Rail Transit
Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety Oversight Program Gao ID: GAO-06-821 July 26, 2006The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's transportation infrastructure. Safety and security oversight of rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In this report, GAO addressed: (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what is known about the program's impact; and (3) challenges facing the program. We also provide information about oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To do our work we surveyed state oversight agencies and transit agencies covered by FTA's program.
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible for developing a program standard that transit agencies must meet and reviewing the performance of the transit agencies against that standard. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, TSA also has security oversight authority over transit agencies. Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a top priority. FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could result in duplication of effort.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-821, Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety Oversight Program
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Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives:
July 2006:
Rail Transit:
Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety
Oversight Program:
GAO-06-821:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-821, a report to Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation‘s
transportation infrastructure. Safety and security oversight of rail
transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies
following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In this
report, GAO addressed: (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is
designed; (2) what is known about the program‘s impact; and (3)
challenges facing the program. We also provide information about
oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To do our
work we surveyed state oversight agencies and transit agencies covered
by FTA‘s program.
What GAO Found:
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA,
other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate
to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires
states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of
rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies
are responsible for developing a program standard that transit agencies
must meet and reviewing the performance of the transit agencies against
that standard. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews
as part of their responsibilities, TSA also has security oversight
authority over transit agencies.
Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit
agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several
transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such
as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is
ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA
has not definitively shown the program‘s benefits and has not developed
performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as
required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to
its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies,
resulting in a lack of information to track the program‘s trends. FTA
officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance
measures and goals to help determine the program‘s impact, especially
since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low.
However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that
the program‘s new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a
top priority.
FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program.
First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically,
officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not
having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight
agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical
training would help address this variation. Second, transit and
oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are
to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail
inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could
result in duplication of effort.
Figure: Examples of Rail Transit Systems Subject to FTA State Safety
Oversight Program:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: PennDOT; Seattle Center Monorail; San Francisco Municipal
Railway, GAO.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct FTA to
(1) set performance goals for the program and develop a plan for
maintaining the stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies and (2)
develop and encourage completion of a recommended training curriculum
for oversight agency staff. Also, we recommend that the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) direct the Assistant
Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
coordinate their security oversight activities and audits with FTA and
transit and oversight agencies. FTA and TSA generally concurred with
the report and are considering how to implement the recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-821].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud on
(202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program:
Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile;
However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document
the Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and
Security:
FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety
Oversight Program:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems:
Appendix II: List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They
Oversee:
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Estimated FTEs Employees Used by Oversight Agencies to Oversee
Transit Agency Safety and Security:
Table 2: Rail Transit and State Oversight Agencies:
Table 3: Rail Transit Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This
Review:
Table 4: State Oversight Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This
Review:
Figures:
Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety
Oversight Program:
Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Participants in the State
Safety Oversight Program:
Figure 3: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies Participating in
State Safety Oversight Program:
Abbreviations:
APTA: American Public Transportation Association:
ATSA: The Aviation and Transportation Security Act:
CPUC: California Public Utilities Commission:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
DRPA: Delaware River Port Authority:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FMCSA: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration:
FRA: Federal Railroad Administration:
FTA: Federal Transit Administration:
FTE: full-time equivalent:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:
NJDOT: New Jersey Department of Transportation:
MUNI: San Francisco Municipal Railway:
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board:
PATCO: Port Authority Transit Corporation:
PennDOT: Pennsylvania Department of Transportation:
PHMSA: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:
PTSB: Public Transportation Safety Board:
TOC: Tri-State Oversight Committee:
TSA : Transportation Security Administration:
TSI: Transportation Safety Institute:
WMATA : Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority:
July 26, 2006:
The Honorable Don Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Ranking Democratic Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
Rail transit moves over 7 million daily passengers. According to
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) statistics, rail transit accounts
for less than 6 percent of all public transportation's accidents while
providing almost 32 percent of all public transportation's passenger
trips, making it one of the safest modes of public transportation.
However, safety and security are still concerns, especially as the
number of rail transit systems--and therefore the number of passengers
riding rail transit--increases. For example, the number of rail transit
systems in FTA's State Safety Oversight program increased from 32 in
1997 to 42 in 2006, and as many as 7 new systems are expected to open
in the next 3 years. Furthermore, the number of fatalities and
accidents has varied over the past few years. For example, while
fatalities ranged from 26 to 57 per year (with an approximate average
of 40 per year) between 1999 and 2005, total reported accidents
decreased 3 percent. Finally, recent acts of terrorism on European and
Indian transit systems illustrate the need to maintain high levels of
safety and security for transit.
The federal government is involved, in varying degrees, with the safety
and security of the nation's transportation system. For example, the
Department of Transportation (DOT) provides oversight of several
transportation modes. Within DOT, the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) promulgate regulations and technical
standards that govern how vehicles or facilities in their respective
modes must be operated or constructed. In addition, each of these
agencies use federal or state inspectors, or a combination of both, to
determine compliance with the safety regulations and guidance they
issue. Finally, these agencies can mandate corrective actions and levy
fines to transportation operators who do not comply with regulations.
FTA's oversight of safety and security differs from the other DOT
agencies. In 1982, FTA's role in transit safety evolved when Congress
gave it the discretion to investigate unsafe conditions in any
operation financed by the agency. Congress also gave FTA the power to
withhold funds until a plan for correcting the conditions had been
approved, but did not give it power to levy fines or take legal actions
against transit agencies.[Footnote 1] However, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) suggested that states and localities
take a more proactive role in overseeing transit safety, and that FTA
closely monitor this state and local oversight.[Footnote 2]
Subsequently, in 1991, Congress required FTA to (1) issue regulations
requiring states to designate an oversight agency to oversee the safety
and security of rail transit agencies and (2) withhold federal funds if
a state did not comply with the regulations. Through the resulting
State Safety Oversight program, which became effective in 1997, FTA
requires states to designate an oversight agency to implement FTA
safety and security oversight over rail transit agencies. In addition,
in 2001, Congress passed legislation creating the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), and defined its primary responsibility
as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. While TSA's most
public role to date has been its airport screening duties, the agency
is taking several steps to secure the U.S. rail transit system,
including developing a rail inspector force.
To assist with Congress' oversight activities, we (1) describe how the
State Safety Oversight program is designed, (2) identify what is known
about the impact of the program on rail transit safety and security,
and (3) identify any challenges to the State Safety Oversight program.
In addition, you asked us to provide information on how the State
Safety Oversight program functions in areas where transit systems cross
state lines. See appendix I for a description of program implementation
where transit systems cross state lines.
To determine how the program is designed, we interviewed a wide range
of stakeholders including FTA, NTSB, TSA, and the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA), an industry group. We also reviewed
program documentation and guidance. To identify what is known about the
impact of the program on rail transit safety and security, we reviewed
FTA documents and interviewed officials with FTA, NTSB, APTA, transit
agencies, and state safety oversight agencies. To identify challenges
facing the program, we conducted interviews with 24 of the 25 state
safety oversight agencies across the country and 37 of the 42 operating
rail transit agencies.[Footnote 3] We visited 8 oversight agencies and
17 transit agencies. We selected these agencies to present a cross-
section of transit and oversight agencies in major cities, smaller
cities, states with several rail transit agencies, and states with only
one rail system. In addition, 2 of the 17 transit agencies that we
selected will soon begin operations to see how the program may be
incorporated into new transit systems. Also, we selected 3 of the 17
because they cross state boundaries, so that we could determine how the
program functions in these regions. We interviewed staff of the transit
and oversight agencies we visited and reviewed relevant program
documentation such as interagency agreements and program standards. We
conducted our work from August 2005 through June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See app. III
for more detailed information on our methodology.)
Results in Brief:
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA,
other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate
to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems.
* FTA requires states to designate a state safety oversight agency and
develops rules and guidance that those designated agencies are to use
to perform their oversight. FTA's rules and guidance are generally
based on a system safety approach to provide a comprehensive and
organized approach to safety and security. In addition, FTA officials
require that oversight agencies include risk management components in
what they require of the transit agencies they oversee. FTA officials
stated that these risk management components, such as hazard analysis
and risk mitigation procedures, are applicable to transit and are
similar to those used in other transportation mode safety approaches.
Although FTA develops and enforces regulations, it neither directly
oversees transit operations, nor provides funding for the program after
state oversight agencies are designated.
* The designated state oversight agencies directly oversee transit
agencies' activities. Among other things, they review transit agencies'
safety and security system plans, audit the transit agencies at least
every 3 years, and conduct periodic reviews of safety and security
trends. States have designated several different types of agencies to
serve as state oversight agencies. Most commonly, states have
designated their transportation departments to fulfill this function,
but public utility commissions, public safety agencies, and regional
transportation authorities also serve in this role. In terms of
funding, although states can use federal New Starts[Footnote 4] funding
to set up a new oversight agency, states must support the continuing
operation of the oversight agency with other, generally non-federal,
sources of funding. Officials in 17 of the 24 state oversight agencies
with whom we spoke reported that they use state funds for the program,
while 10 of the 24 reported they charge the transit agency for
oversight.
* Transit agencies develop and implement safety and security plans,
assess hazardous conditions, report certain incidents to the oversight
agency, conduct self audits, and keep the state oversight agency
apprised of corrective actions.
* Federal agencies other than FTA have oversight responsibility for
part of the safety and security of rail transit operations. Since 2003,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has had a role in transit
security. DHS's Office of Grants and Training provides grants to
transit and other local agencies to enhance security while TSA has
security regulatory authority over rail transit agencies. TSA recently
hired and is deploying a rail security inspector force to oversee
compliance with existing security directives and any future
regulations. In addition, FRA has jurisdiction to regulate the safety
of portions of rail transit systems that share track or rights-of-way
with the general railroad system.
Almost all oversight and transit agencies report that the State Safety
Oversight program is worthwhile in terms of promoting and improving the
safety and security of rail transit systems; however, there is limited
information showing its impact on safety and security. Officials at 23
of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agency officials
with whom we spoke believe the program is worthwhile. The transit
agency officials primarily cite the importance of having state
oversight agency staff "look over their shoulder," review safety and
security trends, and require audits and corrective actions. Although
many officials support the program, FTA's methods for obtaining
information on transit safety and security (i.e., transit and oversight
agency data and FTA audits of the oversight agencies) do not include
performance measures and related program goals. FTA has not conducted
audits every 3 years, as envisioned when the program began. According
to FTA officials, they did not keep to their stated audit schedule
because they were reassessing the priorities for the program after the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. FTA issued annual reports from
1999 through 2003 that track transit accident, crash, fatality, and
other safety data; however, FTA officials have had difficulty
identifying performance measures for the program and setting
performance goals, because of the relatively low number of fatalities
and incidents, and the varying design of rail transit systems, such as
street trolleys and heavy rail. Furthermore, FTA audited all oversight
agencies at least once in the past 8 years (except those that began
operations in 2004 or later). They noted that while they conducted only
four audits of oversight agencies from 2001 to 2004, they also
conducted nine "safety and security readiness reviews" to ensure
transit systems about to begin operations would be able to safely and
securely begin passenger operations. Although the agency was focused on
security after September 11, 2001, this infrequent schedule limits
FTA's ability to conduct oversight, including collecting information on
the safety oversight agencies and making informed and timely revisions
to the program. Recent changes in FTA's program regulations and
leadership provide an opportunity to address this lack of information,
performance measures, and program goals, and to resume its stated audit
schedule. For example, FTA has issued a revision to the regulations
governing the State Safety Oversight program, recommitted to the audit
process, and signed a contract that includes developing performance
measures by the end of fiscal year 2006 and evaluating how new rail
systems are implementing the program.[Footnote 5]
FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program.
First, the amount of staff and the level of state oversight-staff
expertise (and thus their potential ability to oversee transit
agencies) varies widely across the country. For example, one oversight
agency requires its staff to have at least 5 years of rail transit
experience. In contrast, another oversight agency assigned a state DOT
transportation planner to work on safety and security oversight as a
collateral duty. Although no officials identified a safety or security
problem resulting from a lack of staff or expertise, officials from 16
of 24 state safety oversight agencies raised concerns about possibly
not having enough qualified staff to carry out their oversight.
Officials from three state oversight agencies stated that additional
funding to hire more staff for this program would be helpful. Most
transit and oversight agency officials with whom we spoke believe that
federal funding for training and an FTA-developed curriculum would
improve the qualifications and effectiveness of state oversight agency
personnel. While FTA provides technical support on and supports the
exchange of best practices for meeting its regulations, these
activities do not include training on oversight approaches or providing
funding to attend training classes. This contrasts with the approach
taken by other DOT agencies, such as FRA and PHMSA, which provide free
training or use agency funds to pay for state agency personnel to
attend training sessions, in at least some instances. Although FTA
considered addressing the lack of consistency in qualifications among
state agencies in its recent regulations, FTA officials determined the
agency lacks the legal authority to direct states to hire state safety
oversight personnel with specific experience, training, or
certification. A second challenge to implementing the program,
according to officials from 20 of 24 state oversight agencies and 14 of
37 transit agencies, is the uncertainty about the federal role in
transit security given that TSA has no formally defined role in FTA's
program--even though it is the lead agency on security matters and has
regulatory authority over security activities in transportation
including rail. Although TSA's program is still developing, several
oversight and transit agency officials with whom we spoke were
concerned about the potential for duplication of effort given that
state safety oversight agencies and TSA both review and comment on
transit systems' security plans. Several transit agency officials
described this as a particular concern due to the already limited
resources they had available for responding to oversight activities.
TSA and FTA recognize this concern and have begun discussions on how to
coordinate their oversight efforts.
To help ensure that FTA has sufficient information to evaluate the
program's performance, we are recommending that FTA's new program
leadership set performance goals for the program and develop a plan for
maintaining FTA's stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies'
performance at least once every 3 years. Also, to help oversight agency
staff obtain adequate training to perform their duties, we are
recommending that FTA develop a recommended training curriculum for
oversight agency staff and work with oversight agencies to identify
ways to address training deficiencies that exist among oversight agency
staff. Finally, to reduce the potential for duplication of effort and
confusion on the part of oversight and transit agencies regarding the
security portion of the program, we are recommending that FTA and TSA
coordinate their security oversight activities, including performing
security audits in a coordinated fashion.
In commenting on a draft of this report, officials from FTA, TSA, and
NTSB provided comments generally concurring with the report.
Furthermore, FTA and TSA officials stated that they are working to
determine how to implement the recommendations. Finally, TSA provided a
technical comment, which we included in the report.
Background:
In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),[Footnote 6] which added Section 28 to
the Federal Transit Act.[Footnote 7] ISTEA required FTA to establish a
state-managed safety and security oversight program for rail transit
agencies. As a result, on December 27, 1995,[Footnote 8] FTA published
a set of regulations, called Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State Safety
Oversight (subsequently referred to as FTA's rule in this report), for
improving the safety and security of rail transit agencies. State
oversight agencies were required by the rule to approve transit
agencies' safety plans by January 1, 1997, and security plans by
January 1, 1998. As part of the FTA rule, FTA officials stated they
incorporated APTA's 1991 Manual for the Development of Rail Transit
System Safety Program Plans to describe steps the state oversight
agencies should take in developing the program standards that transit
agencies would have to meet.
In 1995, at the time of the FTA rule's publication, 5 of 19 states
affected by the FTA rule had oversight programs in place for rail
transit safety and security, and no oversight agency met all the
requirements in the FTA rule. During the first few years of
implementation, FTA worked with states to develop compliant programs
that addressed FTA's requirements. Ten years after FTA promulgated the
initial rule, FTA published a revision to it in the Federal Register on
April 29, 2005. The FTA rule stated that oversight agencies had to
comply with the revised rule by May 1, 2006. The revisions address, in
part, the needs of a growing oversight community[Footnote 9] and NTSB's
recommendations arising from transit accident investigations. For
example, according to FTA and NTSB, NTSB found that the initial rule
did not include the requirement that oversight agencies verify transit
agencies are following safe and secure operating procedures by formally
documenting how transit agency employees were performing specific work
functions in compliance with the transit agency's rules and procedures-
-a process known as "proficiency and efficiency testing." Thus, the
revised rule specifies what the state oversight agency must require of
rail transit systems regarding such verification, and incorporates into
the regulation material previously incorporated by reference to the
APTA manual. Finally, the revised rule included additional information
on ensuring rail transit security and emergency preparedness.
FTA relies on staff in its Office of Safety and Security to lead the
State Safety Oversight program--and hired the current Program Manager
in March 2006. This manager is also responsible for other safety duties
in addition to the State Safety Oversight program. Additional FTA staff
within the Office of Safety and Security assist with outreach to
transit and oversight agencies and additional tasks. For example, FTA
has devoted a Transit Safety Specialist to the program full time; a
Training Manager, Data Analyst, and Safety Analyst are also available
to assist on an as-needed basis. FTA regional personnel are not
formally involved with the program's day-to-day activities, though
officials from several FTA Regional Offices help address specific
compliance issues that occasionally arise at transit agencies. Also,
staff in at least one FTA Regional Office have taken it upon themselves
to take an active role supporting transit agencies and oversight
agencies in meeting the program's requirements. In addition, regional
staff help states with new transit agencies establish new oversight
agencies, help new transit agencies create safety and security plans,
and have helped facilitate disputes between oversight and transit
agencies as needed. However, after a transit system begins operations,
the program is primarily managed from FTA's headquarters office. FTA
also relies on contractors to do many of the day-to-day activities
ranging from developing and implementing FTA's audit program of state
oversight agencies to developing and providing training classes on
system safety.
FTA's rule applies to all states with rail fixed guideway systems
operating in their jurisdictions. The FTA rule defines a rail fixed
guideway system as any light, heavy, or rapid rail system; monorail,
inclined plane, funicular, trolley, or automated guideway that is not
regulated by FRA and:
* is included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles or
receives funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49
U.S.C. 5336); or:
* has submitted documentation to FTA indicating its intent to be
included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles to receive
funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C.
5336).
Figure 1 shows examples of the types of rail systems that are included
in the State Safety Oversight program.
Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety
Oversight Program:
[See PDF for image]
Source: PennDOT; Seattle Center Monorail; San Francisco Municipal
Railway; GAO.
[End of figure]
FTA's rule states that rail systems that are regulated by FRA, such as
commuter railroads, are not considered rail transit agencies and are
therefore not subject to its rule. In addition, FRA has oversight
authority over the safety of portions of rail transit systems that
share track or rights-of-way with the general railroad system.[Footnote
10] Furthermore, the revised rule's definition of "rail fixed guideway
system" includes systems built entirely without FTA capital funds, but
that intend to receive FTA formula funding. Examples of these systems
include Houston's METRORail system and the New Jersey Transit RiverLINE
system. Rail transit operations that do not receive FTA formula funds
are not subject to oversight through FTA's program. Las Vegas' monorail
line does not receive FTA formula funds and therefore does not fall
within the FTA program. However, some of the rail transit systems--
including automated airport people-movers and sightseeing tramways--
that are not subject to the FTA program may be subject to state-
mandated oversight in certain states.
FTA and FRA have different regulatory authority and this has
implications for their ability to provide oversight.[Footnote 11]
According to statute, FTA cannot regulate safety and security
operations at transit agencies except for purposes of national defense
or in cases of regional or national emergency.[Footnote 12] In
addition, FTA does not have safety inspectors. FTA may, however,
institute nonregulatory safety and security activities, including
safety-and security-related training, research, and demonstration
projects. In addition, FTA may promote safety and security through
grant-making authority. Specifically, FTA may stipulate conditions of
grants, such as certain safety and security statutory and regulatory
requirements, and FTA may withhold funds for noncompliance with the
conditions of a grant.[Footnote 13] In relation to the State Safety
Oversight program, both the authorizing statute and the FTA rule state
FTA may withhold urbanized area program funds from states that do not
meet the requirements of the program.[Footnote 14] For example, FTA
invoked this authority and withheld federal funding from two states
that failed to meet initial deadlines specified in the FTA rule. FTA
withheld approximately $95 million in federal funding from one state
for its failure to designate a state safety oversight agency and
approximately $2.3 million from another state for failure to meet the
FTA rule's implementation deadlines.
FRA has broader jurisdiction over safety regulation than FTA. FRA
oversees over 500 freight railroads and over 20 commuter railroads, in
addition to Amtrak. According to agency officials, FRA can directly
enforce safety statutes or regulations against railroads using a
"toolkit" of consequences, which vary in severity and are used to
compel rail carriers to comply with safety regulations. Most commonly,
FRA will issue a civil penalty, or fine, against a railroad not in
compliance with a particular regulation. Depending on the infraction,
however, FRA can also issue an emergency order (the strongest response
to noncompliance) or it can cite a defect (a minor deficiency that
needs to be addressed but is not egregious enough to warrant a fine).
FRA officials stated that the agency trains and maintains its own cadre
of safety inspectors that are authorized to conduct safety inspections
at any time, 24 hours per day and 7 days per week. In addition to these
inspectors, FRA manages a program called the State Rail Safety
Participation Program which allows states to employ their own FRA-
certified inspectors who can enforce FRA regulations.
Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA),
federal agencies should design programs with measurable goals that
support the agency's strategic goals. Congress enacted GPRA to shift
agencies' focus from simply monitoring activities undertaken to
measuring the results of these activities. Each agency's strategic plan
is to include a mission statement, a set of outcome-related strategic
goals, and a description of how the agency intends to achieve these
goals. To measure progress toward the strategic goals, we have
previously reported that the agency should also have a plan for
collecting data to measure and evaluate program performance.[Footnote
15] Without measurable goals and evaluation, it is difficult to
determine whether the program is accomplishing its intended purpose and
whether the resources dedicated to the program efforts should be
increased, used in other ways, or applied elsewhere.
Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program:
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA,
other federal agencies such as DHS, states, and rail transit agencies
collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems.
Under the program, FTA is responsible for developing the regulations
and guidance governing the program, auditing state safety oversight
agencies to ensure the regulations are enforced, and providing
technical assistance and other information; FTA provides funding to
oversight agencies in only limited instances under the program. State
oversight agencies directly oversee the safety and security of rail
transit systems by reviewing safety and security plans, performing
audits, and investigating accidents. Rail transit agencies are
responsible for developing safety and security plans, reporting
incidents to the oversight agencies, and following all other
regulations state oversight agencies set for them. In addition to FTA,
federal agencies such as FRA, DHS's Office of Grants and Training, and
TSA also have regulatory or funding roles related to rail transit
safety and security.
FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight Program:
FTA officials stated that they used a multi-agency system-safety
approach in developing the State Safety Oversight program.[Footnote 16]
Federal, state, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the
rail transit system is operated safely; each of these agencies has some
monitoring responsibility, either of themselves or another entity. FTA
oversees and administers the program. As the program administrator, FTA
is responsible for developing the rules and guidance that state
oversight agencies are to use to perform their oversight of rail
transit agencies. FTA also is responsible for informing oversight and
transit agencies of new program developments, facilitating and
informing the transit and oversight agencies of available training
through FTA or other organizations, facilitating information sharing
among program participants, and providing technical assistance. One
avenue FTA uses to provide these services is the annual meeting to
which all program participants are invited. FTA also calls special
meetings and communicates information to program participants via e-
mail when applicable. (See fig. 2 showing roles and responsibilities of
participants in the State Safety Oversight program.)
Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Participants in the State
Safety Oversight Program:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO adaptation of State Safety Oversight Program Annual Report
2003, FTA Office of safety and Security.
[End of figure]
FTA officials stated they emphasize that components of a risk-
management approach to safety and security, such as hazard analysis and
risk-mitigation procedures, are included in the program standard that
each state oversight agency issues to the transit agencies they
oversee. This is consistent with our position that agencies make risk-
based decisions on where their assets can best be used, both in
transportation security and safety. However, FTA recognizes that only
parts of the State Safety Oversight program are risk-based. The parts
of the program that are risk-based are the areas where it believes risk
management is most applicable to safety and security. These areas are
similar to those in which other transportation modes, such as aviation
and pipelines, also use risk-based approaches. Areas that are not risk-
based would include such things as requiring minimum standards for all
transit agencies in the program, no matter their size or
ridership.[Footnote 17]
While FTA officials stated that FTA does not inspect transit agencies
with regard to safety, it is responsible for ensuring that, through
audits and reviews of oversight agency reports, state oversight
agencies comply with the program requirements. For example, according
to the FTA rule, when a state proposes to designate an oversight
agency, FTA may review the proposal to ensure the designated agency has
the authority to perform the required duties without any apparent
conflicts. FTA has recommended in two instances that a state choose a
different agency because the oversight agency that the state proposed
appeared to be too closely affiliated with the transit agency and did
not appear to be independent. In addition, FTA is responsible for
reviewing the annual reports oversight agencies submit to (1) ensure
they include all the required information (e.g., descriptions of
program resources, and causes of accidents and collisions), and (2)
look for industry-wide safety and security trends or problems. FTA also
has authority, under the FTA rule, to request additional information
from oversight agencies at any time. Furthermore, FTA is responsible
for performing audits of oversight agencies to ensure they are
complying with program requirements and guidance. FTA audits evaluate
how well an oversight agency is meeting the requirements of the FTA
rule, including whether or not the oversight agency is investigating
accidents properly, if it is conducting its safety and security reviews
properly, and if it is reporting to FTA all the information that is
required. Finally, FTA does not provide funding to states for the
operation of their oversight programs. However, states may use FTA
Section 5309 (New Starts program) funds--normally used to pay for
transit-related capital expenses--to defray the cost of setting up
their oversight agency before a transit agency begins operations. Also,
FTA officials stated this year that FTA used a portion of the funding
originally designated for FTA audits to pay for one person from each
oversight agency to attend training on the revisions to the FTA rule,
which oversight agencies had to comply with by May 1, 2006.
State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Transit
Agencies:
In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are
directly responsible for overseeing rail transit agencies. According to
the FTA rule, states must designate an agency to perform this oversight
function at the time FTA enters into a grant agreement for any New
Starts project involving a new rail transit system, or before the
transit agency applies for funding under FTA's formula program for
urbanized areas. States have designated several different types of
agencies to serve as oversight agencies. Most frequently--in 17 cases-
-states have designated their departments of transportation to serve in
this role, either due to their expertise on rail transportation, or
because state officials believed they had no other agencies with
transportation expertise. In three instances--California, Colorado, and
Massachusetts--states have designated utilities commissions or
regulators to oversee rail transit safety and security. Officials from
these states stated that since these bodies already had regulatory and
oversight authority over utilities in these states, it was a natural
extension of their powers to add rail transit to the list of industries
they oversee. In fact, the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) has been overseeing railroads and rail transit in that state
since 1911. The commission has issued and enforces several "general
orders" that rail transit agencies in California must follow or face
fines and suspended service. Two states have designated emergency
management or public safety departments to oversee their rail transit
agencies. Officials in one state, Illinois, have designated two
separate oversight agencies--both local transportation funding
authorities--to oversee the two rail transit agencies operating in the
state. In the Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia), region, the rail
transit system runs between two states and the District of Columbia.
These states and the District of Columbia established the Tri-State
Oversight Committee as the designated oversight agency.[Footnote 18]
Finally, one state, New York, has given its oversight authority to its
Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB). PTSB officials said they
have authority similar to the public utilities commissions discussed
above, but have no other mission than ensuring and overseeing transit
safety in New York. See appendix I for further discussion of multi-
state operations. Also, see appendix II for a table showing each
oversight agency and the rail transit agencies they oversee.
The individual authority each state oversight agency has over transit
agencies varies widely. While FTA's rule gives state oversight agencies
authority to mandate certain rail safety and security practices as the
oversight agencies see fit, it does not give the oversight agencies
authority to take enforcement actions, such as fining rail transit
agencies or shutting down their operations. However, we found five
states where the oversight agencies have some enforcement authority
over the rail transit agencies they oversee. In all cases, this was due
to the regulatory authority states have granted their oversight
agencies. For instance, state utilities commissions may have this
authority written into their authorizing legislation. In other
instances, states had given this authority to the oversight agency in
state legislation. Officials from oversight agencies that have the
authority to fine or otherwise punish rail transit agencies all stated
that they rarely, if ever, use that authority, but each stated that
they believed it gives their actions extra weight and forced transit
agencies to acquiesce to the oversight agency more readily than they
otherwise might. A majority of oversight agencies, 19 of the 24 with
which we spoke, have no such punitive authority, though officials from
some oversight agencies stated they may be able to withhold grants
their oversight agencies provide to the transit agencies they
oversee.[Footnote 19] Although officials from several of these agencies
stated that they believe they would be more effective if they did have
enforcement authority, under the current program this authority would
be granted by individual states.
While the states have designated a number of different types of
agencies with varying authority to oversee transit agencies, FTA has a
basic set of rules it requires each oversight agency to follow. In the
program, oversight agencies are responsible for the following:
* Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail
transit agency responsibilities. According to the FTA rule, the program
standard "provides guidance to the regulated rail transit properties
concerning processes and procedures they must have in place to be in
compliance with the State Safety Oversight program." FTA requirements
for the program standard are procedural rather than technical. For
example, the program standard must include, at a minimum, areas dealing
with the oversight agency's responsibilities, how the program standard
will be modified, how the oversight agency will oversee the transit
agency's internal safety and security reviews, how the oversight agency
will conduct the triennial audits, and requirements for the rail
transit agency to report accidents. According to FTA, oversight
agencies may choose to develop technical standards, such as
requirements for the strength of track, crashworthiness of rail
vehicles, or brightness of signals. In addition, the standard must
contain sections describing how the oversight agency will investigate
accidents, how the rail transit agency will develop a corrective action
plan to address investigation and audit findings, and the minimum
requirements in the agency's separate safety and security plans. FTA
mandates that the transit agency's safety plan must include, among
other requirements, a process for identifying, managing, and
eliminating hazards. Similarly, FTA mandates that the transit agency's
security plan must include, among other requirements, a process for
managing threats and vulnerabilities, and a method for conducting
internal security reviews.
* Reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans and annual
reports. FTA requires oversight agencies to review and approve these
plans and reports of their safety and security activities to ensure
they meet the program requirements.
* Conducting safety and security audits of rail transit agencies on at
least a triennial basis. FTA requires oversight agency officials to
audit the rail transit agencies' implementation of their safety and
security plans at least once every 3 years. We found one oversight
agency that performed this audit on an annual basis. In addition, we
found five others that perform the audit on a continuous basis,
auditing the rail transit agency on a portion of their safety and
security plans each year. FTA has approved both these alternative
auditing schedules.
* Tracking findings from these audits to ensure they are addressed. FTA
requires oversight agencies to establish a process for tracking and
approving the disposition of recommendations from the triennial audits.
Oversight agencies must also have a process for tracking and
eliminating hazardous conditions that the transit agency reports to the
oversight agency outside the audit process.
* Investigating accidents. FTA requires oversight agencies to
investigate accidents on the rail system that meet a certain damage or
severity threshold and develop a corrective action plan for the causes
leading to the accident. Oversight agencies may hire a contractor or
allow the transit agency to conduct the investigation on its behalf.
* Submitting an annual report to FTA. According to the FTA rule,
oversight agencies must submit an annual report to FTA detailing their
oversight activities, including results of accident investigations and
the status of ongoing corrective actions.
Under the FTA rule, rail transit agencies are mainly responsible for
meeting the program standards that oversight agencies set out for them.
However, the FTA rule also lays out several specific requirements that
oversight agencies must require transit agencies to follow, such as
developing separate system safety and security plans, performing
internal safety and security audits over a 3-year cycle, developing a
hazard-management process, and reporting certain accidents to oversight
agencies within 2 hours. FTA also requires that these requirements are
included in each oversight agency's program standard. The locations and
types of transit agencies participating in the program are shown in
figure 3.
Figure 3: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies Participating in
State Safety Oversight Program:
[See PDF for image]
Source: FTA's National Transit Database; MapArt.
[End of figure]
Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit Safety and
Security, but Often Their Roles Are Outside the State Safety Oversight
Program:
In addition to FTA, the state oversight agencies, and the rail transit
agencies, other governmental agencies have some role in ensuring the
safety and security of rail transit systems. One of these agencies is
DHS' TSA. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),[Footnote
20] passed by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, gave TSA authority for security over all transportation modes,
including authority to issue security regulations.[Footnote 21] While
TSA's most public transportation security duties are its airport
screening and aviation related activities, TSA has taken steps to
enhance rail transit security. For example, in May 2004, TSA issued
security directives to rail transit agencies to ensure all agencies
were implementing a consistent baseline of security. Also, TSA has
hired 100 rail security inspectors, as authorized by Congress.[Footnote
22] While the exact responsibilities of the inspectors are still being
determined, a TSA official stated that they will monitor and enforce
compliance with the security directives by passenger rail agencies, as
well as increase security awareness among rail transit agencies,
riders, and others. The inspectors have begun outreach activities with
rail transit systems aimed at enhancing security in rail and mass
transit systems. TSA officials stated their responsibilities encompass
the security of other rail systems, including freight rail, which is
consistent with ATSA.
In contrast to the enforcement role of TSA, the Office of Grants and
Training within DHS' Preparedness Directorate, plays a role in ensuring
rail transit security through supporting security initiatives. The
Office of Grants and Training (formerly known as the Office of Domestic
Preparedness) is the primary federal source of security funding for
passenger rail systems, and is the principal component of DHS
responsible for preparing the United States for acts of terrorism. In
carrying out its mission to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts
of terrorism, the Office of Grants and Training provides training,
funds for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning and
execution of exercises, technical assistance, and other support to
assist states, local jurisdictions (such as municipalities and transit
agencies), and the private sector. The Office of Grants and Training
has provided over $320 million to rail transit providers through the
Urban Area Security Initiative and Transit Security Grant Program.
In addition to FTA, another DOT agency, FRA, plays a role in ensuring
transit agencies operate safely. In general, FRA exercises its
jurisdiction over parts of a rail transit system that share track with
the general railroad system, or places where a rail transit system and
the general railroad system share a connection (e.g., a grade
crossing).[Footnote 23] Rail transit systems that share track or grade
crossings--or are subject to FRA regulations for other reasons--may
apply to FRA for a waiver from these rules. According to FRA, if a rail
transit vehicle were to operate on the same tracks and at the same time
as general railroads, FRA would make the rail transit agency operating
the vehicle meet the safety standards of the general railroads. This
would likely require rail transit agencies to use much sturdier (and
more expensive) vehicles, and could be cost-prohibitive for the rail
transit agencies. Therefore, 11 rail transit agencies have requested
waivers from FRA based on the fact that their trains operate at
different times than heavy freight trains, and will not be on the track
at the same time, meaning the risk of collision is low or non-existent.
According to an FRA official, as of June 2006, FRA granted waivers to
10 of the 11 rail transit agencies that applied for them.[Footnote 24]
After granting a waiver, FRA stays in contact with FTA and the relevant
transit and oversight agencies to address any safety questions or
problems that arise.
NTSB also plays a role in enhancing and ensuring rail transit safety,
though it has no formal role in FTA's oversight program. NTSB has
authority to investigate accidents involving passenger railroads,
including rail transit agencies. Rail transit agencies must report to
NTSB, within 2 hours, all accidents involving fatalities, multiple
injuries, evacuations, or damage over certain monetary thresholds. NTSB
officials stated they generally will investigate only the more serious
accidents, such as those involving fatalities or injuries, or those
involving recurring safety issues. Often, NTSB accident investigations
of rail transit accidents will result in recommendations to federal
agencies or rail transit agencies to eliminate the condition that led
to the accident. NTSB has no power to enforce its recommendations, but
NTSB states that, historically, agencies have implemented over 80
percent of its recommendations. NTSB also maintains expertise on
transportation safety across all modes of transport and conducts
studies on pressing issues. Rail transit agencies and FTA both stated
that they consult NTSB periodically when they have safety questions, in
addition to reporting accidents to it.
Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile;
However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document
the Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and
Security:
The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom
we spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety
and security in their organizations. These officials provided
illustrations about how the program enhanced safety or security;
however, they have limited statistical evidence that the oversight
program improved safety or security. FTA has obtained a variety of
information on the program from sources such as national transit data,
annual reports from oversight agencies, and its own audits of the
oversight agencies. FTA has used national transit data and oversight
agencies' annual reports to collate information on safety, including
information about fatalities and the causes of incidents; FTA last
issued a report summarizing this information in 2003. However, this
data is not linked to any program goals or performance measures. FTA
officials recognize the need for performance measures for its safety
and security programs and are taking steps in 2006 to begin to address
this need. Finally, although FTA expected to audit the oversight
agencies every 3 years, it has not conducted these audits as frequently
as it had planned (it has conducted eight since September 2001).
However, program officials stated they are committed to getting "back
on track" to meet the planned schedule. Ensuring that FTA devotes
enough resources to conduct the planned audits, and develops and uses
planned performance goals and measures to improve the program, will be
important for future assessments of the program.
Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight Program as
Worthwhile and Valuable:
Both transit agency and oversight agency officials state that FTA's
State Safety Oversight program is worthwhile and valuable because it
helps them maintain and improve safety and security. Of the 37 transit
agency officials with whom we spoke, 35 believe the program that
oversees their safety and security is worthwhile. Several officials
stated that it is important and beneficial to have an independent
agency verify their safety and security progress. One transit agency
official explained that the oversight agency helps transit officials to
identify larger, or systemic, issues. In addition, the program provides
support to exert extra influence on a transit agency's board of
directors or senior management to get safety or security improvements
implemented faster. Furthermore, officials identified specific examples
illustrating how oversight agencies helped improve safety or security.
Officials from 15 transit agencies explained that the program helped
modify equipment to improve safety and security. For example, one
transit agency had problems with train operators failing to stop at red
light signals. The oversight agency helped the safety department exert
enough influence with the transit agency's senior management to replace
all signals with light-emitting diode (LED) signals that were brighter
and more visible. Finally, transit agency officials believe that FTA's
program is an effective method for overseeing safety and security.
Several officials said that having a state or local (rather than
national) oversight agency facilitated ongoing safety and security
improvements and consistent working relationships with the oversight
staff.
In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24
state safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the
State Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for
improving transit systems' safety and security. Several officials
commented that the program provides an incentive to examine safety and
security issues and avoid complacency. It also helps the transit
agencies by providing an independent third party, since self oversight
is not, in the officials' view, the best way to have an agency identify
and resolve its safety and security issues. Furthermore, several
officials commented that they believed the current system worked well,
and that the program provides consistency and endows the state safety
oversight agencies with enough authority to accomplish their tasks.
Also, officials said that having the states carry out the program
provides ongoing oversight in addition to formal audits, which helps
maintain a constant oversight of safety and security issues.
Furthermore, some transit and oversight agency officials stated that,
because they were subject to oversight, they believed they saw improved
safety statistics for their rail system. For example, CPUC provided
safety statistics showing an 87 percent drop in rail transit collisions
at the San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI) from 1997, when the CPUC
became its oversight agency, to 2005.[Footnote 25] Although FTA changed
its definition of a reportable accident during this time period--making
it impossible to determine exactly what impact external oversight had
on MUNI safety--both MUNI and CPUC staff stated they were confident
CPUC's efforts had been a major factor in the reduction in accidents. A
MUNI representative estimated that the reduction in accidents was more
likely about 15 percent, but stated that CPUC oversight led MUNI to
develop a comprehensive safety program, which helped reduce accidents
and increase the agency's focus on meeting safety goals. In another
example, New York oversight officials stated that, in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, fires were prevalent in New York City's transit
system. After the New York State Legislature created the PTSB in 1984
to oversee public transportation safety in New York, the PTSB tracked
incident numbers, approached the transit agency and, according to
oversight and transit agency officials, was able to develop and
implement an action plan which heightened the awareness of (and
ultimately improved) the situation. Since these efforts occurred
several decades ago, the data that might support the officials'
statements were not easily accessible today; however, FTA, PTSB, and
New York City transit officials all cited this as an early success of
state oversight of rail transit.
APTA officials with whom we spoke stated that, although the State
Safety Oversight program contains minimum requirements for safety and
security, the previous industry-regulated approach encouraged industry
officials to surpass minimum standards and continue striving for
improved safety and security.[Footnote 26] However, transit officials
with whom we spoke often discussed the benefits of a federal program.
For example, a transit agency official explained that a benefit of
FTA's rule is that it standardized rail transit safety and security
across the country. In addition, officials from 17 transit agencies
reported that respective state safety oversight agencies imposed
requirements above those required in FTA's requirement. For example,
three state safety oversight agencies reported that they require
transit agencies under their purview to have an "hours of service" type
policy which requires minimum time off duty for train operators to
rest. In addition, several oversight agencies have established more
stringent reporting and notification requirements than required by FTA.
For example, officials from two transit agencies reported that their
oversight agencies require them to report accidents occurring in a rail
yard, while two others stated that their oversight agencies require
notification of any accident involving contact between vehicles, no
matter how minor.
FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information but Does Not Have the
Data to Document the Impact of the Oversight Program on Safety and
Security:
One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight
program's impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects
through the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to
submit. The reports include information on many different issues,
including program resources, accidents, fatalities, injuries, hazardous
conditions, and any corrective actions taken resulting from audits or
accident investigations. FTA officials stated they have used the
oversight agency information, as well as national transit data, to
publish its own annual reports from 1999 to 2003. FTA's reports
included ridership data, fatality and injury data, and the results of
accident investigations to identify common incident causes. Although
these reports may have informed oversight agencies about what safety or
security problems existed, the information was not tied to any program
goals or performance measures. In addition, it has not issued a report
since 2003. Although the reports provide data on transit safety, it is
unclear how oversight agency officials use this data. For example, one
state safety oversight official with whom we spoke recommended that FTA
provide more extensive analysis of the accident data it receives from
oversight agencies. He stated that analyses of such data could identify
trends and help oversight agencies develop a more cooperative and
collegial relationship with each other.
According to program officials, FTA has recognized the need for better
information and performance measures for its safety and security
programs; also, it has not published a report since 2003 because it has
been looking for ways to improve the type of safety and security data
it can collect, and how it can use the information to track program
performance and progress toward as-yet-undefined goals. FTA's 2006
business plan for its Safety and Security Division includes a goal to
continue developing and implementing a data-driven performance analysis
and tracking system to help ensure management decisions are informed by
data and focused on performance and accountability. As part of these
efforts, FTA is working with a contractor to develop performance
measures for the State Safety Oversight program. FTA officials stated
that their contractor is working with oversight and transit agencies to
identify measures that they use and find useful in tracking the safety
and security of their systems. Although it may be difficult to identify
such measures--many of the oversight agencies with whom we spoke do not
have performance measures, either--this effort could allow FTA to more
readily determine areas where the program is having a positive impact
on transit safety and security, and areas where more focus is needed.
Another source of information is the audits of the oversight agencies
that FTA attempts to conduct every 3 years. Although the audits provide
detailed information on specific oversight agencies, FTA has not
brought together information from these audits to provide information
on the safety and security of transit systems across the country. FTA
tracks the deficiencies and areas of concern, and follows up with
oversight agency staff to assure that each state safety oversight
agency resolves the suggested corrective actions. Furthermore, FTA has
not conducted the audits frequently enough to provide a current picture
of transit system safety and security, or to identify some challenges
that oversight and transit agency officials raised during our
interviews with them. FTA has audited each state safety oversight
agency that existed prior to 2004 at least once since the program
began; two agencies were audited twice. According to the FTA
contractor, they piloted the audit program in late 1998 by conducting
audits in three states with different legal authorities and a range of
differently sized rail transit agencies. Regularly scheduled audits
began in 1999. However, FTA largely discontinued the audit program
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and acknowledged that
the agency's priorities shifted in the wake of the attacks. FTA has
audited 8 of 24 existing oversight agencies since September 2001.
However, during that time period, FTA also conducted nine security and
safety reviews to evaluate whether new rail transit projects could
enter operations safely and securely. In addition, the program had
several staffing changes after 2001, causing some oversight and transit
officials to state that the program did not seem to be a priority for
FTA.[Footnote 27] According to FTA officials, including the Program
Manager, who started in February of 2006, FTA is not conducting audits
in fiscal year 2006 so it can use the money and time to help states
comply with the revised rule; FTA has planned a detailed outreach
effort to this end, including a workshop for oversight agency officials
to help ensure compliance. FTA plans to return to its triennial audit
schedule in fiscal year 2007, with 10 audits scheduled. FTA plans to
begin with the states that it has judged to have had the weakest
program standards and procedures, based on their initial submission
under the new rule.
FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety
Oversight Program:
Despite the program's popularity with participants, FTA faces
challenges in implementing the program's revised rule and continuing to
manage the program. First, several oversight agency officials stated
they are not confident they have adequate numbers of staff to
effectively oversee rail transit system safety and security and they
are unsure the current training available to them is sufficient. Also,
we found the level of staffing and expertise of oversight agency staff
varies widely across the country. A second challenge FTA faces in
implementing the program is that many transit and oversight agency
personnel are confused about how security issues in the program will be
handled, and what agencies will be responsible for what actions, as TSA
takes on a greater role in rail transit security.
Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff Are
Adequately Trained and That They Have Adequate Numbers of Staff:
While a clear majority of both oversight and transit agency officials
with whom we spoke endorsed the usefulness of the State Safety
Oversight program, many of these same officials stated that they were
unsure that they were adequately trained for their duties.
Specifically, 18 of 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated
they believed additional training would help them provide more
efficient and effective safety and security oversight. We found that
the level of expertise of oversight agency staff varied widely across
the country. For example, we found that 11 of the 24 oversight agencies
we examined had oversight staff that had no career or educational
background in transit safety or security. Conversely, another 11
oversight agencies required their staff to have certain levels of
experience or education. For example, while New York's PTSB requires
its staff to have 5 years of experience in transit safety, the
Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy requires its
lead oversight staff person to have an engineering degree. According to
some oversight agency officials who had no previous transit safety or
security background, they had to rely on the transit agency staff they
were overseeing to teach them about transit operations, safety, and
security. Therefore, it took them several years before they were
confident that they knew enough about rail transit operations to
provide effective oversight. These officials stated that if they left
their positions, any new staff taking over for them would face a
similar challenge.
Most oversight agency staff believe they are doing a good job and are
helping transit agencies operate more safely and securely through
overseeing their operations, but several cite the lack of a training
curriculum for oversight staff as a challenge to their effectiveness.
Officials from some of the 18 agencies who stated additional training
would be useful cited several examples of how additional training could
benefit them. For example, officials from eight oversight agencies
stated that the training they had received in transit operations,
accident investigations, and other areas was beneficial, but they had
not received any training on how to perform specific oversight
functions. Thus, they were unsure how to carry out their agencies'
primary oversight role. Officials at a majority of oversight agencies
(15 of 24) stated that they felt the training that had been made
available to them either by FTA, the Transportation Safety Institute
(TSI), or the National Transit Institute had been adequate.[Footnote
28] However, officials from 17 of 24 oversight agencies also stated
that they were somewhat unsure of which courses they should take to be
effective in their oversight role. For example, several oversight
agency personnel stated that, while FTA officials have encouraged
oversight agencies' staff to obtain certifications from TSI in transit
safety and security and have encouraged oversight agency staff to take
selected TSI courses, FTA officials have not developed or recommended a
course specifically related to oversight.
Furthermore, although FTA provides training to state oversight agency
staff (either on their own or through TSI), and encourages state
oversight agencies to seek training opportunities, FTA does not pay
staff to travel to these courses. Also, oversight agencies must pay
their own tuition and travel expenses for courses not provided by FTA
or TSI.[Footnote 29] Officials from 10 of the 24 oversight agencies
with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds as one reason why they could
not attend training they had hoped to attend.
Also, officials from all 24 oversight agencies stated that, if FTA
provided some funding for them to travel to training or paid tuition
for training they wanted to attend, it would allow the oversight
agencies to spend their limited resources on direct oversight
activities, such as staff overtime, travel expenses to visit transit
agencies, or hiring contractors. Several oversight agency officials
also cited the example of other DOT agencies that provide free training
or pay for state staff to travel to attend training. For example, 30
states participate in FRA's State Safety Participation Program. These
states have inspectors who FRA has certified to enforce FRA safety
regulations. FRA pays for their initial and ongoing classroom training
and state staff's travel to this training. In addition, the federal
agency regulating pipelines, PHMSA, authorizes state-employed
inspectors to inspect pipelines in many states. To help defray their
costs, PHMSA provides up to 50 percent of a state's expenses in
carrying out their pipeline safety program. PHMSA also recently paid
for two inspectors from each state to attend training when it
instituted a new inspection approach. Officials from both FRA and PHMSA
stated that providing funding to states to train their employees helps
federal agencies more effectively carry out their enforcement
activities, easing the states' burden of paying to enforce federal
regulations. For the first time, FTA paid for oversight agencies'
personnel to travel to attend a special meeting in June 2006 in St.
Louis, where FTA provided technical assistance and shared best
practices in meeting the requirements of the revised rule. This
instance could provide a model for future funding of training or
training-related travel for oversight agency personnel.
FTA officials noted that the agency has provided considerable training
in transit safety and security through TSI and through the State Safety
Oversight program annual meeting, which includes a discussion of best
practices and exchanges of information between oversight agencies.
However, FTA officials agree that they have not provided training
specifically pertaining to oversight activities, or provided a
recommended training curriculum to oversight agencies; officials stated
that it would not be difficult to take these steps in the future. Also,
FTA officials told us that they considered addressing the lack of
consistency in oversight agency staff qualifications when they were
revising the FTA rule in 2005. However, they stated they did not have
the legal authority to direct states to require certain education,
experience, or certifications for oversight agency staff. Also, these
officials stated that FTA has not issued any guidance to states about
what level of training is appropriate for oversight staff or what level
of staffing is appropriate for an oversight agency. However, these
officials noted that, despite the lack of formal guidance, FTA checks
to ensure oversight agency personnel are adequately trained during its
audits; in five instances, FTA has recommended that oversight agency
staff take additional training. FTA officials also stated that FTA
could issue informal guidance or recommendations to oversight agencies
about the level of training their oversight staff should have.
In addition to concerns about training, oversight agencies were unsure
about whether they had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately
oversee a transit agency's operations. Specifically, officials at 14 of
24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that more staff would
help them do their job more effectively. We spoke with some oversight
agency personnel who were highly dedicated to performing oversight,
even though they said they had no assistance and their states had
limited resources to allocate to the task. Some staff took it upon
themselves to stay informed about a transit agency's operations by
staying in regular contact with transit agency personnel, attending
transit agency safety meetings, and making regular inspections of the
system--even though these tasks were not required by their oversight
agencies. However, officials from 11 oversight agencies told us they
had devoted the equivalent of less than one person working half-time to
oversight duties, and, in some cases, described the oversight part of
their job as a "collateral duty." Personnel from some of these
oversight agencies told us they simply did not have time to perform the
kind of active oversight that involved attending transit agency
meetings, making spot inspections, and staying in regular contact with
transit agency personnel. While in some of these instances, the transit
agencies overseen are small, such as small streetcar lines, some of the
transit agencies with the highest ridership levels have similar levels
of oversight. For example, one state that estimated it devotes 0.1 full-
time equivalent (FTE) to oversight program functions is responsible for
overseeing a major transit agency that averages nearly 200,000 daily
passenger trips. This state supplements its staff time with the
services of a contractor, mainly to perform the triennial audits of the
transit agency. Also, one state that estimated devoting 0.5 FTE to
oversight functions is responsible for overseeing five transit agencies
(including two systems not yet in operation) in different cities. The
oversight staff in this state reported that it was difficult to
maintain active oversight when their responsibilities were so spread
out. Furthermore, we found 13 oversight agencies that estimated
dedicating less than one full-time equivalent staff member to the
oversight task. This meant that the person (or persons) assigned to the
oversight tasks had other duties, in addition to oversight of a transit
agency. Table 1 shows the amount of personnel oversight agency
representatives estimated their agencies dedicate to oversight
responsibilities. (See app. II for information on estimated FTE and
transit system information for each state safety oversight agency and
related transit agency).
Table 1: Estimated FTEs Employees Used by Oversight Agencies to Oversee
Transit Agency Safety and Security:
Estimated FTEs: Number of oversight agencies;
0.5 or less: 11;
0.6-1: 5;
1.1-3: 6;
3.1-5: 1;
Over 5: 1;
Total: 24.
Source: GAO analysis of oversight agency interview responses.
[End of table]
Although it is up to states to determine the resources allocated to
this program, providing appropriate and continuing training and
experience may increase the effectiveness of the limited staff states
have to dedicate to this program.
Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA's Emerging
Role in Transit Security Will Affect the Program:
Another challenge facing the program is how the emergence of TSA and
its rail inspectors might affect oversight of transit security. As
discussed above, TSA now has full regulatory authority over
transportation security across all modes, and TSA officials stated the
agency has hired 100 rail inspectors, whose stated mission is to, among
other duties, monitor and enforce compliance with rail security
directives TSA issued in May 2004. However, of the officials at 24
oversight agencies with whom we spoke, 20 stated they did not have a
clear picture of who was responsible for overseeing transit security
issues. Similarly, officials at 14 of 37 transit agencies were also
unsure of lines of responsibility regarding transit security oversight.
Several state oversight agencies were particularly concerned that TSA's
rail inspectors would be duplicating their role in overseeing transit
security. One oversight agency official stated that he felt transit
agencies could begin to experience "audit fatigue" if both TSA and
oversight agencies audited transit agencies' security practices. This
official stated it would be more efficient if TSA and oversight agency
staff audited transit agencies' security practices at the same time.
Officials at several transit agencies were also confused about what
standards they would be required to meet. For example, while oversight
agencies are free to create their own standards, TSA issued rail
security directives in May 2004--and could issue future directives or
requirements that transit agencies must meet. Security officials at one
transit agency specifically voiced concern that there could be
conflicting security requirements and hoped that TSA would coordinate
with oversight agencies' requirements and vice versa.
TSA staff reported hearing similar comments from oversight agencies at
a meeting they jointly hosted with FTA for oversight agencies in May
2006. FTA program staff and TSA rail inspector staff both stated that
they were committed to avoiding duplication in the program and
communicating their respective roles to transit and oversight agency
officials as soon as possible. However, as TSA is still developing
their program, currently there is no formally defined role for TSA in
the State Safety Oversight program, and TSA has not determined the
roles and responsibilities for their rail inspectors. While the FTA
rule discusses requirements for a transit agency's security plan (e.g.,
a method for conducting internal security reviews and a process for
determining security threats and vulnerabilities to a transit agency),
and requires oversight agencies to include security performance in
their audits of transit agencies, the FTA rule does not discuss TSA's
specific role in the program; both TSA and FTA officials stated that
exactly how TSA would participate in the program was still to be
determined. However, TSA and FTA officials both stated they are
committed to working together to ensure inspection activities are
coordinated to foster consistency and minimize disruption to rail
transit agency operations. Also, a TSA regional manager of rail
inspectors with whom we spoke was unsure what the rail inspectors' role
would be in relation to the program; in addition, the manager was
unsure what the details of the program were, including the identity of
the relevant oversight agencies for the region. However, he stated that
he was working to learn these details, and that he and his staff had
been in touch with transit agency security officials to introduce
themselves and gather information.
Furthermore, in May 2006, after we had finished our interviews with
transit and oversight agency staff, TSA staff stated that they were
engaged in an ongoing dialog with FTA and oversight agencies, to
determine how the rail inspectors could best assist oversight agencies
in reviewing transit agency security. TSA gave several examples of
activities resulting from this coordination. For example, TSA reported
that they had designated 26 rail inspectors as liaisons to state
oversight agencies. Also, TSA officials stated that they are working
with FTA and the oversight agency from California to pilot a
coordination approach they could use with oversight agencies across the
country. Additionally, the director of the rail inspector program
attended a meeting with representatives from almost all oversight
agencies to discuss the concept of rail inspectors participating in
oversight-agency audits of transit agencies. Finally, TSA is working to
bring the 26 TSA rail inspectors involved in the State Safety Oversight
program to the next annual meeting for the program's participants, so
that the rail inspectors can learn more about the program and develop a
"game plan" for how the inspectors will participate in the program.
Conclusions:
While FTA faces several challenges with the State Safety Oversight
program, most participants in the program consider it a success at
improving rail transit safety and security; nearly all participants can
cite anecdotal evidence suggesting the program has had a positive
impact. Although FTA collects data on safety and security from transit
and oversight agencies, FTA has not developed a framework for
demonstrating the impact the program has had on rail transit safety and
security. As new leadership takes over administration of the program,
this is an opportune time for FTA to determine how to assess the impact
of the program, including determining a way to measure the impact of
the program, setting performance goals, and developing and providing
the means to meet a consistent schedule of auditing oversight agencies.
Second, state oversight agencies have inconsistent training and
qualifications for oversight staff across the United States, although
it is unclear what impact, if any, this has had on rail transit safety
and security. In other federally mandated transportation safety
programs where states partner with the federal government to perform
oversight duties, the federal government pays for a portion of the
training expenses of oversight staff, (or for oversight staff to travel
to attend training) because having well-trained state officials makes
the federally mandated oversight more efficient and effective. Yet, in
this program, FTA relies entirely on the states to determine how to
fund their direct oversight of rail transit agencies and does not help
defray their training or travel costs. While the program is generally
thought of as bringing about positive change, these differing levels of
training and qualifications are a cause for concern; it is conceivable
that inadequately trained staff, especially staff that have no
experience overseeing transit agency safety, might miss safety problems
they otherwise would notice, or may be unable to effectively evaluate a
transit agency's proposals for resolving existing safety problems
(though it is not clear whether either of these have occurred). One way
to help ensure that oversight agency staff have at least a basic
understanding of how to oversee rail transit operations would be to
evaluate the amount of training oversight agency staff have obtained
and, subsequently, develop a training curriculum that FTA could
recommend to oversight agency personnel. Also, since many oversight
agency personnel have little experience conducting rail transit safety
oversight, including the basic tenets of conducting oversight in the
training curriculum would help ensure that oversight agency staff did
not have to rely on transit agency personnel for advice on conducting
oversight. In addition, FTA could review oversight staff qualifications
in more detail during its audits of oversight agencies to help ensure
oversight staff are adequately trained to perform their duties.
Lastly, many transit and oversight agency staff are concerned that the
existence and deployment of TSA's rail inspectors will complicate
security oversight. While TSA and FTA are undertaking several efforts
to coordinate their activities and determine the roles and
responsibilities of the rail inspectors, the official role of the rail
inspectors in the State Safety Oversight program remains unclear.
Therefore, it is understandable why transit and oversight agency
officials fear possible duplication of effort, especially for
activities such as reviewing security plans and auditing transit
security practices. Also, since TSA and DOT agencies have had some
difficulties coordinating their actions in the past,[Footnote 30] such
concern is warranted, though FTA and TSA statements promising to
address this issue, and their recent activities in this direction, are
a positive step.
Recommendations:
In order to assure that FTA devotes an appropriate level of staff
resources to the State Safety Oversight program, obtains sufficient
information to evaluate the performance of the program, and supports
state oversight agencies in adequately training their staff to perform
their oversight duties, we recommend that the Secretary of
Transportation take the following two actions:
* Direct the Administrator of FTA to take advantage of the opportunity
presented by having new program leadership to set short-and long-term
goals for the program, along with measures to ensure that the program
is making progress toward meeting those goals; develop performance
goals for the agency's other approaches for evaluating the impact of
this program on safety and security; and develop a plan for maintaining
FTA's stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies at least once
every 3 years.
* Direct the Administrator of FTA to assess whether oversight agency
personnel are receiving adequate amounts of training to perform their
activities effectively and, based on the results of this assessment,
work with oversight agencies to develop a strategy to address any
deficiencies they identify. This strategy should include developing an
appropriate training curriculum, including training on conducting
oversight for oversight agency staff and guidance to oversight agencies
encouraging them to have their staff complete the training curriculum.
If FTA determines that it does not have the authority to issue such
guidance, it should seek such statutory authority from Congress.
Furthermore, to reduce confusion among transit and oversight agencies
about the role of TSA in transit security oversight and reduce the
potential duplication of effort that would inconvenience transit
agencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct
the Assistant Secretary of TSA to:
* coordinate with the Administrator of FTA to clearly articulate to
state oversight agencies and transit agencies the roles and
responsibilities TSA develops for its rail inspectors; and:
* work with state oversight agencies to coordinate their security
audits whenever possible and include FTA in this communication to help
ensure effective coordination with these agencies.
Agency Comments:
Officials from FTA, TSA, and NTSB provided oral comments on a draft of
this report through their respective liaisons. The agencies concurred
with the report. Furthermore, FTA and TSA officials stated that they
are working to determine how to implement the recommendations. Finally,
TSA provided a technical comment which we included in the report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Acting Secretary of Transportation, and the Secretary
of Homeland Security. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Katherine A. Siggerud:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems:
Three rail fixed guideway transit systems in the United States--the
Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) in Philadelphia, MetroLink
in St. Louis, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA) in Washington, D.C.--cross state lines. Therefore, these
systems require the collaboration of multiple oversight agencies to run
the State Safety Oversight program or states can agree that one state
will be responsible for oversight of the transit system. Each of these
multi-state transit systems has a different structure to handle
oversight responsibilities. The oversight programs in Philadelphia and
St. Louis have both developed strategies to centralize decision making,
streamline collaboration, and respond promptly to safety and security
audit findings. In contrast, the Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC),
which serves as the oversight agency in the D.C. area, requires
majority decision making by the six committee members of the agency,
including at least one member from each jurisdiction, and has
experienced difficulty obtaining funding, responding to Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) information requests, and ensuring audit findings
are addressed.
Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied Structures and
Handle Oversight Responsibilities Differently:
Each multi-state oversight program varies in structure, and each
performs oversight responsibilities differently. In Philadelphia,
authority to serve as the oversight agency was delegated to one of the
two state agencies--namely, the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation (PennDOT) agreed to allow the New Jersey Department of
Transportation to serve as the sole oversight agency for the PATCO
heavy rail transit line. MetroLink in St. Louis is subject to oversight
from both Illinois (through the St. Clair County Transit District) and
Missouri (through the Missouri Department of Transportation); the two
organizations share oversight duties. Finally, TOC, which is composed
of multiple representatives from each jurisdiction (including Virginia,
Maryland, and Washington, D.C.) provides oversight for WMATA.
The PATCO Speedline is a heavy rail line serving about 38,000 riders
daily and links Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey. Most of PATCO's
track is in New Jersey, and 9 of the 13 stations are in New Jersey.
Until early 2001, safety and security oversight functions were shared
by Pennsylvania and New Jersey through the Delaware River Port
Authority (DRPA), a regional transportation and economic development
agency serving both southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey.
When DRPA implemented organizational and functional changes, DRPA and
PATCO leadership no longer believed that DRPA could perform its role as
the designated oversight agency without facing conflicting interests.
As a result, Pennsylvania and New Jersey agreed to have the New Jersey
Department of Transportation (NJDOT) replace DRPA as the oversight
agency. This arrangement allows the oversight agency to take corrective
action without seeking additional levels of approval from Pennsylvania,
although the oversight agency does keep Pennsylvania informed of its
activities. Also, Pennsylvania provides some support to the NJDOT by
having PennDOT perform oversight functions for the stations,
passageways, and concourses located in Pennsylvania. PennDOT reports
any deficiencies or hazardous conditions that may be noted during the
performance of oversight directly to New Jersey. Through meetings or
other means of communication, the follow-up actions may be performed by
the Pennsylvania oversight agency in a supporting role or directly by
New Jersey. New Jersey currently devotes two full-time and one part-
time staff members to its oversight program, and while these staff
members must oversee several transit systems, including PATCO, their
sole responsibilities for safety and oversight functions.
The St. Louis MetroLink is a light rail line between Lambert-St. Louis
International Airport, in St. Louis, and Scott Air Force Base outside
Shiloh, Illinois. Service was initiated in 1993, at which time the
system included about 16 miles of track in Missouri and about 1.5 miles
of track in Illinois. Because so little track was in Illinois, Illinois
officials agreed to allow the Missouri Department of Transportation to
provide safety and security oversight for the entire system. However,
in 2001, MetroLink opened a 17.4-mile extension in Illinois, which
roughly equalized the amount of track in both states. Because of this,
the states agreed that it was appropriate for Illinois to play a
greater role in safety and security oversight, and Illinois designated
the St. Clair County Transit District as its oversight agency. St.
Clair is one of the few non-state-level agencies to be an oversight
agency. The involvement of two separate oversight agencies could create
challenges to effective implementation, but the agencies have taken
steps to ensure close coordination. First, the Illinois and Missouri
oversight agencies have agreed to use only one uniform safety and
security standard across the entire MetroLink system.[Footnote 31]
According to area officials, this arrangement creates consistency
throughout the system and allows both agencies to perform their
oversight functions in a consistent manner. In addition, the agencies
use a single contractor who is responsible for the triennial audit. All
other work is performed by the Illinois and Missouri oversight
agencies. Finally, staff from the two oversight agencies coordinate
very closely and each have centralized leadership. Specifically, there
is one employee in Missouri who devotes 90 percent of his time to
safety and security oversight activities. Illinois has several
employees who devote smaller percentages of their individual time to
the program, but the Managing Director is primarily responsible for
coordinating with Missouri. MetroLink, in turn, indicated that
responding to state safety oversight directives is a priority, and the
agency works quickly to implement changes.
WMATA operates a heavy rail system within Washington, D.C. (the
District of Columbia), Maryland, and Virginia. The states and the
District of Columbia decided to carry out oversight responsibilities
through a collaborative organization through the TOC. TOC is composed
of six representatives--two each from Maryland, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia. All of the representatives have other primary
duties, and their activities on TOC are collateral to these other daily
duties, as is the case with staff at several other oversight agencies.
TOC does not have any dedicated staff, and TOC members have limited
rail operational experience. To gain access to additional experience
and expertise in rail oversight, TOC contracts with a consultant to
provide technical knowledge, perform required audits of WMATA, and
ensure that audit recommendations are completed. In addition, TOC
funding comes from, and must be approved by, each of the jurisdictions
every year. The Washington Council of Governments processes TOC funds
and handles its contracting procedures. These issues result in a
lengthy process for TOC to receive its yearly funding and process its
expenses.
Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Administrative Challenges
in Different Ways:
The State Safety Oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have
attempted to streamline decision making, while TOC has a more
collaborative process. Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed
strategies to centralize decision making and streamline collaboration,
albeit through different structures. Because Pennsylvania granted New
Jersey the authority to act as the oversight agency for all of PATCO's
territory, PATCO only has to interact with one oversight agency's
staff. New Jersey also has in-house staff dedicated to the State Safety
Oversight program, which helps to ensure continuity, facilitates
communication, and provides PATCO with one set of contacts to work with
on the implementation of any new safety or security processes. Although
St. Louis has two agencies providing safety oversight, both oversight
agencies have made it a priority to ensure that they are providing
consistent information to the transit agency, and they are coordinating
activities so MetroLink is not burdened by multiple contacts about the
same issue. To do this, the Missouri and Illinois representatives stay
in close contact with each other. Both oversight agencies stated they
have in-house staff dedicated to safety and security oversight, and the
agencies have very good working relationships. Oversight agency staff
admitted that St. Louis could face challenges in the future if staff
turned over in either agency and new employees did not establish a
similar working relationship. In addition, officials indicated that, if
oversight agency staff had disagreements over safety or security
standards, or how to enforce the existing standards, it would be highly
problematic. However, officials in the Illinois and Missouri oversight
agencies, as well as at MetroLink, thought that the current
arrangements have produced one set of standards, good communication,
and effective coordination. Both MetroLink and oversight agency staff
in St. Louis credited each other with creating an environment where
this system of having multiple oversight agencies could work well.
In contrast, TOC has implemented a less streamlined process for making
decisions, which, according to FTA and TOC officials, may have
contributed to the difficulties it has had in responding to FTA
information requests. On June 15, 2005, FTA notified TOC that it would
perform TOC's audit in late July 2005. FTA requested information prior
to the audit to facilitate the time it spent on-site. TOC did not
submit the requested State Safety Oversight program materials despite
several FTA requests and an extension by FTA to move the audit to a
later date. At the end of August, FTA initiated its audit even though
it had not received requested information, but was not able to complete
the audit until the end of September, when it received all requested
materials. FTA's Final Audit Report to TOC cited 10 areas for
improvement and provided TOC 60 days to resolve these issues. According
to FTA, TOC resolved one issue within the time period. FTA held a
follow-up review with TOC in mid-March to check on the status of the
remaining areas for improvement. As of June 2006, FTA was evaluating
how many of the remaining audit findings remained open, although FTA
stated that TOC had created a detailed set of internal operating
procedures to address many of FTA's findings and concerns. In addition,
TOC representatives stated that some of the areas for improvement FTA
found were complicated issues, such as reviewing WMATA's accident
investigation procedures and approving modifications, and could not be
addressed within the 60 days FTA initially allowed. TOC staff
emphasized that, although WMATA was sometimes slow to respond to TOC
audit recommendations or information requests, they were pleased with
their relationship with WMATA and that WMATA was responsive to TOC.
Similarly, FTA officials stressed that they recognized and appreciated
the effort TOC had undertaken in addressing FTA's findings.
TOC staff credited WMATA with helping TOC develop a matrix to track
outstanding recommendations and agreeing to meet via conference call on
at least a bi-weekly basis to ensure the issues are addressed. Also,
TOC members stated that part of the reason they were slow to respond to
FTA's initial requests was that TOC had spent all its allocated funds
for the year and, consequently, they had to temporarily stop working
with the consultant who had conducted its audits of WMATA and
maintained their files. According to TOC officials, since the process
for acquiring additional funding would require approval from all three
jurisdictions represented on TOC, it was not feasible to obtain
additional funding quickly. In addition, TOC cannot take any action
without a majority of its members, and at least one member from each
jurisdiction, approving the action. Reaching such majority agreements
can be time consuming since all members of TOC have other primary
responsibilities. This is especially a concern when quick decisions are
necessary, such as responding to FTA's audit recommendations.
TOC officials cited several challenges in accomplishing their mission,
including lack of a dedicated and permanent funding source, the lengthy
process required to obtain approval on planning and implementation of
corrective actions, and limited staff time. They also stated that they
believed TOC and WMATA receive more scrutiny than other transit and
oversight agencies, due to their location in Washington, D.C., and
proximity to FTA's headquarters staff. To address these challenges, the
chair of TOC stated that she planned to spend additional time on
overseeing WMATA and was hoping to work to find ways to streamline the
administrative and funding processes that TOC must navigate. Hiring a
full-time administrator, or designating a TOC member to serve in a full-
time capacity, could help solve some of these issues. However, funding
this position could be a challenge and the administrator would need to
have decision-making authority to be effective and act quickly.
[End of section]
Appendix II List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They
Oversee:
Table 2: Rail Transit and State Oversight Agencies:
State: Singe State Systems: Arkansas;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Arkansas State Highway
and Transportation Department (0.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Central Arkansas Transit Authority
(0.08);
City center served: Little Rock, AR;
Type of system: Trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 159,458; 2.8.
State: Singe State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Bay Area Rapid Transit (7);
City center served: San Francisco, CA;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 99,296,028; 209.
State: Single State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (1.5);
City center served: Los Angeles, CA;
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 74,242,912; 141.6.
State: Single State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): San Francisco Municipal Railway
(7);
City center served: San Francisco, CA;
Type of system: Light rail, trolley, and cable car;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 53,768,895; 81.7.
State: Single State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): San Diego Trolley, Inc. (0.9);
City center served: San Diego, CA;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 29,334,362; 96.6.
State: Single State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Sacramento Regional Transit
District (N/A);
City center served: Sacramento, CA;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 12,008,620; 58.4.
State: Single State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Santa Clara Valley Transit
Authority (N/A);
City center served: San Jose, CA;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 6,780,431; 58.4.
State: Single State Systems: Colorado;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Colorado Public
Utilities Commission (1.2);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Denver Regional Transit District
(1.25);
City center served: Denver, CO;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 11,142,220; 31.6.
State: Single State Systems: Florida;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of
Transportation (1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metro-Dade Transit Authority
(N/A);
City center served: Miami, FL;
Type of system: Heavy rail and automated guideway;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 26,479,423; 53.5.
State: Single State Systems: Florida;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of
Transportation (1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Jacksonville Transportation
Authority (N/A);
City center served: Jacksonville, FL;
Type of system: Automated guideway;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 736,510; 5.4.
State: Single State Systems: Florida;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of
Transportation (1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Hillsborough Area Regional Transit
(0.85);
City center served: Tampa, FL;
Type of system: Trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 565,002; 4.8.
State: Single State Systems: Georgia;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Georgia Department of
Transportation (0.1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority (6);
City center served: Atlanta, GA;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 70,984,053; 96.1.
State: Single State Systems: Illinois;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Regional Transportation
Authority (1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Chicago Transit Authority (11);
City center served: Chicago, IL;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 186,759,524; 206.3.
State: Single State Systems: Louisiana;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Louisiana Department of
Transportation (0.1)[ A];
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Orleans Regional Transit
Authority (N/A);
City center served: New Orleans, LA;
Type of system: Trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 5,667,952; 25.3.
State: Single State Systems: Maryland;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Maryland Department of
Transportation (1.3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Maryland Transit Administration;
(5);
City center served: Baltimore, MD;
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 18,059,117; 87.
State: Single State Systems: Massachusetts;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Massachusetts Department
of Telecommunication and Energy (2.67);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (5.1);
City center served: Boston, MA;
Type of system: Heavy rail, light rail, and trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 215,787,440; 127.3.
State: Single State Systems: Michigan;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Michigan Department of
Transportation (0.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Detroit Transit Corporation (1.1);
City center served: Detroit, MI;
Type of system: Automated guideway;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,340,646; 2.9.
State: Single State Systems: Minnesota;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Minnesota Department of
Public Safety (0.1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Hiawatha Metro Transit (1-1.5);
City center served: Minneapolis, MN;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 7,901,668; 24.4.
State: Single State Systems: New Jersey;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit Newark City
Subway (0.5);
City center served: Newark, NJ;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 14,312,676; 99.9[B].
State: Single State Systems: New Jersey;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit Hudson-Bergen
Light Rail (N/A);
City center served: Jersey City, NJ;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty].
State: Single State Systems: New Jersey;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit River Line (2);
City center served: Trenton, NJ;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty].
State: Single State Systems: New York;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): New York Public
Transportation Safety Board (3.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New York City Transit (15);
City center served: New York City, NY;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,803,536,486; 493.8.
State: Single State Systems: New York;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): New York Public
Transportation Safety Board (3.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Niagara Frontier Transit Authority
(0.5);
City center served: Buffalo, NY;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 5,373,321; 12.4.
State: Single State Systems: Ohio;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Ohio Department of
Transportation (1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Authority (1.2);
City center served: Cleveland, OH;
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 8,236,840; 68.5.
State: Single State Systems: Oregon;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Oregon Department of
Transportation (1.2);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Portland Tri-Met (10);
City center served: Portland, OR;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 34,755,147; 92.9[B].
State: Single State Systems: Oregon;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Oregon Department of
Transportation (1.2);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Portland Streetcar (0.5);
City center served: Portland, OR;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty].
State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit
Authority (2);
City center served: Philadelphia, PA;
Type of system: Heavy rail, light rail, and trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 113,252,100; 141.1.
State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Port Authority of Allegheny County
(0.3);
City center served: Pittsburgh, PA;
Type of system: Light rail and inclined plane;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 8,072,099; 45.8.
State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Cambria County Transit Authority
(1);
City center served: Johnstown, PA;
Type of system: Inclined plane;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 86,031; 0.3.
State: Single State Systems: Puerto Rico;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Puerto Rico State
Emergency and Disaster Management Agency (3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Puerto Rico Highway and
Transportation Authority Tren Urbano (1.6);
City center served: San Juan, Puerto Rico;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 2,182,668; (N/A).
State: Single State Systems: Tennessee;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Tennessee Department of
Transportation (0.25);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Chattanooga Area Rapid Transit
Authority (N/A);
City center served: Chattanooga, TN;
Type of system: Inclined plane;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 435,780; 2.
State: Single State Systems: Tennessee;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Tennessee Department of
Transportation (0.25);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Memphis Area Transit Authority
(0.3);
City center served: Memphis, TN;
Type of system: Trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,015,448; 10.
State: Single State Systems: Texas;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of
Transportation (0.4);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Galveston Island Transit (0.25);
City center served: Galveston, TX;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 47,706; 4.
State: Single State Systems: Texas;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of
Transportation (0.4);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Dallas Area Rapid Transit (0.75);
City center served: Dallas, TX;
Type of system: Light rail and trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 17,487,057; 87.7.
State: Single State Systems: Texas;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of
Transportation (0.4);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metropolitan Transit Authority of
Harris County (2);
City center served: Houston, TX;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 10,233,638; 14.8.
State: Single State Systems: Utah;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Utah Department of
Transportation (0.8);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Utah Transit Authority (1.5);
City center served: Salt Lake City, UT;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 13,101,791; 37.3.
State: Single State Systems: Washington;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Washington State
Department of Transportation (0.35);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Sound Transit Tacoma Link (N/A);
City center served: Tacoma, WA;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 884,895; 3.6.
State: Single State Systems: Washington;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Washington State
Department of Transportation (0.35);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Seattle Center Monorail (0.02);
City center served: Seattle, WA;
Type of system: Automated guideway;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,506,240[C]; 1.8.
State: Single State Systems: Wisconsin;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Wisconsin Department of
Transportation (0.3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Kenosha Transit (0.85);
City center served: Kenosha, WI;
Type of system: Trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 68,209; 1.9.
State: Multi-state systems: Illinois and Missouri;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): St. Clair County Transit
District (0.25-0.5) and Missouri Department of Transportation (0.9);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Bi-State Development Agency - St.
Louis Metro (2);
City center served: St. Louis, MO;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 15,648,233; 75.8.
State: Multi-state systems: New Jersey and Pennsylvania;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Port Authority Transit Corporation
(1);
City center served: Philadelphia, PA;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 9,362,839; 31.5.
State: Multi-state systems: Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.2);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority (1);
City center served: Washington, DC;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 259,430,055; 206.6.
Source: GAO interviews and National Transit Database.
Notes: FTE data comes from our interviews with oversight agencies and
transit agencies. The data do not include contractor staff that assist
transit or oversight agencies, though several agencies reported using
contractors. Data on ridership is current as of 2005, and includes the
total number of passengers boarding the rail system annually (also
known as "unlinked passenger trips") as provided by FTA. Directional
route miles--the miles of track in each direction over which
transportation vehicles travel while carrying passengers--are current
as of 2004, and were obtained from data published by FTA in the
National Transit Database. The data in this table are presented for
background purposes and were not verified. FTA defines trolley
operations as "light rail" for statistical purposes. However, to
differentiate between vintage trolley operations and modern light rail
operations, we have created separate categories for them in this chart.
N/A = Not available:
[A] Because we were not able to speak with the oversight agency, FTE
data was provided by FTA.
[B] Annual unlinked passenger trips and directional route miles
represent the total for all systems within a transit agency.
[C] According to agency officials, the ridership data presented in this
table represents a year when the monorail was out of service for an
extended period and does not reflect the normal use of the system. In
prior years the number of annual unlinked passenger trips exceeded 2
million.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
To provide Congress with a better understanding of how the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) oversees safety and security in rail
transit systems and what is known about the impact of the State Safety
Oversight program on rail safety and security, we met with FTA
management and consultants to discuss the history, mission, and design
of the oversight program. In addition, we discussed system safety and
risk management approaches used by FTA, but we did not independently
verify that oversight agencies use these approaches. We met with
officials from other federal agencies such as the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); we also met
with the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), a transit
industry association. We met with these organizations to determine how
oversight responsibilities are shared and coordinated, and the extent
to which duplication of safety and security guidance existed among
these agencies. We also spoke with a TSA Local Area Supervisor. To
compare other transportation safety and security approaches to the
oversight program, we interviewed FRA, APTA, and safety officials from
Canadian transit agencies.
In addition to these interviews, we also reviewed key documents,
including rules, regulations, procedures, and guidance of the State
Safety Oversight program; the triennial audits FTA performs on
oversight agencies; documents tracking the performance of corrective
action items; and memorandums of agreement between federal agencies to
facilitate safety oversight coordination. At the state level, we
reviewed annual reports that the oversight agencies provide to FTA.
When states were willing to share these documents, we reviewed audits
performed by the oversight agencies on transit agencies (40 percent of
the states provided these documents) and authorizing legislation, or
executive action, creating the state safety oversight agency (more than
80 percent provided the legislation or executive action). To compare
the State Safety Oversight program with other transportation safety
approaches, we reviewed our past work on pipeline, aviation, motor
carriers, and highway safety.
To further our understanding of the design and impact of the program
and also to identify challenges facing the program, we conducted semi-
structured interviews with oversight and transit agencies. To determine
the universe of oversight agencies and rail transit agencies under the
State Safety Oversight program, we requested a list from FTA. We
compared FTA's list of transit systems to information published by APTA
regarding rail systems currently in operation, as well as those that
were under development. In two cases, APTA listed a transit agency that
had initiated service as "proposed," and we were able to resolve this
discrepancy by comparing it to the FTA list and checking the agency's
website, which showed that service had been initiated. We contacted all
transit and oversight agencies participating in the program that were
in operation as of October 2005. This included a total of 25 oversight
agencies and 42 rail transit systems. Twenty-four of the twenty-five
oversight agencies, and 37 of the 42 rail transit systems, agreed to
participate in these interviews. The New Orleans Regional Transit
Authority (a transit agency) and Louisiana Department of Transportation
(an oversight agency) requested that we exclude them from our review
due to the difficulties posed by recovering from Hurricane Katrina, and
we agreed to the request. Four additional transit agencies--the
Jacksonville Transportation Authority, Chattanooga Area Regional
Transportation Authority, Metro-Dade Transit Agency, and Hudson-Bergen
Light Rail line--did not participate in our interviews. The semi-
structured interview guide included questions concerning issues that
could create challenges for the program such as an estimate of the
number of FTE employees dedicated to the program, availability of FTA
or other federally sponsored safety training to oversight agency
employees, state funding schemes to support the program, the workload
associated with audit responsibilities, the role of outside contractors
to conduct the triennial reviews, employee turnover, and frequency of
communication between the transit agencies and federal security
agencies.
The information collected from our semi-structured interviews with the
oversight and transit agencies may be subject to errors, commonly
referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in how a
particular question is interpreted, the sources of information that are
available to interviewees, or how the data are entered into a database
or were analyzed, can introduce unwanted variability in the results
obtained in these interviews. However, we took steps in the development
of the interview questions, the data collection, and the data analysis
to minimize these types of errors. For example, social science survey
specialists developed the questions used in the interviews in
collaboration with our own subject matter experts. Then, the questions
were pretested to ensure that they were relevant, clearly stated, and
easy to comprehend. When the data were analyzed, a second independent
analyst checked all computer programs. Since the interviews were
conducted using an electronic interviewing system, our interviewers
entered answers obtained from officials directly into the electronic
interview instrument. This eliminated the need to have the data keyed
into a database by a third party, thus removing an additional source of
error.
We also conducted several site visits to further our understanding of
the challenges facing the program. We visited 17 transit and 8
oversight agencies in both large and small cities, as well as in states
with several rail transit agencies and only one agency; we chose this
variety to witness a cross-section of transit agencies and observe the
interactions the transit agencies had with their oversight agencies.
Complete lists of the transit and oversight agencies we visited are in
Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. To determine how the program
functions in regions where transit systems cross state boundaries, we
visited three systems that crossed state boundaries. To identify how
the program may be incorporated into new transit systems, we visited
two systems that are in the design or construction phase, and one
oversight agency that will eventually oversee a transit agency yet to
begin service. We confirmed the accuracy of information presented in
the report about state oversight and transit agencies by asking for the
agencies to confirm text we sent to them prior to the publication of
the report. We conducted our work from August 2005 through June 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Table 3: Rail Transit Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This
Review:
Rail transit agency: Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART);
Urban area served: San Francisco/Oakland, California;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: Bi-State Development Agency (MetroLink);
Urban area served: St. Louis, Missouri;
Multi-State region: X;
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: Chicago Transit Authority;
Urban area served: Chicago, Illinois;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: Kenosha Transit;
Urban area served: Kenosha, Wisconsin;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (LACMTA);
Urban area served: Los Angeles, California;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: Maryland Transit Administration (MTA);
Urban area served: Greater Washington, DC, and Maryland;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: New Jersey Transit River Line;
Urban area served: Camden, New Jersey;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: New York City Transit (NYCT);
Urban area served: New York, New York;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: North County Transit District;
Urban area served: San Diego/Oceanside, CA;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: X.
Rail transit agency: Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO);
Urban area served: Lindenwold, New Jersey and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania;
Multi-State region: X;
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: Regional Public Transportation Authority (Valley
Metro);
Urban area served: Phoenix, AZ;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: X.
Rail transit agency: Sacramento Regional Transit District (SRTD);
Urban area served: Sacramento, California;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: San Diego Trolley; Urban area served: San Diego,
California;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI);
Urban area served: San Francisco, California;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority
(SCVTA);
Urban area served: San Jose, California;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
(SEPTA);
Urban area served: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Rail transit agency: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA);
Urban area served: Washington, D.C;
Multi-State region: X;
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Source: National Transit Database.
[End of table]
Table 4: State Oversight Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This
Review:
State oversight agency: Arizona Department of Transportation;
State(s) served: Arizona;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: X.
State oversight agency: California Public Utilities Commission;
State(s) served: California;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
State oversight agency: Missouri Department of Transportation;
State(s) served: Missouri;
Multi-State region: X;
Not yet operating: [Empty].
State oversight agency: New Jersey Department of Transportation;
State(s) served: New Jersey;
Multi-State region: X;
Not yet operating: [Empty].
State oversight agency: Oregon Department of Transportation;
State(s) served: Oregon;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
State oversight agency: Regional Transportation Authority (RTA);
State(s) served: Illinois;
Multi-State region: [Empty];
Not yet operating: [Empty].
State oversight agency: St. Clair County Transit District (SCCTD);
State(s) served: Illinois;
Multi-State region: X;
Not yet operating: [Empty].
State oversight agency: Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC);
State(s) served: District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia;
Multi-State region: X;
Not yet operating: [Empty].
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Katherine A. Siggerud, (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Catherine Colwell, Assistant
Director; Ashley Alley; Colin Fallon; Michele Fejfar; Joah Ianotta;
Stuart Kaufman; Joshua Ormond; Tina Paek; Stephanie Purcell; and
Raymond Sendejas made key contributions to this report.
(542068):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Prior to 1991, FTA was known as the Urban Mass Transportation
Administration. For simplicity, we will refer to the agency as FTA
throughout this report.
[2] NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating
every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant
accidents in the other modes of transportation--railroad, highway,
marine, and pipeline--and issuing safety recommendations aimed at
preventing future accidents.
[3] One oversight agency and five transit agencies declined to
participate in our review.
[4] The New Starts program awards full-funding grant agreements for
capital expenses for fixed guideway rail projects, and certain bus,
trolley, and ferry projects. A full-funding grant agreement establishes
the terms and conditions for federal participation in a project,
including the maximum amount of federal funds available, which, by
statute, cannot exceed 80 percent of the project's net cost.
[5] Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA),
Pub. L. No. 103-62, in 1993. Under the act, federal agencies are to
develop multiyear strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual
performance reports. According to GPRA, federal agencies are to include
performance goals for agency activities in their strategic plans.
[6] Pub. L. No. 102-240.
[7] Codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 5330.
[8] Codified at 49 CFR Part 659.
[9] Since the beginning of the State Safety Oversight program, the
transit community affected by this oversight program grew from 19
states and 32 rail transit agencies to 26 states and 42 rail transit
agencies as of July 2006. FTA anticipates that two new states and as
many as seven new rail transit agencies will enter the State Safety
Oversight program by 2009.
[10] Information on FRA's jurisdiction over rail transit agencies with
shared-use track can be found in FTA and FRA policy statements
published in the Federal Register in July 2000. FRA clarified its
position on safety jurisdiction over shared track situations. See 65
Fed. Reg. 42529 (July 10, 2000).
[11] We also contacted Canadian transit officials in Toronto and
Montreal to discuss their safety and security oversight system.
However, we found that there is no standard national system of rail
safety and security oversight in Canada, except in cases where a
transit system is classified as a regular railroad. According to
officials, rail transit systems are usually self-regulated in Canada,
though some submit to external safety audits conducted by APTA.
[12] 49 U.S.C. sec. 5334 (b).
[13] See 49 U.S.C. sec. 5334 (b) and 49 U.S.C. sec. 5330.
[14] The Urbanized Area Formula Program makes federal resources
available to urbanized areas and to state governors for transit capital
assistance in urbanized areas. An urbanized area is an incorporated
area with a population of 50,000 or more. Urbanized areas with
populations of fewer than 200,000 people may also use FTA's formula
funds for operating assistance.
[15] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[16] A system-safety approach involves the application of technical and
managerial skills, to identify, analyze, assess, and control hazards
and risks.
[17] FTA states that, to ensure a minimum standard is met, a focus on
universally applied rules is necessary. Therefore, FTA officials stated
that they felt it was inappropriate to use a risk-based approach in
this area of the program.
[18] The Tri-State Oversight Committee has six representatives, two
each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
[19] Officials from 16 oversight agencies stated that they provide some
form of grant funding to transit agencies they oversee and that they
could, potentially, withhold those grants to force a transit agency to
take a particular safety action. However, no oversight agency officials
stated that they had taken this step.
[20] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[21] ATSA initially created TSA within DOT. The Homeland Security Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), transferred TSA to
DHS.
[22] These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act of
2005 and its accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with
$12 million in funding for rail security activities.
[23] FRA clarified its position on safety jurisdiction over shared
track situations in a Federal Register posting in 2000. See 65 Fed.
Reg. 42529.
[24] FTA provided documentation showing that FRA told the one rail
transit agency that did not receive its waiver that its application was
unnecessary--what the agency proposed was already allowed under FRA
regulations.
[25] Prior to the existence of the FTA State Safety Oversight program,
California law dictated that CPUC had oversight authority over rail
transit agencies, but exempted municipally operated systems. Because
the City of San Francisco operates MUNI, it was not subject to CPUC
oversight. However, since 49 CFR 659 required that California designate
an agency to oversee all rail transit systems receiving federal funds,
the governor of California designated CPUC to oversee MUNI in 1997.
[26] Prior to the implementation of the State Safety Oversight program,
according to APTA, most transit agencies were self-regulated and
submitted to occasional APTA-sponsored safety audits as a way of
obtaining outside feedback about their safety practices and areas for
potential improvement. APTA charged transit agencies for their
participation in these audits.
[27] FTA's contractor stated that FTA conducted one audit of an
oversight agency, at that agency's request, in 2002, and performed
several audits of oversight agencies that FTA had not previously
audited.
[28] TSI is a part of DOT's Research and Innovative Technology
Administration. The National Transit Institute, which FTA funds, is
affiliated with Rutgers University and dedicated to training employees
of the public transportation industry.
[29] FTA and TSI provide their courses free of charge to transit and
oversight agencies but do charge a nominal fee for course books and
materials. FTA and TSI also respond to requests to teach courses in
field locations, potentially reducing travel costs for participants.
[30] GAO-05-851, GAO-03-263, and GAO-03-843.
[31] In the most recent revision to 49 CFR 659, the Rail Fixed Guideway
Systems; State Safety Oversight rule governing the State Safety
Oversight program, FTA mandated that in areas where transit agencies
ran through multiple states, the states coordinate to ensure they use
the same program standard for the transit agency to meet. This way one
transit agency does not have to meet two separate standards in
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