Passenger Rail Security
Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts Gao ID: GAO-05-851 September 9, 2005The U.S. passenger rail system is a vital component of the nation's transportation infrastructure, carrying more than 11 million passengers each weekday. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) share responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of rail systems. In this report, GAO addressed (1) DHS actions to assess the risks to the U.S. passenger rail system in the context of prevailing risk management principles, (2) federal actions taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system, and (3) security practices that domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators have implemented.
Within DHS, the Office for Domestic Preparedness has completed 7 risk assessments of passenger rail systems around the country, with 12 more under way. TSA has begun to conduct risk assessments and to establish a methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize risks that have been identified but has not yet completed either effort or set timelines for doing so. TSA will not be able to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investment decisions until these efforts are completed. At the department level, DHS has begun developing, but has not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks to transportation and other sectors. Until this framework is finalized and shared with stakeholders, it may not be possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly. The Federal Transit Administration and Federal Railroad Administration within DOT have ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security. In addition, in 2004, TSA issued emergency security directives to domestic rail operators after terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid, Spain, and piloted a test of explosive detection technology for use in passenger rail systems. However, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with the directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. In September 2004, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of understanding to improve coordination between the two agencies, and they are developing agreements to address specific rail security issues. Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have taken a range of actions to help secure their systems. We also observed security practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or their governments that are not currently used by the domestic rail operators we contacted, or by the U.S. government, and which could be considered for use in the United States. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers, and some foreign governments maintain centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies and best practices.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-851, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2005:
Passenger Rail Security:
Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security
Efforts:
GAO-05-851:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-851, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The U.S. passenger rail system is a vital component of the nation‘s
transportation infrastructure, carrying more than 11 million passengers
each weekday. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
Department of Transportation (DOT) share responsibility for ensuring
the safety and security of rail systems.
In this report, GAO addressed (1) DHS actions to assess the risks to
the U.S. passenger rail system in the context of prevailing risk
management principles, (2) federal actions taken to enhance the
security of the U.S. passenger rail system, and (3) security practices
that domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators have
implemented.
What GAO Found:
Within DHS, the Office for Domestic Preparedness has completed 7 risk
assessments of passenger rail systems around the country, with 12 more
under way. TSA has begun to conduct risk assessments and to establish a
methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize risks that
have been identified but has not yet completed either effort or set
timelines for doing so. TSA will not be able to prioritize passenger
rail assets and help guide security investment decisions until these
efforts are completed. At the department level, DHS has begun
developing, but has not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and
the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and
comparing risks to transportation and other sectors. Until this
framework is finalized and shared with stakeholders, it may not be
possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them,
and allocate resources accordingly.
The Federal Transit Administration and Federal Railroad Administration
within DOT have ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security.
In addition, in 2004, TSA issued emergency security directives to
domestic rail operators after terrorist attacks on the rail system in
Madrid, Spain, and piloted a test of explosive detection technology for
use in passenger rail systems. However, federal and rail industry
officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and
complying with the directives, citing limited opportunities to
collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were
incorporated. In September 2004, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of
understanding to improve coordination between the two agencies, and
they are developing agreements to address specific rail security
issues.
Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have taken a
range of actions to help secure their systems. We also observed
security practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or
their governments that are not currently used by the domestic rail
operators we contacted, or by the U.S. government, and which could be
considered for use in the United States. For example, some foreign rail
operators randomly screen passengers, and some foreign governments
maintain centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies and
best practices.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending, among other things, that the Secretary of DHS
direct the Assistant Secretary of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to develop a plan with timelines for completing
its methodology for conducting risk assessments and develop rail
security standards that can be measured and enforced. The Secretary
also should consider the feasibility of implementing certain security
practices used by foreign operators. DHS, DOT, and Amtrak reviewed a
draft of this report and generally agreed with the report‘s
recommendations. DHS‘s detailed comments and GAO‘s response are
contained in the report.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-851.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202)
512-8777 or JayEtta Hecker at (202) 512-2834
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but
Additional Work Is Needed to Guide Security Investments:
Multiple Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail
Security:
U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure
Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security
Actions May Exist:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Elements of a Typical Homeland Security Risk Assessment:
Appendix III: FTA and ODP Passenger Rail Risk Assessments Conducted or
In Progress:
FTA Risk Assessments Conducted:
ODP Risk Assessments:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Selected Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies
Related to Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Table 2: Selected Steps in ODP's Risk Assessment Process:
Table 3: Examples of Measures Required by TSA Security Directives
Issued to Passenger Rail Operators and Amtrak:
Table 4: Domestic Passenger Rail Agencies We Visited or Interviewed for
the Purposes of this Review:
Table 5: Foreign Passenger Rail and Government Agencies We Visited or
Interviewed for the Purposes of This Review:
Figures:
Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Amtrak and Rail Transit Systems:
Figure 2: Risk Management Cycle:
Figure 3: Sample ODP Relative Risk Diagram:
Figure 4: Status of TSA's Passenger Rail Risk Assessment Efforts, as of
July 2005:
Figure 5: Summary Information on TSA's Transit and Rail Inspection
Pilot Program Phases:
Figure 6: Example of Passenger Rail Customer Awareness Poster:
Figure 7: Wallet-size Cards Distributed to BART Employees Containing
Anti-terrorism Information:
Figure 8: Selected Security Design Elements Incorporated into London's
Underground:
Figure 9: Security Design Elements Incorporated into London's
Underground:
Figure 10: Composite of Selected Security Practices in the Passenger
Rail Environment:
Abbreviations:
AAR: American Association of Railroads:
APTA: American Public Transportation Association:
ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act:
BART: San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit:
CCTV: closed-circuit television:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FRA: Federal Railroad Administration:
FTA: Federal Transit Administration:
HSPD-7: Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7:
IAIP: Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection:
MBTA: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
NIPP: National Infrastructure Protection Plan:
ODP: Office for Domestic Preparedness:
PANYNJ: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey:
PATH: Port Authority Trans-Hudson:
PDA: personal digital assistant:
RATP: Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens:
SLGCP: Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness:
TRIP: Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TSSP: transportation sector-specific plan:
UASI: Urban Area Security Initiative:
WMATA: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 9, 2005:
The Honorable Steven LaTourette:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Railroads:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Olympia Snowe:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Barbara Boxer:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Michael Castle:
House of Representatives:
The July 7 and July 21, 2005, bomb attacks on London's subway system,
which resulted in over 50 fatalities and more than 700 injuries,
dramatically highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail systems
worldwide to terrorist attacks and the need for an increased focus on
security for these systems. The U.S. passenger rail system is a vital
component of the nation's transportation infrastructure, encompassing
rail transit (heavy rail, commuter rail, and light rail) and intercity
rail systems.[Footnote 1] Together, these systems carry more than 11
million passengers each weekday. One of the critical challenges facing
rail system operators--and the federal agencies that regulate and
oversee them--is finding ways to protect rail systems from potential
terrorist attacks without compromising the accessibility and efficiency
of rail travel.
Several entities play a role in helping to fund and secure the
passenger rail industry. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary regulator
of the rail system's security, while DHS's Office for Domestic
Preparedness (ODP) has been the primary federal source of security
funding for passenger rail systems. In addition, the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA), state and local agencies (which operate
most rail transit rail systems), and Amtrak are responsible for or have
been involved in the security and safety of the U.S. passenger rail
system.
In the United States, passenger rail systems represent one of many
modes of transportation--along with aviation, maritime, and others--
competing for limited federal security resources. Within the passenger
rail sector itself, there is competition for resources, as federal,
state, and local agencies and rail operators seek to identify and
invest in appropriate security measures to safeguard these systems
while also investing in other capital and operational improvements.
Moreover, given competing priorities and limited homeland security
resources, difficult policy decisions have to be made by Congress and
the executive branch to prioritize security efforts and direct
resources to areas of greatest risk within the passenger rail system,
among all transportation modes, and across other nationally critical
sectors.
In this regard, to help federal decision makers determine how to best
allocate limited resources, we have advocated, the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) has
recommended, and the subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 requires, that a risk management approach be
employed to guide security decision making.[Footnote 2] A risk
management approach entails a continuous process of managing risks
through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and
objectives, assessing and quantifying risks, evaluating alternative
security measures, selecting which measures to undertake, and
implementing and monitoring those measures. In July 2005, in announcing
his proposal for the reorganization of DHS, the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security declared that as a core principle of
the reorganization, the department must base its work on priorities
driven by risk.
You have expressed interest in the progress federal agencies and
domestic passenger rail operators have made in setting and implementing
security priorities in the wake of September 11 and terrorist attacks
on rail systems. In addition, you expressed interest in learning about
the security practices implemented by foreign passenger rail operators.
For this report, we analyzed (1) the actions that DHS and its component
agencies have taken to assess the risks posed by terrorism to the U.S.
passenger rail system in the context of prevailing risk management
principles; (2) the actions that federal agencies have taken to enhance
the security of the U.S. passenger rail system; and (3) the security
practices that domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators
have implemented to mitigate risks and enhance security, and any
differences in these practices.
To perform our analyses, we conducted site visits at, or held
teleconferences with, a total of 32 passenger rail operators in the
United States that represent over 95 percent of the nation's total rail
ridership, as well as Amtrak. We also conducted site visits or met
elsewhere with 13 passenger rail operators in seven European and Asian
countries. During our domestic and international visits, we interviewed
management and security personnel, toured stations and other facilities
such as control centers, observed security practices, and obtained
documentation of security procedures. In addition, we interviewed
officials from domestic and foreign rail industry associations, foreign
governments and rail operators, and representatives of the European
Commission. Because we selected a nonprobability sample of both foreign
and domestic passenger rail operators, the information we obtained from
these interviews and visits cannot be generalized to all foreign or
domestic rail operators.
We also reviewed risk assessments of U.S. rail systems conducted by the
federal government. Risk assessments are used to identify and rank
risks to critical regional or national assets to further identify which
would be most vulnerable to attack based on various threat scenarios.
Risk assessments are an integral part of using a broader risk
management approach to guide investments that help enhance security.
While a risk management approach entails multiple iterative components,
this report primarily addresses the risk assessment component of such
an approach as applied in the homeland security context. (Additional
information about the risk assessment component is contained in app.
II.) Although we identified and cataloged security practices of the
domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted, we did not
evaluate the appropriateness or effectiveness of these practices. We
discussed foreign security practices we observed with DHS, DOT,
passenger rail industry associations, select passenger rail operators,
and transportation security experts from the RAND Corporation and the
Mineta Transportation Institute to explore the potential applicability
of these practices to U.S. passenger rail systems.[Footnote 3] Our work
does not reflect the proposed reorganization of DHS and its component
agencies announced by the Secretary of DHS. We conducted our work from
May 2004 through July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Appendix I contains more details about
our objectives, scope, and methodology.
Results in Brief:
Two component agencies with different missions within DHS are
responsible for, and have engaged in, conducting risk assessments for
the passenger rail industry, in an effort to identify and protect the
assets most vulnerable to attack and most critical to operations, such
as stations, tracks, and bridges. The first, the Office for Domestic
Preparedness, is responsible for, among other things, providing grant
funds and technical assistance to rail operators and others to improve
preparedness at the state and local level. As part of this mission, ODP
has developed and implemented a risk assessment methodology for mass
transit agencies and port authorities, and used it to complete 7 risk
assessments at rail facilities, with an additional 12 assessments in
progress, as of July 2005. According to passenger rail operators we
interviewed, ODP's risk management approach has helped them to
prioritize and allocate resources to protect their systems. For
example, one operator collaborated with ODP on a risk assessment that
resulted in justifying a $500 million high-priority security capital
investment program, which is to fund, among other things, a security
operations center for its passenger train network, alarm monitoring
systems, and an upgraded closed-circuit television system. The second
agency, TSA, has also recently begun to conduct risk assessments of the
rail sector as part of a broader effort to assess risk to all
transportation modes. As of July 2005, while TSA had completed an
overall threat assessment for mass transit and passenger rail, the
agency had not yet completed a risk assessment for the passenger rail
sector or a methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize
risk (as high, medium, or low) identified through assessments, or
indicated when this would be done. Until both of these efforts have
been accomplished, in collaboration with rail industry stakeholders,
TSA will not be able to prioritize passenger rail assets based on risk
and help guide investment decisions about protecting them. A 2003
presidential directive required DHS to, among other things, establish
uniform guidelines and methodologies for integrating federal
infrastructure protection and risk management activities within and
across entire economic sectors, such as transportation (including
rail), energy, and agriculture. To address this requirement, at the
department level, DHS has been developing a broad framework intended to
help federal agencies, the private sector, and state and local
governments develop a consistent approach to analyzing risk to critical
infrastructure within and across sectors. This framework is intended to
enable risks across sectors to be compared as a means of guiding
resource allocation and emergency response planning. Because DHS has
not yet finalized this framework, it is not known what impact, if any,
it may have on risk assessment efforts now under way by TSA, ODP, and
other federal agencies with critical infrastructure protection
responsibilities. Until DHS finalizes this framework, it may not be
possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them,
and then allocate resources accordingly.
A number of federal departments and their component agencies have taken
actions to strengthen passenger rail security. FTA and FRA were the
primary federal agencies involved in passenger rail security matters
prior to the creation of TSA, and both undertook numerous initiatives
both before and after September 11, 2001. For example, FTA conducted
security readiness assessments, sponsored security training, and
developed security guidance for transit agencies. FRA conducted
security inspections of commuter railroads and researched various rail
security technologies. After taking over as the lead federal agency
responsible for transportation security, TSA issued security directives
to the passenger rail industry in May 2004, after terrorists attacked
the commuter rail system in Madrid, Spain. The directives--based upon
industry best practices, according to TSA--required rail operators to
implement a number of security measures, such as conducting frequent
inspections of stations, terminals, and other assets, or utilizing
canine explosive detection teams, if available. According to TSA
officials, because of the need to act quickly, the rule-making process
for these security directives did not include a public comment period.
As a result, stakeholder input was limited. The rapid issuance of these
directives has posed challenges to TSA and rail operators. For example,
while rail operators are required to implement the measures, and TSA
has hired rail inspectors to enforce them, operators told TSA they were
unsure how to comply with the directives because, for example, the
directives include instructions requiring them to perform "frequent
inspections" of key facilities, without defining relevant parameters.
TSA told rail operators when the directives were issued that additional
performance-based guidance would be provided to clarify the directives
requirements, but this information has not been supplied. Further, TSA
has not yet developed criteria or procedures for rail inspectors to use
in enforcing compliance with the directives. In addition, stakeholders
we contacted questioned the extent to which the security directives
reflected industry best practices. For example, one requirement of the
directives was that the doors of the rail engineer's compartment be
locked, which conflicts with an existing FRA safety regulation calling
for these doors to remain unlocked for escape purposes. In September
2004, in response to our prior recommendation, DHS and DOT signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) intended to identify ways to improve
coordination and collaboration between and among federal and rail
industry stakeholders.[Footnote 4] As of July 2005, the departments
were developing agreements within the framework of this memorandum to
delineate specific security-related roles, responsibilities, and
resources for mass transit, rail, research and development, and other
matters.[Footnote 5] However, none of the agreements have been
finalized and timelines have not been established for doing so.
Completing these agreements could help to ensure that federal
activities to secure passenger rail systems are coordinated and that
stakeholders are appropriately involved in the development and
implementation of these activities.
Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted or visited
have generally taken similar actions to help secure their systems
against the risk posed by terrorism. Specifically, most U.S. and
foreign operators we contacted had implemented customer awareness
programs to encourage passengers to remain vigilant and report
suspicious activities, increased the number and visibility of their
security personnel, increased the usage of canine teams to detect drugs
and explosives, enhanced employee training programs, upgraded security
technology, tightened access controls, and made system design
improvements to enhance security. However, we observed security
practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or their
governments that were not in use, at the time we completed our
fieldwork in June 2005, by the domestic rail operators we contacted or
the U.S. government. For example, we found that 2 of 13 foreign rail
operators we contacted utilize covert testing to help keep employees
alert to security threats. In one type of covert test, suspicious items
are placed throughout the rail system and employees are observed to see
how long it takes them to find the objects. In addition, 2 of 13
foreign rail operators we visited randomly screen passengers and their
baggage. After the July 7, 2005, London bombings, four domestic
passenger rail operators began randomly screening passengers and their
baggage on a limited basis. Further, in five countries we visited,
national governments have centralized research on security technologies
and maintain clearinghouses on these technologies and security best
practices, giving rail operators a single source for identifying and
comparing, among other things, chemical sensors, closed-circuit
television, and intrusion detection systems. Introducing any of these
security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal,
fiscal, and cultural challenges, but may nevertheless warrant
examination to determine whether they could enhance the security of
domestic rail systems.
To help ensure that the federal government has the information it needs
to prioritize passenger rail assets based on risk, and in order to
evaluate, select, and implement commensurate measures to help the
nation's passenger rail operators protect their systems against acts of
terrorism, we are making several recommendations. Among them, we
recommend that TSA establish a plan with timelines for completing its
methodology for conducting risk assessments, develop security standards
that reflect industry best practices and can be measured and enforced,
and set timelines for completing memorandum of understanding
agreements. In addition, we are recommending that the Secretary of DHS
determine the feasibility, in a risk management context, of
implementing certain security practices used by foreign rail operators.
These recommendations should be implemented in collaboration with DOT
and the passenger rail industry. We provided DHS, DOT, and Amtrak a
draft of this report for review and comment. DOT and Amtrak generally
agreed with our findings and recommendations and provided technical
comments, which we have incorporated where appropriate. DHS generally
concurred with the report's recommendations. However, DHS raised
questions about, among other things, the extent to which the report
reflected the agency's efforts to involve federal and rail industry
stakeholders in the development of security directives and criticality
assessments. According to TSA, the emergency circumstances under which
the directives were issued allowed for only limited input and review by
federal and rail industry stakeholders. However, we believe that using
the federal rule-making process as a means of establishing permanent
standards would make the process more transparent and could help TSA in
developing standards that are most appropriate for the industry and
which can be measured, monitored, and enforced. These stakeholders will
be involved in administering, implementing, and/or enforcing TSA
standards and stakeholder buy-in would be critical to the success of
such initiatives. DHS's comments appear in appendix IV.
Background:
Overview of the U.S. Passenger Rail System:
Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22
states use some form of rail transit.[Footnote 6] Heavy rail systems--
subway systems like New York City's transit system and Washington,
D.C.'s Metro--typically operate on fixed rail lines within a
metropolitan area and have the capacity for a heavy volume of traffic.
Commuter rail systems typically operate on railroad tracks and provide
regional service (e.g., between a central city and adjacent suburbs).
Commuter rail systems are traditionally associated with older
industrial cities, such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago.
Light rail systems are typically characterized by lightweight passenger
rail cars that operate on track that is not separated from vehicular
traffic for much of the way. All types of rail transit systems in the
United States are typically owned and operated by public sector
entities, such as state and regional transportation authorities.
Amtrak operates the nation's primary intercity passenger rail service
over a 22,000-mile network, primarily over leased freight railroad
tracks.[Footnote 7] Amtrak serves more than 500 stations (240 of which
are staffed) in 46 states and the District of Columbia, and it carried
more than 25 million passengers in 2004. According to Amtrak, about two-
thirds of its ridership is wholly or partially on the "Northeast
Corridor," between Boston and Washington, D.C. Amtrak owns about 650
miles of track, primarily on the Northeast Corridor. Stations are owned
by Amtrak, freight carriers, municipalities, and some private entities.
Amtrak also operates commuter rail services in certain jurisdictions on
behalf of state and regional transportation authorities. Figure 1
identifies the geographic location of rail transit systems and Amtrak
within the United States.
Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Amtrak and Rail Transit Systems:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Passenger Rail Systems Are Inherently Vulnerable to Terrorist Attacks:
To date, U.S. passenger rail systems have not been targets of terrorist
attacks. However, worldwide, public transportation in general and
passenger rail in particular, have been attacked multiple times,
sometimes with grave results. According to a database of worldwide
terrorist incidents maintained by the RAND Corporation, from 1995 to
June 2005, there have been over 250 terrorist attacks worldwide against
rail targets, resulting in almost 900 deaths and over 6,000
injuries.[Footnote 8] Among them were the fatal 1995 sarin gas attack
on the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinri Kyo doomsday cult,
resulting in 12 deaths and 5,000 injuries; the December 2003 bomb
attack by Chechen rebels on a Russian commuter train, resulting in 46
fatalities and 165 injuries; and the March 2004 terrorist bombing
attacks on commuter trains in Madrid, for which an al Qaeda affiliate
organization claimed responsibility, and in which 191 people were
killed and 600 were injured.
According to passenger rail officials and passenger rail experts,
certain characteristics of domestic and foreign passenger rail systems
make them inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and therefore
difficult to secure. By design, passenger rail systems are open (i.e.,
have multiple access points, hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in
some cases, no barriers) so that they can move large numbers of people
quickly. In contrast, the U.S. commercial aviation system is housed in
closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The openness of
passenger rail systems can leave them vulnerable because operator
personnel cannot completely monitor or control who enters or leaves the
systems. In addition, other characteristics of some passenger rail
systems--high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance,
and location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)--
also make them attractive targets for terrorists because of the
potential for mass casualties and economic damage and disruption.
Moreover, some of these same characteristics make passenger rail
systems difficult to secure. For example, the numbers of riders that
pass through a subway system--especially during peak hours--may make
the sustained use of some security measures, such as metal detectors,
difficult because they could result in long lines that could disrupt
scheduled service. In addition, multiple access points along extended
routes could make the cost of securing each location prohibitive.
Balancing the potential economic impacts of security enhancements with
the benefits of such measures is a difficult challenge.
Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Securing Passenger Rail
Systems:
Securing the nation's passenger rail systems is a shared responsibility
requiring coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local
governments; the private sector; and rail passengers who ride these
systems. Since the September 11 attacks, the role of federal government
agencies in securing the nation's transportation systems, including
passenger rail, have continued to evolve. Prior to September 11, DOT--
namely FTA and FRA--was the primary federal entity involved in
passenger rail security matters. In response to the attacks of
September 11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary
responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of
transportation.[Footnote 9] The act also gave TSA regulatory authority
for security over all transportation modes. ATSA does not specify TSA's
roles and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land
transportation modes at the level of detail it does for aviation
security. Instead, the act broadly identifies that TSA is responsible
for ensuring the security of all modes of transportation. With the
passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, TSA was transferred,
along with over 20 other agencies, to the Department of Homeland
Security.[Footnote 10]
With the creation of DHS in 2002, one of its components, ODP, became
the primary federal source for security funding for passenger rail
systems.[Footnote 11] ODP is the principal component of DHS responsible
for preparing the United States for acts of terrorism and has primary
responsibility within the executive branch for assisting and supporting
DHS, in coordination with other directorates and entities outside of
the department, in conducting risk analysis and risk management
activities of state and local governments.[Footnote 12] In carrying out
its mission, ODP provides training, funds for the purchase of
equipment, support for the planning and execution of exercises,
technical assistance, and other support to assist states, local
jurisdictions, and the private sector to prevent, prepare for, and
respond to acts of terrorism. Through the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) grant program, ODP has provided grants to urban areas
to help enhance their overall security and preparedness level to
prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. In 2003 and
2004, $65 million and $50 million, respectively, were allocated to rail
transit agencies through the UASI program. In addition, the DHS
Appropriations Act of 2005 appropriated $150 million for rail transit,
intercity passenger rail, freight rail, and transit agency security
grants. This funding has allowed ODP to build upon the work under way
through the UASI program and create and administer two new programs
focused specifically on transportation security, the Transit Security
Grant Program and the Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program.
These programs provide financial assistance to address security
preparedness and enhancements for transit (to include commuter, heavy,
and light rail systems, intracity bus, and ferry), and intercity rail
(Amtrak) systems. The grant programs specifically provide funding for
the prevention and detection of explosive devices and chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. About $108 million was
provided to rail transit agencies and $7.1 million to Amtrak through
these grant programs in 2005.[Footnote 13]
While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the security of all
transportation modes, FTA conducts nonregulatory safety and security
activities, including safety-and security-related training, research,
technical assistance, and demonstration projects. In addition, FTA
promotes safety and security through its grant-making authority. FTA
provides financial assistance to rail transit agencies to plan and
develop new systems and operate, maintain, and improve existing
systems. FTA stipulates conditions of grants, such as certain safety
and security statutory and regulatory requirements, and FTA may
withhold funds for noncompliance with the conditions of a
grant.[Footnote 14] While FTA cannot regulate safety and security
operations at transit agencies,[Footnote 15] FRA has regulatory
authority for rail safety over commuter rail operators and Amtrak, and
employs over 400 rail inspectors that periodically monitor the
implementation of safety and security plans at these systems.[Footnote
16]
State and local governments, passenger rail operators, and private
industry are also important stakeholders in the nation's rail security
efforts. State and local governments play a vital role, in part,
because they may own or operate a significant portion of the passenger
rail system. Even when state and local governments are not owners and
operators, they are directly affected by passenger rail systems that
run within and through their jurisdictions. Consequently, the
responsibility for responding to emergencies involving the passenger
rail infrastructure often falls to state and local governments.
Passenger rail operators, which can be public or private entities, are
responsible for administering and managing passenger rail activities
and services, including security. Passenger rail operators can directly
operate the service provided or contract for all or part of the total
service. Although all levels of government are involved in passenger
rail security, the primary responsibility for securing passenger rail
systems rests with the passenger rail operators. We discuss actions
taken by federal agencies and passenger rail operators to enhance
security in more detail later in this report.
Assessing and Managing Risks to Rail Infrastructure Using a Risk
Management Approach:
In recent years, we, along with Congress (most recently through the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004),[Footnote 17]
the executive branch (e.g., in presidential directives), and the 9/11
Commission have required or advocated that federal agencies with
homeland security responsibilities utilize a risk management approach
to help ensure that finite national resources are dedicated to assets
or activities considered to have the highest security priority. We have
concluded that without a risk management approach, there is limited
assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism are properly
prioritized and focused. Thus, risk management, as applied in the
homeland security context, can help to more effectively and efficiently
prepare defenses against acts of terrorism and other threats.
A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing
risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and
objectives, performing risk assessments, evaluating alternative actions
to reduce identified risks by preventing or mitigating their impact,
selecting actions to undertake by management, and implementing and
monitoring those actions. Figure 2 depicts a risk management cycle that
is our synthesis of government requirements and prevailing best
practices previously reported.
Figure 2: Risk Management Cycle:
[See PDF for image] --graphic text:
1. Strategic goals, objectives, and constraints,
2. Risk assessment,
3. Alternatives evaluation,
4. Management selection,
5. Implementation and monitoring.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Setting strategic goals, objectives, and constraints is a key first
step in implementing a risk management approach and helps to ensure
that management decisions are focused on achieving a strategic purpose.
These decisions should take place in the context of an agency's
strategic plan that includes goals and objectives that are clear,
concise, and measurable.
Risk assessment, a critical element of a risk management approach,
helps decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that
countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate
the effects of the risks. Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or
quantitative determination of the likelihood of an adverse event
occurring and the severity, or impact, of its consequences. Risk
assessment in a homeland security application often involves assessing
three key elements--threat, criticality, and vulnerability:
* A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the
basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities.
* A criticality or consequence assessment evaluates and prioritizes
assets and functions in terms of specific criteria, such as their
importance to public safety and the economy, as a basis for identifying
which structures or processes are relatively more important to protect
from attack.
* A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be
exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address those
weaknesses.
Information from these three assessments contributes to an overall risk
assessment that characterizes risks on a scale such as high, medium, or
low and provides input for evaluating alternatives and management
prioritization of security initiatives.[Footnote 18] Additional details
on these assessment elements can be found in appendix II. The risk
assessment element in the overall risk management cycle may be the
largest change from standard management steps and is central to
informing the remaining steps of the cycle.
The next step in a risk management approach--alternatives evaluation--
considers what actions may be needed to address identified risks, the
associated costs of taking these actions, and any resulting benefits.
This information is then to be provided to agency management to assist
in the selection of alternative actions best suited to the unique needs
of the organization. An additional step in the risk management approach
is the implementation and monitoring of actions taken to address the
risks, including evaluating the extent to which risk was mitigated by
these actions. Once the agency has implemented the actions to address
risks, it should develop criteria for and continually monitor the
performance of these actions to ensure that they are effective and also
reflect evolving risk.
Federal Agencies with Risk Management Responsibilities:
A number of federal departments and agencies have risk management and
critical infrastructure protection responsibilities stemming from
various requirements. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created
DHS, directed the department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) Directorate to utilize a risk management approach in
coordinating the nation's critical infrastructure protection efforts.
This includes using risk assessments to set priorities for protective
and support measures by the department, other federal agencies, state
and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and
other entities. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7)
defines critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for DHS,
sector-specific agencies (those federal agencies given responsibility
for transportation, energy, telecommunications, and so forth), and
other departments and agencies. The President instructs federal
departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the
protection of critical infrastructure to prevent, deter, and mitigate
the effects of terrorist attacks. The Secretary of DHS is assigned
several responsibilities by HSPD-7, including establishing uniform
polices, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies for integrating
federal infrastructure protection and risk management activities within
and across sectors. To ensure the coverage of critical sectors, HSPD-7
designated sector-specific agencies for 17 critical infrastructure
sectors.[Footnote 19] These agencies are responsible for infrastructure
protection activities in their assigned sectors, including coordinating
and collaborating with relevant federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the private sector to carry out their responsibilities
and facilitating the sharing of information about vulnerabilities,
incidents, potential protective measures, and best practices.
Pursuant to HSPD-7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP), DHS was designated as the sector-specific agency for the
transportation sector, a responsibility the department has delegated to
TSA.[Footnote 20] As the sector-specific agency for transportation, TSA
is required to develop a transportation sector-specific plan (TSSP) for
identifying, prioritizing, and protecting critical transportation
infrastructure and key resources that will provide key input to the
broader NIPP to be prepared by IAIP. DHS issued an interim NIPP in
February 2005 that was intended to serve as a road map for how DHS and
stakeholders--including other federal agencies, the private sector, and
state and local governments--should use risk management principles for
determining how to prioritize activities related to protecting critical
infrastructure and key resources within and among each of the 17
sectors in an integrated, coordinated fashion. DHS expects the next
iteration of the NIPP to be issued in November 2005, with the sector-
specific plans, including the TSSP, being incorporated into this plan
in February 2006. HSPD-7 also requires DHS to coordinate with DOT on
all transportation security matters. Table 1 summarizes selected
responsibilities for federal agencies with lead or supporting roles for
critical infrastructure protection and risk management efforts.
Table 1: Selected Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies
Related to Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Statute or directive: Homeland Security Act of 2002:
Agency with lead or supporting role: IAIP[A];
Selected responsibilities: Coordinates national critical infrastructure
protection (CIP) efforts by:
* conducting risk assessments of key resources and critical
infrastructure to determine the risks posed by terrorist attacks within
the United States;
* integrating relevant information, analyses, and assessments (whether
conducted by department or others) in order to identify priorities for
protective and support measures;
* recommending measures to protect the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States in coordination with other federal
agencies and in cooperation with state and local government agencies
and authorities, the private sector, and other entities;
Related output of action: Develop a comprehensive national plan for
securing the key resources and critical infrastructure;
Due date: Not specified.
Agency with lead or supporting role: ODP[A];
Selected responsibilities: As the principal federal agency in preparing
the United States for acts of terrorism:
* assists and supports DHS in conducting appropriate risk analysis and
risk management activities of state, local, and tribal governments;
* serves as primary office responsible for providing training, funds
for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning and execution
of exercises;
Related output of action: Risk analysis and risk management activities
for states and local jurisdictions;
Due date: Not applicable.
Statute or directive: Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7:
Agency with lead or supporting role: IAIP[B];
Selected responsibilities: Coordinate national CIP efforts by:
* identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection of
critical infrastructure, emphasizing protection against catastrophic
health effects or mass casualties;
* establishing uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and
methodologies for integrating federal infrastructure protection and
risk management activities within and across sectors;
Related output of action: National Infrastructure Protection Plan;
Due date: 12/04.
Agency with lead or supporting role: TSA[C];
Selected responsibilities: As sector-specific agency for
transportation:
* identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical
transportation systems infrastructure, including conducting and
facilitating vulnerability assessments and encouraging risk management
strategies;
* coordinate and collaborate with relevant federal agencies, state and
local governments, and the private sector;
Related output of action: Transportation Sector-Specific Plan;
Due date: 12/04.
Agency with lead or supporting role: DOT[D];
Selected responsibilities: Support CIP activities in transportation
sector by:
* collaborating with DHS on all matters relating to transportation
security and transportation infrastructure protection;
Related output of action: Not applicable;
Due date: Not applicable.
Statute or directive: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004;
Agency with lead or supporting role: TSA[E];
Selected responsibilities: Develop, prepare, implement, and update as
needed a National Strategy for Transportation Security, including:
* development of transportation modal security plans;
* identification and evaluation of transportation assets that must be
protected from terrorist attack;
* development of risk-based priorities across all transportation modes
and realistic deadlines for addressing security needs associated with
those assets;
Related output of action: National Strategy for Transportation
Security;
Due date: 4/05.
Agency with lead or supporting role: DOT;
Selected responsibilities: Works jointly with DHS to develop, revise,
and update the National Strategy for Transportation Security;
Related output of action: Not applicable;
Due date: Not applicable.
Source: GAO analysis of federal roles and responsibilities related to
risk management and critical infrastructure protection.
[A] Lead role designated by statute.
[B] Lead role for all sectors; responsibility delegated by DHS.
[C] Lead role for transportation sector; responsibility delegated by
DHS.
[D] Supporting role for DHS.
[E] Lead role delegated by DHS.
[End of table]
DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but
Additional Work Is Needed to Guide Security Investments:
DHS component agencies have taken various steps to assess the risk
posed by terrorism to U.S. passenger rail systems. ODP has developed
and implemented a risk assessment methodology intended to help
passenger rail operators and others enhance their capacity to respond
to terrorist incidents and identify and prioritize security
countermeasures. As of July 2005, ODP had completed 7 risk assessments
with rail operators and 12 others were under way. Further, TSA
completed a threat assessment for mass transit and rail and has begun
to identify critical rail assets, but it has not yet completed an
overall risk assessment for the passenger rail industry. DHS is
developing guidance to help these and other sector-specific agencies
work with stakeholders to identify and analyze risk.
ODP Has Worked with Passenger Rail Operators to Develop Risk
Assessments to Help Prioritize Rail Security Needs and Investments:
In 2002, ODP began conducting risk assessments of passenger rail
operators through its Mass Transit Technical Assistance program. These
assessments are intended to help passenger rail operators and port
authorities enhance their capacity and preparedness to respond to
terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and identify
and prioritize security countermeasures and emergency response
capabilities. ODP's approach to risk assessment is generally consistent
with the risk assessment component of our risk management approach. The
agency has worked with passenger rail operators and others to complete
several risk assessments. As of July 2005, ODP had completed 7 risk
assessments in collaboration with passenger rail operators.[Footnote
21] Twelve additional risk assessments are under way, and an additional
11 transit agencies have requested assistance through this program.
ODP's methodology for conducting risk assessments is articulated in a
tool kit designed to enable passenger rail operators and others to
compare relative risks among assets, identify assets with a perceived
high level of risk, and prioritize measures to mitigate those
risks.[Footnote 22] Once ODP and a rail operator agree to collaborate
on the risk assessment, ODP sends a technical assistance team
consisting of experts in the risk management and emergency response
field to visit the rail operator on-site to support the implementation
of the risk assessment process. The team assists the operator in using
the tool kit to generate information on criticality, threat,
vulnerability, impact, and risk. Once completed, the documented results
should serve as a guide for future applications of the risk assessment
process to keep pace with new threat information and newly vulnerable
assets.
ODP's risk assessment process involves, first, an analysis of four
elements--criticality, threat, vulnerability, and impact. Using the
tool kit, the operator begins by conducting the criticality assessment
to identify and prioritize critical assets based upon factors such as
the potential for serious injury or loss of life, or the economic
implications on the livelihood, resources, or wealth of the area,
region, or country if the asset was destroyed. Assets deemed to be
"most critical" are then evaluated using the remaining risk assessment
components. The operator then conducts the threat assessment to
identify the range of weapon types that terrorists might use against
the operator's critical assets, establish the likelihood that critical
assets might be targeted, and develop possible attack scenarios. These
attack scenarios are then used to perform a vulnerability assessment
that evaluates the susceptibility of critical assets to these scenarios
and determines such things as the probability of an attack succeeding
and whether it can be stopped. Once these first three assessment
components are completed, the operator determines the impact that the
partial or complete destruction of a critical asset would have on the
asset's ability to function based upon specific threat scenarios. Table
2 describes selected steps that operators take, in conjunction with
ODP, to carry out these four assessment components using ODP's risk
assessment tool kit.
Table 2: Selected Steps in ODP's Risk Assessment Process:
Assessment component: Criticality;
Assessment steps:
Step 1. Develop a worksheet of candidate critical assets (i.e.,
infrastructure, facilities, equipment, and personnel) that enable the
operator to achieve its mission;
Step 2. Establish critical asset factors--factors that describe the
characteristics of assets that would result in significant negative
impact to the operator given their loss in a terrorist event (i.e.,
economic impact, symbolic importance, functional importance);
Step 3. Assign quantitative values to each factor that indicate the
importance of the factor to the overall mission of the operator;
Step 4. Apply the factors to the list of candidate assets to develop a
criticality score;
Step 5. Prioritize assets based upon their criticality scores. Rail
operator officials review rankings to determine their reasonableness
and to establish a threshold for the assets considered most critical.
Assessment component: Threat;
Assessment steps:
Step 1. Develop a list of weapons types (i.e., large or small
explosives, biological conventional explosive, nuclear device) that
might be used by terrorists;
Step 2. Evaluate the selected weapon types on the likelihood (using a
five-point scale) that terrorists have each weapon and would use it
against the operator's assets;
Step 3. Evaluate the attractiveness of targets based on the potential
for casualties, potential for economic disruption, and symbolic
importance;
Step 4. Define attack scenarios (based on target asset, weapon, and
mode of delivery); the information will be used in subsequent
assessment components.
Assessment component: Vulnerability;
Assessment steps:
Step 1. Develop a rating to determine the probability of a successful
attack. Rating is based upon three factors: the ability to limit or
deny ingress and egress to an asset by a terrorist (access control),
the ability to expose or reveal an attack before it takes place
(detection capabilities), the ability to interdict once an attack has
been detected (interdiction capabilities);
Step 2. Using these probability ratings, develop an overall
vulnerability rating that represents the relative likelihood of an
attack being attempted and successfully carried out.
Assessment component: Impact;
Assessment steps:
Step 1. Use the critical asset factors identified above to rate the
effect of a weapon on each asset's mission;
Step 2. Once each asset has been rated, use a mathematical formula to
calculate a total overall impact level--how each asset's mission is
affected based upon the extent to which it would be destroyed.
Source: GAO analysis of ODP information.
[End of table]
The results developed in the threat, criticality, vulnerability, and
impact assessments are then used to develop an overall risk assessment
in order to evaluate the relative risk among various assets, weapons,
and modes of attack. This is intended to give operators an indication
of which asset types and threat scenarios carry the highest risk and
that, accordingly, are likely candidates for early risk mitigation
action. Using the results of the risk assessment process, a diagram of
relative risk is developed by plotting the assets and scenarios in
terms of vulnerability and consequence, as shown in figure 3.[Footnote
23]
Figure 3: Sample ODP Relative Risk Diagram:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
By showing the relative risk of all assets and scenarios identified,
this diagram identifies the assets and scenarios that have the greatest
estimated level of relative risk and provides critical information
useful to develop and prioritize security countermeasures. According to
ODP, assets with scenarios that fall in quadrants I and III have the
greatest potential negative impact (i.e., the greatest consequence) on
an operator's system if attacked. Assets with scenarios that fall in
quadrants I and II have the greatest vulnerability to attack.
Therefore, quadrant I contains the assets and scenarios that have the
greatest vulnerability and negative consequence and are likely
candidates for early mitigation action from a policy decision-making
perspective.
According to rail operators who have used ODP's risk assessment
methodology and commented about it to DHS or us, the method has been
successful in helping to devise risk reduction strategies to guide
security-related investments. For example, between September 2002 and
March 2003, ODP's technical assistance team worked with the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) to conduct a risk
assessment of all of its assets--its Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH)
passenger rail system, as well as airports, ports, interstate highway
crossings, and commercial properties.[Footnote 24] According to PANYNJ
officials, the authority was able to develop and implement a risk
reduction strategy that enabled it to identify and set priorities for
improvements in security and emergency response capability that are
being used to guide security investments.
As part of this risk assessment, PANYNJ identified and prioritized
particular types of security countermeasures that, if implemented,
would improve the authority's overall risk profile by moving assets
into the lower parts of the risk diagram (as shown in fig. 3). Examples
of countermeasures considered include site-hardening of assets such as
bridges and tunnels; increased patrols, guards, and canine units; event-
activated closed-circuit television (CCTV); and intrusion detection
systems. According to PANYNJ officials, the associated costs and
benefits of the countermeasures identified were considered, and
management was involved in choosing and prioritizing the actions
included in the plan. More specifically, according to authority
officials, the risk assessment was instrumental in obtaining management
approval for a 5-year, $500 million security capital investment
program, as it provided a risk-based justification for these
investments.[Footnote 25] Examples of passenger rail security capital
investments PANYNJ is making as part of this program include the
development of a state-of-the art system wide security operations
center for the PATH system, access control and alarm monitoring system
replacement at 45 locations, and digital video recording upgrades to
its CCTV system. At the time of our review, the authority was 2 years
into implementing the strategy and associated capital investment
program and had just completed its first risk assessment update. PANYNJ
officials told us they have formally incorporated the ODP risk
assessment model into the authority's annual planning and budgeting
cycle and are able to track and assess how security projects improve
the authority's overall risk profile. PANYNJ staff are now working on a
cost-benefit module to be included in the authority's risk assessment
program, with the objective of making more discrete trade-offs among
high-cost security programs on the basis of which ones provided the
highest payoff.
The six other passenger rail operators that have completed ODP's risk
assessment process also stated that they valued the process.
Specifically, operators said that the assessments enabled them to
prioritize investments based on risk and are already allowing or are
expected to allow them to effectively target and allocate resources
toward security measures that will have the greatest impact on reducing
risk across their system. For example, one rail operator stated that it
is planning on spending its fiscal year 2005 Transit Security Grant
Program funding to expand its CCTV coverage, with a focus on stations
that serve major public gatherings but do not have such equipment, a
measure identified by the risk assessment as the second most effective
risk reduction measure to implement. [Footnote 26] In addition, as a
result of the assessment, the operator said that it has incorporated
CCTVs into its standard design criteria for new system construction,
such as stations and parking garages.
ODP Has Sought to Promote Risk-Based Decision Making among Federal
Agencies and Rail Operators:
On the basis of its own experience with conducting risk assessments in
the field, and in keeping with its mission to develop and implement a
national program to enhance the capacity of state and local agencies to
respond to incidents of terrorism, ODP has offered to help other DHS
components and federal agencies to develop risk assessment tools,
according to ODP officials. For example, ODP is partnering with the
FRA, TSA, the American Association of Railroads (AAR), and others to
develop a risk assessment tool for freight rail corridors.[Footnote 27]
In a separate federal outreach effort, ODP worked with TSA to establish
a Federal Risk Assessment Working Group to promote interagency
collaboration and information sharing. Representatives from
participating federal agencies meet monthly to encourage information
sharing regarding risk assessments and other related homeland security
issues.[Footnote 28] The working group has, among other things, created
a Web-based calendar so participating agencies can upload and share
information regarding planned assessments. The calendar also contains
detailed information on assessments, including locations, dates, types
of assessment, and points of contact.
In addition, in keeping with its mission to deliver technical
assistance and training, ODP has partnered with the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) to inform passenger rail operators
about its risk assessment technical assistance program.[Footnote 29]
Since June 2004, ODP has attended five APTA conferences or workshops
where it has set up information booths, made the tool kit available,
and conducted seminars to educate passenger rail operators about the
risk assessment process and its benefits. According to an APTA
official, ODP's risk assessment technical assistance program has been
well received by the transit community. The program is dependent on
funding available in ODP's technical assistance budget for support. In
fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the program received $5.2 million and $5.7
million, respectively, through ODP's technical assistance budget.
ODP has leveraged its grant-making authority to promote risk-based
funding decisions for passenger rail. For example, passenger rail
operators must have completed a risk assessment to be eligible for
financial assistance through the fiscal year 2005 Transit Security
Grant program administered by ODP. To receive these funds, passenger
rail operators are also required to have a security and emergency
preparedness plan that identifies how the operator intends to respond
to security gaps identified by risk assessments. This plan, along with
a regional transit security strategy prepared by regional transit
stakeholders, will serve as the basis for determining how the grant
funds are to be allocated.
Risk assessments are also a key driver of federal funds distributed
through ODP's fiscal year 2005 Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program.
This $7.1 million program provides financial assistance to Amtrak for
the protection of critical infrastructure and emergency preparedness
activities along Amtrak's Northeast Corridor and its hub in Chicago.
Amtrak is required to conduct a risk assessment of these areas in
collaboration with ODP, in order to receive the grant funds.[Footnote
30] A recent review of Amtrak's security posture and programs conducted
by the RAND Corporation and funded by FRA in 2004 found that no
comprehensive terrorism risk assessment of Amtrak has been conducted
that would provide an empirical baseline for investment prioritization
and decision making for Amtrak's security policies and investment
plans. As another condition for receiving the grant funds, Amtrak is
required to develop a security and emergency preparedness plan that,
along with the risk assessment, is to serve as the basis for proposed
allocations of grant funding. According to an Amtrak security official,
it welcomes the risk assessment effort and plans to use the results of
the assessment to guide its security plans and investments. According
to ODP officials, as of July 2005, the Amtrak risk assessment was
nearly 50 percent complete.
TSA Has Begun to Assess Risks to Passenger Rail:
As the agency responsible for ensuring the security of all modes of
transportation, TSA has been charged by DHS with fulfilling key
requirements of HSPD-7 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. Specifically, TSA is required to conduct and
facilitate risk assessments in order to identify, prioritize, and
coordinate the protection of critical transportation systems
infrastructure, as well as develop risk-based priorities across all
transportation modes. As part of this effort, TSA is required to
develop plans that, among other things, identify and prioritize
critical transportation assets for protection. At the time of our
review, TSA had taken steps to meet these responsibilities but had not
yet completed the risk assessments for the rail industry (among others)
or the plans that they support as required.
In October 2004, TSA completed an overall threat assessment for both
mass transit and passenger and freight rail modes.[Footnote 31] TSA
began conducting a second risk assessment element--criticality
assessments of passenger rail stations--in the spring of 2004, but the
effort had not been completed at the time of our review. According to
TSA, a criticality assessment tool was developed that considers
multiple factors, such as the potential for loss of life or effects on
public health; the economic impact of the loss of function of the asset
and the cost of reconstitution; and the local, regional, or national
symbolic importance of the asset. These factors were to be used to
arrive at a criticality score that, in turn, would enable the agency to
rank assets and facilities based on relative importance, according to
TSA officials.
To date, TSA has assigned criticality scores to nearly 700 passenger
rail stations. In May 2005, TSA began conducting assessments for other
passenger rail assets such as bridges and tunnels. TSA officials told
us that as of July 2005, they had completed 73 criticality assessments
for bridge and tunnel assets and expect to conduct approximately 370
additional assessments in these categories. Once TSA has completed its
criticality assessment, a senior group of transportation security
experts will review these scores and subsequently rank and prioritize
them. As of July 2005, TSA had not established a time frame for
completing criticality assessments for passenger rail assets or for
ranking assets, and had not identified whether it planned to do so.
In 2003, TSA officials stated that they planned to work with
transportation stakeholders to rank assets and facilities in terms of
their criticality. HSPD-7 requires sector-specific agencies such as TSA
to collaborate with all relevant stakeholders, including federal
departments and agencies, state and local governments, and others. In
addition, DHS's interim NIPP states that sector-specific agencies, such
as TSA, are expected to work with stakeholders--such as rail operators-
-to determine the most effective means of obtaining and analyzing
information on assets. While TSA's methodology for conducting
criticality assessments calls for "facilitated sessions" involving TSA
modal specialists, DOT modal specialists, and trade association
representatives, these sessions with stakeholders have not been held.
According to TSA officials, their final methodology for conducting
criticality assessments did not include DOT modal specialists and trade
associations. With respect to rail operators, TSA officials explained
that their risk assessment process does not require operators'
involvement. TSA analysts said they have access to a great deal of
information (such as open source records, satellite imagery, and
insurance industry data) that can facilitate the assessment process.
However, when asked to comment on TSA's ability to identify critical
assets in passenger rail systems, APTA officials and 10 rail operators
we interviewed told us it would be difficult for TSA to complete this
task without their direct input and rail system expertise.
TSA plans to rely on asset criticality rankings to prioritize which
assets it will focus on in conducting vulnerability assessments. That
is, once an asset, such as a passenger rail station, is deemed to be
most critical, then TSA would focus on determining the station's
vulnerability to attacks. TSA plans to conduct on-site vulnerability
assessments for those assets deemed most critical. For assets that are
deemed to be less critical, TSA has developed a software tool that it
has made available to passenger rail and other transportation operators
for them to use on a voluntary basis to assess the vulnerability of
their assets. As of July 2005, the tool had not yet been used.
According to APTA officials, passenger rail operators may be reluctant
to provide vulnerability information to TSA without knowing how the
agency intends to use such information. According to TSA, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to project any timelines regarding
completion of vulnerability assessments in the transportation sector
because rail operators are not required to submit them. In this regard,
while the rail operators are not required to submit this information,
as the sector-specific agency for transportation, TSA is required by
HSPD-7 to complete vulnerability assessments for the transportation
sector. Figure 4 illustrates the overall progress TSA had made in
conducting risk assessments for passenger rail assets as of July 2005.
Figure 4: Status of TSA's Passenger Rail Risk Assessment Efforts, as of
July 2005:
[See PDF for image] --graphic text:
1. Strategic goals, objectives, and constraints,
2. Risk assessment, (in progress)
3. Alternatives evaluation,
4. Management selection,
5. Implementation and monitoring.
1. Threat assessment: fully completed.
2. Criticality assessment: in progress.
3. Vulnerability assessment: not initiated.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
We recognize that TSA's risk assessment effort is still evolving and
TSA has had other pressing priorities, such as meeting the legislative
requirements related to aviation security. However, until all three
assessments of rail systems--threat, criticality, and vulnerability--
have been completed in sequence, and until TSA determines how to use
the results of these assessments to analyze and characterize risk
(e.g., whether high, medium, or low), it may not be possible to
prioritize passenger rail assets and guide investment decisions about
protecting them.
Finalizing a methodology for assessing risk to passenger rail and other
transportation assets and conducting the assessments are key steps
needed to produce the plans required by HSPD-7 and the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. DHS and TSA have missed
both deadlines for producing these plans. Specifically, DHS and TSA
have yet to produce the TSSP required by HSPD-7 to be issued in
December of 2004, though a draft was prepared in November 2004. DHS and
TSA officials told us that they expected the first version of the TSSP
to be completed in February 2006. DHS and TSA also missed the April 1,
2005, deadline for completing the national strategy for transportation
security required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004. In an April 2005 letter to Congress addressing the missed
deadline, the DHS Deputy Secretary identified the need to more
aggressively coordinate the development of the strategy with other
relevant planning work such as the TSSP, to include further
collaboration with DOT modal administrations and DHS components. The
Deputy Secretary further stated that DHS expected to finish the
strategy within 2 to 3 months. However, as of July 31, 2005, the
strategy had not been completed. In April 2005, senior DHS and TSA
officials told us that in addition to DOT, industry groups such as APTA
and AAR would also be more involved in developing the TSSP and other
strategic plans. However, as of July 2005, TSA had not yet engaged
these stakeholders in the development of these plans.
DHS Faces Challenges in Comparing and Reconciling Risks and
Prioritizing Investments within and across Sectors:
As TSA, other sector-specific agencies, and ODP move forward with risk
assessment activities, DHS is concurrently developing guidance intended
to help these agencies work with their stakeholders to assess risk.
HSPD-7 requires DHS to establish uniform policies, approaches,
guidelines, and methodologies for integrating federal infrastructure
protection and risk management activities within and across sectors. To
meet this requirement, DHS has, among other things, been working for
nearly 2 years on a risk assessment framework through IAIP.[Footnote
32] This framework is intended to help the private sector and state and
local governments to develop a consistent approach to analyzing risk
and vulnerability across infrastructure types and across entire
economic sectors, develop consistent terminology, and foster consistent
results. The framework is also intended to enable a federal-level
assessment of risk in general, and comparisons among risks, for
purposes of resource allocation and response planning. DHS has informed
TSA that this framework will provide overarching guidance to sector-
specific agencies on how various risk assessment methodologies may be
used to analyze, normalize, and prioritize risk within and among
sectors. The interim NIPP states that the ability to rationalize, or
normalize, results of different risk assessments is an important goal
for determining risk-related priorities and guiding investments. One
core element of the DHS framework--defining concepts, terminology, and
metrics for assessing risk--has yet to be completed. The completion
date for this element--initially due in September 2004--has been
extended twice, with the latest due date in June 2005. However, as of
July 31, 2005, this element has not been completed.
Because neither this element nor the framework as a whole has yet been
finalized or provided to TSA or other sector-specific agencies, it is
not clear what impact, if any, DHS's framework may have on ongoing risk
assessments conducted by, and the methodologies used by, TSA, ODP, and
others, and whether or how DHS will be able to use these results to
compare risks and prioritize homeland security investments among
sectors. Until DHS finalizes this framework, and until TSA completes
its risk assessment methodology, it may not be possible to determine
whether different methodologies used by TSA and ODP for conducting
threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments generate disparate
qualitative and quantitative results or how they can best be compared
and analyzed. In addition, TSA and others will have difficulty taking
into account whether at some point TSA may be unnecessarily duplicating
risk management activities already under way at other agencies and
whether other agencies' risk assessment methodologies, and the data
generated by these methodologies, can be leveraged to complete the
assessments required for the transportation sector. In the future, the
implementation of DHS's departmentwide proposed reorganization could
affect decisions relating to critical infrastructure protection as new
directorates are established, such as the directorates of policy and
preparedness, and other preparedness assets are consolidated from
across the department.
Multiple Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail
Security:
FTA and FRA were the primary federal agencies involved in passenger
rail security matters prior to the creation of TSA. Before and after
September 11, these two agencies launched a number of initiatives
designed to strengthen passenger rail security. TSA also took steps to
strengthen rail security, including issuing emergency security
directives to rail operators and testing emerging rail security
technologies for screening passengers and baggage. Rail industry
stakeholders and federal agency officials raised questions about how
effectively DHS had collaborated with them on rail security issues. DHS
and DOT have signed a memorandum of understanding intended to identify
ways that collaboration with federal and industry stakeholders might be
improved.
DOT Agencies Led Initial Efforts to Enhance Passenger Rail Security:
Prior to the creation of TSA in November 2001, DOT agencies (i.e.,
modal administrations)--notably FTA and FRA--were primarily responsible
for the security of passenger rail systems. These agencies undertook a
number of initiatives to enhance the security of passenger rail systems
prior to and after September 11. For example, prior to September 11,
FTA offered voluntary security assessments, sponsored training at the
Transportation Safety Institute, issued written guidelines to improve
emergency response planning, and partially funded a chemical detection
demonstration project, called PROTECT, at the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority. In response to the terrorist attacks on
September 11, FTA, using an $18.7 million appropriation by the
Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental Act of 2002, launched a
multipart transit security initiative, much of which is still in place.
The initiative included security assessments, planning, drills, and
training, as described below:
* Security readiness assessments: FTA deployed teams to assess security
at 32 rail transit operators. FTA chose these 32 agencies on the basis
of their ridership, vulnerability, and the potential consequences of a
terrorist attack. Each assessment included a threat and vulnerability
analysis, an evaluation of security and emergency plans, and a focused
review of the agency's unified command structure with external
emergency responders. FTA completed the assessments in late summer
2002.[Footnote 33]
* Security and emergency management technical assistance: As of July
2005, FTA had provided technical assistance to 32 passenger rail
agencies on security and emergency plans and emergency response drills.
This is also a follow-on effort to the security assessments, as FTA is
helping transit agencies fill identified security gaps customized to
the individual agency's needs and operating characteristics.
* Emergency response drills: FTA offered transit agencies grants up to
$50,000 for organizing and conducting emergency preparedness drills.
According to FTA officials, FTA has awarded $3.4 million to over 80
transit agencies through these grants.
* Transit Safety and Security Roundtables program: FTA developed the
Transit Safety and Security Roundtables program, which brings together
safety and security chiefs of the 30 largest transit systems to share
information on technology and best practices and to develop
relationships between federal and local officials working in the areas
of transit safety and security. In October 2003, FTA and DHS, through
TSA, sponsored the most recent roundtable, in Washington, D.C. In
October 2005, FTA and DHS plan to hold a roundtable with safety and
security representatives of the 50 largest transit agencies.
* Connecting Communities program: FTA developed and currently is
offering free emergency preparedness and security training to transit
agencies through its Connecting Communities Forums. These forums are
designed to bring together personnel from small and medium-sized
transit agencies with their local emergency responders, including local
firefighters and police officers. The purposes of the forums are to
give the participants a better understanding of the roles played by
transit agencies and emergency responders and to allow participants to
begin developing the plans, tools, and relationships necessary to
respond effectively in an emergency. FTA sponsored 17 forums under this
program and has plans for the delivery of 12 more by the end of fiscal
year 2006. TSA has provided financial support to this program. In
fiscal year 2005, TSA transferred $100,000 to FTA to support the
Connecting Communities program.
* Transit Watch program: In 2003, FTA instituted the Transit Watch
campaign, a nationwide safety and security awareness program designed
to encourage the active participation of transit passengers and
employees in maintaining a safe transit environment. The program
provides information and instructions to transit passengers and
employees so that they know what to do and whom to contact in the event
of an emergency in a transit setting. Transit Watch invites riders and
employees to be the "eyes and ears" of their local transit system. FTA
plans to continue this initiative, in partnership with TSA and ODP, and
offer additional security awareness materials that address unattended
bags and emergency evacuation procedures for transit agencies.
* Additional security training: In addition to the programs and
training cited above, FTA worked with the National Transit Institute,
Johns Hopkins University, and the Transportation Safety Institute to
expand safety and security course offerings. For example, the National
Transit Institute is now offering a security awareness course to
frontline transit employees free of charge. The course covers skill
sets for observing, determining, and reporting people and items that
are suspicious or out of place. FTA also developed a training course
for frontline transit employees to recognize and react to terrorist
activity. This course incorporates the latest in international
counterterrorism techniques.
* Security guidance: FTA also developed security guidance for transit
agencies based largely on the findings of the security readiness
assessments. For example, in November 2003, FTA issued its Top 20
Security Program Action Items for Transit Agencies, which recommends
measures for transit agencies to implement into their security programs
to improve both security and emergency preparedness. Recommended
practices include performing background checks on employees,
instituting access control procedures, and providing security awareness
training to frontline employees. In 2003, FTA also issued recommended
measures for transit agencies to implement in responding to various DHS
threat level designations.
FTA has also used research and development funds to develop guidance
for security design strategies to reduce the vulnerability of transit
systems to acts of terrorism. In November 2004, FTA provided rail
operators with security considerations for transportation
infrastructure. This guidance provided recommendations intended to help
operators deter and minimize attacks against their facilities, riders,
and employees by incorporating security features into the design of
rail infrastructure. (Additional details on the use of this guidance
are discussed later in this report.)
FRA has also taken a number of actions to enhance passenger rail
security since September 11. For example, it has assisted commuter
railroads in developing security plans, reviewed Amtrak's security
plans, and helped fund FTA security readiness assessments for commuter
railroads. More recently, in the wake of the Madrid terrorist bombings,
nearly 200 FRA inspectors, in cooperation with DHS, conducted multi-day
team inspections of each of the 18 commuter railroads and Amtrak to
determine what additional security measures had been put into place to
prevent a similar occurrence in the United States. FRA also conducted
research and development projects related to passenger rail security.
These projects included rail infrastructure security and trespasser
monitoring systems and passenger screening and manifest projects,
including explosives detection.
Although DOT modal administrations now play a supporting role in
transportation security matters since the creation of TSA, they remain
important partners in the federal government's efforts to improve rail
security, given their role in funding and regulating the safety of
passenger rail systems. Moreover, as TSA moves ahead with its passenger
rail security initiatives, FTA and FRA are continuing their passenger
rail security efforts.
TSA Issued Mandatory Security Directives to Rail Operators but Faces
Challenges Related to Compliance and Enforcement:
In response to the March 2004 commuter rail attacks in Madrid and
federal intelligence on potential threats against U.S. passenger rail
systems, TSA issued security directives to the passenger rail industry
in May 2004. TSA issued these security directives to establish a
consistent baseline standard of protective measures for all passenger
rail operators, including Amtrak.[Footnote 34] The directives were not
related to, and were issued independent of, TSA's efforts to conduct
risk assessments to prioritize rail security needs. TSA considered the
measures required by the directives to constitute mandatory security
standards that were required to be implemented within 72 hours of
issuance by all passenger rail operators nationwide. In an effort to
provide some flexibility to the industry, the directives allowed rail
operators to propose alternative measures to TSA in order to meet the
required measures. Table 3 contains examples of security measures
required by these directives.
Table 3: Examples of Measures Required by TSA Security Directives
Issued to Passenger Rail Operators and Amtrak:
TSA directives require passenger rail operators to:
* designate coordinators to enhance security-related communications
with TSA,
* provide TSA with access to the latest security assessments and
security plans,
* reinforce employee watch programs,
* ask passengers and employees to report unattended property or
suspicious behavior,
* remove trash receptacles at stations determined by a vulnerability
assessment to be at significant risk and only to the extent practical,
except for clear plastic or bomb-resistant containers,
* install bomb- resistant trash cans to the extent resources allow,
* utilize canine explosive detection teams, if available, to screen
passenger baggage, terminals, and trains,
* utilize surveillance systems to monitor for suspicious activity, to
the extent resources allow,
* allow TSA- designated canine teams at any time or place to conduct
canine operations,
* conduct frequent inspections of key facilities, stations, terminals,
or other critical assets for persons and items that do not belong,
* inspect each passenger rail car for suspicious or unattended items,
at regular periodic intervals,
* ensure that appropriate levels of policing and security are provided
that correlate to DHS threat levels and threat advisories,
* lock all doors that allow access to train operators' cab or
compartment, if equipped with locking mechanisms,
* require Amtrak to request that adult passengers provide
identification at the initial point where tickets are checked.
Source: TSA.
[End of table]
Although TSA issued these directives, it is unclear how TSA developed
the required measures contained in the directives, how TSA plans to
monitor and ensure compliance with the measures, how rail operators are
to implement the measures, and which entities are responsible for their
implementation. According to the former DHS Undersecretary for Border
and Transportation Security, the directives were developed based upon
consultation with the industry and a review of best practices in
passenger rail and mass transit systems across the country and were
intended to provide a federal baseline standard for security. TSA
officials stated to us that the directives were based upon FTA and APTA
best practices for rail security. Specifically, TSA stated that it
consulted a list of the top 20 actions FTA identified that rail
operators can take to strengthen security, FTA-recommended protective
measures and activities for transit agencies that may be followed based
on current threat levels, and an APTA member survey. While some of the
directives correlate to information contained in the FTA guidance, such
as advocating that rail personnel watch for abandoned parcels,
vehicles, and the like, the source for many of the directives is
unclear. For example, the source material TSA consulted does not
support the requirement that train cabs or compartment doors should be
kept locked. Furthermore, the sources do not necessarily reflect
industry best practices, according to FTA and APTA officials. FTA's
list of recommended protective measures and the practices identified in
the APTA survey are not necessarily viewed as industry best practices.
For example, the APTA member survey that TSA used reports rail security
practices that are in use by operators but which are not best practices
endorsed by the group or other industry stakeholders.
TSA officials have stated that they understood the importance of
partnering with the rail industry on security matters, and that they
would draw on the expertise and knowledge of the transportation
industry and other DHS agencies, as well as all stakeholders, in
developing security standards for all modes of transportation,
including rail. TSA officials held an initial meeting with APTA, AAR,
and Amtrak officials to discuss the draft directives prior to their
issuance and told them that they would continue to be consulted prior
to their final issuance. However, these stakeholders were not given an
opportunity to comment on a final draft of the directives before their
release because, according to TSA, DHS determined that it was important
to release the directives as soon as possible to address a current
threat to passenger rail. In addition, TSA stated that because the
directives needed to be issued quickly, there was no public comment as
part of the rule-making process. Shortly after the directives were
issued, TSA's Deputy Assistant Administrator for Maritime and Land
Security told rail operators at an APTA conference we attended in June
2004 that if TSA determined that there is a need for the directives to
become permanent, they would undergo a notice-and-comment period as
part of the regulatory process. As of July 2005, TSA had not yet
determined whether it intends to pursue the rule-making process with a
notice-and-comment period.
APTA and AAR officials stated that because they were not consulted
throughout the development of the directives, the directives did not,
in their view, reflect a complete understanding of the passenger rail
environment or necessarily incorporate industry best practices. For
example, APTA, AAR, and some rail operators raised concerns about the
feasibility of installing bomb-resistant trash cans in rail stations
because they could direct the force of a bomb blast upward, possibly
causing structural damage in underground or enclosed stations. DHS's
Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
recently conducted tests to determine the safety and effectiveness of
13 models of commercially available bomb-resistant trash receptacles.
At the time of our review, the results of these tests were not yet
available.
Amtrak and FRA officials raised concerns about some of the directives,
as well, and told us they questioned whether the requirements reflected
industry best practices. For example, before the directives were
issued, Amtrak expressed concerns to TSA about the feasibility of the
requirement to check the identification of all adult passengers
boarding its trains because they did not have enough staff to perform
these checks. However, the final directive included this requirement,
and after they were released, Amtrak told TSA it could not comply with
this requirement "without incurring substantial additional costs and
significant detrimental impacts to its operations and revenues." Amtrak
officials told us that since passenger names would not be compared
against any criminal or terrorist watch list or database, the benefits
of requiring such identification checks were open to debate. To resolve
its concern, and as allowed by the directive, Amtrak proposed, and TSA
accepted, random identification checks of passengers as an alternative
measure. FRA officials further stated that current FRA safety
regulations requiring engineer compartment doors be kept unlocked to
facilitate emergency escapes[Footnote 35] conflicts with the security
directive requirement that doors equipped with locking mechanisms be
kept locked. This requirement was not included in the draft directives
provided to stakeholders. TSA did call one commuter rail operator prior
to issuing the directives to discuss this potential proposed measure,
and the operator raised a concern about the safety of the locked door
requirement. TSA nevertheless included this requirement in the
directives.
With respect to how the directives were to be enforced, rail operators
were required to allow TSA and DHS to perform inspections, evaluations,
or tests based on execution of the directives at any time or location.
Upon learning of any instance of noncompliance with TSA security
measures, rail operators were to immediately initiate corrective
action. Monitoring and ensuring compliance with the directives has
posed challenges for TSA. In the year after the directives were issued,
TSA did not have dedicated field staff to conduct on-site inspections.
When the rail security directives were issued, the former DHS
Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security stated that TSA
planned to form security partnership teams with DOT, including FRA rail
inspectors, to help ensure that industry stakeholders complied with the
directives. These teams were to be established in order to tap into
existing capabilities and avoid duplication of effort across agencies.
As of July 2005, these teams had not yet been utilized to perform
inspections. TSA has, however, hired rail compliance inspectors to,
among other things, monitor and enforce compliance with the security
directives. As of July 2005, TSA had hired 57 of up to 100 inspector
positions authorized by Congress.[Footnote 36] However, TSA has not yet
established processes or criteria for determining and enforcing
compliance, including determining how rail inspectors or DOT
partnership teams will be used in this regard.
Establishing criteria for monitoring compliance with the directives may
be challenging because the language describing the required measures
allows for flexibility and does not define parameters. In an effort to
acknowledge the variable conditions that existed in passenger rail
environments, TSA designed the directives to allow flexibility in
implementation through the use of such phrases as "to the extent
resources allow," "to the extent practicable," and "if available." The
directives also include non-specific instructions that may be difficult
to measure or monitor, telling operators to, for example, perform
inspections of key facilities at "regular periodic intervals" or to
conduct "frequent inspections" of passenger rail cars. When the
directives were issued, TSA stated that it would provide rail operators
with performance-based guidance and examples of announcements and signs
that could be used to meet the requirements of the directives,
including guidance on the appropriate frequency and method for
inspecting rail cars and facilities. However, as of July 2005, this
information had not been provided.
Industry stakeholders we interviewed raised questions about how they
were to comply with the measures contained in the directives and which
entities were responsible for implementing the measures. According to
an AAR official, in June 2004, AAR officials and rail operators held a
conference call with TSA to obtain clarification on these issues.
According to AAR officials, in response to an inquiry about what would
constitute compliance for some of the measures, the then-TSA Assistant
Administrator for Maritime and Land Security told participants that the
directives were not intended to be overly prescriptive but were
guidelines, and that operators would have the flexibility to implement
the directives as they saw fit. The officials also asked for
clarification on who was legally responsible for ensuring compliance
for measures where assets, such as rail stations, were owned by freight
railroads or private real estate companies. According to AAR officials,
TSA told them it was the responsibility of the rail operators and asset
owners to work together to determine these responsibilities. However,
according to AAR and rail operators, given that TSA has hired rail
inspectors and indicated its intention to enforce compliance with the
directives, it is critical that TSA clarify what compliance entails for
measures required by the directives and which entities are responsible
for compliance with measures when rail assets are owned by one party
but operated by another--such as when private companies that own
terminals or stations provide services for commuter rail operations.
The challenges TSA has faced in developing security directives as
standards that reflect industry best practices--and which can be
measured and enforced--stem from the original emergency nature of the
directives, which were issued with limited input and review. TSA told
rail industry stakeholders when the directives were issued 15 months
ago that the agency would consider using the federal rule-making
process as a means of making the standards permanent. Doing so would
require TSA to hold a notice-and-comment period, resulting in a public
record that reflects stakeholders' input on the applicability and
feasibility of implementing the directives, along with TSA's rationale
for accepting or rejecting this input. While there is no guarantee that
this process would produce more effective security directives, it would
be more transparent and could help TSA in developing standards that are
most appropriate for the industry and can be measured, monitored, and
enforced.
TSA Has Begun Testing Rail Security Technologies:
In addition to issuing security directives, TSA also sought to enhance
passenger rail security by conducting research on technologies related
to screening passengers and checked baggage in the passenger rail
environment. Beginning in May 2004, TSA conducted a Transit and Rail
Inspection Pilot (TRIP) study, in partnership with DOT, Amtrak, the
Connecticut Department of Transportation, the Maryland Transit
Administration, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA). TRIP was a $1.5 million, three-phase effort to test the
feasibility of using existing and emerging technologies to screen
passengers, carry-on items, checked baggage, cargo, and parcels for
explosives. Figure 5 summarizes TRIP's three-phased approach.
Figure 5: Summary Information on TSA's Transit and Rail Inspection
Pilot Program Phases:
[See PDF for image] --graphic text:
Text box:
Phase I: Screen commuter rail passengers and carry-on baggage before
trains are boarded using an explosive detection device similar in
appearance to an airport metal detector and other explosive screening
technologies.
Phase II: Screen passenger baggage including checked baggage, unclaimed
baggage, and cargo on longhaul Amtrak trains prior to departure.
Phase III: Screen passengers and their carry-on baggage on board a
moving commuter rail train. All passengers are required to enter the
train in the specially designed screening car, which was a commuter
rail passenger car that been reconfigured to hold screening equipment
and security personnel.
Source: TSA.
[End of figure]
According to TSA, all three phases of the TRIP program were completed
by July 2004. However, TSA has not yet issued a planned report
analyzing whether the technologies could be used effectively to screen
rail passengers and their baggage. According to TSA officials, a report
on results and lessons learned from TRIP is under review by DHS. TSA
officials told us that based upon preliminary analyses, the screening
technologies and processes tested would be very difficult to implement
on more heavily used passenger rail systems, such as mass transit
systems in large urban areas, because these systems carry high volumes
of passengers and have multiple points of entry. However, TSA officials
stated to us that the screening processes used in TRIP may be useful on
certain long-distance intercity train routes, which make fewer stops.
Further, officials stated that screening could be used either randomly
or for all passengers during certain high-risk events or in areas where
a particular terrorist threat is known to exist. For example, screening
technology similar to that used in TRIP was used by TSA to screen
certain passengers and belongings in Boston and New York during the
Democratic and Republican national conventions, respectively, in 2004.
APTA officials and the 28 passenger rail operators we interviewed--all
who are not directly involved in the pilot--agreed with TSA's
preliminary assessment. They told us they believed that the TRIP
screening procedures could not work in most passenger rail systems,
given the number of passengers using these systems and the open nature
(e.g., multiple entry points) of the systems. For example, as one
operator noted, over 1,600 people pass through dozens of access points
in New York's Penn Station per minute during a typical rush hour,
making screening of all passengers very challenging, if not impossible.
Passenger rail operators were also concerned that screening delays
could result in passengers opting to use other modes of transportation.
APTA officials and some rail operators we interviewed said that had
they been consulted by TSA, they would have recommended alternative
technologies to explore and indicated that they hoped to be consulted
on security technology pilot programs in the future. FRA officials
further stated that TSA could have benefited from earlier and more
frequent collaboration with them during the TRIP pilot than occurred,
and could have tapped their expertise to analyze TRIP results and
develop the final report. TSA research and development officials told
us that the agency has begun to consider and test security technologies
other than those used in TRIP, which may be more applicable to the
passenger rail environment. For example, TSA's and DHS's Science and
Technology Directorate are currently evaluating infrared cameras and
electronic metal detectors, among other things.
DHS and DOT Are Taking Steps to Improve Coordination and Collaboration
with Federal Agencies and Industry Stakeholders:
In our prior transportation security work, we have called for improved
coordination among all levels of government and the private sector, as
a means of enhancing security across all transportation modes.[Footnote
37] In September 2004, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of understanding
to develop procedures by which the two departments could improve their
cooperation and coordination for promoting the safe, secure, and
efficient movement of people and goods throughout the transportation
system. The MOU defines broad areas of responsibility for each
department. For example, it states that DHS, in consultation with DOT
and affected stakeholders, will identify, prioritize, and coordinate
the protection of critical infrastructure. The MOU was developed in
response to a recommendation we made in June 2003 in which we noted
that the roles and responsibilities of DOT and TSA for transportation
security matters had not been clearly defined. We emphasized the need
for greater coordination between DOT and TSA on transportation security
efforts--noting that the lack of coordination can lead to duplication
or conflicting efforts and gaps in preparedness. To improve
coordination between DOT and DHS on transportation security matters, we
recommended that DOT and DHS develop a mechanism, such as a memorandum,
to clearly define roles and responsibilities for transportation
security matters, in such areas as the development and implementation
of security standards and regulations, determining funding priorities,
and interfacing with the transportation industry.
The MOU between DHS and DOT represents an overall framework for
cooperation that is to be supplemented by additional signed agreements,
or annexes, between the departments. These annexes are to delineate the
specific security-related roles, responsibilities, resources, and
commitments for mass transit, rail, research and development, and other
matters. As of July 2005, separate annexes for mass transit security,
rail security, and research and development were at various stages of
development, according to DHS and DOT officials. DHS and DOT officials
told us that an annex for mass transit security had been prepared and
was undergoing final review by both departments. According to DHS and
DOT officials, the annex is intended to ensure that the programs and
protocols for incorporating stakeholder feedback and making
enhancements to security measures are coordinated.
According to officials, the mass transit annex will address how DHS's
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness,
TSA, FTA, and DOT's Office of Intelligence, Security, and Emergency
Management are to coordinate their programs and services, including
grants, training, exercises, risk assessments, and technical
assistance, in order to better assist transit agencies in prioritizing
and addressing their security needs. For example, officials stated to
us that the annex would likely address coordination on such programs as
FTA's Transit Watch and Transit Safety and Security Roundtables
programs, which are designed to raise transit employees' on-the-job
awareness about security and provide a forum for stakeholders to share
information on technology and best practices. In addition, according to
officials, the annex will require DHS and DOT to consult on such
matters as regulations and security directives that affect security and
will identify points of contact for coordinating this consultation.
In addition to the annexes currently under development, DHS and DOT
must also complete an annex to define and clarify the respective roles
and responsibilities of DHS and DOT relating to public transportation
security within 45 days of the enactment of The Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005, which
President Bush signed on August 10, 2005. According to the law, this
annex shall establish a process to develop security standards for
public transportation agencies; create a method of direct coordination
with public transportation agencies on security matters; address any
other issues determined to be appropriate by the Secretary of
Transportation and the Secretary of Homeland Security; and include a
formal and permanent mechanism to ensure coordination and involvement
by DOT, as appropriate, in public transportation security.[Footnote 38]
In addition to their work on the MOU and related annexes, DHS and TSA
have taken other steps in an attempt to improve collaboration with DOT
and industry stakeholders. In April 2005, DHS officials stated that
better collaboration with DOT and industry stakeholders was needed to
develop strategic security plans associated with various homeland
security presidential directives and statutory mandates, such as the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which
required DHS to develop a national strategy for transportation security
in conjunction with DOT. Responding to the need for better
collaboration, DHS established a senior-level steering committee in
conjunction with DOT to coordinate development of this national
strategy. In addition, senior DHS and TSA officials stated that
industry groups will also be involved in developing the national
strategy for transportation security and other strategic plans.
Moreover, according to TSA's assistant administrator for intermodal
programs, TSA intends to work with APTA and other industry stakeholders
in developing security standards for the passenger rail
industry.[Footnote 39]
U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure
Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security
Actions May Exist:
U.S. passenger rail operators have taken numerous actions to secure
their rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, in the
United States, and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. These actions
included both improvements to system operations and capital
enhancements to a system's facilities, such as track, buildings, and
train cars. All of the U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted have
implemented some types of security measures--such as increased numbers
and visibility of security personnel and customer awareness programs--
that were generally consistent with those we observed in select
countries in Europe and Asia. We also identified three rail security
practices--covert testing, random screening of passengers and their
baggage, and centralized research and testing--utilized by foreign
operators or their governments that are not currently utilized by
domestic rail operators or the U.S. government.[Footnote 40]
Actions Taken by U.S. and Foreign Passenger Rail Operators to
Strengthen Security Reflect Security Assessments, Budgetary
Constraints, and Other Factors:
All 32 of the U.S. rail operators we interviewed or visited reported
taking specific actions to improve the security and safety of their
rail systems by, among other things, investing in new security
equipment, utilizing more law enforcement personnel, and establishing
public awareness campaigns. Passenger rail operators we spoke with
cited the 1995 sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system and the
September 11 terrorist attacks as catalysts for their security actions.
After the attacks, many passenger rail operators used FTA's security
readiness assessments of heavy and passenger rail systems as a guide to
determine how to prioritize their security efforts, as well as their
own understanding of their system's vulnerabilities, to determine what
actions to take to enhance security. Similarly, as previously
mentioned, the rail systems that underwent ODP risk assessments are
currently using or plan to use these assessments to guide their
security actions. In addition, 20 of the 32 U.S. operators we contacted
or visited had conducted some type of security assessment internally or
through a contractor, separate from the federally funded assessments.
For example, some assessments evaluated vulnerabilities of physical
assets, such as tunnels and bridges, throughout the passenger rail
system. Passenger rail operators stated that security-related spending
by rail operators was also based, in part, on budgetary considerations,
as well as other practices used by other rail operators that were
identified through direct contact or during industry association
meetings.[Footnote 41] Passenger rail operators frequently made capital
investments to improve security, and these investments often are not
part of federal funding packages for new construction unless they are
part of new facilities being constructed. According to APTA, 54 percent
of transit agencies are facing increasing deficits, and no operator
covers expenses with fare revenue; thus, balancing operational and
capital improvements with security-related investments has been an
ongoing challenge for these operators. Several foreign rail operators
we interviewed also stated that funding for security enhancements was
limited in light of other funding priorities within the rail system,
such as personnel costs and infrastructure and equipment maintenance.
Foreign rail operators we visited also told us that risk assessments
played an important role in guiding security-related spending for rail.
For example, one foreign rail operator with a daily ridership of 2.3
million passengers used a risk management methodology to assess risks,
threats, and vulnerabilities to rail in order to guide security
spending. The methodology is part of the rail operator's corporate
focus on overall safety and security and is intended to help protect
the operator's various rail systems against, among other things,
terrorist attacks, as well as other forms of corporate loss, such as
service disruption and loss of business viability. According to the
operator, the methodology employs a "risk-informed" approach to support
management's business decision process regarding security. Other than
the results of risk assessments, issues such as laws and regulations,
and business requirements, are also taken into consideration. The
approach relies on a combination of risk, threat, and vulnerability
assessment and management, and focuses on proactive prevention.
Implementing the methodology involves all corporate departments and
staff at three activity levels:
* At the corporate level, the focus on security is articulated in a
three-part corporate security policy that states, among other things,
that managers are responsible for performing risk management activities
in their functional areas and maintaining cost-effective security
measures.
* At the department level, department heads are responsible for
promoting security awareness, setting rules and guidelines, and
allocating security responsibilities (in the form of assigning "risk
ownership").
* At the line level, managers are responsible for implementing the risk
assessment component of the methodology, consistent with the security
policy described earlier. This component, which involves an iterative
process, consists of identifying threats and quantifying risks (risk is
expressed as a function of likelihood and consequence); designing and
implementing security protective measures; and measuring compliance
with and the effectiveness of these measures, similar to our risk
management approach.
According to officials of the foreign rail operator, to measure
performance, the operator conducts periodic surveys to measure the
perceptions of riders and employees; rates the success of drills; and
measures the incidence of crime (such as pick pocketing). The
operator's security department also conducts audits to measure
compliance and help ensure that security procedures are being followed.
Separately, the rail operator's insurers review the security management
of the rail system, including the methodology, every 4 years.
U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices:
Both U. S. and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have
implemented similar operational and capital improvements[Footnote 42]
to enhance the security of their systems.[Footnote 43] A summary of
these efforts follows.
Operational improvements:
Customer awareness: Customer awareness programs we observed used
signage and announcements to encourage riders to alert train staff if
they observed suspicious packages, persons, or behavior. Of the 32
domestic rail operators we interviewed, 30 had implemented a customer
awareness program or made enhancements to an existing program. FTA has
assisted rail operators in this area by creating the Transit Watch
program, in cooperation with industry groups such as APTA. Transit
Watch is a nationwide safety and security awareness program designed to
encourage the active participation of transit passengers and employees
in maintaining a safe transit environment. FTA distributed education
and training materials to rail operators so these materials could be
provided to customers and employees. Rail operators stated that they
attempt to entitle their customer awareness programs so that customers
can easily remember the goals of the program. New York City Transit's
"If You See Something, Say Something" campaign and the WMATA program,
"Is That Your Bag?" are examples of this. (See fig. 6 for an example of
public awareness signage). Foreign rail operators we visited also
attempt to enhance customer awareness. For example, 11 of the 13
operators we interviewed had implemented a customer awareness program.
Similar to programs of U.S. operators, these programs used signage,
announcements, and brochures to inform passengers and employees about
the need to remain vigilant and report any suspicious activities. Only
one of the European passenger rail operators that we interviewed has
not implemented a customer security awareness program, citing the fear
or panic that it might cause among the public.
Figure 6: Example of Passenger Rail Customer Awareness Poster:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Increased number and visibility of security personnel: Of the 32 U.S.
rail operators we interviewed, 23 had increased the number of security
personnel they utilized since September 11, to provide security
throughout their system or had taken steps to increase the visibility
of their security personnel. In addition to adding security personnel,
many operators stated that increasing the visibility of security was as
important as increasing the number of personnel. For example, several
U.S. and foreign rail operators we spoke with had instituted policies
such as requiring their security staff, in brightly colored vests, to
patrol trains or stations more frequently, so they are more visible to
customers and potential terrorists or criminals. These policies make it
easier for customers to contact security personnel in the event of an
emergency, or if they have spotted a suspicious item or person. At
foreign sites we visited, 10 of the 13 operators had increased the
number of their security officers throughout their systems in recent
years because of the perceived increase in risk of a terrorist attack.
One rail operator, the Tokyo Metro system, in addition to increasing
the number of security personnel, has also made them more visible.
Tokyo Metro stations now include an elevated security platform for
security personnel to stand on, which allows them to better see
throughout the station and allows passengers to see the security staff
more easily.
Increased use of canine teams: Of the 32 U.S. passenger rail operators
we contacted, 21 had begun to use canine units, which include both dogs
and human handlers, to patrol their facilities or trains or had
increased their existing utilization of such teams. Often, these units
are used to detect the presence of explosives, or in some cases, drugs,
and may be called in when a suspicious package is detected. One
operator we spoke with uses its canines to patrol its system simply as
a crime deterrent rather than to detect explosives or drugs. Some
operators that did not maintain their own canine units stated that it
was prohibitively expensive to do so and that they could call in local
police canine units if necessary. In foreign countries we visited,
passenger rail operators' use of canines varied. In some Asian
countries, canines were not culturally accepted by the public and thus
were not used for rail security purposes. In contrast, most European
passenger rail operators, as in the United States, used canines for
explosive detection or as deterrents.
Employee training: All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we
interviewed had provided some type of security training to their staff,
either through in-house personnel or an external provider. In many
cases, this training consisted of ways to identify suspicious items and
persons and how to respond to events once they occur. For example, the
London Underground and the British Transport Police developed the "HOT"
method for its employees to identify suspicious items in the rail
system. In the HOT method, employees are trained to look for packages
or items that are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and not Typical of the
environment. Items that do not meet these criteria would likely receive
a lower security response than an item meeting all of the criteria.
However, if items meet all of these criteria, employees are to notify
station managers, who would call in the authorities and potentially
shut down the station or take other action. According to London
Underground officials, the HOT method has significantly reduced the
number of system disruptions caused when a suspicious item was
identified. In addition, officials noted that the HOT method is easy
for rail employees to remember and is successful, in part, because it
provides rail employees with the discretion to make security-related
decisions on their own. According to British Transport Police and
London Underground officials, there have been no cases where unattended
packages that employees determined did not meet the HOT criteria
contained explosive devices. Several passenger rail operators in the
United States and abroad have trained their employees in the HOT
method. Several domestic operators had also trained their employees in
how to respond to terrorist attacks and provided them with wallet-size
cards highlighting actions they should take in response to various
forms of attack. (See fig. 7 for examples of cards that are distributed
by the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit [BART] to their employees
to help them prevent or respond to terrorist attacks.) It is important
to note that training such as the HOT method is not designed to prevent
acts of terrorism like the July 2005 London attacks, where suicide
bombers killed themselves rather than leaving bombs behind.
Figure 7: Wallet-size Cards Distributed to BART Employees Containing
Anti-terrorism Information:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Officials from the London Underground also provided insights into the
importance of how training is provided to staff, in addition to the
type of training provided. In training rail station staff, London
Underground officials stressed the importance of direct supervisors or
managers providing security briefings to each employee or small groups
of employees. In doing so, officials stated that they believed it helps
make staff more aware of their responsibilities in certain situations,
enables supervisors to hold employees accountable for what they learned
in training, and allows employees to ask questions related to their
specific job duties.
Passenger and baggage screening practices: Some domestic and foreign
rail operators have trained employees to recognize suspicious behavior
as a means of screening passengers. Eight U.S. passenger rail operators
we contacted were utilizing some form of behavioral screening. For
example, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), which
operates Boston's T system, has utilized a behavioral screening system
to identify passengers exhibiting suspicious behavior. The
Massachusetts State Police train all MBTA personnel to be on the
lookout for behavior that may indicate someone has criminal intent, and
to approach and search such persons and their baggage when appropriate.
Massachusetts State Police officers have been training rail operators
on this behavior profiling system, and WMATA and New Jersey Transit
were among the first additional operators to implement the system.
According to MBTA personnel, several other operators have expressed
interest in this system. Abroad, we found that 4 of 13 operators we
interviewed had implemented forms of behavioral screening similar to
MBTA's system. (Rail operators' use of random screening of passengers
is discussed later in the report.)
All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we contacted have ruled
out an airport-style screening system for daily use in heavy traffic,
where each passenger and the passenger's baggage are screened by a
magnetometer or X-ray machine, based on cost, staffing, and customer
convenience factors, among others. For example, although the Spanish
National Railway screens passenger baggage using an X-ray machine on
certain long-distance trains that it believes could be at risk, all of
the operators we contacted stated that the cost, staffing requirements,
delay of service, and inconvenience to passengers would make such a
system unworkable in highly trafficked, inherently open systems like
U.S. and foreign passenger rail operations. In addition, one Asian rail
official stated that his organization was developing a contingency plan
for implementing an airport-style screening system, but that such a
system would be used only in the event of intelligence information
indicating suicide bomb attacks were imminent, or if several attacks
had already occurred during a short period of time. According to this
official, the plan was in the initial stages of development, and the
organization did not know how quickly such a system could be
implemented.
Capital improvements:
Upgrading technology: Many rail operators we interviewed had embarked
on programs designed to upgrade their existing security technology. For
example, we found that 29 of the 32 U.S. operators had implemented a
form of CCTV to monitor their stations, yards, or trains. While these
cameras cannot be monitored closely at all times, because of the large
number of staff they said this would require, many rail operators felt
the cameras acted as a deterrent, assisted security personnel in
determining how to respond to incidents that have already occurred, and
could be monitored if an operator has received information that an
incident may occur at a certain time or place in their system. One rail
operator, New Jersey Transit, had installed "smart" cameras, which were
programmed to alert security personnel when suspicious activity
occurred, such as if a passenger left a bag in a certain location or if
a boat were to dock under a bridge. According to the New Jersey Transit
officials, this technology was relatively inexpensive and not difficult
to implement. Several other operators stated they were interested in
exploring this technology.
Abroad, all 13 of the foreign rail operators we visited had CCTV
systems in place. For example, the London Underground uses an extensive
system of CCTV cameras to monitor all of its passenger rail system
stations and respond to both criminal and emergency incidents. In
addition, one Asian system we visited had over 1,000 cameras recording
activity in some of its busier stations. However, as in the United
States, foreign rail operators use these cameras primarily as a crime
deterrent and to respond to incidents after they occur, because they do
not have enough staff to continuously monitor all of these cameras. The
Madrid Metro is currently testing the use of personal digital
assistants (PDA), which would have the ability to operate all security
functions in passenger rail stations. These PDAs would enable security
staff to monitor any station CCTV camera that they chose from the PDA
and respond to a potential emergency, such as a terrorist attack, by
shutting down rail or station operations (escalators or ventilation
systems, amongst others) from the PDA itself. Madrid Metro officials
said that they plan to make the use of the PDAs operational in the
future, but did not know when they would do so.
In addition, 18 of the 32 U.S. rail operators we interviewed had
installed new emergency phones or enhanced the visibility of the
intercom systems they already had. Passengers can use these systems to
contact train operators or security personnel to report suspicious
activity, crimes in progress, or other problems. Furthermore, while
most rail operators we spoke with had not installed chemical or
biological agent detection equipment because of the costs involved, a
few operators had this equipment or were exploring purchasing it. For
example, WMATA, in Washington, D.C., has installed these sensors in
some of its stations, thanks to a program jointly sponsored by DOT and
the Department of Energy that provided this equipment to WMATA because
of the high perceived likelihood of an attack in Washington, D.C. Also,
at least three other domestic rail operators we spoke with are
exploring the possibility of partnering with federal agencies to
install such equipment in their facilities on an experimental basis.
Also, as in the United States, a few foreign operators had implemented
chemical or biological detection devices at these rail stations, but
their use was not widespread. Two of the 13 foreign operators we
interviewed had implemented these sensors, and both were doing so on an
experimental basis. In addition, police officers from the British
Transport Police--responsible for policing the rail system in the
United Kingdom--were equipped with pagers to detect chemical,
biological, or radiological elements in the air, allowing them to
respond quickly in case of a terrorist attack using one of these
methods. The British Transit Police also has three vehicles carrying
devices to determine if unattended baggage contains explosives--these
vehicles patrol the system 24 hours per day.
Access control: Tightening access procedures at key facilities or
rights-of-way is another way many rail operators have attempted to
enhance security. A majority of domestic and selected foreign passenger
rail operators had invested in enhanced systems to control unauthorized
access at employee facilities and stations. Specifically, 23 of the 32
U.S. operators had installed a form of access control at key facilities
and stations. This often involved installing a system where employees
had to swipe an access card to gain access to control rooms, repair
facilities, and other key locations. For example, the Greater Cleveland
Regional Transit Authority had a particularly comprehensive system
where all doors throughout its rail system are linked to a central
alarm and intrusion detection system. If an unauthorized employee or
customer attempts to gain access to any facility system wide, alarms
are to activate in the control center. Also, BART in California has a
modern system utilizing lasers to detect intruders at tunnel portals
and other key facilities. Finally, all 13 foreign operators had
implemented some form of access control to their critical facilities or
rights-of-way. However, these measures varied from simple alarms on
doors at electrical substations on one subway system we visited to
infrared sensors monitoring every inch of right-of-way along the track
on three of the high-speed interurban rail systems. The high-speed
systems had these extensive systems because of the potential for
catastrophe if a train traveling at over 200 miles per hour were to hit
a vehicle placed along the tracks or travel over rail that had been
sabotaged.
Rail system design and configuration: In an effort to reduce
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and increase overall security,
passenger rail operators in the United States and abroad have been, or
are now beginning to, incorporate security features into the design of
new and existing rail infrastructure, primarily rail stations. For
example, of the 32 domestic rail operators we contacted, 22 of them had
removed their conventional trash bins entirely, or replaced them with
transparent or bomb-resistant trash bins, as TSA instructed in its May
2004 security directives. In past terrorist attacks on rail systems,
particularly in Great Britain, trash bins have been used as a means for
hiding explosive devices. Removing trash bins entirely, as PATH in New
Jersey has done, eliminates the trash bin as a place to hide an
explosive device. Installing transparent trash bins, as a few operators
have done, might allow security personnel to see inside trash bins to
determine if suspicious items are inside. Three operators have
installed bomb-resistant trash bins to contain the impact of a blast
and minimize the amount of dangerous shrapnel that could be expelled.
Conversely, one rail operator told us that his agency was not removing
any of its conventional trash bins because it feared litter would
become an unmanageable problem without them and that bomb-resistant and
transparent trash bins were ineffective--specifically, that they simply
directed the force of a bomb blast upward toward the ceiling, which
could cause severe structural damage in an underground station.
Similarly, while only a limited number of domestic rail operators we
contacted ever had bicycle or storage lockers in their systems, many of
those operators that did, at one time, have those lockers told us that
they had removed them to avoid the possibility of someone using them as
a hiding place for an explosive, or had moved them to locations farther
away from stations and crowded places to minimize the impact of a
potential attack. Also, foreign rail operators had taken steps to
remove traditional trash bins from their systems. Of the 13 operators
we visited, 8 had either removed their trash bins entirely or replaced
them with blast-resistant cans or transparent receptacles. In fact, the
London Underground rail system was the first system worldwide to begin
using clear plastic trash bags to eliminate places to hide an
explosive. Officials from the Underground stated that this technique
helped to deter terrorists from the Irish Republican Army from placing
bombs in conventional trash cans during the height of that
organization's terrorist campaign against the rail system.
Many foreign rail operators are also incorporating aspects of security
into the design of their rail infrastructure. Of the 13 operators we
visited, 11 have attempted to design new facilities with security in
mind and have attempted to retrofit older facilities to incorporate
security-related modifications. For example, one foreign operator we
visited is retrofitting its train cars with windows that passengers
could open in the event of a chemical attack. In addition, the London
Underground, one of the oldest rail systems in the world, incorporates
security into the design of all its new stations as well as when
existing stations are modified. We observed several security features
in the design of Underground stations, such as using vending machines
that have no holes that someone could use to hide a bomb, and sloped
tops to reduce the likelihood that a bomb can be placed on top of the
machine. In addition, stations are designed to provide staff with clear
lines of sight to all areas of the station, such as underneath benches
or ticket machines, and station designers try to eliminate or restrict
access to any recessed areas where a bomb could be hidden. Figure 8
shows selected security design elements incorporated into London
Underground stations.
Figure 8: Selected Security Design Elements Incorporated into London's
Underground:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In one London station, we observed the use of netting throughout the
station to help prevent objects, such as bombs, from being placed in a
recessed area, such as beneath a stairwell or escalator. In this
station and other stations we visited, Underground officials have
installed "help posts" at which customers can call for help if an
incident occurs. When these posts are activated, CCTV cameras display a
video image of the help post and surrounding area to staff at a central
command center. This allows the staff to directly observe the situation
and respond appropriately. See figure 9 for a photograph of a help
post.
Figure 9: Security Design Elements Incorporated into London's
Underground:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Underground officials stated that the incorporation of security
features in station design is an effective measure in deterring some
terrorists from attacking the system. For example, officials told us
that CCTV video recorded the efforts by Irish Republican Army
terrorists attempting to place an explosive device inside a station--
and when they could not find a suitable location to hide the device,
they placed it outside in a trash can instead, thereby mitigating the
impact of the explosion.
In the United States, several passenger rail operators stated that they
were taking security into account when designing new facilities or
remodeling older ones. Twenty-two of 32 rail operators we interviewed
told us that they were incorporating security into the design of new or
existing rail infrastructure. For example, New York City Transit and
PATH officials told us they are incorporating security into the design
of its new stations, including the redesigned Fulton Street station and
the World Trade Center Hub that were damaged or destroyed during the
September 11 attacks.
Under FTA's New Starts program--a discretionary grant-making program
available to transit agencies seeking federal funds for new or expanded
fixed-guideway system construction--a security management plan must be
developed and security must be taken into consideration when designing
or constructing federally funded projects. Although security-specific
design considerations are required for these security plans, the plans
need not incorporate a particular set of security design principles or
guidelines. In June 2005, FTA issued guidelines for use by the transit
industry encouraging the incorporation of particular security features
into the design of transit infrastructure. These guidelines include,
for example, increasing visibility for onboard staff, reducing the
areas where someone could hide an explosive device on a transit
vehicle, and enhancing emergency exits in transit stations. The program
guidance for New Starts does not require that agencies consider these
particular guidelines to further enhance station security and mitigate
exposures to terrorist attack when enhancing new systems or expansions.
In response to our inquiry about the feasibility and appropriateness of
such a requirement, FTA officials stated that they planned to
incorporate such a requirement into the program's regulations after
legislation reauthorizing the New Starts program is approved.[Footnote
44]
Figure 10 shows a diagram of several security measures that we observed
in passenger rail stations both in the United States and abroad. It
should be noted that this represents an amalgam of stations we visited,
not any particular station.
Figure 10: Composite of Selected Security Practices in the Passenger
Rail Environment:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Amtrak Faces Challenges Specific to Intercity Passenger Rail in
Securing Its System:
In securing its extensive system, Amtrak faces its own set of security-
related challenges, some of which are different from those facing a
commuter rail or transit operator. First, Amtrak operates over
thousands of miles, often far from large population centers. This makes
its route system much more difficult to patrol and monitor than one
contained in a particular metropolitan region, and it causes delays in
responding to incidents when they occur in remote areas. Also, outside
the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak operates almost exclusively on tracks
owned by freight rail companies. Amtrak also utilizes stations owned by
freight rail companies, transit and commuter rail authorities, private
corporations, and municipal governments. This means that Amtrak often
cannot unilaterally make security improvements to others' rights-of-way
or station facilities and that it is reliant on the staff of other
organizations to patrol their facilities and respond to incidents that
may occur. Furthermore, with over 500 stations, only half of which are
staffed, screening even a small portion of the passengers and baggage
boarding Amtrak trains is difficult. Last, Amtrak's financial condition
has never been strong--Amtrak has been on the edge of bankruptcy
several times--and the future of Amtrak operations is in question
pending the outcome of the fiscal year 2006 budget.[Footnote 45]
Amid the ongoing challenges of securing its coast-to-coast railway,
Amtrak has taken some actions to enhance security throughout its
intercity passenger rail system. For example, Amtrak has initiated a
passenger awareness campaign, similar to those described elsewhere in
this report. Also, Amtrak has begun enforcing existing restrictions on
carry-on luggage that limit passengers to two carry-on bags, not
exceeding 50 pounds. All bags also must have identification tags on
them. Furthermore, Amtrak has begun requiring passengers to show
positive identification after boarding trains when asked by staff to
ensure that tickets have not been transferred or stolen, although
Amtrak officials acknowledge their onboard staffs only sporadically
enforce this requirement because of the numerous tasks these staff
members must perform before a train departs. However, in November 2004,
Amtrak implemented the Tactical Intensive Patrols (TIPS) program, under
which its security staff flood selected platforms to ensure Amtrak
baggage and identification requirements are met by passengers boarding
trains. In addition, Amtrak increased the number of canine units
patrolling its system, most of which are located in the Northeast
Corridor, looking for explosives or narcotics and assigned some of its
police to ride trains in the Northeast Corridor. Also, Amtrak has
instituted a policy of randomly inspecting checked luggage on its
trains. Finally, Amtrak is making improvements to the emergency exits
in certain tunnels to make evacuating trains in the tunnels easier in
the event of a crash or terrorist attack.
To ensure that security measures are applied consistently throughout
Amtrak's system, Amtrak has established a series of Security
Coordinating Committees, which include representatives of all Amtrak
departments. These committees are to review and establish security
policies, in coordination with Amtrak's police department, and have
worked to develop countermeasures to specific threats. According to
Amtrak, in the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings, these
committees met with Amtrak police and security staff to ensure
additional security measures were implemented. Also in the wake of the
London attacks, Amtrak began working with the police forces of several
large east coast cities, allowing them to patrol Amtrak stations to
provide extra security. In addition, all Amtrak employees now receive a
"Daily Security Awareness Tip" and are receiving computer-based
security training. Amtrak police officers are also now receiving
specialized counterterrorism training.
While Amtrak has taken the actions outlined above, it is difficult to
determine if these actions appropriately or sufficiently addressed
pressing security needs. As discussed earlier, Amtrak has not performed
a comprehensive terrorism risk assessment that would provide an
empirical baseline for investment prioritization and decision making
for Amtrak's security policies and investment plans. However, as part
of the 2005 Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program, Amtrak is required
to produce a security and emergency preparedness plan, which is to
include a risk assessment that Amtrak expects to finish by September
30, 2005. Upon completing this plan, Amtrak management should have a
more informed basis regarding which security enhancements should
receive the highest priority for implementation.
Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used in the
United States:
While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail
systems are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are
implementing, we encountered three practices in other countries that
were not currently in use among the domestic passenger rail operators
we contacted at the time we completed our field work in June 2005, nor
were they performed by the U.S. government. These practices are
discussed below.
Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited utilize
covert testing to keep employees alert about their security
responsibilities. Covert testing involves security staff staging
unannounced events to test the response of railroad staff to incidents
such as suspicious packages or setting off alarms. In one European
system, this covert testing involves security staff placing suspicious
items throughout their system to see how long it takes operating staff
to respond to the item. Similarly, one Asian rail operator's security
staff will break security seals on fire extinguishers and open alarmed
emergency doors randomly to see how long it takes staff to respond.
Officials of these operators stated that these tests are carried out on
a daily basis and are beneficial because their staff know they could be
tested at any moment, and they, therefore, are more likely to be
vigilant with respect to security.
Random screening: Of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed, 2 have
some form of random screening of passengers and their baggage in place.
In the systems where this is in place, security personnel can approach
passengers either in stations or on the trains and ask them to submit
their persons or their baggage to a search. Passengers declining to
cooperate must leave the system. For example, in Singapore, rail agency
officials rotate the stations where they conduct random searches so
that the searches are carried out at a different station each day.
Prior to the July 2005 London bombings, no passenger rail operators in
the United States were practicing a form of random passenger or baggage
screening on a continuing daily basis. However, during the Democratic
National Convention in 2004, MBTA instituted a system of random
screening of passengers, where every 11th passenger at certain stations
and times of the day was asked to provide his or her bags to be
screened. Those who refused were not allowed to ride the system. MBTA
officials recognized that it is impossible to implement such a system
comprehensively throughout the rail network without massive amounts of
additional staff, and that even doing random screening on a regular
basis would be a drain on resources. However, officials stated that
such a system is workable during special events and times of heightened
security but would have to be designed very carefully to ensure that
passengers' civil liberties were not violated. After the July 2005
London bombings, four passenger rail operators--PATH, New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New Jersey Transit, and Utah
Transit Authority in Salt Lake City--implemented limited forms of
random bag screening in their system.[Footnote 46] In addition, APTA,
FTA, and the National Academy of Science's Transportation Research
Board are currently conducting a study on the benefits and challenges
that passenger rail operators would face in implementing a randomized
passenger screening system.[Footnote 47] The study is examining such
issues as the legal basis for conducting passenger screening or search,
the precedence for such measures in the transportation environment, the
human resources required, and the financial implications and cost
considerations involved. As of July 2005, an initial draft of the study
was under review.
National government maintains clearinghouse on technologies and best
practices: According to passenger rail operators in five countries we
visited, their national governments have centralized the process for
performing research and developing passenger rail security technologies
and maintaining a clearinghouse on these technologies and security best
practices. According to these officials, this allows rail operators to
have one central source for information on the merits of a particular
passenger rail security technology, such as chemical sensors, CCTVs,
and intrusion detection devices. Some U.S. rail operators we
interviewed expressed interest in there being a more active centralized
federal research and development authority in the United States to
evaluate and certify passenger rail security technologies and make that
information available to rail operators. Although TSA is the primary
federal agency responsible for conducting transportation security
research and development, and has conducted the TRIP as previously
mentioned, most of the agency's research and development efforts to
date have focused on aviation security technologies. As a result,
domestic rail operators told us that they rely on consultations with
industry trade associations, such as APTA, to learn about best
practices for passenger rail security technologies and related
investments. Several rail operators stated that they were often unsure
of where to turn when seeking information on security-related products,
such as CCTV cameras or intrusion detection systems. Currently, many
operators said they informally ask other rail operators about their
experiences with a certain technology, perform their own research via
the Internet or trade publications, or perform their own testing.
No federal agency has yet compiled or disseminated best practices to
rail operators to aid in this process. We have previously reported that
stakeholders have stated that the federal government should play a
greater role in testing transportation security technology and making
this information available to industry stakeholders.[Footnote 48] TSA
and DOT agree that making the results of research testing available to
industry stakeholders could be a valuable use of federal resources by
reducing the need for multiple rail operators to perform the same
research and development efforts, but they have not taken action to
address this.[Footnote 49]
Implementing these three practices--covert testing, random screening,
and a government-sponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best
practices--in the United States could pose political, legal, fiscal,
and cultural challenges because of the differences between the United
States and these foreign nations. For instance, many foreign nations
have dealt with terrorist attacks on their public transportation
systems for decades, compared with the United States, where rail
transportation has not been specifically targeted during terrorist
attacks. According to foreign rail operators, these experiences have
resulted in greater acceptance of certain security practices, such as
random searches, which the U.S. public may view as a violation of their
civil liberties or which may discourage them from using public
transportation. The impact of security measures on passengers is an
important consideration for domestic rail transit operators, since most
passengers could choose another means of transportation, such as a
personal automobile. As such, security measures that limit
accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause
inconvenience could push people away from transit and into their cars.
In contrast, the citizens of the European and Asian countries we
visited are more dependent on public transportation than most U.S.
residents and therefore, according to the rail operators we spoke with,
may be more willing to accept more intrusive security measures, simply
because they have no other choice for getting from place to place.
Nevertheless, in order to identify innovative security measures that
could help further mitigate terrorism-related risk to rail assets--
especially as part of a broader risk management approach discussed
earlier--it is important to at least consider assessing the feasibility
and costs and benefits of implementing the three rail security
practices we identified in foreign countries in the United States.
Officials from DHS, DOT, passenger rail industry associations, and rail
systems we interviewed told us that operators would benefit from such
an evaluation. Furthermore, the passenger rail association officials
told us that such an evaluation should include practices used by
foreign rail operators that integrate security into infrastructure
design.
Differences in the business models and financial status of some foreign
rail operators could also affect the feasibility of adopting certain
security practices in the United States. Several foreign countries we
visited have privatized their passenger rail operations. Although most
of the foreign rail operators we visited--even the privatized systems-
-rely on their governments for some type of financial assistance, two
foreign rail operators generated significant revenue and profits in
other business endeavors, which they said allowed them to invest
heavily in security measures for their rail systems. In particular, the
Paris Metro system is operated by the RATP Corporation (Regie Autonome
des Transports Parisiens), which also contracts with other cities in
France and throughout the world to provide consulting and project
management services. RATP's ability to make a profit, according to its
officials, through its consulting services allows the agency to
supplement government funding in order to support expensive security
measures for the Paris mass transit system. For example, RATP recently
installed a computer-assisted security control system that uses CCTV,
radio, and global positioning technology that it says has significantly
reduced the amount of time it takes for security or emergency personnel
to respond to an incident or emergency, such as a terrorist attack.
Because of RATP's available funding for security, the corporation also
purchased an identical system for the Metropolitan Paris Police, so the
RATP and the police system would be compatible. In addition, according
to Hong Kong mass transit system officials, their company was highly
profitable because of its real estate and development operations,
allowing the company to invest in security measures. In contrast,
domestic rail operators do not generate a profit and therefore are
dependent on financial assistance from the federal, state, and local
levels of government to maintain and enhance services, including
funding security improvements.
Another important difference between domestic and foreign rail
operators is the structure of their police forces. In particular,
England, France, Belgium, and Spain all have national police forces
patrolling rail systems in these countries. The use of a national
police force is a reflection that these foreign countries often have
one nationalized rail system, rather than over 30 rail transit systems
owned and operated by numerous state and local governments, as is the
case in the United States. For example, in France, the French National
Railway operates all intercity passenger rail services in the country
and utilizes the French Railway police to provide security. According
to foreign rail operators, the use of one national rail police force
allows for consistent policing and security measures throughout the
country. In the United States, in contrast, there is not a national
police force for the rail transit systems.[Footnote 50] Rather, some
transit agencies maintain individual polices forces, while others rely
on their city or county police forces for security.
Conclusions:
The recent London rail bombings made clear that even when a variety of
security precautions are put in place, passenger rail systems that move
high volumes of passengers on a daily basis remain vulnerable to
attack. It is important nonetheless to take the necessary steps to
identify and mitigate risks to passenger rail systems. In the United
States, securing the passenger rail system is a daunting task. As we
have reported previously, the sheer number of stakeholders involved in
securing these systems can lead to communication challenges,
duplication of effort, and confusion about roles and responsibilities.
Accordingly, enhanced federal leadership is needed to help ensure that
actions and investments designed to enhance security are properly
focused and prioritized. We are encouraged by the steps DHS components
have taken to use elements of a risk management approach to guide
critical infrastructure protection decisions for the passenger rail
industry. This is a necessary step in a broader effort by DHS to
determine how to allocate finite resources not only to help protect all
modes of transportation, but also to secure other national critical
infrastructure sectors.
However, both DHS and TSA could take additional steps to help ensure
that the risk management efforts under way clearly and effectively
identify priority areas for security-related investments in rail and
other sectors. We recognize that TSA has had many aviation security-
related responsibilities and has implemented many security initiatives
to meet legislative requirements. Notwithstanding, TSA has not yet
completed its methodology for determining how the results of threat,
criticality, and vulnerability assessments will be used to identify and
prioritize risks to passenger rail and other transportation sectors. In
order to complete and apply its methodology as part of the forthcoming
transportation sector-specific plan, TSA needs to more consistently
involve industry stakeholders in the overall risk assessment process
and collaborate with them on collecting and analyzing information on
critical infrastructure and key resources in the passenger rail
industry. Without consistent and substantive stakeholder input, TSA may
not be able to fully capture critical information on rail assets--
information that is needed to properly assess risk. In addition, as
part of the process to complete its risk assessment methodology, TSA
needs to consider whether other proven approaches, such as ODP's risk
assessment methodology, could be leveraged for rail and other
transportation modes, such as aviation. Until the overall risk to the
entire transportation sector is identified, TSA will not be able to
fully benefit from the outcome of risk management analysis--including
determining where and how to target the nation's limited resources to
achieve the greatest security gains.
Once risk assessments for the passenger rail industry have been
completed, it will be critical to be able to compare assessment results
across all transportation modes as well as other critical sectors and
make informed, risk-based investment trade-offs. The framework that DHS
is developing to help ensure that risks to all sectors can be analyzed
and compared in a consistent way needs to be completed and shared with
TSA and other sector-specific agencies. The delay in completing the
element of the framework that defines concepts, terminology, and
metrics for assessing risk limits DHS's ability to compare risk across
sectors as sector-specific agencies are concurrently conducting risk
assessment activities without this guidance. Until this framework is
complete, it will not be possible for information from different
sectors to be reconciled to allow for a meaningful comparison of risk-
-a goal outlined in DHS's interim NIPP.
Apart from its efforts to formally identify risks, TSA has taken steps
to enhance the security of the overall passenger rail system. The
issuance of security directives in the wake of the Madrid bombings was
a well-intentioned effort to take swift action in response to a current
threat. However, because these directives were issued under emergency
circumstances, with limited input and review by rail industry and
federal stakeholders--and no public comment period--they may not
provide the industry with baseline security standards based on industry
best practices. Nor is it clear how these directives are to be measured
and enforced. Consequently, neither the federal government nor rail
operators can be sure they are requiring and implementing security
practices proven to help prevent or mitigate disasters. Collaborating
with rail industry stakeholders to develop security standards is an
important starting point for strengthening the security of passenger
rail systems. DHS and DOT have taken steps in this direction through
the interdepartmental MOU in place and related agreements now being
developed to define roles and responsibilities and resources for mass
transit, rail, and other matters. These agreements, once completed and
communicated to the rail industry, will help ensure that federal
activities to secure rail systems, including the development of
standards, are coordinated, and that stakeholders are involved in their
development and implementation to the extent possible. Otherwise,
security efforts could be duplicative, thus dispersing finite
resources, rather than focusing them based on risk, or fail to achieve
the intended ends. Given the importance of clearly defining DHS's and
DOT's roles and responsibilities for rail security matters, time frames
could be established to hold DHS and DOT accountable for completing the
MOU agreements.
While foreign passenger rail operators face similar challenges to
securing their systems and have generally implemented similar security
practices as U.S. rail operators, there are some practices that are
utilized abroad that U.S. rail operators or the federal government have
not studied in terms of the feasibility, costs, and benefits. For
example, an information clearinghouse for new passenger rail
technologies that are available and have been tested might allow rail
operators to efficiently implement technologies that had already
received approval. In addition, while FTA plans to require rail
operators to consider its security infrastructure design guidelines
when renovating or constructing rail systems or facilities,
opportunities may still exist to further research and evaluate ways of
integrating security into design, as some foreign rail operators have
done. Another rail security practice--covert testing of rail security
procedures--is being used in two foreign rail systems we visited and is
considered by them as an effective means of keeping rail employees
alert to their surroundings and potential security threats. And
finally, random searches of passengers and baggage are being used by
two foreign rail operators and this practice has recently been adopted
by four domestic rail operators in the wake of the London attacks.
Introducing these security practices into the United States may involve
cultural, financial, and political challenges, owing to differences
between the United States and foreign nations. Nonetheless, as part of
the overall risk management approach, there may be compelling reasons
for exploring the feasibility, costs, and benefits of implementing any
of these practices in the United States. Doing so could enable the
United States to leverage the experiences and knowledge of foreign
passenger rail operators and help identify additional innovative
measures to secure rail systems against terrorist attack in this
country.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order for the Department of Homeland Security to have the
information needed to fully evaluate, compare, and prioritize risk
mitigation activities across sectors, we recommend that the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security take the following action:
* Establish a timeline for completing the department's framework for
analyzing sector risks and ensure that the risk assessment
methodologies used by sector-specific agencies are consistent with this
framework.
In order for the Transportation Security Administration to have the
information needed to more fully evaluate, select, and implement risk
mitigation activities, and complete its transportation sector-specific
plan and other strategic risk based plans, we recommend that the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant
Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration to take the
following two actions:
* Establish a plan for completing its methodology for conducting risk
assessments that includes timelines and addresses how it will work with
passenger rail stakeholders and leverage existing federal expertise in
Department of Homeland Security components, including the Office for
Domestic Preparedness, as well as the Department of Transportation
modal administrations, including the Federal Railroad Administration
and the Federal Transit Administration.
* Evaluate whether the risk assessment methodology used by the Office
for Domestic Preparedness should be leveraged to facilitate the
completion of risk assessments for rail and other transportation modes.
To ensure that future rail security directives are enforceable,
transparent, and feasible, we recommend that the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of the
Transportation Security Administration, in collaboration with the
Department of Transportation and the passenger rail industry, to take
the following two actions:
* Develop security standards that reflect industry best practices and
can be measured, monitored, and enforced by Transportation Security
Administration rail inspectors and, if appropriate, by rail asset
owners. This could be accomplished by using the rule-making process,
with notice in the Federal Register and an opportunity for interested
stakeholders to comment, to promulgate long-term regulations that
incorporate these standards.
* Set timelines for completing the memorandum of understanding modal
agreements for rail, mass transit, and research and development, which
both the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Transportation have agreed to pursue.
To help strengthen the security of passenger rail systems in the United
States and potentially leverage the knowledge and practices employed by
foreign rail operators, we recommend that the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the Department
of Transportation and the passenger rail industry, take the following
two actions:
* Evaluate the feasibility of establishing and maintaining an
information clearinghouse on existing and emergency security
technologies and security best practices used in the passenger rail
industry both in the United States and abroad.
* Evaluate the potential benefits and applicability--as risk analyses
warrant and as opportunities permit--of implementing covert testing
processes to evaluate the effectiveness of rail system security
personnel; implementing practices used by foreign rail operators that
integrate security into infrastructure design; and implementing random
searches or screening of passengers and their baggage, pending the
results of an ongoing joint federal and industry review of the impact
of random screening on passenger rail operators.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided DHS, DOT, and Amtrak a draft of this report for review and
comment. DOT and Amtrak generally agreed with our findings and
recommendations and provided technical comments, which we incorporated
where appropriate.
DHS generally concurred with the report's recommendations and provided
detailed comments on various sections of the report. Its comments are
contained in appendix IV. We summarize their comments and provide our
response below.
In commenting on the report, DHS stated that it is working through the
Office of State and Local Government Coordination Preparedness
(referred to in this report as the Office for Domestic Preparedness,
ODP), TSA, and FTA to maximize and leverage collective resources to
better serve the mass transit and commuter rail industry. In addition,
DHS indicated that it will share ODP's risk management architecture
with public and private sector entities and use risk management
principles to better prioritize its funding decisions. DHS reported
taking or is planning to take other actions to enhance the security of
the U.S. passenger rail system, such as initiating a canine explosives
detection program, gathering and centralizing information on mass
transit security to aid in decision making, and partnering with FRA
inspectors to review rail security measures in operation since the July
2005 London rail bombings. We are encouraged by DHS's efforts to work
towards a common risk-based architecture for securing the passenger
rail system and its related security initiatives.
In more specific comments, DHS stated that our assertion that TSA
missed the December 2004 deadline for completing the TSSP was
misleading because the agency completed a draft by November 2004. DHS
also stated that it plans to include industry associations, such as
APTA and AAR, in its development of the TSSP and noted that it
partnered with these associations and their members after the London
bombings in July 2005. We modified the report to reflect the fact that
a draft TSSP was completed by this date. However, the plan was not
produced by December 2004, as required by HSPD-7, and therefore was not
available for use by the rail operators and stakeholders.
DHS also noted that while TSA's methodology for conducting criticality
assessments relies on open source information and therefore does not
require direct contact with industry stakeholders, the agency
nevertheless involved federal stakeholders and rail operators in
conducting the assessments. We recognize that TSA's process for
conducting criticality assessments relies on open source information,
and TSA reported to us that it had some contact with stakeholders.
However, DHS's interim NIPP states that the department and sector-
specific agencies would work with the industry to determine the most
effective means of collecting and analyzing information on critical
assets. TSA was not able to provide us with evidence showing that it
had solicited and evaluated input from industry stakeholders on its
criticality assessment methodology. In addition, the criticality
assessment case files we reviewed contained no evidence of coordination
with stakeholders during the assessment process. Furthermore, industry
associations we interviewed told us that TSA did not solicit their
input on the agency's criticality assessment methodology or ask them to
identify specific critical assets. Moreover, of the 32 rail operators
we contacted about TSA's criticality assessment process, 22 operators
responded; of those who responded, all stated that TSA did not involve
them in conducting critical assessments of their systems.
DHS also stated that while stakeholders were not given an opportunity
to comment on the final draft of the measures contained in the security
directives, various stakeholders, including Amtrak, did comment on each
of the measures required by the directive. Our report acknowledges that
associations and Amtrak were given an opportunity to comment on the
draft directives. However, the draft directives initially provided to
industry stakeholders did not include all of the measures required by
the final directives. For example, the draft directives provided to
APTA and AAR did not include the requirement that engineer cab or
compartments be kept locked. Moreover, although TSA stated that it
would continue to collaborate with industry stakeholders on the
development of the directives, DHS and TSA determined that the
prevailing threat environment necessitated issuing the directives
without additional consultation. According to TSA, the emergency
circumstances under which the directives were issued allowed for only
limited input and review by federal and rail industry stakeholders.
However, we believe that using the federal rule-making process as a
means of establishing permanent standards would make the process more
transparent and could help TSA in developing standards that are most
appropriate for the industry and which can be measured, monitored, and
enforced. Since stakeholders will play a critical role in
administering, implementing, and/or enforcing TSA standards, their
involvement in the development of standards is important to the success
of these initiatives.
DHS stated that our report criticized TSA's efforts to develop the
directives based upon consultation with industry and a review of best
security practices. Specifically, DHS said that TSA went beyond FTA's
and APTA's written documents (i.e., FTA's list of the top 20 actions
FTA rail operators can take to strengthen security, FTA-recommended
protective measures and activities for transit agencies that may be
followed based on current threat levels, and an APTA member survey) and
considered other effective security measures, such as locking engineer
cab and compartment doors (a measure suggested by WMATA, according to
DHS), which the agency said were being implemented by various
operators. While we agree that collaborating with other federal
agencies and industry stakeholders to develop security standards based
upon best practices is a critical step in enhancing the security of
U.S. passenger rail systems and are making a recommendation to this
effect, we continue to question the extent to which TSA followed this
approach in developing the directives and the criteria TSA used to
determine what constituted industry best practices. For example,
regarding the requirement to lock train operator cabs or compartments,
it is unclear whether this requirement is an industry best practice.
The source material TSA provided to us, which the agency said it
consulted in developing the directives, does not indicate that locking
engineer or train operator cab or compartment doors is a best practice,
or an effective one, in use by WMATA or other operators. Furthermore,
TSA did not seek input from other stakeholders to determine whether
they viewed this as a best practice. For example, the draft directives
provided to AAR and APTA for comment did not include this measure. In
addition, documentation shows that TSA called one commuter rail
operator prior to issuing the directives to discuss this proposed
measure, and the operator raised a concern about the safety of the
locked door requirement. All of the rail operators and association
representatives we interviewed raised concerns either about the extent
of TSA's coordination with the industry in developing the directives or
the feasibility of specific directives.
Regarding our assertion that the locked door measure may conflict with
an FRA safety requirement, DHS responded that, according to FRA, the
measure applied only to two types of passenger rail cars. However,
FRA's director of the office of safety assurance and compliance and its
director of security disagreed with this assertion and said that this
safety concern would apply to all commuter or intercity rail equipment
that is equipped with locking mechanisms. While the locked door
requirement may be well intentioned, it may have the unintended
consequence of increasing safety risks to railroad employees and
passengers. According to FRA, a locked door pursuant to the directive
would not allow the locomotive engineer to quickly exit the cab when
faced with an impending highway rail grade crossing collision or other
accident. In some cases, the door providing access to the locomotive's
cab also serves as one of only two primary paths for emergency exit by
passengers and is marked as an emergency exit. According to FRA, if
these doors are locked pursuant to the directives, they may not be
usable in an emergency, and passenger evacuation time could be
substantially increased.
In the report, we stated that APTA, AAR, and other stakeholders did not
believe they had been sufficiently consulted throughout the development
of the security directives, including the measure advocating
installation of bomb-resistant trash cans. As a result, stakeholders
did not believe the directives reflected a complete understanding of
the passenger rail environment or incorporate industry best practices.
On this issue, DHS noted in its comments that the directives did not
require the installation of bomb-resistant trash cans, but rather
encouraged the removal of traditional trash cans. While we agree that
the directive emphasizes the desirability, under certain circumstances
and to the extent that resources allow, of removing traditional trash
cans, we believe the directive also directly advocates the use of bomb-
resistant trash cans since it directs operators to "install bomb
resistant receptacles to the extent resources allow." While industry
stakeholders had an opportunity to comment on the trash can removal
issue, they were not given an opportunity to consider the feasibility
or efficacy of installing bomb-resistant trash cans because this
measure was not included in the draft directives provided to industry
stakeholders for comment.
With regard to the directive requiring Amtrak and the Alaska Railroad
Corporation to perform ID checks on all passengers, DHS stated that our
report raised an issue regarding the efficacy of performing ID checks
without vetting passenger names against a watch list or other database.
DHS stated that ID checks were a baseline measure that could be
enhanced in response to heightened or specific threats by vetting names
against a watch list. DHS also explained that Amtrak was already
performing some ID checks, and that the measure was designed to
incorporate the ID check into current business practice of operators
such as Amtrak, which could request passengers to have their IDs
available when tickets are checked. We do not disagree with DHS's
assertion that additional measures could be added in heightened threat
environments. Our discussion of this measure focuses on Amtrak's
concern about the feasibility of the requirement in light of the
potential impacts on Amtrak's operations and revenue. DHS's explanation
of the intent of this measure suggests that it was to encourage the use
of ID checks and that operators "could request passengers to have their
ID available." However, as written, the directive requires rather than
encourages IDs to be checked at the initial point where tickets are
checked.
In commenting on our report's assertion that it is unclear which
entities are responsible for implementing the security directives, DHS
acknowledged that individual stations and terminals may be owned and/or
operated by multiple federal, state, and private entities but
emphasized that the prevailing threat environment at the time the
security directives were issued necessitated looking to the passenger
rail operator to coordinate the implementation of the required
measures. We agree that rail operators must play an important role in
the implementation of measures in stations that they may not own.
However, the directives, as written, do not make it clear which
entities (rail operators and station and terminal owners) are
responsible for implementing the requirements and, in the 15 months
since the directives were issued, TSA has not yet clarified these
responsibilities. The industry associations and rail operators still
believe that implementation responsibilities remain unclear. Given that
TSA considers these directives to be mandatory and has hired inspectors
to ensure compliance with directives, we believe that it is important
to clearly articulate which entities are to be held accountable for
implementing the measures required by the directives.
Finally, DHS commented that it has approved and distributed standard
operating procedures to its rail inspectors since we completed our
field work, and that DOT had been actively engaged in reviewing and
commenting on these procedures. We are encouraged that TSA is moving
forward with efforts to develop processes for ensuring compliance with
security standards. However, as stated above, we are concerned that TSA
may not be effectively able to ensure or enforce compliance until the
standards have been more fully developed in consultation with
stakeholders. TSA was not able to provide us with evidence to show it
had collaborated with DOT in developing and approving these procedures.
In addition, DOT officials raised questions regarding the approved
status of these procedures. For example, FTA's director of safety and
security told us he had not seen either a draft or a final version of
these procedures. Furthermore, FRA's director of the office of safety
assurance and compliance did not believe the procedures had been
approved. According this official, TSA provided a draft of the standard
operating procedures on August 10, 2005, and comments are due back on
September 14, 2005.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this
report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of
Transportation, the Assistant Secretary of the Transportation Security
Administration, the Administrator of the Federal Railroad
Administration, the Administrator of the Federal Transit
Administration, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Amtrak,
the Director of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination
and Preparedness, and interested congressional committees. We will make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will
be available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact Ms. Cathleen Berrick on (202) 512-8777 or Ms. JayEtta Hecker on
(202) 512-2834. Contact points for our offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Cathleen A. Berrick, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
JayEtta Hecker, Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To address our first objective, to identify the actions taken by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies to assess risks posed by
terrorism in the context of prevailing risk management principles, we
interviewed officials from DHS, the Department of Transportation (DOT),
and Amtrak. Specifically, within DHS, we interviewed officials from the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office of Intermodal
Security Programs (formerly the Office of Maritime and Land Security),
Office of Transportation Security Policy, Transportation Security
Intelligence Service, and the Chief Operating Officer. We also
interviewed officials from the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP), the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate, the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, and the Office of Inspector General. Within DOT,
we interviewed officials from the Office of Intelligence, Inspector
General, Deputy Secretary of Transportation, the Federal Transit
Administrations (FTA) Office of Safety and Security, and the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) Office of Security and Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance. We also interviewed Amtrak's Chief of Police
and Security, Vice President of Corporate Security, Inspector General,
and Amtrak security officials in locations throughout the United
States. In addition, we reviewed federal agency plans such as the DHS
Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and obtained and
reviewed various risk-related assessments conducted by federal
agencies, including the vulnerability assessments of rail transit
systems conducted by FTA, TSA threat assessments of mass transit and
rail and criticality assessments of passenger rail assets, and a
passenger rail risk assessment tool kit developed by SLGCP. Further, we
conducted a site visit to and interview with officials from the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey to discuss the results of an SLGCP
risk assessment conducted at that location.
To address our second objective to determine the actions that federal
agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail
system, we interviewed officials from FTA's Office of Safety and
Security, DOT's Office of the Secretary, FRA's Office of Security,
Office of Research and Development, and Office of Safety Assurance and
Compliance, and TSA's Office of Intermodal Security Programs, Office of
Research and Development, and the Chief Operating Officer. We did not
evaluate the effectiveness of any of these federal passenger rail
security efforts. We also reviewed federal guidance, such as Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7, FTA's Top 20 Security Program Action
Items for Transit Agencies, and TSA's security directives for passenger
rail operators; inspected all phases of TSA's TRIP program; and
reviewed the memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOT.
To determine the security practices that domestic and selected foreign
passenger rail operators have implemented to mitigate risks and enhance
security, and any differences in these practices, we interviewed
officials from TSA's Office of Intermodal Security Programs, FRA's
Office of International Policy, and FTA's Office of Safety and Security
to discuss domestic and foreign passenger rail security measures. We
also conducted site visits to or teleconferences with 32 heavy and
commuter rail operators in the United States--representing over 95
percent of the nation's passenger rail ridership in 2003--and Amtrak.
Table 4 lists the domestic passenger rail operators that we visited or
interviewed during our review.
Table 4: Domestic Passenger Rail Agencies We Visited or Interviewed for
the Purposes of this Review:
Passenger rail agency: Altamont Commuter Express (ACE);
Urban area served: Stockton and San Jose, California.
Passenger rail agency: Alaska Railroad Corporation;
Urban area served: Anchorage and Fairbanks, Alaska.
Passenger rail agency: Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART);
Urban area served: San Francisco-Oakland, California.
Passenger rail agency: CALTRAIN;
Urban area served: San Francisco and San Jose, California.
Passenger rail agency: San Diego Transit Corp. (Coaster);
Urban area served: San Diego, California.
Passenger rail agency: Dallas Area Rapid Transit/Trinity Railway
Express (DART);
Urban area served: Dallas, Texas.
Passenger rail agency: Greater Cleveland Regional Transportation
Authority (GCRTA);
Urban area served: Cleveland, Ohio.
Passenger rail agency: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (LACMTA);
Urban area served: Los Angeles, California.
Passenger rail agency: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
(MARTA);
Urban area served: Atlanta, Georgia.
Passenger rail agency: Maryland Transit Administration (MTA);
Urban area served: Greater Washington, D.C., and Maryland.
Passenger rail agency: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(MBTA);
Urban area served: Boston, Massachusetts.
Passenger rail agency: METRA Commuter Rail;
Urban area served: Chicago, Illinois.
Passenger rail agency: Southern California Regional Rail Authority
(Metrolink);
Urban area served: Greater Los Angeles, California.
Passenger rail agency: Long Island Railroad (LIRR);
Urban area served: New York, New York.
Passenger rail agency: Metro North Railroad (MNR);
Urban area served: New York, New York.
Passenger rail agency: New York City Transit (NYCT);
Urban area served: New York, New York.
Passenger rail agency: Staten Island Railway (SIR);
Urban area served: New York, New York.
Passenger rail agency: San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI);
Urban area served: San Francisco, California.
Passenger rail agency: Northern Indiana Commuter District;
Urban area served: Chicago, Illinois--Northern Indiana.
Passenger rail agency: Delaware River Port Authority (PATCO);
Urban area served: New Jersey and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Passenger rail agency: Port Authority Trans Hudson (PATH);
Urban area served: New York, New York--New Jersey.
Passenger rail agency: San Diego Trolley;
Urban area served: San Diego, California.
Passenger rail agency: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority (SEPTA);
Urban area served: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Passenger rail agency: South Florida Regional Transportation Authority
(SFRTA);
Urban area served: Miami, Florida.
Passenger rail agency: Connecticut Department of Transportation (Shore
Line East);
Urban area served: New Haven, Connecticut.
Passenger rail agency: Sound Transit (Sounder);
Urban area served: Seattle, Washington.
Passenger rail agency: TRIMET;
Urban area served: Portland, Oregon.
Passenger rail agency: Virginia Railway Express (VRE);
Urban area served: Northern Virginia, Greater Washington, D.C.
Passenger rail agency: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA);
Urban area served: Washington, D.C.
Passenger rail agency: New Jersey Transit (NJT);
Urban area served: Newark, New Jersey-New York, New York.
Passenger rail agency: Miami Dade Transit;
Urban area served: Miami, Florida.
Passenger rail agency: Chicago Transit Authority (CTA);
Urban area served: Chicago, Illinois.
Source: National Transit Database.
[End of table]
We also conducted site visits to 13 passenger rail operators in seven
European and Asian countries, including France, the United Kingdom,
Belgium, Spain, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. In all of these
countries, we met with passenger rail security officials and toured
facilities to identify security practices being used on their systems
as well as differences from U.S. passenger rail systems. We also met
with government officials in select countries. See table 5 for a list
of foreign passenger rail operators and government agencies we met with
abroad.
Table 5: Foreign Passenger Rail and Government Agencies We Visited or
Interviewed for the Purposes of This Review:
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Paris Metro;
Area served: Paris, France.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: French National Railway;
Area served: France.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: National Department for
Transport--Security Directorate;
Area served: United Kingdom.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: London Underground;
Area served: London, United Kingdom.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Network Rail;
Area served: United Kingdom.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: British Transport Police;
Area served: United Kingdom.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Channel Tunnel Rail Link;
Area served: United Kingdom/France.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Transport for London;
Area served: London, United Kingdom.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Belgian National Railway;
Area served: Belgium.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Madrid Metro;
Area served: Madrid, Spain.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: RENFE (Spanish National
Railway);
Area served: Spain.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: European Commission--
Directorate for Energy and Transport;
Area served: European Union.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: JR Central;
Area served: Japan.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Tokyo Metro;
Area served: Tokyo, Japan.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, and Transport;
Area served: Japan.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: SBS Transit Corporation;
Area served: Singapore.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Singapore Mass Rapid
Transit;
Area served: Singapore.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Land Transport Authority;
Area served: Singapore.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Hong Kong Mass Transit
Railway;
Area served: Hong Kong.
Passenger rail agency or government agency: Special Administrative
Regional Government;
Area served: Hong Kong.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We also attended an international rail security conference sponsored by
the International Union of Railways in partnership with the
International Union on Public Transport. While attending this
conference, we interviewed officials from the German National Railway.
Because we selected a nonprobability sample of both foreign and
domestic passenger rail operators, the information we obtained from
these interviews and visits cannot be generalized to all foreign or
domestic rail operators.
Finally, we discussed those foreign security practices identified with
several domestic passenger rail operators and a collection of surface
transportation security experts from the Mineta Transportation
Institute and RAND Corporation to determine the potential to use some
of these practices in the United States.
We performed our work from May 2004 through July 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Elements of a Typical Homeland Security Risk Assessment:
A threat assessment: Threat is defined as a potential intent to cause
harm or damage to an asset (e.g., natural environment, people, man-made
infrastructures, and activities and operations). Threat assessments
consist of the identification of adverse events that can potentially
affect an entity. Threats might be present at the global, national, or
local level, and their sources include terrorists and criminal
enterprises. Specific threat information may indicate vulnerabilities
that are subject to attack, or following the completion of a risk
management process may, for instance, indicate that resources should be
temporarily deployed to protect cargo in a particular region of the
country or a specific airport. Even if updated often, a threat
assessment might not adequately capture some emerging threats.
A vulnerability assessment: Vulnerability is defined as the inherent
state (either physical, technical, or operational) of an asset that can
be exploited by an adversary to cause harm or damage. Vulnerability
assessments identify these inherent states and the extent of their
susceptibility to exploitation, relative to the existence of any
countermeasures. A vulnerability assessment is generally conducted by a
team of experts skilled in such areas as engineering, intelligence,
security, information systems, finance, and other disciplines.
A criticality assessment: Criticality is defined as an asset's relative
importance, given that an event occurs. Criticality or similar
consequence assessments identify and evaluate an entity's assets based
on a variety of factors, including the importance of its mission or
function, the extent to which people are at risk, or the significance
of a structure or system in terms of, for example, national security,
economic activity, or public safety. Criticality or consequence
assessments are important because they provide, in combination with
threat and vulnerability assessments, information for later stages of
the risk management process; Risk assessment: A complete risk
assessment is a qualitative and/or quantitative determination of the
likelihood (probability) of occurrence of an adverse event and the
severity, or impact, of its consequences. Risk assessment can involve
designating risk as, for example, low, medium, or high (other scales,
such as numeric, can also be used), and often integrates threat,
criticality, and vulnerability assessments. Such analyses can help
inform which actions are best suited to mitigate assessed risk, in
conjunction with the risk-based evaluation of alternatives while
considering cost and other factors.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: FTA and ODP Passenger Rail Risk Assessments Conducted or
In Progress:
FTA Risk Assessments Conducted:
1. Bi-State Development Agency;
2. Chicago Metra Commuter Rail;
3. Chicago Transit Authority;
4. Dallas Areas Rapid Transit--Trinity Railway Express;
5. Denver Regional Transportation District;
6. Detroit Department of Transportation;
7. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority;
8. King County Department of Transportation Metro District;
9. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority;
10. Maryland Transit Administration;
11. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority;
12. Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County;
13. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority;
14. Metropolitan Transportation Authority--Long Island Railroad;
15. Metropolitan Transportation Authority--Metro North Railroad;
16. Metropolitan Transportation Authority--New York City Transit;
17. Miami Dade Transit;
18. Minneapolis Metro Transit;
19. New Jersey Transit;
20. New Orleans Regional Transit Authority;
21. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority;
22. North County Transit District--Coaster;
23. Port Authority Trans-Hudson--PATH;
24. Port Authority of Allegheny County Pennsylvania;
25. Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority;
26. Sacramento Regional Transit District;
27. San Diego Trolley;
28. Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority;
29. San Francisco Municipal Railway-MUNI;
30. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit;
31. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority;
32. Tri-County Commuter Rail Authority;
33. Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon--TriMet;
34. Utah Transit Authority;
35. Virginia Railway Express;
36. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
ODP Risk Assessments:
Completed:
1. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey;
2. New Jersey Transit;
3. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority;
4. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority;
5. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority;
6. Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon--TriMet;
7. Delaware River Port Authority--PATCO.
In Progress:
1. Bay Area Rapid Transit;
2. San Mateo County Transit District;
3. San Francisco Municipal Railway;
4. Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, Texas;
5. Chicago Transit Authority;
6. Miami-Dade Transit;
7. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority;
8. AMTRAK Northeast Corridor;
9. Dallas Area Rapid Transit/Trinity Railway Express;
10. South Florida Regional Transportation Authority;
11. Maryland Transit Administration;
12. Detroit Transportation Corporation.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
September 1, 2005:
Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security & Justice Issues:
Ms. JayEtta Z. Hecker:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Berrick and Ms. Hecker:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled,
"Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts," GAO-05-851. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the work done in this report to
identify areas for improvement in the DHS/Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) rail passenger security initiatives. We generally
concur with the recommendations and appreciate the discussion of
challenges, program successes, and next steps that this report
contains. However, DHS would like to comment about certain areas within
the report.
We agree with the report's findings in relation to the Office of State
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP's) risk
assessment programs and value the comments provided with respect to our
service to the Nation's Mass Transit Communities. In addition, we
recognize and appreciate that the report has referenced the necessity
of "shared responsibility" which remains a key theme of SLGCP and
hopefully, all of our constituents. The referenced SLGCP risk
assessment method ensures that capacities to manage an event are also
addressed to ascertain whether resource allocation of first responders
to these critical assets is appropriately measured.
Further, as we enter into FY06, we will continue to serve the nation's
state and local communities by enhancing our offerings along the
principles of risk-based prioritization. Additionally, SLGCP and its
partners, including TSA at DHS and the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT), are working
together to address any potential redundancies in program delivery, as
we remain committed to the goal of maximizing and leveraging our
collective resources to better serve the mass transit and commuter rail
industry. This coordination has resulted in leveraging of programming,
planning and outreach, as well as a better-synchronized mission and
message.
We will continue to share SLGCP's risk management architecture, as well
as identify and address how we must compare critical asset criterion
within the domain of terrorism risk across the nation's transportation
system. As noted in the draft report, SLGCP is leveraging its "grant-
making authority to promote risk-based funding decisions", and we will
continue to use those risk management principles to better attribute a
risk-based prioritization approach congruent with Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8.
With that being said, we would like to pose some specific comments
related to the TSA portion of the report. To be specific, in the
section of your draft report entitled, "TSA Has Begun to Assess Risks
to Passenger Rail," you comment on the exclusion of industry groups
such as the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and the
Association of American Railroads (AAR) in the development of strategic
plans. TSA plans to include these stakeholders in the revised National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP/Transportation Security Specific
Plan (TSSP) development process in order to capture industry's input in
the TSSP. TSA has also actively participated with both organizations
and their members in working together after the London bombings on July
7, 2005.
Additionally, your assertion that TSA missed the deadline for
completing the TSSP by December 2004 is misleading because TSA did, in
fact, complete a draft TSSP in November 2004. Completion of the draft
sector-specific plans depends on the content of the NIPP Base Plan
which is currently being revised. The revised NIPP, expected to be
issued in late 2005, will address your first recommendation as it
contains national guidelines and milestones for conducting sector-
specific risk assessments.
In your discussion of TSA's methodology for conducting criticality
assessments, you state, "According to TSA officials, their final
methodology for conducting criticality assessments did not include DOT
modal specialists and trade associations." By design, information
supporting our criticality assessments is obtained through open source
resources; nevertheless, TSA has involved Federal stakeholders as well
as owner/operators during the process to complete our criticality
assessments. TSA will conduct facilitated vulnerability assessments
with private sector stakeholders which include owner/operators.
In the section entitled, "°TSA Issued Mandatory Security Directives to
Rail Operators but Faces Challenges Related to Compliance and
Enforcement," you state that stakeholders were not given an opportunity
to comment on the final draft of the directives. While stakeholders
were not provided final copies of the security directives prior to
issuance, various stakeholders, including Amtrak, were provided with
and commented on each of the security measures contained in the
security directives.
Your report further states that TSA developed the directives based upon
consultation with the industry and a review of best practices in
passenger rail and mass transit systems across the country, and were
also based upon FTA and APTA best practices for rail security. The
report seems to criticize this approach by stating, "For example, the
source material TSA consulted does not support the requirement that
train cabs or compartment doors should be kept locked." In developing
the directives, TSA went beyond FTA's and APTA's written documents and
considered effective security measures implemented by various mass
transit operators. For instance, the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority (WMATA) identified the security measure referred to
above. Mass transit operators, such as WMATA and many others, require
their operators to lock the operator's compartment, thus precluding
access to the operator's compartment and train controls.
Additionally, your report states that this security measure may
conflict with a Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) safety
requirement. In consultation with stakeholders, TSA was advised of the
wide variety of types and designs of passenger rail cars currently in
service. According to FRA, the potential conflict relates to only two
types of passenger cars. Mindful of the significant variation in
operations and car configurations throughout the passenger rail
systems, TSA provided a means for operators to obtain variances from
the requirements of the security directives. Under the heading
"Approval of Alternative Measures," a rail operator "may submit to TSA,
proposed alternative measures and the basis for submitting the
alternative measures for approval.." This provision was designed to
ensure that the security measures would not unduly interfere with
operations or adversely impact rail safety. Moreover, concerns
regarding the locking of selected types of passenger rail cars were not
raised by DOT in its comments to the proposed security directives.
The report indicates that "APTA and AAR officials stated that because
they were not consulted throughout the development of the directives,
the directives did not, in their view, reflect a complete understanding
of the passenger rail environment or necessarily incorporate industry
best practices." In support of this assertion, the report cites the
security measure pertaining to bomb-resistant trash cans and concerns
regarding the feasibility of installing such trash cans. Based on
stakeholders' comments and concerns, the security measure as adopted
does not require the installation of bomb-resistant trash cans at any
given location. The measure emphasizes the desirability, under certain
circumstances and including to the extent that resources allow, of
removing from platform areas traditional trash cans which can be used
to conceal an improvised explosive device. The use of clear plastic
trash cans, utilized extensively overseas, was provided as a specific
low cost alternative.
The report also raises an issue regarding the efficacy of
identification (ID) checks without vetting against a watch list or
other database. The security directives established a "baseline" of
security measures which could be enhanced in response to heightened or
specific threats. For example, if there was a specific threat to
Amtrak, TSA, in consultation with stakeholders, could consider the
necessity of vetting passengers against a watch list or other database.
As a baseline, the current security measure deters individuals from
being able to anonymously travel throughout Amtrak's extensive network.
In consultation with Amtrak, TSA learned that Amtrak ticketing policy
includes checking 1D at the ticket counter, checking tickets at large
stations prior to boarding, and requiring passengers purchasing a
ticket at kiosks to sign their ticket, which is often accomplished on
the train in the presence of the conductor. This measure was designed
to incorporate the ID check into current business practices of
operators such as Amtrak, which could request passengers to have their
1D available when tickets are checked prior to boarding or when their
tickets are checked or validated by the conductor onboard the train.
The size and diversity of the surface transportation systems in the
United States preclude a one size fits all approach to securing the
vast network of interconnected and interdependent operations. The
Nation's passenger rail system is a clear example of this challenge.
Individual stations and terminals may be owned and/or operated by
multiple Federal, State, and private entities. These stations and
terminals often serve multiple intermodal operators. Similarly, tracks,
bridges, tunnels, and other infrastructure utilized by the passenger
rail operators are to a large extent owned and operated by other
entities. You state that "it is unclear .. which entities are
responsible for [security directive] implementation." The challenge to
respond to the prevailing threat in a timely and efficient manner
necessitated looking to the passenger rail operator as the primary, but
not necessarily the sole party responsible for implementing the
security measures contained in the referenced security directives. As
set forth in the security directives, the passenger rail operators are
in a unique position to "coordinate implementation of the security
measures with all other entities involved in the security operation,
including, but not limited to, third party owners of rail passenger
stations and freight railroads hosting the operations of parties to
which this security directive applies." Additionally, "the passenger
rail operator shall immediately pass the information and directives set
forth in this security directive to all stations affected." Securing
the Nation's transportation system requires the active coordination and
cooperation of all stakeholders. If for some reason an operator is
unable to meet its responsibilities under the security directives, it
is incumbent upon them to take corrective action where possible or
advise TSA and request approval of alternative measures. TSA is unaware
of any situation where a passenger rail operator was precluded from
meeting its responsibility under the security directive by an owner or
operator of a station, terminal, or other infrastructure. If such an
issue arises, TSA is fully prepared to work with the passenger rail
operator and the owner and/or operator of the station, terminal, or
other infrastructure to ensure effective security measures are in
place.
You also comment "it is unclear .. how TSA plans to monitor and ensure
compliance with the measures" and that TSA has not yet established
processes or criteria for determining and enforcing compliance with the
security directives. TSA has approved and distributed standard
operating procedures to its surface transportation security inspectors,
which address both of these concerns. DOT has been actively engaged in
reviewing and commenting on the document.
An operational improvement cited in your section entitled, "U.S. and
Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices, Operational
Improvements," is the increased use of canine teams. In FY05, Congress
provided TSA $2 million to support the deployment of canine explosives
detection teams in mass transit rail. To better secure transportation
systems and to fulfill congressional intent, TSA enlarged its TSA-
certified National Explosives Detection Canine Program to train and
place canine teams in the nation's mass transit and commuter rail
systems. On August 10, 2005, TSA offered to provide a cadre of canines
to the selected systems. The systems selected for participation had
until late August to provide TSA with a letter of intent to participate
in the program.
We agree that the success of transportation security rests on the close
partnership among DHS and transportation stakeholders. Ensuring that
our Nation's transportation systems are secure must be accomplished
through effective partnering between Federal, State, local, and private
sector industry entities. Following the rail bombings in London, TSA
Surface Transportation Inspectors partnered with FRA safety inspectors
to review the security measures in place at various rail operations
throughout our country. TSA will continue to work closely with our DOT
counterparts and other stakeholders to ensure an effective and
efficient monitoring of surface transportation security measures.
TSA officials have interacted with their foreign counterparts on rail
and transit security issues, with the intention of sharing and gleaning
best practices from countries with a history of terrorism against their
surface transportation systems, and will continue to do so. TSA has
developed forums for sharing security information and practices on
behalf of DHS across all modes of transportation. TSA regularly meets
with officials from the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, Israel, France,
Japan, Greece (particularly in preparation for the Olympics), the
Netherlands, Canada, and other countries. TSA also benefits from having
representatives based overseas in U.S. Embassies; these TSA employees
have expanded their traditional aviation security roles to include
security issues relating to all modes of transportation.
As part of the overall effort of coordinating information collection,
analysis, and dissemination, TSA plans to initiate a pilot project
focusing on mass transit. The mass transit pilot is led by TSA, and
includes staff from Infrastructure Protection and the DOT. The pilot
project team will collect information from a wide array of entities and
serve as a single focal point for mass transit security information
synthesis. It is here, among the key security partners, that the data
will be analyzed, shared, and used to provide decision-making
recommendations to leadership and easy, one-stop shopping for transit
stakeholders. The transit pilot is one of the immediate and practical
ways TSA is evaluating how it can redefine itself as the nerve center
within DHS for transportation security issues.
In summary, DHS and TSA would like to emphasize the dynamic and
maturing organizational environment in which the passenger rail
security program has operated since the start of this audit in May
2004. DHS appreciates your review of our rail security initiatives and
thanks you for the thorough analysis and discussion that comprises this
report. We continue to be cognizant of the areas in passenger rail
security upon which we can improve.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512-8777;
JayEtta Z. Hecker, (202) 512-2834:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Seto Bagdoyan, Amy Bernstein, Leo
Barbour, Christopher Currie, Nikki Clowers, Scott Farrow, David Hooper,
Andrew Huddleston, Kirk Kiester, Octavia Parks, Jack Schulze, and Ray
Sendejas made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The U.S. passenger rail system consists of heavy, commuter, light,
and intercity rail systems. Heavy rail is an electric railway that can
carry a heavy volume of traffic. Heavy rail is characterized by high
speed and rapid acceleration, passenger rail cars operating singly or
in multi-car trains on fixed rails, separate rights of way from which
all other vehicular and foot traffic is excluded, sophisticated
signaling, and high-platform loading. Most subway systems are
considered heavy rail. Commuter rail is characterized by passenger
trains operating on railroad tracks and providing regional service,
such as between a central city and its adjacent suburbs. Light rail
systems typically operate passenger rail cars singly (or in short,
usually two-car, trains) and are driven electrically with power being
drawn from an overhead electric line. Amtrak operates the nation's
primary intercity rail system.
[2] Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
[3] The institute was established by Congress as part of the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 and focuses on
international surface transportation policy issues involving research,
education, and technology transfer. RAND is a nonprofit research
organization that analyzes security issues in the rail sector, among
other things.
[4] GAO, Mass Transit: Federal Actions Could Help Transit Agencies
Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-263 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13,
2002), and Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help
Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 2003).
[5] The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation
Equity Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-59) enacted on August 10, 2005, requires
DOT and DHS to complete an agreement within 45 days of enactment to
define and clarify their respective roles related to public
transportation security.
[6] The American Public Transportation Association compiled this fiscal
year 2003 ridership data from FTA's National Transit Database. These
are the most current data available. Rail transit systems in the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are included in these statistics.
[7] The Alaska Railroad Corporation also operates intercity passenger
rail service.
[8] These statistics do not include the July 2005 London attacks, which
resulted in over 50 fatalities and over 700 injuries.
[9] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[10] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[11] The Department of Justice established ODP in 1998 within the
Office of Justice Programs. ODP was subsequently transferred to DHS's
Directorate of Border and Transportation Security upon DHS's creation
in March 2003 (Homeland Security Act of 2002, section 403(5), 6 U.S.C.
203(5)). In March 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security consolidated
ODP with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination to form
the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
(SLGCP). SLGCP, which reports directly to the DHS Secretary, was
created to provide a "one-stop shop" for the numerous federal
preparedness initiatives applicable to state and local governments. The
proposed reorganization of DHS may result in transferring portions of
ODP to a newly established Directorate of Preparedness.
[12] At the time of our review, DHS was undertaking a departmentwide
reorganization that will affect both the structure and functions of DHS
directorates and component agencies.
[13] The remaining funds were used to provide security grants for
intracity bus and freight rail systems and for technical assistance and
management and administration purposes. 49 USC 5307 (d)(1)(J)(i).
[14] For example, transit agencies must spend 1 percent of their
urbanized area formula funds on security improvements. FTA is to verify
that agencies comply with this requirement and may withhold funding
from agencies that it finds are not in compliance. Agencies are not
required to comply with this spending rule if a valid justification can
be documented, such as state and local funds for security are
inadequate or security trend data do not warrant security spending.
[15] 49 U.S.C. 5324(c). FTA has regulatory authority for state safety
oversight of rail fixed-guideway systems and a drug and alcohol
program. DOT is responsible for regulating the safety of transit
agencies.
[16] FRA administers and enforces the federal laws and related
regulations that are designed to promote safety on railroads, such as
track maintenance, inspection standards, equipment standards, and
operating practices. FRA exercises jurisdiction over all areas of
railroad safety under 49 U.S.C. 20103.
[17] Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
[18] GAO, Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to
Optimize Resources, GAO-05-357T (Washington D.C.: Feb. 15, 2005);
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001); and Combating
Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target
Program Investments, GAO/NSIAD-98-74 (Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1998).
[19] Sector-specific agencies have been designated for the following
sectors: transportation; agriculture and food; public health and health
care; drinking water and wastewater treatment; energy; banking and
finance; national monuments and icons; defense industrial base;
information technology; telecommunications; chemical; emergency
services; postal and package shipping; dams; government facilities;
commercial facilities; and nuclear reactors, materials, and waste.
[20] The transportation sector includes mass transit; aviation;
maritime; ground/surface; and rail and pipeline systems.
[21] ODP has completed risk assessments with the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey, New Jersey Transit, Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, Tri-
County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon, and the Delaware
River Port Authority.
[22] According to ODP, risk assessment methodologies from a variety of
sources were reviewed as part of the tool kit's development, including
various state transportation risk assessment methods, airport
vulnerability methods, and DOT infrastructure assessment methods.
[23] "Consequence" is defined as the portion of an asset's criticality
that would be reduced as a result of a successful attack.
[24] PANYNJ is a bistate public agency that manages and maintains
bridges, tunnels, bus terminals, airports, the PATH passenger rail
system, and seaports in the greater New York/New Jersey metropolitan
area. PANYNJ was also the property owner and operator of the World
Trade Center site and the PATH passenger rail station underneath the
site that was destroyed by the September 11 terrorist attacks. At the
request of PANYNJ, ODP's technical assistance team worked with
authority personnel to conduct the first risk assessment using ODP's
model. This collaborative effort provided the means for ODP to test and
refine its methodology and develop the tool kit now in use.
[25] On the basis of the ODP and prior risk assessments and identified
risks, PANYNJ identified approximately $1 billion dollars in security
investments or actions. The current $500 million capital investment
program was based directly on the highest risks identified in the
assessment. The initial $500 million program did not include
countermeasures identified by the assessments that could not be
implemented immediately. For example, the authority viewed
countermeasures, such as weapons of mass destruction detection systems,
as cost-prohibitive until technological advances are made in this
arena.
[26] The assessment identified the most effective risk reduction
measure as training employees and informing the public to serve as the
"eyes and ears" and report suspicious objects and behaviors. While,
according to the agency, it had undertaken comprehensive steps in these
areas, the assessment pointed out the usefulness of making these
efforts a permanent part of training, procedures, and public
information.
[27] The American Association of Railroads is an association
representing the interests of the rail industry, focused mostly at the
federal level. Its members are primarily freight rail operators in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico. However, it also represents some
passenger rail interests, including Amtrak.
[28] Participating agencies include DHS's Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness, DHS's U.S. Coast Guard, DHS's
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, the
Department of Defense's U.S. Transportation Command, DOT's Federal
Transit Administration, and DOT's Federal Highway Administration.
[29] The American Public Transportation Association is a nonprofit
trade association representing over 1,500 public and private member
organizations, including transit systems and commuter rail operators;
planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product and service
providers; academic institutions; transit associations; and state
departments of transportation.
[30] Up to 30 percent of the available funds will be available to
assist Amtrak in meeting its most pressing security needs in the
Northeast Corridor and Chicago (as identified through previously
conducted site-specific assessments) prior to completion of the risk
assessment. However, the remainder of the grant funds will not be
released until Amtrak has completed the risk assessment and also
submitted a security and emergency preparedness plan. Amtrak is also
required to demonstrate that its planning process and allocations of
funds are fully coordinated with regional planning efforts in the
National Capitol Region, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Chicago.
Amtrak is using approximately $700,000 of the grant funds for the ODP
risk assessment.
[31] The results of TSA's passenger and freight rail threat assessments
contain information that is security sensitive or classified and
therefore cannot be disclosed in this report.
[32] DHS refers to this framework as a Risk Analysis and Management for
Critical Asset Protection.
[33] FTA completed three additional assessments of rail transit
agencies as part of its technical assistance program.
[34] According to TSA, in issuing the passenger rail and mass transit
security directives, TSA exercised its authorities under 49 U.S.C. 114.
We are currently examining whether TSA met all relevant legal
requirements in the promulgation of the directives.
[35] 49 CFR 238.235.
[36] These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act of
2005 and its accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with
$12 million in funding for rail security activities.
[37] GAO-03-263 and GAO-03-843.
[38] Section 3028 of Pub. L. No. 109-59.
[39] APTA is a standards development organization recognized by DOT
that has set standards for commuter rail, mass transit, and bus safety
and operations.
[40] At the time we completed our work, in June 2005, these three
practices were not utilized. However, as discussed later in this
report, some rail operators began using random screening in the
aftermath of the July bomb attacks on the London subway system.
[41] As we have previously reported, since the mid-1990s, federal
funding for transit and commuter rail operators has generally been
limited to assistance with capital projects involving building new
transit service, extensions of existing lines, or rehabilitation of
existing transit infrastructure, such as tracks, rolling stock, or
stations. See GAO-03-263.
[42] Operational enhancements are actions that involve changes to the
way a rail agency's staff operate their rail system on a day-to-day
basis--such as enhancing customer awareness, increasing the number and
visibility of security personnel, training employees, and implementing
selective passenger and baggage screening. Capital improvements include
construction of new facilities or rehabilitation of old facilities such
as stations, train yards, tracks, and so on, or purchase of new
equipment to enhance existing capabilities.
[43] Actions taken by Amtrak to enhance security are discussed later in
this report.
[44] The New Starts program was reauthorized through the enactment of
Pub. L. No. 109-59 on August 10, 2005.
[45] The President's fiscal year 2006 budget proposed eliminating the
federal government's subsidy to Amtrak. According to Amtrak officials,
while the outcome of the budget is unknown at this time, severe
cutbacks in Amtrak funding could reduce the amount of personnel Amtrak
has available to perform security functions, while a total elimination
of federal funding for Amtrak could cause a system shutdown.
[46] According to APTA, MBTA has maintained the right to conduct random
searches of passengers. In addition, after the London bombings, the
Metropolitan Area Rapid Transit Authority in Atlanta posted notices on
buses and trains stating that it maintains the right to conduct random
searches.
[47] This research is being conducted through the Transit Cooperative
Research Program, a partnership among these three entities that
undertakes research and other technical activities in response to the
needs of transit service providers.
[48] GAO-03-843.
[49] See GAO-03-843.
[50] Unlike domestic rail transit agencies, Amtrak maintains a 342-
member police force for its national network.
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