Next Generation Air Transportation System
Preliminary Analysis of Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System Gao ID: GAO-06-915T July 25, 2006The health of our nation's air transportation system is critical to our citizens and economy. However, the current approach to managing air transportation is becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally obsolete. In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to plan for and coordinate, with federal and nonfederal stakeholders, a transformation from the current air traffic control (ATC) system to the "next generation air transportation system" (NGATS). Housed within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), JPDO has seven partner agencies that make up JPDO's senior policy committee: the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. This testimony, which provides preliminary results from GAO's ongoing work on JPDO, provides information on (1) the status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS, (2) the key challenges facing JPDO as it moves forward with its planning efforts, and (3) the key challenges facing FAA as it implements the transformation while continuing its current operations. The statement is based on GAO's analysis of JPDO documents, interviews, and the views of a panel of experts, as well as on past GAO work.
JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordination with its federal partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with the requirements of its authorizing legislation--Vision 100--and with several practices that our previous work has shown can facilitate federal interagency collaboration and the development of an enterprise architecture (i.e., system blueprint). JPDO's framework includes an integrated plan that provides a vision for NGATS, an organizational structure and processes for leveraging the resources and expertise of federal and nonfederal stakeholders, and an enterprise architecture that defines the specific requirements for NGATS. As JPDO moves forward, it will face leadership, leveraging, and commitment challenges. Currently, JPDO lacks a permanent director and a permanent chairperson of its senior policy committee to provide the leadership needed to overcome barriers to interagency coordination. In addition, despite early successes, JPDO may have difficulty continuing to leverage its partner agencies' resources and expertise for NGATS because these agencies have missions and priorities in addition to NGATS and JPDO does not yet have signed, long-term agreements with the partner agencies on their respective roles and responsibilities. Finally, JPDO faces the challenge of convincing nonfederal stakeholders that the government is fully committed to implementing NGATS, given that, in some instances, it has discontinued work on new technologies for the national airspace system. FAA faces challenges in institutionalizing recent improvements in its management and acquisition processes, as well as in obtaining the expertise and resources necessary to implement NGATS. First, institutionalizing FAA's process improvements is critical to successfully implementing NGATS. Second, FAA may lack the expertise needed to manage the NGATS effort. GAO has identified two potential approaches for FAA to supplement its capabilities that FAA is considering. Third, achieving cost savings is critical to funding the implementation of NGATS.
GAO-06-915T, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Preliminary Analysis of Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transforamtion of the National Airspace System
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, July 25, 2006:
Next Generation Air Transportation System:
Preliminary Analysis of Progress and Challenges Associated with the
Transformation of the National Airspace System:
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director Physical
Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-06-915T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-915T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S.
Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
The health of our nation‘s air transportation system is critical to our
citizens and economy. However, the current approach to managing air
transportation is becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally
obsolete. In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO) to plan for and coordinate, with federal and nonfederal
stakeholders, a transformation from the current air traffic control
(ATC) system to the ’next generation air transportation system“
(NGATS).
Housed within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), JPDO has seven
partner agencies that make up JPDO‘s senior policy committee: the
Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland
Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.
This testimony, which provides preliminary results from GAO‘s ongoing
work on JPDO, provides information on (1) the status of JPDO‘s efforts
to plan for NGATS, (2) the key challenges facing JPDO as it moves
forward with its planning efforts, and (3) the key challenges facing
FAA as it implements the transformation while continuing its current
operations. The statement is based on GAO‘s analysis of JPDO documents,
interviews, and the views of a panel of experts, as well as on past GAO
work.
What GAO Found:
JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordination with its
federal partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent
with the requirements of its authorizing legislation”Vision 100”and
with several practices that our previous work has shown can facilitate
federal interagency collaboration and the development of an enterprise
architecture (i.e., system blueprint). JPDO‘s framework includes an
integrated plan that provides a vision for NGATS, an organizational
structure and processes for leveraging the resources and expertise of
federal and nonfederal stakeholders, and an enterprise architecture
that defines the specific requirements for NGATS.
As JPDO moves forward, it will face leadership, leveraging, and
commitment challenges. Currently, JPDO lacks a permanent director and a
permanent chairperson of its senior policy committee to provide the
leadership needed to overcome barriers to interagency coordination. In
addition, despite early successes, JPDO may have difficulty continuing
to leverage its partner agencies‘ resources and expertise for NGATS
because these agencies have missions and priorities in addition to
NGATS and JPDO does not yet have signed, long-term agreements with the
partner agencies on their respective roles and responsibilities.
Finally, JPDO faces the challenge of convincing nonfederal stakeholders
that the government is fully committed to implementing NGATS, given
that, in some instances, it has discontinued work on new technologies
for the national airspace system.
FAA faces challenges in institutionalizing recent improvements in its
management and acquisition processes, as well as in obtaining the
expertise and resources necessary to implement NGATS. First,
institutionalizing FAA‘s process improvements is critical to
successfully implementing NGATS. Second, FAA may lack the expertise
needed to manage the NGATS effort. GAO has identified two potential
approaches for FAA to supplement its capabilities that FAA is
considering. Third, achieving cost savings is critical to funding the
implementation of NGATS.
Figure: Air Traffic Management:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO; PhotoDisc.
[End of Figure]
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-915T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham,
Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the status of efforts by the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO) to plan for and coordinate the transformation of the
nation's current air traffic control (ATC) system to the "next
generation air transportation system" (NGATS)--a system intended to
safely accommodate an expected tripling of air traffic by 2025.
Authorized in 2003, JPDO is housed within the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), whose Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is
responsible for modernizing and operating the nation's current ATC
system.[Footnote 1] According to Vision 100,[Footnote 2] the
legislation that authorized JPDO, the transformation to NGATS will be
completed by 2025 with the assistance of seven organizations that make
up JPDO's senior policy committee: the Departments of Transportation,
Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy. As JPDO plans the transformation to NGATS and
coordinates the related efforts of its partner agencies, FAA will be
responsible for both implementing the transformation and safely
operating the current ATC system 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
My statement today focuses on three key questions. (1) What is the
status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS? (2) What key challenges
does JPDO face in moving forward with its planning efforts? (3) What
key challenges does FAA face in transitioning from the current ATC
system and in implementing NGATS? My statement is based on our analysis
of documents provided by JPDO and its partner agencies; the
perspectives of agency officials and stakeholders with whom we have
spoken; the results of a panel of experts that we convened; and our
review of relevant literature, including JPDO's December 2004
integrated plan and March 2006 progress report. The statement also
draws on our prior work on FAA's program for modernizing the national
airspace system, which we have listed as a high-risk program since
1995.[Footnote 3] To assess JPDO's framework for facilitating
coordination among its partner agencies, obtaining the participation of
nonfederal stakeholders, and conducting technical planning for NGATS,
we compared JPDO's practices with those that we have found to be
effective in facilitating federal interagency collaboration and
enterprise architecture[Footnote 4] development.[Footnote 5] We also
reviewed the National Research Council's 2005 report on JPDO, which
provided a technical assessment of the research, development, and
technology components of JPDO's integrated plan. Later this year, we
expect to issue a report on our assessment of the status of JPDO's
efforts to plan for the development of NGATS. We are performing our
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
The following summarizes our findings to date:
* JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordination with its
partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with
the requirements of Vision 100 and with several practices that our
previous work has shown can facilitate federal interagency
collaboration and enterprise architecture development. Vision 100
established JPDO as a planning and coordinating body and outlined
elements for creating NGATS and managing the related work. These
elements, which make up JPDO's framework, include an integrated plan
that provides a vision for NGATS, an organizational structure and
processes for leveraging the resources and expertise of federal and
nonfederal stakeholders, and an enterprise architecture that defines
the specific requirements for NGATS.
* JPDO faces leadership, leveraging, and commitment challenges as it
moves forward with planning for NGATS. Currently, two leadership
positions critical to JPDO's success are vacant: JPDO has not had a
permanent director for over 6 months, and since the Secretary of
Transportation resigned, the senior policy committee has been without a
permanent chairperson. In addition, despite early successes in
leveraging its partner agencies' resources and expertise for NGATS
initiatives, JPDO may have difficulty continuing to do so because its
partner agencies have a variety of missions and priorities in addition
to NGATS, and JPDO does not yet have formal, signed agreements with the
agencies on their respective roles and responsibilities. JPDO also
faces the challenge of convincing nonfederal stakeholders that the
government is fully committed to NGATS because, in the past, the
government has discontinued work on new technologies for the national
airspace system, including one technology in which a nonfederal
stakeholder had already invested.
* FAA faces challenges in institutionalizing recent improvements in its
management and acquisition processes, as well as in obtaining the
expertise and resources needed to implement NGATS. First, the
successful implementation of NGATS will depend on FAA's incorporating
the improved processes into its organizational structure and culture.
Second, FAA may not have the expertise needed to manage the NGATS
implementation effort. Our work has identified, and FAA is considering,
two approaches for addressing this challenge--contracting with a lead
systems integrator and obtaining technical advice from federally funded
research and development corporations. Third, FAA will need resources
to implement NGATS, some of which may have to come from savings in
operating and maintaining the current ATC system.
Background:
In late 2003, recognizing that the current approach to managing air
transportation is becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally
obsolete, Congress created JPDO to plan NGATS, a system intended to
accommodate the threefold increase in air traffic demand expected by
2025. JPDO's scope is broader than that of traditional ATC
modernization in that it is "airport curb to airport curb,"
encompassing such issues as security screening and environmental
concerns. Additionally, JPDO's approach will require unprecedented
collaboration and consensus among many stakeholders--federal and
nonfederal--about necessary system capabilities, equipment, procedures,
and regulations. Each of JPDO's partner agencies will play a role in
the transformation to NGATS. For example, the Department of Defense has
deployed "network centric" systems,[Footnote 6] originally developed
for the battlefield, that are being considered as a conceptual
framework to provide all users of the national airspace system--FAA and
the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security--with a common view of
that system.
Vision 100 required the Secretary of Transportation to establish JPDO
within FAA to manage work related to NGATS. The Director of JPDO
reports to the FAA Administrator and to the Chief Operating Officer
within ATO. JPDO began operating in early 2004.
JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS:
JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordination with its
partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with
the requirements of Vision 100 and with several practices that our work
has shown can facilitate federal interagency collaboration and
enterprise architecture development. This framework includes an
integrated plan, an organizational structure, and an enterprise
architecture.
As Required by Vision 100, JPDO Developed an Integrated Plan and
Reported on the Progress of That Plan:
Vision 100 calls for the development of an integrated plan for NGATS
and annual updates on the progress of that plan. JPDO's partner
agencies developed an integrated plan and submitted it to Congress on
December 12, 2004. The plan includes a vision statement for meeting the
predicted threefold increase in demand for air transportation by 2025
and eight strategies that broadly address the goals and objectives for
NGATS. In March 2006, JPDO published its first report to Congress on
the progress made in carrying out the integrated plan.
The integrated plan is consistent with effective collaboration
practices we have identified. According to our research on federal
interagency collaborations, agencies must have a clear and compelling
rationale for working together to overcome significant differences in
their missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business. In
working together to develop JPDO's integrated plan, the partner
agencies agreed on a vision statement to transform the air
transportation system and on broad statements of future system goals,
performance characteristics, and operational concepts.
JPDO Developed an Organization for Involving Federal and Nonfederal
Stakeholders:
Vision 100 includes requirements for JPDO to coordinate and consult
with its partner agencies, private sector experts, and the public.
Accordingly, JPDO established an organizational structure to involve
federal and nonfederal stakeholders throughout the organization. This
structure includes a federal interagency policy committee, an institute
for nonfederal stakeholders, and integrated product teams (IPT) that
bring together federal and nonfederal experts to plan for and
coordinate the development of technologies that will address JPDO's
eight broad strategies.
* JPDO's senior policy committee was formed and is headed by the
Secretary of Transportation, as required in Vision 100. The committee
includes senior-level officials from JPDO's partner agencies and has
met three times since its inception.
* The NGATS Institute (the Institute) was created by an agreement
between the National Center for Advanced Technologies[Footnote 7] and
FAA to incorporate the expertise and views of stakeholders in private
industry, state and local governments, and academia. The NGATS
Institute Management Council, composed of top officials and
representatives from the aviation community, oversees the policy and
recommendations of the Institute and provides a means for advancing
consensus positions on critical NGATS issues. In March 2006, the
Institute held its first public meeting to solicit information from the
public and other interested stakeholders who are not involved in the
council or the IPTs. These types of meetings are designed to address
the Vision 100 requirement that JPDO coordinate and consult with the
public.
* The IPTs are headed by representatives of JPDO's partner agencies and
include more than 190 stakeholders from over 70 organizations, whose
participation was arranged through the Institute.
Figure 1 shows JPDO's position within FAA and the JPDO structures that
bring together federal and nonfederal stakeholders, including the
Institute and the IPTs.
Figure 1: Organization of JPDO:
[See PDF for image]
Source: JPDO.
[End of figure]
JPDO's organizational structure incorporates some of the practices we
have found effective for federal interagency collaborations. For
example, our work has shown that mutually reinforcing or joint
strategies can help align partner agencies' activities, core processes,
and resources to accomplish a common outcome. Each of the eight IPTs is
aligned with one of the eight strategies outlined in JPDO's integrated
plan, and each is headed by a partner agency that has taken the lead on
a specific strategy. Our research has also found that collaborating
agencies should identify the resources needed to initiate or sustain
their collaborative effort. To leverage human resources, JPDO has
staffed the various levels of its organization--including JPDO's board,
the IPTs, and technical divisions--with partner agency employees, many
of whom work part time for JPDO. Finally, our work has shown that
involving stakeholders can, among other things, increase their support
for a collaborative effort. The Institute provides for involving
nonfederal stakeholders, including the public, in planning NGATS.
JPDO Has Begun to Leverage the Resources of Its Partner Agencies for
NGATS:
Vision 100 requires JPDO to coordinate NGATS-related programs across
the partner agencies. To address this requirement, JPDO conducted an
initial interagency review of its partner agencies' research and
development programs during July 2005 to identify work that could
support NGATS. Through this process, JPDO identified early
opportunities that could be pursued during fiscal year 2007 to
coordinate and minimize the duplication of research programs across the
partner agencies and produce tangible results for NGATS. For example,
one identified opportunity is to align aviation weather research across
FAA, NASA, and the Departments of Commerce and Defense; develop a
common weather capability; and harmonize and incorporate into NGATS
those agency programs designed to seamlessly integrate weather
information and aircraft weather mitigation systems. In addition, the
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)[Footnote 8] and
System Wide Information System (SWIM)[Footnote 9] programs at FAA were
identified as opportunities for accelerated funding to produce tangible
results for NGATS. JPDO is currently working with the Office of
Management and Budget to develop a systematic means of reviewing the
partner agencies' budget requests so that the NGATS-related funding in
each request can easily be identified. Such a process would help the
Office of Management and Budget consider NGATS as a unified federal
investment, rather than as disparate line items distributed across
several agencies' budget requests.
JPDO's effort to leverage its partner agencies' resources for NGATS
demonstrates another practice important to sustaining collaborations.
Our work on collaborations has found that collaborating agencies, by
assessing their relative strengths and limitations, can identify
opportunities for leveraging each others' resources and thus obtain
benefits that would not be available if they were working separately.
JPDO's first interagency review of its partner agencies' research and
development programs has facilitated the leveraging of technological
resources for NGATS. The budget process under development with OMB
provides a further opportunity to leverage resources for NGATS.
Consistent with Vision 100, JPDO Is Developing an Enterprise
Architecture:
Vision 100 requires JPDO to create a multiagency research and
development roadmap for the transition to NGATS. To comply with Vision
100, JPDO has been working on an enterprise architecture and expects to
complete an early version of the architecture by September 2006. Many
of JPDO's future activities will depend on the robustness and
timeliness of this architecture development. The enterprise
architecture will describe FAA's operation of the current national
airspace system, JPDO's plans for NGATS, and the sequence of steps
needed for the transformation to NGATS. The enterprise architecture
will provide the means for coordinating among the partner agencies and
private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research and
development activities, and integrating equipment.
JPDO has taken several important steps to develop the enterprise
architecture--one of the most critical planning documents in the NGATS
effort. For example, JPDO has drafted a concept of operations--a
document that describes the operational transformations needed to
achieve the overall goals of NGATS. JPDO has used this document to
identify key research and policy issues for NGATS. For example, the
concept of operations identifies several issues associated with
automating the ATC system, including the need for a backup plan in case
automation fails, the responsibilities and liabilities of different
stakeholders during an automation failure, and the level of monitoring
needed by pilots when automation is ensuring safe separation between
aircraft. As the concept of operations matures, it will be important
for air traffic controllers and other affected stakeholders to provide
their perspectives on this effort so that needed adjustments can be
made in a timely manner. JPDO officials recognize the importance of
obtaining stakeholders' comments on the concept of operations and are
currently incorporating stakeholders' comments into the concept of
operations. JPDO expects to release its initial concept of operations
by the end of July.
Another step that JPDO has taken to develop the enterprise architecture
is to form an Evaluation and Analysis Division (EAD), composed of FAA
and NASA employees and contractors. This division is assembling a suite
of models to help JPDO refine its plans for NGATS and iteratively
narrow the range of potential solutions. For example, EAD has used
modeling to begin studying how possible changes in the duties of key
personnel, such as air traffic controllers, could affect the workload
and performance of others, such as airport ground personnel. According
to JPDO officials, the change in the roles of pilots and controllers is
the most important human factors issue involved in creating NGATS. JPDO
officials noted that the Agile Airspace and Safety IPTs include human
factors specialists and that JPDO's chief architect has a background in
human factors. However, EAD has not yet begun to model the effect of
the shift in roles on pilots' performance because, according to an EAD
official, a suitable model has not yet been incorporated into the
modeling tool suite. According to EAD, addressing this issue is
necessary, but will be difficult because data on pilot behavior are not
readily available for use in creating such models. Furthermore, EAD has
not yet studied the training implications of various NGATS-proposed
solutions because further definition of the concept of operations for
these solutions is needed. As the concept of operations and enterprise
architecture mature, EAD will be able to study the extent to which new
air traffic controllers will have to be trained to operate both the old
and the new equipment.
To develop and refine the enterprise architecture for NGATS, JPDO is
following an effective technology development practice that we
identified and applied to enterprise architecture development. This
phased, "build a little, test a little" approach is similar to a
process we have advocated for FAA's major system acquisition programs.
This phased approach will also allow JPDO to incorporate evolving
market forces and technologies in its architecture and thus better
manage change. Consequently, additional refinements are expected to be
made to the enterprise architecture.
As Required by Vision 100, JPDO Has Begun Efforts to Estimate the Costs
of NGATS:
Vision 100 requires JPDO to identify the anticipated expenditures for
developing and deploying NGATS. To begin estimating these expenditures
realistically, JPDO is holding a series of investment analysis
workshops with stakeholders to obtain their input on potential NGATS
costs. The first workshop, held in April 2006, was for commercial and
business aviation, equipment manufacturers, and ATC systems developers.
The second workshop is planned for August for operators of lower-
performance aircraft used in both commercial and noncommercial
operations. The third workshop, planned for early September, will focus
on airports and other local, state, and regional planning bodies.
Although these workshops will help JPDO develop a range of potential
costs for NGATS, a mature enterprise architecture is needed to provide
the foundation for developing NGATS costs. Several unknown factors will
drive these costs. According to JPDO, one of these drivers is the
technologies expected to be included in NGATS. Some of these
technologies are more complex and thus more expensive to implement than
others. A second driver is the sequence for replacing current
technologies with NGATS technologies. A third driver is the length of
time required for the transformation to NGATS, since a longer period
would impose higher costs. JPDO's first draft of its enterprise
architecture, expected in September 2006, could reduce some of these
variables, thereby allowing improved, albeit still preliminary,
estimates of NGATS' costs.
Although the enterprise architecture for NGATS is not yet complete,
both FAA and its Research, Engineering and Development Advisory
Committee (REDAC) have developed preliminary cost estimates, which
officials of both organizations have emphasized are not yet endorsed by
any agency. FAA estimates that the facilities and equipment cost to
maintain the ATC system and implement the transformation to NGATS will
be about $66 billion, or about $50 billion in constant 2005 dollars.
The annual cost would average $2.7 billion per year in constant 2005
dollars from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2025, or about $200
million more each year than FAA's fiscal year 2006 facilities and
equipment appropriation.
REDAC's Financing NGATS Working Group has developed a $15 billion
average annual cost estimate for NGATS that includes costs not only for
facilities and equipment but also for operations; airport improvement;
and research, engineering, and development--the remaining three
components of FAA's appropriation. As table 1 indicates, the working
group began with FAA's facilities and equipment estimate and went on to
calculate the remaining costs for FAA to maintain the current ATC
system and implement the transformation to NGATS. REDAC's estimate for
NGATS's total cost averages about $1 billion more annually than FAA's
total appropriations for fiscal year 2006.
Table 1: FAA's and REDAC's Cost Estimates for NGATS:
Dollars in billions.
Facilities and equipment;
FAA: Total NGATS cost: $50.5;
FAA: Average annual cost: $2.7;
REDAC[A]: Total NGATS cost: $50.5;
REDAC[A]: Average annual cost: $2.7.
Operations;
FAA: Total NGATS cost: [B];
FAA: Average annual cost: [B];
REDAC[A]: Total NGATS cost: $162.1;
REDAC[A]: Average annual cost: $8.5.
Airport improvement;
FAA: Total NGATS cost: [B];
FAA: Average annual cost: [B];
REDAC[A]: Total NGATS cost: $67.5;
REDAC[A]: Average annual cost: $3.6.
Research, engineering, and development;
FAA: Total NGATS cost: [B];
FAA: Average annual cost: [B];
REDAC[A]: Total NGATS cost: $12.4;
REDAC[A]: Average annual cost: $0.7.
Total;
FAA: Total NGATS cost: [B];
FAA: Average annual cost: [B];
REDAC[A]: Total NGATS cost: $292.5;
REDAC[A]: Average annual cost: $15.5.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA and REDAC information.
[A] This is the working group's estimate under its "base case"
scenario, which assumes that FAA's operations cost would increase
between 2006 and 2010, but then become constant through 2025 as
productivity increases offset the higher cost of increased demand. The
working group also calculated a lower-cost "best case" scenario and a
higher-cost "worst case" scenario using differing assumptions of
productivity gains.
[B] FAA did not estimate these costs.
[End of table]
Besides being preliminary, these estimates are incomplete--FAA's more
than REDAC's because FAA's does not include any costs other than those
for facilities and equipment. An FAA official acknowledged that the
agency would likely incur additional costs, such as for safety
certifications or operational changes responding to new NGATS
technologies. Additionally, FAA's facilities and equipment cost
estimate assumes that the intermediate technology development work,
performed to date by NASA, has been completed. As I will discuss
shortly, it is currently unclear who will now perform this work, but if
FAA assumes responsibility for the work, REDAC has estimated additional
FAA funding needs of at least $100 million a year. Furthermore, neither
FAA's nor REDAC's estimate includes the other partner agencies' costs
to implement NGATS, such as those that the Department of Homeland
Security might incur to develop and implement new security
technologies. Finally, these estimates treat NGATS's development and
implementation period as an isolated event. Consequently, the costs
drop dramatically toward 2025. In reality, officials who developed
these estimates acknowledge that planning for the subsequent "next
generation" system will likely be underway as 2025 approaches and the
actual modernization costs could therefore be higher in this time frame
than these estimates indicate.
JPDO Faces Leadership, Resource, and Commitment Challenges as It Moves
Forward with Planning for NGATS:
JPDO faces several challenges in planning for NGATS, including
addressing leadership vacancies, leveraging resources and expertise
from its partner agencies, and convincing nonfederal stakeholders that
the government is fully committed to NGATS.
Two Key JPDO Leadership Positions Are Vacant:
JPDO has not had a permanent director since January 2006 and, with the
recent resignation of the Secretary of Transportation, the senior
policy committee is without a permanent chairperson. Our work has shown
that, to overcome barriers to interagency coordination, committed
leadership by individuals at the top of all involved organizations is
critical. Leadership will also be important to provide a "champion" for
JPDO and to sustain the partner agencies' focus on and contributions to
the transformation to NGATS. Moreover, without a chairperson of the
senior policy committee, no one within JPDO is responsible for
sustaining JPDO's collaboration and overseeing its work.
These vacancies raise concerns about the continued progress of JPDO and
NGATS. After ATO was authorized, we reported that without a chief
operating officer, FAA was unable to move forward with the new air
traffic organization--that is, to bring together the ATC system's
acquisition and operating functions, as intended, into a viable
performance-based organization (PBO).[Footnote 10] This PBO was
designed to be part of the solution to the chronic schedule delays,
cost overruns, and performance shortfalls in FAA's ATC modernization
program. We believe that filling the two vacant positions is critical
to ensure continued progress for JPDO and NGATS.
Leveraging Resources and Expertise Poses a Challenge over Time:
JPDO officials view leveraging the partner agencies' resources and
expertise as one of their most significant challenges. According to
JPDO officials, leveraging efforts have worked well so far, but JPDO's
need for resources and expertise will increase with the development of
NGATS, and for at least two reasons, JPDO may have difficulty meeting
this need. First, JPDO's partner agencies have a variety of missions
and priorities in addition to NGATS, and their priorities may change.
Recently, for example, NASA reduced its aeronautics budget and decided
to focus on fundamental[Footnote 11] research, in part because the
agency believes such research is more in keeping with its mission and
unique capabilities. These changes occurred even though NASA's current
reauthorization act requires the agency to align its aviation research
projects to directly support NGATS goals. In light of the changes, it
is unclear what fundamental research NASA will perform to support NGATS
and who will perform the development steps for that research--that is,
the validation and demonstration that must take place before a new
technology can be transferred to industry and incorporated into a
product. JPDO and FAA officials said that not enough is understood
about NASA's plans to assess the impact of NASA's action on NGATS, but
many experts told us that NASA's new focus on fundamental research
creates a gap in the technology development continuum. Some believe
that FAA has neither the research and development infrastructure nor
the funding to do this work. As I previously mentioned, REDAC, in a
draft report, estimated that FAA would need at least $100 million
annually in increased funding to perform this research and development
work. REDAC further estimated that establishing the necessary
infrastructure within FAA could delay the implementation of NGATS by 5
years.
Second, JPDO may have difficulty leveraging its partner agencies'
resources and expertise because it does not yet have formal, long-term
agreements with the agencies on their roles and responsibilities in
creating NGATS. According to JPDO officials, they are working to
establish memorandums of understanding (MOU) signed by the heads of the
partner agencies that will broadly define the partner agencies' roles
and responsibilities at a high level. JPDO is also developing more
specific MOUs with individual partner agencies that lay out
expectations for support on NGATS components, such as information
sharing through network-centric operations.
Obtaining the specialized expertise of some stakeholders poses an
additional challenge for JPDO. Air traffic controllers, for example,
will play a key role in NGATS, but their union is not participating in
JPDO. Currently, the ATC system relies primarily on air traffic
controllers to direct pilots to maintain safe separation between
aircraft. Under NGATS, this premise could change and, accordingly, JPDO
has recognized the need for human factors research on issues such as
how tasks should be allocated between humans and automated systems and
how the existing allocation of responsibilities between pilots and air
traffic controllers might change. The input of current air traffic
controllers who have recent experience controlling aircraft is
important in considering human factors and safety issues because of the
controllers' familiarity with existing operating conditions.
The air traffic controllers' labor union, the National Air Traffic
Controllers Association (NATCA), has not participated in NGATS since
June 2005, when FAA terminated a labor liaison program that assigned
air traffic controllers to major system acquisition program offices and
to JPDO. FAA had determined that the benefits of the program were not
great enough to justify its cost. The NGATS Institute Management
Council includes a seat for the union, but a NATCA official told us
that the union's head had been unable to attend the council's meetings.
According to JPDO officials, the council has left a seat open in hopes
that the controllers will participate in NGATS as the new labor-
management agreement between NATCA and FAA is implemented.
Convincing Nonfederal Stakeholders That the Government Is Fully
Committed to NGATS Presents Another Challenge:
Convincing nonfederal stakeholders that the government is fully
committed to NGATS poses a challenge because, in the past, the
government has stopped some modernization efforts, including one in
which an airline had already invested in supporting technologies.
Specifically, FAA developed a datalink communications system that
transmitted scripted e-mail-like messages between controllers and
pilots. One airline equipped some of its aircraft with this new
technology, but because of funding cuts, among other things, FAA
canceled the program. Moreover, as we have reported,[Footnote 12] some
aviation stakeholders have expressed concern that FAA may not follow
through with its airspace redesign efforts and are hesitant to invest
in equipment unless they are sure that FAA will remain committed to its
efforts. One expert suggested that the government might mitigate this
issue by making an initial investment in a specific technology before
requesting that airlines or other industry stakeholders purchase
equipment.
Stakeholders' belief that the government is fully committed to NGATS
will be important as efforts to implement NGATS technologies move
forward. Achieving many of the benefits of NGATS will require users of
the system--airlines and general aviation--to purchase NGATS-
compatible technologies, such as ADS-B. This new air traffic
surveillance system, which JPDO has identified as one of the early core
technologies for NGATS, requires aircraft to be equipped with
components that will be implemented in two phases. FAA anticipates
significant cost savings from the implementation of the first phase,
but the airlines do not expect to benefit until the second phase is
complete. The technology should then allow pilots to fly more precise
routes at night and in poor visual conditions. Another early core
technology for NGATS, SWIM, is also intended to produce benefits for
users, but again, it is not expected to do so for many years.
Nonfederal stakeholders' support for these and other NGATS technologies
will be important, and their support will depend, in part, on their
assurance of the government's full commitment.
FAA Faces Institutionalization, Expertise, and Resource Challenges as
It Transitions to NGATS:
FAA faces challenges in implementing NGATS, including
institutionalizing recent improvements in its management and
acquisition processes, acquiring expertise to implement highly complex
systems, and achieving cost savings to help fund NGATS technologies.
Institutionalizing Recent Improvements in Management and Acquisition
Processes Will Be Critical to the Successful Implementation of NGATS:
With the establishment of ATO and the appointment of a Chief Operating
Officer (COO) for it, FAA put a new management structure in place and
established more businesslike management and acquisition processes to
address the cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls that have
plagued ATC modernization over the years. Under the new structure, FAA
is a flatter organization, with fewer management layers, and managers
are in closer contact with the services they deliver. FAA has also
taken some steps to break down the vertical lines of authority, or
organizational stovepipes, that we found hindered communication and
coordination across FAA. For example, the COO holds daily meetings with
the managers of ATO's departments and holds the managers collectively
responsible for the success of ATO through the performance management
system.
FAA has revised its management processes to increase accountability.
For example, it has established a cost accounting system and made the
units that deliver services within each department responsible for
managing their own costs. Thus, each unit manager develops an operating
budget and is held accountable for holding costs within specific
targets. Managers track the costs of their unit's operations,
facilities and equipment, and overhead and use this information to
determine the costs of the services their unit provides. Managers are
evaluated and rewarded according to how well they hold their costs
within established targets. Our work has shown that it is important,
when implementing organizational transformations, to use a performance
management system to assure accountability for change.[Footnote 13]
Finally, FAA is revising its acquisition processes, as we
recommended,[Footnote 14] and taking steps to improve oversight,
operational efficiency, and cost control. To ensure executive-level
oversight of all key decisions, FAA has revised its Acquisition
Management System to incorporate key decision points in a knowledge-
based product development process. Moreover, as we have reported, an
executive council now reviews major acquisitions before they are sent
to FAA's Joint Resources Council.[Footnote 15] To better manage cost
growth, this executive council also reviews breaches of 5 percent or
more in a project's cost, schedule, or performance. FAA has issued
guidance on how to develop and use pricing, including guidelines for
disclosing the levels of uncertainty and imprecision that are inherent
in cost estimates for major ATC systems. Additionally, FAA has begun to
base funding decisions for system acquisitions on a system's expected
contribution to controlling operating costs. Finally, FAA is creating a
training framework for its acquisition workforce that mirrors effective
human capital practices that we have identified, and the agency is
taking steps to measure the effectiveness of its training.
Since 2004, FAA has met its acquisitions performance goal--to have 80
percent of its system acquisitions on schedule and within 10 percent of
budget. To sustain this record, FAA will need to institutionalize its
reforms--that is, provide for their duration beyond the current
administration at FAA and ATO by ensuring that the reforms are fully
integrated into the agency's structure and processes at all levels and
have become part of its organizational culture. Our work has shown that
successfully institutionalizing change in large public and private
organizations can take 5 to 7 years or more.[Footnote 16]
Despite Recent Process Improvements, FAA Faces Challenges in Obtaining
the Expertise Needed to Implement a System as Complex as NGATS:
In the past, a lack of expertise contributed to shortfalls in FAA's
management of ATC modernization projects. Although the personnel
flexibilities that Congress authorized in 1995 allowed FAA to establish
criteria for outstanding performance and match industry pay scales for
needed expertise, industry experts have questioned whether FAA will
have the technical expertise needed to implement NGATS--a task of
unprecedented complexity, according to JPDO, FAA, and other aviation
experts. In 2004, we found that FAA could not ensure that its own best
practices were consistently used in managing acquisitions and, as a
result, its major acquisitions were still at risk of cost overruns,
schedule slippages, or performance shortfalls.[Footnote 17] These
findings are consistent with concerns about the expertise of
acquisition managers governmentwide. According to a 2005 study by the
Merit Systems Protection Board,[Footnote 18] at least 50 percent of the
government personnel who currently manage technical contracts reported
needing training in areas such as contract law, developing
requirements, requesting bids, developing bid selection criteria and
price determinations, and monitoring contractor performance.
Recognizing the complexity of the NGATS implementation effort and the
possibility that FAA may not have the in-house expertise to manage it
without assistance, we have identified potential approaches for
supplementing FAA's capabilities. One of these approaches is for FAA to
contract with a lead systems integrator (LSI). Generally, an LSI is a
prime contractor that would help to ensure that the discrete systems
used in NGATS will operate together and whose responsibilities may
include designing system solutions, developing requirements, and
selecting major system and subsystem contractors. The government has
used LSIs before for programs that require the integration of multiple
complex systems. Our research indicates that although LSIs have certain
advantages, such as the knowledge, understanding, skills, and ability
to integrate functions across various systems, their use also entails
certain risks. For example, because an LSI may have significantly more
responsibility than a prime contractor usually does, careful oversight
is necessary to ensure that the government's interests are protected
and that conflicts of interest are avoided. Consequently, selecting,
assigning responsibilities to, and managing an LSI could pose
significant challenges for JPDO and FAA.
Another approach that we have identified involves obtaining technical
advice from federally funded research and development corporations to
help the agency oversee and manage prime contractors. These nonprofit
corporations are chartered to provide long-term technical advice to
government agencies in accordance with various statutory and regulatory
rules to ensure independence and prevent conflicts of interest.
FAA officials indicated that they are considering at least these two
approaches to help address any possible gaps the agency may have in its
technical expertise. Given the complexity of implementing NGATS, we
believe that FAA's consideration of these approaches to filling any
gaps in its technical expertise is appropriate. We believe that either
of these approaches could reduce the risks associated with implementing
NGATS.
FAA Will Require Resources to Implement NGATS:
The cost of operating and maintaining the current ATC system while
implementing NGATS will be another important challenge in transitioning
to NGATS--a system that, as noted, is broader in scope than the current
ATC system and will require funding for security technologies and
environmental activities as well as ATC technologies. Although
additional funding for the current ATC system and for NGATS may come
from increased congressional appropriations, some industry analysts
expect that most of the funds for implementing NGATS will have to come
from savings in operating and maintaining the current ATC system.
FAA is currently seeking to reduce costs by introducing infrastructure
and operational efficiencies and expects to use the savings from these
efforts to help fund the implementation of NGATS. For example, FAA has
begun to decommission ground-based navigational aids, such as compass
locators, outer markers, and nondirectional radio beacons, as it begins
to move toward a satellite-based navigation system. In fiscal year
2005, FAA decommissioned 177 navigational aids, claiming savings of
$2.9 million. According to one expert, FAA could additionally generate
revenue from these sites by leasing them for warehouses or cell phone
towers. FAA also expects to reduce costs by streamlining its
operations. For example, it is consolidating its administrative
activities, currently decentralized across its nine regions, into three
regions, and anticipates an annual savings of up to $460 million over
the next 10 years. Our work analyzing international air navigation
service providers has shown that additional cost savings may be
possible by further consolidating ATC facilities such as terminal radar
approach control (TRACON) facilities and ATC centers. According to one
estimate of potential FAA savings, consolidating the existing 21 air
route traffic control centers into 6 centers could save approximately
$600 million per year. Finally, FAA expects to save costs through
outsourcing. For example, it outsourced its automated flight service
stations to a private contractor and expects to achieve savings of $1.7
billion over 10 years. In addition, it expects savings of $0.5 billion
from 400 staffing reductions that occurred between the time the
outsourcing began and the time the new contract was actually
implemented. The agency expects to receive $66 million--the first
installment of these cost savings--in fiscal year 2007.
Until FAA has completed its estimates of both NGATS costs and the cost
savings it will be able to achieve between now and 2025, it will not be
able to determine how far these cost savings will go toward financing
NGATS. Nonetheless, one analyst has preliminarily estimated that FAA's
expected savings through infrastructure and operational efficiencies
will fall far short of the amount needed to finance NGATS.[Footnote 19]
While more information is needed to estimate the amount of any
shortfall with greater confidence, these preliminary and incomplete
estimates signal the extent of the resource challenge.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. We would be pleased to
answer any questions that you and Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Gerald
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making
key contributions to this statement include Kevin Egan, Elizabeth
Eisenstadt, David Hooper, Heather Krause, Elizabeth Marchak, Edmond
Menoche, Faye Morrison, Taylor Reeves, and Richard Scott.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Although ATO is immediately responsible for modernizing the ATC
system, we will refer to FAA throughout this statement because it
encompasses JPDO and is ultimately responsible for the modernization
effort.
[2] Pub. L. No. 108-176, Vision 100--Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, December 12, 2003.
[3] ATC modernization has remained on our high-risk list since 1995.
See GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[4] An enterprise architecture is a tool, or blueprint, for
understanding and planning complex systems. The NGATS enterprise
architecture will provide the means for coordinating among the partner
agencies and private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research
and development activities, and integrating equipment. The enterprise
architecture will describe the current national airspace system, NGATS,
and the sequence of steps needed to implement the transformation to
NGATS.
[5] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005) and GAO, Federal Aviation
Administration: Stronger Architecture Program Needed to Guide Systems
Modernization Efforts, GAO-05-266 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005).
[6] Network-centric systems aim to exploit technical advances in
information technology and telecommunications to improve situational
awareness and the speed of decision making.
[7] The National Center for Advanced Technologies is a nonprofit unit
within the Aerospace Industries Association.
[8] ADS-B is a surveillance technology that transmits an aircraft's
identity, position, velocity, and intent to other aircraft and to ATC
systems on the ground, thereby enabling pilots and controllers to have
a common picture of airspace and traffic. By providing pilots with a
display that shows the location of nearby aircraft, the system enables
pilots to collaborate in decision making with controllers, safely
allowing reduced aircraft separation and thereby increasing capacity
within the national airspace system.
[9] SWIM is expected to help in the transition to network-centric
operations by providing the infrastructure and associated policies and
standards to enable information sharing among all authorized system
users, such as the airlines, civilian government agencies, and the
military.
[10] GAO, National Airspace System: Current Efforts and Proposed
Changes to Improve Performance of FAA's Air Traffic Control System; GAO-
03-542 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003).
[11] NASA uses the term fundamental to refer to research that includes
continued long-term, scientific study in core areas such as physics,
chemistry, materials, experimental techniques, and computational
techniques to enable new capabilities and technologies for individual
and multiple disciplines.
[12] GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation will Require
Cultural Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available
Management Tools, GAO-06-154 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005).
[13] GAO-03-542.
[14] GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has
Improved, but Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure
Results, GAO-05-23 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004).
[15] GAO-05-23.
[16] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[17] GAO-05-23.
[18] U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Contracting Officer
Representatives: Managing the Government's Technical Experts to Achieve
Positive Contract Outcomes (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2005).
[19] Aviation Management Associates, Inc., The "No New Money" Scenario
for the Next Generation Air Transportation System, (Alexandria, VA:
Oct. 1, 2005).
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