Air Traffic Control Modernization
Status of the Current Program and Planning for the Next Generation Air Transportation System Gao ID: GAO-06-653T June 21, 2006The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) effort to modernize the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system has been listed by GAO as a high risk program for more than a decade now, due to systemic management and acquisition problems. Two relatively new organizations housed within FAA--the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)--have been given the bulk of the responsibility for planning and implementing these modernization efforts. Congress created ATO to be a performance-based organization that would improve the culture, structure, and processes and improve accountability in the ATC modernization program. Congress created JPDO, made up of seven partner agencies, to coordinate the federal and nonfederal stakeholders necessary to plan a transition from the current air transportation system to the "next generation air transportation system" (NGATS). This testimony is based on GAO's recently completed and ongoing studies of the ATC modernization program. GAO provides information on (1) the status of ATO's efforts to implement processes and other initiatives aimed at efficiently managing and modernizing the current ATC system and (2) the status of JPDO's planning efforts and the key challenges that JPDO faces in planning for NGATS.
ATO has made significant progress toward the efficient management of the nation's ATC system, but faces several challenges. ATO has implemented organizational and business process changes, and has taken steps to increase scrutiny of its acquisition decisions. ATO has met its acquisition performance goal for the second consecutive year--that is, 80 percent of its system acquisitions are on schedule and within 10 percent of budget. ATO has identified cost savings opportunities through consolidation of administrative activities and outsourcing. However, ATO faces several challenges, including sustaining and institutionalizing its progress toward operating effectively as a performance-based organization, hiring and training thousands of air traffic controllers, ensuring stakeholder involvement in major system acquisitions, and keeping acquisitions on schedule and within budget. JPDO is making progress in its planning for NGATS, but faces several challenges. JPDO is implementing a number of practices that our work has shown facilitates the federal interagency collaboration that is central to its mission and legislative mandate. However, JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and technological resources needed to continue developing plans and system requirements for NGATS. Thus, a challenge may arise in leveraging the resources of the partner agencies. As part of its planning, JPDO is working to develop a cost estimate for NGATS through a series of workshops with various stakeholders. JPDO has taken several important first steps and is following effective practices in developing an NGATS enterprise architecture--a blueprint for NGATS and one of the most critical planning documents in the NGATS effort. JPDO faces several challenges, including maintaining stakeholder support over the long term, defining roles and responsibilities and deciding how to coordinate the implementation of NGATS, and addressing several critical policy issues, such as the extent to which NGATS will accommodate visual flights versus instrument-only flights.
GAO-06-653T, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Status of the Current Program and Planning for the Next Generation Air Transportation System
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 21, 2006:
Air Traffic Control Modernization:
Status of the Current Program and Planning for the Next Generation Air
Transportation System:
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-06-653T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-653T, testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Federal Aviation Administration‘s (FAA) effort to modernize the
nation‘s air traffic control (ATC) system has been listed by GAO as a
high risk program for more than a decade now, due to systemic
management and acquisition problems. Two relatively new organizations
housed within FAA”the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and the Joint
Planning and Development Office (JPDO)”have been given the bulk of the
responsibility for planning and implementing these modernization
efforts. Congress created ATO to be a performance-based organization
that would improve the culture, structure, and processes and bring
accountability to the ATC modernization program. Congress created JPDO,
made up of seven partner agencies, to coordinate the federal and
nonfederal stakeholders necessary to plan a transition from the current
air transportation system to the ’next generation air transportation
system“ (NGATS). This testimony is based on GAO‘s recently completed
and ongoing studies of the ATC modernization program. GAO provides
information on (1) the status of ATO‘s efforts to implement processes
and other initiatives aimed at efficiently managing and modernizing the
current ATC system and (2) the status of JPDO‘s planning efforts and
the key challenges that JPDO faces in planning for NGATS.
What GAO Found:
ATO has made significant progress toward the efficient management of
the nation‘s ATC system, but faces several challenges. ATO has
implemented organizational and business process changes, and has taken
steps to increase scrutiny of its acquisition decisions. ATO has met
its acquisition performance goal for the second consecutive year”that
is, 80 percent of its system acquisitions are on schedule and within 10
percent of budget. ATO has identified cost savings opportunities
through consolidation of administrative activities and outsourcing.
However, ATO faces several challenges, including sustaining and
institutionalizing its progress toward operating effectively as a
performance-based organization, hiring and training thousands of air
traffic controllers, ensuring stakeholder involvement in major system
acquisitions, and keeping acquisitions on schedule and within budget.
JPDO is making progress in its planning for NGATS, but faces several
challenges. JPDO is implementing a number of practices that our work
has shown facilitates the federal interagency collaboration that is
central to its mission and legislative mandate. However, JPDO is
fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks authority
over the key human and technological resources needed to continue
developing plans and system requirements for NGATS. Thus, a challenge
may arise in leveraging the resources of the partner agencies. As part
of its planning, JPDO is working to develop a cost estimate for NGATS
through a series of workshops with various stakeholders. JPDO has taken
several important first steps and is following effective practices in
developing an NGATS enterprise architecture”a blueprint for NGATS and
one of the most critical planning documents in the NGATS effort. JPDO
faces several challenges, including maintaining stakeholder support
over the long term, defining roles and responsibilities and deciding
how to coordinate the implementation of NGATS, and addressing several
critical policy issues, such as the extent to which NGATS will
accommodate visual flights versus instrument-only flights.
Figure: Air Traffic Management:
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-653T].
To view the full product, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham, at (202) 512-2834 or
dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the status of efforts by the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and
the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to modernize and
transform the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system. Both
organizations are within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
represent recent efforts by Congress to, among others things, ensure a
national airspace system that is safe, efficient, and capable of
meeting a growing demand for air transportation--a demand that is
expected to triple by 2025. ATO has responsibility for operating,
maintaining, and modernizing the current ATC system. ATO was authorized
as a performance-based organization (PBO)[Footnote 1] in 2000 and
includes 36,000 of FAA's roughly 46,000 employees. JPDO, authorized in
2003, is responsible for planning and coordinating the broader and
longer-term transformation (through 2025) to the "next generation air
transportation system" (NGATS). JPDO is conducting its work with the
assistance of seven partner agencies: the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation; FAA; the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office
of Science and Technology Policy.
In 1981, FAA began a program to replace and upgrade ATC facilities and
equipment, but encountered chronic cost, schedule, and performance
problems, leading us to classify FAA's ATC modernization program as
high risk in 1995.[Footnote 2] We have issued a series of reports on
these problems and made numerous recommendations over the years. Our
reports focused on many aspects of the national airspace system,
including the management of modernization projects; the management of
the information technology that is at the heart of many modern ATC
systems; the challenges FAA faces in increasing system capacity and
reducing delays; and an acquisition workforce culture that lacked the
mission focus, accountability, coordination, and adaptability needed
for FAA to meet its cost, schedule, and performance targets. FAA has
implemented many of our recommendations to varying degrees.
System modernization, as envisioned in NGATS and being planned by JPDO,
will be costly and will have to compete with other national priorities
and demands for resources. ATO will be especially challenged to
maintain the current ATC system while simultaneously developing and
transitioning to the future system. These tasks will require ATO to
make the best and most efficient use of increasingly scarce resources.
Additionally, the transition also involves the recognition that other
nations are upgrading their aviation systems, creating a need for
global harmonization to support international travel and commerce.
My statement today focuses on two key questions. (1) What is the status
of ATO's efforts to implement processes and other initiatives aimed at
efficiently managing and modernizing the current ATC system? (2) What
is the status of JPDO's planning efforts, and what are the key
challenges that JPDO faces in planning for NGATS? My statement is based
on our recently completed and ongoing studies of FAA's ATC
modernization program, together with updated information from ATO and
JPDO officials and aviation stakeholder[Footnote 3]s. Later this year,
we expect to issue two detailed reports related to the issues discussed
in this statement. One report will provide our assessment of the status
of JPDO's efforts to plan for the development of NGATS. Another report
will examine financial management issues at FAA, including options for
cost savings and alternative funding mechanisms. We are performing our
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
The following is a summary of our findings to date:
* ATO has made significant progress toward the efficient management of
the nation's ATC system, but faces several challenges. ATO has
implemented organizational and business process changes to improve
management of the ATC modernization program. ATO has taken several
steps to increase its scrutiny of its acquisition decisions, in part by
ensuring executive-level oversight of key decisions and improving
understanding of system requirements to avoid delays and cost overruns.
ATO has met its acquisition performance goal for the second consecutive
year--that is, 80 percent of its system acquisitions are on schedule
and within 10 percent of budget. ATO has identified cost savings
opportunities through consolidation of administrative activities and
outsourcing. However, ATO faces several challenges, including
sustaining and institutionalizing ATO's progress toward operating
effectively as a performance-based organization, hiring and training
thousands of air traffic controllers, ensuring stakeholder involvement
in major system acquisitions, and keeping acquisitions on schedule and
within budget.
* JPDO is making progress in its planning for NGATS, but faces several
challenges. JPDO is implementing a number of practices that our work
has shown facilitates the federal interagency collaboration that is
central to its mission and legislative mandate. However, JPDO is
fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks authority
over the key human and technological resources needed to continue
developing plans and system requirements for NGATS. Thus, a challenge
may arise in leveraging the resources of the partner agencies--agencies
with a variety of missions and priorities other than supporting NGATS.
For example, NASA has reduced its aeronautics budget, raising questions
about how the research and development efforts necessary for NGATS will
be completed. As part of its planning, JPDO is working to develop a
cost estimate for NGATS through a series of workshops with various
stakeholders. JPDO has taken several important first steps and is
following effective practices in developing an NGATS enterprise
architecture--a blueprint for NGATS and one of the most critical
planning documents in the NGATS effort. In addition to the challenge of
leveraging resources noted above, JPDO faces several other challenges,
including maintaining stakeholder support over the long term, defining
roles and responsibilities and deciding how to coordinate the
implementation of NGATS, and addressing several critical policy issues,
such as the extent to which NGATS will accommodate visual flights
versus instrument-only flights.
Background:
The ATC system is composed of an array of largely ground-based
subsystems, including radars; automated data-processing, navigation,
and communications equipment; and ATC facilities. These subsystems work
together to support all phases of flight for aircraft operating in U.S.
airspace. The ATC system also includes the FAA employees who manage,
operate, and maintain ATC equipment and facilities.
In 1995, based on the premise that FAA would be better able to manage
the ATC modernization if it were not constrained by federal personnel
and acquisition laws, Congress passed legislation that exempted FAA
from most federal personnel and acquisition laws and
regulations.[Footnote 4] In December 2000, President Clinton signed an
executive order and a few months later Congress passed supporting
legislation that, together, provided FAA with the authority to create
ATO as a PBO to control and improve FAA's management of the
modernization effort. In February 2004, FAA reorganized, transferring
36,000 employees (most of who worked in air traffic services and
research and acquisitions) to ATO. (See fig. 1.)
Figure 1: Figure 1. Prior and Current Structure of Research and
Acquisitions and Air Traffic Services, and Free Flight Organizations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In late 2003, recognizing that the current approach to managing air
transportation is becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally
obsolete, Congress created JPDO[Footnote 5] to plan NGATS, a system
intended to accommodate what is expected to be three times more air
traffic by 2025 than there is today. JPDO's scope is broader than
traditional ATC modernization in that it is "airport curb to airport
curb," encompassing such issues as security screening and environmental
concerns. Additionally, JPDO's approach will require unprecedented
collaboration and consensus among many stakeholders--federal and
nonfederal--about necessary system capabilities, equipment, procedures,
and regulations. Each of JPDO's partner agencies will play a role in
creating NGATS. For example, the Department of Defense has deployed
"network centric" systems,[Footnote 6] originally developed for the
battlefield, that are being considered as a framework to provide all
users of the national airspace system--FAA and the Departments of
Defense and Homeland Security--with a common view of that system. To
incorporate the expertise and views of nonfederal stakeholders, the
NGATS Institute was created by an agreement between the National Center
for Advanced Technologies and FAA.
JPDO began its initial operations in early 2004. A Senior Policy
Committee, chaired by the Secretary of Transportation and including
senior representatives from each of the participating departments and
agencies, provides oversight to JPDO. JPDO is located within FAA and
reports to the FAA Administrator and to the Chief Operating Officer
within ATO. (See figure 2.)
Figure 2: Organizational Chart of JPDO:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ATO Has Made Significant Progress Toward More Efficiently Managing ATC
Modernization, but Challenges Remain:
ATO has implemented organizational and business process changes to
improve management of the ATC modernization program. ATO has taken
several steps to increase its scrutiny of its acquisition decisions and
has met its acquisition performance goal for the second consecutive
year. ATO has identified cost savings opportunities through
consolidation of administrative activities and outsourcing. However,
ATO faces several challenges, including sustaining and
institutionalizing ATO's progress toward operating effectively as a
performance-based organization, hiring and training thousands of air
traffic controllers, ensuring stakeholder involvement in major system
acquisitions, and keeping acquisitions on schedule and within budget.
ATO Has Implemented Organizational and Business Process Changes to
Improve Management of the ATC Modernization Program:
In our past work, we noted that FAA's acquisitions workforce operated
in an environment where accountability was not well defined or enforced
and vertical lines of authority impaired productivity, communication,
and decision-making across the organization. Our recent studies have
shown that ATO is taking steps to break down those vertical lines of
authority and organizational "stovepipes." ATO has become a flatter
organization, with fewer management layers. Additionally, the Chief
Operating Officer (COO), who heads ATO, is holding ATO's vice
presidents collectively accountable for the organization's success, in
addition to their areas of specific responsibility. The COO conducts
daily meetings with the managers of ATO's departments to review
operations. According to the COO, these meetings have provided a more
holistic perspective on the organization since, formally, some managers
were only focused on and responsible for their own departments.
ATO is also in the early stages of involving the line staff in the
efforts aimed at increasing organizational effectiveness and
efficiency. For example, ATO surveyed the workforce to determine the
extent to which employees and managers believe the organization
exhibits managerial accountability, customer focus, and
transformational leadership. The first survey established a baseline
against which ATO plans to measure progress through future annual
surveys. By analyzing the results, ATO expects to determine the
underlying assumptions that drive employee behavior and decide where to
target efforts for change. According to an ATO official, such a root-
cause level of analysis has never been done before in FAA. FAA is also
undertaking an initiative that includes creating a training framework
and measures for the effectiveness of that training. These initiatives
mirror effective human capital practices that we have identified in
previous reports.
In addition to organizational efforts, ATO is moving forward with an
improvement to its business processes with the development of a cost
accounting system, which will eventually be implemented throughout FAA
to improve its financial management. Ultimately, ATO plans to routinely
incorporate the cost information generated by the cost accounting
system into its investment decision-making. When implemented, this cost
accounting system will address a long-standing GAO concern that FAA has
not had the needed cost accounting practices in place to effectively
manage software-intensive investments, which characterize many of the
agency's major ATC system acquisitions. This type of information can be
used to improve future cost estimates for these acquisitions.
In another change to its business processes, FAA has stated that its
management will provide additional information to decision makers to
better illustrate the rationale behind its budget requests. This
information is helpful to decision makers when budget constraints do
not allow all system acquisitions to be fully funded at their planned
and approved levels, leaving FAA to decide which programs to fund and
which to cut, according to its priorities. Those that are cut may fall
behind schedule, requiring FAA to continue operating and maintaining
the older equipment and possibly delaying the realization of benefits
from the new system. To address this issue, we recommended that FAA
identify and annually report on programs that have had funding
deferred, reduced, or eliminated, and the impact of those decisions on
ATC modernization.[Footnote 7] Such information would make clear how
constrained budgets will affect modernization of the national airspace
system and how FAA is working to live within its means. In its formal
written response to our recommendation, FAA stated its intent to better
inform Congress in the future by providing information in its capital
investment plan, submitted to Congress annually with the President's
Budget, that will identify changes from the preceding year. We have not
yet verified whether FAA's action fully responds to our recommendation.
ATO Has Increased Scrutiny of Its Investment Decisions:
ATO has taken several steps to increase its scrutiny of its acquisition
decisions, both with initial investment decisions and as part of
acquisition oversight. Since 2004, the ATO executive council has been
reviewing the mission need and readiness for decisions for all proposed
investments. Furthermore, to ensure executive-level oversight of all
key decisions, FAA plans to incorporate key decision points in a
knowledge-based product development process by June 2006, as we have
recommended; however, we have not yet independently assessed the
sufficiency of this change. FAA has also issued guidance on how to
develop and use investment pricing, including guidelines for disclosing
the levels of uncertainty and imprecision that are inherent in cost
estimates for major ATC systems.
To improve its understanding of system requirements, FAA has developed
a software acquisition process improvement model.[Footnote 8] When a
system's requirements are not fully understood at the start of an
acquisition, requirements must often be redefined or unplanned work
performed, which takes time and can be costly. In addition, unplanned
work may occur when the agency misjudges the extent to which a
commercial-off-the-shelf or nondevelopmental item, such as one procured
by another agency, will meet the agency's needs. To address these
issues, FAA has developed and applied a process improvement model that
assesses the maturity of FAA's software and systems capabilities. As we
reported, this approach has resulted in enhanced productivity, higher
quality, greater ability to predict schedules and resources, better
morale, and improved communication and teamwork.[Footnote 9] However,
FAA did not mandate the use of the model throughout the organization.
In response to our recommendation that FAA institutionalize the model's
use throughout the organization, FAA has begun developing a requirement
that acquisition projects have process improvement activities in place
before seeking approval from FAA's investment review board.
With regard to acquisition investment oversight, ATO has increased the
use of an earned value approach to program oversight.[Footnote 10] In
fiscal year 2000, only 4 programs used an earned value approach,
compared to 19 major active programs in fiscal year 2006. Going
forward, all new acquisitions will use an earned value approach. ATO
has also conducted business case reviews for facilities and equipment-
and operations-funded programs. Based on these reviews, ATO terminated
funding for three projects. One was cancelled because the prototype
lacked demonstrable benefits, another due to a poor business case, and
the third due to weaknesses in its business case as well as schedule
and performance issues.[Footnote 11]
Additionally, FAA has implemented, or is in the process of
implementing, a number of recommendations that we have made to improve
acquisition investment management. For example, FAA is now considering
all information technology investments as a complete portfolio. In
2004, we pointed out that FAA was not evaluating projects beyond the
first 2 years of service to ensure alignment with organizational
goals.[Footnote 12] Consequently, the agency could not ensure that
projects with a longer service history (which at the time totaled about
$1.3 billion per year) were still aligned with FAA's strategic plans
and business goals and objectives. We recommended that FAA include
these projects in its investment portfolio management for review. In
response to this and other recommendations we have made, FAA is making
revisions to its Acquisition Management System. FAA has modified its
Acquisition Management Policy to require periodic monitoring of in-
service systems to collect and analyze performance data to use as the
basis for sustained deployment. In a similar vein, ATO has committed to
basing future funding decisions for system acquisitions on their
contribution to reducing the agency's operating costs while maintaining
safety. ATO is also requiring that acquisition planning documents be
prepared in a format consistent with that prescribed by the Office of
Management and Budget for use in justifying all major capital
investments.
FAA Met Its Acquisition Performance Goal for the Second Consecutive
Year, but Use of Revised Milestones Does Not Provide Consistent
Benchmarks:
FAA has met its acquisitions performance goal 2 years in a row. The
goal for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 was to have 80 percent of its
system acquisitions on schedule and within 10 percent of budget. The
goal gradually increases to 90 percent by fiscal year 2008. The
increase will make FAA's acquisition performance goal consistent with
targets set in the Department of Transportation's strategic plan and
will comply with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of
1994.[Footnote 13]
Having such a goal is also consistent with the President's Management
Agenda, which calls for a commitment to achieve immediate, concrete,
and measurable results in the near term, and meeting this goal shows
progress toward better acquisition management. However, because the
milestones for certain acquisitions have changed over the years to
reflect changes in cost and schedule, using those revised milestones
may not provide a complete picture of the acquisition's progress over
time. For example, the milestones for 3 of the 16 major system
acquisitions that we reviewed in detail during 2004 and 2005 were being
revised to reflect cost or schedule changes during 2005. These revised
milestones, together with revised targets for meeting them, will become
the new milestones for fiscal year 2006. While revising milestones and
targets that are no longer valid is an appropriate management action,
using revised targets for measuring performance does not provide a
consistent benchmark over time. The extent to which an acquisition
meets its annual performance targets is one measure of its performance
and should be viewed together with other measures, such as its progress
against original and revised baselines. The variance reports provided
to the FAA Administrator and to Congress may also be useful in
evaluating an acquisition's performance.[Footnote 14]
Since fiscal year 2003, the number of acquisition programs measured by
FAA has varied from 31 to 42. According to FAA, the number varies from
year to year, in part, because some programs reach completion and
others are initiated. The programs that are selected each fiscal year
represent a cross section of ATO programs, including investments in new
capabilities and others that are ready for use without modification.
FAA's Portfolio of Goals, which provides supplementary information on
the agency's performance goals, asserts that no bias exists in the
selection of milestones for performance review, but does not state the
basis for this conclusion. The portfolio also states that the
milestones selected represent the program office's determination of the
efforts that are "critical" or important enough to warrant inclusion in
the acquisition performance goal for the year. However, we have not
conducted a detailed examination of the reliability and validity of
FAA's metrics for its acquisition program performance.
ATO Is Reviewing Its Infrastructure and Operations for Cost Savings,
but Lacks Consistent Processes for Determining Savings:
ATO is seeking cost savings by reviewing its operations and
infrastructure. It has begun to decommission ground-based navigational
aids, such as compass locators, outer markers and nondirectional radio
beacons, as it begins to transition to a satellite-based navigation
system. In fiscal year 2005, ATO decommissioned 177 navigational aids,
claiming a savings of $2.9 million. In addition to the savings
generated from decommissioning, one expert with whom we spoke noted
that these sites could be converted to revenue-generating uses, such as
leasing the sites for warehouses or cell phone towers. ATO also expects
to reduce costs through streamlining its operations. For example, it is
consolidating its administrative activities, currently decentralized
across its nine regions, into three regions, and anticipates an annual
savings of up to $460 million over the next 10 years. Our work
analyzing international air navigation service providers has shown that
additional cost savings may be possible by further consolidating ATC
facilities such as terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facilities
and air traffic control centers. According to one estimate,
consolidating the existing 21 air route traffic control centers into 6
centers could save approximately $600 million per year.
ATO also expects to reduce costs through outsourcing. For example, it
reduced costs by outsourcing its automated flight service stations to a
private contractor and expects to achieve savings of $1.7 billion over
ten years. Additionally, $0.5 billion in savings are expected to be
realized by staffing reductions of 400 that occurred between the time
the outsourcing began and the new contract was actually implemented.
The agency expects to receive $66 million--the first installment of
these cost savings--in fiscal year 2007.
However, we have found that ATO lacks a consistent process for
identifying the costs and benefits associated with some of its cost
control efforts. For example, ATO did not offset its reported savings
from decommissioning navigational aids with the costs likely to
accompany such activities, such as real property disposition (including
buildings or real property leases, standby power systems, and fuel
storage tanks), site cleanup, and restoration. Without a transparent
and verifiable process for determining the savings, as well as the
offsetting costs, the true savings remain unclear. As ATO proceeds with
these efforts, stakeholders also caution that decommissioning
navigational aids should entail comprehensive risk mitigation to ensure
that ATO retains adequate safety levels.
However, while facility consolidations could offer additional savings,
an FAA official noted that there are practical limits to these efforts.
For example, consolidated facilities would need to handle higher
volumes of communication, but as the volume of communication increases,
so does "latency"--the delay in transmission that occurs between
sending and receiving messages. According to FAA, studies of
telecommunications centers in the private sector suggest that 15
facilities that combine the approximately 180 existing en route and
oceanic air traffic control centers and terminal radar approach control
facilities might be appropriate. Security concerns, such as the need
for redundancy, also come into play in consolidation decisions.
Consequently, if FAA decides to procede with facility closures, it is
important that it do so within the context of a logical, well-
documented, and risk-based process in consultation with congressional
oversight committees.
ATO Faces Human Capital Challenges in Institutionalizing Its
Performance-based Organization and Hiring and Training Thousands of Air
Traffic Controllers:
ATO faces a challenge in sustaining and institutionalizing its efforts
to operate as a PBO. Our work has shown that successful transformations
and the institutionalization of change in large public and private
organizations can take 5 to 7 years or more to fully
implement.[Footnote 15] Long-term, high-level management attention will
be needed to assess ATO's transformation on a continuing basis.
FAA also faces the challenge of hiring and training thousands of air
traffic controllers during the coming decade. According to its
controller staffing plan, FAA expects to lose about 11,000 air traffic
controllers due to voluntary retirements or mandatory retirements at
age 56, as well as other reasons.[Footnote 16] These retirements stem
from the 1981 controller strike, when President Ronald Reagan fired
over 10,000 air traffic controllers, and FAA then had to quickly
rebuild the controller workforce. From 1982 through 1991, FAA hired an
average of 2,655 controllers per year. These controllers will become
eligible for retirement during the next decade.
To replace these controllers, as well as those who will leave for other
reasons, and to accommodate forecasted changes in air traffic, FAA
plans to issue annual air traffic controller staffing plans based on
the agency's air traffic forecast. FAA's December 2004 Air Traffic
Controller Work Force Plan called for hiring 12,500 new controllers
over 10 years, based on the agency's 2004 air traffic
forecast.[Footnote 17] FAA informed us that its 2006 staffing plan
update, which it expects to issue shortly, will reflect the need to
hire fewer controllers over the next few years, compared to the 2004
plan, because FAA's 2006 air traffic forecast predicts less air traffic
during this time frame. In fiscal year 2005, FAA hired 438 controllers-
-three more than its target, which was constrained that year due to
budget considerations. According to an FAA official, FAA plans to hire
930 controllers in fiscal year 2006 (FAA had hired 637 controllers
through May 2006).
FAA Faces Challenges in Ensuring Stakeholder Involvement in Major
System Acquisitions:
Adequately involving stakeholders in a system's development is
important to ensure that the system meets users' needs. In the past,
air traffic controllers were permanently assigned to FAA's major system
acquisition program offices and provided input into air traffic control
modernization projects. In June 2005, FAA terminated this arrangement
because of budget constraints and other reasons. According to FAA, it
now plans to obtain the subject-matter expertise of air traffic
controllers or other stakeholders as needed in major system
acquisitions. It remains to be seen whether this approach will suffice
for stakeholder involvement. Our past work has indicated that a lack of
stakeholder involvement both early on and throughout a system's
development was a systemic factor contributing to acquisitions missing
their cost, schedule, and performance targets.
FAA Faces Challenges in Keeping Acquisitions on Schedule and within
Budget:
Three systems--all communications-related--missed their fiscal year
2005 acquisition performance goals for schedule. According to FAA, the
$310 million FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) acquisition,
which is replacing costly existing networks of separately managed
systems and services by integrating advanced telecommunications
services, was behind schedule because the program was unable to ramp up
its activities to the level specified in its plan. To complete the
installations in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 as originally
scheduled, FAA initiated a plan to put the program back on schedule and
has met the plan's milestones since August 2005.
To the extent that delays in FTI persist, FAA will not accrue the full
extent of the $672 million in cost savings that the program was
expected to produce. The Department of Transportation's Office of the
Inspector General has reported that FAA did not realize $32.6 million
in anticipated operating cost savings in fiscal year 2005 because of
the limited progress made in disconnecting legacy circuits. The office
also reported that without a nearly tenfold increase in its rate of
transferring service to FTI and disconnecting legacy circuits, FAA
stands to miss out on an additional $102 million in cost savings in
fiscal year 2006. FAA has informed us that since the Inspector General
made this assessment, the program has achieved a significant increase
in the rates of transferring over services and disconnecting legacy
circuits. As an alternative to continuing the current FTI program, some
experts have suggested that FAA consider outsourcing this activity, as
it did for its flight service stations.[Footnote 18]
Two other communications acquisition programs also missed their
acquisition performance goals for schedule in 2005--the $325 million
Next Generation Air-to-Ground Communication system, segment 1A, which
replaces analog communication systems with digital systems, and the $85
million Ultra High Frequency Radio Replacement, which replaces aging
equipment used to communicate with Department of Defense aircraft.
According to an FAA official, as the agency assessed its priorities for
fiscal year 2005, a decision was made that these programs would receive
fewer resources. The resources that were then available were not
sufficient to allow the programs to meet established milestones.
In summary, ATO has made a number of promising moves toward operating
effectively as a PBO, and we view ATO's efforts to improve its
management and acquisitions processes as positive steps. However, ATO
has been established for only slightly more than 2 years. Work remains
to ensure that these processes become institutionalized and that
continuing challenges are addressed. Although it is still too early to
evaluate the effectiveness of many of these steps, we are monitoring
ATO's progress. Moving forward, ATO will play a key role in
implementing NGATS, as planned by JPDO. I will now discuss the status
of JPDO's planning efforts.
JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS, but Faces Challenges in
Several Areas:
JPDO has implemented several effective practices to facilitate
collaboration among its partner agencies, but faces challenges in
continuing to leverage resources. JPDO is working to develop a cost
estimate for NGATS through a series of workshops with various
stakeholders. JPDO is taking a reasonable approach to technical
planning, but some key tasks are yet to be completed. However, JPDO
faces several challenges, including maintaining stakeholder support
over the long term, defining roles and responsibilities as well as
deciding how to coordinate the implementation of NGATS, and addressing
several critical policy issues.
JPDO Is Working to Facilitate Collaboration among Federal Agencies, but
Faces Challenges in Continuing to Leverage Resources:
Our work to date shows that JPDO is implementing a number of practices
that our work has shown facilitates the federal interagency
collaboration that is central to its mission and legislative mandate.
According to our research, agencies must have a clear and compelling
rationale for working together to overcome significant differences in
their missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business. In
developing JPDO's integrated plan,[Footnote 19] the partner agencies
agreed to a vision statement and eight strategies that broadly address
the goals and objectives for NGATS. These strategies formed the basis
for JPDO's eight integrated product teams (IPT), and various partner
agencies have taken the lead on specific strategies. Our research has
also shown that it is important for collaborating agencies to leverage
the human, technological, and physical resources needed to initiate or
sustain their collaborative effort. To leverage human resources, JPDO
has staffed the various levels of its organization with partner-agency
employees, many of whom work part time for JPDO. To leverage
technological resources, JPDO conducted an interagency program review
of its partner agencies' research and development programs to identify
work that could support NGATS. Through this process, JPDO identified
early opportunities that could be pursued during fiscal year 2007 to
produce tangible results for NGATS, such as the Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)[Footnote 20] program at FAA.
However, while JPDO's legislation, integrated plan, and governance
structure[Footnote 21] provide the framework for collaboration among
multiple federal agencies, JPDO is fundamentally a planning and
coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and
technological resources needed to continue developing plans and system
requirements for NGATS. Consequently, the ability to continue
leveraging resources of the partner agencies will be critical to JPDO's
success. Beginning around 2008, JPDO expects a significant increase in
its IPTs' workloads. JPDO officials told us that although the partner
agencies have not yet expressed concerns over the time that their
employees spend on JPDO work, it remains to be seen whether agencies
will be willing to allow their staff to devote more of their time to
JPDO. In addition, JPDO anticipates needing more agency resources to
plan and coordinate demonstrations of potential technologies to
illustrate some of the early benefits that could be achieved from the
transformation to NGATS.
This challenge of leveraging resources arises, in part, because the
partner agencies have a variety of missions and priorities other than
supporting NGATS. NASA, for example, while conducting key aeronautical
and safety research and development relevant to NGATS, nonetheless has
other competing missions. NASA has recently reduced its aeronautics
budget and plans to focus its efforts on foundational
research.[Footnote 22] This decision raises two important questions.
First, what research needed for NGATS will NASA perform or not perform?
Second, for the foundational research that will be performed, who will
perform the development steps--the validation and demonstration of new
technology--that must take place before a new technology can be
transferred to industry and incorporated into a product? JPDO and FAA
officials told us that not enough is understood about what NASA plans
to do and not do and, therefore, the impact of NASA's action on NGATS
remains unclear at present.
However, many experts with whom we spoke believe that NASA's new focus
on foundational research creates a gap in the technology development
continuum. Some believe that FAA has neither the research and
development infrastructure nor the funding to do this work. FAA's
Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee
(REDAC),[Footnote 23] in a draft report, estimates that FAA would need
at least $100 million annually in increased funding to perform this
research and development work, and that reestablishing the
infrastructure within FAA to accomplish this work could delay NGATS
implementation by 5 years. An official of the working group that
produced the draft report stated that a significant amount of research
and development is needed to create NGATS. For example, the official
stated that more research is needed to understand wake vortex, which
could be a limiting factor in airspace capacity and would impact
aircraft sequencing for landing or departure.[Footnote 24] The official
also stated that intermediate-level technology development is important
in establishing "product proof," meaning that technology needs to be
validated, demonstrated, and certified before beginning the systems
acquisition process.
JPDO officials view leveraging partner agency resources as one of their
most significant near-term challenges. JPDO officials stated that they
feel the process has worked sufficiently well so far. For example, JPDO
successfully requested that FAA pursue funding in its fiscal year 2007
budget request to accelerate development of ADS-B and System Wide
Information Management (SWIM),[Footnote 25] which are two key systems
identified for NGATS. However, as noted, our past work on FAA's
national airspace modernization program has shown that receiving fewer
resources than planned was one factor that contributed to delays in
implementing technologies and significant cost increases. Thus,
continuing success in leveraging partner agencies' resources will help
avoid program delays and reduction in the benefits-to-cost ratio.
To further leverage resources for NGATS, JPDO has issued guidance to
its partner agencies identifying areas that JPDO would like to see
emphasized in the agencies' fiscal year 2008 budget requests and
expects to follow this process annually in the years to come. JPDO
officials have informed us that they have held face-to-face discussions
with partner agency managers about the guidance and are currently in
the process of reviewing partner agency responses to the guidance and
identifying whether gaps exist. Such gaps will be presented to the
Senior Policy Committee for discussion at its July meeting, according
to these officials.
JPDO is currently working with the Office of Management and Budget to
develop a systematic means of reviewing partner agency budget requests
so that the NGATS-related funding in each request is easily identified.
This includes a review of budgets submitted by the Department of
Homeland Security for efforts by the Transportation Security
Administration and the Department of Commerce for efforts by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Such a process would
help the Office of Management and Budget consider NGATS as a unified
federal investment, rather than as disparate line items distributed
across several agencies' budget requests.
JPDO Is Working to Develop a Cost Estimate for NGATS:
Important to the planning of NGATS is the development of realistic cost
estimates for the entire NGATS. To assist in developing such estimates,
JPDO is holding a series of investment analysis workshops with
stakeholders to obtain their input. The first workshop, held in April
2006, was for commercial and business aviation, equipment
manufacturers, and systems developers. The second workshop is planned
for early July for operators of lower performance aircraft used in both
commercial and non-commercial operations, including general aviation
personal and business flying, flight training, piston and turbine
rotorcraft as well as public users of the system including civil and
military aircraft operated by local, state, and federal governments.
The third workshop, planned for late July or early August, will focus
on airports and other local, state, and regional planning bodies. JPDO
plans to use the combined information from these three workshops to
begin to develop a range of the potential costs of NGATS.
Preliminary estimates of NGATS' cost, developed by REDAC and ATO, could
also provide input into JPDO's cost estimate. REDAC and ATO officials
emphasized that their estimates are preliminary and not yet endorsed by
any agency. A draft study by REDAC's Financing the NGATS Working Group
estimated that to implement NGATS and continue operating the national
airspace system through 2025, the combined costs of FAA's four
appropriation accounts--operations, facilities and equipment, research,
engineering and development--and grants-in-aid for airports (commonly
known as the Airport Improvement Program)--would average about $15
billion per year, or about $900 million more than FAA's fiscal year
2006 appropriation. The estimate assumes that (1) the general fund
contribution will be 20 percent, using the current trust fund revenue
model and (2) between 2011 and 2025, productivity increases will offset
the increased operating costs of additional demand.[Footnote 26]
ATO has developed a preliminary estimate of the increased facilities
and equipment cost that NGATS would require. ATO estimates that the
cumulative additional facilities and equipment cost between fiscal
years 2006 and 2025 would be about $15.3 billion, or about $800 million
per year, on average, from fiscal year 2007 through 2025. According to
an ATO official, the ATO facilities and equipment cost estimate is the
same as the facilities and equipment component of REDAC's cost
estimate. The only difference is that ATO's estimate accounts for
inflation, while REDAC expresses its estimate in constant 2005 dollars.
In addition to being preliminary, it is important to note the
limitations of these estimates. First, ATO's estimate does not include
any costs other than those for facilities and equipment. However, an
ATO official acknowledged that there would likely be additional costs
within FAA, such as for safety certification or making operational
changes to respond to NGATS' new technologies. Additionally, ATO's
facilities and equipment cost estimate assumes that the intermediate
technology development work, which NASA has historically performed, has
been completed. As I previously stated, REDAC believes that the cost of
intermediate technology development could be substantial. Furthermore,
neither estimate includes other partner agencies' costs to implement
NGATS, such as those that the Department of Homeland Security might
incur to develop and implement new security procedures. Also, these
estimates treat NGATS' development and implementation period as an
isolated event. Consequently, the costs drop dramatically toward 2025.
In reality, officials who developed these estimates acknowledge that
planning for the subsequent "next generation" system will likely be
underway as 2025 approaches and that actual operations and
modernization costs could be higher in this time frame than these
estimates indicate.
In addition, several unknown factors will drive the cost of NGATS.
According to JPDO, one of these drivers is the technologies expected to
be included in NGATS. Some of these are more complex and thus more
expensive to implement than others. A second driver is the sequence in
which NGATS technologies will replace the technologies now in use. A
third driver is the length of time required to transition to NGATS,
since a longer transition period would impose higher costs. Later this
year, JPDO expects to issue a first draft of its enterprise
architecture, or blueprint for the NGATS, which could reduce these
variables, thereby allowing improved, albeit still preliminary,
estimates of NGATS' cost.
JPDO Is Taking a Reasonable Approach to Technical Planning, but Some
Key Tasks are Yet to Be Completed:
To conduct the technical planning for NGATS, JPDO has formed separate
divisions to perform system modeling and create the NGATS enterprise
architecture, but has not yet completed key activities. JPDO has formed
an Evaluation and Analysis Division (EAD), composed of FAA and NASA
employees and contractors, to assemble a suite of models that will help
JPDO refine its plans for NGATS and iteratively narrow the range of
potential solutions. For example, EAD has used modeling to begin
studying how possible changes in the duties of key individuals, such as
air traffic controllers, could affect the workload and performance of
others, such as airport ground personnel.
As I previously noted, NGATS could shift some tasks now done by air
traffic controllers to pilots. According to JPDO officials, the change
in roles of pilots and controllers is the most important human factors
issue involved in creating the NGATS. JPDO officials noted that the
Agile Airspace and Safety IPTs contain human factors specialists and
that JPDO's chief architect has a background in human factors. However,
EAD has not yet begun to model the effect of the shift in roles on
pilots' performance because, according to an EAD official, a suitable
model has not yet been incorporated into the modeling tool suite.
According to EAD, addressing this issue is necessary, but will be
difficult because data on pilot behavior are not readily available to
use in creating such models. Furthermore, EAD has not yet studied the
training implications of various NGATS-proposed solutions because
further definition of the concept of operations for these solutions has
not been completed. As the concept of operations matures, it will be
important for air traffic controllers and other affected stakeholders
to provide their perspectives on these modeling efforts. In addition,
as the concept of operations and plans for sequencing equipment
matures, EAD will be able to study the extent to which new air traffic
controllers will have to be trained to operate both the old and the new
equipment.
To develop an enterprise architecture--a blueprint for NGATS and one of
the most critical planning documents in the NGATS effort--JPDO has
taken several important first steps and is following several effective
practices that we have identified for enterprise architecture
development. However, JPDO's enterprise architecture is currently a
work in progress and many of JPDO's future activities will depend on
the robustness and timeliness of its architecture development. The
enterprise architecture will describe FAA's operation of the current
national airspace system, JPDO's plans for the NGATS, and the sequence
of steps needed to transition between them. The enterprise architecture
will provide the means for coordinating among the partner agencies and
private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research and
development activities, and integrating equipment. And as I noted
earlier, the enterprise architecture will also be a key tool in
developing cost estimates for NGATS.
To date, JPDO has formed an Enterprise Architecture Division and has
established and filled a chief architect position. JPDO has also
established an NGATS Architecture Council composed of representatives
from each partner agency's chief architect office to provide the
organizational structure and oversight needed to develop the enterprise
architecture. JPDO is using a phased "build a little, test a little"
approach for developing and refining its enterprise architecture that
is similar to a process that we have advocated for FAA's major system
acquisition programs. In addition, this phased development process will
allow JPDO to incorporate evolving market forces and technologies in
its architecture and thus better manage change. JPDO plans to have an
early version of the architecture by the end of fiscal year 2006.
Maintaining Stakeholder Support Will Be a Long-Term Challenge for JPDO:
JPDO has structured itself to involve federal and nonfederal
stakeholders throughout its organization, but maintaining their long-
term support will be a challenge. Our work has shown that involving
stakeholders can, among other things, increase their support for a
collaborative effort. Federal stakeholders from the partner agencies
serve on JPDO's Senior Policy Committee, board, and IPTs. Nonfederal
stakeholders may participate through the NGATS Institute (the
Institute). Through the Institute, JPDO obtained the participation of
over 180 stakeholders from over 70 organizations for the IPTs. The
NGATS Institute Management Council, composed of top officials and
representatives from the aviation community, oversees the policy and
recommendations of the Institute and provides a means for advancing
consensus positions on critical NGATS issues.
Although JPDO has developed the mechanisms for involving stakeholders
and brought stakeholders into the process, it faces challenges in
sustaining nonfederal stakeholders' participation over the long term.
Much as with the federal partner agencies, JPDO has no direct authority
over the human, technical, or financial resources of its nonfederal
stakeholders. To date, these stakeholders' investment in NGATS has been
through their part-time, pro bono participation on the IPTs and the
NGATS Institute Management Council.[Footnote 27] The challenge for JPDO
is to maintain the interest and enthusiasm of these nonfederal
stakeholders, which will have to juggle their own multiple priorities
and resource demands, even though some of the tangible benefits of
NGATS may not be realized for several years. For example, stakeholders'
support will be important for programs such as SWIM, which is a
prerequisite to future benefits, but may not produce tangible benefits
in the near term.
In the wake of past national airspace modernization efforts, JPDO also
faces the challenge of convincing nonfederal stakeholders that the
government is financially committed to NGATS. While most of FAA's major
ATC acquisition programs are currently on track, earlier attempts at
modernizing the national airspace system encountered many difficulties.
In one instance, for example, FAA developed a datalink communications
system that transmitted scripted e-mail-like messages between
controllers and pilots. One airline equipped some of its aircraft with
this new technology, but because of funding cuts, among other things,
FAA ended up canceling the program. In a similar vein, we have reported
that some aviation stakeholders expressed concern that FAA may not
follow through with its airspace redesign efforts and are hesitant to
invest in equipment unless they are sure that FAA's efforts will
continue. One expert suggested to us that the government might mitigate
this issue by making an initial investment in a specific technology
before requesting that airlines or other industry stakeholders purchase
equipment.
In addition to maintaining stakeholder involvement, JPDO faces
challenges in obtaining the participation of all stakeholders. In
particular, JPDO does not involve current air traffic controllers, who
will play a key role in NGATS. The current air traffic control system
is based primarily on the premise that air traffic controllers direct
pilots to maintain safe separation between aircraft. In NGATS, this
premise could change and, accordingly, JPDO has recognized the need to
conduct human factors research on such issues, including how tasks
should be allocated between humans and automated systems and how the
existing allocation of responsibilities between pilots and air traffic
controllers might change. The input of current air traffic controllers
who have recent experience controlling aircraft is important in
considering human factors and safety issues.
However, as mentioned, no current air traffic controllers are involved
in NGATS. In June 2005, FAA terminated its labor liaison program based
on its determination that program was not providing sufficient benefit
compared to the program's cost. The liaison program assigned air
traffic controllers to major system acquisition program offices, as
well as to JPDO. Since that time, the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association (NATCA), the labor union that represents air traffic
controllers, has not been a participant in planning NGATS. Although the
NGATS Institute Management Council includes a seat for the union, a
NATCA official told us that the union's head had been unable to attend
the council's meetings. According to JPDO officials, the council has
left a seat open in hopes that the controllers will participate in
NGATS as the new labor-management agreement between NATCA and FAA is
implemented.
Finally, some of the benefits of NGATS' are contingent on users of the
system--airlines and general aviation--equipping their aircraft with
NGATS-compatible technologies. This is particularly important
concerning ADS-B, a new air traffic surveillance system that JPDO has
determined will be one of the early core technologies for NGATS. The
first phase of ADS-B implementation, known as "ADS-B out," will allow
FAA to replace many ground radars that currently provide aircraft
surveillance with less costly ground-based transceivers. Aircraft would
be equipped with ADS-B out, which broadcasts a signal to these
transceivers. FAA anticipates significant cost savings from this phase
and, according to trade association officials, regional and large
commercial airlines are largely supportive of this initial phase. But
implementing ADS-B out is just the first step to achieving the larger
benefits of ADS-B, which would be provided by "ADS-B in." ADS-B in
would allow aircraft to receive signals from ground-based transceivers
or directly from other ADS-B equipped aircraft--this could allow pilots
to "see" nearby traffic and, consequently, take on some responsibility
for maintaining safe separation from those aircraft.
However, before airlines can establish a business case that supports an
investment, several unknowns concerning ADS-B in must be resolved. For
example, the cost of installing ADS-B in must be determined. Also,
human factors considerations need further exploration to determine
whether pilots can safely use ADS-B in to maintain separation of
aircraft. Finally, it is unclear whether air carriers will be willing
to equip with the second frequency that ADS-B would require.[Footnote
28] How these issues are resolved will be an important factor in
airlines' decisions on whether to equip with ADS-B in. Given the
breadth and complexity of NGATS, issues involving equipage decisions by
nonfederal stakeholders are likely to arise again and can impact the
extent and speed to which the benefits envisioned by NGATS will be
realized.
As NGATS Moves Toward Implementation, Defining Roles and
Responsibilities and Deciding How to Coordinate Implementation Are
Challenges:
JPDO also faces the challenge of clearly defining its partner agencies'
roles and responsibilities. Our work has shown that collaborating
agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective
roles and responsibilities, including how the collaboration will be
led. JPDO has operated thus far with no formal, long-term agreement on
partner agencies' roles and responsibilities in creating NGATS. JPDO
officials informed us that they are working to establish a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) signed by the heads of the partner agencies that
will broadly define partner agency roles and responsibilities at a high
level. JPDO officials said they hope to have the MOU signed and
released next month. JPDO is also developing more specific MOUs with
partner agencies that lay out expectations for support on NGATS
components, such as information sharing through network-enabled
operations.
Defining roles and responsibilities is particularly important between
JPDO and ATO, because both organizations have responsibilities related
to planning the national airspace system's modernization. ATO has
primary responsibility for the ATC system's current and near-term
modernization, while JPDO has responsibility for planning and
coordinating a transformation to NGATS over the next 20 years. The
roles and responsibilities of each office are currently being worked
out. ATO now plans to expand its Operational Evolution Plan so that it
applies FAA-wide and represents FAA's piece of JPDO's overall NGATS
plan.[Footnote 29] ATO is also prioritizing its facilities and
equipment investments to support the NGATS. As the roles and
responsibilities of the two offices become more clearly defined, there
is also a need to better communicate these decisions to stakeholders.
As NGATS moves forward, JPDO and FAA must address how to define roles
and responsibilities for managing its implementation. JPDO, FAA, and
other aviation experts consider NGATS to be a task of unprecedented
complexity, with each partner agency having responsibility for
developing and implementing portions of NGATS, while JPDO maintains a
coordinating role. Recognizing the complexity involved in implementing
NGATS, FAA and JPDO officials are considering several different
approaches, one of which is to contract with a lead systems integrator
(LSI). Generally, an LSI is a prime contractor that would help to
ensure that the discrete systems used in NGATS will operate together
and whose responsibilities may include designing system solutions,
developing requirements, and selecting major system and subsystem
contractors.
The government has used LSIs before for complex programs that require
system-of-systems integration. Our research indicates that, while LSIs
provide certain advantages, such as the ability to know, understand,
and integrate functions across various systems, they also entail
certain risks. For example, because the degree of responsibility held
by the LSI may be significantly greater than that usually held by a
prime contractor, careful oversight may be necessary to ensure that the
government's interests are protected and that conflicts of interest are
avoided. Consequently, selecting, assigning responsibilities, and
managing an LSI could pose significant challenges for JPDO and FAA.
JPDO Must Address a Variety of Policy Issues:
JPDO also faces critical policy issues as NGATS moves toward
implementation. Some stakeholders have noted that addressing the policy
issues needed to implement NGATS technologies will be even more of a
challenge for JPDO than determining the technologies for NGATS. JPDO's
Concept of Operations--a document that provides a textual operational
description of the transformations needed to achieve NGATS' overall
goals--has been used to identify key research and policy issues for
NGATS. For example, the Concept of Operations identifies several issues
surrounding the automation of the air traffic control system, including
the need for a backup plan in the event that automation fails, the
responsibilities and liabilities of different stakeholders in the event
of automation failure, and the level of monitoring needed by pilots
when automation is ensuring safe separation from surrounding aircraft.
JPDO officials said that most policy decisions, when they occur, will
be tied to the requirements of the enterprise architecture. However,
some decisions will involve input from several entities and
stakeholders. For example, it is likely that decisions on concepts and
policies relating to general aviation would be made in concert among
FAA, JPDO, and the Senior Policy Committee, with significant input from
the general aviation community, to address concerns such as visual
flight rules versus instrument flight rules. Flowing from broad policy
decisions, FAA or other partner agencies would have to start developing
regulations to implement the new technologies so that they would be
ready at the appropriate time.
In addition, JPDO has limited control over some of the factors
affecting NGATS-related policy issues. For example, the consolidation
of ATC facilities could provide cost savings that could in turn be used
for NGATS technologies. However, facility consolidations can often run
into political hurdles that are outside of JPDO's control. Similarly,
while JPDO's Airport IPT is considering how airport capacity can be
expanded, a JPDO official told us that the ability of JPDO to enhance
airport capacity is still limited because enhancement decisions are
made at the state and local level. The official also noted that JPDO
cannot channel federal funds from the Airport Improvement Program to
airports where capacity expansion is most needed to achieve the goals
of NGATS.
Another key policy area is how JPDO will work toward global
harmonization. For example, concurrent with JPDO's efforts, the
European Commission[Footnote 30] is conducting a project to harmonize
and modernize the European air traffic management systems. Known as the
Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research Programme (SESAR),
the project is overseen by the European Organization for the Safety of
Air Navigation (Eurocontrol).[Footnote 31] Eurocontrol has contracted
out the work of SESAR to a 30-member consortium of airlines, air
navigation service providers, airports, manufacturers, and others. The
consortium is receiving 60 million euros ($73 million)[Footnote 32] to
conduct a 2-year definition phase and produce a master plan for SESAR.
JPDO officials said they recognize the need for global harmonization of
systems and have met with officials from various parts of the world--
including Europe, China, and East Asia--to assess the potential for
cooperative NGATS demonstrations. JPDO has a Global Harmonization IPT,
led by managers from ATO's International Operations Planning Services
International and FAA's Office of International Aviation. The IPT's
mission is to harmonize equipment and operations globally and advocate
the adoption of U.S.-preferred transformation concepts, technologies,
procedures, and standards. The Harmonization IPT finalized its charter
in March 2006 and is working to develop an international strategy and
outreach plan. In addition to external efforts, the Harmonization IPT
plans to work as a crosscutting IPT that will raise awareness of global
interoperability and standards issues within the other IPTs as they
consider system performance requirements.
According to several European officials with whom we spoke, global
harmonization (and harmonization with the U.S. system specifically) is
considered to be a key ingredient for the success of SESAR. Several of
these officials said that although the European organization invited
JPDO to participate as a full member in SESAR and the organization has
indicated its willingness to have reciprocal participation with the
United States, personnel exchanges are just beginning to occur. JPDO
officials recognize the importance of cooperative efforts and noted
that if Europe and the United States were to implement different and
incompatible standards and technologies, there could be a major adverse
impact on airlines that serve international markets. Nonetheless, these
officials point out that JPDO, as a U.S. government entity, could not
participate as a member in a private industry effort like the SESAR
consortium. FAA is, however, a member of the European Commission's
Industry Consultation Body, which provides advice to SESAR.
According to an FAA official, negotiations are currently underway to
complete an MOU between FAA and the European Commission that will
commit both parties to cooperation in information sharing and the
development of a seamless air traffic management system. JPDO officials
noted that personnel exchanges and other cooperative activities, such
as information exchanges and a joint working group on technical
standards, are already occurring under a memorandum of cooperation
between FAA and Eurocontrol.
While FAA and JPDO's Harmonization IPT are planning cooperative
activities, our research has identified several other areas where
cooperation does not appear to be fully developed. For example, the
SESAR and NGATS initiatives, despite their similarities, do not have
coordination activities such as peer reviews of relevant research,
cooperation on safety analysis (such as through the pooling of accident
data), or validation of technologies. It is possible that greater
cooperation and exchange between NGATS and SESAR might develop once
planning has progressed to the development and validation stage.
Concluding Observations:
Transforming the national airspace system to accommodate what is
expected to be three times the current amount of traffic by 2025,
providing adequate security and environmental safeguards--and doing
these things seamlessly while the current system continues to operate-
-will be an enormously complex undertaking. Both ATO and JPDO have been
given difficult tasks in a difficult budgetary environment. Going
forward, efforts to control costs and leverage resources will become
ever more critical. Success also depends on the ability of ATO and JPDO
to define their roles and form a collaborative environment for planning
and implementing the next generation system.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this statement for the record, please
contact Gerald Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
Individuals making key contributions to this statement include
Nabajyoti Barkakati, Christine Bonham, Colin Fallon, Carol Henn, David
Hooper, Heather Krause, Elizabeth Marchak, Edmond Menoche, Faye
Morrison, Richard Scott, Sarah Veale, and Matthew Zisman.
FOOTNOTES
[1] PBOs are discrete units, led by a Chief Operating Officer, that
commit to clear objectives, specific measurable goals, customer service
standards, and targets for improved performance.
[2] ATC Modernization has remained on our high-risk list since 1995.
See GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[3] Because ATO includes the majority of FAA employees, this statement
will refer to ATO initiatives, even though some may apply FAA-wide.
[4] Pub. L. No. 104-50, Fiscal Year 1996 Department of Transportation
Appropriations Act.
[5] Pub. L. No. 108-176, Vision 100--Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, December 12, 2003.
[6] Network centric operations aim to exploit technical advances in
information technology and telecommunications to improve situational
awareness and the speed of decision making.
[7] GAO, The National Airspace System: FAA Has Made Progress but
Continues to Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic Control
Systems, GAO-05-331 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).
[8] FAA's process improvement model, titled "Integrated Capability
Maturity Model," is a tool to assess the maturity of the agency's
software acquisition capabilities.
[9] GAO, Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities Improved,
but More Can Be Done to Institutionalize Improvements, GAO-04-901
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004).
[10] An earned valued management system measures performance by
comparing the value of work accomplished with work scheduled and
thereby provides early warning of schedule delays and cost overruns.
[11] The Medium Intensity Airport Weather System (MIAWS), intended to
provide a real time display of storm positions and estimated storm
tracks, was terminated for lack of demonstrable benefit. The Mode
Select (Mode S) program, intended to provide enhanced radar
surveillance information, was terminated due to a poor business case.
The Asset and Supply Chain Management Program, intended to assist in
asset and logistics management, was terminated due to business case
weaknesses and schedule and performance issues.
[12] GAO, Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management
Capabilities in Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems Is
Needed, GAO-04-822 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004).
[13] Pub. L. No. 103-355.
[14] According to FAA, the agency tracks acquisition program
performance from its original baseline or any subsequently approved
baselines approved by the Joint Resource Council and reports variances
to the Administrator and to Congress as required.
[15] GAO-03-669.
[16] Federal Aviation Administration, A Plan for the Future: The
Federal Aviation Administration's 10-Year Strategy for the Air Traffic
Control Workforce (Dec. 21, 2004).
[17] According to FAA, since issuing its controller staffing plan, it
has achieved productivity gains that have reduced the need to hire
about 460 air traffic controllers.
[18] In February 2005, FAA awarded a contract for the operation of its
flight service stations.
[19] The Vision 100 Act called for JPDO to create and carry out an
integrated plan for NGATS. This integrated plan was developed by the
partner agencies and submitted to Congress on December 12, 2004.
[20] ADS-B is a surveillance technology that transmits an aircraft's
identity, position, velocity, and intent to other aircraft and to ATC
systems on the ground, thereby enabling pilots and controllers to have
a common picture of airspace and traffic. By providing pilots with a
display that shows the location of nearby aircraft, the system enables
pilots to collaborate in decision making with controllers, safely
allowing reduced aircraft separation and thereby increasing capacity
within the national airspace system.
[21] Some of JPDO's governance structure was determined by Vision 100,
which directed the Secretary of Transportation to establish a Senior
Policy Committee and set forth the membership of this committee. In
addition, JPDO has established a Board of Directors, a Master IPT, and
several divisions.
[22] NASA uses the term foundational to refer to research that explores
core science, but does so with a view toward how the research will be
applied.
[23] FAA's Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee,
established in 1989, advises the FAA Administrator on research and
development issues and coordinates FAA's research, engineering, and
development activities with industry and other government agencies. The
committee considers aviation research needs in air traffic services,
airport technology, aircraft safety, aviation security, human factors,
and environment and energy.
[24] Wake vortex is air turbulence that occurs behind an aircraft and
was a cause in the 2001 American Airlines accident in which 265 people
died.
[25] SWIM is expected to help in the transition to network-centric
operations by providing the infrastructure and associated policies and
standards to enable information sharing among all authorized system
users, such as the airlines, other government agencies, and the
military.
[26] The $15 billion estimate is based on the working group's "base
case" scenario. The working group also calculated a lower cost "best
case" scenario, in which FAA achieves an annual 2 percent productivity
increase beyond the cost of increased demand; and a higher cost "worst
case" scenario, in which costs grow with the increase in operations
with no productivity increases.
[27] Nonfederal stakeholders' participation varies from approximately
10 percent to 25 percent of their time per week on the IPTs and
involves approximately one meeting per month for members of the
council.
[28] In 2002, FAA established a policy whereby commercial air
transport, regional, and military fleets operating in the nation's
higher airspace would use the 1090 MHz frequency. The policy also
prescribed the use of 978 MHz, known as the "universal access
transceiver" or UAT, for general aviation operating in lower airspace.
Uplinking weather and national airspace status information is only
possible on the 978 MHz frequency.
[29] Currently, FAA's Operational Evolution Plan monitors how NAS
capacity will change over a rolling 10-year planning horizon depending
on numerous variables, such as the demand for air travel, the
completion of new runways, and the availability of new ATC systems.
[30] The European Commission is a politically independent institution
that prepares and implements legislative instruments.
[31] Eurocontrol is an autonomous organization established in 1963 with
the intention of creating a single upper airspace in Europe.
[32] A portion of this funding is in-kind services from Eurocontrol. To
convert euros to U.S. dollars, we used 1.2098, the foreign exchange
rate for March 21, 2006, as published in The Washington Post.
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