Passenger Rail Security
Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts Gao ID: GAO-06-557T March 29, 2006The July 2005 bombing attacks on London's subway system dramatically revealed the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to terrorist attacks and demonstrated the need for an increased focus on security for these systems. This testimony, which is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 report on passenger rail security (GAO-05-851), provides information on (1) the security practices that domestic and selected foreign rail transit operators have implemented to mitigate risks and enhance security; (2) the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) funding of rail transit security and use of risk management in funding decisions; and (3) the steps DHS and DOT have taken to improve coordination on rail transit security matters. As part of its 2005 report, GAO contacted 32 U.S. rail transit operators and 13 passenger rail operators in seven European and Asian countries.
Domestic and foreign rail transit operators GAO contacted have taken similar actions to help secure their systems, including implementing customer awareness programs, increasing the number and visibility of their security personnel, and upgrading security technology. Also, both domestic and foreign operators have used risk assessments to guide security-related activities and spending. However, GAO also observed security practices that were used by certain foreign passenger rail operators, but were not employed in the United States at the time of GAO's review. For example, some foreign rail operators use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats or randomly screen passengers. Centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies, such as chemical sensors, and best practices are also maintained in some foreign countries. While introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, the practices may nevertheless warrant further examination. Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments, and DHS has promoted risk-based funding decisions in the allocation of transit security grants. DHS's Office of Grants and Training is the primary source of security funding for passenger rail systems, providing over $320 million in grants to rail transit agencies for fiscal years 2003 to 2006. The Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its grant-making authority to promote risk-based funding decisions for passenger rail by requiring, for example, that operators complete a risk assessment to be eligible for a transit security grant. As we have noted in previous reports, using assessments of risk to target resources to the highest priority is especially critical given the competition for resources within the rail transit sector, and between the rail transit sector and the other modes of transportation. DOT's Federal Transit Administration (FTA) also helps fund rail transit security efforts by providing financial assistance to transit agencies and requiring that they spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds on security improvements. To improve coordination on transportation security matters, including rail transit security, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in September 2004. DHS and DOT also signed a transit security annex to the MOU in September 2005 that delineates specific security-related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for transit issues. In GAO's view, these actions are positive steps forward in addressing the coordination problems GAO previously identified. For instance, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with TSA's May 2004 security directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. Effective coordination between DHS and DOT will continue to be important as both departments move forward with existing programs and new security initiatives.
GAO-06-557T, Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-557T
entitled 'Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security
Practices and Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts' which was released
on March 29, 2006.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Highways, Transit, and Pipelines, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST:
Wednesday, March 29, 2006:
Passenger Rail Security:
Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk Can Help Guide Security
Efforts:
Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues:
GAO-06-557T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-557T, a testimony before the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit,
and Pipelines, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The July 2005 bombing attacks on London‘s subway system dramatically
revealed the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to
terrorist attacks and demonstrated the need for an increased focus on
security for these systems.
This testimony, which is based primarily on GAO‘s September 2005 report
on passenger rail security (GAO-05-851), provides information on (1)
the security practices that domestic and selected foreign rail transit
operators have implemented to mitigate risks and enhance security; (2)
the Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) and the Department of
Transportation‘s (DOT) funding of rail transit security and use of risk
management in funding decisions; and (3) the steps DHS and DOT have
taken to improve coordination on rail transit security matters. As part
of its 2005 report, GAO contacted 32 U.S. rail transit operators and 13
passenger rail operators in seven European and Asian countries.
What GAO Found:
Domestic and foreign rail transit operators GAO contacted have taken
similar actions to help secure their systems, including implementing
customer awareness programs, increasing the number and visibility of
their security personnel, and upgrading security technology. Also, both
domestic and foreign operators have used risk assessments to guide
security-related activities and spending. However, GAO also observed
security practices that were used by certain foreign passenger rail
operators, but were not employed in the United States at the time of
GAO‘s review. For example, some foreign rail operators use covert
testing to help keep employees alert to security threats or randomly
screen passengers. Centralized clearinghouses on rail security
technologies, such as chemical sensors, and best practices are also
maintained in some foreign countries. While introducing any of these
security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal,
fiscal, and cultural challenges, the practices may nevertheless warrant
further examination.
Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments, and DHS
has promoted risk-based funding decisions in the allocation of transit
security grants. DHS‘s Office of Grants and Training is the primary
source of security funding for passenger rail systems, providing over
$320 million in grants to rail transit agencies for fiscal years 2003
to 2006. The Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its grant-
making authority to promote risk-based funding decisions for passenger
rail by requiring, for example, that operators complete a risk
assessment to be eligible for a transit security grant. As we have
noted in previous reports, using assessments of risk to target
resources to the highest priority is especially critical given the
competition for resources within the rail transit sector, and between
the rail transit sector and the other modes of transportation. DOT‘s
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) also helps fund rail transit
security efforts by providing financial assistance to transit agencies
and requiring that they spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula
funds on security improvements.
To improve coordination on transportation security matters, including
rail transit security, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) in September 2004. DHS and DOT also signed a transit security
annex to the MOU in September 2005 that delineates specific security-
related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for transit
issues. In GAO‘s view, these actions are positive steps forward in
addressing the coordination problems GAO previously identified. For
instance, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about
the feasibility of implementing and complying with TSA‘s May 2004
security directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with
TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. Effective
coordination between DHS and DOT will continue to be important as both
departments move forward with existing programs and new security
initiatives.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO‘s September 2005 report on passenger rail security recommended,
among other things, that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
collaboration with DOT, determine the feasibility of implementing
certain rail security practices used in foreign countries. DHS and DOT
generally agreed with the report‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-557T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact JayEtta Z. Hecker at
(202) 512-2834 or Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-3404.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on rail
transit security. The London rail bombings that took place in July
2005--resulting in over 50 fatalities and more than 700 injuries--made
clear that even when a variety of security precautions are in place,
rail transit systems that move high volumes of passengers each day
remain vulnerable to terrorist attack. While securing the U.S. rail
transit system is a daunting task--a shared responsibility requiring
coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local governments
and the private sector--it is important nonetheless to take the
necessary steps to identify and mitigate risks to rail transit systems.
As we have reported previously, the sheer number of stakeholders
involved in securing these systems can lead to communication
challenges, duplication of effort, and confusion about roles and
responsibilities. Key federal stakeholders with critical roles to play
within the rail sector include the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), which is responsible for transportation security
overall, and the Office of Grants and Training,[Footnote 1]which
provides grant funds to rail operators and conducts risk assessments
for passenger rail agencies, both within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS); and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), both within the Department of
Transportation (DOT). One of the critical challenges facing these
federal agencies, and the rail system operators they oversee or
support, is finding ways to protect rail systems from potential
terrorist attacks without compromising the accessibility and efficiency
of rail transit.
At the federal level, another significant challenge to securing rail
systems involves the allocation of resources. Rail transit systems
represent one of many modes of transportation--along with aviation,
maritime, and others--competing for limited federal security resources.
Within the rail transit sector itself, there is competition for
resources, as federal, state, and local agencies and rail operators
seek to identify and invest in appropriate security measures to
safeguard these systems while also investing in other capital and
operational improvements. Moreover, given competing priorities and
limited homeland security resources, difficult policy decisions have to
be made by Congress and the executive branch to prioritize security
efforts and direct resources to the areas of greatest risk within the
rail transit system, among all transportation modes, and across other
nationally critical sectors.
To help federal decision makers determine how to best allocate limited
resources, we have advocated, the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) has recommended,
and the subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 requires, that a risk management approach be employed to guide
security decision making.[Footnote 2] A risk management approach
entails a continuous process of managing risks through a series of
actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing
and quantifying risks, evaluating alternative security measures,
selecting which measures to undertake, and implementing and monitoring
those measures. In July 2005, in announcing his proposal for the
reorganization of DHS, the Secretary of Homeland Security declared that
as a core principle of the reorganization, the department must base its
work on priorities driven by risk.
My testimony will cover three areas: (1) the security practices that
domestic and selected foreign rail transit operators have implemented
to mitigate risks and enhance security, and any differences in these
practices; (2) DHS's and DOT's funding of rail transit security and use
of risk management in funding decisions; and (3) the steps DHS and DOT
have taken to improve coordination on rail transit security matters. My
comments today are based on our body of work on passenger rail security
issues, including our September 2005 report to the Chairman of the
House Transportation and Infrastructure's Subcommittee on Railroads,
Senators Snowe and Boxer, and Representative Castle.[Footnote 3] For
this report, we contacted 32 U.S. rail transit operators and 13
passenger rail operators in seven European and Asian countries. These
domestic and foreign rail agencies and the areas they serve are listed
in appendix I. All of the reports on which this statement is based were
prepared in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
In summary:
Domestic and foreign rail transit operators we contacted have taken
similar actions to help secure their systems, such as implementing
customer awareness programs, upgrading security technology, and
tightening access controls. Also, both domestic and foreign operators
have used risk assessments to guide security-related activities and
funding. However, we also observed rail security practices in foreign
countries that were not in use domestically at the time of our review.
For example, some foreign rail operators use covert testing to help
keep employees alert to security threats or randomly screen passengers.
In addition, centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies,
such as chemical sensors, and best practices are maintained in some
foreign countries. While introducing any of these security practices
into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, fiscal, and
cultural challenges, the practices may nevertheless warrant further
examination. In our September 2005 report on passenger rail security,
we recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in collaboration with DOT and the passenger rail industry,
determine the feasibility, in a risk management context, of
implementing certain rail security practices used in foreign countries,
including covert testing and random screening, an information
clearinghouse for security technologies and best practices, and
practices that integrate security into infrastructure design.[Footnote
4] DHS and DOT generally agreed with the report's recommendations.
* Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments, and DHS
has promoted risk-based funding decisions in the allocation of transit
security grants. DHS's Office of Grants and Training is the primary
source of security funding for passenger rail systems. From fiscal year
2003 through fiscal year 2006, the Office of Grants and Training
provided over $320 million in grants to rail transit agencies through
the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and the Transit Security
Grant Programs. The Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its
grant-making authority to promote risk-based funding decisions for
passenger rail by requiring, for example, that operators complete a
risk assessment to be eligible for a transit security grant. Using
assessments of risk to target resources to the highest priority is
especially critical given the competition for resources within the rail
transit sector, and between the rail transit sector and the other modes
of transportation. Moreover, as the 2005 London rail bombings
dramatically illustrated, even when a variety of security precautions
are put in place, passenger rail systems remain vulnerable and
attractive targets given their open designs and the high volumes of
passengers they transport each day. Thus, it is important that limited
resources are targeted to security activities that have the greatest
impact on reducing overall risk. DOT's FTA also helps fund rail transit
security efforts through the financial assistance it provides to
transit agencies. In addition, FTA requires that a certain percentage
of federal funds be devoted to security activities. Specifically,
transit agencies are required to spend 1 percent of their urbanized
area formula funds on security improvements.[Footnote 5]
* To improve coordination on transportation security matters, including
rail transit security, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) in September 2004. The MOU defines broad areas of responsibility
for each department. The two departments also signed a transit security
annex to the MOU in September 2005 that delineates the specific
security-related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments
for transit issues. We believe these actions are positive steps forward
in addressing the coordination problems we have previously identified.
For instance, in 2004, TSA issued emergency security directives to
domestic rail operators after terrorist attacks on the rail system in
Madrid. However, federal and rail industry officials raised questions
about the feasibility of implementing and complying with these
directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to
ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. Effective
coordination between DHS and DOT will continue to be important as both
departments move forward with existing programs and new security
initiatives. For example, to avoid duplication and confusion, it will
be important that TSA coordinate the oversight activities of its rail
inspectors with those of the state auditors from FTA's State Safety
Oversight program and FRA's rail safety inspectors.
Background:
Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22
states use some form of rail transit--that is, heavy, commuter, and
light rail. Heavy rail systems--subway systems like New York City's
transit system and Washington, D.C.'s Metro--typically operate on fixed
rail lines within a metropolitan area and have the capacity for a heavy
volume of traffic. Commuter rail systems generally operate on railroad
tracks and provide regional service (e.g., between a central city and
adjacent suburbs)--and are traditionally associated with older
industrial cities, such as Boston, New York, and Chicago. Light rail
systems are typically characterized by lightweight passenger rail cars
that operate on track that is not separated from vehicular traffic for
much of the way. Figure 1 identifies the geographic location of rail
transit systems within the United States.
Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Rail Transit Systems:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to rail transit officials and experts, certain
characteristics of rail transit systems make them inherently vulnerable
to terrorist attacks and therefore difficult to secure. By design, rail
transit systems are open (i.e., have multiple access points, hubs
serving multiple carriers, and, in some cases, no barriers) so that
they can move large numbers of people quickly. In contrast, the U.S.
commercial aviation system is housed in closed and controlled locations
with few entry points. The openness of rail transit systems can leave
them vulnerable because operator personnel cannot completely monitor or
control who enters or leaves the systems. Other characteristics of some
rail transit systems--high ridership, expensive infrastructure,
economic importance, and location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or
tourist destinations)--also make them attractive targets for terrorists
because of the potential for mass casualties and economic damage and
disruption. Moreover, some of these same characteristics make rail
transit systems difficult to secure. For example, the numbers of riders
that pass through a subway system--especially during peak hours--may
make the sustained use of some security measures, such as metal
detectors, difficult because their use could result in long lines that
could disrupt scheduled service. In addition, multiple access points
along extended routes could make the cost of securing each location
prohibitive. Balancing the potential economic effects of security
enhancements with the benefits of such measures is a difficult
challenge.
Securing the nation's rail transit systems is a shared responsibility
requiring coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local
governments; the private sector; and the passengers who ride these rail
systems. Since the September 11 attacks, the role of federal government
agencies in securing the nation's transportation systems, including
rail transit, have continued to evolve. Before September 11, DOT--
namely, FTA--was the primary federal entity involved in rail transit
security matters. In response to the attacks of September 11, Congress
passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which
created TSA within DOT and defined its primary responsibility as
ensuring security in all modes of transportation.[Footnote 6] The act
also gave TSA regulatory authority for security over all transportation
modes. ATSA does not specify TSA's roles and responsibilities in
securing the maritime and land transportation modes at the level of
detail it does for aviation security. Instead, the act broadly
identifies TSA as responsible for ensuring the security of all modes of
transportation. With the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
TSA was transferred, along with over 20 other agencies, to
DHS.[Footnote 7] While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the
security of all transportation modes, FTA conducts nonregulatory safety
and security activities, including safety-and security-related
training, research, technical assistance, and demonstration projects.
In addition, FTA promotes safety and security through its grant-making
authority.
U.S. and Foreign Rail Transit Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to
Secure Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security
Actions May Exist:
U.S. rail transit operators have taken numerous actions to secure their
rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the
United States and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. These actions
included both improvements to system operations and capital
enhancements to system facilities, such as track, buildings, and train
cars. All of the U.S. rail transit operators we contacted have
implemented some security measures--such as customer awareness programs
and more, and more visible, security personnel--that were generally
consistent with those we observed in Europe and Asia. We also
identified three rail security practices--covert testing, random
screening of passengers and their baggage, and maintaining a
centralized clearinghouse on rail security technologies--used in
foreign countries but not, at the time or our review,
domestically.[Footnote 8]
U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices:
Both U.S. and foreign rail transit operators we contacted have
implemented similar improvements to enhance the security of their
systems. To guide security actions and spending, domestic and foreign
operators--even the privatized foreign systems--consider risk
assessments, budget constraints, and other factors. For example, one
foreign rail operator with a daily ridership of 2.3 million passengers
used a risk management methodology to assess risks, threats, and
vulnerabilities to rail in order to guide security spending. According
to the operator, the methodology employs a "risk informed" approach to
support management's business decision process regarding security. A
summary of domestic and foreign security practices follows.
Customer awareness: Customer awareness programs we observed used signs
and announcements to encourage riders to alert train staff if they
observed suspicious packages, persons, or behavior. Of the 32 domestic
rail operators we interviewed, 30 had implemented a customer awareness
program or made enhancements to an existing program. Foreign rail
operators we visited also attempt to enhance customer awareness. For
example, 11 of the 13 operators we interviewed had implemented a
customer awareness program. Similar to programs of U.S. operators,
these programs used signs, announcements, and brochures to inform
passengers and employees about the need to remain vigilant and report
any suspicious activities.
More, and more visible security personnel: Of the 32 U.S. rail
operators we interviewed, 23 had increased the number of security
personnel they used since September 11, to provide security throughout
their system or had taken steps to increase the visibility of their
security personnel. For example, several U.S. and foreign rail
operators we spoke with had instituted policies such as requiring their
security staff to wear brightly colored vests and patrol trains or
stations more frequently, so they are more visible to customers and
potential terrorists or criminals. These policies make it easier for
customers to contact security personnel in the event of an emergency,
or if they have spotted a suspicious item or person. At foreign sites
we visited, 10 of the 13 operators had increased the number of their
security officers throughout their systems in recent years because of
the perceived increase in the risk of a terrorist attack.
Increased use of canine teams: Of the 32 U.S. rail transit operators we
contacted, 21 had begun to use canine units, which include both dogs
and human handlers, to patrol their facilities or trains or had
increased their use of such teams. In foreign countries we visited,
rail transit operators' use of canine units varied. In some Asian
countries, dogs were not culturally accepted by the public and thus
were not used for rail security purposes. Most European rail transit
operators used canine units for explosives detection or as deterrents.
Employee training: All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we
interviewed had provided some type of security training to their staff,
either through in-house personnel or an external provider. In many
cases, this training consisted of ways to identify suspicious items and
persons and to respond to events once they occur. For example, the
London Underground and the British Transport Police developed the "HOT"
method for Underground employees to identify suspicious items in the
rail system. In the HOT method, employees are trained to look for
packages or items that are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and not
Typical of the environment. If items meet all of these criteria,
employees are to notify station managers, who are to call in the
authorities and potentially shut down the station or take other action.
According to London Underground officials, the HOT method has
significantly reduced the number of system disruptions caused when a
suspicious item was identified. Several rail transit operators in the
United States and abroad have trained their employees in the HOT
method. It is important to note that such training is not designed to
prevent acts of terrorism like the July 2005 London attacks, in which
suicide bombers killed themselves rather than leaving bombs behind.
Passenger and baggage screening practices: Some domestic and foreign
rail operators have trained employees to recognize suspicious behavior
as a means of screening passengers. Eight U.S. rail transit operators
we contacted were using some form of behavioral screening. For example,
the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), which operates
Boston's T system, has adopted a behavioral screening system to
identify passengers exhibiting suspicious behavior. The Massachusetts
State Police train all MBTA personnel to be on the lookout for behavior
that may indicate someone has criminal intent, and to approach and
search such persons and their baggage when appropriate. Abroad, we
found that 4 of the 13 operators we interviewed had implemented forms
of behavioral screening similar to MBTA's system. All of the domestic
and foreign rail operators we contacted have ruled out an airport-style
screening system for daily use in heavy traffic. According to the
operators, such a system, in which each passenger and the passenger's
baggage are screened by a magnetometer or X-ray machine, raised
concerns about cost, staffing, and customer convenience, among other
factors.
Upgrading technology: Many rail operators we interviewed had embarked
on programs designed to upgrade their existing security technology. For
example, we found that 29 of the 32 U.S. operators had implemented a
form of closed-circuit television (CCTV) to monitor their stations,
yards, or trains. While these cameras cannot be monitored closely at
all times, because of the large number of staff the operators said
would be required, many rail operators told us the cameras act as a
deterrent, assist security personnel in determining how to respond to
incidents that have already occurred, and can be monitored if an
operator has received information that an incident may occur at a
certain time or place in a system. One rail operator, New Jersey
Transit, had installed "smart" cameras, which were programmed to alert
security personnel when suspicious activity occurred, such as if a
passenger left a bag in a certain location or a boat docked under a
bridge. According to the New Jersey Transit officials, this technology
was relatively inexpensive and not difficult to implement. Several
other operators said they were interested in exploring this technology.
Abroad, all 13 of the foreign rail operators we visited had CCTV
systems in place. As in the United States, foreign rail operators use
these cameras primarily to deter crime and to respond to incidents
after they occur, because they do not have enough staff to monitor all
the cameras continuously.
Most rail operators we spoke with had not installed equipment for
detecting chemical or biological agents because of the costs involved,
but a few operators had this equipment or were exploring its purchase.
For example, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA), in Washington, D.C., has installed these sensors in some of
its stations, thanks to a program jointly sponsored by DOT and the
Department of Energy that provided this equipment to WMATA because of
the high perceived likelihood of an attack in Washington, D.C. Also, at
the time of our review, at least three other domestic rail operators we
spoke with were exploring the possibility of partnering with federal
agencies to install such equipment in their facilities on an
experimental basis. Also, as in the United States, a few foreign
operators had implemented chemical or biological detection devices at
rail stations, but their use was not widespread. Two of the 13 foreign
operators we interviewed had implemented these sensors, and both were
doing so on an experimental basis. In addition, police officers from
the British Transport Police--responsible for policing the rail system
in the United Kingdom--were equipped with pagers to detect chemical,
biological, or radiological elements in the air, allowing them to
respond quickly in case of a terrorist attack using one of these
methods. The British Transit Police also have three vehicles carrying
devices to determine if unattended baggage contains explosives. These
vehicles patrol the system 24 hours per day.
Access control: Tightening access procedures at key facilities or
rights-of-way is another way many rail operators have attempted to
enhance security. A majority of domestic and selected foreign passenger
rail operators had invested in enhanced systems to control unauthorized
access at employee facilities and stations. Specifically, 23 of the 32
U.S. operators had installed a form of access control at key facilities
and stations. This often involved installing a system requiring
employees to swipe an access card to gain access to control rooms,
repair facilities, and other key locations. All 13 foreign operators
had implemented some system to control access to their critical
facilities or rights-of-way.
Rail system design and configuration: In an effort to reduce
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and increase overall security, rail
transit operators in the United States and abroad have been, or are now
beginning to, incorporate security features into the design of new and
existing rail infrastructure, primarily rail stations. For example, of
the 32 domestic rail operators we contacted, 22 had removed their
conventional trash bins entirely, or replaced them with transparent or
bomb-resistant trash bins, as TSA directed in May 2004. Foreign rail
operators had taken steps to remove traditional trash bins from their
systems. Of the 13 operators we visited, 8 had either removed their
trash bins entirely or replaced them with blast-resistant cans or
transparent receptacles.
Many foreign rail operators are also incorporating aspects of security
into the design of their rail infrastructure. Of the 13 operators we
visited, 11 have attempted to design new facilities with security in
mind and have attempted to retrofit older facilities to incorporate
security-related modifications. For example, one foreign operator we
visited is retrofitting its train cars with windows that passengers can
open in the event of a chemical attack. In addition, the London
Underground, one of the oldest rail systems in the world, incorporates
security into the design of all its new stations as well as of
modifications to existing stations. We observed several security
features in the design of Underground stations, such as the use of
vending machines that have no holes that someone could use to hide a
bomb, and sloped tops to reduce the likelihood that a bomb can be
placed on top of the machine. In addition, stations are designed to
provide staff with clear lines of sight to all areas of the station,
such as underneath benches or ticket machines, and station designers
try to eliminate or restrict access to any recessed areas where a bomb
could be hidden.
In the United States, several rail transit operators said they were
taking security into account when designing new facilities or
remodeling older ones. Twenty-two of 32 rail operators we interviewed
told us that they were incorporating security into the design of new or
existing rail infrastructure. For example, New York City Transit and
Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) officials told us they are
incorporating security into the design of its new stations, including
the redesigned Fulton Street station and the World Trade Center Hub
that were damaged or destroyed during the September 11 attacks. In
addition, in June 2005, FTA issued guidelines for use by the transit
industry encouraging the incorporation of particular security features
into the design of transit infrastructure. These guidelines include,
for example, increasing visibility for onboard staff, reducing the
areas where someone could hide an explosive device on a transit
vehicle, and enhancing emergency exits in transit stations. Figure 2
illustrates several security measures that we observed in rail transit
stations both in the United States and abroad. It should be noted that
this figure represents an amalgam of stations we visited, not any
particular station.
Figure 2: Composite of Selected Security Practices in the Rail Transit
Environment:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used in the
United States:
While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail
systems are similar to those U.S. rail transit operators are
implementing, we encountered three practices in other countries that
were not currently in use among the domestic rail transit operators we
contacted as of June 2005, nor were they performed by the U.S.
government. These practices are discussed below.
Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited use
covert testing to keep employees alert about their security
responsibilities. Covert testing involves security staff staging
unannounced events to test the response of railroad staff to incidents
such as suspicious packages or alarms. In one European system, security
staff place suspicious items throughout their system to see how long it
takes operating staff to respond to the items. Similarly, one Asian
rail operator's security staff break security seals on fire
extinguishers and open alarmed emergency doors randomly to see how long
it takes staff to respond. Officials of these operators stated that
these tests are carried out daily and are beneficial because the staff
know they could be tested at any moment and are therefore more likely
to be vigilant about security.
Random screening: Of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed, 2
conducts some form of random screening of passengers and their baggage.
In the systems where this practice is used, security personnel can
approach passengers either in stations or on the trains and ask them to
submit their persons or their baggage to a search. Passengers declining
to cooperate must leave the system. For example, in Singapore, rail
agency officials rotate the stations where they conduct random searches
so that the searches are carried out at a different station each day.
Before the July 2005 London bombings, no rail transit operators in the
United States were randomly screening passengers or baggage every day.
However, during the Democratic National Convention in 2004, MBTA began
randomly screening every 11th passenger at certain stations and times
of the day, asking the passenger to provide his or her bags to be
screened. Those who refused were not allowed to ride the system. MBTA
officials recognized that it is impossible to implement such a system
comprehensively throughout the rail network without major staffing
increases, and that even doing random screening regularly would be a
drain on resources. However, officials stated that such a system is
workable during special events and times of heightened security but
would have to be designed very carefully to ensure that passengers'
civil liberties were not violated. After the July 2005 London bombings,
four rail transit operators--PATH, New York Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, New Jersey Transit, and Utah Transit Authority in Salt Lake
City--implemented limited forms of random baggage screening in their
system.
National government maintains clearinghouse on technologies and best
practices: According to passenger rail operators in five countries we
visited, their national governments have centralized the process for
performing research and developing passenger rail security technologies
and maintaining a clearinghouse on these technologies and security best
practices. According to these officials, this practice allows rail
operators to have one central source for information on the merits of a
particular passenger rail security technology, such as chemical
sensors, CCTVs, and intrusion detection devices. No federal agency has
compiled or disseminated best practices to rail operators to aid in
this process. Some U.S. rail operators we interviewed expressed
interest in there being a more active centralized federal research and
development authority in the United States to evaluate and certify
passenger rail security technologies and make that information
available to rail operators. We have also previously reported that
stakeholders have stated that the federal government should play a
greater role in testing transportation security technology and making
this information available to industry stakeholders.[Footnote 9]
Currently, many operators said they informally ask other rail operators
about their experiences with a certain technology, perform their own
research via the Internet or trade publications, or perform their own
testing. TSA and DOT agree that making the results of research testing
available to industry stakeholders could be a valuable use of federal
resources because it would reduce the need for multiple rail operators
to perform the same research and development efforts, but they have not
taken steps to implement this practice.[Footnote 10]
Implementing these three practices--covert testing, random screening,
and a government-sponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best
practices--in the United States could pose political, legal, fiscal,
and cultural challenges because of the differences between the United
States and these foreign nations. For instance, many foreign nations
have dealt with terrorist attacks on their public transportation
systems for decades, compared with the United States, where rail
transportation has not been specifically targeted during terrorist
attacks. According to foreign rail operators, these experiences have
resulted in greater acceptance of certain security practices, such as
random searches, which the U.S. public may view as a violation of their
civil liberties or which may discourage the use of public
transportation. The impact of security measures on passengers is an
important consideration for domestic rail transit operators, since most
passengers could choose another means of transportation, such as a
personal automobile. As such, security measures that limit
accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause
inconvenience could push people away from transit and into their cars.
In contrast, the citizens of the European and Asian countries we
visited are more dependent on public transportation than most U.S.
residents and therefore, according to the rail operators we spoke with,
may be more willing to accept more intrusive security measures, simply
because they have no other choice for getting from place to place.
Nevertheless, in order to identify innovative security measures that
could help further mitigate terrorism-related risk to rail assets it is
important to at least consider assessing the feasibility and costs and
benefits of implementing in the United States the three rail security
practices we identified in foreign countries. Officials from DHS, DOT,
passenger rail industry associations, and rail systems we interviewed
told us that operators would benefit from such an evaluation.
Furthermore, the passenger rail association officials told us that such
an evaluation should include practices used by foreign rail operators
that integrate security into infrastructure design.
Differences in the business models and financial status of some foreign
rail operators could also affect the feasibility of adopting certain
security practices in the United States. Several foreign countries we
visited have privatized their passenger rail operations. Although most
of the foreign rail operators we visited--even the privatized systems-
-rely on their governments for some type of financial assistance, two
foreign rail operators generated significant revenue and profits in
other business endeavors, which they said allowed them to invest
heavily in security measures for their rail systems.
Another important difference between domestic and foreign rail
operators is the structure of their police forces. In particular,
England, France, Belgium, and Spain all have national police forces
patrolling rail systems in these countries. The use of a national
police force is a reflection that these foreign countries often have
one nationalized rail system, rather than over 30 rail transit systems
owned and operated by numerous state and local governments, as is the
case in the United States. For example, in France, the French National
Railway operates all intercity passenger rail services in the country,
and the French Railway police provide security. According to foreign
rail operators, the use of one national rail police force allows for
consistent policing and security measures throughout the country. In
the United States, by contrast, some transit agencies maintain
individual polices forces, while others rely on their city or county
police forces for security.
DHS and DOT Help Fund Security Efforts, and Some Funding Decisions Are
Risk-Based:
Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments, and DHS
has promoted risk-based funding decisions in the allocation of transit
security grants. DHS's Office of Grants and Training administers the
UASI and Transit Security grant programs. These programs have provided
over $320 million in grants to rail transit agencies for certain
security activities since fiscal year 2003. The Office of Grants and
Training has leveraged its grant-making authority to promote risk-based
funding decisions for passenger rail by requiring, for example, that
operators complete a risk assessment to be eligible for a transit
security grant. FTA also helps fund rail transit security efforts
through the financial assistance it provides to transit agencies, with
the stipulation that a certain percentage of federal funds be used for
security activities.
DHS and DOT Help Fund Rail Transit Security Efforts:
With the creation of DHS in 2002, one of its components, the Office of
Grants and Training, became the primary federal source for security
funding for passenger rail systems. The Office of Grants and Training
is the principal component of DHS responsible for preparing the United
States for acts of terrorism and has primary responsibility within the
executive branch for assisting and supporting DHS, in coordination with
other directorates and entities outside the department, in conducting
risk analysis and risk management activities for state and local
governments. In carrying out its mission, the Office of Grants and
Training provides training, funds for the purchase of equipment,
support for the planning and execution of exercises, technical
assistance, and other support to assist states, local jurisdictions,
and the private sector to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of
terrorism. Through the UASI grant program, the Office of Grants and
Training has provided grants to urban areas to help enhance their
overall security and preparedness level to prevent, respond to, and
recover from acts of terrorism. In 2003 and 2004, $65 million and $50
million, respectively, were allocated to rail transit agencies through
the UASI program. In addition, the DHS Appropriations Act of 2005
appropriated $150 million for rail transit, intercity passenger rail,
freight rail, and transit agency security grants.[Footnote 11] This
funding has allowed the Office of Grants and Training to build upon the
work under way through the UASI program and create and administer new
programs focused specifically on transportation security, including the
Transit Security Grant Program. This program provides financial
assistance to address security preparedness and enhancements for
transit (to include commuter, heavy, and light rail systems; intracity
buses, and ferries). Table 1 summarizes the funding provided to rail
transit providers through the UASI and Transit Security Grant Program
from 2003 through 2006.
Figure 3: Security Grants Provided by the Office of Grants and Training
to Rail Transit Providers, 2003 through 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DHS Office of Grants and Training.
[End of figure]
Although FTA now plays a supporting role in rail transit security
matters since the creation of TSA, it remains an important partner in
funding security efforts. FTA provides financial assistance to rail
transit agencies to plan and develop new systems and operate, maintain,
and improve existing systems. Rail transit agencies can use some of
this funding for security activities, although the agencies have to
balance investments in security against other competing priorities. In
addition, FTA promotes safety and security through its grant-making
authority. FTA stipulates conditions of grants, such as certain safety
and security statutory and regulatory requirements, and FTA may
withhold funds for noncompliance with the conditions of a grant. For
example, transit agencies must spend 1 percent of their urbanized area
formula funds--which is FTA's largest grant program--on security
improvements.[Footnote 12]
Using Risk Management Approach Can Help Direct Federal Funds to Highest
Rail Transit Security Priorities:
In recent years, we, along with Congress, the executive branch, and the
9/11 Commission have required or advocated that federal agencies with
homeland security responsibilities use a risk management approach to
help ensure that finite national resources are dedicated to assets or
activities considered to have the highest security priority. A risk
management approach entails a continuous process of managing risk
through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and
objectives, performing risk assessments, evaluating alternative actions
to reduce identified risks by preventing or mitigating their impact,
selecting actions to undertake by management, and implementing and
monitoring those actions. We have concluded that without a risk
management approach, there is limited assurance that programs designed
to combat terrorism are properly prioritized and focused. Targeting
resources to the highest priority is especially critical given the
competition for resources within the rail transit sector, and between
the rail transit sector and the other modes of transportation.
Moreover, as the 2005 London rail bombings dramatically illustrated,
even when a variety of security precautions are put in place, passenger
rail systems remain vulnerable and attractive targets given their open
designs and the high volumes of passengers they transport each day.
Thus, it is important that limited resources are targeted to security
activities that have the greatest impact on reducing overall risk.
DHS' Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its grant-making
authority to promote risk-based funding decisions for passenger rail.
For example, passenger rail operators must have completed a risk
assessment to be eligible for financial assistance through the fiscal
year 2005 Transit Security Grant program administered by the Office of
Grants and Training. To receive these funds, rail transit operators are
also required to have a security and emergency preparedness plan that
identifies how the operator intends to respond to security gaps
identified by risk assessments. This plan, along with a regional
transit security strategy prepared by regional transit stakeholders,
will serve as the basis for determining how the grant funds are to be
allocated.
Coordination between Federal Agencies Has Faced Challenges and Will
Continue to Be Important:
Prior to the creation of DHS, DOT modal agencies, such as FTA and FRA,
were the primary federal agencies involved in rail transit security
matters. Since Congress passed ATSA in 2001, creating TSA and giving it
regulatory authority over the security of all modes of transportation,
federal agencies have had some difficulty coordinating their activities
and communicating to industry stakeholders about their role and
responsibilities. In response to a GAO recommendation, DOT and DHS
entered into an MOU to better coordinate their activities and have
embarked on a number of initiatives to improve their coordination with
each other and with industry stakeholders. Coordination between DHS and
DOT will continue to be important as both departments move forward with
existing programs and new security initiatives, such as TSA's
deployment of its rail inspectors.
DHS and DOT Have Worked to Improve Coordination on Transit Security
Matters:
Although DOT modal administrations have played supporting roles in
transportation security matters since the creation of TSA, they remain
important partners in the federal government's efforts to improve rail
security, given DOT's role in funding and overseeing the safety of rail
transit systems. For example, as previously mentioned, FTA provides
financial assistance to rail transit agencies, and some of this funding
can, and in some cases must, be used for security activities. In
addition, FTA has regulatory authority for state safety oversight of
rail fixed-guideway systems and for a drug and alcohol program, and FRA
has regulatory authority for rail safety over commuter rail operators.
As we have previously reported, it could be difficult to distinguish
DOT's role in maintaining and improving transportation safety from
DHS's role in securing the transportation system because security is
often intertwined with safety.[Footnote 13] Moreover, FTA and FRA are
continuing their rail transit security efforts as TSA moves ahead with
its rail transit security initiatives.[Footnote 14]
We have previously reported that coordination between DHS and DOT, as
well as between DHS and rail transit stakeholders, could be improved.
For example, in our September 2005 report on rail security, we noted
that TSA provided limited opportunities for other federal agencies and
the rail industry to collaborate in the development of its passenger
rail security directives, which were issued in May 2004 to provide a
consistent baseline standard of protective measures for all passenger
rail operators.[Footnote 15] Federal and rail industry officials have
raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying
with the directives, noting, among other things, that the directives do
not reflect a complete understanding of the rail transit environment or
necessarily incorporate industry best practices. In addition, in 2003,
we noted that representatives from several associations told us that
they have received conflicting messages from the federal agencies
involved in transportation security, including rail transit.[Footnote
16] We further noted that representatives from several associations
also stated that their members were unclear about which agency to
contact for their various security concerns and which agency has
oversight for certain issues. We concluded that a lack of clearly
defined roles and responsibilities can lead to problems such as
duplication and conflicting efforts, gaps in preparedness, and
confusion. Moreover, a lack of coordination can strain
intergovernmental relationships, drain resources, and raise the
potential for problems in responding to terrorism. Therefore, we
recommended that DHS and DOT use a mechanism, such as a memorandum of
agreement, to clearly delineate their roles and responsibilities. At a
minimum, we recommended that this mechanism establish the
responsibilities of each entity in setting, administering, and
implementing security standards and regulations; determining funding
priorities; and interfacing with the transportation industry, as well
as define each entity's role in the inevitable overlap of some safety
and security activities.
In response to our 2003 recommendation, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) in September 2004 to develop procedures through
which the two departments could improve their cooperation and
coordination in promoting the safe, secure, and efficient movement of
people and goods throughout the transportation system. The MOU defines
broad areas of responsibility for each department. For example, it
states that DHS, in consultation with DOT and affected stakeholders,
will identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical
infrastructure. The MOU between DHS and DOT represents an overall
framework for cooperation that is to be supplemented by additional
signed agreements, or annexes, between the departments. These annexes
are to delineate the specific security-related roles, responsibilities,
resources, and commitments for mass transit, rail, research and
development, and other matters. The annex for mass transit security was
signed in September 2005.[Footnote 17] According to DHS and DOT
officials, this annex is intended to ensure that the programs and
protocols for incorporating stakeholder feedback and making
enhancements to security measures are coordinated. For example, the
annex requires that DHS and DOT consult on such matters as regulations
and directives that affect security. The annex also identifies points
of contact for coordinating this consultation.
In addition to their work on the MOU and related annexes, DHS and TSA
have taken other steps to improve collaboration with DOT and industry
stakeholders. In April 2005, DHS officials stated that better
collaboration with DOT and industry stakeholders was needed to develop
strategic security plans associated with various homeland security
presidential directives and statutory mandates, such as the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which
required DHS to develop a national strategy for transportation security
in conjunction with DOT. Responding to the need for better
collaboration, DHS established a senior-level steering committee in
conjunction with DOT to coordinate the development of this national
strategy. In addition, senior DHS and TSA officials stated that
industry groups would also be involved in developing the national
strategy for transportation security and other strategic plans.
Moreover, according to TSA's assistant administrator for intermodal
programs, TSA intends to work with APTA and other industry stakeholders
in developing security standards for the rail transit
industry.[Footnote 18]
Coordination between Federal Agencies Will Continue to Be Important:
DOT's and DHS's efforts to enhance coordination between their agencies
and with industry stakeholders on security matters are welcome.
Effective coordination between the two departments will continue to be
important as both move forward in implementing existing programs as
well as new security initiatives. For example, FTA administers the
State Safety Oversight program, which mandates that state-designated
agencies oversee the safety of rail transit agencies. Although ATSA
gave TSA final regulatory authority over all modes of transportation,
including rail transit, in the program, FTA sets out minimum
requirements the state oversight agencies must ensure that transit
agencies meet. FTA's mandated minimum requirements include security
components, one of which directs rail transit agencies to maintain a
system security plan that includes controls to address employee and
passenger security and a process for conducting internal security
reviews. Several rail transit operators told us that they were confused
by having to answer to both FTA and TSA for transportation security
matters. We have ongoing work for the full Committee examining the
State Safety Oversight program--and, as part of this review, we will be
exploring the extent to which FTA and TSA work together in implementing
this program. We expect to issue our report later this summer.
Another area that will require continued coordination is DHS's and
DOT's security and safety oversight efforts. TSA has hired rail
inspectors to, among other things, monitor and enforce compliance with
its May 2004 passenger rail security directives. As of March 2006, TSA
had filled 99 of up to 100 inspector positions authorized by
Congress.[Footnote 19] However, TSA has not yet established processes
or criteria for determining and enforcing compliance. TSA has also not
determined how its rail inspectors will be used to enforce the
directives or how they will coordinate with existing FRA safety
inspectors or state oversight auditors involved in the State Safety
Oversight Program. The Director of TSA's Surface Transportation
Inspection Program, which oversees the rail inspectors, and a local
rail inspector program supervisor told us that they looked forward to
coordinating with FTA on the State Safety Oversight program and would
be open to a formalized role in the program, but had not held any
discussions with FTA about what that role would be. In fact, both the
Director and the local supervisor admitted that they were not familiar
with the program's requirements. In addition, the transit security
annex to the MOU between DHS and DOT does not explicitly mention the
State Safety Oversight program as a program for which the two agencies
will collaborate, and officials from several state oversight agencies
said they were unsure what their role would be in overseeing security
once the TSA rail inspectors began their duties. Also, FRA and TSA
officials told us that the details of how TSA rail inspectors will
coordinate with the approximately 400 existing FRA safety inspectors
and 160 state employees enforcing FRA passenger rail rules and
regulations remain to be determined. Both FRA and TSA stated that they
were committed to avoiding duplication of effort and would work to
communicate their respective roles and responsibilities to transit
agency officials.
Another area requiring continued coordination is the funding of rail
transit security activities. Specifically, the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
(SAFETEA-LU)[Footnote 20] included a provision mandating that DOT and
DHS collaborate on a joint rulemaking for the Transit Security Grant
Program. The joint rulemaking is to establish the characteristics of
and requirements for transit security grants, including funding
priorities, eligible activities, methods for awarding grants, and
limitations on administrative expenses. The rule is currently being
drafted, and officials from DHS' Office of Grants and Training told us
they expected it to be finalized in summer 2006.
Concluding Observations:
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the 2005 London rail bombings made clear
that even when a variety of security precautions are put in place, rail
transit systems that move high volumes of passengers daily remain
vulnerable to attack. Security cannot be guaranteed. Nevertheless, it
is important that we take steps to identify and mitigate risks to
passenger rail systems. While domestic rail agencies have implemented a
number of security practices that are generally consistent with those
of foreign rail operators, they have not adopted some practices used in
other countries, including covert testing, random screening, and
information clearinghouses for new security technologies and best
practices. Despite the potential political, legal, fiscal, and cultural
challenges that implementing these additional practices in the United
States could pose, we continue to believe that the practices may
warrant further examination, and we stand by our September 2005
recommendations that DHS, in collaboration with DOT and the passenger
rail industry, evaluate the feasibility of implementing them.
As we move forward with efforts to enhance rail transit security, it is
important that we do not examine rail transit security actions and
funding in isolation. Rail transit systems represent one of many modes
of transportation competing for limited federal security resources.
Given competing priorities and finite resources, difficult policy
decisions will have to be made by Congress and the executive branch to
prioritize security efforts and direct resources to the areas of
greatest risk within the passenger rail system, across all
transportation modes, and across other sectors of the economy. As we
have previously noted in past reports, adopting a risk management
approach can help guide and inform these difficult decisions--and help
ensure that finite national resources are dedicated to assets or
activities considered to have the highest security priority. DHS has
taken steps to adopt a risk management approach.
Finally, the sheer number of stakeholders involved in securing rail
transit systems can lead to communication challenges, duplication of
effort, and confusion about roles and responsibilities. With the
execution of the MOU and transit security annex, DHS and DOT have taken
important steps forward in improving coordination among the federal
entities involved in rail transit security matters. These new
agreements will be tested as both departments proceed with new security
initiatives and existing programs, such as FTA's State Safety Oversight
program. We stand ready to assist the Committee and Subcommittee in
monitoring these developments.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact JayEtta Z.
Hecker at (202) 512-2834 or Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512-3404.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Nikki
Clowers, Colin Fallon, Kirk Kiester, and Ray Sendejas.
Appendix I--Domestic and Foreign Rail Agencies GAO Contacted for GAO-05-
851:
Table 1: Domestic Passenger Rail Agencies We Visited or Interviewed:
Passenger rail agency: Altamont Commuter Express (ACE);
Urban area served: Stockton and San Jose, California.
Passenger rail agency: Alaska Railroad Corporation;
Urban area served: Anchorage and Fairbanks, Alaska.
Passenger rail agency: Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART);
Urban area served: San Francisco -Oakland, California.
Passenger rail agency: CALTRAIN;
Urban area served: San Francisco and San Jose, California.
Passenger rail agency: San Diego Transit Corp. (Coaster);
Urban area served: San Diego, California.
Passenger rail agency: Dallas Area Rapid Transit/Trinity Railway
Express (DART);
Urban area served: Dallas, Texas.
Passenger rail agency: Greater Cleveland Regional Transportation
Authority (GCRTA);
Urban area served: Cleveland, Ohio.
Passenger rail agency: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (LACMTA);
Urban area served: Los Angeles, California.
Passenger rail agency: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
(MARTA);
Urban area served: Atlanta, Georgia.
Passenger rail agency: Maryland Transit Administration (MTA);
Urban area served: Greater Washington, DC, and Maryland.
Passenger rail agency: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(MBTA);
Urban area served: Boston, Massachusetts.
Passenger rail agency: METRA Commuter Rail;
Urban area served: Chicago, Illinois.
Passenger rail agency: Southern California Regional Rail Authority
(Metrolink);
Urban area served: Greater Los Angeles, California.
Passenger rail agency: Long Island Railroad (LIRR);
Urban area served: New York, New York.
Passenger rail agency: Metro North Railroad (MNR);
Urban area served: New York, New York.
Passenger rail agency: New York City Transit (NYCT);
Urban area served: New York, New York.
Passenger rail agency: Staten Island Railway (SIR);
Urban area served: New York, New York.
Passenger rail agency: San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI);
Urban area served: San Francisco, California.
Passenger rail agency: Northern Indiana Commuter District;
Urban area served: Chicago, Illinois --Northern Indiana.
Passenger rail agency: Delaware River Port Authority (PATCO);
Urban area served: New Jersey and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Passenger rail agency: Port Authority Trans Hudson (PATH);
Urban area served: New York, New York --New Jersey.
Passenger rail agency: San Diego Trolley;
Urban area served: San Diego, California.
Passenger rail agency: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority (SEPTA);
Urban area served: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Passenger rail agency: South Florida Regional Transportation Authority
(SFRTA);
Urban area served: Miami, Florida.
Passenger rail agency: Connecticut Department of Transportation (Shore
Line East);
Urban area served: New Haven, Connecticut.
Passenger rail agency: Sound Transit (Sounder);
Urban area served: Seattle, Washington.
Passenger rail agency: TRIMET;
Urban area served: Portland, Oregon.
Passenger rail agency: Virginia Railway Express (VRE);
Urban area served: Northern Virginia, Greater Washington, D.C.
Passenger rail agency: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA);
Urban area served: Washington, D.C.
Passenger rail agency: New Jersey Transit (NJT);
Urban area served: Newark, New Jersey --New York, New York.
Passenger rail agency: Miami Dade Transit;
Urban area served: Miami, Florida.
Passenger rail agency: Chicago Transit Authority (CTA);
Urban area served: Chicago, Illinois.
Source: National Transit Database:
[End of table]
Table 2: Foreign Passenger Agencies We Contacted:
Passenger rail agency: Paris Metro;
Area served: Paris, France.
Passenger rail agency: French National Railway;
Area served: France.
Passenger rail agency: London Underground;
Area served: London, United Kingdom.
Passenger rail agency: Network Rail;
Area served: United Kingdom.
Passenger rail agency: Channel Tunnel Rail Link;
Area served: United Kingdom/France.
Passenger rail agency: Belgian National Railway;
Area served: Belgium.
Passenger rail agency: Madrid Metro;
Area served: Madrid, Spain.
Passenger rail agency: RENFE (Spanish National Railway);
Area served: Spain.
Passenger rail agency: JR Central;
Area served: Japan.
Passenger rail agency: Tokyo Metro;
Area served: Tokyo, Japan.
Passenger rail agency: SBS Transit Corporation;
Area served: Singapore.
Passenger rail agency: Singapore Mass Rapid Transit;
Area served: Singapore.
Passenger rail agency: Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway;
Area served: Hong Kong.
Source: GAO:
[End of table]
FOOTNOTES
[1] DHS's Office of Grants and Training was formerly called the Office
of Domestic Preparedness.
[2] Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638. For more information on risk
management, see GAO, Transportation Security: Systematic Planning
Needed to Optimize Resources, GAO-05-357T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15,
2005); Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide
Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001);
and Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize and Target Program Investments, GAO/NSIAD-98-74 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 9, 1998).
[3] GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 9, 2005); GAO, Rail Security: Some Actions Taken to Enhance
Passenger and Freight Rail Security, but Significant Challenges Remain,
GAO-04-598T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2004); GAO, Transportation
Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges,
GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003); and GAO, Mass Transit:
Federal Actions Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security
Challenges, GAO-03-263 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2002).
[4] GAO-05-851.
[5] FTA's urbanized area formula grant program provides federal funds
to urbanized areas (jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more)
for transit capital investments, operating expenses, and transportation-
related planning.
[6] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[7] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[8] At the time we completed our work in June 2005, these three
practices were not utilized. However, as discussed later in this
testimony, some rail operators began using random screening in the
aftermath of the July bomb attacks on the London subway system and
others may have begun utilizing this or other security practices since
our report.
[9] GAO-03-843.
[10] GAO-03-843.
[11] Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298 (2004).
[12] FTA is to verify that agencies comply with the requirement to
spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds on security
improvements and may withhold funding from agencies that it finds are
not in compliance. Agencies are not required to comply with this
spending rule if a valid justification can be documented, such as state
and local funds for security are inadequate or security trend data do
not warrant security spending.
[13] GAO-03-843.
[14] For information about TSA's, FTA's, and FRA's rail transit
security initiatives, see GAO-05-851.
[15] GAO-05-851.
[16] GAO-03-843.
[17] Congress required that an annex to the MOU be signed that would,
among other things, define and clarify the respective transit security
roles and responsibilities of each department. Pub. L. 109-59, § 3028
(2005).
[18] APTA is a standards development organization recognized by DOT
that has set standards for commuter rail, mass transit, and bus safety
and operations.
[19] These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act of
2005 and its accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with
$12 million in funding for rail security activities.
[20] P.L. 109-59.
