Next Generation Air Transportation System
Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System
Gao ID: GAO-07-25 November 13, 2006
In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to plan for and coordinate, with federal and nonfederal stakeholders, a transformation from the current air traffic control system to the "next generation air transportation system" (NGATS) by 2025. Housed within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), JPDO has seven partner agencies: the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. FAA will have primary responsibility for implementing NGATS. This report addresses (1) the status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS, (2) the key challenges facing JPDO, and (3) the key challenges facing FAA as it implements the transformation. To address these issues, GAO reviewed relevant documents, interviewed agency officials and stakeholders, and conducted an expert panel.
JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordinating with its partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with its authorizing legislation and with several practices that GAO's previous work has shown can facilitate federal interagency collaboration. JPDO's partner agencies have agreed on a vision for NGATS and on eight strategies that broadly address the goals and objectives of NGATS. JPDO has been developing an enterprise architecture (or blueprint) for NGATS and plans to use the enterprise architecture and stakeholder input from investment analysis workshops to develop a realistic cost estimate for NGATS. JPDO faces challenges in institutionalizing its collaborative effort, addressing planning and expertise gaps, establishing credibility with stakeholders, and harmonizing its work with other countries' efforts to modernize their own air traffic management systems. To date, JPDO has not established some practices significant to institutionalizing its collaborative process, such as formalizing roles and responsibilities. Such practices are important because JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and financial resources needed to continue developing plans and system requirements for NGATS. FAA, as the key implementer of the transition to NGATS, faces challenges both in institutionalizing the management reforms that it has made in recent years that have contributed to its ability to meet its goals for air traffic control system acquisitions and in obtaining the financial and technical resources needed to implement NGATS. FAA also faces challenges in finding ways to reduce costs or realize savings to help fund the costs of transitioning to NGATS while continuing to operate and maintain the current system. Finally, FAA faces challenges in obtaining the technical and contract management expertise needed to define, implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs and systems inherent in the transition to NGATS.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-07-25, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2006:
Next Generation Air Transportation System:
Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the
National Airspace System:
GAO-07-25:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-25, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office
(JPDO) to plan for and coordinate, with federal and nonfederal
stakeholders, a transformation from the current air traffic control
system to the ’next generation air transportation system“ (NGATS) by
2025. Housed within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), JPDO has
seven partner agencies: the Departments of Transportation, Commerce,
Defense, and Homeland Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy. FAA will have primary responsibility for
implementing NGATS. This report addresses (1) the status of JPDO‘s
efforts to plan for NGATS, (2) the key challenges facing JPDO, and (3)
the key challenges facing FAA as it implements the transformation. To
address these issues, GAO reviewed relevant documents, interviewed
agency officials and stakeholders, and conducted an expert panel.
What GAO Found:
JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordinating with its
partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with
its authorizing legislation and with several practices that GAO‘s
previous work has shown can facilitate federal interagency
collaboration. JPDO‘s partner agencies have agreed on a vision for
NGATS and on eight strategies that broadly address the goals and
objectives of NGATS. JPDO has been developing an enterprise
architecture (or blueprint) for NGATS and plans to use the enterprise
architecture and stakeholder input from investment analysis workshops
to develop a realistic cost estimate for NGATS.
JPDO faces challenges in institutionalizing its collaborative effort,
addressing planning and expertise gaps, establishing credibility with
stakeholders, and harmonizing its work with other countries‘ efforts to
modernize their own air traffic management systems. To date, JPDO has
not established some practices significant to institutionalizing its
collaborative process, such as formalizing roles and responsibilities.
Such practices are important because JPDO is fundamentally a planning
and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and
financial resources needed to continue developing plans and system
requirements for NGATS.
FAA, as the key implementer of the transition to NGATS, faces
challenges both in institutionalizing the management reforms that it
has made in recent years that have contributed to its ability to meet
its goals for air traffic control system acquisitions and in obtaining
the financial and technical resources needed to implement NGATS. FAA
also faces challenges in finding ways to reduce costs or realize
savings to help fund the costs of transitioning to NGATS while
continuing to operate and maintain the current system. Finally, FAA
faces challenges in obtaining the technical and contract management
expertise needed to define, implement, and integrate the numerous
complex programs and systems inherent in the transition to NGATS.
Figure: Seven Partner Agencies Form the Joint Planning and Development
Office:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that JPDO institutionalize its practices for interagency
collaboration and assess stakeholder involvement, and that FAA assess
its needs for technical expertise. JPDO and FAA commented that they
plan to consider GAO‘s recommendations. NASA highlighted the impact of
its refocused aeronautics research. GAO incorporated the other
agencies‘ technical comments as appropriate.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-25].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham,
Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS:
JPDO Faces Institutionalization, Planning, Commitment, and
Interoperability Challenges as It Moves Forward with NGATS:
FAA Faces Several Challenges to Its Ability to Successfully Implement
NGATS:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Results of Expert Panel Voting:
Session Two: Identifying JPDO's Achievements and Challenges:
Session Three: Strategies for Addressing JPDO's Challenges:
Session Four: Global Harmonization and Cooperation:
Appendix III: SESAR: The European Air Traffic Modernization Initiative:
Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: JPDO's Strategies and Related IPT Lead Agency:
Table 2: Names and Affiliations of Expert Panelists:
Table 3: Expert Panel Votes on Top Achievements of JPDO:
Table 4: Expert Panel Votes on Top Challenges Facing JPDO:
Table 5: Short-term Strategies for JPDO:
Table 6: Midterm Strategies for JPDO:
Table 7: Long-term Strategies for JPDO:
Table 8: Importance of JPDO Involvement in Harmonization Efforts:
Table 9: Level of Coordination between Europe and the United States:
Table 10: Preparation for Success:
Figures:
Figure 1: Organization of JPDO:
Figure 2: REDAC's Funding Estimates for FAA under Status Quo and NGATS
Scenarios, 2006-2025:
Abbreviations:
ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast:
ATC: air traffic control:
ATO: Air Traffic Organization:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOC: Department of Commerce:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization:
IPT: integrated product team:
JPDO: Joint Planning and Development Office:
LSI: lead systems integrator:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NATCA: National Air Traffic Controllers Association:
NGATS: Next Generation Air Transportation System:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
OSTP: White House Office of Science and Technology Policy:
REDAC: Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee:
SESAR: Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research Programme:
SWIM: System Wide Information Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 13, 2006:
The Honorable Sherwood Boehlert:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bart Gordon:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Science:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ken Calvert:
Chairman:
The Honorable Mark Udall:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics:
Committee on Science:
House of Representatives:
While the health of the nation's air transportation system is critical
to the economy, the current approach to managing air transportation is
becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally obsolete. In 2003,
Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO) to plan for and coordinate a transition from the nation's
current air traffic control system to the "next generation air
transportation system" (NGATS)--a system intended to safely accommodate
a possible tripling of air traffic by 2025. NGATS is envisioned as a
major redesign of the air transportation system that will entail
precision satellite navigation; digital, networked communications; an
integrated weather system; layered, adaptive security; and more. Vision
100,[Footnote 1] the legislation that authorized JPDO, requires the
office to operate in conjunction with multiple government agencies,
including the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and
Homeland Security; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Although JPDO is
responsible for planning the transformation to NGATS and coordinating
the related efforts of its partner agencies, FAA will be largely
responsible for implementing the policies and systems necessary for
NGATS, while safely operating the current air traffic control system 24
hours a day, 7 days a week.
In light of the difficulty and importance of the tasks before JPDO and
FAA, you asked us to review the efforts to organize and plan for NGATS.
Accordingly, we addressed the following questions: (1) What is the
status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS? (2) What key challenges
does JPDO face in moving forward with its planning efforts? (3) What
key challenges does FAA face as it moves toward implementing NGATS?
To address the status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS and the
challenges that the office faces, we reviewed documents provided by
JPDO and its partner agencies, including JPDO's December 2004
Integrated Plan, its 2005 Progress Report, and July 2006 draft Concept
of Operations. We interviewed agency officials and stakeholders and
convened a panel of experts to gather information and perspectives
about the efforts of JPDO. We assessed the status and challenges of
JPDO's framework for facilitating coordination among its partner
agencies by comparing JPDO's efforts to date against selected key
practices that we have reported can enhance and sustain federal
collaborative efforts.[Footnote 2] We selected five of eight practices
as criteria for this review because they are significant to building
the framework needed for any collaboration and are particularly
important to JPDO at this early juncture in its collaborative efforts.
The key practices used for this assessment include defining and
articulating a common outcome, establishing mutually reinforcing or
joint strategies, identifying and addressing needs by leveraging
resources, agreeing on roles and responsibilities, and reinforcing
agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans
and reports.[Footnote 3] We assessed JPDO's efforts to obtain the
participation of nonfederal stakeholders by obtaining the perspectives
of nonfederal stakeholders involved with JPDO and drawing on our body
of work on stakeholder involvement. We assessed JPDO's technical
planning efforts for NGATS by comparing JPDO's practices with those
that we have found to be effective in developing enterprise
architectures.[Footnote 4] One of our senior-level technologists also
reviewed JPDO's draft Concept of Operations. We also obtained
information on an estimate of FAA's future costs under NGATS but did
not review in detail the methodology or assumptions used to develop
this estimate. To understand JPDO's and FAA's efforts to date on global
harmonization, we met with European officials and reviewed documents
related to Europe's concurrent air transportation modernization effort,
known as the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research
Programme (SESAR). To determine the challenges that FAA faces in
implementing NGATS, we met with agency officials, reviewed
documentation related to FAA's modernization efforts, and drew upon our
prior work examining FAA's program to modernize the National Airspace
System. We conducted our work between July 2005 and September 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See
appendix I for a more detailed explanation of our scope and
methodology. A detailed discussion of the results of our expert panel
is contained in appendix II.
Results in Brief:
JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordination with its
partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with
the requirements of Vision 100 and with several practices that our
previous work has shown can facilitate federal interagency
collaboration and enterprise architecture development. JPDO and its
partner agencies have developed an Integrated Plan and reported on the
progress of that plan as called for in Vision 100. In working to
develop the Integrated Plan, the partner agencies agreed on a vision
for NGATS and on eight strategies that broadly address the goals and
objectives of NGATS--actions consistent with effective collaborative
practices that we have identified. JPDO has also established an
organizational structure that involves federal and nonfederal
stakeholders throughout the organization. To leverage human resources,
JPDO has staffed the various levels of its organization with partner
agency employees, many of whom work part time for JPDO. To leverage
technological resources, JPDO has sought to coordinate NGATS-related
programs across the partner agencies. JPDO identified early
opportunities that could be pursued during fiscal year 2007 to minimize
the duplication of research programs across agencies and to produce
tangible results for NGATS. JPDO has been developing an enterprise
architecture (or blueprint)--one of the most critical planning
documents in the NGATS effort--and has taken several steps consistent
with effective practices that we have identified for enterprise
architecture development. JPDO expects the enterprise architecture to
provide more clarity regarding its expectations for NGATS, thereby
facilitating coordination among the partner agencies and private sector
manufacturers, alignment of relevant research and development
activities, and integration of equipment. The enterprise architecture
is also critical to the development of realistic cost estimates for
NGATS. Without such realistic cost estimates, Congress is handicapped
in its planning for the funding needs of NGATS. To this end, JPDO has
also begun working with its stakeholders to develop initial cost
information through a series of investment analysis workshops. Finally,
JPDO recognizes the importance of global harmonization of air
transportation technologies and systems and has begun work to ensure
that the NGATS effort is harmonized with the European SESAR effort and
with the efforts of other regions.
JPDO faces challenges in institutionalizing its collaborative effort,
addressing planning and expertise gaps, establishing credibility with
stakeholders, and harmonizing its work with other countries' efforts to
modernize their own air traffic management systems. JPDO is
fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks authority
over the key human and technological resources needed to continue
developing plans and system requirements for NGATS. To date, JPDO has
not established some practices significant to institutionalizing the
collaborative process. For example, JPDO does not have formal, long-
term agreements among the partner agencies on their roles and
responsibilities in creating NGATS. JPDO has been working to establish
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with its partner agencies since at
least August 2005, but the MOU had not been signed as of September
2006. JPDO also currently lacks explicit policies and procedures for
decision making and dispute resolution and has not yet completed
mechanisms for leveraging partner agency resources. To its credit, JPDO
has been working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
develop a means to consider NGATS-related funding, dispersed across
JPDO's partner agency budget requests, as a unified federal program.
Nonetheless, given JPDO's limited authority, the office could face
challenges in sustaining the lengthy and elaborate federal
collaborative effort set forth by Vision 100 without full development
of procedures and mechanisms for dispute resolution and leveraging of
resources. JPDO also faces challenges with some planning and expertise
gaps. For example, NASA is moving toward a focus on fundamental
research and away from demonstration projects. Many experts told us
that this creates a gap in technology development. This raises the
question of what entity will do the developmental work that will be
important to NGATS. According to JPDO officials, they are conducting a
gap analysis on the impact of NASA's actions on NGATS planning. Also
important to NGATS is the involvement of all key stakeholders in the
planning process, yet some stakeholders, such as active air traffic
controllers, are not currently involved with JPDO. Our work on past air
traffic control modernization projects has shown that a lack of
stakeholder involvement early and throughout a project has been a key
factor that leads to cost increases and delays. As noted by our expert
panel, JPDO also faces challenges in establishing credibility among
stakeholders. For example, some members of our expert panel told us
that, although JPDO has produced much activity, they did not feel the
effort had demonstrated sufficient progress; some stakeholders told us
that both the 2004 Integrated Plan and the 2005 Progress Report lacked
sufficient detail, such as definition of research needs. Finally, JPDO
faces challenges in achieving global harmonization for NGATS. While FAA
and the European Commission recently signed an MOU to ensure
cooperation between the aviation modernization programs in the United
States and Europe, much work remains in carrying out that agreement and
in addressing harmonization throughout other regions of the world.
FAA, as the key implementer of the transition to NGATS, faces
challenges both in institutionalizing the management reforms that it
has made in recent years, which have contributed to its ability to meet
its goals for ATC acquisitions, and in obtaining the financial and
technical resources needed to implement NGATS. Since 1995, we have
designated FAA's air traffic control modernization program as high risk
because of systemic management and acquisition problems. FAA has
recently taken a number of actions aimed at improving its management
practices, including a focus on implementing more businesslike
management and acquisition processes. FAA has also taken steps to
institutionalize these improvements by ensuring that the reforms are
fully integrated into the agency's structure and processes at all
levels and have become part of its organizational culture. However,
transforming organizational cultures requires substantial management
attention, as it can take several years for such initiatives to be
fully implemented and cultures transformed in a sustainable manner. FAA
also faces challenges in finding ways to reduce costs or realize
savings to help fund the costs of transitioning to NGATS while
continuing to operate and maintain the current system. FAA is working
to reduce costs by streamlining its operations and could realize
savings in operating costs from the implementation of some NGATS
technologies. Finally, FAA faces challenges in obtaining the expertise
needed to implement a system as complex as NGATS. Recognizing the
complexity of the NGATS implementation effort and the possibility that
FAA may not have the in-house expertise to manage it without
assistance, we have identified potential approaches for supplementing
FAA's capabilities. Approaches include contracting with a lead systems
integrator or obtaining technical advice from a federally funded
research and development corporation. FAA has not yet formally explored
its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and
contract management expertise that will be required of it to define,
implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs and systems
inherent in the transition to NGATS.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct JPDO to
take actions to institutionalize the partner agencies' collaboration in
supporting NGATS, including action on an MOU among the partner
agencies, actions to finalize procedures to leverage partner agency
resources, and actions to develop procedures for dispute resolution. We
are also recommending that the Secretary direct JPDO to determine
whether key stakeholders and expertise are not currently represented in
JPDO planning efforts. Finally, we are recommending that the Secretary
direct FAA to undertake a formal exploration of the technical expertise
and contract management expertise that will be required by FAA to
implement NGATS.
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation; FAA; JPDO; NASA; and
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy for their
review and comment. NASA's written comments are included as appendix
IV. NASA agreed with the majority of the report's content, but
highlighted specific points about (1) the impact of its recent emphasis
on fundamental aeronautics, (2) NASA's role in developing NGATS, and
(3) NASA's fiscal year 2007 request for aeronautics research funding.
Transportation, FAA, JPDO, Homeland Security, and the Office of Science
and Technology Policy provided technical clarifications and additional
information, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate. FAA
and JPDO neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations, but
said they would consider them. Commerce and Defense had no comments on
the draft report.
Background:
JPDO began operating in early 2004 and is housed within FAA. JPDO's
Director reports to the FAA Administrator and to the FAA Chief
Operating Officer (head of FAA's Air Traffic Organization [ATO]). The
scope of JPDO's effort is broader than that of traditional air traffic
control modernization in that it is "airport curb to airport curb,"
encompassing such issues as security screening and environmental
concerns. Additionally, JPDO's approach will require unprecedented
collaboration and consensus among many stakeholders--federal and
nonfederal--about necessary system capabilities, equipment, procedures,
and regulations. JPDO has identified roles for each of its partner
agencies in the transformation to NGATS. For example, the Department of
Defense has deployed "network centric" systems,[Footnote 5] originally
developed for the battlefield, that are being considered as a
conceptual framework to provide all users of the National Airspace
System--FAA and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security--with
a common view of that system.
Since its inception, JPDO has focused on establishing an organizational
framework to carry out the interagency planning mandate contained in
Vision 100, while ensuring participation of nonfederal stakeholders and
the general public. JPDO has also reviewed the research projects of its
partner agencies to identify work that aligns with NGATS' needs and has
issued budget guidance to these agencies to highlight the areas where
each agency could contribute to implementing NGATS. JPDO currently has
several key NGATS planning documents in various stages of development.
JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS:
Many of JPDO's actions are consistent with practices that our work has
shown facilitate interagency collaboration--a key factor in the future
success of NGATS. JPDO is also developing an enterprise architecture--
a key document for NGATS planning--using a phased approach that is
similar to a process we have advocated for FAA's major systems
acquisition programs and anticipates having a first draft in by the end
of 2006. Although a preliminary estimate exists of FAA's costs to
implement NGATS, further work is needed to develop a comprehensive
understanding of NGATS costs.
As Required by Vision 100, JPDO Developed an Integrated Plan and
Reported on the Progress of That Plan:
Vision 100 calls for JPDO to develop an integrated plan for NGATS and
provide annual updates on the progress of that plan. JPDO, with its
partner agencies, developed an NGATS Integrated Plan and submitted it
to Congress on December 12, 2004. The plan includes a vision statement
for a system capable of handling a threefold increase in demand for air
transportation by 2025. The vision entails providing services tailored
to individual customer needs, allowing all communities to participate
in the global economy, and seamlessly integrating civil and military
operations. The partner agencies also agreed on eight strategies that
broadly address the goals and objectives for NGATS. In March 2006, JPDO
published its first report to Congress on the progress made in carrying
out the NGATS Integrated Plan.
In addition to complying with Vision 100's mandate, developing an
integrated plan is consistent with effective collaborative practices we
have identified.[Footnote 6] According to our research on federal
interagency collaborations, agencies must have a clear and compelling
rationale for working together to overcome significant differences in
their missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business.
JPDO's partner agencies have a diverse set of missions, ranging from
national defense to the promotion of commerce. Yet each has some
involvement in the air transportation system and can make a
contribution to NGATS. In working together to develop JPDO's Integrated
Plan, the partner agencies agreed on a vision statement to transform
the air transportation system and on broad statements of future system
goals, performance characteristics, and operational concepts.
JPDO Developed an Organization for Involving Federal and Nonfederal
Stakeholders:
Vision 100 includes requirements for JPDO to coordinate and consult
with its partner agencies, private sector experts, and the public.
JPDO's approach has been to establish an organizational structure that
involves federal and nonfederal stakeholders throughout the
organization. This structure includes a federal interagency senior
policy committee, an institute for nonfederal stakeholders, and eight
integrated product teams (IPT) that bring together federal and
nonfederal experts to plan for and coordinate the development of
technologies that will address JPDO's eight broad strategies.
JPDO's senior policy committee is headed by the Secretary of
Transportation (as required in Vision 100) and includes senior-level
officials from JPDO's partner agencies. It has met three times since
its inception. The NGATS Institute (the Institute) was created by an
agreement between the National Center for Advanced
Technologies[Footnote 7] and FAA to incorporate the expertise and views
of stakeholders from private industry, state and local governments, and
academia. The NGATS Institute Management Council, composed of top
officials and representatives from the aviation community, oversees the
policy, recommendations, and products of the Institute and provides a
means for advancing consensus positions on critical NGATS issues. To
meet Vision 100's requirement that JPDO coordinate and consult with the
public, the Institute held its first public meeting in March 2006. The
IPTs are headed by representatives of JPDO's partner agencies and
include more than 200 nonfederal stakeholders from over 100
organizations, whose participation was arranged through the Institute.
Figure 1 illustrates JPDO's position within FAA and the JPDO structures
that bring together federal and nonfederal stakeholders, including the
Institute and the IPTs.
Figure 1: Organization of JPDO:
[See PDF for image]
Source: JPDO.
Note: Department of Commerce = DOC; Department of Defense = DOD;
Department of Homeland Security = DHS.
[End of figure]
JPDO's organizational structure incorporates some of the practices that
we have found to be effective for federal interagency collaborations.
For example, our work has shown that mutually reinforcing or joint
strategies can help align partner agencies' activities, core processes,
and resources to accomplish a common outcome. Each of the eight IPTs is
aligned with one of the eight strategies outlined in JPDO's Integrated
Plan, and each is headed by a partner agency that has taken the lead on
a specific strategy (see table 1). Our research has also found that
collaborating agencies should identify the resources needed to initiate
or sustain their collaborative effort. To leverage human resources,
JPDO has staffed the various levels of its organization--including
JPDO's board, the IPTs, and technical divisions--with partner agency
employees, many of whom work part time for JPDO. Finally, our work has
shown that involving stakeholders can, among other things, increase
their support for a collaborative effort. The Institute provides a
method for involving nonfederal stakeholders, including the public, in
planning NGATS.
Table 1: JPDO's Strategies and Related IPT Lead Agencies:
Strategy: Develop airport infrastructure to meet future demand;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation Administration.
Strategy: Establish an effective security system without limiting
mobility or civil liberties;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Strategy: Establish an agile air traffic system that quickly responds
to shifts in demand;
Related IPT Lead Agency: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration[A].
Strategy: Establish shared situational awareness--where all users share
the same information;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Department of Defense.
Strategy: Establish a comprehensive and proactive approach to safety;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation Administration.
Strategy: Develop environmental protection that allows sustained
aviation growth;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation Administration.
Strategy: Develop a systemwide capability to reduce weather impacts;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Department of Commerce.
Strategy: Harmonize equipage and operations globally;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation Administration.
Sources: GAO and JPDO.
[A] NASA leads this IPT because it has primary responsibility for
conducting the necessary research; implementation of the agile air
traffic system is the responsibility of FAA.
[End of table]
JPDO Has Begun to Leverage the Resources of Its Partner Agencies:
Vision 100 requires JPDO to coordinate NGATS-related programs across
the partner agencies. To address this requirement, JPDO conducted an
initial review of its partner agencies' research and development
programs during July 2005 to identify work that could support NGATS.
Through this process, JPDO identified early opportunities that could be
pursued during fiscal year 2007 to coordinate and minimize the
duplication of research programs across the partner agencies and
produce tangible results for NGATS. For example, one such opportunity
involves aligning aviation weather research across FAA, NASA, and the
Departments of Commerce and Defense, developing a common weather
capability, and integrating weather information into NGATS decision
systems. In addition, FAA's Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B)[Footnote 8] and System Wide Information Management
(SWIM)[Footnote 9] programs were identified as opportunities to receive
accelerated funding to begin producing tangible results for NGATS.
JPDO's efforts to leverage its partner agencies' resources for NGATS
demonstrates another practice important to sustaining collaborations.
Our work on collaborations has found that collaborating agencies, by
assessing their relative strengths and limitations, can identify
opportunities for leveraging each others' resources and thus obtain
benefits that would not be available if they were working separately.
JPDO's first interagency review of its partner agencies' research and
development programs was a step toward leveraging technological
resources for NGATS.
Consistent with Vision 100, JPDO Is Developing an Enterprise
Architecture:
Vision 100 requires JPDO to create "a multiagency research and
development roadmap" for the transition to NGATS. To comply with this
requirement, JPDO has been developing an enterprise architecture--one
of the most critical planning documents in the NGATS effort. An
enterprise architecture is akin to blueprints for a building. It is
meant to provide a common tool for planning and understanding the
complex, interrelated systems that will make up NGATS. JPDO intends for
the enterprise architecture to describe FAA's operation of the current
National Airspace System, JPDO's plans for NGATS, and the sequence of
steps needed for the transformation to NGATS. JPDO expects the
enterprise architecture to provide more clarity regarding its
expectations for NGATS, thereby facilitating coordination among the
partner agencies and private sector manufacturers, the alignment of
relevant research and development activities, and the integration of
equipment. Many of JPDO's future activities will depend on the
robustness and timeliness of this architecture development.
JPDO has taken several important steps to work toward the development
of a mature enterprise architecture.[Footnote 10] For example, JPDO has
drafted a Concept of Operations--a higher-level document that describes
how NGATS will operate in 2025.[Footnote 11] JPDO has used this
document to identify key research and policy issues for NGATS, such as
those associated with automating the air traffic control (ATC) system,
including the need for a backup plan in case automation fails, the
responsibilities and liabilities of different stakeholders during an
automation failure, and the level of monitoring needed by pilots when
automation is ensuring safe separation between aircraft. JPDO officials
are currently incorporating stakeholders' comments into the Concept of
Operations.
Another step that JPDO has taken to develop the enterprise architecture
is to form an Enterprise Architecture and Engineering Division. JPDO
has established and filled a chief architect position and established
an NGATS Architecture Council composed of representatives from each
partner agency's chief architect office. This type of organizational
structure is consistent with effective practices that we have
identified in enterprise architecture development. Similarly, JPDO has
established an Evaluation and Analysis Division that is assembling a
suite of models to help JPDO refine its plans for NGATS and iteratively
narrow the range of potential solutions. For example, the division has
used modeling to begin studying how possible changes in the duties of
some key personnel could affect the workload and performance of others.
To develop and refine the enterprise architecture for NGATS, JPDO plans
to follow a phased, "build a little, test a little" approach. This
approach is similar to a process we have advocated for FAA's major
system acquisition programs. While JPDO expects the first draft of its
enterprise architecture to be issued by the end of this calendar year,
officials anticipate that it will be further refined based on
stakeholder comments. This phased approach will also allow JPDO to
incorporate evolving market forces and technologies into its
architecture and thus better manage change.
The Existing Cost Estimate for NGATS Is Incomplete:
Understanding the costs involved in the transition to NGATS is critical
to the NGATS planning effort, yet no comprehensive estimation of these
costs has been developed. This cost information is particularly
important to Congress, which will have the authority to make NGATS
funding decisions. To begin estimating NGATS costs, JPDO is holding a
series of investment analysis workshops with stakeholders.
Representatives from commercial and business aviation, equipment
manufacturers, and ATC systems developers attended the first workshop,
held in April 2006. The second workshop, held in August 2006, was for
those involved with general aviation and public safety operations. JPDO
plans to invite representatives from airports and regional, state, and
local planning bodies to the third workshop. According to JPDO,
participants in these workshops are asked to discuss and comment on the
appropriateness of JPDO's current assumptions about factors that drive
private sector costs.
Although JPDO expects that these workshops will provide information to
be used in developing a range of potential costs for NGATS, an
enterprise architecture is needed to further define and better
understand how a number of factors will drive NGATS costs. One of these
drivers is the decision about which technologies to include in NGATS.
Some of these technologies are more complex and thus more expensive to
implement than others. A second driver is the sequence for replacing
current technologies with NGATS technologies. A third driver is the
length of time required for the transformation to NGATS, since,
according to JPDO, a longer period would impose higher costs. JPDO's
first draft of its enterprise architecture could reduce some of these
variables, thereby allowing improved estimates of NGATS' costs.
While JPDO is beginning to explore the issue of cost estimates for
NGATS, an advisory committee to FAA--the Research, Engineering and
Development Advisory Committee (REDAC)--has developed a limited,
preliminary cost estimate, which officials have emphasized is not yet
endorsed by any agency.[Footnote 12] REDAC estimated that FAA's budget
under an NGATS scenario would average about $15 billion per year
through 2025, or about $1 billion more annually (in today's dollars)
than FAA's fiscal year 2006 appropriation. REDAC estimated that the
cost for a status quo scenario (i.e., no NGATS) would also be about $15
billion per year through 2025.[Footnote 13] These estimates came out
roughly equal, on average, because future FAA spending would be higher
under NGATS than the status quo scenario in the early years but lower
than under the status quo toward 2025 (see fig. 2). This relationship
is due primarily to the expectation that, under the NGATS scenario,
capital expenditures would be higher than under the status quo scenario
in the near term, but operations costs would be lower because of
productivity improvements in the longer term. Moreover, the NGATS cost
estimate assumes that capital costs decrease sharply toward 2025.
Officials who developed this estimate explained that the estimate
treats NGATS as an isolated event. In reality, these officials
acknowledge that planning for the subsequent "next generation" system
will likely be under way as 2025 approaches, and the actual
modernization costs could, therefore, be higher in this time frame than
the estimate indicates.
Figure 2: REDAC's Funding Estimates for FAA under Status Quo and NGATS
Scenarios, 2006-2025:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO and REDAC.
Note: Estimated costs shown in constant 2005 dollars.
[End of figure]
In addition, this estimate should be viewed within the context of a
number of factors. First, REDAC does not believe that maintaining the
status quo is a viable option because it would provide insufficient
capacity to meet projected future demand. REDAC stated that it
presented the status quo option "for analytical purposes only since the
current approach to air traffic control and management in use in the
United States cannot be scaled up to handle the projected growth in
traffic." In fact, JPDO has estimated the annual economic cost of not
meeting future demand; by 2020, JPDO estimates this cost at $40 billion
per year. Second, the REDAC estimate does not include the costs of the
intermediate technology development work, performed to date by NASA. As
discussed later in this report, it is currently unclear which entities
will perform this work.
Last, and most important, this estimate was developed before JPDO
completed important planning documents and does not include estimates
of the other partner agencies' costs of implementing NGATS. An early
version of JPDO's Concept of Operations for NGATS was released for
stakeholder comment only this past July, and the initial draft of the
enterprise architecture has yet to be released. Both of these documents
will have to be synchronized with JPDO's Operational Improvement
Roadmaps, which will describe the timing of the implementation of
various NGATS systems. The draft Concept of Operations states that
several topics, including safety management and regulation, will be
addressed in later iterations of the document. Similarly, JPDO plans to
first release a version of the enterprise architecture that addresses
only the "block to block"--that is, the air traffic management--aspects
of NGATS. A "curb to curb" enterprise architecture, which would include
security, is not expected until around the middle of 2007. Thus,
REDAC's estimate does not include the other partner agencies' costs to
implement NGATS, such as those that the Department of Homeland Security
might incur to develop and implement new security technologies. In
addition to including partner agency costs in the estimate, other
costs, such as those for training of personnel in new technologies,
must be further explored.
JPDO Recognizes the Importance of Global Harmonization and Has Begun
Harmonization Activities:
Concurrent with JPDO's efforts, the European Commission is conducting a
project, known as SESAR, to harmonize and modernize the European air
traffic management system. The project is overseen by the European
Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol).
Eurocontrol has contracted out the work of SESAR to a 30-member
consortium of airlines, air navigation service providers, airports,
manufacturers, and others. See appendix III for a more detailed
description of SESAR.
American and European aviation officials have recognized the importance
of harmonization--that is, of adopting equivalent performance standards
and technologies that will make their equipment interoperable. Vision
100 calls for NGATS to enable seamless global operations, and JPDO
officials have acknowledged that different and incompatible standards
and technologies, if implemented, could have a major adverse impact on
airlines that serve international markets. In working toward
harmonization, personnel exchanges between Europe and the United States
have begun, and FAA is a member of a group that advises the industry
consortium that manages SESAR under a preexisting MOU between
Eurocontrol and FAA. In addition, FAA and the European Commission
signed another MOU in July 2006 to establish a framework for ensuring
cooperation in working toward a more common global air traffic
management system.
JPDO Faces Institutionalization, Planning, Commitment, and
Interoperability Challenges as It Moves Forward with NGATS:
JPDO faces a challenge in institutionalizing the interagency
collaborative process with its partner agencies. Some planning and
expertise gaps exist, including technology development, human factors
research, and the participation of key stakeholders. JPDO faces
challenges in convincing stakeholders of the credibility of its effort
and of the government's commitment to the NGATS effort. JPDO also faces
challenges related to harmonizing NGATS with modernization efforts
taking place in other countries.
Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Poses a Challenge for
JPDO:
Although JPDO's legislation, Integrated Plan, and established
governance structure provide the framework for collaborating among
multiple federal agencies, JPDO is fundamentally a planning and
coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and
technological resources needed to continue developing plans and system
requirements for NGATS. Consequently, institutionalizing the
collaborative process with its partner agencies will be critical to
JPDO's ability to leverage the necessary funding for developing NGATS.
Institutionalizing the collaborative process means that, as
administrations and staffing within JPDO change over the years, those
coming into JPDO will have a clear understanding of what is expected of
them and of the time and resource commitments entailed.
To date, JPDO has not established practices significant to
institutionalizing the collaborative process. For example, our work on
effective collaboration practices has shown that collaborating agencies
should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and
responsibilities. At a fundamental level, JPDO does not have formal,
long-term agreements among the partner agencies on their roles and
responsibilities in creating NGATS. Additionally, some stakeholders
with whom we spoke noted that several IPTs are still struggling to
define their roles and responsibilities in developing NGATS. Presently,
there is no mechanism that assures that the partner agencies'
commitment will continue over the 20-year time frame of NGATS or that
ensures accountability to JPDO. According to JPDO officials, they are
working to establish an MOU, signed by the Secretary or other high-
ranking official from each partner agency, which will broadly define
the partner agencies' roles and responsibilities. However, JPDO first
informed us of the development of the MOU in August 2005 and, as of
September 2006, the MOU had not been finalized.
Defining roles and responsibilities is particularly important between
JPDO and FAA's ATO, since both organizations have responsibilities
related to planning national airspace system modernization. ATO has
primary responsibility for the ATC system's current and near-term
modernization, while JPDO has responsibility for planning and
coordinating a transformation to NGATS over the next 20 years. Some
stakeholders have expressed concern that the relationship between
JPDO's and ATO's efforts is not clear. Some of our expert panelists
felt that a "gap" plan should be developed to identify areas that might
fall between ATO's efforts to maintain the current system and JPDO's
plans for the future. According to JPDO and ATO officials, the roles
and responsibilities of each office are currently being worked
out.[Footnote 14] ATO now plans to expand its Operational Evolution
Plan--to be renamed the Operational Evolution Partnership--so that it
applies FAA-wide and represents FAA's piece of JPDO's overall NGATS
plan.[Footnote 15] In essence, ATO intends for the Operational
Evolution Partnership to become FAA's implementation plan for NGATS.
Without continued focus on clarifying and institutionalizing the
relationship between ATO and JPDO, it is more difficult to ensure
continued progress toward NGATS, particularly with the FAA
Administrator's and ATO Chief Operating Officer's terms ending within
the next 2 years.
In addition to not having clearly defined the roles and
responsibilities of the various federal and nonfederal participants,
JPDO also currently lacks explicit policies and procedures for decision
making and dispute resolution. Our collaboration work shows that in
defining and agreeing on roles and responsibilities, the collaborating
agencies should also establish how the collaborative effort will be
led; this establishment of leadership facilitates decision making for
the collaboration. According to JPDO officials, the senior policy
committee makes decisions through consensus of the members. If there
are any issues that the committee cannot resolve among themselves, JPDO
officials said that they would expect that the Secretary of
Transportation would elevate those issues to the appropriate White
House-level policy council, such as the Domestic Policy Council.
However, without documented policies or procedures on the decision
making and dispute resolution processes for the senior policy committee
and the JPDO board, there is no clear understanding of the process and
no institutionalized approach to carry forward as members of the senior
policy committee and board change over time.
Another mechanism for institutionalizing the collaborative process is
to use the agencies' strategic and annual performance plans as tools to
establish complementary goals and strategies for achieving results.
Based on our assessment of the partner agencies' strategic plans, we
found that only the Department of Transportation, NASA, and FAA have
incorporated NGATS goals into their strategic plans. Thus, more
opportunities may exist for integrating NGATS goals into the partner
agencies' plans and budgets. One example of such integration is NASA's
current reauthorization act, which requires the agency to align its
aviation research projects to directly support NGATS goals. NASA has
now focused one of its research programs specifically on the needs of
NGATS and JPDO.
Finally, JPDO has not completed mechanisms for leveraging partner
agency resources--an important practice for sustaining collaborations
and an issue that JPDO officials view as one of their greatest
challenges. JPDO has been working with OMB to develop a process for
identifying "NGATS-related projects" across the various agencies. This
process would allow OMB to consider NGATS-related projects as a unified
program going forward and to make funding decisions accordingly.
According to JPDO officials, leveraging efforts have worked well so
far, but JPDO's need for resources and expertise will increase with the
development of NGATS. One expert with whom we spoke noted that the real
heavy lifting for JPDO was still ahead because developing a step-by-
step, detailed implementation plan will be much more resource intensive
than the development of the vision for NGATS has been to date. Also,
JPDO could face difficulties in securing needed agency resources if the
priorities of the partner agencies change over time, as all of the JPDO
partner agencies have a variety of missions and priorities in addition
to NGATS. For example, according to the President's proposed fiscal
year 2007 budget and NASA's current plans, space exploration
activities, including research and development, will continue to be the
largest part of NASA's budget in the future. This trend will be driven
by the development of a replacement vehicle for the space shuttle,
manned lunar exploration, and robotic and manned Mars exploration
missions. In contrast, funding for aeronautics research within NASA is
projected to decline through at least fiscal year 2011.
JPDO Faces Challenges in Addressing Planning and Expertise Gaps:
In the early stages of JPDO's efforts, gaps in planning and expertise
have emerged. JPDO may face challenges in addressing these gaps because
of its lack of authority over partner agencies' resources and
expertise.
Technology Development and Technology Transfer:
Our analysis of NASA's aeronautics research budget shows a 30 percent
decline, in constant 2005 dollars, from 2005 to 2011. To its credit,
given the reduced resources available for aeronautics, NASA plans to
address the research and development needs of NGATS. However, NASA is
also moving toward a focus on fundamental aeronautical
research[Footnote 16] and away from demonstration projects.[Footnote
17] Many experts told us that NASA's new focus on fundamental research
creates a gap in the technology development continuum.[Footnote 18] As
we have reported, NASA's current plans might leave technologies too
underdeveloped for easy transfer to industry and raises the question of
what entity will do this developmental work.[Footnote 19] Some believe
that FAA has neither the research and development infrastructure nor
the funding to do this work. According to a draft report by REDAC, FAA
would need at least $100 million annually in increased funding to
perform this research and development work, and establishing the
necessary infrastructure within FAA could delay the implementation of
NGATS by 5 years. According to JPDO officials, they are conducting a
gap analysis on the impact of NASA's actions on NGATS planning. We
believe that such an analysis, as well as finding a solution if needed,
are critically important steps.
Human Factors Research:
Addressing human factors issues is another key challenge for JPDO. For
example, NGATS Concept of Operations envisions an increased reliance on
automation, which raises questions about the role of the air traffic
controller in such an automated system. Similarly, the Concept of
Operations envisions that pilots will take on a greater share of the
responsibility for maintaining safe separation and other tasks
currently performed by controllers. This raises human factors questions
about whether pilots can safely perform these additional duties.
Although JPDO has begun to model how shifts in air traffic controllers'
workloads would affect their performance, it has not yet begun to model
the effect of how this shift in workload to pilots would affect pilot
performance. According to a JPDO official, modeling the effect of
changes in pilot workload has not yet begun because JPDO has not yet
identified a suitable model for incorporation into its suite of
modeling tools. According to JPDO, the change in the roles of pilots
and controllers is the most important human factors issue involved in
creating NGATS but will be difficult to research because data on pilot
behavior are not readily available for use in creating models. In
addition to the study of changing roles, JPDO has not yet studied the
training implications of various systems or solutions proposed for
NGATS. For example, JPDO officials said they will be able to study the
extent to which new air traffic controllers will have to be trained to
operate both the old and the new equipment as the Concept of Operations
and enterprise architecture mature.
Absence of Key Stakeholder Involvement:
Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers, will play
key roles in NGATS but are not currently involved in the NGATS planning
effort. JPDO officials believe that they have sufficient expertise
involved in the NGATS effort at this time because some participants
have prior experience as air traffic controllers. However, one
stakeholder with whom we spoke said that controllers need to be part of
the NGATS effort now because their expertise extends beyond equipment
configuration to issues involving the NGATS vision and Concept of
Operations. Similarly, a member of our expert panel expressed concern
that planning for NGATS would be unsuccessful without controller
participation. The input of current air traffic controllers who have
recent experience controlling aircraft is important in considering
human factors and safety issues because of the controllers' familiarity
with existing operating conditions. Our work on past air traffic
control modernization projects has shown that a lack of stakeholder or
expert involvement early and throughout a project can lead to cost
increases and delays.
The air traffic controllers' labor union, the National Air Traffic
Controllers Association (NATCA), has not participated in NGATS since
June 2005 when FAA terminated a labor liaison program that assigned air
traffic controllers to major system acquisition program offices and to
JPDO. FAA had determined that the benefits of the program were not
great enough to justify its cost. Nonetheless, several stakeholders who
serve on the Institute Management Council and the IPTs said they were
concerned about the lack of air traffic controller involvement with
JPDO. The NGATS Institute Management Council includes a seat for the
union, but a NATCA official told us that the union's head had been
unable to attend the council's meetings. According to JPDO officials,
the council has left a seat open in hopes that the controllers will
participate in NGATS as the new labor-management agreement between
NATCA and FAA is implemented. Additionally, an official with the
Institute noted that the council plans to reach out to the air traffic
controllers in an attempt to obtain their future participation.
Establishing Credibility with Stakeholders That the Government Is Fully
Committed to NGATS Presents a Challenge:
Establishing credibility was viewed by the majority of our expert
panelists as the primary challenge facing JPDO. This view partially
stems from past experiences where the government has stopped some
modernization efforts after industry invested in supporting
technologies. For example, FAA developed a datalink communications
system that transmitted scripted e-mail-like messages between
controllers and pilots. One airline invested in this technology by
equipping some of its aircraft, but because of funding cuts, among
other things, FAA canceled the program. We have also reported that some
aviation stakeholders have expressed concern that FAA may not follow
through with its airspace redesign efforts and are hesitant to invest
in equipment unless they are sure that FAA will remain committed to its
efforts.[Footnote 20] One expert suggested that the government might
mitigate this issue by making an initial investment in a specific
technology before requesting that airlines or other industry
stakeholders purchase equipment.
Stakeholders' belief that the government is fully committed to NGATS
will be important as efforts to implement NGATS technologies move
forward. Achieving many of the benefits of NGATS will require actions
by FAA as well as by users of the system--airlines and general
aviation. For example, JPDO has identified ADS-B as a new air traffic
surveillance system that will be critical to NGATS. ADS-B would replace
many existing radars that track aircraft location and speed with less
costly ground-based transceivers. FAA views ADS-B as a cornerstone
technology for NGATS that will increase NAS capacity, efficiency, and
safety. However, to achieve the full benefits of ADS-B, FAA must
develop policies and regulations and install the ground infrastructure
to support ADS-B, while users of the system must install ADS-B-
compatible equipment on their aircraft.
FAA has developed plans for implementing ADS-B over the next 15 to 20
years. FAA plans to award a contract for acquiring the ground
infrastructure for ADS-B in July 2007 and is developing an ADS-B
rulemaking, scheduled for issuance in 2009. FAA's initial deployment
plans focus on areas of the nation that do not have radar surveillance,
such as the Gulf of Mexico. During this initial deployment, FAA plans
to further develop ADS-B interfaces with its existing ATC systems.
According to FAA, the agency is also working with national and
international organizations to ensure that the concerns of the aviation
community are recognized and addressed. FAA plans to deploy ADS-B
nationwide by 2013.
However, full utilization of ADS-B depends not only on government
efforts, but also involves decisions by nonfederal stakeholders about
what equipment to purchase and the timing of such purchases. With ADS-
B for example, an official of RTCA's ADS-B working group noted that the
cost and expected benefits of equipping aircraft to take full advantage
of ADS-B is a key issue for users of the system.[Footnote 21] On the
cost side, the expert said that equipping existing aircraft to
communicate with the ground stations may not be cost prohibitive for
regional and large commercial airlines, but equipping these aircraft to
be able to utilize ADS-B's full capabilities could require cost
prohibitive modifications. Consequently, the expert noted that carriers
plan to install equipment to utilize ADS-B's full capabilities only as
they order new aircraft. He also said that carriers could have full-
capability ADS-B installed on new aircraft that they are ordering now,
except that specifications do not yet exist. Concerning the benefits of
equipping aircraft to fully utilize ADS-B, the expert noted that the
extent of some of these benefits are dependent on FAA decisions that
have not yet been made, such as whether FAA will grant responsibility
to pilots for maintaining safe separation distances and what
technologies will provide a backup system for ADS-B. The expert
believed that some air carriers were hesitant on ADS-B due to concerns
that FAA might not follow through with deployment of full ADS-B
capabilities.
Credibility of JPDO's efforts could also be impacted by perceptions
regarding the progress of NGATS planning efforts. For example, some
members of our expert panel told us that, although JPDO has produced
much activity, they did not feel the effort had demonstrated sufficient
progress. Some stakeholders we spoke with felt the Integrated Plan and
Progress Report have not contained detailed implementation plans or
interim milestones. According to one stakeholder, JPDO's 2005 Progress
Report lacked information related to the evolution of an implementation
plan, definition of research needs, and some discussion of relative
costs and funding for NGATS, or a definitive plan to produce these
vital pieces of information. While JPDO officials recognize that some
stakeholders have been critical of JPDO's progress to date, these
officials believe that given JPDO's mission--to involve partner
agencies and nonfederal stakeholders--progress will happen at a more
measured pace.
Our own technical expert in enterprise architecture examined JPDO's
draft Concept of Operations and determined that it does not yet include
key elements such as scenarios illustrating NGATS operations; a summary
of NGATS' operational impact on users and other stakeholders; and an
analysis of the benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs that were
considered for NGATS.[Footnote 22] According to our technical expert,
the draft Concept of Operations lacks an overall description that ties
together the five areas--air navigation service operations, flight
operations, network centric infrastructure services, shared situational
awareness services, and security management services--that the draft
document covers. Our expert believes that the five areas are currently
disjointed and that the document only provides some details for one
area--the air navigation service operations. As noted earlier, JPDO
officials are currently incorporating stakeholder comments into the
draft Concept of Operations and will release another version.
JPDO Recognizes the Importance of Global Harmonization, but Challenges
Remain:
Vision 100 calls for harmonization activities and some progress has
been made in facilitating harmonization, although challenges remain in
creating modernized systems that are globally interoperable. FAA and
the European Commission signed an MOU in July 2006 to ensure
coordination between the aviation modernization programs in Europe and
the United States. According to the MOU, FAA and the European
Commission intend to explore and discuss opportunities for implementing
common or interoperable technologies and synchronizing time lines in
the development of regulations, standards, procedures, research and
development, and other activities to be agreed upon later. The MOU
provides broadly for these activities to be accomplished through
information exchanges, coordination of studies, and participation in
working groups and consultative bodies. JPDO is currently working with
the European Commission to plan regular technical interchange meetings
to conduct peer reviews of NGATS and SESAR developments. Two of these
meetings are tentatively planned for fiscal year 2007, according to
JPDO officials.
JPDO's Global Harmonization IPT (led by FAA) is planning cooperative
activities and has made some progress, although the IPT is still early
in its planning activity. The Global Harmonization IPT, whose mission
is to harmonize equipment and operations globally and to advocate the
adoption of U.S.-preferred transformation concepts, technologies,
procedures, and standards, is led by managers from ATO's Operations
Planning Services International and FAA's Office of International
Aviation. The IPT finalized its charter in March 2006 and is working to
develop an international strategy and outreach plan. As part of this
effort, JPDO and FAA officials have met with officials from various
parts of the world--including Europe, Canada, China, Japan, and Mexico-
-to assess the potential for cooperative NGATS demonstrations. JPDO
officials noted that there are working visits and ongoing negotiations
with China and Japan on MOUs, and ADS-B activities in Australia and
East Africa. Internally, the Global Harmonization IPT also plans to
raise awareness of harmonization issues within the other IPTs as they
consider performance requirements for NGATS.
FAA Faces Several Challenges to Its Ability to Successfully Implement
NGATS:
Institutionalizing ATO's recent improvements in management and
acquisition processes will be critical to the successful implementation
of NGATS. FAA will be challenged to fund operation of the current air
traffic control system while simultaneously funding the implementation
of and transition to NGATS technologies and systems. FAA will also be
challenged to obtain the expertise needed to implement a system as
complex as NGATS.
Institutionalizing Recent Improvements in Management and Acquisition
Processes Will Be Critical to the Successful Implementation of NGATS:
As the primary entity responsible for implementing NGATS, FAA will need
to ensure that the management reforms it has recently instituted
continue. Since 1995, we have designated FAA's ATC modernization
program as high risk because of systemic management and acquisition
problems. Realization of NGATS's goals could be severely compromised if
these problems carry over into FAA's implementation of NGATS, which is
an even more complex and ambitious undertaking than past ATC
modernization efforts.
FAA has recently taken a number of actions aimed at improving its
management practices. FAA hired a Chief Operating Officer in 2003 and
established the performance-based ATO in early 2004 to operate and
modernize the air traffic control system. Since the establishment of
ATO, the Chief Operating Officer has been focusing on implementing more
businesslike management and acquisition processes to address the cost,
schedule, and performance shortfalls that have plagued ATC
modernization over the years. Under the new structure, FAA is a flatter
organization, with fewer management layers, and managers are in closer
contact with the services they deliver. FAA has also taken some steps
to break down the vertical lines of authority, or organizational
stovepipes, that we found hindered communication and coordination
across FAA. To increase accountability, FAA has established a cost
accounting system and made the units that deliver services within each
department responsible for managing their own costs. In addition,
managers are evaluated and rewarded according to how well they hold
their costs within established targets.[Footnote 23]
Finally, FAA is revising its acquisition processes, as we
recommended,[Footnote 24] and is taking steps to improve oversight,
operational efficiency, and cost control. To ensure executive-level
oversight of all key decisions, FAA has revised its Acquisition
Management System to incorporate key decision points in a knowledge-
based product development process. Moreover, as we have
reported,[Footnote 25] an executive council now reviews major
acquisitions before they are sent to FAA's Joint Resources
Council.[Footnote 26] To better manage cost growth, this executive
council also reviews breaches of 5 percent or more in a project's cost,
schedule, or performance. FAA has also issued guidelines for disclosing
the levels of uncertainty and imprecision that are inherent in cost
estimates for major ATC systems and has begun to base funding decisions
for system acquisitions on a system's expected contribution to
controlling operating costs.
To its credit, FAA has taken steps to institutionalize these
improvements--that is, provide for their duration beyond the current
administration at FAA and ATO by ensuring that the reforms are fully
integrated into the agency's structure and processes at all levels and
have become part of its organizational culture. FAA's strategic plan,
titled "Flight Plan 2006-2010," contains a strategy to implement
corporate systems, policies, programs, and tools to build a results-
oriented, high-performance workforce. FAA's Human Capital Plan includes
a goal to create a results-oriented culture and strategies for
implementing performance management and compensation systems that focus
on achieving results.
FAA has also established a performance goal and begun tracking metrics
for acquisitions. The goal for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 was to have
80 percent of its system acquisitions on schedule and within 10 percent
of budget. The goal gradually increases to 90 percent by fiscal year
2008. The increase will make FAA's acquisition performance goal
consistent with targets set in the Department of Transportation's
strategic plan and will comply with the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act of 1994.[Footnote 27] To date, FAA reports that it has
been meeting its performance goal.
Our past work identified FAA's lack of a constructive acquisition
workforce culture as a key factor contributing to problems in its ATC
modernization program. We view FAA's changes as important steps toward
institutionalizing a results-oriented culture. Using a performance
management system to define responsibility and ensure accountability
for change is a key practice that can help agencies transform their
cultures so that they can be more results oriented, customer focused,
and collaborative. However, transforming organizational cultures
requires substantial management attention. The experiences of
successful transformations and change management initiatives in large
public and private organizations suggest that it can take 5 to 7 years
or more until such initiatives are fully implemented, and cultures are
transformed in a sustainable manner.
Finding Resources to Implement NGATS and Operate the ATC System Poses a
Challenge:
The cost of operating and maintaining the current ATC system while
implementing NGATS will be another important challenge in transitioning
to NGATS--a system that, as noted, is broader in scope than the current
ATC system and will require funding for security technologies and
environmental activities, as well as ATC technologies. Finding
opportunities to reduce costs or realize savings could mitigate this
challenge. Implementing the new technologies envisioned in the
operational concept for NGATS could provide opportunities for reducing
costs. For example, NGATS envisions more use of satellites for
surveillance and navigation, which could allow FAA to decommission some
of its ground-based navigational aids, such as compass locators, outer
markers, and nondirectional radio beacons. FAA also is working to
reduce costs by consolidating its administrative activities, currently
decentralized across its nine regions, into three regions, and
anticipates an annual savings of up to $460 million over the next 10
years.
Until FAA has completed its estimates of both NGATS costs and cost
savings that it will be able to achieve between now and 2025, it will
not be able to determine how far these cost savings will go toward
financing NGATS. Nonetheless, one expert has preliminarily estimated
that FAA's current expected savings through infrastructure and
operational efficiencies will be well below the amount needed to
support NGATS capital funding.[Footnote 28] While more information is
needed to estimate the amount of any shortfall with greater confidence,
even the preliminary estimate signals the extent of the resource
challenge.
FAA Faces Challenges in Obtaining the Expertise Needed to Implement a
System as Complex as NGATS:
A lack of expertise contributed to weaknesses in FAA's past management
of ATC modernization projects. Although the personnel flexibilities
that Congress authorized in 1995 allowed FAA to establish criteria for
outstanding performance and match industry pay scales for needed
expertise, industry experts continue to question whether FAA will have
the technical expertise needed to implement NGATS--a task of
unprecedented complexity, according to JPDO, FAA, and other aviation
experts. A panel of experts that we convened in 2004 to discuss FAA's
ATC modernization program noted that a shortfall in technical expertise
was the key technical factor affecting modernization.[Footnote 29] The
panelists said that FAA sometimes lacked the technical proficiency to
"scrub" project proposals early on for potential problems and to
oversee the contractors who implemented its modernization projects.
The need for expertise also extends to the tasks of contract
administration. According to a 2005 study by the Merit Systems
Protection Board,[Footnote 30] at least 50 percent of the government's
contracting officer representatives--the government's technical experts
who are responsible for developing and managing the technical aspects
of contracts--reported needing training in areas such as contract law,
developing requirements, requesting bids, developing bid selection
criteria and price determinations, and monitoring contractor
performance.
Recognizing the complexity of the NGATS implementation effort and the
possibility that FAA may not have the in-house expertise to manage it
without assistance, we have identified potential approaches for
supplementing FAA's capabilities. One of these approaches is for FAA to
contract with a lead systems integrator (LSI). Generally, an LSI is a
prime contractor that would help to ensure that the discrete systems
used in NGATS will operate together and whose responsibilities may
include designing system solutions, developing requirements, and
selecting major system and subsystem contractors. The government has
used LSIs before for programs that require the integration of multiple
complex systems. Our research indicates that, although LSIs have
certain advantages, such as the knowledge, understanding, skills, and
ability to integrate functions across various systems, their use also
entails certain risks. For example, because an LSI may have
significantly more responsibility than a prime contractor usually does,
careful oversight is necessary to ensure that the government's
interests are protected and that conflicts of interest are avoided.
Consequently, selecting, assigning responsibilities to, and managing an
LSI could pose significant challenges for JPDO and FAA.
Another approach that we have identified involves obtaining technical
advice from federally funded research and development corporations to
help the agency oversee and manage prime contractors. These nonprofit
corporations are chartered to provide long-term technical advice to
government agencies in accordance with various statutory and regulatory
rules to ensure independence and prevent conflicts of interest. FAA
officials indicated that they are considering these two approaches to
help address any possible gaps the agency may have in its technical
expertise. However, FAA has not yet formally explored its strengths and
weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract
management expertise that will be required of it to define, implement,
and integrate the numerous complex programs and systems inherent in the
transition to NGATS.
Conclusions:
Transforming the National Airspace System to accommodate what could be
three times the current demand for air transportation services by 2025,
providing appropriate security and environmental safeguards, and doing
these things seamlessly while the current system continues to operate
will be an enormously complex undertaking. As JPDO notes in its
Integrated Plan, there has never been a transformation effort similar
to this one with as many stakeholders and as broad a scope. As JPDO
nears the end of its third year of operation, it has done a significant
amount of work to create an organizational structure that facilitates
the federal interagency collaboration and stakeholder participation
that must occur for the office to be successful in its mission. JPDO
has made significant strides in meeting its planning and coordination
role as set forth by Congress.
However, there are some practices important to institutionalizing the
collaborative process that JPDO has not yet established. These
practices could improve the office's chances for long-term success.
Clearly defining roles and responsibilities of all the parties at all
the organizational levels is fundamental to such a large and complex
collaborative effort. To date, JPDO has established its basic
organizational structure but has not yet refined the roles and
responsibilities within those structures. Particularly important will
be the ability of JPDO and ATO to define their roles and
responsibilities and form a collaborative environment for planning and
implementing the next generation system. Also important to JPDO's
success are establishing mechanisms for dispute resolution, leveraging
resources, and ensuring the involvement of all crucial stakeholders in
the planning for NGATS. While JPDO has incorporated numerous
stakeholders from industry, academia, and state and local governments
into the IPTs, current air traffic controllers represent one important
group of stakeholders who are not participating at this time.
Other areas important to NGATS need to evolve further. JPDO has begun
the process of developing cost estimates with the series of workshops
that it is holding, and these workshops should be very helpful to JPDO
in obtaining crucial stakeholder input on cost issues. However, much
work remains before any type of reliable and comprehensive estimates
for NGATS costs can be expected. Without cost information, Congress is
handicapped in its efforts to plan accordingly for NGATS. It will be
important, as the enterprise architecture takes shape, that JPDO
expedite its efforts to provide Congress with credible cost estimates
that include costs for all of the JPDO partner agencies, as well as
costs related to training, technology development, and demonstration
projects.
Another important area is ensuring global harmonization on systems and
procedures so that international travel and commerce are not harmed by
incompatible modernization efforts. The establishment of JPDO's Global
Harmonization IPT and the recent signing of the MOU between FAA and the
European Commission should begin to address the many issues involved
with harmonization, but it is not yet clear what specifically will be
done to further international cooperation. Finally, as noted, the
complexity of the effort to transform the nation's air transportation
system is staggering. FAA will be challenged to have in place the
technical and contracting expertise needed to manage the transition to
NGATS.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Because of the importance of the successful planning and implementation
of NGATS and the need for effective collaboration between diverse
organizations, we are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation
direct JPDO to take the following five actions:
* To better institutionalize its practices and expectations for
interagency collaboration and stakeholder involvement, JPDO should
finalize and present to the Senior Policy Committee for its
consideration and action the MOU among the partner agencies to define
their roles and responsibilities related to NGATS planning and
development.
* Clarify the roles and responsibilities between JPDO and ATO in the
planning, development, and transition from JPDO to FAA for
implementation of NGATS.
* Develop written procedures that formalize agreements with OMB
regarding the leveraging of partner agency resources and the
identification of NGATS-related programs within agency budgets.
* Develop written procedures for dispute resolution at all levels of
the JPDO organization.
* To better ensure the involvement of all key stakeholders in the NGATS
planning process, determine whether key stakeholders and expertise are
not represented on JPDO's integrated product teams, divisions, or
elsewhere within its organization. For example, JPDO should consider
the addition of active, subject matter expert air traffic controllers
to its integrated product teams.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct FAA to
take the following action:
* Given the technical complexity of the implementation of NGATS and
FAA's past experiences, undertake a formal exploration of FAA's
strengths and weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and
contract management expertise that will be required to define,
implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs and systems
inherent in the transition to NGATS. For example, FAA should work to
determine whether it will need to contract with an LSI, federally-
funded not-for-profit corporation, or other technical or managerial
entity to assist in the implementation of NGATS.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation; FAA; JPDO; NASA; and
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy for their
review and comment. NASA provided written comments, which are reprinted
in appendix IV. Transportation, FAA, JPDO, Homeland Security, and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy provided technical
clarifications and additional information, which we incorporated into
this report as appropriate. FAA and JPDO neither agreed nor disagreed
with our recommendations, but said they would consider them. Commerce
and Defense had no comments on the draft report.
NASA generally agreed with the report's contents, but highlighted three
items that the agency felt were important. First, NASA believes that
its return to fundamental aeronautics research will be critical to the
success of NGATS and is uniquely suited to NASA's core expertise. NASA
stated that until the enterprise architecture, operational improvement
road maps, and integrated capability work plans are developed, any
assertion of a technology development gap is highly speculative and
cannot be factually substantiated. As our report points out, NASA
plans, to its credit, to address the research and development needs of
NGATS. However, as our report also points out, numerous experts and
stakeholders with whom we spoke believed that NASA's move toward
fundamental research does create a technology development gap and that
it is unclear at this time what entity will do the developmental work
for NGATS technologies prior to transitioning these technologies to an
acquisition program. Our work has shown that developing technology to
higher levels of maturity help avoid cost, schedule, and performance
problems later, as systems are acquired. For example, we have reported
that cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls
occurred in the Department of Defense's weapons acquisitions, in part
because the technologies were transitioned to acquisitions before they
were fully developed. Second, NASA noted that, while it leads the Agile
Air Traffic System IPT, implementation of the system will be the
responsibility of FAA. We agree and do not intend to suggest in our
report that an agency's leadership of an IPT implies that an agency is
necessarily responsible for implementation of related systems. We
modified the text accordingly. Finally, NASA notes that the fiscal year
2007 President's Budget Request and run out for NASA aeronautics
research projects a relatively flat, not declining, funding profile.
However, as we have noted in a recent report, when converted into 2005
dollars, NASA's proposed aeronautics research budget will decrease by
nearly 30 percent from $906 million in 2005 to $647 million (in 2005
dollars) in 2011.[Footnote 31]
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees and the members of the JPDO
Senior Policy Committee, JPDO Board, and the JPDO Executive Director.
We also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me on 202-512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We examined (1) the status of the Joint Planning and Development
Office's (JPDO) efforts to plan for the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NGATS), (2) the key challenges facing JPDO as it
moves forward with its planning efforts, and (3) the key challenges
facing the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as it implements the
transformation while continuing its current operations.
To determine the status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS and the
challenges that the office faces, we discussed JPDO's plans and
products with the office's Director, Deputy Director, division heads,
and the leaders of each JPDO integrated product team (IPT). We reviewed
relevant literature and JPDO publications, including JPDO's December
2004 Integrated Plan, 2005 Progress Report, and draft NGATS Concept of
Operations. We reviewed previous GAO reports on the National Airspace
System, air traffic control modernization, and federal interagency
collaboration. We reviewed the National Academy of Sciences' 2005
report on JPDO entitled "Technology Pathways: Assessing the Integrated
Plan for a Next Generation Air Transportation System." We assessed the
status and challenges of JPDO's framework for facilitating coordination
among its partner agencies by comparing JPDO's efforts to date against
selected key practices that we have reported can enhance and sustain
federal collaborative efforts.[Footnote 32] We selected five of eight
practices as criteria for this review because they are significant to
building the framework needed for any collaboration and are
particularly important to JPDO at this early juncture in its
collaborative efforts. The key practices used for this assessment
include defining and articulating a common outcome, establishing
mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, identifying and addressing
needs by leveraging resources, agreeing on roles and responsibilities,
and reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative efforts through
agency plans and reports.[Footnote 33] We assessed JPDO's efforts to
obtain the participation of nonfederal stakeholders by obtaining the
perspectives of nonfederal stakeholders involved with JPDO and drawing
on our body of work on stakeholder involvement. We assessed JPDO's
technical planning efforts for NGATS by comparing JPDO's practices with
those that we have found to be effective in developing enterprise
architectures.[Footnote 34] We also obtained the perspectives of
nonfederal stakeholders whose organizations are represented on the
Institute Management Council of the NGATS Institute, and interviewed
nonfederal stakeholders who represent the aviation industry on various
IPTs. We met with FAA's Chief Architect to discuss how FAA's enterprise
architecture for the National Airspace System would be integrated into
that for NGATS, as well as cost estimates for NGATS. We also discussed
NGATS cost estimates with a member of FAA's Research, Development and
Engineering Advisory Committee (REDAC) and obtained information on
REDAC's estimate of future FAA costs under NGATS. We did not review in
detail the methodology or assumptions that REDAC used to develop this
estimate. Additionally, we observed two NGATS Investment Analysis
Workshops--one held with commercial and business aviation stakeholders
and one held with general aviation stakeholders. One of our senior
level technologists from our Applied Research and Methods team, who has
been involved in our past work on enterprise architectures and has
contributed to our federal guide on enterprise architecture, reviewed
JPDO's draft Concept of Operations by comparing it with the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) Standard 1362-1998
for concept of operations documents.[Footnote 35] We also conducted a
one-day panel of aviation experts during which we sought their
perspectives on the status of JPDO's planning efforts and the
challenges that it faces in planning for NGATS. For more detailed
information on the expert panel, see appendix II.
Because international harmonization is a key element of NGATS and the
European Union has embarked on a concurrent venture known as the Single
European Sky Air Traffic Management Research Programme (SESAR), we
obtained information on the plans for SESAR and discussed harmonization
issues with officials in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
To determine the challenges that FAA faces in implementing NGATS, we
met with the agency's Chief Operating Officer to discuss how FAA would
integrate the many expected components of NGATS into FAA's
modernization plans. We also discussed FAA's implementation plans for
System Wide Information Management and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast, two key elements of NGATS, with these programs' respective
program management officials and drew upon our work examining FAA's
program to modernize the National Airspace System.
We conducted our work between July 2005 and September 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Results of Expert Panel Voting:
We contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a panel
of experts and stakeholders. Our panel was held on March 2, 2006, at
the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C. The panel
consisted of 14 experts from the aviation industry and academia, one of
whom served as the panel's moderator. (See table 2.) We worked with the
National Academy of Sciences to identify and select panelists who were
knowledgeable about the efforts of the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO) and could respond to our questions about JPDO's
achievements and challenges. The panelists were asked to provide their
views during several sessions held during the day.
Table 2: Names and Affiliations of Expert Panelists:
Name: Ronald R. Fogleman (moderator);
Affiliation: Principal, Durango Aerospace, Inc; Chief of Staff, U.S.
Air Force (retired).
Name: Langhorne Bond;
Affiliation: President, International Loran Association; Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator (retired).
Name: Carol Carmody;
Affiliation: Director of Transportation Initiatives, The National
Academy of Public Administration.
Name: Jerald M. Davis;
Affiliation: President, Foxfire Inc; FAA (retired).
Name: Soeren Fischer;
Affiliation: Vice President Strategy & Communication, Air Traffic
Alliance.
Name: Mark Hansen;
Affiliation: Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering, University of California-Berkeley.
Name: John B. Hayhurst;
Affiliation: Senior Vice President, The Boeing Company (retired).
Name: Richard E. Heinrich;
Affiliation: Director, Strategic Initiatives, Commercial Systems,
Rockwell Collins, Inc.
Name: Bill Jeffers;
Affiliation: Senior Director, FAA Programs, ARINC; FAA (retired).
Name: Richard Marchi;
Affiliation: Senior Advisor, Airports Council International-North
America.
Name: Amy R. Pritchett;
Affiliation: David S. Lewis Associate Professor of Cognitive
Engineering, School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of
Technology.
Name: Dorothy Robyn;
Affiliation: The Brattle Group, Inc.
Name: William F. Wangerien;
Affiliation: Vice President, Operations, Planning, and Reliability
Control, Delta Airlines, Inc. (retired).
Name: Christopher Wickens;
Affiliation: Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.
Sources: GAO and National Academy of Sciences.
[End of table]
Following a welcome and introductions, the panel moved into the four
sessions, as follows:
* Session One: Overview of JPDO. In this session, the Chief Operating
Officer of FAA and the Acting Deputy Director of JPDO each gave a
presentation and answered questions from the panelists. The Chief
Operating Officer discussed the challenges of running a complex air
traffic organization. The Acting Deputy of JPDO explained how the
office is organized to attract public and private sector expertise.
These officials departed prior to the second session.
* Session Two: Identifying JPDO's Achievements and Challenges. The
panelists were asked to identify what they considered to be JPDO's
major achievements of the past 2 years and why. Following that
discussion, they were asked to identify the major challenges ahead for
JPDO and how those challenges might hinder JPDO's ability to move
forward with planning and developing the next generation air
transportation system (NGATS).
* Session Three: Strategies for Addressing JPDO's Challenges. The
panelists were asked to identify strategies that JPDO could use to
address the challenges identified in session two.
* Session Four: Global Harmonization and Cooperation. Panelists were
asked to discuss how the different accountability and authority
mechanisms of the JPDO and Single European Sky Air Traffic Management
Research Programme (SESAR) could affect the success of each effort.
They were also asked to what extent harmonization is important and why.
Finally, they were asked what lessons were learned from other
collaborative efforts between nations or cabinet-level departments.
At the end of the last three sessions, panelists were asked to respond
to questions that summarized the issues discussed. For example, at the
end of the second session, panelists were asked to select what they
considered to be the top achievements from the full list of the
achievements that they generated during the discussion.[Footnote 36]
For another session, panelists were asked about their level of concern
on issues related to the level of coordination between Europe and the
United States. In an attempt to provide context for the achievements
and challenges as well as the other voting results, we examined the
transcript to obtain statements in support of the most widely held
views for each question. The views expressed by the panelists were
their own and do not necessarily represent the views of GAO or the
National Academy of Sciences.
Session Two: Identifying JPDO's Achievements and Challenges:
During the second session, panelists discussed what they considered to
be JPDO's major achievements over the past 2 years. At the end of the
discussion, the panelists generated a list of what they considered to
the JPDO's most significant achievements, in no particular order. To
differentiate the relative significance of the achievements, each
panelist was asked, in a series of three questions, to vote for the
achievement he or she believed was the first, second, and third most
significant. To produce a rank order of items on the list, achievements
identified as the first most significant were assigned three points,
the second most significant achievements were assigned two points, and
the third most significant were assigned one point. The weighted values
for each achievement were summed and then ordered from the achievements
with the highest number of points to the lowest. (See table 3.)
Table 3: Expert Panel Votes on Top Achievements of JPDO:
Expert panel votes--achievements: Established process (IPTs, NGATS
Institute);
Rank: 1.
Expert panel votes--achievements: Senior-level interest;
Rank: 2.
Expert panel votes--achievements: Established products (plans,
organization);
Rank: 3.
Expert panel votes--achievements: Provided vision;
Rank: 4.
Expert panel votes--achievements: Agency coordination, common dialogue;
Rank: 5.
Expert panel votes--achievements: Began efforts to integrate budgets;
Rank: 6.
Expert panel votes--achievements: Jump start: looking backward for
continuity;
Rank: 7.
Expert panel votes--achievements: Involvement of private sector;
Rank: 8.
Source: GAO.
Note: When weighted rankings resulted in a tie, the tie was broken by
determining which category had the highest number of votes in the first
round, and, if necessary, the second round.
[End of table]
Panelists identified JPDO's top achievement as establishing a process
for conducting work related to the planning of NGATS. This included
setting up the integrated product teams (IPT) and the NGATS Institute.
One panel member said that JPDO had established a process. Another
panelist stated that JPDO had taken "a significant step forward" by
developing a process that brought people from different groups together
in the same room to talk about building the aviation system of the
future. Another panelist credited JPDO with establishing the NGATS
Institute.
Panelists felt that senior-level interest was the second most
significant achievement. For example, JPDO's Senior Policy Committee
includes cabinet-level representation. During the discussion, one
panelist said he believed that the level of interest shown by people
within different cabinet departments and other agencies was good.
Finally, panelists identified the development of products, including
plans and organizational structures, as the third most significant
achievement. For example, one panelist said that having JPDO produce a
product (i.e., the Integrated Plan) that Congress asked for, and
delivering it on time, was a major achievement. Another panelist felt
that JPDO provided continuity when it decided to incorporate Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and System Wide Information
Management (SWIM) into its future plans. Too often, the panelist said,
plans do not take into account past research and lessons learned.
During the second session, panelists also identified what they thought
were the top three challenges facing JPDO. To produce a list of
challenges, we followed the same general procedure used to identify
JPDO's major achievements as described above. That is, the panelists
were asked a series of three questions and the answers were weighted to
generate a single ranking. (See table 4.)
Table 4: Expert Panel Votes on Top Challenges Facing JPDO:
Expert panel votes--challenges: Credibility (roadmap, detailed plan);
Rank: 1.
Expert panel votes--challenges: Lack of national priority;
Rank: 2.
Expert panel votes--challenges: Collaborate with rest of the world;
Rank: 3.
Expert panel votes--challenges: Lack of comprehensive plan;
Rank: 4.
Expert panel votes--challenges: Responsibility without authority;
Rank: 5.
Expert panel votes--challenges: Clarify relationship of JPDO/ATO[A];
Rank: 6.
Expert panel votes--challenges: Tension between mission and politics;
Rank: 7.
Expert panel votes--challenges: Enterprise architecture
accomplishments;
Rank: 8.
Expert panel votes--challenges: Impact of annual budget process;
Rank: (Tie) 9.
Expert panel votes--challenges: Unclear mandate;
Rank: (Tie) 9.
Source: GAO.
[A] ATO is FAA's Air Traffic Organization.
Note: When weighted rankings resulted in a tie, the tie was broken by
determining which category had the highest number of votes in the first
round, and, if necessary, the second round.
[End of table]
Panelists identified establishing credibility as the top challenge
facing JPDO, due to FAA's past track record in air traffic control
modernization, the lack of detail in the Integrated Plan, and a lack of
air traffic controller and/or union involvement. For example, one
panelist noted that early investors in previous modernization attempts
did not always get the payback from their investment in new technology
because of a lack of follow-through on programs that would use that
technology. Some panelists were worried that the NGATS effort will
simply be another failed effort at modernization. Second, some
panelists felt that the Integrated Plan's lack of meaningful details
directly impinged on JPDO's credibility. For example, one cited the
National Research Council's evaluation of the Integrated Plan and said
the plan was more "an aspirational vision than an integrated
plan."[Footnote 37] A second panelist said the only thing new in the
JPDO vision was that it contained some information about security.
Another said, "We're not convinced they're looking at the personnel
issues, the aircraft issues, the economic issues, [or] the way to
motivate people." Third, panelists also cited a lack of air traffic
controllers' or union involvement in JPDO's process as a problem.
Controllers have to be brought on board as equal partners or JPDO's
efforts are "not going to work," said one panelist.
Panelists cited the second biggest challenge facing JPDO as the fact
that NGATS is not viewed as a national priority; the panelists devoted
a considerable amount of discussion to this topic. One panelist stated
that "changing the airspace" needs to be made a presidential priority
in order to get enough interest to align budgets and resources and to
execute the program. In the words of another panelist, "—until there is
some clear national priority given to this whole idea of the next
generation airspace or plan or concept—it's going to be a series of
band-aids and stops and starts."
The need to collaborate with the rest of the world was considered the
third most significant challenge facing JPDO because the office will
have to work with both the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and SESAR, the panelists said.[Footnote 38] Collaboration is
necessary to harmonize as many aviation procedures as possible,
panelists said. One panelist noted that because of ICAO's international
role, it was really crucial that JPDO, FAA's ATO, and FAA keep ICAO
informed. For example, the panelist said, "talk to them, brief them,
collaborate with them, so that when there is a solution or a decision
made about how to go forward, that it's not sprung on the rest of the
world, but the rest of the world has some awareness of how we got
there."
Session Three: Strategies for Addressing JPDO's Challenges:
In the third session, panelists were asked to discuss strategies that
they felt JPDO could use to address the challenges that the panelists
had identified in session two. At the end of the discussion, panelists
generated a list of what they considered to be the most significant
strategies, in no particular order. Panelists were asked in a series of
questions to identify which strategies, in their opinion, should be
implemented within the next 1-2 years, the next 3-5 years, and beyond 5
years. The results for each question below were ranked by the number of
votes. (See tables 5-7.)
Table 5: Short-term Strategies for JPDO:
What strategy is critical for JPDO to implement in the short term
(within the next 1-2 years)?: Outsource the development of the plan;
Number of votes: 5.
What strategy is critical for JPDO to implement in the short term
(within the next 1-2 years)?: Appoint, support, and sustain strong
leadership;
Number of votes: 4.
What strategy is critical for JPDO to implement in the short term
(within the next 1-2 years)?: Restructure the plan (stakeholder,
requirements, metrics) and gap analysis;
Number of votes: 3.
What strategy is critical for JPDO to implement in the short term
(within the next 1-2 years)?: Presidential directive;
Number of votes: 1.
What strategy is critical for JPDO to implement in the short term
(within the next 1-2 years)?: Formalize collaborative structure with
SESAR;
Number of votes: 1.
What strategy is critical for JPDO to implement in the short term
(within the next 1-2 years)?: Define stakeholders (European model,
other analyses);
Number of votes: 0.
What strategy is critical for JPDO to implement in the short term
(within the next 1-2 years)?: Better explain the economic consequences
of doing nothing;
Number of votes: 0.
What strategy is critical for JPDO to implement in the short term
(within the next 1-2 years)?: Senior Policy Committee to clarify JPDO-
ATO relationship and address legislative responsibilities;
Number of votes: 0.
What strategy is critical for JPDO to implement in the short term
(within the next 1-2 years)?: Total;
Number of votes: 14.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Five of the 14 panelists identified outsourcing the development of the
NGATS plan as critical to JPDO's efforts in the short term (i.e., the
next 1 to 2 years). According to the panelists, outsourcing to a
contractor or group of contractors would have several benefits,
including a more businesslike approach, more rapid completion of the
planning, and more opportunity for a range of aviation companies to be
involved (including some companies from other countries). One panelist
felt that JPDO's bureaucracy and political constraints impaired its
ability to develop the business and technical plan needed for the
future. Another panelist believed that without outsourcing, JPDO may
not succeed, something that could delay development of the system by
three to five years. "And this is not a time that we can afford that,"
the panelist said.
The second critical short-term strategy for JPDO, according to the
panelists, is appointing, supporting, and sustaining strong leadership.
Panelists said they were concerned about the turnover in leadership at
JPDO. One panelist stated, "They haven't had sustained, strong
leadership," noting JPDO had had three directors, while another
negatively remarked about JPDO's "revolving door structure." One
panelist also noted that, unlike Europe, the United States has no
highly placed public official who acts as an advocate for the plan. In
Europe, for example, the Vice President of the European Commission
spent time advocating in addition to her regular duties. The panelist
said that the leadership of this official is one of the single biggest
differences that explain where the United States is versus where the
European Union is today.
The third short-term strategy that panelists believed was critical to
JPDO is restructuring the parts of the plan that relate to
stakeholders, requirements and metrics, and performing a gap analysis.
JPDO "ought to at least look at the European model as a place to start
defining stakeholders," one panelist said. Panelists also urged that
the NGATS plan be restructured to incorporate metrics. The plan, one
panelist said, is a large design problem that should be approached by
figuring out what the metrics are, as well as the core issues and
requirements. The plan should describe work being done and provide a
clear statement of the metrics that should be achieved by 2025, as well
as the interim milestones. Panelists additionally stated that a "gap"
plan should be developed to identify areas that might fall between the
ATO's and JPDO's efforts. The gap plan would need to be comprehensive,
understandable, and explain who will do what and when it will be
mandated.
Table 6: Midterm Strategies for JPDO:
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the midterm
(within the next 3-5 years)?: Restructure the plan (stakeholder,
requirements, metrics) and gap analysis;
Number of votes: 3.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the midterm
(within the next 3-5 years)?: Outsource the development of the plan;
Number of votes: 3.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the midterm
(within the next 3-5 years)?: Formalize collaborative structure with
SESAR;
Number of votes: 3.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the midterm
(within the next 3-5 years)?: Appoint, support, and sustain strong
leadership;
Number of votes: 2.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the midterm
(within the next 3-5 years)?: Better explain the economic consequences
of doing nothing;
Number of votes: 2.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the midterm
(within the next 3-5 years)?: Presidential directive;
Number of votes: 1.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the midterm
(within the next 3-5 years)?: Define stakeholders (European model,
other analyses);
Number of votes: 0.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the midterm
(within the next 3-5 years)?: Senior Policy Committee to clarify JPDO-
ATO relationship and address legislative responsibilities;
Number of votes: 0.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the midterm
(within the next 3-5 years)?: Total;
Number of votes: 14.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Panelists again identified restructuring the plan and conducting a gap
analysis, as well as outsourcing the development of the plan, as two of
the key midterm (3-5 years) strategies for JPDO. The panelists also
identified establishing a structure that formalizes collaboration with
SESAR as a third midterm strategy. One panelist said that JPDO should
work with ICAO to come up with a structural framework for a full
exchange between JPDO and SESAR--one that extends beyond the exchange
of a few experts.[Footnote 39] Collaboration is important not only
between JPDO and SESAR but also for the companies involved, the
panelist said. For example, because Boeing and Rockwell Collins are
working with SESAR, they contribute their views about technology, which
will then become incorporated to ensure interoperability. In addition,
panelists noted the importance of a collaborative structure is to help
define a common set of performance requirements, especially for the
airlines. "They want one set of procedures to be able to fly from A to
B. And this is not only Europe, but worldwide," one panelist said.
Table 7: Long-term Strategies for JPDO:
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the long term
(more than 5 years)?: Formalize collaborative structure with SESAR;
Number of votes: 5.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the long term
(more than 5 years)?: Restructure the plan (stakeholder, requirements,
metrics) and gap analysis;
Number of votes: 3.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the long term
(more than 5 years)?: Appoint, support, and sustain strong leadership;
Number of votes: 2.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the long term
(more than 5 years)?: Outsource the development of the plan;
Number of votes: 2.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the long term
(more than 5 years)?: Better explain the economic consequences of doing
nothing;
Number of votes: 1.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the long term
(more than 5 years)?: Presidential directive;
Number of votes: 1.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the long term
(more than 5 years)?: Define stakeholders (European model, other
analyses);
Number of votes: 0.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the long term
(more than 5 years)?: Senior Policy Committee to clarify JPDO-ATO
relationship and address legislative responsibilities;
Number of votes: 0.
What strategy is critical for the JPDO to implement in the long term
(more than 5 years)?: Total;
Number of votes: 14.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Panelists identified the four most important long-term (more than 5
years) strategies for JPDO as (1) formalizing a collaborative structure
with SESAR; (2) restructuring the plan; (3) appointing, supporting, and
sustaining strong leadership; and (4) outsourcing the development of
the plan, as discussed above.
Session Four: Global Harmonization and Cooperation:
The fourth session focused on global harmonization and cooperation.
Panelists were asked to discuss how the different accountability and
authority mechanisms of JPDO and SESAR could affect the success of each
effort. They were also asked to what extent harmonization is important
and why. Finally, they were asked what lessons were learned from other
collaborative efforts between nations or other cabinet-level
departments. The panelists were then asked to vote on the questions
below. In this case, the possible answers were generated by GAO prior
to the expert panel. (See table 8.)
Table 8: Importance of JPDO Involvement in Harmonization Efforts:
JPDO's involvement in global harmonization efforts is an essential
component for the success of NGATS. Do you:: Strongly agree;
Number of votes: 10.
JPDO's involvement in global harmonization efforts is an essential
component for the success of NGATS. Do you:: Agree;
Number of votes: 2.
JPDO's involvement in global harmonization efforts is an essential
component for the success of NGATS. Do you:: Strongly disagree;
Number of votes: 0.
JPDO's involvement in global harmonization efforts is an essential
component for the success of NGATS. Do you:: Neither agree nor
disagree;
Number of votes: 0.
JPDO's involvement in global harmonization efforts is an essential
component for the success of NGATS. Do you:: Disagree;
Number of votes: 2.
JPDO's involvement in global harmonization efforts is an essential
component for the success of NGATS. Do you:: Don't know;
Number of votes: 0.
JPDO's involvement in global harmonization efforts is an essential
component for the success of NGATS. Do you:: Total;
Number of votes: 14.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Panelists overwhelmingly agreed that JPDO's involvement in global
harmonization is essential for the success of NGATS. Panelists said
that involvement in global harmonization efforts results in information
sharing that benefits all member countries, largely through ICAO. One
panelist noted that ICAO has a fairly good track record in helping
member states reach agreement on harmonized standards. Panelists also
noted that such collaborative efforts can result in sharing of best
practices, as well as a working relationship with the European Union's
SESAR effort. For example, one item for collaboration between JPDO and
SESAR is resolving time frames for completion. JPDO has 2025 deadline,
while SESAR's is 2020. "Gaps in things like that could be closed with
cooperation and collaboration," one panelist said.
Table 9: Level of Coordination between Europe and the United States:
Regarding the current level of coordination between Europe and the
United States, we should be:: Very greatly concerned;
Number of votes: 7.
Regarding the current level of coordination between Europe and the
United States, we should be:: Greatly concerned;
Number of votes: 4.
Regarding the current level of coordination between Europe and the
United States, we should be:: Moderately concerned;
Number of votes: 1.
Regarding the current level of coordination between Europe and the
United States, we should be:: Somewhat concerned;
Number of votes: 1.
Regarding the current level of coordination between Europe and the
United States, we should be:: Not concerned;
Number of votes: 1.
Regarding the current level of coordination between Europe and the
United States, we should be:: Total;
Number of votes: 14.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Most panelists said that they were very greatly concerned, or greatly
concerned, about the current level of coordination between the United
States and Europe regarding global harmonization. (See table 9.) One
panelist stated that the existing concept of operations was developed
with considerable coordination with other countries and thought that
JPDO's credibility would be harmed if it unilaterally developed a
concept of operations. Another panelist added that the United States
had worked closely with Europe to develop Advanced Technologies and
Oceanic Procedures, which helps increase international travel capacity.
In less than 10 years, this project went from an idea to a system that
a number of people and countries supported, the panelist said. That
achievement was done with very close coordination among the FAA, the
U.S. aviation industry, and the European authorities and experts, the
panelist said.
Table 10: Preparation for Success:
Which initiative is better organized for success?: Europe;
Number of votes: 12.
Which initiative is better organized for success?: Too early to tell;
Number of votes: 2.
Which initiative is better organized for success?: United States;
Number of votes: 0.
Which initiative is better organized for success?: Don't know;
Number of votes: 0.
Which initiative is better organized for success?: Total;
Number of votes: 14.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Panelists overwhelmingly said Europe's SESAR initiative was better
organized than JPDO for success. (See table 10.) They cited several
reasons, including SESAR's public-private partnership that focuses on
letting industry develop the European plan. They also raised concerns
that there was a lack of leadership with the U.S. effort, that there
had been much activity but little progress, and that the sheer size of
JPDO's bureaucracy would hinder progress. In discussing the area of
public-private partnerships, one panelist noted that SESAR's
organization was industry-centric, as opposed to the U.S. effort, which
involves a service provider or political-centric activity. One panelist
stated that "[W]e have two different models. I think one is headed
toward success and one is going to be fraught with the problems of the
past. So a solution-oriented answer is a more deeply focused industry
set of implementations as opposed to an advisory role." Another
panelist expressed concern that FAA has a tendency to pick a project de
jour and that project is now JPDO. Noting JPDO's complex organizational
chart, the panelist said, "[It] is nothing compared to the complexity
that's been built into the processes down at the IPT level." The
panelist said that people are being asked to make very large
commitments of time to participate in multiple subgroups on each of
eight IPTs, plus the NGATS institute. "I'm just concerned that there's
an awful lot of process here and not much substance," said the
panelist.
[End of section]
Appendix III: SESAR: The European Air Traffic Modernization Initiative:
The Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research Programme
(SESAR) is in some ways the European equivalent of next generation air
transportation system (NGATS). While both initiatives are designed to
increase the capacity of their respective air traffic management
systems to meet expected increases in demand, SESAR is also intended to
address Europe's historically fragmented airspace. Europe's patchwork
of national systems has led to inefficiencies, capacity constraints,
and delays. European countries have individually developed their air
traffic management systems, but this uncoordinated development risks
duplication of effort, significant additional cost, and unnecessary
delays in the introduction of new equipment. The European Organisation
for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol), ATM 2000+ Strategy, and
other initiatives had attempted to address these issues by obtaining
collaboration among the numerous stakeholders. However, these efforts
did not always include all stakeholders, and progress was impeded
because consensus could not be reached. Hence, the delays continue and
problems are expected to worsen with the expectation of at least a
doubling of demand by 2020.
To more forcefully address these issues, the European Parliament and
member states agreed on regulations that were entered into force in
April 2004 creating a "Single European Sky." In contrast to past
efforts by Eurocontrol, the Single European Sky legislation provides
more authority to unify and harmonize air traffic management equipment
and procedures throughout Europe and establishes various mechanisms to
help ensure the participation of stakeholders. To carry out the Single
European Sky vision, the European Commission and Eurocontrol created
the SESAR project, which is divided in two major phases: definition and
implementation, and is expected to last until 2020.
The definition phase of SESAR started in March 2006 and will last 2
years. Planning done under the definition phase is being handled by a
29-member SESAR Consortium that includes airlines, air navigation
service providers, airports, and suppliers. The SESAR Consortium is
performing the planning under a contractual arrangement with
Eurocontrol that calls for specific time lines and deliverables. The
SESAR Consortium has formed a 10-member executive committee to make
decisions on deliverables, to make other key decisions, and resolve
disputes. To ensure that the future users of the new system--the
airlines--have a major say in the outcome of the definition phase, four
of the executive committee members are representatives of airlines. The
remainder of the committee is composed of three members representing
air navigation service providers, two members representing airports,
and one member representing suppliers.
The day-to-day management of the definition phase is run by the Air
Traffic Alliance--a consortium of Airbus, EADS, and Thales--following a
call for tender for a project manager by Eurocontrol. The Air Traffic
Alliance answered the call and won the contract, which calls for the
delivery of a Master Plan that will lay out a mission for the future
Single European Sky and a roadmap for implementation. The European
Commission and Eurocontrol have provided 60 million euros ($76 million)
to fund the project definition phase with half provided by each
organization.[Footnote 40]
The SESAR Consortium is a bottom-up organization, meaning that the
aviation industry is essentially developing the ATM roadmap for final
approval by Eurocontrol and the European Commission. The definition
phase has been organized into six sequential deliverables and 20 work
packages. A mixture of consortium members will work on each package, to
ensure the appropriate use of expertise and consideration of
viewpoints. For example, airlines, air navigation service providers,
suppliers, and Eurocontrol, will work on the Master Plan. The first
deliverable, a report describing the current air transport situation,
identifying critical issues, and recommending ways to address these
issues was published in July 2006.[Footnote 41]
In addition to the SESAR members, several associations are project
associates, such as the International Air Transport Association, which
represents commercial airlines, and the European Cockpit Association,
which represents pilots. Project associates, including U.S. companies
Boeing, Rockwell Collins, and Honeywell, are also involved in this
phase of the project.
The second phase of SESAR--implementation (2007-2013)--will focus on
systems design and producing the key systems components. The commission
has proposed using a joint undertaking to implement the Single European
Sky. A joint undertaking is a legal entity that permits a mixture of
public and private funding and was also used to implement Europe's
Galileo satellite navigation system. The plan for the joint
undertaking, however, has not yet been finalized under the European
Union's procedures. Tentative plans to fund the development phase (2008-
2013) call for $381 million annually.[Footnote 42] One-third of the
funding would come from the commission, one-third from Eurocontrol, and
one-third from industry.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Headquarters:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
October 31, 2006:
Reply to Attn of: Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate:
Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Dr. Dillingham:
NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft of the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report GAO-07-25 entitled "Next
Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges
Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System."
While we agree with the majority of the content, we would like to
highlight three items that we think are important.
First, there are several references to NASA's return to fundamental
aeronautical research creating a potential gap in technology
development. NASA would like to point out that the return to cutting-
edge fundamental aeronautics research focuses our attention on research
that is considered high risk by industry because the payoff from an
economic standpoint is typically uncertain as well as long-term, and
the results are not appropriable to a single company. Such research
will be critical for the success of the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NGATS) and is uniquely suited to NASA's core
expertise. Ultimately, however, as the report of the Commission on the
Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry (2002) stated: "Industry has the
responsibility for leveraging government and university research and
for transforming it into new products and services, quickly and
affordably." Our return to fundamental, innovative research will
increase the probability of developing the revolutionary technologies
that will be required for the successful implementation of NGATS and
will broaden the advanced technology development options.
Regarding this first point, NASA would like to further emphasize that
identification of a potential gap in technology development is highly
speculative until the Enterprise Architecture, the Operational
Improvement roadmaps, and the Integrated Capability Work Plans are
developed and agreed upon by the Joint Planning and Development Office
members. These activities are planned to occur during FY 2007. Until
then, assertions of gaps cannot be factually substantiated.
Second, while NASA is the Integrated Product Team (IPT) lead for the
Agile Air Traffic System (ATS), we will not be responsible for its
establishment. NASA leads the Agile ATS IPT because it has primary
responsibility for conducting the necessary research; implementation of
the Agile ATS will be the responsibility of the Federal Aviation
Administration.
Third, we would like to indicate that the FY 2007 President's Budget
Request and run out for NASA aeronautics research projects a relatively
flat, not declining, funding profile.
In closing, NASA would again like to thank you for the opportunity to
provide comments about the GAO draft report. We hope that these
comments will be useful.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Lisa J. Porter:
Associate Administrator for Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gerald Dillingham, (202) 512-2834, or dillinghamg@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to this
report were Nabajyoti Barkakati, Jay Cherlow, Kevin Egan, Colin Fallon,
Brandon Haller, David Hooper, Heather Krause, Elizabeth Marchak, Edmond
Menoche, Faye Morrison, Taylor Reeves, Richard Scott, and Sarah Veale.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. No. 108-176, Vision 100--Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, December 12, 2003.
[2] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
[3] The remaining three practices include establishing compatible
policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency
boundaries; developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on
results; and reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative
efforts through performance management systems.
[4] An enterprise architecture is a tool, or blueprint, for
understanding and planning complex systems. JPDO anticipates that the
NGATS enterprise architecture will provide the means for coordinating
among the partner agencies and private sector manufacturers, aligning
relevant research and development activities, and integrating
equipment. See GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger
Architecture Program Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts, GAO-
05-266 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005).
[5] Network centric systems aim to exploit technical advances in
information technology and telecommunications to improve situational
awareness and the speed of decision making.
[6] GAO-06-15.
[7] The National Center for Advanced Technologies is a nonprofit unit
within the Aerospace Industries Association.
[8] ADS-B is a surveillance technology that transmits an aircraft's
identity, position, velocity, and intent to other aircraft and to ATC
systems on the ground, thereby enabling pilots and controllers to have
a common picture of airspace and traffic. By providing pilots with a
display that shows the location of nearby aircraft, the system enables
pilots to collaborate in decision making with controllers, safely
allowing reduced aircraft separation and thereby increasing capacity
within the National Airspace System.
[9] SWIM is expected to help in the transition to network centric
operations by providing the infrastructure and associated policies and
standards to enable information sharing among all authorized system
users, such as the airlines, civilian government agencies, and the
military.
[10] We have developed an Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity
Framework. This framework outlines steps toward achieving a stable and
mature process for managing the development, maintenance, and
implementation of enterprise architectures. See GAO, Information
Technology: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Enterprise
Architecture Management (Version 1.1), GAO-03-584G (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 1, 2003).
[11] According to standards of the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE), a Concept of Operations is a user-
oriented document that describes the characteristics of a proposed
system from the user's viewpoint. Among other things, the key elements
that should be included in a Concept of Operations are major system
components, interfaces to external systems, and performance
characteristics such as speed and capacity.
[12] In developing its estimate, REDAC used FAA's projected facilities
and equipment costs under an NGATS scenario, as well as REDAC's own
estimates for the costs of operations; research, engineering, and
development; and airport improvements--the remaining three components
of FAA's appropriation.
[13] In this report, we describe REDAC's "base case" scenarios, which
assumed that FAA's operations costs would increase between 2006 and
2010 but then remain constant through 2025 (except for inflation), as
productivity increases offset the higher cost of increased demand.
REDAC also developed estimates for lower-cost "best case" and higher-
cost "worst case" scenarios using differing assumptions of productivity
gains.
[14] The FAA order establishing JPDO directs JPDO to, among other
things, report to ATO's Chief Operating Officer for day-to-day
management oversight and integration into the National Airspace System.
[15] Currently, FAA's Operational Evolution Plan monitors how NAS
capacity will change over a rolling 10-year planning horizon depending
on numerous variables, such as the demand for air travel, the
completion of new runways, and the availability of new ATC systems. It
has also focused on the building capacity at 35 large hub airports.
[16] NASA defines fundamental research as that research that includes
continued, long-term scientific study in areas such as physics,
chemistry, materials, experimental techniques, and computational
techniques that leads to a furthering of understanding of the
underlying principles that form the foundation of the core aeronautics
disciplines, as well as that research that integrates the knowledge
gained in these core areas to significantly enhance capabilities,
tools, and technologies at the disciplinary (e.g., aerodynamics,
combustion, dynamics and control, acoustics) and multidisciplinary
(e.g., engine design, airframe design) level.
[17] NASA noted that it will still conduct flight test experiments
across most of the projects in its portfolio.
[18] In focusing on fundamental research, NASA does not plan to develop
new technologies to the same level of maturity as in the past.
[19] GAO, U.S. Aerospace Industry: Progress in Implementing Aerospace
Commission Recommendations, and Remaining Challenges, GAO-06-920
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006).
[20] GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation will Require
Cultural Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available
Management Tools, GAO-06-154 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005).
[21] Organized in 1935 and once called the Radio Technical Commission
for Aeronautics, RTCA is today known just by its acronym. RTCA is a
private, not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based
performance standards for ATC systems. RTCA serves as a federal
advisory committee, and its recommendations are the basis for a number
of FAA's policy, program, and regulatory decisions. RTCA includes an
ADS-B working group within its air traffic management advisory
committee. The ADS-B Working Group includes representatives of air
transport, avionics manufacturers, business aviation, Department of
Defense, and general aviation.
[22] Our senior level technologist reviewed JPDO's Concept of
Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation System, version
0.2, dated July 24, 2006, by comparing it with the IEEE Standard 1362-
1998 for concept of operations documents.
[23] Our work has shown that it is important, when implementing
organizational transformations, to use a performance management system
to assure accountability for change. See GAO-03-669.
[24] GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has
Improved, but Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure
Results, GAO-05-23 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004).
[25] GAO-05-23.
[26] The Joint Resources Council is an executive body consisting of
associate and assistant administrators, acquisition executives, the
Chief Financial Officer, the Chief Information Officer, and legal
counsel. The council makes corporate-level decisions, including those
that determine whether an acquisition meets a mission need and should
proceed. The council also approves changes to a program's baseline,
budget submissions, and the National Airspace System's architecture
baseline.
[27] Pub. L. No. 103-355.
[28] Aviation Management Associates, Inc., The "No New Money" Scenario
for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (Alexandria, VA: Oct.
1, 2005).
[29] GAO, National Airspace System: Experts' Views on Improving the
U.S. Air Traffic Control Modernization Program, GAO-05-333SP
(Washington, D.C.: April 2005).
[30] U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Contracting Officer
Representatives: Managing the Government's Technical Experts to Achieve
Positive Contract Outcomes (Washington, D.C.: December 2005).
[31] GAO-06-920.
[32] GAO-06-15.
[33] The remaining three practices include establishing compatible
policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency
boundaries; developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on
results; and reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative
efforts through performance management systems.
[34] An enterprise architecture is a tool, or blueprint, for
understanding and planning complex systems. JPDO anticipates that the
NGATS enterprise architecture will provide the means for coordinating
among the partner agencies and private sector manufacturers, aligning
relevant research and development activities, and integrating
equipment. See GAO-05-266.
[35] IEEE is a nonprofit, technical professional association that
develops standards for a broad range of global industries, including
the information technology and information assurance industries and is
a leading source for defining best practices.
[36] Panelists voted electronically at the end of the last three
sessions using voting equipment provided by GAO.
[37] National Research Council of National Academies Technology
Pathways: Assessing the Integrated Plan for a Next Generation Air
Transportation System (Washington, D.C.: 2005).
[38] ICAO was established in 1944 by 52 nations whose aim was to assure
the safe, orderly and economic development of international air
transport. ICAO serves as the global forum for civil aviation.
[39] It should be noted that on July 18, 2006, a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) was signed between FAA and the European Commission.
This MOU establishes a framework for cooperation between the FAA and
the European Commission.
[40] To convert euros to U.S. dollars, we used 1.26855, the foreign
exchange rate for September 19, 2006, as published in The Washington
Post.
[41] SESAR Consortium, Air Transport Framework: The Current Situation,
DLM-0602-001-03-00 (July 2006).
[42] To convert euros to U.S. dollars, we used 1.26855, the foreign
exchange rate for September 19, 2006, as published in The Washington
Post.
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