Aviation Security
Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons Gao ID: GAO-06-475 May 26, 2006The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to approve air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, onboard commercial aircraft to thwart an attack. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, one air carrier received approval to deploy electric stun devices. To address concerns regarding reports of injuries after the use of these devices and to ensure that the impacts of these devices onboard aircraft have been fully evaluated, this report answers the following: (1) What analyses has the federal government conducted to assess the safety and effectiveness of these devices onboard commercial aircraft? (2) What controls does TSA have in place to help ensure uniform and timely review of air carrier requests to deploy these devices onboard commercial aircraft?
The Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have conducted reviews addressing the effect of electric stun devices on aircraft. Plus, various federal as well as other organizations examined the health effects that electric stun devices have on individuals. But, no studies of health effects have been conducted in an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to NIJ, although electric stun devices have been used successfully many times to subdue suspects, certain compromised populations, such as the elderly and those with a history drug and alcohol abuse, may be at risk for negative outcomes. In April 2002, NIJ concluded that the use of electric stun devices in accordance with appropriate policies and training may be an effective means for flight deck crews to thwart an attack but should not be deployed without further testing. Similarly, in a 2003 report to Congress, TSA generally concurred with NIJ's conclusions. But, neither review included in-flight testing or empirical testing of these devices that would demonstrate that they would enhance security. TSA's position is that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft environment, is necessary to determine if these devices can be used safely and effectively. TSA lacks key internal controls, to help ensure uniformity in decision making and a transparent process to review requests to deploy electric stun devices onboard commercial aircraft. Specifically, TSA (1) lacks a well-defined organizational area with responsibility to receive and review requests, (2) has not established formal criteria for decision making to approve requests and has not communicated criteria to external stakeholders, and (3) maintained little documentation of its decision making and activities to account for its handling of past requests. Without clearly defined approval criteria and a point of contact, TSA cannot reasonably assure that its decision making is uniform and consistent, nor can it provide a transparent request and approval process for air carriers.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-475, Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2006:
Aviation Security:
Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better Management
Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than-
Lethal Weapons:
GAO-06-475:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-475, a report to the Honorable John L. Mica,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to
approve air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons,
including electric stun devices, onboard commercial aircraft to thwart
an attack. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, one air carrier
received approval to deploy electric stun devices. To address concerns
regarding reports of injuries after the use of these devices and to
ensure that the impacts of these devices onboard aircraft have been
fully evaluated, this report answers the following: (1) What analyses
has the federal government conducted to assess the safety and
effectiveness of these devices onboard commercial aircraft? (2) What
controls does TSA have in place to help ensure uniform and timely
review of air carrier requests to deploy these devices onboard
commercial aircraft?
What GAO Found:
The Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) have conducted reviews addressing the effect of
electric stun devices on aircraft. Plus, various federal as well as
other organizations examined the health effects that electric stun
devices have on individuals. But, no studies of health effects have
been conducted in an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to
National Institute of Justice (NIJ), although electric stun devices
have been used successfully many times to subdue suspects, certain
susceptible populations, such as the elderly and those with a history
drug and alcohol abuse, may be at risk for negative outcomes. In April
2002, NIJ concluded that the use of electric stun devices in accordance
with appropriate policies and training may be an effective means for
flight deck crews to thwart an attack but should not be deployed
without further testing. Similarly, in a 2003 report to Congress, TSA
generally concurred with NIJ‘s conclusions. But, neither review
included in-flight testing or empirical testing of these devices that
would demonstrate that they would enhance security. TSA‘s position is
that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft environment, is
necessary to determine if these devices can be used safely and
effectively.
TSA lacks key internal controls, to help ensure uniformity in decision
making and a transparent process to review requests to deploy electric
stun devices onboard commercial aircraft. Specifically, TSA (1) lacks a
well-defined organizational area with responsibility to receive and
review requests, (2) has not established formal criteria for decision
making to approve requests and has not communicated criteria to
external stakeholders, and (3) maintained little documentation of its
decision making and activities to account for its handling of past
requests. Without clearly defined approval criteria and a point of
contact, TSA cannot reasonably assure that its decision making is
uniform and consistent, nor can it provide a transparent request and
approval process for air carriers.
Figure: Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD):
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that should air carrier interest in deploying these
devices resume, TSA should ensure that there is reliable research
supporting their use in an aircraft environment and that the agency
implement internal controls to govern receipt and review of air carrier
requests. The Department of Homeland Security agreed with our
recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-475].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at 202-
512-8777 or berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Scope and Methodology:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Existing Reviews and Studies Do Not Provide Definitive Evidence of the
Safety and Security Effectiveness of Electric Stun Devices on board
Commercial Aircraft:
TSA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure Uniform and
Timely Review Regarding Requests for Use of Electric Stun Devices:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: TSA's Proposed List of Criteria for Evaluating Less-than-
Lethal Weapons requests:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figure:
Figure 1: Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD):
Abbreviations:
ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
EMDD: electro-muscular disruption device:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FFDO: Federal Flight Deck Officer:
LTL: less-than-lethal:
NIJ: National Institute of Justice:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TSL: Transportation Security Laboratory:
TSNM: Transportation Sector Network Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 26, 2006:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Aviation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to
approve air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons,
including electric stun devices[Footnote 1] on board commercial
aircraft for the purposes of thwarting an attack.[Footnote 2] Shortly
after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, two domestic and one
foreign air carrier requested approval to deploy electric stun devices
on board their commercial aircraft. The two domestic air carriers
sought approval to deploy these devices for flight deck crew (the pilot
and others within the cockpit) but after approximately 18 months
without a disposition from TSA, primarily citing confusion with the
review process chose to no longer pursue their requests. The foreign
air carrier, which sought approval to deploy the devices on
international flights to the United States for use by government law
enforcement officers and specially trained flight attendants, also
experienced extended delays before ultimately receiving approval in
December 2004 to deploy electric stun devices in its passenger
cabins.[Footnote 3] According to air carrier officials we spoke to,
since the establishment of additional security measures such as an
expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service,[Footnote 4] hardened
cockpit doors, 100 percent passenger and baggage screening, and
particularly initiation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO)
program,[Footnote 5] air carrier interest in deploying electric stun
devices to enhance security has diminished. Notwithstanding the current
lack of demonstrated interest, it is possible that demand among air
carriers to deploy these devices could resume in the future.
Due in part to recent reports regarding injuries after the use of
electric stun devices and the lack of regulations governing their
general use, the House Subcommittee on Aviation wants to ensure that
the impacts of using electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft
have been fully evaluated. Given this concern, this report addresses
the following questions:
* What analysis has the federal government conducted to assess the
safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices on board commercial
aircraft?
* What controls does TSA have in place to help ensure uniform and
timely review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun devices
on board commercial aircraft?
Scope and Methodology:
To determine what analysis the federal government had conducted to
assess the safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices on board
commercial aircraft, we conducted a literature search to identify the
extent of past research that had been done by various federal agencies
on the safety and effectiveness of deploying these devices on board
commercial aircraft. We also conducted a literature search of existing
studies addressing the health effects of these devices. We currently
have a separate ongoing engagement that is evaluating the extent to
which claims regarding the safety and effectiveness of electric stun
devices are supported by currently available scientific data. The
results of our literature searches were limited because no federal
studies or reviews examining the use of electric stun devices on board
commercial aircraft have been published since May 2003, and no studies
have been published examining the potential health effects of these
devices on individuals who are on board commercial aircraft. We
examined reviews produced by the Department of Justice's National
Institute of Justice (NIJ) and by Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL)[Footnote 6] as well as a
TSA report to Congress regarding the use of less-than-lethal weapons,
including electric stun devices, on board commercial aircraft and
reviewed the methodologies employed and the conclusions drawn. We also
examined Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reviews of test data
submitted by a commercial air carrier and spoke to the individual at
FAA who produced those reviews.
To assess what controls TSA put in place to help ensure uniform and
timely review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun devices
on board commercial aircraft, we reviewed TSA's handling of these
requests and compared this process to our Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 7] Specifically, to
determine how TSA ensures uniform and timely review of air carrier
requests, we interviewed cognizant TSA officials regarding their
processing of past requests and reviewed related documentation. Our
ability to obtain complete information at TSA was limited because,
according to TSA officials, individuals involved in reviewing past
requests from air carriers were no longer with the agency and only
limited documentation of the review process or supporting materials was
retained by TSA. However, we were able to obtain copies of some TSA
correspondence and other documents regarding the review process from
private sector officials involved in the requests. We interviewed
officials from FAA regarding their role and activities in reviewing
requests from commercial air carriers wishing to deploy less-than-
lethal weapons. We also interviewed officials from a nonprobability
sample of eight domestic air carriers selected based on number of
flights per year,[Footnote 8] two of which had requested permission
from TSA to deploy electric stun devices on board their aircraft.
Because this is a nonprobability sample, results of these interviews
cannot be generalized to the universe of air carriers. We also
interviewed officials from the one foreign air carrier that had
requested and received permission to deploy these devices on their
aircraft. In instances where air carriers had requested approval to
deploy these devices, we asked them to assess their experience with TSA
regarding any guidance provided and responsiveness to their requests.
We also interviewed officials from five domestic air industry
associations and obtained the views of two foreign air carrier
associations to determine their views on the general efficacy of using
electric stun devices on commercial aircraft.[Footnote 9]
We conducted our work between June 2005 and April 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The Transportation Security Administration, DHS Transportation Security
Laboratory, Federal Aviation Administration, and the National Institute
of Justice have conducted reviews addressing the effect of electric
stun devices on aircraft avionics. The TSA and TSL reviews also
addressed the potential security effectiveness of these devices. In
addition, various federal and other organizations have conducted
reviews addressing the health effects of electric stun devices on
individuals. However, no studies of health effects have been conducted
in an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to an NIJ official,
although electric stun devices have been used successfully many times
to subdue suspects, including individuals who may fall into certain
potentially susceptible populations, there is no independent research
to indicate whether these electric stun devices would be either safe or
unsafe. However, some susceptible populations such as the elderly and
those who have a sustained history of alcohol and illicit drug use may
be at greater risk for negative outcomes. NIJ recommended that study of
these issues be conducted and has initiated several projects in this
area. The TSL and the FAA each reviewed a study conducted in February
2002 by an air carrier regarding the effect of one model of electric
stun device on aircraft avionics and concurred with the carrier's
conclusion that the 50,000 volt device tested would be unlikely to harm
aircraft avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that the results
for the one type of device tested do not necessarily reflect how other
brands and models of electric stun devices may perform under similar
circumstances. For example, according to the TSL review, it is likely
that devices exceeding 100,000 volts would not be suitable for use on
aircraft. In April 2002, the NIJ concluded that the use of electric
stun devices in accordance with appropriate policies and training may
be an effective means for flight deck crews to thwart an
attack.[Footnote 10] Similarly, in a report to Congress issued in May
2003, which TSA officials told us consisted primarily of the results of
a literature search, TSA generally concurred with NIJ's conclusion but
further concluded that commercial aviation security may be enhanced
through deployment of these devices. Although both the TSA and the NIJ
reports provided a conceptual framework for determining the suitability
of electric stun devices in an aircraft environment, neither review
included in-flight testing or other empirical analysis to conclude that
electric stun devices offered additional security. In its report, NIJ
also concluded that electric stun devices should not be deployed in
aircraft until extensive testing had been completed in realistic
settings and on various types of aircraft. TSA's current position is
that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft environment, is
necessary to determine if these devices can be used safely and
effectively.
TSA lacks key internal controls, prescribed in our Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, to help ensure uniformity
in decision making and a clear and transparent process for reviewing
requests to deploy electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft.
Specifically, TSA:
* lacks a well-defined organizational area or individual with
responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests,
* has not established formal criteria for decision making to approve
requests and has not clearly communicated criteria to external
stakeholders, and:
* maintains little or no documentation of its decision making and
activities to account for its handling of past requests to deploy
electric stun devices.
Without clearly defined and communicated approval criteria and
organizational point of contact, TSA cannot have reasonable assurance
that its decision making is uniform and consistent, nor can it provide
a clear and transparent request and approval process for air carriers.
The lack of a formal system of record keeping also prevents TSA
management from ensuring consistency in decision making and diminishes
TSA's ability to be accountable to Congress and other stakeholders. TSA
officials were not able to tell us specifically why these controls were
not in place when prior applications were being reviewed. According to
TSA, air carriers have not expressed an interest in deploying electric
stun devices on board their aircraft since October 2004, and TSA does
not currently anticipate additional air carrier requests. However, TSA
stated that it would implement these internal controls for future
requests that may come in from air carriers.
In order to help ensure that TSA's review and approval process for the
use of less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, is
responsive, uniform, accountable, and serves the public interest, we
are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
Assistant Secretary, TSA, to ensure that there are reliable studies and
research supporting the use of less-than-lethal devices on commercial
aircraft should air carrier interest in deploying these devices resume.
Also, in order to help ensure consistency in decision making and
responsiveness to air carriers, we are recommending that the Secretary
of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, TSA, to implement
key internal controls related to TSA's handling of requests for the use
of less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, on board
commercial aircraft. In commenting on this report, TSA agreed with our
findings and recommendations and has begun to establish the framework
for a review process that will implement internal controls to more
effectively govern the receipt and review of any future requests by air
carriers to deploy LTL weapons on board their aircraft.
Background:
According to NIJ--the research, development, and evaluation agency
within DOJ--less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices,
are designed to incapacitate, confuse, delay, or restrain an adversary
in a variety of situations. Less-than-lethal weapons can be grouped
into six general categories: electric stun, chemical, impact
projectile, physical restraint, light, and acoustic. Preliminary
reviews conducted by NIJ and TSL identified that of the six different
less-than-lethal weapon categories, electric stun devices showed the
most promise for use on board commercial aircraft.
There are two types of electric stun devices that have potential use in
commercial aircraft according to a May 2003 TSA report. The first is a
handheld device with two probes that, when pressed against the skin or
clothing of an attacker and activated by the operator, produces a high
(50,000) voltage but low current discharge. When contact is made
between the attacker and the activated device, a circuit is completed,
and the subject receives a debilitating shock. The second type of
electric stun device is technically referred to as an electro-muscular
disruption device (EMDD). An EMDD fires two barbs connected to trailing
wires that lead back to the operator. When the barbs penetrate the
subject's skin or clothing, an electrical circuit is completed, and an
electrical discharge, similar to the direct contact device discharge,
automatically results causing an immediate loss of the person's
neuromuscular control and the ability to perform coordinated action for
the duration of the impulse. This barb type EMDD device, shown in
figure 1, is similar to the type considered for use by air carriers and
is hereafter referred to in this report as an electric stun device.
Figure 1: Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
TSA may provide air carriers operating to, from, or within the United
States with authorization to use less-than-lethal weapons, including
electric stun devices, on board their aircraft subject to legal and
regulatory considerations. For example, TSA must follow the
requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 44903(i) before granting an air carrier
request to arm members of the flight deck crew with electric stun
devices.[Footnote 11] Similarly, air carriers that request permission
to allow the use of such devices by persons other than flight deck crew
(such as government law enforcement officers and flight attendants--
persons situated outside of the cockpit), as was the case with the
foreign air carrier, must seek an amendment to its TSA-approved
security program.[Footnote 12] In the case of a foreign air carrier,
TSA may approve such an amendment if it finds that the security
program, as amended, continues to provide a level of protection similar
to the level provided by U.S. air carriers servicing the same
airports.[Footnote 13]
FAA also plays a collateral role in the determination of whether
electric stun devices can be deployed on board commercial
aircraft.[Footnote 14] FAA has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring
the safe operation of aircraft within the United States.[Footnote 15]
According to FAA officials, FAA certifies the airworthiness of all
domestic aircraft before they are put into service and performs
periodic safety inspections as part of FAA's safety oversight
responsibilities. FAA's airworthiness certifications, however, would
not address the use of electric stun devices because, according to FAA,
such devices fall within the category of portable electronic devices
that are not considered part of the aircraft itself. FAA's regulations
generally require the operator of the aircraft to determine whether a
portable electronic device will interfere with the safe operation of
the aircraft before allowing its operation on board.[Footnote 16]
Consequently, FAA does not formally approve the use of portable
electronic devices and would not for electric stun devices.[Footnote
17] According to FAA officials, if asked by an air carrier and
resources permitting, the agency could render a technical opinion on
the safety of such devices, but it is up to the air carrier to prove
that the device will not interfere, disturb, interrupt, or cause
catastrophic failure to the avionics of the aircraft. If FAA's review
of the air carrier's testing indicates that these devices may have some
adverse affect on aircraft avionics, FAA would bring it to the air
carrier's attention. According to FAA officials, the FAA does not issue
any documentation of approval or certification regarding the use of
portable electronic devices on aircraft. In particular, FAA officials
told us that it would not be appropriate for the agency to provide TSA
written approval for the use of any type of portable electric devices,
including less-than-lethal devices. Further, according to FAA
officials, the agency has no specific safety standard for less-than-
lethal devices. Officials added that for any electric stun devices
actually deployed on commercial aircraft, FAA would consider any safety
issues as part of its normal oversight inspections.
Officials from each of the eight domestic air carriers we interviewed
stated that after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, they
reassessed their security procedures in an effort to upgrade their
security posture. Among the security initiatives each air carrier
considered, was arming pilots with electric stun devices.
Representatives from the air carriers had mixed views on whether
electric stun devices or firearms would be their preferred security
measure within the cockpit. However, none of the domestic air carrier
officials we interviewed said their airlines had considered having
electric stun devices available for use by flight attendants in the
cabin, primarily because they believed carrying these devices is
incompatible with flight attendants' customer-service role. Shortly
after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, two domestic air
carriers sought TSA approval to allow flight-deck crews to use these
devices. In addition, one foreign air carrier made two separate
requests and ultimately received TSA approval in 2004 to deploy
electric stun devices to government law enforcement officers and
specially trained flight attendants situated in the passenger cabin of
its aircraft.
Domestic air carrier trade associations we interviewed generally
favored the use of firearms over electric stun devices on the flight
deck due to perceived vulnerabilities of the electric stun devices
against multiple attackers as well as the temporary effect that the
device may have. Similarly, the associations we interviewed expressed
concerns about possible failures of the devices at critical times and
simple countermeasures that could be used to limit their effectiveness.
Since the establishment of additional security measures after the
terrorist attacks of September 2001, such as an expanded Federal Air
Marshal Service, hardened cockpit doors, 100 percent passenger and
baggage screening, and particularly the voluntary arming of pilots
through the FFDO program, air carrier interest in deploying electric
stun devices to enhance security has diminished. Officials from some
air carriers we spoke to stated that the high cost of deployment of
electric stun devices as well as liability concerns, compared to the
liability relief afforded through the FFDO program, made the use of
electric stun devices relatively less attractive.[Footnote 18]
According to the Association of European Airlines, it is its general
position that the presence of weapons on board aircraft, be they lethal
or nonlethal, be they on the flight deck or in the passenger cabin,
should be prohibited. Similarly, the Association of Asian Pacific
Airlines said its member airlines are generally adamant about not
arming the cabin crew with any weapon on board an aircraft and are more
in favor of ground-based security approaches.
Existing Reviews and Studies Do Not Provide Definitive Evidence of the
Safety and Security Effectiveness of Electric Stun Devices on board
Commercial Aircraft:
The federal government has conducted limited reviews addressing the
effect of electric stun devices on individuals or aircraft avionics and
on their security effectiveness, none of which was supported by
empirical analysis or testing in an aircraft environment. Although
various federal and other organizations have reviewed the health
effects that electric stun devices have on individuals, studies have
not been conducted in an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to
an NIJ official, there is no independent research to indicate whether
these electric stun devices would be either safe or unsafe regarding
certain potentially susceptible populations. TSL and FAA each reviewed
a study conducted by an air carrier regarding the effect of one model
of electric stun device on aircraft avionics and concurred with its
conclusion that the device tested would be unlikely to harm aircraft
avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that the results for the
one type of device tested do not necessarily reflect how other brands
and models of electric stun devices may perform under similar
circumstances. NIJ concluded that the use of these devices in
accordance with appropriate policies and training may be an effective
means for flight deck crews to thwart an attack. Similarly, in a report
to Congress issued in May 2003, TSA generally concurred with NIJ's
conclusion and further concluded that commercial aviation security may
be enhanced through deployment of these devices. However, it concluded
that electric stun devices should not be deployed in aircraft until
extensive testing has been completed in realistic settings and on
various types of aircraft.
Federal and Other Organizations Have Reviewed Health Effects of
Electric Stun Devices, but NIJ Officials Recommended More Study:
Federal agencies and other organizations have conducted reviews
addressing the health effects of electric stun devices on individuals.
Moreover, according to an NIJ official, although electric stun devices
have been used successfully many times to subdue suspects, including
individuals who may fall into certain potentially susceptible
populations, there is no independent research to indicate whether these
electric stun devices would be either safe or unsafe. However, some
susceptible populations such as the elderly and those who have a
sustained history of alcohol and illicit drug use may be at greater
risk for negative outcomes. NIJ recommended that study of these issues
be conducted and has initiated several projects in this area.
The Federal Government Has Conducted Limited Analysis on the Effects of
Electric Stun Devices on Critical Aircraft Avionics:
The federal government has conducted limited analysis to determine if
electric stun devices would adversely affect aircraft avionics. In
April 2002, FAA, in its role of ensuring the safe operation of
aircraft, within the United States, reviewed test data submitted by a
domestic air carrier, regarding one specific electric stun device and
its potential effect on aircraft avionic systems.[Footnote 19] FAA
officials told us that they did not publish any results of this
preliminary review but did communicate to TSA that based on the air
carriers' test results; it did not believe the particular device tested
would have an adverse affect on aircraft avionics. FAA officials added
that if electric stun devices were actually deployed on commercial
aircraft, FAA would consider any safety issues as part of its normal
oversight inspections. Similarly, TSL published a review of the same
test data in September 2002. TSL's review focused on technical and
airworthiness factors including potential levels of electromagnetic
interference from discharging the electric stun device. Although FAA
and TSL have not performed any in-flight testing of their own, both
concurred with the conclusion of the air carrier study that the one
type of 50,000 volt electric stun device tested would be unlikely to
harm aircraft avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that the
results for the one type of device tested do not necessarily reflect
how other brands and models of electric stun devices may perform under
similar circumstances. For example, according to the TSL review, it is
likely that devices exceeding 100,000 volts would be unsuitable for use
on aircraft.
Federal Reviews Conclude Electric Stun Devices May Enhance Commercial
Aviation Security, but Supporting Analysis Is Limited:
In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that electric stun devices,
used in accordance with appropriate policies and training, may have the
potential to allow flight deck crews to thwart an attack while an
aircraft is in flight--i.e. interrupt an attack, control an aggressor,
or delay an attack while the flight crew safely lands the aircraft.
However, the report did not include any empirical testing of electric
stun devices in an aircraft setting to demonstrate how they would
enhance security. Rather, information for its report was derived by
reviewing existing information on electric stun devices as well as
meeting with experts from the aviation industry and persons experienced
in the design and use of less-than-lethal technology in settings other
than aircraft. To determine whether electric stun devices have the
potential to enhance aviation security, NIJ first identified certain
desirable characteristics in less-than-lethal weapons given the
environment that exists in an aircraft. Specifically, in commercial
aircraft (1) sensitive critical flight instruments are in continual
use; and (2) passenger and crew spaces are crowded and confined.
According to NIJ, given this environment, less-than-lethal weapons that
would be used to thwart attacks on board commercial aircraft should
exhibit the following characteristics:
* immediately incapacitate an aggressor;
* have quickly reversible and controllable effects;
* be usable in a confined space;
* be simple to operate;
* have multishot capability; and:
* not damage critical avionics (navigational, etc.)
Next, NIJ compared various categories of less-than-lethal weapons,
including electric stun devices, against these criteria. It concluded
that electric stun devices showed the most promise for use by flight
deck crews.
TSL, in a report issued in September 2002, concurred with NIJ's earlier
findings and similarly concluded that less-than-lethal weapons may
provide an additional layer of security and deterrence in the aviation
environment. However, the report focused primarily on the effects on
airworthiness and technical issues associated with electric stun
devices. References in the TSL report regarding the security benefits
associated with these weapons were based primarily on work previously
conducted by NIJ.
In a separate report to Congress issued in May 2003, TSA concluded that
commercial aviation security could be enhanced through the deployment
of electric stun devices. Although this report provided a conceptual
framework for evaluating the suitability of different categories of
less-than-lethal weapons for use in an aircraft environment, like the
NIJ study, no weapons were tested against various threat scenarios
including air piracy threats. TSA officials told us that this report
was hurriedly put together to meet a congressional mandate and that it
relied primarily on the earlier NIJ study and a review of other
literature. When asked about their current position regarding the use
of electric stun devices on board aircraft, TSA officials told us that
empirical data and operational case studies, particularly in the
aircraft environment, would be necessary to determine whether these
devices can be deployed safely, effectively, and in a tactically
reasonable manner.
Similar to NIJ, TSA, to conduct its review, assessed the
characteristics of various categories of less-than-lethal weapons--
including electric stun devices, chemical (conventional), chemical
(sedative), impact projectile, physical restraint, light, and acoustic
and malodorous weapons--against a predetermined set of criteria to
determine their suitability for use in a commercial aircraft
environment. These criteria covered the following aspects related to
the devices:
* currently used in law enforcement;
* potential to cause collateral damage;
* potential to cause catastrophic aircraft failure;
* how quickly effects occur;
* reversibility of effects;
* potential for unintended consequences or other deployment concerns;
and:
* relative effectiveness to deter or defeat threats.
After comparing each category of less-than-lethal weapon to the
criteria, like NIJ, TSA concluded that only electric stun devices may
be suitable for aircraft deployment.
The National Institute of Justice Identified Areas for Further Research
Regarding Electric Stun Devices:
In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that each type of less-than-
lethal weapon poses either safety or effectiveness issues that should
be tested further in multiple aircraft settings before any deployment.
It also concluded that systematic testing of the weapons' effects on
critical aircraft avionics is essential to ensure they will not damage
or disable flight systems. Further, the report noted that the most
important unknown with these devices is the potential effect of a high-
voltage electrical discharge on aircraft avionics. Therefore, NIJ
concluded that electric stun devices should not be deployed in aircraft
until extensive testing has been completed in realistic settings and on
various types of aircraft.
TSA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure Uniform and
Timely Review Regarding Requests for Use of Electric Stun Devices:
TSA has not established processes and procedures for reviewing requests
from air carriers to deploy electric stun devices on board their
aircraft that include (1) well defined key areas of authority and
responsibility, (2) clearly communicated information regarding decision-
making criteria to TSA decision makers and their external stakeholders,
and (3) a records system to account for handling of requests and
supporting documentation--three key internal controls called for by the
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. TSA officials
were not able to tell us specifically why these controls were not in
place when prior applications were being reviewed. TSA officials stated
that they currently do not plan to establish these controls because air
carriers have not expressed an interest to TSA in deploying these
devices since October 2004, and officials do not anticipate additional
air carrier requests.
A Lack of Well-Defined Areas of Responsibility Led to Air Carriers'
Confusion Regarding the Status of Their Requests:
TSA does not have a well-defined organizational area or individual with
responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests from air carriers
interested in requesting approval to deploy electric stun devices on
board their aircraft to enhance security. Internal control standards in
the federal government state that to have an effective control
environment it is important for agencies to clearly define key areas of
authority and responsibility. Officials from all three air carriers
that had submitted requests to TSA to deploy electric stun devices on
board commercial aircraft told us that they had experienced confusion
regarding the status and disposition of their requests and were unaware
to whom they should have directed inquiries. For example, an official
from one domestic air carrier stated that it was in contact with
multiple TSA personnel but were not sure which individual was in charge
of reviewing electric stun device requests or whether the information
it received from TSA was accurate and authoritative. We also noted
during our review of TSA documentation that in at least one instance, a
TSA official requested information from an air carrier that had
previously been received by the agency.
As the National Strategy for Homeland Security indicates and as we have
reported in previous work, securing the nation requires effective
partnerships with the private sector.[Footnote 20] Air carriers that
seek to enhance security measures on board their aircraft offer an
opportunity for such partnership. However, without a clearly defined
organizational area or individual within TSA to review requests and
communicate effectively with the requesting air carrier officials, TSA
cannot be a responsive and effective partner.
According to TSA officials, there is currently no organizational area
or individual responsible for receipt or review of requests from air
carriers that may wish to deploy electric stun devices on board their
aircraft because of the lack of demonstrated interest from air
carriers.
TSA Has Not Established and Clearly Communicated Formal Criteria or
Guidelines for Decision Making to Internal or External Stakeholders:
TSA has not established and communicated a formalized set of criteria
to evaluate air carriers' requests to deploy electric stun devices as a
security measure on board their aircraft. Internal control standards in
the federal government state that for a federal agency or private
sector entity to run and control its operations effectively, it must
have relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to internal
as well as external events. Although TSA received requests from three
air carriers to deploy these devices, it did not have criteria
established within the agency and communicated to air carriers that
would (1) help ensure uniform decision making and (2) make requirements
for approval clear to all parties.
The lack of established and well-communicated criteria resulted in
inefficient handling of requests that made the process more difficult
for the air carriers. In particular, TSA made multiple requests for
nearly a year and a half for information from the two domestic air
carriers that requested permission to deploy electric stun devices,
without clearly communicating what would be required for approving
their requests or clearly explaining why additional information was
being requested. Ultimately, one domestic air carrier withdrew its
request to use electric stun devices in June 2003, primarily citing
confusion over TSA's protracted approval process. The other domestic
air carrier that had requested permission to deploy the devices did not
formally withdraw its request, but also made the decision in June 2003
not to further pursue the initiative. One of these air carriers also
cited mitigating security measures such as the FFDO program and
reinforced cockpit doors that had been implemented as an additional
reason why it did not continue pursuing the deployment of electric stun
devices and also the additional costs of implementing a less-than-
lethal weapons program.
In its May 2003 report to Congress, TSA proposed a number of key
criteria for evaluating requests from air carriers to deploy less-than-
lethal devices on board their aircraft. Among these criteria was the
need for (1) an appropriate training regimen, (2) procedures of use,
and (3) assurance from the air carriers that the devices would provide
passenger safety. However, these criteria were not formally established
for use by TSA decision makers when evaluating air carrier requests nor
communicated to air carriers interested in requesting permission to use
these devices. We have included a list of these proposed criteria in
appendix I of this report. In addition to making the request process
consistent and clear, establishing criteria can help the agency ensure
that any approvals for the use of electric stun devices on board
commercial aircraft are compatible with TSA's mission to ensure the
security of the nation's transportation system and the traveling
public. For example, in the case of criteria governing training, we
have previously reported that any civilian electric-stun-device
training curriculum should have a very explicit use-of-force policy.
Unlike police officers, civilians are not generally experienced in
deciding whether the use of force is justified and, if so, to what
extent. Therefore, it should be the goal of any training curricula for
persons authorized to utilize electric stun devices, such as aircraft
flight deck or cabin crew members, to involve as many scenarios as
possible so that the trainee understands what level of force is
appropriate.[Footnote 21]
Although TSA has no supporting documentation of having applied the
criteria proposed in its 2003 report to requests submitted by
commercial air carriers, according to agency officials, TSA took into
account these considerations when ultimately approving the foreign air
carrier request in December 2004. TSA officials further told us that
any additional requests would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
using similar considerations. However, without establishing and clearly
communicating criteria and information needs both internally and
externally, TSA cannot have reasonable assurance that its decision
making will be uniform, consistent, compatible with its mission and
clear and transparent for air carriers seeking approval to deploy these
devices. TSA officials stated that they still consider the criteria
contained in the May 2003 report to the Congress appropriate and
current for use in handling any requests by air carriers to implement a
less-than-lethal weapons program.
TSA officials said that they could not fully explain the delays in
addressing the early requests from the air carriers because the persons
involved with the initial request reviews are no longer with the
agency. Officials stated that at the time of the initial requests,
there was a high rate of turnover and a rapid rate of change associated
with the formation of TSA as a new agency. Officials further stated
that the agency was not fully ready to address requests to deploy
electric stun devices before the time the foreign air carrier request
was reviewed in 2004. Even at that point, TSA officials said that they
planned to review each application that was received on a case-by-case
basis since they did not expect a high demand from air carriers to
deploy these devices. According to TSA officials, since 2004, no other
carriers have expressed an interest in electric stun devices as a
security measure. TSA officials told us that because of this lack of
interest, no program requirements or criteria were ever formalized
regarding the use of electric stun devices on commercial aircraft;
however, if future requests are received, TSA would take steps to
formalize these criteria into specific guidelines for the application
review process.
We asked TSA officials how they planned to address any potential future
requests from air carriers to deploy less-than-lethal weapons including
electric stun devices on board their aircraft. They stated that the TSA
Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM) Airlines office would
take the lead for any requests from domestic air carriers. For foreign
air carriers, TSNM's International Division will take the lead.
Further, a working evaluation group, consisting of the Federal Air
Marshal Service, Office of Chief Counsel, and other program offices at
the discretion of the administrator will be involved in the review
process. According to TSA, this group will provide their respective
expertise and recommendations to the lead office. Each lead office will
be responsible for resolving differences, keeping diligent records of
the review process, the ultimate approval or disapproval decision, and
responding to the requesting air carriers in a timely manner.
TSA Has Not Maintained Documentation of Its Activities and Key
Decisions Related to Electric Stun Device Requests:
For the three requests submitted, TSA did not record (1) the rationale
for and outcome of its decision making regarding requests to deploy
electric stun devices or (2) the information and documentation
exchanged between the agency and air carriers. According to the
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, agency
activities should be promptly recorded to maintain their relevance and
value to management in controlling operations and making decisions.
This applies to the entire process, from initiation and authorization
through final classification. Moreover, to help ensure accountability
and internal oversight, this documentation should be readily available
for examination by TSA management, Congress, and other appropriate
external parties. Although, in its 2003 report to Congress, TSA stated
that its Office of Aviation Operations would maintain a system of
records for requests to deploy electric stun devices, few records were
kept. Agency officials told us that they maintained only limited
documentation regarding the foreign air carrier's request and
maintained no documentation regarding the receipt and review of request
materials submitted by the two domestic air carriers. Without a system
of documentation, TSA management will not be able to review decisions
to help ensure consistency and responsiveness to air carriers making
requests, nor will TSA be able to readily make documentation available
for examination by Congress and other appropriate external parties. As
we noted above, TSA told us that, in the future, it plans to keep
diligent records of the review process and ultimate approval or
disapproval decisions for all requests from air carriers.
Conclusions:
Due primarily to other enhancements in aviation security since 2001,
there appears to be no demonstrated interest on the part of air
carriers to introduce less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun
devices, on their aircraft. However, should interest in such measures
resume, federal government reviews to date have identified areas in
need of further study before these devices are deployed on board
commercial aircraft. In particular, it would be important for TSA to
know the appropriateness of the devices in an aircraft environment,
effects on the safe operation of the aircraft, effects on passenger
safety, and how such devices would enhance security.
Also, should interest in using less-than-lethal devices on aircraft
resume, TSA would not be in the best position to address new requests
in an efficient and effective manner. Without internal controls to
govern its process for receiving and reviewing requests from air
carriers, TSA would lack assurance that its decision making is
appropriate and necessary and serves the public interest. Specifically,
without a well-defined organizational area or individual with
responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests, TSA cannot be a
responsive and effective partner with private sector air carriers. In
addition, it will not be able to provide a clear and transparent
request process for air carriers. Without established and clearly
communicated information regarding decision-making criteria, within TSA
and for its external stakeholders, TSA lacks reasonable assurance that
its decision making will be uniform, consistent, and compatible with
its mission. Although TSA outlined criteria in a 2003 Report to
Congress for use in examining requests from air carriers, the agency
never formalized any criteria for use by decision makers, nor did it
communicate clear criteria to air carriers making requests for
approval. Finally, without documentation of key activities and
decisions related to less-than-lethal device requests, TSA cannot
ensure accountability in handling such requests and the availability of
documentation for examination by Congress and other external parties.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to help ensure TSA's review and approval process for the use
of any less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, is
responsive, uniform, accountable, consistently applied and serves the
public interest, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration,
to take the following two actions, should commercial air carrier
interest in deploying these devices resume:
* Ensure that there is sufficiently reliable research supporting the
use of less-than-lethal devices being requested that, at a minimum,
address the appropriateness of their usage in the unique aircraft
environment, including passenger safety, how the use of these devices
would enhance security, and the effects of these devices on the safe
operation of the aircraft.
* Establish appropriate internal controls to govern air carriers'
requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons including electric stun
devices on board their aircraft, including (1) clearly defining the
organizational area or individual within TSA with the authority and
responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests; (2) establishing a
records system to help ensure accountability; and (3) formalizing and
clearly communicating criteria for approving requests both within the
responsible area of TSA and to interested air carriers.
Agency Comments:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from DHS, FAA and NIJ.
FAA and NIJ provided technical comments, which have been incorporated
in this report where appropriate. We received written comments from DHS
on May 5, 2006. DHS agreed with our report and recommendations stating
that our findings and recommendations will aid in the development of a
more effective and efficient review process if interest by air carriers
in less-than-lethal (LTL) weapons resumes at a future date. According
to DHS, since our review, TSA has begun to establish the framework for
a review process if additional applications for LTL weapons are
received. For future LTL weapons applications, the Transportation
Sector Network Management (TSNM) Airlines Division or the TSNM
International Division will take the lead for domestic and
international applications respectively. An evaluation working group,
consisting of the Federal Air Marshal Service, Office of Chief Counsel,
and other program offices, at the discretion of the administrator, will
be involved in the review process. This group will provide their
respective expertise and recommendations, with the lead office
responsible for ensuring progress, resolving differences, and keeping
diligent records of the review and ultimate approval or disapproval.
The full text of DHS's comments is included as appendix II.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 18 days
from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Director, Office
Management and Budget; and any other interested parties. We will also
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report or wish to discuss it
further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at berrickc@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. See appendix III
for a list of major contributors to this report.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
[End of section]
Appendix I: TSA's Proposed List of Criteria for Evaluating Less-than-
Lethal Weapons requests:
* Separate requests--There must be a separate request (application) for
each type of LTL device that is proposed for use.
* Method of deployment must be articulated--Where and how will the LTL
device be transported, utilized, and stored aboard aircraft.
* Aircrew selection--What are the air carrier's procedures to ensure
that an unqualified crew member does not obtain access to the LTL
devices? This would include crew members identified in need of anger
management assistance.
* Well-documented incoming information--Incoming correspondence must be
well documented and articulate clearly why a device that is being
submitted for approval. The information contained must, at the very
least, provide evidence that the product is known to the industry, with
viable and recent studies and research supporting its use in the
aircraft environment and that the product meets safety standards set by
the Federal Aviation Administration.
* Threshold of protection--The correspondence must contain language
that enumerates how an LTL device meets the threshold of protection for
the cockpit, aircraft and passenger safety. It must include any
completed studies on LTL devices and their use in the cockpit and cabin
of the aircraft, the appropriateness for their usage in this unique
environment and how it would not produce catastrophic failure of the
aircraft.
* Enumerate procedures--The air carrier must clearly state its policy
and the procedures it will employ, including legal considerations and
similar issues. The air carrier would articulate the escalation/de-
escalation for the use of force (Common Strategy and DOJ Use of Force
Policy). This could include awareness of problem, deterrence,
avoidance, verbalization, empty hand control, intermediate device (LTL
device) and any other self-defense techniques.
* Procedures for the LTL device--The procedures for the use of an LTL
device must accompany any written request explaining the process for
use of a product. Details of procedures to ensure that any LTL device
is not deployed on aircraft destined for international venues must be
included.
* Training regimen--The air carrier must be able to articulate its
training regimen and the manner in which pilots and/or flight
attendants have been educated and trained on the requested device to be
used and re-certification protocols. TSA's Office of Training and
Quality Performance will review any proposal, make recommendations, and
in conjunction with Office of Aviation Operations, approve training
manuals and processes associated with initial and re-certification
training as a part of the carrier's request to employ LTL devices.
* Provide documented evidence--The requesting air carrier must provide
documentary evidence, including testimony about the devices by subject
matter experts. These should be attached to the carrier's proposal.
* Provide documentation of FAA approval--A letter from the FAA
approving the use of an less-than-lethal device based on its meeting
safety standards imposed by the FAA demonstrating that the device will
not interfere, disturb, interrupt, or cause catastrophic failure to the
avionics of the aircraft.
(Foregoing is TSA text.)
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
Homeland Security:
May 8, 2006:
Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Berrick:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on draft report GAO-06-475,
Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better
Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying
Less-than-Lethal Weapons. Technical comments have been provided under
separate cover.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurs with the
recommendations and appreciates the time and resources that the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has devoted to this important
review. The recommendations and findings of this report will aid in the
development of a more effective and efficient review process if
interest by air carriers in Less-than-Lethal (LTL) weapons regenerates
at a future date.
Since GAO's review, TSA has begun to establish the framework for a
review process if additional applications for LTL weapons are received.
For future LTL weapons applications, Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA's) Office of Transportation Sector Network
Management (TSNM) Airlines Division or the TSNM International Division
will take the lead for domestic and international applications,
respectively. An evaluation working group, consisting of the Federal
Air Marshal Service, Office of Chief Counsel, and other program
offices, at the discretion of the Assistant Secretary, will be involved
in the review process. This group will provide their respective
expertise and recommendations, with the lead office responsible for
ensuring progress to meet the congressionally required 90-day response
time, resolving differences, and keeping diligent records of the review
and ultimate approval/disapproval.
For the past application, TSA used the ten guidelines listed on pages
22-23 of the Report to Congress on Less-than-Lethal Weapons dated May
25, 2003. These guidelines are still appropriate and current. Were
future LTL weapons applications to be received, TSA would take steps to
formalize these guidelines into specific criteria for the LTL weapons
application review process.
As you are well aware, TSA currently has no applications from any air
carrier, domestic or foreign, for an LTL weapons program. With recent
organizational changes across the agency, TSA is now better prepared to
work with its industry stakeholders and to utilize the GAO
recommendations to more efficiently respond to and document any future
LTL weapons program requests. TSA appreciates these findings, and will
stand ready to implement them if air carriers resume interest in LTL
weapons programs at a future date.
With regard to the draft report's specific recommendations, we submit
the following:
Should commercial air carrier interest in deploying these devices
resume, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration to take the
following two actions:
Recommendation 1: Ensure that there is sufficiently reliable research
supporting the use of less-than-lethal devices being requested that, at
a minimum, address the appropriateness of their usage in the unique
aircraft environment, including passenger safety, how the use of these
devices would enhance security, and the effects of these devices on the
safe operation of the aircraft.
TSA Concurs. TSA agrees that sufficient reliable research supporting
the use of less-than-lethal devices should be conducted. TSA is not
responsible for certification of aircraft and aircraft systems. Future
Less-than-Lethal (LTL) weapon applications would have to include
appropriate documentation, research, etc., to support the air carrier's
request and to demonstrate that the weapon would not have an adverse
impact on the aircraft or aircraft systems. TSA will formally request
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) expert analysis and
conclusions on any possible effects of LTL weapons or any other weapons
deemed intrinsically dangerous, (specific weapons on the specific types
of aircraft operated by the applicant carrier), and will approve or
disapprove an application accordingly to ensure the safety and security
of airline passengers.
Recommendation 2: Establish appropriate internal controls to govern
receipt and review of air carrier requests, including: (1) clearly
defining the organizational area or individual within TSA with the
authority and responsibility for; (2) establishing a records system to
help ensure accountability; and (3) formalizing and clearly
communicating criteria for approving requests to employ less-than-
lethal weapons including electric stun devices both within the
responsible area of TSA and to interested air carriers.
TSA Concurs. For future LTL applications, TSA's Office of
Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM) Airlines Division or
the TSNM International Division will take the lead for domestic and
international applications, respectively. An evaluation working group,
consisting of the Federal Air Marshal Service, Office of Chief Counsel,
and other program offices, at the discretion of the Assistant
Secretary, will be involved in the review process. This group will
provide their respective expertise and recommendations, with the lead
office responsible for ensuring progress to meet the congressionally
required 90-day response time, resolving differences, and keeping
diligent records of the review and ultimate approval/ disapproval.
For the past application, TSA used the ten guidelines listed on pages
22-23 of the Report to Congress on Less-than-Lethal Weapons dated May
25, 2003. These guidelines are still appropriate and current. Were
future LTL weapons applications to be received, TSA would take steps to
formalize these guidelines into specific criteria for the LTL weapons
application review process.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-8777:
Staff Acknowledgments:
The following teams and individuals contributed to this report: William
W. Crocker III, Assistant Director; Robert J. Rivas, J. Michael
Bollinger, John P. Stradling, and Kathryn E. Godfrey, Homeland Security
and Justice; David P. Alexander, Applied Research & Methodology; and
Thomas F. Lombardi, Office of General Counsel:
FOOTNOTES
[1] Less-than-lethal weapons have been developed to provide law
enforcement, corrections, and military personnel with an alternative to
lethal force. Weapons of this type include, among others, chemical,
electromuscular inhibitor devices (more commonly known as electric stun
devices), and impact projectiles. They are designed to temporarily
incapacitate, confuse, delay, and restrain an adversary in a variety of
situations. Less-than-lethal weapons are most often used when, (1)
lethal force is not appropriate; (2) lethal force is justified but less
force may subdue an aggressor; or (3) lethal force is justified but its
use could cause collateral effects, such as injury to bystanders or
life threatening damage to property and environment. By comparing the
environment on board an aircraft with the attributes of various less-
than-lethal weapons, the National Institute of Justice and TSA
concluded that electric stun devices showed the most promise and were
the only acceptable less-than-lethal weapon for use on commercial
aircraft. Therefore, this report focuses on the use of electric stun
devices.
[2] See, e.g., Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No.
107-71, § 126(b), 115 Stat. 597, 632 (2001) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 44903(i)). See also, e.g., 49 C.F.R. Pt. 1546.
[3] The foreign air carrier initially requested to deploy these devices
on international flights to the U.S. in March 2002. It subsequently
renewed its request in May 2004. Obtaining TSA authorization to deploy
such devices required the foreign air carrier to amend, and TSA to
approve, its security program. See 49 C.F.R. § 1546.105.
[4] The Federal Air Marshal Service consists of trained and armed civil
aviation security specialists that are deployed on board aircraft to
protect passengers, crew, and aircraft from terrorist activities on
both domestic and international fights.
[5] Commercial pilots who volunteer to participate in the Federal
Flight Deck Officers Program are trained and equipped with firearms to
protect the aircraft cockpit. The pilots are deputized as federal
flight deck officers. See 49 U.S.C. § 44921.
[6] The Transportation Security Laboratory was within the
Transportation Security Administration until October 2005 when it was
transferred to the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department
of Homeland Security.
[7] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November
1999).
[8] Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations
are selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using
specific characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from
nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a
population because in a nonprobability sample some elements of the
population being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being
selected as part of the sample.
[9] The domestic trade associations were the Air Line Pilots
Association, Air Transport Association, Association of Flight
Attendants, Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations, and Regional
Airline Association. The foreign airline associations we contacted were
Association of European Airlines and the Association of Asian Pacific
Airlines.
[10] Section 126(a) of Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
required the National Institute of Justice to assess the range of less-
than-lethal weaponry available for use by a flight deck crew member to
temporarily incapacitate an individual who presents a clear and present
danger to the safety of the aircraft, its passengers, or individuals on
the ground and report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary
of Transportation within 90 days after the date of enactment of the
act. See National Institute of Justice, Less-than-lethal Weaponry for
Aircraft Security (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2002).
[11] Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44903(i), TSA may authorize members of a
flight deck crew to carry less-than-lethal weapons if, in accordance
with recommendations of the NIJ, it determines, with approval of the
Attorney General and Secretary of State, that deploying such weapons is
appropriate, necessary, and would effectively serve the public interest
in avoiding air piracy. Upon granting such authority TSA must prescribe
rules for training such crew members in the proper use of the weapons
and guidelines setting forth circumstances under which the weapons may
be used.
[12] For example, the foreign air carrier sought to amend its TSA-
approved security program to allow for the use of electric stun devices
by armed law enforcement officers and specially trained flight
attendants in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 1546.105.
[13] See 49 C.F.R. § 1546.103(a)(1) (providing that a foreign air
carrier security program is only acceptable to TSA if it provides
passengers a similar level of protection); but see 49 U.S.C. § 44906
(requiring that the foreign air carrier security program adhere to
identical measures (emphasis added)).
[14] For example, 49 U.S.C. § 114(f) (13) imposes upon TSA a duty to
work in conjunction with FAA regarding any actions or activities that
may affect aviation safety or air carrier operations. In addition, §
114(l)(4) prohibits TSA from taking an aviation security action if the
FAA Administrator notifies TSA that the action could adversely affect
the airworthiness of an aircraft. TSA may then only proceed with such
action if the Secretary of Transportation subsequently approves the
action.
[15] FAA is responsible for ensuring the safe flight of domestic air
carriers, but also has responsibilities, though more limited in scope,
for the safety of foreign air carriers operating to, from, or within
the United States. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 129.
[16] See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91.21 (governing the use of portable
electronic devices on board aircraft). FAA regulations do not require
air carriers to submit findings to FAA or obtain the agency's approval
before authorizing the use of a portable electronic device on board the
aircraft.
[17] Regardless, air carriers must obtain TSA authorization before
deploying or allowing electric stun devices on board aircraft flying
to, from, or within the U.S. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 1544.201(d).
[18] 49 U.S.C. § 44921(h) provides liability protections to air
carriers and FFDO's from liability arising out of an FFDO's use or
failure to use a firearm.
[19] The domestic air carrier tested one model of electric stun device
in a number of aircraft models within its fleet and on the ground.
[20] GAO, Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and
Challenges Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-
05-33 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005).
[21] GAO, Taser Weapons: Use of Tasers by Selected Law Enforcement
Agencies, GAO-05-464 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005). For example,
pursuant to any authorization granted by TSA for an air carrier's
flight deck crew members to carry a less-than-lethal weapon under §
44903(i), TSA must prescribe rules requiring that any such crew member
be trained in the proper use of the weapon and guidelines setting forth
the circumstances under which such weapons may be used.
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