18.55;
Development costs: Current: $18.55;
Deployment schedule: Original: Start: Fiscal Year 2000;
Finish: Fiscal Year 2003;
Deployment schedule: Current: Start: N/A;
Finish: N/A.
ASR-9/Mode S Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)-The ASR-9 program
provides aircraft detection and separation services at congested
airports, which reduces aircraft delays and improves safety;
Development costs: Original: $186.50;
Development costs: Current: $186.50;
Deployment schedule: Original: Start: TBD;
Finish: TBD;
Deployment schedule: Current: Start: TBD;
Finish: TBD.
Precision Runway Monitor (PRM)-The PRM system is an accurate,
electronic scan radar that tracks and processes aircraft targets at a 1-
second update rate;
Development costs: Original: $145.80;
Development costs: Current: $145.80;
Deployment schedule: Original: Start: October 1997;
Finish: 2007;
Deployment schedule: Current: Start: October 1997;
Finish: January 2007.
En Route System Modification-This program will replace obsolete en
route components, such as processors;
upgrade the controllers' displays and the infrastructure that supports
those displays;
and configure the consoles to accommodate additional processors;
Development costs: Original: $201.90;
Development costs: Current: $201.90;
Deployment schedule: Original: Start: N/A;
Finish: May 2009;
Deployment schedule: Current: Start: N/A;
Finish: N/A.
Initial Academy Training System (IATS)-This high-fidelity training
system for the FAA Academy will enable the training of an increasing
number of new air traffic controllers as the existing workforce
retires;
Development costs: Original: $23.35;
Development costs: Current: $23.35;
Deployment schedule: Original: Start: September 2005;
Finish: September 2005;
Deployment schedule: Current: Start: September 2005;
Finish: September 2005.
Aviation Surface Weather Observation Network (ASWON)-The primary
purpose of ASWON is to support FAA and National Weather Service (NWS)
modernization by automating surface weather observation to meet the
needs of pilots, operators, and air traffic personnel without incurring
the high costs of labor-intensive manual surface weather observations;
Development costs: Original: $350.90;
Development costs: Current: $403.80;
Deployment schedule: Original: Start: September 2002;
Finish: September 2010;
Deployment schedule: Current: Start: Unknown;
Finish: Unknown.
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
[End of table]
To its credit, FAA has reported that it met its annual acquisition
performance goal for fiscal year 2004--to meet 80 percent of designated
milestones and maintain 80 percent of critical program costs within 10
percent of the budget as published in its Capital Investment
Plan.[Footnote 40] Specifically, it set annual performance cost goals
and schedule milestones for 41 of the 55 system acquisitions under the
ATC modernization program. For these 41 system acquisitions, FAA set 51
schedule milestones and met 46 of them--with "meeting the goal" defined
as achieving 80 percent of its designated program milestones. It also
set and met its annual cost performance goals for each of these 41
system acquisitions. In our opinion, having and meeting such
performance goals is commendable, but it is important to note that
these goals are updated program milestones and cost targets, not those
set at the program's inception.[Footnote 41] Consequently, they do not
provide a consistent benchmark for assessing progress over time.
Moreover, as indicators of annual progress, they cannot be used in
isolation to measure progress in meeting cost and schedule targets over
the life of an acquisition. Finally, given the problems FAA has had in
acquiring major ATC systems for over two decades, it is too soon to
tell whether meeting these annual performance goals will ultimately
improve the agency's ability to deliver system acquisitions as
promised.
FAA Has Taken Some Positive Steps to Address Key Legacy Challenges, but
Additional Steps Are Warranted to Reduce Risk and Strengthen Oversight:
FAA has taken a number of positive steps, primarily through the ATO, to
address key legacy challenges in acquiring major systems under its ATC
modernization program; however, we have identified additional steps
that are warranted to reduce risk and strengthen oversight. Some of the
steps FAA has taken directly address the four factors we identified as
contributing to cost, schedule, and/or performance problems, while
others support more general efforts to improve the modernization
program's management. The steps taken and additional steps needed are
discussed below by key areas.
Steps Taken to Address the Four Factors We Identified As Contributing
to Performance Shortfalls and Additional Steps Needed:
To address the concern that some system acquisitions have had
difficulty meeting performance targets because they have not received
annual funding at the levels called for in key planning documents, the
ATO has taken several steps. For example, the ATO has demonstrated a
willingness to cut major programs that were not meeting their
performance targets even after a significant investment of agency
resources. The ATO is currently reviewing all of its capital projects
to reassess priorities. Both of these actions should help improve the
chances that sufficient funding will be available for priority system
acquisitions to conduct the annual activities necessary to keep them on
track to meet cost, schedule, and performance targets.
Specifically, for fiscal year 2005, the appropriation for FAA's
facilities and equipment budget, which funds the ATC modernization
program, was $393 million less than the agency had planned to spend.
FAA absorbed the $393 million reduction largely by cutting funding for
three of the major system acquisitions we reviewed in detail: a digital
e-mail-type capability between controllers and pilots was suspended
(CPDLC);the next generation air-to-ground communication system had the
funding cut for a major component (NEXCOM); and a precision-landing
system augmented by satellites for use primarily by commercial airlines
(LAAS) was returned to research and development to focus the remaining
funding for the system on resolving a key performance shortfall. FAA
also plans to defer funding for CPDLC and LAAS for fiscal year 2006.
FAA decisions to cut or eliminate funding for system acquisitions in
its current ATC modernization system may prove to be positive in the
long run. For example, although FAA and National Air Traffic
Controllers Association officials say that the cuts the agency made to
3 of its 16 major ATC system acquisitions will delay system benefits
until the acquisitions are fully developed and deployed, the cuts
demonstrate FAA's willingness to suspend major ATC system acquisitions,
despite large resource investments. In addition, by delaying a system
acquisition, FAA may later be able to save time and money by leveraging
the experiences that others have had with developing and deploying
systems that provide similar capabilities (e.g., the controller-pilot e-
mail-type capability for which FAA cut funding is now in use in both
Canada and Europe). Furthermore, as FAA continues to reassesses its
funding priorities, it could explore cost-saving options including
taking steps to systematically (1) evaluate the costs and benefits of
continuing to fund system acquisitions across the ATC modernization
program at current and planned levels to identify potential areas for
savings and (2) identify potentially lower-cost alternatives to current
system acquisitions, such as lower-cost controller workstations.
FAA has also taken a number of steps to address two other factors--
reduce the risk of requirements growth and/or the need to undertake
unplanned work--and to improve its ability to better assess and manage
the risks associated with acquiring major ATC systems that require
complex software development. However, additional steps are needed in
these areas.
* Processes for acquiring software and systems: FAA has made progress
in improving its process for acquiring software-intensive systems--
including establishing a framework for improving its system management
processes, and performing many of the desired practices for selected
FAA projects.[Footnote 42] The quality of these systems and software,
which are essential to FAA's ATC modernization program, depends on the
value and maturity of the processes used to acquire, develop, manage,
and maintain them. In response to our previous recommendations, FAA
developed an FAA-integrated capability maturity model (iCMM). Since FAA
implemented the model, a growing number of system acquisitions have
adopted the model, and its use has paid off in enhanced productivity,
higher quality, greater ability to predict schedules and resources,
better morale, and improved communication and teamwork. However, ATO
did not mandate the use of the process improvement model for all
software-intensive acquisition projects. In response to our
recommendation, the ATO informed us of its plans to establish, by June
30, 2005, an overall policy defining the ATO's expectations for process
improvement, and by September 30, 2005, a process improvement plan to
address and coordinate improvement activities throughout the
organization.
* Management of information technology investments: In 2004, we
reported that FAA has made considerable progress in managing its
information technology investments.[Footnote 43]However, we also found
that FAA's lack of regular review of investments that are more than 2
years into their operations is a weakness in the agency's ability to
oversee more than $1 billion of its information technology investments
as a total package of competing investment options and pursue those
that best meet the agency's goals. FAA recently informed us that it has
taken a number of steps aimed at achieving a higher maturity level,
including establishing service-level mission need statements and
service-level reviews, which address operational systems to ensure that
they are achieving the expected level of performance. While these steps
could resolve some of the deficiencies that we previously reported, we
have not yet performed our own evaluation of these steps. FAA could
potentially realize considerable savings or performance improvements if
these reviews result in the discontinuation of some investments, since
operating systems beyond their second year of service accounted for 37
percent of FAA's total investment in information technology in fiscal
year 2004.
* Enterprise architecture: FAA has established a project office to
develop a NAS enterprise architecture--a blueprint for modernization--
and designated a chief architect, and has committed resources to this
effort, and issued its latest version of its architecture.[Footnote 44]
However, FAA has not yet taken key steps to improve its architecture
development, such as designating a committee or group representing the
enterprise to direct, oversee, or approve the architecture;
establishing a policy for developing, maintaining, and implementing the
architecture; or fully developing architecture products that meet
contemporary guidance and describe both the "As Is" and "To Be"
environments and developing a sequencing plan for transitioning between
the two.
To help address concerns that stakeholders have not been sufficiently
involved throughout the development of major systems acquisitions, FAA
has taken a number of steps. For example, when the ATO was created, it
brought together the FAA entities that develop systems and those who
will ultimately use them. Specifically, it reorganized FAA's air
traffic services and research and acquisition organizations along
functional lines of business to bring stakeholders together and
integrate goals. The ATO is also continuing with a phased approach to
system acquisitions that it began using under Free Flight Phase
1,[Footnote 45] through which it has begun to involve stakeholders more
actively throughout a system acquisition's development and deployment.
However, as we reported in November 2004, FAA needs to take additional
steps to ensure the continued and active involvement of stakeholders in
certifying new ATC system acquisitions.[Footnote 46] In addition, the
union that represents the specialists who install, maintain,
troubleshoot, and certify NAS systems, recently testified that over the
past 2 years, FAA has systematically eliminated the participation of
these specialists in all but a few modernization programs.[Footnote 47]
Given the importance of stakeholder involvement in the development and
deployment of new ATC systems, their continued involvement in ATC
modernization efforts will be important to help avoid the types of
problems that led to cost growth and delays for STARS.
Other Steps FAA Has Taken to Improve the Modernization Program's
Management and Additional Steps That Are Needed:
Reassessment of capital investment to decrease operating costs: Both
the FAA Administrator and the ATO's chief operating officer have
committed to basing future funding decisions for system acquisitions on
their contribution to reducing the agency's operating costs while
maintaining safety. This is consistent with our 2004 recommendation
that FAA consider its total portfolio of investments as a package of
competing options. Currently, only 1 of the 55 system acquisitions in
FAA's ATC modernization program--FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure--
helps to reduce the agency's operating costs. Most of FAA's major
system acquisitions are aimed at increasing the capacity of the NAS and
delivering benefits to system users. The ATO is in the process of
reviewing all of its capital investments, including system acquisitions
under the ATC modernization program, to identify areas of cost savings
and to focus limited funding on investments that will reduce operating
costs. However, because FAA has only recently begun to incorporate this
type of analysis of the costs and operational efficiency of system
acquisitions into the decision-making and management processes, it is
too early to assess the results.
Acquisition Management System: The ATO has taken a number of steps to
improve its Acquisition Management System (AMS). For example, it has
revised AMS to require that acquisition planning documents be prepared
in a format consistent with that prescribed by OMB for use in
justifying all major capital investments. In addition, the ATO revised
AMS in December 2004, in part to respond to recommendations we made
about needed changes in its investment management practices for
information technology.[Footnote 48] However, we have not yet
independently assessed the sufficiency of these changes. Moreover,
additional changes to AMS are warranted. For example, while AMS
provides some discipline for acquiring major ATC systems, it does not
use a knowledge-based approach to acquisitions, characteristic of best
commercial and DOD practices. A knowledge-based approach includes using
established criteria to attain specific knowledge at three critical
junctures in the acquisition cycle, which we call knowledge points, and
requiring oversight at the corporate executive level for each of these
knowledge points. Experience has shown that not attaining the level of
knowledge called for at each knowledge point increases the risk of cost
growth and schedule delays.[Footnote 49] We recommended, among other
things, that FAA take several actions to more closely align its
acquisition management system with commercial best practices. FAA said
that our recommendations would be helpful to them as they continue to
refine this system.
Cost accounting and cost estimating practices: FAA has improved its
financial management by moving forward with the development of a cost
accounting system, which it plans to fully deploy by 2006. Ultimately,
FAA plans to use this cost information routinely in its decision-
making. When implemented, this cost accounting system will address a
long-standing GAO concern that FAA has not had the needed cost
accounting practices in place to effectively manage software-intensive
investments, which characterize many of agency's major ATC system
acquisitions. This type of information can be used to improve future
estimates of cost for these acquisitions.[Footnote 50]
Organizational culture: FAA has also sought to establish an
organizational culture that supports sound acquisitions. We have
ongoing work to assess FAA's efforts concerning cultural change.
ATO business practices: To improve its investment management decision-
making and oversight of major ATC acquisitions, the ATO has informed us
that it has initiated the following steps, which we have reported are
important to effective oversight:[Footnote 51]
* integrated AMS and OMB's Capital Planning and Investment Control
Process to develop a process for analyzing, tracking, and evaluating
the risks and results of all major capital investments made by FAA;
* conducted Executive Council[Footnote 52] reviews of project breaches
of 5 percent in cost, schedule, and/or performance to better manage
cost growth;
* issued monthly variance reports to upper management to keep them
apprised of cost and schedule trends; and:
* increased the use of cost monitoring or earned value
management[Footnote 53] systems to improve oversight of programs.
However, much work remains before the ATO will have key business
practices in place.
Specifically, according to the ATO's chief operating officer, it will
be at least 2 years before the ATO has completed the basic management
processes needed to use the new financial management systems it has
been putting in place.
Despite progress to date, until the agency addresses the residual
issues cited above, it will continue to risk the project management
problems affecting cost, schedule, and/or performance that have
hampered its ability to acquire systems for improving air traffic
control.
A Constrained Budgetary Environment Could Further Challenge the ATO's
Efforts to Modernize the ATC System:
The ATO will be further challenged to modernize the ATC system in the
current constrained budget environment and remain within the
administration's future budget targets, which are lower than those of
recent years. Specifically, for fiscal year 2005, FAA requested $393
million less than it had planned to spend for activities under the
facilities and equipment budget account, which funds the ATC
modernization program and related modernization activities. In
addition, the President's fiscal year 2006 budget submission calls for
an additional cut to this budget account of $77 million from FAA's
planned level, which would bring the fiscal year 2006 funding level to
about $470 million below the fiscal year 2004 appropriation. Moreover,
FAA officials told us that funding for the facilities and equipment
account is likely to hold near fiscal year 2004 levels, or at about
$2.5 billion annually, for the next 5 years. In total, FAA plans to
spend $4.4 billion during fiscal years 2005 through 2009 on key
modernization efforts, despite FAA receiving about $2 billion less than
it had planned in appropriations over this 5-year period for its
facilities and equipment budget, which funds the ATC modernization
program and related modernization activities.
To fund its major system acquisitions while remaining within the
administration's budget targets, the ATO has eliminated planned funding
to start new projects and substantially reduced planned funding for
other areas. These funding decisions are reflected in FAA's updated
Capital Investment Plan. This plan shows substantially reduced funding
for two major system acquisitions in fiscal year 2005--CPDLC and LAAS-
-and defers funding for them in fiscal year 2006. For the remaining 14
major ATC system acquisitions we reviewed in detail, FAA plans to
increase funding by $533 million between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal
year 2009. In contrast, for the remaining 39 system acquisitions, FAA
has reduced funding by $420 million for this period.
The planned increases in funding for these 14 major system acquisitions
also come at the expense of other modernization activities outside the
ATC modernization program, such as capital expenditures to replace
aging ATC facilities that will house the system acquisitions. For
example, FAA reports that it needs $2.5 billion (2005 dollars) annually
to renew its aging physical infrastructure--assuming a $30 billion
value of its assets and a 7-to 12-year useful life. According to the
ATO, much of its physical infrastructure, including the buildings and
towers that house costly ATC systems, is over 30 years old and needs to
be refurbished or replaced.[Footnote 54] However, FAA plans to reduce
funding for facilities by nearly $790 million between fiscal year 2005
and fiscal year 2009--a plan that runs counter to its reported need to
refurbish or replace its physical infrastructure. Furthermore, FAA also
plans to cut $1.4 billion from its spending plans for fiscal years 2005
through 2009 for, among other things, new system acquisitions in the
ATC modernization pipeline that do not yet have agency-approved cost,
schedule, and performance targets or baselines (e.g., a new technology
that would allow pilots to "see" the location of other aircraft on
cockpit display).[Footnote 55]
Our work has shown that FAA has taken some important steps to
prioritize the 55 system acquisitions under its ATC modernization
program. These revised priorities are reflected in its most recent
plans, which detail the areas where FAA plans to make cuts within its
facilities and equipment budget to live within its expected means
during fiscal years 2005 through 2009. However, our work has also shown
that these plans do not provide detailed information about the trade-
offs that are underlie decisions to fully fund some systems and to
defer, reduce, or eliminate funding for others and how these cuts will
affect FAA's modernization efforts, including what impact they will
have on interdependent system acquisitions. To convey information to
decision-makers on the impact of reduced funding on modernization, the
ATO should detail its rationale and explicitly identify the trade-offs
it is making to reach the administration's budget targets, highlighting
those programs slated for increased funding and those slated for
reduced funding. Key information includes delayed benefits, the impact
of cutting one ATC system acquisition on related or interdependent
systems, and increased costs for maintaining legacy systems until new
systems are deployed. Overall, the ATO needs to explicitly identify the
implications of deferring, reducing, or cutting funding for a
particular system or activity on the agency's ability to modernize both
the ATC system and related components of the NAS in the near, mid, and
longer term. While funding deferrals, reductions, and cuts to ATC
system acquisitions and related activities in FAA's facilities and
equipment budget may be beneficial and necessary in the long run, it is
important for senior agency, department, OMB, and congressional
decision-makers to have complete information to make informed decisions
about the trade-offs that are being made when they consider annual
budget submissions.
As part of our research, we sought the perspective of an international
group of experts, who also suggested that the ATO should provide the
administration and Congress with detailed information in its budget
submissions about the impact of reduced budgets on both ATC and NAS
modernization.[Footnote 56] These experts were a part of an
international panel of aviation experts we convened to address, among
other issues, how federal budget constraints have affected ATC
modernization and what steps the ATO could take in the short term to
address these constraints.
For example, aviation experts emphasized the need for the ATO--which is
now the organizational entity responsible for acquiring ATC systems--to
prioritize its capital investments, as well as its investment in
operating systems, with affordability in mind. These experts believe
that the ATO needs to review all of its spending plans for
modernization, determine which programs can realistically be funded,
and select programs to cut. Moreover, they indicated that the ATO
should have a mechanism to explain to Congress the implications that
cutting one system has on other systems. For example, according to one
of these experts, the current budget process tears apart a highly
layered, interdependent system and does not reveal synergies between
projects. Then, when the budget request goes to Congress, he said, "you
have no opportunity to try to explain to anybody the interconnections
of these programs." As a result, when the appropriators decide not to
fund a project, they may not understand how their decision will affect
other projects.
Conclusions:
The constrained budgetary environment makes it more important than ever
for FAA to meet cost, schedule, and performance targets for each of the
major ATC systems it continues to fund and to ensure that related
activities, such as those to refurbish or replace the buildings that
house ATC modernization systems, receive sufficient funding. The need
for FAA to accommodate a 25 percent increase in demand for air travel
over the next decade underscores the importance of these efforts. FAA
has demonstrated a commitment to live within its expected means during
fiscal years 2005 through 2009 by setting priorities among its ATC
system acquisitions and identifying areas where it plans to cut
funding. However, without detailed information about the trade-offs
that underlie decisions to fully fund some systems and to defer,
reduce, or eliminate funding for others, FAA's plans do not allow
senior agency, department, OMB, and congressional decision-makers to
assess the implications of approving annual budget submissions for the
ATC modernization program and related modernization activities that
support more comprehensive efforts to modernize the NAS.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To help ensure that key administration and congressional decision-
makers have more complete information to assess the potential impact of
annual budget submissions on individual ATC system acquisitions, the
overall ATC modernization program, and related larger-scale NAS
modernization activities funded through the facilities and equipment
budget, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct FAA to
identify which activities under the ATC modernization program have had
funding deferred, reduced, or eliminated and to provide detailed
information about the impact of those decisions on FAA's ability to
modernize the ATC system and related components of the NAS in the near,
mid, and longer term. This information should be reported to Congress
annually.
Agency Comments:
We provided a copy of our draft report to DOT for review and comment.
The draft was reviewed by officials throughout DOT and FAA, including
the Vice President for Acquisition and Business Service. These
officials provided comments through email. They generally agreed with
the report and provided technical comments on specific aspects of the
report, which we incorporated as appropriate. The FAA officials said
they are continuing to consider our recommendation and indicated they
would provide a response to it as required by 31 U.S.C. §720.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of
Transportation, and the Administrator, FAA. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
Please call me at (202) 512-2834 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IV.
Signed by:
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
List of Congressional Requesters:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Don Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Ranking Democratic Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jerry Costello:
Ranking Democratic Member:
Subcommittee on Aviation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Background and Status of FAA's 16 Major System Acquisitions
We Reviewed in Detail:
Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X):
Figure 2: ASDE-X Screen Depicting an Airport Layout with Active
Aircraft Targets:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is Sensis Corporation.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
ASDE-X enables air traffic controllers to track the surface movement of
aircraft and vehicles. It was developed to reduce runway incursions,
reported as increasing from 186 in 1993 to 383 in 2001.[Footnote 57]
ASDE-X improves the ability of controllers to maintain awareness of the
operational environment and to anticipate contingencies. The detection
system automatically predicts potential conflicts and seamlessly covers
airport runways, taxiways, and other areas.
Figure 3: Changes to ASDE-X Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[A] According to FAA officials, the change in cost target for ASDE-X
was due to an increase in the scope of the project.
[B] FAA plans to extend ASDE-X's current deployment target from 2007 to
2009 because the project's budgets were cut in fiscal years 2004 and
2005.
[End of figure]
In June 2002, FAA decided to upgrade seven additional airports
increasing the project's total cost by $80.9 million. As of September
2004, FAA had placed three systems in operation and installed six
others. FAA officials said they propose to extend the deployment
baseline from 2007 to 2009 because budgets were cut in fiscal years
2004 and 2005; in addition, internal and external funding was
reprogrammed for other high-priority activities. The ASDE-X program
office is working on alternative cost estimates and plans to present
them to the Joint Resources Council by June 2005.
Airport Surveillance Radar Model-11 (ASR-11):
Figure 4: ASR-11 Equipment:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is Raytheon.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
ASR-11 replaces aging analog radars, such as ASR-7 and ASR-8, with a
single, integrated digital radar system. ASR-11 reduces operational
costs, improves safety, and accommodates future capacity increases. ASR-
11 also provides surveillance information to existing systems, such as
the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) in terminal
facilities and other systems in en route ATC facilities. As of March
2005, five sites have been commissioned into the NAS and five
additional sites are in full operational capability.
Figure 5: Changes to ASR-11 Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ASR-11 has experienced unplanned work, and the funding level received
was less than the agency-approved funding level for the system
acquisition; both factors contributed to schedule extensions and cost
increases. FAA misjudged the extent to which the high-level
requirements that were used to support the Department of Defense's
procurement of the commercial-off-the-shelf/nondevelopmental item
(COTS/NDI) could result in a product capable of meeting FAA's mission
or user needs. As a result, unplanned software changes were required.
The program requested $98.8 million for fiscal year 2004, based on the
system's acquisition program baseline, but received $74.3 million. In
May 2004, FAA reprogrammed $2.35 million from ASR-11's appropriated
funds to the Essential Air Service.[Footnote 58] Due to funding
reductions, FAA decreased the number of ASR-11 systems to be purchased
from 112 to 111. The 2005 request of $107.6 million was not approved;
the reduction to $87.5 million may result in additional cost growth or
the elimination of planned replacement sites. The ASR-11 program is
scheduled to go to the Joint Resources Council in fiscal year 2005 to
extend the program's schedule to 2013 and to revise the baseline
funding, primarily because of deferrals and budget reductions. As of
March 2005, five sites have been commissioned into the NAS and five
additional sites are fully operational.
Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon Interrogator-Replacement (ATCBI-6):
Figure 6: ATCBI-6 Screen Display Depicting All Transponder-Equipped
Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is Raytheon.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
ATCBI-6 is part of the agency's continuing effort to upgrade equipment
to provide greater system capability and reliability that will, in
turn, reduce operating costs. The ATCBI-6 replacement program will
replace existing en route air traffic control beacon interrogator
(ATCBI-4/5) equipment. The new ATCBI-6 radars will be able to determine
both range and direction to and from aircraft, in addition to
forwarding this information to the appropriate Air Route Traffic
Control Centers' automation systems.
Figure 7: Changes to ATCBI-6 Cost and Schedule Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Funding reductions of $31.0 million for fiscal years 2002 and 2003
contributed to the extension of ATCBI-6's schedule. According to FAA,
if funding reductions continue, further delays could occur with the
system's deployment, installation, and commissioning activities. As of
September 2004, the contractor has been meeting the new contract
delivery schedule.
Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP):
Figure 8: ATOP Equipment Reporting Aircraft Position Information:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is Lockheed Martin.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
ATOP replaces aging oceanic ATC systems and procedures with an
integrated system of new controller workstations, data-processing
equipment, and software that will enhance the control and flow of
oceanic air traffic to and from the United States. The system
automatically updates information on an aircraft's location and
supersedes the current manual process. FAA controls oceanic air traffic
at three sites: Anchorage, Alaska;
New York, New York;
and Oakland, California.
Figure 9: Changes to ATOP Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The ATOP program is operating within its cost, schedule, and
performance targets. ATOP achieved its initial operational capability
milestone in June 2004. The contractor had originally agreed to a more
aggressive development schedule in order to achieve this milestone by
April 2003, or 14 months earlier. FAA determined, however, that the
contractor could not meet this accelerated date because of poor
requirements development, unrealistic schedule targets, and inadequate
estimation of software complexity. This exacerbated the scheduled
transition from the current oceanic system to ATOP. Consequently, FAA
spent an additional $4 million a year to operate and maintain the old
system until ATOP is fully operational. According to FAA, the ATOP
program office did not overspecify the operational and performance
requirements; it wrote the technical document at a level that allowed
the contractor to select the appropriate solutions and did not restrict
design innovations. Yet, FAA's internal documents revealed that the
requirements were not adequately defined. For example, the ATOP
Investment Analysis Study reported to the Joint Resources Council prior
to the contract award that the lack of more detailed ATOP requirements
at this stage of acquisition added risk and was of concern to the
investment analysis team.
According to FAA, the agency has taken steps to recognize the concerns
identified by the ATOP Investment Analysis Study by maintaining
requirements, encouraging controller participation, and robustly
testing the system. FAA officials stated that the agency has developed
a transition plan for the three sites. To accelerate the transition
schedule and offset facility attrition, the ATOP program filled eight
new controller positions at the New York site and six at the Oakland
site. In addition, ATOP training schedules are in place, and classes
for FAA's Air Traffic and Airway Facilities personnel are under way.
Although the contractor's costs to develop ATOP have grown by
approximately $20 million, FAA is not responsible for payment because
it has a fixed-price contract arrangement with the contractor. Yet,
according to the Department of Transportation's Inspector General, FAA
would have to pay for all software problems after February 28, 2005.
After February 2005, Lockheed Martin will continue to work on software
changes under the time and materials portion of the ATOP contract. FAA
plans to maintain the acquisition program baseline milestones by
relying on current contractor staffing and resources. FAA expects to
conduct full transition exercises in June 2005 at the New York and
Oakland sites.
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC):
Figure 10: CPDLC Text Message on an Aircraft Display:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is to be determined.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
CPDLC will allow pilots and controllers to transmit digital data
messages directly between FAA automated ground computers and aircraft.
By digitally transmitting routine air traffic control (ATC) messages
between pilots and controllers, CPDLC will alleviate voice congestion,
enhance ATC efficiency, and increase capacity by allowing controllers
to handle more aircraft. FAA originally planned to implement CPDLC in
several phases. Build 1, the initial development phase, was deployed in
Miami for 2 years and consisted of four information services: initial
contact, transfer of communications, altimeter setting, and predefined
menu text. Build 1A would have added five additional services,
including speed, altitude, and route clearance, but it was deferred by
a Joint Resources Council decision in April 2003. Presently, FAA is
conducting a preliminary investment analysis of National Build, which
is intended to deploy the CPDLC system to all 20 Air Route Traffic
Control Centers after they have implemented the En Route Automation
Modernization (ERAM) program.
Figure 11: Changes to CPDLC Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
CPDLC Build 1, implemented at Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center in
October 2002, operated for 2 years. FAA's acquisitions office had
awarded the CPDLC Build 1A development contract before fully
understanding the system's requirements, including those of FAA's
aircraft certification office. Additionally, detailed interoperability
requirements of air and ground equipment were not complete before the
contract was awarded. According to FAA, additional CPDLC hardware,
software, and other requirements increased costs by $69.8 million over
the original baseline of $166.7 million. The revised cost target
presented to the Joint Resources Council in April 2003 was $236.5
million, about a 42 percent increase from its original cost target, for
only 8 of the 20 proposed Build 1A locations. FAA decided to suspend
acquisition of Build 1A because of concerns about the high costs of
communications service provider messages, the uncertainty of
integrating CPDLC with ERAM, and the ability of airlines to install,
and benefit from, the CPDLC avionics equipment.
En Route Communications Gateway (ECG):
Figure 12: ECG Maintenance Workstation Display:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is Lockheed Martin.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
ECG replaces the interim Peripheral Adapter Module Replacement Item
(PAMRI). Providing an interface from radar sites to en route centers,
PAMRI has been operating for 10 years and has exceeded its life
expectancy. The open and expandable platform of the ECG will allow for
new connectivity and functionality as the NAS evolves.
Figure 13: Changes to ECG Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
FAA is on schedule to complete ECG deployment in calendar year 2005.
Tests revealed a weakness in security: limitations in designing the
monitoring capability prevented appropriate monitoring unless a system
technician remained logged on. To ensure that only authorized personnel
had access to the system and that the monitoring could be done without
a technician on-site, the ECG program office implemented a "guest"
logon that enabled monitoring and prevented unauthorized access.
According to FAA officials, correcting the weakness cost about $25,000,
which falls within the program's budget and schedule. An additional
challenge concerns monitoring the ECG system from the System Operations
Control (SOC)[Footnote 59] positions. This issue may require SOC
personnel to leave their posts if ECG requires some intervention to,
among other things, discover why an event occurred. FAA is evaluating
an improvement in the monitoring capability at the SOC positions. The
estimated cost is $480,000, which falls within the program's budget and
schedule.
En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM):
Purpose and Status:
Modular and expandable, ERAM will replace software and hardware in the
host computers at FAA's 20 en route air traffic control centers, which
provide separation, routing, and advisory information. ERAM's flight
data processing capabilities will provide flexible routing around
restrictions, such as congestion and weather. It will improve
surveillance by increasing the number and types of surveillance
sources, such as radars. ERAM will provide safety alerts to prevent
aircraft collisions and congestion.
Figure 14: Changes to ERAM Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ERAM has not breached schedule or cost parameters, but it remains a
high-risk program because of its size and its amount of software code
(more than 1 million lines). The contractor has reported that
engineering costs are rising because of lower productivity than
originally planned and an increase in the number of lines of software
code. According to FAA officials, the contractor's management reserve
can absorb additional software development costs.
Free Flight Phase 2 (FFP2):
Figure 15: Free Flight Phase 2 User Request Evaluation Tool:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractors for this system are Computer Sciences Corporation,
ITT, Lockheed Martin, and Metron.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
FFP2 builds on Free Flight Phase 1, which established the concept of
managing air traffic in a way that enhances the safety, capacity, and
efficiency of the NAS. Under FFP2, FAA expects air traffic control to
move gradually from a highly structured system, based on elaborate
rules and procedures, to a more flexible system that allows pilots,
within limits, to change their route, speed, and altitude while keeping
air traffic controllers informed of such changes. FFP2 will allow
controllers to manage pilot requests for flight information in en route
airspace, identify and resolve possible mid-air conflicts up to 20
minutes in advance, and develop arrival sequence plans.
Figure 16: Changes to FFP2 Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to FAA officials, the schedule delay in FFP2's deployment
from 2006 to 2007 because, among other things, the funding level
received was less than the agency-approved funding level for the system
acquisition. Since the transition from Free Flight Phase 1 to Phase 2,
the program has received less than the expected level of funding. For
example, in fiscal year 2003, FAA requested $107 million;
however, due to external and internal budget cuts, the funding was
reduced to $70 million.
FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI):
Figure 17: FTI Primary Network Operations Control Center:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is Harris Corporation.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
FTI will replace costly networks of separately managed systems and
services--both leased and owned--by integrating advanced
telecommunications services within the NAS and non-NAS infrastructures.
FTI will provide FAA with commercial telecommunications services that
can meet present and future telecommunications needs between
facilities. Its modern and reliable consolidated network will furnish
multi-service capabilities.
Figure 18: Changes to FTI Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
FTI's two-phase transition will take about 5 years to complete. Phase I
was implemented at 21 Air Route Traffic Control Centers and 2 National
Network Operations Control Centers. Deployment of Phase II, which is
under way, will extend service to the remaining 4,477 NAS facilities.
In June 2003, the FTI program returned to the Joint Resources Council
with a proposed revision to the baseline that was based on actual
contract prices for NAS operational services and estimated prices for
mission support services. The council deferred revising the baseline
until the program negotiated prices for mission support services. A
consolidated Acquisition Program Baseline package for the full scope of
NAS operational and mission support services was then completed in
December 2004. The Joint Resources Council approved the revised
baseline on December 8, 2004.
Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS):
Figure 19: ITWS Situation Display:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is Raytheon.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
ITWS furnishes air traffic controllers and supervisors with full-color
graphic displays of weather information concerning airport terminal
airspace within a 60-mile radius. It provides a comprehensive current
weather situation and precise forecasts of expected weather conditions
for the next 60 minutes. ITWS requires no meteorological interpretation
by air traffic controllers or pilots.
Figure 20: Changes to ITWS Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[A] FAA initially projected that its first ITWS deployment would occur
between September 2001 and August 2002 and that final system deployment
would occur between January 2003 and July 2003.
[End of figure]
ITWS experienced delays because its software development was complex
and the funding level received was less than the agency-approved
funding level for the system acquisition. The program appeared to be
progressing according to its baseline; however, immediately after the
critical design review in September 1998, the contractor revealed that
the program had exceeded the target cost by $4 million. Consequently,
ITWS experienced schedule delays and cost increases, along with
performance shortfalls.
In May 2004, FAA's Joint Resources Council revised the baseline for the
ITWS program to include, in production, the capability to predict
weather conditions 60 minutes into the future. Because of constrained
funding, the ATO Executive Council froze funding for fiscal years 2005,
2006, and 2007. In addition, FAA postponed deploying 12 of the 34
systems until an undefined future date. In January 2005, FAA management
decided that the ITWS program would use already-procured equipment to
install the next six sites and transition to Airport Improvement
Program grants for the remaining scheduled sites. The ITWS program
office is currently studying the impact of the decision on the system's
baseline. According to the contractor and the original acquisition
plan, all systems were scheduled for delivery by December 2001, but
that date has now been extended to after 2009.
Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS):
Figure 21: Key Components of LAAS:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is Honeywell.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
LAAS will allow aircraft to execute precision instrument approaches and
landings in all weather conditions. Its global positioning system will
broadcast highly accurate information to aircraft in a flight's final
phases, providing more precise approach paths than the current
instrument landing system, reducing the required separation between
incoming aircraft, and increasing airspace capacity. LAAS will also
provide airports with precision approach capability for all runways,
eliminating the need for multiple-instrument landing system
installations.
Figure 22: Changes to LAAS Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
For LAAS, three of the four factors we discussed have contributed to
the system's cost increases, schedule extensions, and performance
problems. Specifically, poorly established requirements resulted in the
addition of 113 new requirements to the initial specification,
entailing unplanned work including significant software and hardware
changes. In addition, FAA underestimated LAAS' software complexity
because it inadequately assessed the system's technology maturity. In
particular, the agency misunderstood the potential for radio
interference through the atmosphere, which could limit LAAS'
operations. FAA also did not fully engage technical experts early in
the approval process of LAAS. According to the Department of
Transportation Inspector General, although FAA has had a LAAS Integrity
Panel in place since 1996 to assist with its research and development
activities, the panel was not formally tasked with resolving the
integrity requirement[Footnote 60] early in the approval process, which
might have enabled FAA to develop a quicker solution.[Footnote 61] In
2003, FAA focused the LAAS Integrity Panel on developing a solution to
meet the integrity requirement.
The contractor has experienced difficulties ensuring that the system
will alert pilots when it produces erroneous information. FAA and the
contractor agree that these difficulties have resulted from a lack of
communication. When the contract was awarded, FAA assumed that LAAS was
80-percent developed but later discovered that only about 20 percent
was complete. FAA therefore suspended funding in fiscal year 2005 and
used the remaining $18 million to resolve the integrity requirement
problem, among other things, in fiscal year 2004. Although FAA had not
requested funding, Congress did approve an additional $10 million for
LAAS in fiscal year 2005. The FAA will continue to work on resolving
LAAS integrity and safety assurance issues during fiscal year 2005.
During fiscal year 2006, the program office will develop a business
case justification on whether to continue the LAAS program.
Next Generation Air-to-Ground Communication (NEXCOM):
Figure 23: Multimode Digital Radio:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is ITT (segment 1A).
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
NEXCOM will improve air traffic control communications by replacing
controller-pilot analog communication with a state-of-the-art digital
system. Consisting of multimode digital radios, avionics, and ground
stations, NEXCOM will enhance security by requiring digital
authentication and preventing "phantom controllers" from gaining access
to the communications system. NEXCOM Segment 1A will replace 30-to 40-
year-old radios, deploying 12,000 new radio sets that use analog and
digital communications with aircraft. Segment 1B will create ground
stations to communicate with aircraft equipped with digital capability.
Figure 24: Changes to NEXCOM Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
NEXCOM experienced schedule slippages in developing Segment 1A--the
multimode radio sets--because the vendor failed to meet interference
requirements and to perform additional tests to avoid risks associated
with future upgrades. FAA's initial plans did require meeting
interference requirements. The initial schedule assumed FAA could
procure a nondevelopmental item (NDI) product that met the interference
requirements. The vendor's product did not meet the established
interference requirements. A solution had to be developed and tested.
The project schedule had to be adjusted to accommodate additional
development and testing. As a result, the system's approval was delayed
by about 20 months. In September 2003, NEXCOM Segment 1A was initially
deployed at Jacksonville, Florida. Segment 1A cost and schedule
baseline is scheduled for a Joint Resources Council review in August
2005.
NEXCOM's cost growth has resulted from additional software and hardware
requirements. Because the funding level received was less than the
agency-approved funding level for the system acquisition, FAA postponed
funding Segment 1B--the ground stations--until at least fiscal year
2008. FAA has no current estimate for the last deployment date.
FAA plans to develop and deploy NEXCOM Segment 2 between 2008 and 2013.
This segment will provide a digital data link to aircraft at high and
super-high altitudes. Segment 3, scheduled between 2011 and 2013, will
provide digital voice and data link capabilities throughout the ATC
system. FAA has not developed funding estimates for these two segments.
NAS Infrastructure Management System--Phase 2 (NIMS-2):
Figure 25: NIMS Infrastructure:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is Digicon.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
NIMS, a centralized maintenance management system, will operate and
maintain the NAS infrastructure, including its facilities, systems, and
equipment (e.g., communications, radars, and navigational aids). NIMS
will decrease the number of en route delays by reducing the time
required to restore systems to full operation following maintenance.
NIMS--Phase 1 currently provides initial Operational Control Center
capability,[Footnote 62] along with remote monitoring and control
functionality, to 3,700 NAS facilities and 5,800 deployed maintenance
data terminals. By fully implementing resource management and
enterprise management software, NIMS--Phase 2 will focus on increasing
workforce productivity in such priority activities as receiving orders
and managing resources. Future NIMS phases will allow for information
sharing that is in sync with NAS' technological improvements.
Figure 26: Changes to NIMS-Phase 2 Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to FAA, the funding for NIMS-Phase 2 was $96.4 million below
the approved amount in agency planning documents. Subsequently, FAA had
to defer additional system requirements, extend the schedule by 5
years, and increase the system's cost estimate by $84.0 million. FAA is
revising the baseline for Phase 2, as shown in figure 26;
a Joint Resources Council decision is planned for August 2005.
Operational and Supportability Implementation System (OASIS):
Figure 27: OASIS Dual Screen Display:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractors for this system are Harris Corporation (OASIS
workstations) and Evans Corporation (consoles), respectively.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
OASIS, a modified commercial-off-the-shelf system, replaces workstation
consoles, among other things, at automated flight service stations. It
also replaces the Flight Services Automation system for which spare
parts and hardware support have been difficult for FAA to maintain.
OASIS furnishes up-to-the-minute weather graphics by integrating real-
time weather and flight planning data with overlays of flight routes.
It also provides operational support, retrieves reports, and supplies
lightning data and icing images, among other things.
Figure 28: Changes to OASIS Schedule and Cost Estimates:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
OASIS has experienced schedule extensions and cost increases because of
unplanned work, insufficient stakeholder involvement, and funding that
is less than the agency had approved as needed for meeting the system's
schedule, cost, and performance targets. For example, the system
acquisition schedule slipped because of a larger-than-planned
development effort. FAA's 1998 review of the contractor system's
architecture for OASIS revealed that the commercial-off-the-shelf
solution was not as mature as FAA had envisioned when the contract was
awarded and revealed that the contractor's commercial products did not
fully satisfy its requirements. According to the Department of
Transportation's Inspector General, FAA had identified a number of
significant human factors concerns, such as inadequate weather
graphics. This indicated that stakeholders were not sufficiently
involved throughout the system's design and development. As a result,
FAA eliminated the option of commercial-off-the-shelf procurement. In
addition, the OASIS program was rebaselined in March 2000 due to fiscal
year 2000 appropriations being reduced to $10 million from the $21.5
million baseline. The reduction in funding resulted in a reduced rate
of software development, delayed and reduced the rate of planned
hardware and console deployments, and resulted in the incremental
deployment of operational software. This contributed to FAA's delay of
its first-site implementation from July 1998 to 2002.
According to FAA officials, receiving less funding than the agency had
approved for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 also resulted in a delay in
OASIS' deployment to automated flight service stations. As of February
2005, FAA had deployed 19 systems: 16 at Automated Flight Service
Stations (AFSS) and 3 at other sites. Software upgrades that are under
way will be completed by June 2005. FAA had no plans for installations
or software upgrades beyond those at the AFSS sites, pending an
evaluation of private-sector bids to operate flight service stations.
Until then, FAA had directed the program to remain within the funding
levels of its Capital Investment Plan for fiscal years 2004 to
2006.[Footnote 63] According to FAA, since completion of the evaluation
of bids in February 2005, OASIS' implementation remains unchanged. FAA
does not plan on additional OASIS funding for software enhancements or
more installations. FAA plans to phase out OASIS between March 2006 and
March 2007 in accordance with the new service provider's transition
plan.
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS):
Figure 29: STARS Controller Workstation:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is Raytheon.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
STARS--a joint program of FAA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the
Department of Transportation (DOT)--replaces aging FAA and DOD terminal
systems with state-of-the-art terminal air traffic control systems. The
system is designed to prevent duplication of development and logistic
costs. Civil and military air traffic controllers use STARS to direct
aircraft near major U.S. airports. Its open and expandable terminal
automation platform can accommodate air traffic growth, as well as new
hardware and software that promote safety, maximize operational
efficiency, and improve controllers' productivity.
Figure 30: Changes to STARS Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[A] This estimate includes development costs only and does not include
technology refresh and terminal automation enhancement.
[B] Based on the May 2004 FAA approved Acquisition Program Baseline for
development and procurement estimates.
[C] The February 1996 baseline included limited human factor
evaluations and a basic commercial-off-the-shelf configuration.
[End of figure]
FAA revised its baseline for the STARS program in May 2004, changing
the acquisition to a phased approach that divides large programs into
smaller phases to allow the agency to evaluate other alternatives of
system implementation. For Phase 1, STARS was approved for deployment
to 51 Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities. Following
the system's release and FAA's concurrence with the November 23, 2004,
report from the DOT Inspector General, FAA reduced STARS' deployment to
47 TRACON facilities. STARS is fully operational at 29 FAA terminal
radar control facilities and 21 DOD radar control facilities. If
approved in 2005, DOD plans to deploy STARS to 106 Radar Approach and
Control (RAPCON) facilities and 75 towers nationally and worldwide.
With completion of DOD's transition in 2004 to FAA's new STARS'
configuration, both DOD and FAA are operating together on a single
national software and hardware configuration baseline.
During STARS' development, schedule slippages and cost increases
occurred because the original commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
acquisition strategy focused on early adoption of commercial technology
by FAA and DOD could avoid the increasing cost of supporting legacy
systems by quickly deploying STARS to the highest-priority air traffic
control facilities, and then making further improvements. FAA had
compressed STARS' original development and testing schedule from 32 to
25 months, leaving only limited time for human factors evaluations.
Allowing insufficient time to involve stakeholders, FAA and the
contractor had to restructure the contract to address technicians' and
controllers' concerns, including an inconsistency in visual warning
alarms and color codes between the old and the new systems. However,
the STARS initial system configuration was satisfactory for use by DOD
as deployed. The FAA modified the COTS strategy and suspended STARS
deployments until FAA controller and technician requirements were
developed. FAA estimates the COTS acquisition strategy, which limited
involvement of controllers and maintenance technicians in the system's
development added 3 years and $500 million to the development of more
than 160 system requirements. The first phase of the three-phase
deployment plan comprises 47 systems. FAA and the DOT are currently
determining a safe, economical, and affordable site mix for follow-up
phases.
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS):
Figure 31: Key Components of WAAS:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Contractor for this system is Raytheon.
[End of figure]
Purpose and Status:
WAAS uses global positioning system satellites to provide precise
navigation and landing guidance to aircraft at all airports, including
thousands that have no ground-based instrument landing capability. WAAS
also provides safer and more efficient arrival, en route, and departure
operations by allowing user equipment to augment the global positioning
system while increasing its position accuracy and reliability, among
other things.
Figure 32: Change to WAAS Schedule and Cost Targets:
[See PDF for image]
[A] September 1999 and May 2004 estimates for WAAS development exclude
$1.3 billion in satellite communications leases.
[End of figure]
When WAAS has full operating capability, it will provide en route
navigation guidance from the surface up to 100,000 feet and instrument
landing guidance down to 200 feet. It currently provides full en route
navigation up to 100,000 feet and instrument landing guidance down to
250 feet at all qualified airports in the continental United States.
FAA has begun to publish WAAS instrument flight procedures for some
runways; however, pilots cannot use WAAS for landing guidance on those
runways for which FAA has not written guidance. To achieve full
operating capability, a second civil aviation frequency must be added
to new global positioning system satellites to allow aircraft to
conduct precision runway approach operations during ionospheric
interruptions, such as "solar storms." The Department of Defense, which
is responsible for providing this frequency, plans to add it between
2013 and 2019.
FAA encountered cost, schedule, and performance problems because its
scheduling was accelerated, coordination among its offices proved
insufficient, and technical challenges delayed its meeting the
integrity requirement--a requirement that pilots be alerted in a timely
manner when the system should not be used. At the urging of government
and aviation industry groups in the early 1990s, FAA accelerated WAAS'
schedule by attempting to develop, test, and deploy the system within
28 months, even though software development alone was expected to take
24 to 28 months. Rather than shortening the total development time,
these steps contributed to schedule delays. FAA also set development
milestones before completing the research and development required to
prove WAAS' capability. Since officials on WAAS' integrated product
development team within the aircraft certification office did not
participate regularly during design and development, FAA did not
recognize its difficulty in meeting the integrity requirement or its
lack of scientific and technical expertise. FAA eventually acquired the
expertise, and a team of satellite navigation experts solved the
problem. These actions resulted in unplanned work and contributed to
the rise in WAAS's cost from the original estimate of $509 million in
1994 to $2.036 billion in 2005, and to a 6-year extension in its
commissioning date. According to FAA, adding 6 years to the program's
life cycle also contributed to increased costs.[Footnote 64]
[End of section]
Appendix II Information on the 39 Additional Systems under the ATC
Modernization Program:
Table 4: Cost and Schedule Information for Nine Additional Major
Systems under the ATC Modernization Program:
Dollars in millions.
Program/system description: HOST/Oceanic Computer System Replacement
(HOCSR): Replaces the main ATC computer processor and some peripherals
and ensures supportability of other peripherals until replaced by ERAM;
Original cost target: $424.10;
Current cost target: $368.50;
1st year funded: FY 97;
Last year funding planned: FY 05;
Original schedule initial deployment target: December 1998;
Current schedule initial deployment target: December 1998;
Original schedule last deployment target: June 2004;
Current schedule last deployment target: April 2004.
Program/system description: En Route System Modification: Will replace
obsolete components, upgrade controllers' displays and supporting
infrastructure, and configure consoles to accommodate additional
processors;
Original cost target: $201.90;
Current cost target: $201.90;
1st year funded: FY 00;
Last year funding planned: FY 09;
Original schedule initial deployment target: N/A;
Current schedule initial deployment target: N/A;
Original schedule last deployment target: May 2009;
Current schedule last deployment target: N/A.
Program/system description: Initial Academy Training System (IATS):
Enables the training of an increasing number of new air traffic
controllers at the FAA Academy;
Original cost target: $23.35;
Current cost target: $23.35;
1st year funded: FY 03;
Last year funding planned: FY 08;
Original schedule initial deployment target: September 2005;
Current schedule initial deployment target: September 2005;
Original schedule last deployment target: September 2005;
Current schedule last deployment target: September 2005.
Program/system description: Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Radio
Replacement: Replaces aging equipment used to communicate with
Department of Defense aircraft in support of military operations;
Original cost target: $85.15;
Current cost target: $85.15;
1st year funded: FY 01;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
Original schedule initial deployment target: FY 03;
Current schedule initial deployment target: FY 10;
Original schedule last deployment target: FY 10;
Current schedule last deployment target: FY 10.
Program/system description: Command Center Conference Control System
(CCS)-Replace Operational Telephone Voice Switch (OTS): Replaces the
existing telephone system at the FAA Air Route Control System Command
Center in Herndon, Va. The existing telephone system is becoming
unsupportable and can no longer perform required functions;
Original cost target: $12.70;
Current cost target: $12.70;
1st year funded: FY 02;
Last year funding planned: FY 05;
Original schedule initial deployment target: FY 05;
Current schedule initial deployment target: FY 05;
Original schedule last deployment target: FY 05;
Current schedule last deployment target: FY 05.
Program/system description: Capstone Phase I (a part of the Safe Flight
21 program): A demonstration program, intended to improve aviation
system safety in Alaska through the introduction of new communications,
navigation, and surveillance technologies, as well as improving
aviation system capacity and efficiency;
Original cost target: $18.55;
Current cost target: $18.55;
1st year funded: N/A;
Last year funding planned: N/A;
Original schedule initial deployment target: FY 00;
Current schedule initial deployment target: N/A;
Original schedule last deployment target: FY 03;
Current schedule last deployment target: N/A.
Program/system description: Automated Surveillance Radar-Model 9 (ASR-
9)/Mode Service Life Extension (SLEP): Extends the service life of the
radar by replacing obsolete components to sustain existing system
capabilities, such as providing aircraft detection and separation
services to reduce aircraft delays and improve safety at congested
airports;
Original cost target: $186.50;
Current cost target: $186.50;
1st year funded: FY 01;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
Original schedule initial deployment target: TBD;
Current schedule initial deployment target: TBD;
Original schedule last deployment target: TBD;
Current schedule last deployment target: TBD.
Program/system description: Aviation Surface Weather Observation
Network (ASWON): A suite of five weather systems that provides
automated surface weather observation to meet the needs of pilots,
operators, and air traffic controllers;
Original cost target: $350.90;
Current cost target: $403.80;
1st year funded: FY 98;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
Original schedule initial deployment target: September 2002;
Current schedule initial deployment target: N/A;
Original schedule last deployment target: September 2010;
Current schedule last deployment target: N/A.
Program/system description: Precision Runway Monitor (PRM): An
electronic scan radar that tracks and processes aircraft targets at a 1-
second update rate and allows simultaneous approaches on runways spaced
less than 4,300 feet apart, thereby increasing capacity and reducing
delays during adverse weather conditions;
Original cost target: $145.80;
Current cost target: $145.80;
1st year funded: FY 88;
Last year funding planned: FY 07;
Original schedule initial deployment target: October 1997;
Current schedule initial deployment target: October 1997;
Original schedule last deployment target: January 2007;
Current schedule last deployment target: January 2007.
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
[End of table]
Table 5: Cost and Schedule Information for the 30 Buy-It-by-the-Pound
Systems under the ATC Modernization Program:
Dollars in millions.
Program/system description: En Route Enhancements: Maintains current
software systems and supports development, integration, and
implementation of upgrades to, among other things, the Host software;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $5.30;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $36.50;
1st year funded: FY 01;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Terminal Sustainment: Will maintain the
existing FAA terminal automation systems, such as Common Automated
Radar Terminal System (CARTS) ARTS IIEs and IIIEs, until the Terminal
Automation Modernization and Replacement program replaces or upgrades
the systems.[A];
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $6.30;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $73.60;
1st year funded: FY 00;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Current Enhanced Traffic Management System
(ETMS) OPS: Maintains and supports mission-critical traffic flow
management (TFM) operations in 85 ATC facilities and makes necessary
upgrades to support enhanced traffic management services;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $13.40;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $116.50;
1st year funded: FY 98;
Last year funding planned: FY 05;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Traffic Flow Management Infrastructure (TFM-
I);
Modernization: Modernizes the TFM decision support systems and tools
that help balance growing flight demands with NAS capacity within an
environment;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $8.50;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $30.40;
1st year funded: FY 02;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: February;
2008;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Departure Spacing Program (DSP): Assists
controllers in the more efficient management of departures from
multiple airports within the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan
areas;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $7.50;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $48.50;
1st year funded: FY 01;
Last year funding planned: FY 06;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: Prior to
FY 03;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: Prior to
FY 03.
Program/system description: NAS Resources/Notice to Airmen (NOTAM):
Provides an automated, centralized, standardized, and timely
distribution system for NOTAMS using a dedicated telecommunications
network;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $1.70;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $10.90;
1st year funded: FY 04;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Voice Switching and Control System
(VSCS)[B]: Upgrade and tech refresh to ensure that the air-to-ground
and ground-to-ground communications capabilities are reliable and
available for separating aircraft, coordinating flight plans, and
transferring information between en route ATC facilities;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $13.60;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $60.00;
1st year funded: FY 01;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: October
2006;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Weather Message Switching Center
Replacement (WMSCR) Transition:;
Will upgrade obsolete processors, output devices, display screens,
backup systems and software. This will allow pilots quick and accurate
access to weather data and NOTAMS;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $2.50;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $8.50;
1st year funded: FY 01;
Last year funding planned: FY 05;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Enhanced Terminal Voice Switch (ETVS):
Replaces obsolete voice switches in the ATC Towers and Terminal Radar
Approach Control facilities. Voice switches enable air traffic
controllers to communicate with aircraft as well as other ATC
facilities;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $2.00;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $95.40;
1st year funded: FY 95;
Last year funding planned: FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: May 1998;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Communications Facilities Expansion (CFE):
Provides a vehicle for facilities to improve communications coverage to
meet specific operational requirements based upon, among other things,
air traffic demand;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $6.00;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $53.00;
1st year funded: FY 91;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Air/Ground Communications Radio Frequency
Interference (RFI) Elimination: Provides equipment to improve air
and/or ground communications and provides support for remote
communication facilities. The equipment will reduce the need for inter-
modulation products, thus eliminating the major source of radio
frequency interference at congested sites;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $1.20;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $26.40;
1st year funded: FY 89;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: 1st
delivery on current contract June 1996;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: Ongoing.
Program/system description: Critical Telecommunications Support (CTS):
Enables FAA to nationally manage programmed, unprogrammed, and
emergency telecommunications network requirements for the NAS;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $9.90;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $63.00;
1st year funded: FY 89;
Last year funding planned: FY 05;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Recovery Communications (RCOM )-Command and
Control Communications (C3): Provides FAA with the minimum command-and-
control communications capability necessary to direct the management,
operation, and reconstruction of the NAS during regional or local
emergencies when normal common carrier communications are interrupted.
C3 also provides minimum capabilities for continuity of operations for
FAA;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $6.30;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $51.10;
1st year funded: FY 92;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: June 2003;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Aeronautical Data Link (ADL)-Flight
Information Service (FIS): Provides data link broadcasts of graphic and
text flight information service data to the cockpit that are consistent
with information available to air traffic controllers and flight
service specialists in the NAS;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $3.30;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $8.50;
1st year funded: FY 99;
Last year funding planned: FY 08;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: June 2000;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Tower Data Link Services (TDLS): Displays
the clearances received from Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC)
to the tower, distributes flight plan data, weather information, and
general information messages from the ARTCC National Airspace Center
computer to ARTCC printers and Air Traffic Control Towers (ATCT) remote
sites. In addition, the system displays weather information received
via ATCT weather interface;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $2.30;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $10.80;
1st year funded: FY 00;
Last year funding planned: FY 05;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: Tech
refresh;
start May 2002;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Voice Recorder Replacement Program (VRRP):
Replaces a total of 530 aging analog systems with modern digital
systems that will reduce both life-cycle maintenance costs and
maintenance staffing requirements;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $3.60;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $24.80;
1st year funded: FY 97;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: January
1996;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Houston Area Air Traffic System (HAATS):
Provides the focal point and support for infrastructure, national
airspace improvements, and implementation of the new procedures and
airspace design for the Houston area;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $12.00;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $52.10;
1st year funded: FY 01;
Last year funding planned: FY 08;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Instrument Landing Systems (ILS):[C]
Provides precision guidance (horizontal, vertical, and distance)
information to allow category I, II, and III landing approaches at
large and medium airports;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $5.70;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $455.30;
1st year funded: FY 89;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: April
1995, February 2007;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Visual Navaids for New Qualifiers: Procures
and installs visual navigational aids approach lighting systems to
enhance landing capabilities at designated airports throughout the
United States;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $9.80;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $40.90;
1st year funded: FY 93;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: June 2006;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Approach Lighting System Improvement
(ALSIP) Continuation: Retrofits rigid lighting systems with lightweight
and low-impact resistant structures that collapse or break apart at
impact, thereby reducing damage to aircraft that may strike these
structures during departure or landing;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $5.80;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $183.20;
1st year funded: FY 93;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: September
1996;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Visual Navaids-Sustain, Replace, Relocate:
Replaces aging, obsolete visual navigational aids and other ground-
based navigation and landing aids to maintain current en route,
approach, and landing capabilities at various airports throughout the
United States;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $3.00;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $6.00;
1st year funded: FY 02;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Very High Frequency Omni-directional Range
(VOR) Collocated with Tactical Air Navigation (VORTAC): Replaces,
relocates, or converts VORTAC facilities used for aerial navigation.
General aviation, commercial carriers, and other groups use this
navigation capability for en route navigation and approach operations
into airports;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $1.60;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $27.00;
1st year funded: FY 93;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: NA;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Runway Visual Range (RVR)-
Replacement/Establishment: Replaces aging, maintenance-intensive, and
difficult-to-support RVR legacy systems. Pilots receive critical
meteorological visibility data that are used to decide whether it is
safe to take off or land when visibility is limited;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $2.80;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $42.50;
1st year funded: FY 98;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Sustain Distance Measuring Equipment (DME):
Replaces older DME, which is difficult and expensive to maintain
because replacement parts are largely unavailable, and provides current
technology electronics to improve operations and facilities
performance;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $1.20;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $13.90;
1st year funded: FY 99;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: August
2003;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Long Range Radars (LRR) Improvements-
Infrastructure Upgrades: Sustains and improves LRRs, many of which are
over 50 years old, and require upgrades to prevent outages and reduce
maintenance costs;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $1.00;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $20.20;
1st year funded: FY 00;
Last year funding planned: FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Runway Incursion Reduction Program (RIRP)-
ATDP: Provides research, development, and operational evaluation of
technologies to improve runway safety;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $1.40;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $35.40;
1st year funded: FY 99;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B): Broadcasts derived aircraft position data from an onboard
navigation system such as global navigation satellite system thereby
allowing pilots and air traffic controllers to "see" location of nearby
aircraft and engage in collaborative decisionmaking;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $3.50;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $14.30;
1st year funded: FY 99;
Last year funding planned: FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) Open
Systems Upgrades: Detects, processes, distributes, and displays
hazardous and routine weather information on air traffic controller
consoles;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $2.00;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $32.90;
1st year funded: FY 98;
Last year funding planned: FY 06;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: February
2000;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR)-
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP): Maintains the current level of
service until 2020 and improves deteriorating system reliability. The
service provides air traffic controllers with reports of hazardous
windshear and other severe weather in and near an airport's terminal
approach and departure zone at higher-density airports with high
occurrences of thunderstorms;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $3.30;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $3.30;
1st year funded: FY 03;
Last year funding planned: FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: September
2004;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Program/system description: Corridor Integrated Weather System (CIWS):
Will improve airspace capacity during adverse weather in congested
airspace. The key approach is to provide accurate and timely prediction
of hazardous weather activity;
Appropriated funding for 1st year: $5.00;
Appropriated funding through FY 04: $9.10;
1st year funded: FY 02;
Last year funding planned: Beyond FY 09;
1st initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A;
Last initial operating capability/operational readiness date: N/A.
Source: GAO presentation of FAA data.
[A] Terminal Automation Modernization and Replacement program is
intended to replace aging automation and display systems at the
Nation's terminal air traffic control facilities.
[B] The VSCS tech refresh does not have a baseline;
an investment analysis is pending.
[C] The April 1995 operational readiness data (ORD) is under the
original contract, while the new contract will be in effect in fiscal
year 2006. Additional systems added in appropriations may affect the
last ORD.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
We examined (1) FAA's experience in meeting cost, schedule, and/or
performance targets for major system acquisitions under its ATC
modernization program, (2) the steps FAA has taken to address long-
standing challenges with the ATC modernization program and additional
steps that are needed, and (3) the potential effects of the constrained
budget environment on FAA's ability to modernize the ATC system.
To address the first objective, we selected 16 of the 55 system
acquisitions in the ATC modernization program to review in
detail.[Footnote 65] We selected these 16 systems in July 2004, when
this review was still a part of our broader work on FAA's efforts to
modernize the National Airspace System (NAS).[Footnote 66]Specifically,
we selected the 16 ATC system acquisitions with the largest life-cycle
costs that met the following criteria: each system had cost, schedule,
and/or performance targets, was discussed in our prior and Department
of Transportation Inspector General reports, had not been fully
implemented or deployed by 2004, and received funding in 2004. We
reviewed this list with FAA officials to ensure that we did not exclude
any significant system.[Footnote 67] (See app. I for additional
information on these 16 systems.) FAA does not have a formal definition
of major systems under its Acquisition Management System; however,
agency officials told us that if a system acquisition has a formally
approved baseline, we could consider it "major." Using this definition,
we determined that 25 of the 55 system acquisitions under the ATC
modernization program are major. The remaining 30 system acquisitions
are generally what FAA refers to as buy-it-by-the-pound systems that
are commercially available and ready to use without modification, such
as those to replace a system that has reached the end of its useful
life.
For fiscal year 2005, the 55 systems accounted for about 55 percent of
FAA's facilities and equipment (F&E) budget, or $1.38 billion of the
$2.52 billion appropriated for the F&E budget. The 16 major systems
accounted for 36 percent ($917.3 million), and the other 39 system
acquisitions accounted for about 19 percent ($460 million). The
remaining 45 percent of the F&E budget will be spent on facilities,
mission support, and personnel-related activities ($1.14 billion).
To assess the 16 major system acquisitions, we relied largely on data
collected from FAA and contracting officials for two engagements we
issued in November 2004 on FAA's acquisition and certification
processes.[Footnote 68] In turn, we updated this information and
collected data on the remaining 39 systems under the modernization
program, primarily through interviews with FAA officials and analyses
of the data they provided, including key acquisition documents.(See
app. II for additional information on these 39 system acquisitions.) In
addition, we reviewed our past reports and those of the Department of
Transportation's Inspector General. Furthermore, we interviewed FAA
officials within the recently created ATO and collected and analyzed
the documents they provided. We also interviewed officials with the
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Air Transport Association,
Department of Defense, National Air Traffic Controllers Association,
and RTCA.[Footnote 69] Furthermore, we convened a panel of
international aviation experts[Footnote 70] to obtain their views on,
among other things, the factors that have affected the cost, schedule,
and/or performance of FAA's ATC modernization program.
In addition, we assessed the reliability of FAA's cost and schedule
estimates. Through interviews with FAA officials about their data
system and quality controls, we determined that the cost and schedule
estimates were appropriate for use in our report. Specifically, the
estimates are sufficiently authoritative, appropriate, and reliable to
allow us to use them without conducting any further assessment. The
estimates appear to be based on reasonable assumptions. Our review did
not focus on FAA's efforts to modernize its facilities.
To address the second objective, we interviewed FAA officials,
primarily within the recently created ATO, and collected and analyzed
the documents they provided. We also interviewed officials with the
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Air Transport Association,
Department of Defense, National Air Traffic Controllers Association,
and RTCA.
We also reviewed past GAO reports and those of the Department of
Transportation's Inspector General. In addition, we obtained the views
of the international aviation experts who participated in our panel on
what steps the ATO could take in the short term to address the factors
that have affected the cost, schedule, and/or performance of FAA's ATC
modernization program.
To address the third objective, we interviewed officials within FAA's
ATO and obtained and analyzed data on FAA's capital investments and
annual budgets. We also interviewed officials with other organizations
cited above. In addition, we obtained the views of the international
aviation panelists on how federal budget constraints have affected ATC
modernization and what steps the ATO could take in the short term to
address these constraints. We conducted our review from November 2004
through May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. (202) 512-2834:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Beverly L. Norwood, Tamera
Dorland, Seth Dykes, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Brandon Haller, Bert
Japikse, Maren McAvoy, and Ed Menoche made key contributions to this
report.
(540096):
FOOTNOTES
[1] For purposes of this report, "NAS modernization" refers to ATC
facilities, equipment, and related expenses.
[2] The estimates are presented in then-year dollars, which means that
they represent the nominal dollar sum of the estimated spending in
different years. To estimate future-year spending, FAA incorporates
assumptions on inflation developed by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB).
[3] This report, as well as our work for more than two decades on FAA's
ATC modernization program, has assessed progress for major ATC system
acquisitions based on the cost, schedule, and performance goals set at
the inception of each program.
[4] Department of Transportation Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 104-50, §
348 (1995).
[5] Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century, Pub. L. 106-181, § 303 (2000);
E.O.13180. Under the executive order, part of the ATO's purpose is to
"develop methods to accelerate air traffic control modernization and to
improve aviation safety related to air traffic control."
[6] According to FAA officials, the number of system acquisitions in
the ATC modernization program can vary annually, when Congress earmarks
funds for a specific system acquisition. As of March 2005, the number
of system acquisitions under the program was 55.
[7] At the time of our audit, FAA planned to deploy 64 Operational and
Supportability Implementation Systems (OASIS) to automated flight
service stations by 2005. However, after deploying 19 such systems in
2004, FAA discontinued the system's deployment, pending a decision
about whether to contract out the operation of automated flight service
stations. In February 2005, FAA awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin
to operate these stations.
[8] Our methodology for selecting the 16 system acquisitions to review
in detail was based on the fiscal year 2004 appropriation for FAA's
facilities and equipment budget, which was available when the
engagement was designed. However, to make the report as current as
possible, we have used fiscal year 2005 funding levels where
appropriate, including the status sheets for each of the 16 systems in
appendix I. See app. III for additional information on our methodology.
[9] Our review of FAA's NAS modernization efforts will be issued later
this year.
[10] FAA does not have a formal definition of "major" systems under its
Acquisition Management System;
however, agency officials told us that if a system acquisition has a
formally approved baseline, we could consider it "major." Using this
definition, 25 of the 55 system acquisitions under the ATC
modernization program are major.
[11] The remaining 45 percent of the facilities and equipment budget
for fiscal year 2005 will be spent on facilities, mission support, and
personnel-related activities.
[12] Organized in 1935 and once called the Radio Technical Commission
for Aeronautics, RTCA is today known just by its acronym. RTCA is a
private, not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based
performance standards for ATC systems. RTCA serves as a federal
advisory committee, and its recommendations are the basis for a number
of FAA's policy, program, and regulatory decisions.
[13] GAO, Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic Control
Modernization Program, GAO-05-333SP (Washington, D.C.: April 2005).
[14] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005);
GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Ensure Better Coordination When
Approving Air Traffic Control Systems, GAO-05-11 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 17, 2004);
GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has Improved,
but Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure Results,
GAO-05-23 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004);
GAO, Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management
Capabilities in Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems Is
Needed, GAO-04-822 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004);
and GAO, Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities Improved,
but More Can Be Done to Institutionalize Improvements, GAO-04-901
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004).
[15] Schedule extensions were calculated based on the date FAA plans to
deploy the last system.
[16] Our statements about cost, schedule, and/or performance in this
report and in our past reports are based on the original targets that
FAA established and approved at the start of its acquisition programs.
[17] GAO-04-901.
[18] GAO-05-23.
[19] GAO-05-207.
[20] 31 U.S.C. § 720 requires, in part, that agencies report the
actions taken on our recommendation to the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs and to the House Committee on
Government Reform not later than 60 days from the date of the report.
[21] FAA uses three types of facilities to control traffic: airport
towers, terminal radar approach control facilities, and en route
centers. Airport towers direct traffic on the ground, before landing,
and after takeoff within 5 nautical miles of the airport and about
3,000 feet above the airport. Terminal radar approach control
facilities sequence and separate aircraft as they approach and leave
airports, beginning about 5 nautical miles and ending about 50 nautical
miles from the airport and generally up to 10,000 feet above the
ground. Air route traffic control centers, called en route centers,
control aircraft in transit and during approaches to some airports,
generally controlling air space that extends above 18,000 feet for
commercial aircraft.
[22] Executive Order 13180 created the ATO. The executive order was
later amended by Executive Order 13264, which removed the description
of air traffic services as an "inherently governmental function."
[23] The 10 service units that make up the ATO include Safety,
Communications, Operations Planning, Finance, Acquisition and Business
Services, En Route and Oceanic Services, Terminal Services, Flight
Services, System Operations Services, and Technical Operations
Services.
[24] In December 2004, FAA revised its Acquisition Management System,
including changing the name Acquisition Program Baseline to Exhibit 300
Program Baseline.
[25] Air Traffic Control involves a number of other systems, such as
the Common Automated Radar Terminal System, used in the terminal
arrival and terminal departure phases.
[26] Many of these systems are referred to as "buy-it-by-the-pound"
systems, which, generally, are commercially available at a set level of
performance, and, therefore, do not have performance goals per se.
[27] FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure was not directly affected by
these four factors, but did experience cost growth.
[28] In December 2004, FAA revised its acquisition management system
policy by replacing the requirement for an acquisition program baseline
with a requirement for preparing an OMB Exhibit 300 Baseline, which
includes additional information required for FAA's annual budget
formulation and submission process.
[29] The ASR-11 program is scheduled to go to the Joint Resources
Council in fiscal year 2005 to extend the program's schedule to 2013
and to revise the baseline funding.
[30] FAA defines a COTS item as a product or service that has been
developed for sale, lease, or license to the general public. The
product is currently available at a fair market value. FAA defines a
NDI as an item that was previously developed for use by a government
(federal, state, local, or foreign) and that requires limited further
development. For example, the Army's SINCGARS radio is the core of
FAA's NEXCOM radio, and the software FAA selected for ATOP was NDI
software from New Zealand's air navigation system.
[31] For purposes of this report, the underestimation of software
complexity refers to poor estimation of the level of effort that would
be required to modify software to meet requirements (e.g., COTS or
NDI).
[32] FAA also transferred $1.3 billion--the cost of satellite leases--
from the operations account to the facilities and equipment account,
bringing the total estimate at completion cost to $3.3 billion.
[33] FAA began fielding CARTS in 1997, as the interim primary terminal
automation system until it was replaced with STARS. To date, the agency
has not ruled out keeping CARTS as an alternative, if STARS proves to
be unaffordable or does not perform as expected. CARTS was not one of
the systems FAA was acquiring in fiscal year 2004, when we designed our
methodology.
[34] Air traffic specialists are controllers and automation specialists
who work at flight service stations throughout the United States and
provide, among other things, briefings of weather conditions along a
pilot's route of flight and information on traffic conditions for
landing and departing at airports where there is no control tower and
no restrictions on the use of airspace.
[35] The Capital Investment Plan, a 5-year financial plan, allocates
funds to NAS projects on the basis of a detailed analysis of project
funding by FAA functional working groups. The plan includes estimates
for the current fiscal-year budget and for 4 future-year expenditures
for each line item in the facilities and equipment budget.
[36] GAO-05-207.
[37] As mentioned previously, FAA does not have a formal definition of
"major" systems, but suggested that we consider a system as major if it
has a baseline for cost, schedule, and performance formally approved by
senior agency officials. Using this definition, we consider 9 of the
remaining 39 systems major. These 9 major systems bring the total
number of major systems under the ATC modernization program to 25.
[38] Aviation Surface Weather Observation Network (ASWON) automates
surface weather observation information, replacing labor-intensive and
high-cost manual surface weather observations.
[39] The Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement (HOCSR) is an
interim upgrade and modernization program designed to replace the En
Route Host Computer hardware, software, and peripheral equipment to
reduce delays and improve reliability.
[40] According to FAA, 43 capital projects were included in the fiscal
year 2004 acquisition performance goal--41 of these projects fall under
the ATC modernization program.
[41] Our statements about meeting cost, schedule, and/or performance
targets in this report and in our past reports are based on the
original targets that FAA established and approved at the start of its
acquisition programs.
[42] GAO, Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities Improved,
but More Can Be Done to Institutionalize Improvements, GAO-04-901
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004).
[43] GAO-04-822.
[44] GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture
Program Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts, GAO-05-266
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005).
[45] Under Free Flight Phase 1, FAA developed a suite of tools to
assist controllers with managing air traffic.
[46] GAO-05-11.
[47] On Transforming the Federal Aviation Administration: A Review of
the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and the Joint Program Development
Office (JPDO), Statement of Thomas Brantley, President, Professional
Airways Systems Specialists (PASS) AFL-CIO, before the House Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, April
7, 2005.
[48] GAO-04-822.
[49] For more information on using a knowledge-based approach, see GAO,
Air Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has Improved, but
Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure Results, GAO-
05-23 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004).
[50] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[51] GAO-05-23;
GAO-04-822.
[52] The ATO's Executive Council is responsible for further
implementing acquisition reform for major ATC system acquisitions.
[53] Earned value management compares the actual work performed at
certain stages of a job to its actual costs--rather than comparing
budgeted and actual costs, the traditional management approach to
assessing progress. By measuring the value of the work that has been
completed at certain stages in a job, earned value management can alert
program managers, contractors, and administrators to potential cost
growth and schedule delays before they occur and to problems that need
correcting before they worsen.
[54] We have not verified FAA's reported needs to refurbish or replace
these structures/facilities.
[55] Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B).
[56] The panel consisted of foreign and domestic aviation experts from
industry, government, private think tanks, and academia. Their fields
of expertise included aviation safety, economics, and engineering;
transportation research and policy;
and government and private-sector management. Former FAA officials and
current executives of the air traffic organizations in Canada and the
United Kingdom were among the experts, as was the chairman of
EUROCONTROL's Performance Review Commission. GAO, Experts' Views on
Improving the U.S. Air Traffic Control Modernization Program, GAO-05-
333SP (Washington, D.C.: April 2005).
[57] FAA defines runway incursion as any occurrence at an airport
involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that
creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of separation between
aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to
land.
[58] The objective of the Essential Air Service program is to ensure
that small communities that had received scheduled passenger air
service before deregulation will continue to have access to the
nation's air transportation system.
[59] The System Operations Center (SOC) is the workspace on the
operations control room floor where managers monitor the state of the
equipment providing air traffic services.
[60] The system's integrity requirement alerts pilots of erroneous
information not more often than once every 47 years, or 10-7.
[61] Department of Transportation's Inspector General, FAA Needs to
Reset Expectations for LAAS Because Considerable Work Is Required
before It Can Be Deployed for Operational Use, AV-2003-006 (Dec. 16,
2002).
[62] Operational Control Center capability, established in 2001, is a
standard set of tools and procedures needed to open the control
centers. The tools provide the initial enterprise management and
resource management technical capabilities needed at Operational
Control Centers.
[63] The Capital Investment Plan, a 5-year financial plan, allocates
funds to NAS projects on the basis of a detailed analysis of project
funding by FAA functional working groups. The plan includes estimates
for the current fiscal year budget and for 4 future year expenditures
for each line item in the facilities and equipment budget.
[64] FAA also transferred $1.3 billion--the cost of satellite leases--
from the operations account to the facilities and equipment account,
bringing the total estimate at completion cost to $3.3 billion.
[65] According to FAA officials, the number of system acquisitions in
the ATC modernization program can vary annually, when Congress earmarks
funds for a specific system acquisition. As of March 2005, the number
of system acquisitions under the program was 55.
[66] Our review of FAA's NAS modernization efforts will be issued later
this year.
[67] To make the report as current as possible, we have used fiscal
year 2005 funding levels where appropriate, including the status sheets
for each of the 16 systems in appendix I.
[68] GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Ensure Better Coordination
When Approving Air Traffic Control Systems, GAO-05-11 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2004);
GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has Improved,
but Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure Results,
GAO-05-23 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004).
[69] Organized in 1935 and once called the Radio Technical Commission
for Aeronautics, RTCA is today known just by its acronym. RTCA is a
private, not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based
performance standards for ATC systems. RTCA serves as a federal
advisory committee, and its recommendations are the basis for a number
of FAA's policy, program, and regulatory decisions.
[70] GAO, Experts' Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic Control
Modernization Program, GAO-05-333SP (Washington, D.C.: April 2005).
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