Rail Transit
Observations on FTA's State Safety Oversight Program Gao ID: GAO-06-997T July 19, 2006The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's transportation infrastructure, carrying millions of people daily. Unlike most transportation modes, safety and security oversight of rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In addition, in 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, giving the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) authority for security over all transportation modes, including rail transit. This testimony is based on ongoing work for this subcommittee's committee--the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. I describe (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what is known about the impact of the program on rail safety and security; and (3) challenges facing the program. I also provide information about oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To address these issues, we reviewed program documents and interviewed stakeholders including officials from FTA, TSA, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the American Public Transportation Association. We also surveyed state oversight and transit agencies covered by FTA's program, interviewing 24 of the 25 oversight agencies and 37 of 42 transit agencies across the country.
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible for overseeing transit agencies, including reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, the TSA also has security oversight authority over transit agencies. Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a top priority. FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could result in duplication of effort.
GAO-06-997T, Rail Transit: Observations on FTA's State Safety Oversight Program
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Highways, Transit, and Pipelines, Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, July 19, 2006:
Rail Transit:
Observations on FTA's State Safety Oversight Program:
Statement of Katherine Siggerud, Director Physical Infrastructure:
GAO-06-997T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-997T, a report to Subcommittee on Highways,
Transit and Pipelines, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation‘s
transportation infrastructure, carrying millions of people daily.
Unlike most transportation modes, safety and security oversight of rail
transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies
following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In
addition, in 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, giving the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
authority for security over all transportation modes, including rail
transit.
This testimony is based on ongoing work for this subcommittee‘s
committee”the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. I
describe (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2)
what is known about the impact of the program on rail safety and
security; and (3) challenges facing the program. I also provide
information about oversight of transit systems that cross state
boundaries. To address these issues, we reviewed program documents and
interviewed stakeholders including officials from FTA, TSA, the
National Transportation Safety Board, and the American Public
Transportation Association. We also surveyed state oversight and
transit agencies covered by FTA‘s program, interviewing 24 of the 25
oversight agencies and 37 of 42 transit agencies across the country.
What GAO Found:
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA,
other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate
to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires
states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of
rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies
are responsible for overseeing transit agencies, including reviewing
transit agencies‘ safety and security plans. While oversight agencies
are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, the
TSA also has security oversight authority over transit agencies.
Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit
agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several
transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such
as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is
ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA
has not definitively shown the program‘s benefits and has not developed
performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as
required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to
its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies,
resulting in a lack of information to track the program‘s trends. FTA
officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance
measures and goals to help determine the program‘s impact, especially
since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low.
However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that
the program‘s new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a
top priority.
FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program.
First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically,
officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not
having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight
agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical
training would help address this variation. Second, transit and
oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are
to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail
inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could
result in duplication of effort.
Figures: Examples of Rail Transit Systems subject to FTA State Safety
Oversight Program:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: Pennsylvania DOT; Seattle Center Monorail; San Francisco
Municipal Railway; GAO.
[End of Figure]
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-997T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud on
(202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the mechanisms in
place to oversee the safety and security of the nation's rail transit
system. This system moves more than 7 million daily passengers, and,
according to Federal Transit Administration (FTA) statistics, accounts
for less than 6 percent of all public transportation accidents while
providing almost 32 percent of all passenger trips, making it one of
the safest forms of public transportation. However, safety and security
are still concerns. Although safe, the number of fatalities and
accidents has varied over the past few years. For example, between 1999
and 2005, fatalities have ranged from 26 to 57 per year, with an
approximate average of 40 per year. In addition, recent acts of
terrorism on European and Indian transit systems illustrate the need to
maintain high levels of safety and security for transit.
The focus of my testimony today is FTA's State Safety Oversight
program. In 1991, Congress required FTA to (1) issue regulations
requiring states to designate an oversight agency to oversee the safety
and security of rail transit agencies, and (2) withhold federal funds
if a state did not comply with the regulations. Through the resulting
State Safety Oversight program, FTA requires states to designate an
oversight agency to implement FTA safety and security oversight over
rail transit agencies.
My testimony today (1) describes how the State Safety Oversight program
is designed, (2) identifies what is known about the impact of the
program on rail transit safety and security, and (3) identifies any
challenges to the State Safety Oversight program. It also provides
information on how the State Safety Oversight program functions in
areas where transit systems cross state lines (see app. I). My comments
are based on our ongoing work for this subcommittee's committee--the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. We plan to
release this work soon. To obtain information on how the program is
designed and identify what is known about the impact of the program, we
reviewed program guidance and interviewed a wide range of stakeholders
including FTA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA), an industry group. To identify
challenges facing the program, we conducted interviews with 24 of the
25 state safety oversight agencies across the country and 37 of the 42
operating rail transit agencies.[Footnote 1] We also visited 8
oversight agencies and 17 transit agencies--of these 17 transit
agencies, 2 will soon begin operations and 3 cross state boundaries. We
conducted our work from August 2005 through June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary:
* FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA,
other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate
to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires
states to designate a state safety oversight agency and develops and
oversees the implementation of rules and guidance on safety and
security that the designated agencies are to use to oversee transit
operations; however, it does not fund state agencies' ongoing
oversight. The designated state oversight agencies directly oversee
transit agencies' activities including their safety and security plans.
Most commonly, these oversight agencies are state transportation
departments, but public utility commissions and regional transportation
authorities also serve in this role. Transit agencies develop and
implement safety and security plans, assess hazardous conditions,
report certain incidents to the oversight agency, conduct self audits,
and keep the state oversight agency apprised of corrective actions.
Finally, federal agencies including the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) also have a role in
transit security.
* Almost all oversight and transit agencies report that the State
Safety Oversight program is worthwhile in terms of promoting and
improving the safety and security of rail transit systems; however,
there is limited information showing its impact on safety and security.
For example, transit agency officials cite the importance of having
state oversight agency staff help them identify larger, systemic
issues. Although many officials support the program, FTA's methods for
obtaining information on transit safety and security (i.e., transit and
oversight agency data and FTA audits of the oversight agencies) do not
include performance measures and related program goals. FTA issued
annual reports from 1999 through 2003 that track transit accident,
crash, fatality, and other safety data, but FTA officials have found it
difficult to identify performance measures for the program and set
performance goals, because of the relatively low number of fatalities
and incidents and the varying design of rail transit systems.
Furthermore, in the past 8 years, FTA has audited all oversight
agencies in operation before 2004 at least once; however, FTA has not
conducted audits as often as it envisioned when it started the program
(i.e., once every 3 years). This reduced schedule limits FTA's ability
to conduct oversight, including collecting information on the safety
oversight agencies and making informed and timely revisions to the
program. According to FTA officials, they did not keep to their stated
audit schedule because they were reassessing the priorities for the
program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. They also
noted that they continued conducting "safety and security readiness
reviews" to ensure that new transit systems would be able to safely and
securely begin passenger operations. Recent changes in FTA's program
regulations and leadership provide an opportunity to address this lack
of information, performance measures, and program goals, and to resume
its stated audit schedule.
* FTA faces challenges in managing and implementing the program. First,
the level of state oversight-staff expertise and number of oversight
staff (and thus their potential ability to oversee transit agencies),
varies widely across the country. For example, one oversight agency
requires its staff have at least 5 years of rail transit experience
while another oversight agency assigned a state department of
transportation planner to work on safety and security oversight as a
collateral duty. Although no officials identified a safety or security
problem resulting from lack of staff expertise, most transit and
oversight agency officials with whom we spoke believe that federal
funding for training and an FTA-developed curriculum--including
training on how to oversee safety and security--would improve the
qualifications and effectiveness of state oversight agency personnel.
Furthermore, FTA's approach contrasts with the approach other
Department of Transportation (DOT) agencies, such as FRA and the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) take,
which is to provide free training or use agency funds to pay for state
agency personnel's attendance at training sessions, in some
instances.[Footnote 2] A second challenge to implementing the program,
according to officials from 20 of 24 state oversight agencies and 14 of
37 transit agencies, is the uncertainty about the role of TSA in FTA's
program since Congress designated TSA the lead agency on security
matters in 2001. Although TSA has regulatory authority over security
activities in transportation, its rail program is still developing, and
several oversight and transit agency officials with whom we spoke were
concerned about the potential for duplication of effort given that
state safety oversight agencies and TSA both review and comment on
transit systems' security plans. TSA and FTA recognize this concern and
have begun discussions on how to coordinate their oversight efforts.
Background:
In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),[Footnote 3] which added Section 28 to
the Federal Transit Act.[Footnote 4] ISTEA required FTA to establish a
state-managed safety and security oversight program for rail transit
agencies. As a result, on December 27, 1995,[Footnote 5] FTA published
a set of regulations, called Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State Safety
Oversight (subsequently referred to as FTA's rule), to improve the
safety and security of rail transit agencies. FTA's rule required state
oversight agencies to have approved transit agencies' safety plans by
January 1, 1997, and security plans by January 1, 1998. At the time of
the FTA rule's publication, 5 of 19 states affected by the FTA rule had
oversight programs in place for rail transit safety and security, and
no oversight agency met all the requirements in FTA's rule. During the
first few years of implementation, FTA worked with states to develop
compliant programs that addressed FTA's requirements. Ten years after
FTA promulgated the initial rule, FTA published a revision to it in the
Federal Register on April 29, 2005, which required that oversight
agencies had to comply with the revised FTA rule by May 1, 2006.
FTA relies on staff in its Office of Safety and Security to lead the
State Safety Oversight program--and hired the current Program Manager
in March 2006. This manager is also responsible for other safety duties
in addition to the State Safety Oversight program. Additional FTA staff
within the Office of Safety and Security assist with outreach to
transit and oversight agencies and additional tasks. FTA regional
personnel are not formally involved with the program's day-to-day
activities, though officials from FTA Regional Offices help address
specific compliance issues that occasionally arise and help states with
new transit agencies establish new oversight agencies. FTA also relies
on contractors to do many of the day-to-day activities, ranging from
developing and implementing FTA's audit program of state oversight
agencies to developing and providing training classes on system safety.
The revised FTA rule applies to all states with rail fixed guideway
systems operating in their jurisdictions. As specified in the FTA rule,
a rail fixed guideway system is defined as: "any light, heavy, or rapid
rail system; monorail, inclined plane, funicular, trolley, or automated
guideway that is not regulated by FRA and:
* is included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles or
receives funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49
U.S.C. 5336); or:
* has submitted documentation to FTA indicating its intent to be
included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles to receive
funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C.
5336)."
Figure 1 shows examples of the types of rail systems that are included
in the State Safety Oversight program.
Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety
Oversight Program:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Pennsylvania DOT, Seattle Monorail; San Francisco Municipal
Railway; GAO.
[End of figure]
FTA's program generally differs from other agencies within DOT, such as
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), FRA, and PHMSA. These
agencies promulgate their own technical standards that govern how
vehicles or facilities must be operated or constructed, while FTA does
not prescribe technical standards, though the state oversight agencies
can develop technical standards.
Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program:
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA,
other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate
to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. Under the
program, FTA is responsible for developing the regulations and guidance
governing the program, auditing state safety oversight agencies to
ensure the regulations are enforced, and providing technical assistance
and other information; FTA provides funding to oversight agencies in
only limited instances under the program. State oversight agencies
directly oversee the safety and security of rail transit systems by
reviewing safety and security plans, performing audits, and
investigating accidents. Rail transit agencies are responsible for
developing safety and security plans, reporting incidents to the
oversight agencies, and following all other regulations state oversight
agencies set for them. In addition to FTA, federal agencies such as
FRA, DHS's Office of Grants and Training, and TSA also have regulatory
or funding roles related to rail transit safety and security.
FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight Program:
FTA officials stated that they used a multi-agency system-safety
approach in developing the State Safety Oversight program.[Footnote 6]
Federal and state agencies and rail transit agencies collaborate to
ensure the rail transit system is operated safely and each of these
agencies has some monitoring responsibility, either of themselves or
another entity. FTA oversees and administers the program. As the
program administrator, FTA is responsible for developing the rules and
guidance that state oversight agencies are to use to perform their
oversight of rail transit agencies. FTA also is responsible for
informing oversight and transit agencies of new program developments,
facilitating and informing the transit and oversight agencies of
training available through FTA or other organizations, facilitating
information sharing among program participants, and providing technical
assistance.
FTA officials stated they emphasize that components of a risk-
management approach to safety and security, such as hazard analysis and
risk-mitigation procedures, are included in the program standard that
each state oversight agency issues to the transit agencies they
oversee. This is consistent with our position that agencies make risk-
based decisions on where their assets can best be used, both in
transportation security and safety. However, FTA recognizes that some
parts of the State Safety Oversight program are not risk-based,
including requiring minimum standards for all transit agencies in the
program, no matter their size or ridership.[Footnote 7]
While FTA officials stated that FTA does not inspect transit agencies
with regard to safety, it is responsible for ensuring that, through
reviews of oversight agency reports and audits, state oversight
agencies comply with the program requirements. For example, according
to the FTA rule, when a state proposes to designate an oversight
agency, FTA may review the proposal to ensure the designated agency has
the authority to perform the required duties without any apparent
conflicts. FTA has recommended in two instances that a state choose a
different agency because the oversight agency that the state proposed
appeared to be too closely affiliated with the transit agency and did
not appear to be independent. In addition, FTA is responsible for
reviewing the annual reports oversight agencies submit. FTA officials
ensure they include all the required information--such as descriptions
of program resources, and causes of accidents and collisions; they then
compile this information for a program annual report, and look for
industry-wide safety and security trends or problems. Furthermore, FTA
is responsible for performing audits of oversight agencies to ensure
they are complying with program requirements and guidance. FTA audits
evaluate how well an oversight agency is meeting the requirements of
the FTA rule, including whether or not the oversight agency is
investigating accidents properly, if it is conducting its safety and
security reviews properly, and if it is reporting to FTA all the
information that is required.
Finally, FTA does not provide funding to states for the operation of
their oversight programs. However, states may use FTA Section 5309 (New
Starts program) funds--normally used to pay for transit-related capital
expenses--to defray the cost of setting up their oversight agency
before a transit agency begins operations. Also, FTA officials stated
this year that FTA used a portion of the funding originally designated
for FTA audits to pay for one person from each oversight agency to
attend training on the revisions to FTA's rule, which oversight
agencies had to comply with by May 1, 2006.
State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Transit
Agencies:
In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are
responsible for directly overseeing rail transit agencies. According to
the FTA rule, states must designate an agency to perform this oversight
function at the time FTA enters into a grant agreement for any "New
Starts" project involving a new rail transit system, or before the
transit agency applies for FTA formula funding. States have designated
several different types of agencies to serve as oversight agencies.
Most frequently--in 17 cases--states have designated their departments
of transportation to serve in this role. In three instances--
California, Colorado, and Massachusetts--states have designated
utilities commissions or regulators to oversee rail transit safety and
security. According to state officials, since these bodies already had
regulatory and oversight authority, it was a natural extension of their
powers to add rail transit oversight to their responsibilities. Two
states have designated emergency management or public safety
departments to oversee their rail transit agencies. Officials in one
state, Illinois, have designated two separate oversight agencies, both
local transportation funding authorities, to oversee the two rail
transit agencies operating in the state. In the Washington, D.C.
(District of Columbia), region, the rail transit system runs between
two states and the District of Columbia. These states and the District
of Columbia established the Tri-State Oversight Committee as the
designated oversight agency.[Footnote 8] Finally, one state, New York,
has given its oversight authority to its Public Transportation Safety
Board (PTSB). PTSB officials said they have authority similar to the
public utilities commissions discussed above, but have no other mission
than ensuring and overseeing transit safety in New York. See appendix
II for a table showing each oversight agency and the rail transit
agencies they oversee.
The individual authority each state oversight agency has over transit
agencies varies widely. While FTA's rule gives state oversight agencies
authority to mandate certain rail safety and security practices as the
oversight agencies see fit, it does not give the oversight agencies
authority to take enforcement actions, such as fining rail transit
agencies or shutting down their operations. However, we found five
states where the states granted their oversight agencies some punitive
authority over the rail transit agencies they oversee. Officials from
oversight agencies that have the authority to fine or otherwise punish
rail transit agencies all stated that they rarely, if ever, use that
authority, but each stated that they believed it gives their actions
extra weight and forced transit agencies to acquiesce to the oversight
agency more readily than they otherwise might. The majority of
oversight agencies, 19 of the 24 with which we spoke, have no such
punitive authority, though officials from some oversight agencies
stated they may be able to withhold grants their oversight agencies
provide to the transit agencies they oversee.[Footnote 9] Although
officials from several of these agencies stated that they believe they
would be more effective if they did have enforcement authority, under
the current program this authority would be granted by individual
states.
While the states have designated a number of different types of
agencies with varying authority to oversee transit agencies, FTA has a
basic set of rules it requires each oversight agency to follow. In the
program, oversight agencies are responsible for the following:
* Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail
transit agency responsibilities, providing "guidance to the regulated
rail transit properties concerning processes and procedures they must
have in place to be in compliance with the State Safety Oversight
program."
* Reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans and annual
reports.
* Conducting safety and security audits of rail transit agencies on at
least a triennial basis.
* Tracking findings from these audits to ensure they are addressed, and
tracking and eliminating hazardous conditions that the transit agency
reports to the oversight agency outside the audit process.
* Investigating accidents that meet a certain damage or severity
threshold and developing a corrective action plan for the causes
leading to the accident.
* Submitting an annual report to FTA detailing their oversight
activities, including results of accident investigations and the status
of ongoing corrective actions.
FTA's rule also lays out several specific requirements that oversight
agencies must require transit agencies to follow, such as developing
separate system safety and security plans, performing internal safety
and security audits over a 3-year cycle, developing a hazard management
process, and reporting certain accidents to oversight agencies within 2
hours. The locations and types of transit agencies participating in the
program are shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies Participating in
State Safety Oversight Program:
[See PDF for image]
Source: FTA's National Transit Database.
[End of figure]
Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit Safety and
Security, but Often Their Roles Are Outside the State Safety Oversight
Program:
In addition to FTA, the state oversight agencies, and the rail transit
agencies, two entities within DHS are involved in transit safety
security. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),[Footnote
10] passed by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, gave TSA authority for security over all transportation modes,
including authority to issue security regulations.[Footnote 11] While
TSA's most public transportation security duties are its airport
screening activities, TSA has taken steps to enhance all rail security,
including rail transit. For example, in May 2004, TSA issued security
directives to rail transit agencies to ensure all agencies were
implementing a consistent baseline of security. Also, TSA has hired 100
rail security inspectors, as authorized by Congress.[Footnote 12] While
the exact responsibilities of the inspectors are still being
determined, a TSA official stated that they will monitor and enforce
compliance with the security directives by passenger rail agencies, as
well as increase security awareness among rail transit agencies,
riders, and others.
In contrast to the enforcement role of TSA, another DHS agency, the
Office of Grants and Training plays a role in ensuring rail transit
security through supporting security initiatives. The Office of Grants
and Training (formerly known as the Office of Domestic Preparedness) is
the primary federal source of security funding for rail transit
systems, as well as for state and local jurisdictions; this security
funding goes toward the purchase of equipment, support planning and the
execution of exercises, and the provision of technical assistance to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism. The Office of
Grants and Training has provided over $320 million to rail transit
providers through the Urban Area Security Initiative and Transit
Security Grant Program.
FRA, within DOT, also plays a role in ensuring transit agencies operate
safely. In general, FRA exercises its jurisdiction over parts of a rail
transit system that share track with the general railroad system, or
places where a rail transit system and the general railroad system
share a connection (e.g., a grade crossing).[Footnote 13] According to
FRA, if a rail transit vehicle were to operate on the same tracks and
at the same time as general railroads, this would make the rail transit
agency operating the vehicle use much sturdier (and more expensive)
vehicles. Therefore, 11 rail transit agencies have requested waivers
from FRA and, according to an FRA official, as of June 2006, FRA
granted waivers to 10 of the 11 rail transit agencies that applied for
them.[Footnote 14]
Finally, NTSB also plays a role in enhancing and ensuring rail transit
safety, though it has no formal role in FTA's oversight program. NTSB
has authority to investigate accidents involving passenger railroads,
including rail transit agencies. NTSB officials stated they generally
will investigate only the more serious accidents, such as those
involving fatalities or injuries, or those involving recurring safety
issues. Often, NTSB accident investigations of rail transit accidents
will result in recommendations to federal agencies or rail transit
agencies to eliminate the condition that led to the accident.
Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile;
However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document
the Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and
Security:
The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom
we spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety
and security in their organizations. These officials provided
illustrations about how the program enhanced safety or security;
however, they have limited statistical evidence that the oversight
program improved safety or security. FTA has obtained a variety of
information on the program from sources such as national transit data,
annual reports from oversight agencies, and its own audits of the
oversight agencies. However, these data are not linked to any program
goals or performance measures. FTA officials recognize the need for
performance measures for its safety and security programs and are
taking steps in 2006 to begin to address this need. Finally, although
FTA expected to audit the oversight agencies every 3 years, it has not
conducted these audits as frequently as it had planned (it has
conducted eight audits since September 2001). However, program
officials stated they are committed to getting "back on track" to meet
the planned schedule.
Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight Program as
Worthwhile and Valuable:
Both transit agency and oversight agency officials state that FTA's
State Safety Oversight program is worthwhile and valuable because it
helps them maintain and improve safety and security. Of the 37 transit
officials with whom we spoke, 35 believe the program that oversees
their safety and security is worthwhile. One transit agency official
explained that the oversight agency helps them identify larger,
systemic issues. In addition, the program provides support to exert
extra influence on a transit agency's board of directors or senior
management to get safety or security improvements implemented faster
and improve the safety and security of their equipment. For example,
one oversight agency helped its transit agency's safety department
address problems with train operators running red light signals by
helping convincing the transit agency's senior management to replace
all signals with light-emitting diode (LED) signals that were brighter
and more visible. Finally, transit agency officials believe that FTA's
program is an effective method for overseeing safety and security.
Several officials said that they felt having a state or local (rather
than national) oversight agency facilitated ongoing safety and security
improvements and consistent working relationships with the oversight
staff.
In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24
state safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the
State Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for
improving transit systems' safety and security. Several officials
commented that the program provides an incentive to examine safety and
security issues and avoid complacency. Furthermore, several officials
commented that they believed the current system worked well and that
the program provides consistency, endowing the state safety oversight
agencies with enough authority to accomplish their tasks. Also,
officials said that having the states carry out the program provides on-
going oversight in addition to formal audits, which helps maintain a
constant oversight of safety and security issues.
Finally, several transit and oversight agency officials stated that,
because they were subject to oversight, they believed they saw improved
safety in their rail system, but it was difficult to show statistics
proving this. For example, the California oversight agency found an 87
percent drop in rail transit collisions at the San Francisco transit
agency (MUNI) from 1997, when the oversight agency began oversight, to
2005.[Footnote 15] Although FTA changed its definition of a reportable
accident during this time period--making it impossible to determine
exactly what impact external oversight had on MUNI safety--both MUNI
and the oversight agency staff stated they were confident the oversight
efforts had been a major factor in reducing accidents.
APTA officials with whom we spoke were concerned that, although the
State Safety Oversight program contains minimum requirements for safety
and security, the previous industry-regulated approach encouraged
industry officials to surpass minimum standards and continue striving
for improved safety and security.[Footnote 16] However, transit
officials with whom we spoke often discussed the benefits of a federal
program. In addition, officials from 17 transit agencies reported that
their respective state safety oversight agencies imposed requirements
above those required in FTA's requirement.
FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information, but Does Not Have the
Data to Document the Impact of the Oversight Program on Safety and
Security:
One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight
program's impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects
through the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to
submit. The reports include information on many different issues
including program resources, accidents, fatalities, injuries, hazardous
conditions, and any corrective actions taken resulting from audits or
accident investigations. FTA officials stated they have used the
oversight agencies' reports to publish their own annual reports on
transit safety; however, the information was not tied to any program
goals or performance measures. In addition, the 2003 report is the most
recent one FTA has issued.
According to program officials, FTA has recognized the need for better
information and performance measures for its safety and security
programs and has not published a report since the 2003 report because
it has been looking into improving the type of safety and security data
it can collect, and how it can use the information to track program
performance and progress toward yet to be defined goals. FTA's 2006
business plan for its Safety and Security Division includes a goal to
continue developing and implementing a data-driven performance analysis
and tracking system to help ensure management decisions are informed by
data and focus on performance and accountability. As part of these
efforts, FTA officials explained they are working with a contractor who
is working with oversight and transit agencies to identify measures
that they can use to develop performance measures for the State Safety
Oversight program.
Another source of information is the audits of the oversight agencies
that FTA had planned to conduct every 3 years. However, the agency has
not met this schedule. Although the audits provide detailed information
on specific oversight agencies, FTA has not brought together
information from these audits to provide information on the safety and
security of transit systems across the country. FTA tracks the
deficiencies and areas of concern and follows up with oversight agency
staff to assure that each state safety oversight agency resolves the
suggested corrective actions. Given this lack of consistent audits, we
are unsure if FTA has obtained enough information to provide a current
picture of transit system safety and security, or a framework to
identify potential challenges that oversight and transit agency
officials may face in implementing the program. FTA has audited each
state oversight agency that existed prior to 2004 at least one time
since the program began; two agencies were audited twice. However, FTA
largely discontinued the audit program after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks and acknowledged that the agency's priorities shifted
in the wake of the terrorist attacks. However, officials indicated they
continued to evaluate the readiness of rail transit projects to safely
and securely enter operations. In addition, according to FTA officials,
FTA is not conducting audits in fiscal year 2006 so it can use the
money and time to help states comply with the revised FTA rule, and has
planned a detailed outreach effort--including a workshop for oversight
agency officials--to help ensure compliance. FTA plans to return to its
triennial audit schedule in fiscal year 2007, with 10 audits scheduled
for the first year to get back on the triennial schedule.
FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety
Oversight Program:
Despite the program's popularity with participants, FTA faces
challenges in implementing the program's revised rule and continuing to
manage the program. First, several oversight agency officials stated
they are not confident they have adequate numbers of staff to
effectively oversee rail transit system safety and security, and they
are unsure the current training available to them is sufficient. Also,
we found the level of staffing and expertise of oversight agency staff
varies widely across the country. A second challenge FTA faces in
implementing the program is that many transit and oversight agency
personnel are confused about how security issues in the program will be
handled, and what agencies will be responsible for what actions, as TSA
takes on a greater role in rail transit security.
Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff Are
Adequately Trained and That They Have Adequate Numbers of Staff:
While a majority of both oversight and transit agency officials with
whom we spoke endorsed the usefulness of the State Safety Oversight
program, many of these same officials stated that they were unsure that
they were adequately trained for their duties. Specifically, officials
from 18 of 24 oversight agencies with which we spoke stated they
believed additional training would help them provide more efficient and
effective safety and security oversight. We found that the level of
expertise of oversight agency staff varied widely across the country.
For example, 11 of the 24 oversight agencies with which we spoke had
oversight staff that had no career or educational background in transit
safety or security. Conversely, another 11 oversight agencies required
their staff to have certain levels of experience or education. For
example, New York's Public Transportation Safety Board requires its
staff to have 5 years of experience in transit safety. According to
some oversight agency officials who had no previous transit safety or
security background, they had to rely on the transit agency staff they
were overseeing to teach them about transit operations, safety, and
security. These officials stated that if they left their positions, any
new staff taking over for them would face a similar challenge.
Therefore, several oversight agency staff cite the lack of a training
curriculum for oversight staff as a challenge to their effectiveness.
For example, officials from eight oversight agencies stated that the
training they had received in transit operations, accident
investigations, and other areas was beneficial, but they had not
received any training on how to perform oversight functions. Although
many oversight agency officials acknowledged that they felt the
training that had been made available to them either by FTA, the
Transportation Safety Institute (TSI), or the National Transit
Institute (NTI) had been adequate,[Footnote 17] officials from 17 of 24
oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that they were somewhat
unsure of which courses they should take to be effective in their
oversight role.
Furthermore, although FTA provides training to state oversight agency
staff (either on their own or through TSI), and encourages state
oversight agencies to seek training opportunities, FTA does not pay
staff to travel to these courses. Also, oversight agencies must pay
their own tuition and travel expenses for courses not provided by FTA
or TSI.[Footnote 18] Officials from 10 of the 24 oversight agencies
with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds as one reason why they could
not attend training they had hoped to attend. Also, officials from all
24 oversight agencies stated that, if FTA provided some funding for
them to travel to training or paid tuition for training they wanted to
attend, it would allow the oversight agencies to spend their limited
resources on direct oversight activities, such as staff overtime,
travel expenses to visit transit agencies, or hiring contractors.
Several oversight agency officials also cited the example of other DOT
agencies that provide free training or pay for state staff to travel to
attend training. For example, 30 states participate in FRA's State Rail
Safety Participation Program. These states have inspectors who FRA has
certified to enforce FRA safety regulations. FRA pays for their initial
and ongoing classroom training and state staff's travel to this
training. In addition, the federal agency regulating pipelines, PHMSA,
authorizes state-employed inspectors to inspect pipelines in many
states. PHMSA also recently paid for two inspectors from each state to
attend training when it instituted a new inspection approach. Officials
from both FRA and PHMSA stated that providing funding to states to
train their employees helps the federal agencies more effectively carry
out their enforcement activities, easing the states' burden of paying
to enforce federal regulations. For the first time, FTA paid for
oversight agencies' personnel to travel to attend a special meeting in
June 2006 in St. Louis, where FTA provided technical assistance and
shared best practices in meeting the requirements of the revised FTA
rule. FTA officials agree that they have not provided training
specifically pertaining to oversight activities or provided a
recommended training curriculum to oversight agencies, but stated that
it would not be difficult to take these steps.
FTA officials told us that they considered addressing the lack of
consistency in oversight agency staff qualifications when they were
revising FTA's rule in 2005; however, they stated they did not have the
legal authority to direct states to require certain education,
experience, or certifications for oversight agency staff. Furthermore,
these officials noted that, despite the lack of formal requirements,
FTA checks to ensure oversight agency personnel are adequately trained
during its audits, and have recommended in five instances that
oversight agency staff take additional training. They also stated that
FTA could issue guidance or recommendations to oversight agencies about
the level of training their oversight staff should have.
In addition to concerns about training, oversight agencies were unsure
they had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately oversee a transit
agency's operations. Officials at 14 of 24 oversight agencies with whom
we spoke stated that more staff would help them do their job more
effectively. Officials from 11 oversight agencies told us they devoted
the equivalent of less than one person working half-time on oversight,
and, in some cases, described oversight as a "collateral duty." See
table 1 for the amount of personnel oversight agency representatives
estimated their agencies dedicate to oversight responsibilities. While
in some of these instances, the transit agencies overseen are small,
some of the transit agencies with the highest ridership levels have
similar levels of oversight. For example, one state that estimated it
devotes 0.1 full-time equivalent (FTE) to oversight program functions
is responsible for overseeing a major transit agency that averages
nearly 200,000 daily passenger trips. This state supplements its staff
time with the services of a contractor, mainly to perform the triennial
audits of the transit agency. Also, one state that estimated devoting
0.5 FTE to oversight functions is responsible for overseeing five
transit agencies (including two systems not yet in operation) in
different cities, making it difficult to maintain active oversight when
their responsibilities are so spread out. As FTA resumes its audit
schedule, it would be practical for FTA to focus on this issue. (See
app. II for information on estimated FTE and transit system information
for each state safety oversight agency and related transit agency).
Table 1: Estimated FTEs Used by Oversight Agencies to Oversee Transit
Agency Safety and Security:
Estimated FTEs: Number of oversight agencies;
0.5 or less: 11;
0.6-1: 5;
1.1-3: 6;
3.1-5: 1;
Over 5: 1;
Total: 24.
Source: GAO analysis of oversight agency interview responses.
[End of table]
Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA's Emerging
Role in Transit Security Will Affect the Program:
Another challenge facing the program is how TSA and its rail inspectors
might affect oversight of transit security. As I mentioned earlier, TSA
has regulatory authority over transportation security, and, according
to TSA officials, has hired 100 rail inspectors, who are to monitor and
enforce compliance with rail security directives TSA issued in May
2004. However, of the officials at 24 oversight agencies with whom we
spoke, officials at 20 agencies stated they did not have a clear
picture of who was responsible for overseeing transit security issues.
Similarly, officials at 14 of 37 transit agencies were also unsure of
lines of responsibility regarding transit security oversight. Several
state oversight agencies were particularly concerned that TSA's rail
inspectors would be duplicating their role in overseeing transit
security. One oversight agency official stated it would be more
efficient if TSA and oversight agency staff audited transit agencies'
security practices at the same time.
TSA staff reported hearing similar comments from oversight agencies;
FTA program staff and TSA rail inspector staff both indicate that they
are committed to avoiding duplication in the program and communicating
their respective roles to transit and oversight agency officials as
soon as possible. However, as TSA is still developing its program,
currently there is no formally defined role for TSA in the State Safety
Oversight program, and TSA has not determined the roles and
responsibilities for its rail inspectors. While FTA's rule discusses
requirements for a transit agency's security plan, it does not discuss
TSA's specific role in the program, and both TSA and FTA officials
state that exactly how TSA would participate in the program was still
to be determined. However, the officials added that they are working
together to ensure inspection activities are coordinated, thereby
fostering consistency and minimizing disruption to rail transit agency
operations. For example, in May 2006, TSA's director of the rail
inspector program reported that it had designated 26 rail inspectors as
liaisons to state oversight agencies. Also, these TSA rail inspectors
attended a training session where FTA presented information on the
State Safety Oversight program, and they have contacted 13 oversight
agencies to begin discussions on how they can coordinate activities.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I plan to include
recommendations to address these challenges in the report we plan to
issue next week. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or
other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Katherine
Siggerud at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony include Ashley Alley, Catherine
Colwell, Colin Fallon, Michele Fejfar, Joah Iannotta, Stuart Kaufman,
Joshua Ormond, Tina Paek, Stephanie Purcell, and Raymond Sendejas.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems:
Three rail fixed guideway transit systems in the United States--the
Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) in Philadelphia, MetroLink
in St. Louis, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA) in Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia)--cross state lines
and require the collaboration of multiple oversight agencies to run the
State Safety Oversight program; alternatively, states can agree that
one state will be responsible for oversight of the transit system. Each
of these multi-state transit systems has a different structure to
handle oversight responsibilities. The oversight programs in
Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed strategies to centralize
decision making, streamline collaboration, and respond promptly to
safety and security audit findings. In contrast, the Tri-State
Oversight Committee (TOC), which serves as the oversight agency in the
District of Columbia area, requires majority decision making by the six
committee members of the agency, including at least one member from
each jurisdiction. However, WMATA has experienced difficulty obtaining
funding, responding to FTA information requests, and ensuring audit
findings are addressed.
Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied Structures and
Handle Oversight Responsibilities Differently:
Each multi-state oversight program varies in structure and each
performs oversight responsibilities differently. In Philadelphia,
authority to serve as the oversight agency was delegated to one of the
two state agencies--namely, the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation (PennDOT) agreed to allow the New Jersey Department of
Transportation (NJDOT) to serve as the sole oversight agency for the
PATCO heavy rail transit line. MetroLink in St. Louis is subject to
oversight from both Illinois (through the St. Clair County Transit
District) and Missouri (through the Missouri Department of
Transportation); the two organizations share oversight duties. Finally,
TOC, which is composed of multiple representatives from each
jurisdiction (including Virginia, Maryland, and the District of
Columbia), provides oversight for WMATA.
The PATCO Speedline is a heavy rail line serving about 38,000 riders
daily and links Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey. Most of PATCO's
track is in New Jersey, and 9 of the 13 stations are in New Jersey.
Until early 2001, safety and security oversight functions were shared
by Pennsylvania and New Jersey through the Delaware River Port
Authority (DRPA), a regional transportation and economic development
agency serving both Southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey.
When DRPA implemented organizational and functional changes, DRPA
leadership no longer believed that DRPA could perform its role as the
designated oversight agency without facing conflicting interests. As a
result, Pennsylvania and New Jersey agreed to have NJDOT replace DRPA
as the oversight agency. This arrangement allows the oversight agency
to take corrective action without seeking additional levels of approval
from Pennsylvania, although the oversight agency does keep Pennsylvania
informed of its activities. Also, Pennsylvania provides some support to
NJDOT by having PennDOT perform oversight functions for the stations,
passageways, and concourses located in Pennsylvania. PennDOT reports
any deficiencies or hazardous conditions that may be noted during the
performance of oversight directly to New Jersey. Through meetings or
other means of communication, the follow-up actions may be performed by
the Pennsylvania oversight agency in a supporting role or directly by
New Jersey. New Jersey currently devotes two full-time staff members
and one part-time staff member to its oversight program, and while
these staff members must oversee several transit systems, including
PATCO, their sole responsibilities are for safety and oversight
functions.
The St. Louis MetroLink is a light rail line between Lambert-St. Louis
International Airport in St. Louis and Scott Air Force Base outside
Shiloh, Illinois. Service was initiated in 1993, at which time the
system included about 16 miles of track in Missouri and about 1.5 miles
of track in Illinois. Because so little track was in Illinois, Illinois
officials agreed to allow the Missouri Department of Transportation to
provide safety and security oversight for the entire system. However,
in 2001, MetroLink opened a 17.4-mile extension in Illinois, which
roughly equalized the amount of track in both states. Because of this,
the states agreed that it was appropriate for Illinois to play a
greater role in safety and security oversight, and Illinois designated
the St. Clair County Transit District as its oversight agency. St.
Clair is one of the few non-state-level agencies to be an oversight
agency. The involvement of two separate oversight agencies could create
challenges to effective implementation, but the agencies have taken
steps to ensure close coordination. First, the Illinois and Missouri
oversight agencies have agreed to use only one uniform safety and
security standard across the entire MetroLink system.[Footnote 19]
According to area officials, this arrangement creates consistency
throughout the system and allows both agencies to perform their
oversight functions in a consistent manner. In addition, the agencies
use a single contractor who is responsible for the triennial audit. All
other work is performed by the Illinois and Missouri oversight
agencies. Finally, staff from the two oversight agencies coordinate
very closely and each have centralized leadership. Specifically, there
is one full-time employee in Missouri who devotes 90 percent of his
time to safety and security oversight activities. Illinois has several
employees who devote smaller percentages of their individual time to
the program, but the Managing Director is primarily responsible for
coordinating with Missouri. MetroLink, in turn, indicated that
responding to state safety oversight directives is a priority, and the
agency works quickly to implement changes.
WMATA operates a heavy rail system within the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Virginia. The states and the District of Columbia decided
to carry out their oversight responsibilities through a collaborative
organization managed by TOC. TOC is composed of six representatives--
two each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. All of
the representatives have other primary duties, and their activities on
TOC are collateral to these other daily duties, as is the case with
staff at several other oversight agencies. TOC does not have any
dedicated staff, and TOC members have limited rail operational
experience. To gain access to additional experience and expertise in
rail oversight, TOC contracts with a consultant to provide technical
knowledge, perform required audits of WMATA, and ensure that audit
recommendations are completed. In addition, TOC funding comes from, and
must be approved by, each of the jurisdictions every year. The
Washington Council of Governments processes TOC funds and handles their
contracting procedures. These issues result in a lengthy process for
TOC to receive its yearly funding and process its expenses.
Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Their Administrative
Challenges in Different Ways:
The State Safety Oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have
attempted to streamline their decision making, while TOC has a more
collaborative process. Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed
strategies to centralize decision making and streamline collaboration,
albeit through different structures. Because Pennsylvania granted New
Jersey the authority to act as the oversight agency for all of PATCO's
territory, PATCO only has to interact with one oversight agency's
staff. New Jersey also has in-house staff dedicated to the State Safety
Oversight program, which helps to ensure continuity, facilitates
communication, and provides PATCO with one set of contacts to work with
on the implementation of any new safety or security processes. Although
St. Louis has two agencies providing safety oversight, both oversight
agencies have made it a priority to ensure that they are providing
consistent information to the transit agency, and they are coordinating
their activities so MetroLink is not burdened by multiple contacts
about the same issue. To do this, the Missouri and Illinois
representatives stay in close contact with each other. Both oversight
agencies stated they have in-house staff dedicated to safety and
security oversight, and the agencies have very good working
relationships. Oversight agency staff admitted that St. Louis could
face challenges in the future if staff turned over in either agency and
new employees did not establish a similar working relationship. In
addition, officials indicated that, if oversight agency staff had
disagreements over safety or security standards, or how to enforce the
existing standards, it would be highly problematic. However, officials
in the Illinois and Missouri oversight agencies, as well as at
MetroLink, thought that the current arrangements have produced one set
of standards, good communication, and effective coordination. Both
MetroLink and oversight agency staff in St. Louis credited each other
with creating an environment where this system of having multiple
oversight agencies could work well.
In contrast, TOC has implemented a less streamlined process for making
decisions, which, according to FTA and TOC officials, may have
contributed to the difficulties it has had in responding to FTA
information requests. On June 15, 2005, FTA notified TOC that it would
perform TOC's audit in late July 2005. FTA requested information prior
to the audit to facilitate the time it spent on-site. TOC did not
submit the requested State Safety Oversight program materials despite
several FTA requests and an extension by FTA to move the audit to a
later date. At the end of August, FTA initiated its audit even though
it had not received requested information, but was not able to complete
the audit until the end of September, when it received all requested
materials. FTA's Final Audit Report to TOC cited 10 areas for
improvement and provided TOC 60 days to resolve these issues. According
to FTA, TOC resolved one issue within the time period. FTA held a
follow-up review with TOC in mid-March to check on the status of the
remaining areas for improvement. As of June 2006, FTA was evaluating
how many of the remaining audit findings remained open, although FTA
stated that TOC had created a detailed set of internal operating
procedures to address many of FTA's findings and concerns. In addition,
TOC representatives stated that some of the areas for improvement FTA
found were complicated issues, such as reviewing WMATA's accident
investigation procedures and approving modifications, and could not be
addressed within the 60 days FTA initially allowed. TOC staff
emphasized that, although WMATA was sometimes slow to respond to TOC
audit recommendations or information requests, they were pleased with
their relationship with WMATA and that WMATA was responsive to TOC.
Similarly, FTA officials stressed that they recognized and appreciated
the effort TOC had undertaken in addressing FTA's findings.
TOC staff credited WMATA with helping TOC develop a matrix to track
outstanding recommendations and agreeing to meet via conference call on
at least a bi-weekly basis to ensure the issues are addressed. Also,
TOC members stated that part of the reason they were slow to respond to
FTA's initial requests was that TOC had spent all its allocated funds
for the year and, consequently, they had to temporarily stop working
with the consultant who had conducted its audits of WMATA and
maintained their files. According to TOC officials, since the process
for acquiring additional funding would require approval from all three
jurisdictions represented on TOC, it was not feasible to obtain
additional funding quickly. In addition, TOC cannot take any action
without a majority of its members, and at least one member from each
jurisdiction, approving the action. Reaching such majority agreements
can be time consuming since all members of TOC have other primary
responsibilities. This is especially a concern when quick decisions are
necessary, such as responding to FTA's audit recommendations.
TOC officials cited several challenges in accomplishing their mission,
including lack of a dedicated and permanent funding source, the lengthy
process required to obtain approval on planning and implementation of
corrective actions, and limited staff time. They also stated that they
believed TOC and WMATA receive more scrutiny than other transit and
oversight agencies, due to their location in the District of Columbia,
and their proximity to FTA's headquarters staff. To address these
challenges, the chair of TOC stated that she planned to spend
additional time overseeing WMATA and was hoping to work to find ways to
streamline the administrative and funding processes that TOC must
navigate. Hiring a full-time administrator, or designating a TOC member
to serve in a full-time capacity, could help solve some of these
issues. However, funding this position could be a challenge, and the
administrator would need to have decision-making authority to be
effective and act quickly.
[End of section]
Appendix II: List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They
Oversee:
State: Singe State Systems: Arkansas;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Arkansas State Highway
and Transportation Department (0.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Central Arkansas Transit Authority
(0.08);
City center served: Little Rock, AR;
Type of system: Trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 159,458; 2.8.
State: Singe State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Bay Area Rapid Transit (7);
City center served: San Francisco, CA;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 99,296,028; 209.
State: Single State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (1.5);
City center served: Los Angeles, CA;
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 74,242,912; 141.6.
State: Single State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): San Francisco Municipal Railway
(7);
City center served: San Francisco, CA;
Type of system: Light rail, trolley, and cable car;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 53,768,895; 81.7.
State: Single State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): San Diego Trolley, Inc. (0.9);
City center served: San Diego, CA;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 29,334,362; 96.6.
State: Single State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Sacramento Regional Transit
District (N/A);
City center served: Sacramento, CA;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 12,008,620; 58.4.
State: Single State Systems: California;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Santa Clara Valley Transit
Authority (N/A);
City center served: San Jose, CA;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 6,780,431; 58.4.
State: Single State Systems: Colorado;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Colorado Public
Utilities Commission (1.2);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Denver Regional Transit District
(1.25);
City center served: Denver, CO;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 11,142,220; 31.6.
State: Single State Systems: Florida;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of
Transportation (1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metro-Dade Transit Authority
(N/A);
City center served: Miami, FL;
Type of system: Heavy rail and automated guideway;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 26,479,423; 53.5.
State: Single State Systems: Florida;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of
Transportation (1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Jacksonville Transportation
Authority (N/A);
City center served: Jacksonville, FL;
Type of system: Automated guideway;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 736,510; 5.4.
State: Single State Systems: Florida;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of
Transportation (1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Hillsborough Area Regional Transit
(0.85);
City center served: Tampa, FL;
Type of system: Trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 565,002; 4.8.
State: Single State Systems: Georgia;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Georgia Department of
Transportation (0.1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority (6);
City center served: Atlanta, GA;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 70,984,053; 96.1.
State: Single State Systems: Illinois;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Regional Transportation
Authority (1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Chicago Transit Authority (11);
City center served: Chicago, IL;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 186,759,524; 206.3.
State: Single State Systems: Louisiana;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Louisiana Department of
Transportation (0.1)[ A];
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Orleans Regional Transit
Authority (N/A);
City center served: New Orleans, LA;
Type of system: Trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 5,667,952; 25.3.
State: Single State Systems: Maryland;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Maryland Department of
Transportation (1.3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Maryland Transit Administration;
(5);
City center served: Baltimore, MD;
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 18,059,117; 87.
State: Single State Systems: Massachusetts;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Massachusetts Department
of Telecommunication and Energy (2.67);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (5.1);
City center served: Boston, MA;
Type of system: Heavy rail, light rail, and trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 215,787,440; 127.3.
State: Single State Systems: Michigan;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Michigan Department of
Transportation (0.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Detroit Transit Corporation (1.1);
City center served: Detroit, MI;
Type of system: Automated guideway;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,340,646; 2.9.
State: Single State Systems: Minnesota;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Minnesota Department of
Public Safety (0.1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Hiawatha Metro Transit (1-1.5);
City center served: Minneapolis, MN;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 7,901,668; 24.4.
State: Single State Systems: New Jersey;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit Newark City
Subway (0.5);
City center served: Newark, NJ;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 14,312,676; 99.9[B].
State: Single State Systems: New Jersey;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit Hudson-Bergen
Light Rail (N/A);
City center served: Jersey City, NJ;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty].
State: Single State Systems: New Jersey;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit River Line (2);
City center served: Trenton, NJ;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty].
State: Single State Systems: New York;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): New York Public
Transportation Safety Board (3.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New York City Transit (15);
City center served: New York City, NY;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,803,536,486; 493.8.
State: Single State Systems: New York;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): New York Public
Transportation Safety Board (3.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Niagara Frontier Transit Authority
(0.5);
City center served: Buffalo, NY;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 5,373,321; 12.4.
State: Single State Systems: Ohio;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Ohio Department of
Transportation (1);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Authority (1.2);
City center served: Cleveland, OH;
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 8,236,840; 68.5.
State: Single State Systems: Oregon;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Oregon Department of
Transportation (1.2);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Portland Tri-Met (10);
City center served: Portland, OR;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 34,755,147; 92.9[B].
State: Single State Systems: Oregon;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Oregon Department of
Transportation (1.2);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Portland Streetcar (0.5);
City center served: Portland, OR;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty].
State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit
Authority (2);
City center served: Philadelphia, PA;
Type of system: Heavy rail, light rail, and trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 113,252,100; 141.1.
State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Port Authority of Allegheny County
(0.3);
City center served: Pittsburgh, PA;
Type of system: Light rail and inclined plane;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 8,072,099; 45.8.
State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Cambria County Transit Authority
(1);
City center served: Johnstown, PA;
Type of system: Inclined plane;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 86,031; 0.3.
State: Single State Systems: Puerto Rico;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Puerto Rico State
Emergency and Disaster Management Agency (3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Puerto Rico Highway and
Transportation Authority Tren Urbano (1.6);
City center served: San Juan, Puerto Rico;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 2,182,668; (N/A).
State: Single State Systems: Tennessee;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Tennessee Department of
Transportation (0.25);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Chattanooga Area Rapid Transit
Authority (N/A);
City center served: Chattanooga, TN;
Type of system: Inclined plane;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 435,780; 2.
State: Single State Systems: Tennessee;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Tennessee Department of
Transportation (0.25);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Memphis Area Transit Authority
(0.3);
City center served: Memphis, TN;
Type of system: Trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,015,448; 10.
State: Single State Systems: Texas;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of
Transportation (0.4);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Galveston Island Transit (0.25);
City center served: Galveston, TX;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 47,706; 4.
State: Single State Systems: Texas;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of
Transportation (0.4);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Dallas Area Rapid Transit (0.75);
City center served: Dallas, TX;
Type of system: Light rail and trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 17,487,057; 87.7.
State: Single State Systems: Texas;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of
Transportation (0.4);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metropolitan Transit Authority of
Harris County (2);
City center served: Houston, TX;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 10,233,638; 14.8.
State: Single State Systems: Utah;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Utah Department of
Transportation (0.8);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Utah Transit Authority (1.5);
City center served: Salt Lake City, UT;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 13,101,791; 37.3.
State: Single State Systems: Washington;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Washington State
Department of Transportation (0.35);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Sound Transit Tacoma Link (N/A);
City center served: Tacoma, WA;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 884,895; 3.6.
State: Single State Systems: Washington;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Washington State
Department of Transportation (0.35);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Seattle Center Monorail (0.02);
City center served: Seattle, WA;
Type of system: Automated guideway;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,506,240[C]; 1.8.
State: Single State Systems: Wisconsin;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Wisconsin Department of
Transportation (0.3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Kenosha Transit (0.85);
City center served: Kenosha, WI;
Type of system: Trolley;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 68,209; 1.9.
State: Multi-state systems: Illinois and Missouri;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): St. Clair County Transit
District (0.25-0.5) and Missouri Department of Transportation (0.9);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Bi-State Development Agency - St.
Louis Metro (2);
City center served: St. Louis, MO;
Type of system: Light rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 15,648,233; 75.8.
State: Multi-state systems: New Jersey and Pennsylvania;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Port Authority Transit Corporation
(1);
City center served: Philadelphia, PA;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 9,362,839; 31.5.
State: Multi-state systems: Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC;
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.2);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority (1);
City center served: Washington, DC;
Type of system: Heavy rail;
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 259,430,055; 206.6.
Sources: GAO interviews and National Transit Database.
Notes: Full-time equivalent (FTE) data comes from our interviews with
oversight agencies and transit agencies. The data do not include
contractor staff that assist transit or oversight agencies, though
several agencies reported using contractors. Data on ridership is
current as of 2005, and includes the total number of passengers
boarding the rail system annually (also known as "unlinked passenger
trips") as provided by FTA. Directional route miles--the miles of track
in each direction over which transportation vehicles travel while
carrying passengers--are current as of 2004, and were obtained from
data published by FTA in the National Transit Database. The data in
this table are presented for background purposes and were not verified.
FTA defines trolley operations as "light rail" for statistical
purposes. However, to differentiate between vintage trolley operations
and modern light rail operations, we have created separate categories
for them in this chart.
N/A = Not available:
[A] Because we were not able to speak with the oversight agency, FTE
data was provided by FTA.
[B] Annual unlinked passenger trips and directional route miles
represent the total for all systems within a transit agency.
[C] According to agency officials, the ridership data presented in this
table represents a year when the monorail was out of service for an
extended period and does not reflect the normal use of the system. In
prior years the number of annual unlinked passenger trips exceeded
about 2 million.
[End of table]
[End of Section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] One oversight agency and five transit agencies declined to
participate in our review.
[2] PHMSA requires new inspectors to complete applicable Transportation
Safety Institute (TSI) training courses in a 3-year period.
[3] P.L. 102-240.
[4] Codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 5330.
[5] Codified at 49 CFR Part 659.
[6] A system-safety approach involves the application of technical and
managerial skills to identify, analyze, assess, and control hazards and
risks.
[7] FTA states that to ensure a minimum standard is met, a focus on
universally applied rules is necessary. Therefore, FTA officials stated
that they felt it was inappropriate to use a risk-based approach in
this area of the program.
[8] The Tri-State Oversight Committee has six representatives--two each
from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
[9] Officials from 16 oversight agencies stated that they provide some
form of grant funding to transit agencies they oversee and that they
could, potentially, withhold those grants to force a transit agency to
take a particular safety action. However, no oversight agency officials
stated that they had taken this step.
[10] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[11] ATSA initially created TSA within DOT. The Homeland Security Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), transferred TSA to
DHS.
[12] These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act of
2005 and its accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with
$12 million in funding for rail security activities.
[13] FRA clarified its position on safety jurisdiction over shared-
track situations. See 65 Fed. Reg. 42529 (Jul. 10, 2000).
[14] FTA provided documentation showing that FRA told the one rail
transit agency that did not receive its waiver that its application was
unnecessary--what the agency proposed was already allowed under FRA
regulations.
[15] Prior to the existence of the FTA State Safety Oversight program,
California law dictated that the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) had oversight authority over rail transit agencies, but exempted
municipally operated systems. Since the City of San Francisco operates
MUNI, it was not subject to CPUC oversight. However, since 49 CFR Part
659 required that California designate an agency to oversee all rail
transit systems receiving federal funds, the governor of California
designated CPUC to oversee MUNI in 1997.
[16] Prior the implementation of the State Safety Oversight program,
according to APTA, most transit agencies were self-regulated and
submitted to occasional APTA-sponsored safety audits as a way of
obtaining outside feedback about their safety practices and areas for
potential improvement. APTA charged transit agencies for their
participation in these audits.
[17] TSI is a part of DOT's Research and Innovative Technology
Administration. NTI, which FTA funds, is affiliated with Rutgers
University and dedicated to training employees of the public
transportation industry.
[18] FTA and TSI provide their courses free of charge to transit and
oversight agencies but do charge a nominal fee for course books and
materials. FTA and TSI also respond to requests to teach courses in
field locations, potentially reducing travel costs for participants.
[19] In the most recent revision to 49 CFR Part 659, the Rail Fixed
Guideway Systems; State Safety Oversight rule, governing the State
Safety Oversight program, FTA mandated that in areas where transit
agencies ran through multiple states, the states coordinate to ensure
they use the same program standard for the transit agency to meet. This
way one transit agency does not have to meet two separate standards in
different parts of their system.
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