Aviation Safety
FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges Gao ID: GAO-06-1091T September 20, 2006The U.S. commercial aviation industry has had an extraordinary safety record in recent years. However, expected increases in air-traffic--including the introduction of new vehicles into the national airspace, such as unmanned vehicles and very light jets--and human resource issues, present challenges that have the potential to strain the existing safety oversight system. GAO's testimony focuses on these questions: (1) How is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ensuring that the areas of highest safety risk are addressed? (2) How is FAA ensuring that its staff maintain the skills and knowledge to consistently carry out the agency's oversight programs? and (3) What are the key safety challenges facing FAA? This statement is based on our recent reports on FAA's inspection oversight programs, industry partnership programs, and enforcement and training programs. It is also based on interviews with FAA and relevant industry officials.
FAA's aviation safety oversight system includes programs that focus on identifying and mitigating risks through a system safety approach and by leveraging resources, but as FAA is still developing evaluations for some of these programs, it remains unclear the extent to which they are achieving their intended effects. FAA's system safety approach for overseeing airlines--through the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) and Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP)--uses inspection staff efficiently by prioritizing workload based on areas of highest risk and ensuring that corrective actions have been taken. However, recent and planned changes that would move inspections of about 100 airlines from SEP to ATOS will shift inspector workload and might affect FAA's capability to oversee the industry. FAA also concentrates its limited staff resources on the most safety-critical functions and through its designee programs delegates other, less critical activities to designees. Designees perform about 90 percent of certification-related activities, and thus allow FAA to better leverage resources. GAO's recent work found some weaknesses in FAA's system safety approach and recommended that FAA develop effective evaluative processes and accurate nationwide data on its safety oversight programs to address these weaknesses so that program managers and other officials have assurance that the programs attain their intended effect. FAA has begun implementing those recommendations but does not plan to evaluate SEP, which it intends to discontinue after December 2007. Training--including mandatory training requirements for FAA's workforce as well as designees--is an integral part of FAA's safety oversight system. GAO has reported that FAA has generally followed effective management practices for planning, developing, delivering, and assessing the impact of its technical training for safety inspectors, although some practices have yet to be fully implemented. However, several actions could improve the results of its training efforts. For example, FAA develops technical courses on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of an overall curriculum for each type of inspector, such as inspectors of operations or cabin safety, because the agency has not systematically identified the technical skills and competencies each type of inspector needs to effectively perform inspections. FAA has recognized the need to improve its training program in this and other areas. FAA faces several key safety challenges, including not meeting its performance target for commercial air carrier safety this year because of recent fatal accidents. Further, FAA's ability to oversee aviation safety will be affected by recent and anticipated trends in inspector and air traffic controller attrition. Also, FAA intends to enhance runway safety by relying on new technologies that are expected to reduce runway accidents. However, schedule delays and cost increases challenge FAA's ability to deploy this technology. Finally, new types of aviation vehicles are changing the aviation industry and will require new areas of expertise for FAA's inspectors and controllers.
GAO-06-1091T, Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, September 20, 2006:
Aviation Safety:
FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges:
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. Director, Physical
Infrastructure Issues:
Aviation Safety:
GAO-06-1091T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-1091T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The U.S. commercial aviation industry has had an extraordinary safety
record in recent years. However, expected increases in air-
traffic”including the introduction of new vehicles into the national
airspace, such as unmanned vehicles and very light jets”and human
resource issues, present challenges that have the potential to strain
the existing safety oversight system. GAO‘s testimony focuses on these
questions: (1) How is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
ensuring that the areas of highest safety risk are addressed? (2) How
is FAA ensuring that its staff maintain the skills and knowledge to
consistently carry out the agency‘s oversight programs? and (3) What
are the key safety challenges facing FAA? This statement is based on
our recent reports on FAA‘s inspection oversight programs, industry
partnership programs, and enforcement and training programs. It is also
based on interviews with FAA and relevant industry officials.
What GAO Found:
FAA‘s aviation safety oversight system includes programs that focus on
identifying and mitigating risks through a system safety approach and
by leveraging resources, but as FAA is still developing evaluations for
some of these programs, it remains unclear the extent to which they are
achieving their intended effects. FAA‘s system safety approach for
overseeing airlines”through the Air Transportation Oversight System
(ATOS) and Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP)”uses inspection
staff efficiently by prioritizing workload based on areas of highest
risk and ensuring that corrective actions have been taken. However,
recent and planned changes that would move inspections of about 100
airlines from SEP to ATOS will shift inspector workload and might
affect FAA‘s capability to oversee the industry. FAA also concentrates
its limited staff resources on the most safety-critical functions and
through its designee programs delegates other, less critical activities
to designees. Designees perform about 90 percent of certification-
related activities, and thus allow FAA to better leverage resources.
GAO‘s recent work found some weaknesses in FAA‘s system safety approach
and recommended that FAA develop effective evaluative processes and
accurate nationwide data on its safety oversight programs to address
these weaknesses so that program managers and other officials have
assurance that the programs attain their intended effect. FAA has begun
implementing those recommendations but does not plan to evaluate SEP,
which it intends to discontinue after December 2007.
Training”including mandatory training requirements for FAA‘s workforce
as well as designees”is an integral part of FAA‘s safety oversight
system. GAO has reported that FAA has generally followed effective
management practices for planning, developing, delivering, and
assessing the impact of its technical training for safety inspectors,
although some practices have yet to be fully implemented. However,
several actions could improve the results of its training efforts. For
example, FAA develops technical courses on an ad hoc basis rather than
as part of an overall curriculum for each type of inspector, such as
inspectors of operations or cabin safety, because the agency has not
systematically identified the technical skills and competencies each
type of inspector needs to effectively perform inspections. FAA has
recognized the need to improve its training program in this and other
areas.
FAA faces several key safety challenges, including not meeting its
performance target for commercial air carrier safety this year because
of recent fatal accidents. Further, FAA‘s ability to oversee aviation
safety will be affected by recent and anticipated trends in inspector
and air traffic controller attrition. Also, FAA intends to enhance
runway safety by relying on new technologies that are expected to
reduce runway accidents. However, schedule delays and cost increases
challenge FAA‘s ability to deploy this technology. Finally, new types
of aviation vehicles are changing the aviation industry and will
require new areas of expertise for FAA‘s inspectors and controllers.
What GAO Recommends:
To help FAA fully realize the benefits of its safety oversight system,
GAO has made several recommendations to address the weaknesses
identified in GAO‘s reviews. Although FAA has begun addressing the
recommendations, many have not been fully implemented.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1091T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham,
Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on issues related to
aviation safety. The U.S. commercial aviation industry has had an
extraordinary safety record in recent years. In order to maintain a
high level of safety, it is important for the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to have a safety oversight system that is
comprehensive, efficient, and effective and can provide an early
warning of hazards that can lead to accidents. It is equally important
to have a skilled, well-trained workforce to implement and monitor this
safety oversight system. However, expected increases in air traffic--
including the introduction of new vehicles into the national air space,
such as unmanned vehicles and very light jets--and human resource
issues present challenges that have the potential to strain the
existing safety oversight system. My testimony today focuses on these
questions: (1) How is FAA ensuring that the areas of highest safety
risk are addressed? (2) How is FAA ensuring that its staff maintain the
skills and knowledge to consistently carry out the agency's oversight
programs? and (3) What are the key safety challenges facing FAA? We
will also discuss our related recommendations that FAA has not fully
addressed. This statement is based on our recent reports on FAA's
inspection oversight programs, industry partnership programs, and
enforcement and training programs. Additionally, we met with FAA
officials and relevant industry groups and reviewed their documentation
to obtain information on challenges facing FAA. We conducted this work
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Following is a summary of our findings:
* FAA's safety oversight system has programs that focus on identifying
and mitigating risk through a system safety approach, leveraging
resources, and enforcing safety regulations, but concerns exist with
each aspect of the system. FAA's system safety approach for overseeing
airlines--through the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) and
Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP)--has many strengths. Both
programs, for example, use inspection staff efficiently by prioritizing
workload based on areas of highest risk and ensuring that corrective
actions have been taken. However, the full potential of SEP is not
being realized because the inspection workload for the 81 airlines
included in SEP is heavily oriented to nonrisk based activities. Of
additional concern is that recent and planned changes to transfer about
100 airlines from SEP to ATOS will affect inspector workload that may
affect FAA's capability to oversee the aviation industry. FAA leverages
resources and saves money through its "designee" programs, in which
individuals and organizations have been delegated to act on FAA's
behalf to perform about 90 percent of certification-related activities.
The designee program allows FAA to better concentrate its limited staff
resources on the most safety-critical functions. However, planned
changes to some designee programs that would create a new
"organizational designation authorization" will result in FAA focusing
on the performance of organizations rather than the individuals within
the organization who carry out the delegated functions. As FAA moves
from direct oversight of the individuals performing delegated
activities, it will be important for the agency to have valid and
reliable data and strong evaluative processes to monitor any program
changes that have implications for safety. FAA's enforcement program,
which is an outgrowth of its inspection process, is intended to ensure
industry compliance with safety regulations and is another important
element of its safety oversight system. A key objective of FAA's policy
of assessing legal sanctions against entities or individuals that do
not comply with aviation safety regulations is to deter future
violations. However, we found that recommendations for sanctions are
sometimes reduced on the basis of factors that are not associated with
the merits of the case, and the economic literature on deterrence
suggests that the goal of preventing future violations is weakened when
the penalties for violations are lowered for reasons not related to the
merits of the case. For fiscal years 1993 through 2003, we found that
civil monetary penalties were reduced by 52 percent from a total of
$334 million to $162 million. It is important for FAA to have effective
evaluative processes and relevant data on its numerous safety programs
so that the agency has assurance the programs are having their intended
effect, especially as FAA's oversight becomes more indirect and as
significant program changes are made. Our most recent work has shown
the lack of evaluative processes and limitations with data for FAA's
SEP program, designee programs, industry partnership programs, and
enforcement program.
* FAA has made training an integral part of its safety oversight system
and has established mandatory training requirements for its workforce
as well as designees, but several actions could improve the results of
its training efforts. We have reported that FAA has generally followed
effective management practices for planning, developing, delivering,
and assessing the impact of its technical training for safety
inspectors, although some practices are still early in the
implementation phase. For example, in developing its training
curriculum for inspectors, FAA followed effective management practices,
such as developing courses that support changes in inspection
procedures resulting from regulatory changes or agency initiatives. On
the other hand, FAA develops technical courses on an ad hoc basis
rather than as part of an overall curriculum for each type of
inspector, such as inspectors of operations or cabin safety, because
the agency has not systematically identified the technical skills and
competencies each type of inspector needs to effectively perform
inspections. FAA has recognized the need for improvements to its
training program in this and other areas and has begun taking some
action to address these and other training issues.
* FAA faces a number of key safety challenges, including meeting its
performance target for commercial air carrier safety, which it will not
meet in fiscal year 2006 because of recent fatal accidents. The
challenge of meeting its performance target will be exacerbated by
other challenges in human capital management, the acquisition and
operation of new safety enhancing technologies, and new types of
vehicles, such as very light jets (VLJ), that may place additional
workload strains on FAA inspectors and air traffic controllers. FAA's
ability to oversee aviation safety will be affected by recent and
anticipated trends in inspector and air traffic controller attrition.
For example, FAA estimates it will lose 10,291, or about 70 percent of
the controller workforce, over the next 10 years, primarily due to
retirements. FAA intends to enhance runway safety by relying on new
advanced technologies that are expected to reduce runway accidents.
However, schedule delays and cost increases have affected FAA's ability
to deploy this technology. Finally, if predictions about new types of
aviation vehicles are borne out, it will change the aviation landscape
and will require new areas of expertise for FAA's inspectors and
controllers. For example, the industry predicts there may be as many as
5,000 to 10,000 VLJs operating in the national airspace by 2020, which
would further congest the national airspace system especially at and
near smaller airports, where VLJs are expected to be prevalent because
of their smaller size.
Background:
The U.S. commercial aviation industry, with less than one fatal
accident per 5 million flights from 2002 through 2005 has an
extraordinary safety record. However, when passenger airlines have
accidents or serious incidents, regardless of their rarity, the
consequences can be tragic. In addition, according to Bureau of
Transportation Statistics data, flight arrival delays have increased
from 15 percent in 2003 to 22 percent in 2006. Increases in flight
delays can be viewed as evidence of strain in the aviation system, as a
loss of efficiency in the air system is a symptom of increased strain.
Losses of efficiency and the corresponding strain on the system could
potentially result in hazards that decrease safety. In order to
maintain a high level of aviation safety, it is critical to have well-
established, efficient, and effective systems in place to provide an
early warning of hazards that can lead to accidents.
FAA has established a number of systems and processes to inspect and
oversee various aspects of passenger airline safety, such as aircraft
maintenance and flight operations. In 1998, the agency implemented the
Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), which currently oversees 35
commercial airlines and cargo carriers; the goal is for ATOS to oversee
all commercial passenger and cargo airlines. ATOS emphasizes a system
safety approach that extends beyond periodically checking airlines for
compliance with regulations to using technical and managerial skills to
identify, analyze, and control hazards and risks. For example, under
ATOS, inspectors develop surveillance plans for each airline, based on
data analysis and risk assessment, and adjust the plans periodically
based on inspection results. Our review of ATOS's early implementation
found weaknesses, which FAA addressed by improving guidance to
inspectors and increasing data usefulness.
FAA's inspection process for the 81 commercial airlines not covered by
ATOS has two components. The National Work Program Guidelines (NPG) is
the original oversight program for these airlines. Under NPG, an FAA-
wide committee of managers identifies an annual minimum set of required
inspections to ensure that airlines comply with their operating
certificates; this process is not risk-based. In 2002, FAA added
another component, the Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP), to
the inspection process to incorporate principles of ATOS into its
oversight of commercial airlines. The two components are used together
to establish the number and types of annual inspections for airlines.
Inspections can encompass many different activities, such as visually
spot-checking an airplane at a gate, monitoring procedures on a
scheduled flight, or observing maintenance performed on an aircraft.
Each year, FAA headquarters establishes a baseline number and type of
inspections for each airline through NPG. Through SEP, teams of FAA
inspectors analyze the results of an airline's prior inspections at
periodic meetings and, based on their assessment of specific risks,
establish other inspections that may be needed.
Since 1990, FAA has emphasized industry partnership programs that allow
participants, such as airlines and pilots, to self-report violations of
safety regulations and help identify safety deficiencies and
potentially mitigate or avoid fines or other legal action. For example,
the Voluntary Disclosure Program encourages the self-reporting of
manufacturing problems and safety incidents by participants that can
include air carriers and repair stations.[Footnote 1]
When violations of statutory and regulatory requirements are identified
through inspections, partnership programs, or other methods, FAA has a
variety of enforcement tools that it may use to respond to the
violations, including administrative actions (such as issuing a warning
notice or a letter of correction that includes the corrective actions
the violator is to take) and legal sanctions (such as levying a fine or
suspending or revoking a pilot's certificate or other FAA-issued
certificate).
The achievement of FAA's mission is dependent in large part on the
skills and expertise of its workforce, whose aviation safety activities
include air traffic control, maintenance of air traffic control
equipment, and certification and inspection of various industry
participants. As of 2006, 714 of FAA's approximately 3,400 inspectors
were dedicated to overseeing the 35 airlines in ATOS. Approximately
1,100 inspectors[Footnote 2] oversee other entities and individuals,
including the remaining 81 commercial airlines that are included in the
SEP inspection program, about 5,200 aircraft repair stations, and
approximately 625,000 pilots. FAA's safety oversight programs for other
aspects of the aviation industry--including manufacturers of aircraft
and aircraft parts, repair stations, flight schools, aviation
maintenance technician schools, pilots, and mechanics--involve
certification, surveillance, and inspection by FAA's safety inspectors,
engineers, flight surgeons, and designated representatives. FAA
authorizes about 13,400 private individuals and 218 organizations
(called "designees") to act as its representatives to conduct many
safety certification activities that FAA considers to be nonsafety
critical, such as administering flight tests to pilots, inspecting
repair work by maintenance facilities, conducting medical examinations
of pilots, and approving designs for aircraft parts. These designees
are grouped into 18 different programs and are overseen by three FAA
offices--Flight Standards Service, Aerospace Medicine, and Aircraft
Certification Service--all of which are under the Office of Aviation
Safety. In addition, FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) includes the
approximately 16,700 air traffic controller workforce[Footnote 3] and
nearly 7,200 field maintenance technicians responsible for maintaining
ATO's equipment and facilities, which include 21 air traffic control
centers, 518 airport control towers, and 76 flight service facilities.
While overall commercial aviation safety trends have been generally
positive over the last several years, recent safety trends may warrant
scrutiny. On the positive side, the number of serious runway
incursions[Footnote 4] has decreased since fiscal year 2002.
Specifically, in fiscal year 2002, there were 37 serious runway
incursions, compared with 29 in fiscal year 2005. Recent fiscal year
2006 data also continue the downward trend, with 25 serious runway
incursions as of August 1, 2006--fewer than at the same time in the
previous fiscal year. However, with four fatal accidents in fiscal year
2006,[Footnote 5] FAA will not meet its performance target for fiscal
year 2006 for commercial air carrier safety.[Footnote 6] Although
general aviation accidents have decreased from 1,715 in 2002 to 1,669
in 2005, general aviation safety continues to be a concern because it
represents a significant number of fatal accidents every year. (See
fig. 1.) For example, 321 of the 1,669 general aviation accidents in
2005 were fatal. Additionally, the poorer safety records of cargo and
air ambulances services, compared with the commercial passenger airline
accident rate, point out the safety vulnerabilities in this area.
According to FAA, from 1998 through 2005, the accident rate for
scheduled air cargo operators declined significantly, but was still
about 2.5 times higher than the accident rate for scheduled passenger
operators. Further, in instances where there was not an isolated injury
to a single individual, the accident rate for cargo was about 6.3 times
higher than for commercial passenger aviation.[Footnote 7] In addition,
from January 2002 to January 2005, there were 55 emergency medical
services or air ambulance accidents, with 54 fatalities, the highest
number of accidents since the 1980s.[Footnote 8] In addition, FAA did
not meet its performance target with regard to operational
errors[Footnote 9] for fiscal years 2003 through 2005. While
operational errors continued an upward trend in 2006, FAA was below the
fiscal year 2006 target of 4.27 operational errors per million
activities as of June 2006.
Figure 1: Number of General Aviation Accidents and Fatalities, 2000
through 2005:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: NTSB.
[End of Figure]
FAA's Safety Oversight System Includes Programs That Focus on Risk
Management and Leveraging Resources, but System Is Hindered by Data
Limitations and Lack of Evaluations:
FAA's safety oversight system has programs that focus on identifying
and mitigating risk through a system safety approach, leveraging
resources, and enforcing safety regulations, but the programs lack
fully developed evaluative processes. As mentioned previously, FAA
oversees commercial airlines by one of two programs--ATOS, which
includes 35 airlines, and SEP, which includes the remaining 81
airlines. Both programs emphasize a system safety approach of using
risk analysis techniques, which allow for the efficient use of
inspection staff and resources by prioritizing workload based on areas
of highest risk and require that inspectors verify that corrective
actions are taken. For example, FAA has developed risk assessment
worksheets for both programs that guide inspectors through identifying
and prioritizing risks associated with key airline areas, such as
flight operations and personnel training. Information from the
worksheets is then used to target resources to mitigating those risks.
In recent work we found that the benefits of FAA's system safety
approach for the inspection of airlines covered under SEP could be
enhanced if FAA more completely implemented the program and addressed
other challenges.[Footnote 10] Most of FAA's inspections of those
airlines were not risk-based. For example, as shown in figure 2 from
fiscal years 2002 through 2004, SEP--a risk-based approach--guided only
23 percent of the inspection activities for the top 25 SEP airlines in
terms of the number of enplanements. The remaining 77 percent of
inspection activities were identified through NPG, a process that is
not risk-based or system safety oriented. Although inspectors can
replace NPG-identified activities with SEP-identified activities that
they deem address a greater safety risk, we found that FAA inspectors
interpret agency emphasis on NPG as discouraging this practice. To
address this issue, we recommended that FAA improve communication with
and training of inspectors in areas of system safety and risk
management. In response to our recommendations, FAA revised its
guidelines to require inspectors and managers to ensure that risk
information is used and updated its SEP training course to reflect that
change. Since FAA's focus on system safety represents a cultural shift
in the way the agency oversees the aviation industry, it will be
important for FAA to monitor the implementation of system safety and
risk management principles. We recommended that FAA establish a
continuous evaluative process for its activities under SEP, but the
agency does not intend to set up a process since it expects to
eliminate the SEP program after December 2007, which is its deadline
for moving all commercial airlines to the ATOS program. If the deadline
slips, we believe our recommendation remains valid.
Figure 2: SEP-and NPG-Initiated Required Inspections for the Top
Airlines Covered by the Programs, Fiscal Years 2002-2004:
Type of inspection: SEP-initiated;
2002: 1,261;
2003: 1,567;
2004: 927;
Total: 3,755 (23%).
Type of inspection: NPG-initiated;
2002: 5,470;
2003: 3,623;
2004: 3,338;
Total: 12,431 (77%).
Type of inspection: Total;
2002: 6,731;
2003: 5,190;
2004: 4,265;
Total: 16,186 (100%).
Source: GAO analysis of FAA information.
Note: Top airlines ranked in terms of number of enplanements.
[End of Figure]
Furthermore, FAA's plans to dissolve the SEP program after moving all
commercial airlines to ATOS will shift the inspectors workloads and
present a challenge to FAA's inspection oversight process. As FAA
shifts airlines to ATOS, it will also move inspectors to the program.
Unlike SEP inspectors, ATOS inspectors are dedicated to an airline and
generally cannot be used to inspect other entities. SEP inspectors, on
the other hand, have other duties in addition to overseeing airlines--
such as certifying and approving aircraft types; overseeing repair
stations, designees, and aviation schools; and investigating accidents.
For example, our analysis of FAA data indicated that, for fiscal years
2002 through 2004, about 75 percent of SEP inspectors had
responsibility for more than 3 entities, and about half had
responsibility for more than 15. As inspectors are transitioned to
ATOS, the remaining SEP inspector workforce will have to add those
other entities to their workload. Furthermore, ATOS requires more
inspectors per airline than SEP. For example, when FAA recently
transitioned four airlines to ATOS,[Footnote 11] the total size of the
four inspection teams increased 30 percent, from 73 to 95 inspectors.
With the expansion of the ATOS program, it will be important to monitor
the magnitude of the shift in resources and the effect it may have on
FAA's overall capability to oversee the industry as well as any changes
to the current ATOS program that may be required by the
expansion.[Footnote 12]
FAA's Oversight Focuses on Leveraging Inspector Resources, Which
Results in Less Direct Oversight of the Industry:
An important part of FAA's safety oversight system are designee
programs, through which FAA authorizes about 13,400 private individuals
and 218 organizations to act on its behalf to conduct safety
certification activities that FAA considers to be non-safety critical.
We reported that designees perform about 90 percent of certification-
related activities, thus greatly leveraging the agency's resources and
enabling inspectors to concentrate on what FAA considers the most
safety-critical activities.[Footnote 13] However, concerns about the
consistency and adequacy of designee oversight by FAA have been raised
by experts and other individuals we interviewed. For example, designees
and industry officials that we spoke with indicated that FAA's level of
oversight and interpretation of rules differ among regions and among
offices within a region, which limits FAA's assurance that designees'
work is performed uniformly in accordance with FAA's standards and
policy, the primary goal of which is the safety of U.S. aviation. To
improve management control of the designee programs, and thus increase
assurance that designees meet FAA's performance standards, we
recommended that FAA develop mechanisms to improve the compliance of
FAA program and field offices with existing policies. In response to
our recommendations, FAA has, among other things, established a
designee quality assurance office to address inconsistent and
nonstandard oversight issues among offices. FAA has also developed a
survey that will collect information from individuals who recently
worked with designees, such as pilots who recently received their
license through a designee, to gather information that can be used to
continually improve designee programs.
To increase FAA's assurance that its designees are meeting FAA's safety
standards, it will be important for FAA to continue these activities,
which are in the early stages of development or implementation,
especially as the agency moves to replace certain designee programs
with an organizational designation authorization (ODA). ODA would
expand the number and types of organizational designees and further
transform FAA's role to that of monitoring the performance of others.
In October 2005, FAA issued a final rule that established the ODA
program and provides for the phasing out of organizational designees by
November 2009. By that time, the current 218 organizational designees
will have to apply for and be granted status as an ODA.[Footnote 14] In
August 2006, FAA issued an order that establishes procedures for the
ODA program, including the capability to expand the activities that may
be delegated out. Under the program, FAA will focus on the performance
of organizations rather than the individuals within the organization
who carry out the delegated functions. As FAA makes these changes to
its designee programs that remove FAA from direct oversight of the
individuals performing the delegated activities, it will be important
for the agency to adhere to its policy of using designees only for less
safety-critical work. It will also be important for FAA to have the
data and evaluative processes, which we discuss later in this
testimony, to effectively monitor the new program.
FAA is also becoming increasingly removed from overseeing airline
maintenance. In recent years, in an attempt to reduce costs, airlines
have increasingly contracted out maintenance. For example in 2000, 44
percent of major air carriers' maintenance expenses were attributable
to outsourcing; in 2004, it had increased to 54 percent. However, FAA's
inspection activities have remained focused on air carriers' in-house
maintenance, according to DOT's Inspector General.[Footnote 15]
Enforcement Is an Important Element of FAA's Safety Oversight System,
but Deterrent Effect of Sanctions Is Unclear:
FAA's enforcement process, which is intended to ensure industry
compliance with safety regulations, is another important element of its
safety oversight system. FAA assesses legal sanctions against entities
or individuals that do not comply with aviation safety regulations.
Such sanctions are intended to deter future violations. However, we
found that the effect of FAA's legal sanctions on deterrence is
unclear, and that recommendations for sanctions are sometimes changed
on the basis of factors not associated with the merits of the
case.[Footnote 16] For fiscal years 1993 through 2003, attorneys in
FAA's Office of the Chief Counsel authorized a 52 percent reduction in
the civil monetary penalties assessed (from a total of $334 million to
$162 million). FAA officials told us the agency sometimes negotiate
lower fines, thereby reducing sanctions to close cases more quickly and
reduce FAA attorneys' caseloads. Economic literature on deterrence
suggests that although negative sanctions (such as fines and
certificate suspensions) can deter violations, if violators expect
sanctions to be reduced, they may have less incentive to comply with
regulations. In effect, it becomes more difficult to achieve the goal
of preventing future violations when the penalties for present
violations are lowered for reasons not related to the merits of the
case.
Recent changes that FAA has made to its enforcement program may lead to
more uniformly set fines and, thus, potentially less need to revise
fines. Prior to September 2005, the initial recommendation to use
administrative actions (such as warning notices and letter of
correction) or legal sanctions (such as fines or suspension of
operating certificates) was based on the judgment of the inspectors. If
inspectors recommended a legal sanction, they then consulted FAA's
sanction guidance policy to determine the amount of the proposed
penalty. In September 2005, FAA adopted changes to its enforcement
program that incorporated system safety risk management principles and
established explicit criteria for inspectors to use in making an
initial enforcement recommendation. As soon as FAA investigators have
gathered sufficient information to categorize the safety risk and the
conduct (i.e., whether it was intentional, reckless, or systemic), they
prepare a risk statement that describes the hazard created by the act
and the potential consequence of that hazard. An example of a risk
statement is "an aircraft that operates in Class B airspace without a
clearance providing separation from other aircraft could cause a mid-
air collision." The investigators then review the risk statement to
determine the severity of the hazard (using a scale of catastrophic,
critical, marginal, or negligible) and the likelihood of the worst
credible outcome (using a scale of frequent, occasional, or remote).
Based on these assessments, investigators apply a decision tool that
determines the type of action (legal or administrative) to take against
an individual or business. Inspectors no longer have the responsibility
of recommending a specific fine level. It is too early to determine if
these changes to the enforcement program have resulted in a more
uniform application of penalties and fewer penalty reductions.
Data Limitations and Lack of Evaluations Limit FAA's Ability to Manage
Risk and Are Particularly Critical as FAA's Oversight Becomes More
Indirect:
Effective processes for evaluating FAA's safety oversight programs,
along with accurate nationwide data on those programs would provide
FAA's program managers and other officials with assurance that the
programs are having their intended effect, especially as FAA's
oversight becomes more indirect. Such processes and data are also
important because FAA's workforce is dispersed worldwide--with
thousands of staff working out of more than 100 local offices--and
because FAA's use of a risk-based system safety approach represents a
cultural shift from its traditional inspection program. The experiences
of successful transformations and change management initiatives in
large public and private organizations suggest that it can take 5 to 7
years or more until such initiatives are fully implemented and cultures
are transformed in a sustainable manner. As a result, evaluation is
important to understanding if the cultural shift has effectively
occurred. Our most recent work has shown that FAA had not evaluated its
safety programs, and we recommended that the agency establish
continuous evaluative processes for the SEP program, designee programs,
industry partnership programs, and enforcement program. FAA has made
recent progress in implementing some of these recommendations. For
example, FAA has scheduled audits of all its designee programs, to be
completed by the end of fiscal year 2009, and established a delegation
steering group that first met in August 2006 and will be responsible
for agencywide monitoring of the designee programs for compliance with
program policies and evaluating the effectiveness of the designee
programs. Additionally, as FAA implements its new enforcement policy,
it has established procedures to monitor the new policy on a quarterly
basis and to recommend process improvements based on the information
collected. However, FAA does not plan to evaluate the SEP program
because it intends to discontinue the program after December 2007.
Yet, FAA's ability to evaluate its programs is hindered by its lack of
useful nationwide data. For example, we found that FAA's oversight of
designees was hampered, in part, by the limited information of
designee's performance contained in the various designee
databases.[Footnote 17] These databases contain descriptive information
on designees, such as their types of designations and status (i.e.,
active or terminated). More complete information would allow the agency
to gain a comprehensive picture of whether staff are carrying out their
responsibilities to oversee designees. To improve management control of
the designee programs, and thus increase assurance that designees meet
the agency's performance standards, we recommended that FAA improve the
consistency and completeness of information in the designee databases.
To address this recommendation, FAA has established the Designee
Integration User Group, which expects to begin work in September 2006
on an automated information tool that will track data on all designees.
We also found problems with the accuracy or completeness of data in the
SEP and enforcement programs, which FAA has recently taken steps to
begin addressing.
Training Is an Integral Part of FAA's Safety Oversight System, but
Several Actions Could Improve Results:
FAA's use of a risk-based system safety approach to inspections
requires inspectors to apply data analysis and auditing skills to
identify, analyze, assess, and control potential hazards and risks. To
effectively identify safety risks, inspectors must be well-trained in
the system-safety approach and have sufficient knowledge of
increasingly complex aircraft, aircraft parts, and systems. It is also
important that FAA's large cadre of designees is well-trained in
federal aviation regulations and FAA policies. FAA has made training an
integral part of its safety inspection system by establishing mandatory
training requirements for its workforce as well as designees. Although
FAA provides inspectors with extensive training in federal aviation
regulations; inspection and investigative techniques; and technical
skills, such as flight training for operations inspectors, we have
identified weaknesses with the training program. The agency provides
designees with an initial indoctrination that covers federal
regulations and agency policies, and refresher training every 2 to 3
years.
We have reported that FAA has generally followed effective management
practices for planning, developing, delivering, and assessing the
impact of its technical training[Footnote 18] for safety inspectors,
although some practices have yet to be fully implemented.[Footnote 19]
Appendix I describes the extent to which FAA follows effective
management practices in each of these four areas. Some examples follow:
* In developing its training curriculum for inspectors, FAA has
developed courses that support changes in inspection procedures
resulting from regulatory change or agency initiatives. On the other
hand, FAA develops technical courses on an ad hoc basis rather than as
part of an overall curriculum for each inspector specialty--such as air
carrier operations, maintenance, and cabin safety--because the agency
has not systematically identified the technical skills and competencies
each type of inspector needs to effectively perform inspections.
* In delivering training, FAA has established clear accountability for
ensuring that inspectors have access to technical training, has
developed a way for inspectors to choose courses that meet job needs
and further professional development, and offers a wide array of
technical and other courses. However, both FAA and its inspectors
recognize the need for more timely selection of inspectors for
technical training.
To address some of these issues, we recommended, among other things,
that FAA ensure that inspector technical training needs are identified
and met in a timely manner by systematically assessing inspectors'
technical training needs and better aligning the timeliness of training
to when inspectors need the training to do their jobs. In addition, we
have identified gaps in the training provided to SEP inspectors, and
have recommended that FAA improve inspectors' training in areas such as
system safety and risk management to ensure that these inspectors have
a complete and timely understanding of FAA's policies in these areas.
We identified similar competency gaps related to designee oversight.
For example, FAA does not require refresher training on how to oversee
designees, which increases the risk that inspectors do not retain the
information, skills, and competencies required to perform their
oversight responsibilities. We recommended that FAA provide additional
training for staff who directly oversee designees.
FAA has begun to address these recommendations. For example, FAA plans
to release five Web-based courses by the end of 2006, which will allow
the agency to provide training closer to the time that employees need
it. Also, FAA has instituted an electronic learning management system
that provides for employee input to their own learning plans. FAA has
also updated the SEP training course to reflect recent policy changes
that emphasize the importance of risk management. Finally, FAA has
begun developing a new designee oversight training course that is
planned to be ready by the summer of 2007.
It is important that FAA's inspection workforce, designees, and FAA-
certified aviation mechanics are knowledgeable about the latest
technology changes. While we did not attempt to assess the technical
proficiency that FAA's workforce requires and will require in the near
future, FAA officials said that inspectors do not need a substantial
amount of technical training courses because inspectors are hired with
a high degree of technical knowledge of aircraft and aircraft systems.
They further indicated that inspectors can sufficiently keep abreast of
many of the changes in aviation technology through FAA and industry
training courses and on-the-job training. Similarly, we did not
identify any specific gaps in the competencies of designees. However,
in its certification program for aviation mechanics, we found that FAA
standards for minimum requirements for aviation courses at FAA-approved
aviation maintenance technician schools and its requirements for FAA-
issued mechanics certificates do not keep abreast with the latest
technologies. In 2003, we reported that those standards had not been
updated in more than 50 years.[Footnote 20] We recommended that FAA
review the curriculum and certification requirements and update both.
In response to this recommendation, Vision 100--Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, which was passed December 12, 2003, required FAA
to update the standards 1 year after enactment of the law and to
conduct reviews and updates every 3 years after the initial update. FAA
issued an Advisory Circular in January 2005 that described suggested
curriculum changes; however, the agency has not updated the
certification requirements for mechanics.
FAA Faces a Number of Challenges in Overseeing Aviation Safety:
FAA faces a number of key safety challenges, including meeting its
performance target for commercial air carrier safety, which it will not
meet in fiscal year 2006 because of recent fatal accidents. With four
fatal commercial air carrier accidents in fiscal year 2006, the agency
will not meet its target of 0.018 fatal accidents per 100,000
departures.[Footnote 21] Moreover, for the past 3 years, FAA did not
meet its performance target for severe operational errors, which occur
when aircraft do not maintain safe distances in the air; as of June
2006, the agency was slightly below its target level of 4.27 severe
operational errors per million activities. In addition, although
general aviation accidents have, on the whole, decreased in recent
years, general aviation safety is also a concern because of the large
number of fatal accidents every year--an average of 334 fatal accidents
have occurred annually since 2000. Furthermore, other industry sectors,
such as cargo operations[Footnote 22] and on-demand air
ambulances,[Footnote 23] have poor safety records, as mentioned
earlier. It will be important for FAA to develop the appropriate
strategies to deal with the challenges posed by these safety records
and to continuously monitor safety information to identify trends and
early warnings of other safety problems.
Also as described earlier, FAA also faces a number of challenges to
several of its oversight programs. Specifically, FAA's rapid expansion
of ATOS, by transferring about 100 airlines and additional inspectors
to the program over about 2 years, will cause shifts in inspector
workload that may affect the agency's ability to oversee other parts of
the industry. Furthermore, some activities, such as FAA's creation of
ODAs and the trend for airlines to outsource maintenance, will remove
FAA from direct oversight. It will be important for FAA to have robust
data and continuous evaluative processes to monitor such activities and
program changes in order to ensure they are not having a negative
effect on safety.
Meeting the challenges posed by recent safety trends and program
changes will be exacerbated by other challenges in human capital
management; the acquisition and operation of new safety enhancing
technologies; and new types of vehicles, such as very light jets (VLJ),
that may place additional workload strains on FAA inspectors and air
traffic controllers.
FAA Faces Challenges in Human Resources:
FAA's ability to oversee aviation safety will be affected by recent and
anticipated trends in attrition of its inspectors compounded, in some
cases, by delays in hiring and increased workload. For example, for
fiscal years 2005 through 2010, FAA estimated that over 1,100 safety
inspectors who oversee commercial airlines and general aviation will
leave the agency, with an average loss due to attrition of about 195
inspectors per year. However, FAA's efforts to hire more inspectors
have been hindered by a budget situation in 2005 that resulted in a
hiring freeze during part of that year. During the hiring freeze, FAA
filled safety-critical positions, such as principal inspectors, through
internal appointments. As other safety inspectors left, they were not
replaced and their workload was divided among the remaining inspectors.
Concerned about the need for additional safety inspectors, for fiscal
year 2006, Congress provided additional funding over the budget request
to FAA with the expectation that the funding would increase the safety
staff by 248. This increase in funding would allow for hiring an
additional 182 safety inspectors in Aviation Flight Standards (AFS) and
an additional 66 inspectors and engineers in Aircraft Certification
Service (AIR). However, as a result of a rescission and unfunded pay
raises for fiscal year 2006, FAA lacks the funds to hire 67 staff of
the expected 248 new staff. As a result, FAA's revised hiring target is
139 AFS staff and 42 AIR staff. As of August 2006, FAA has hired an
additional 25 AFS and 28 AIR staff. (See fig. 3.) According to FAA, it
has a pipeline of applicants and expects to reach its goal of filling
the 181 slots by the end of the fiscal year. However, the actual number
of aviation safety inspector slots needed is unknown, because FAA lacks
staffing standards for safety inspectors. The National Academy of
Sciences, under a congressional mandate, has just completed a study for
FAA to estimate staffing standards for inspectors to ensure proper
oversight over the aviation industry.
Figure 3: Number of Additional Staff for AFS and AIR, Fiscal Year 2006:
Office: AFS;
Additional staff funded by Congress: 182;
FAA revised target: 139;
Hired as of August 2006: 25.
Office: AIR;
Additional staff funded by Congress: 66;
FAA revised target: 42;
Hired as of August 2006: 28.
Office: Total;
Additional staff funded by Congress: 248;
FAA revised target: 181;
Hired as of August 2006: 53.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA information.
[End of Figure]
During the coming decade, FAA will need to hire and train thousands of
air traffic controllers to replace those who will retire and leave for
other reasons. FAA estimates it will lose 10,291 controllers, or about
70 percent of the controller workforce, for fiscal years 2006 through
2015, primarily due to retirements.[Footnote 24] To replace these
controllers and to accommodate forecasted increases in air traffic and
expected productivity increases, FAA plans to hire a total of 11,800
new controllers over the next 10 years, or 1,180 per year, on
average.[Footnote 25] By the end of fiscal year 2006, FAA expects to
hire 930 controllers. As of August 2006, FAA had hired 920. Figure 4
shows the estimated losses each year as well as the number of planned
hires.
Figure 4: Estimated Controller Losses and Planned Hires, Fiscal Years
2006-2015:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: FAA.
[End of Figure]
Recent events may exacerbate the staffing situation. New data indicate
that controllers are retiring at a faster rate than FAA anticipated. In
its 2004 workforce report, FAA projected 341 retirements for fiscal
year 2005; 465 controllers actually retired--36 percent more than FAA's
estimate. In addition, a new contract with the air traffic controllers
union was recently implemented by FAA after lengthy negotiations. Under
this new contract, most current air traffic controllers would continue
to receive their existing base salaries and benefits, which may remove
a financial incentive to continue working past their retirement
eligibility date, while newly hired controllers would be hired at lower
wage rates, which may affect FAA's ability to hire new controllers. FAA
has maintained that this contract will result in significant cost
savings, freeing up resources for other critical agency needs. It is
too soon to know what effect, if any, the new contract may have on
retirement decisions.
In addition to the challenge of hiring large numbers of controllers,
FAA will face a challenge in training its new hires expeditiously so
that it can plan to have the right number of controllers in the right
facilities when they are needed. According to FAA, its ability to train
the new controllers depends upon several factors, including hiring a
relatively even number of controllers each year, reducing the time it
takes to hire a controller, and reducing the duration of training. FAA
estimates that because of the long training time, it must hire enroute
controllers[Footnote 26] an average of 3 to 5 years in advance of when
they are needed. FAA is taking actions to address these issues. For
example, in line with our recommendation, a recent change to the
training program allows individuals who complete collegiate
requirements under the Air Traffic Collegiate Training
Initiative[Footnote 27] to bypass the first 5 weeks of initial FAA
Academy training required for controllers.
FAA also faces the challenge of ensuring that control facilities have
adequate staffing based on their unique traffic demands and the
accuracy of FAA's retirement forecast. Historically, FAA has computed
staffing standards, which are the number of controllers needed on a
systemwide basis, but distribution of these totals to the facility
level was a negotiated process. The staffing standards did not take
into account the significant differences in complexity and workload
among FAA's 300 terminal and enroute control facilities, which can lead
to staffing imbalances. FAA has begun developing and implementing new
staffing standards that use an algorithm that incorporates traffic
levels and complexity of traffic at the facility level to determine the
number of controllers needed, according to an FAA official. As FAA
further refines its process for determining controller staffing needs,
the ultimate objective is to assess the traffic level and complexity on
a sector-by-sector basis to develop more accurate controller staffing
requirements.
FAA Faces Challenges in Implementing Advanced Technology to Increase
Air Traffic Safety:
To enhance runway safety, FAA intends to rely on new technologies--
beginning with the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) and
Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X)--that are expected
to reduce runway accidents.[Footnote 28] AMASS and ASDE-X are
instrumental in mitigating runway incursions and operational errors.
However, FAA faces challenges--such as a reduced number of airports
scheduled to receive the equipment, schedule delays, and cost
increases--that affect its reliance on the technologies.
FAA's original plans called for 34 airports to receive AMASS[Footnote
29] and 35 airports to receive ASDE-X (see app. II).[Footnote 30] In
total, 59 airports were to receive one or both technologies, but this
number was reduced to 44 in August 2006 after FAA canceled plans to
deploy ASDE-X at 15 of the originally scheduled airports. FAA plans to
take these 15 systems and upgrade certain airports that already have
AMASS based on the rationale that maximum benefit is achieved by
deploying ASDE-X to airports with larger traffic counts or more complex
operations. This decision leaves 15 airports (see fig. 5) that were
supposed to receive ASDE-X without either advanced technology system.
Since the anticipated future increase in air traffic from commuter
airlines and very light jets are likely to be at smaller airports that
lack the advanced technologies, it will be important for FAA to
periodically re-evaluate its deployment strategy.
Figure 5: Airports Scheduled to Receive ASDE-X before Deployment Was
Canceled by FAA:
List of airports:
Airport:
Albuquerque International Sunport Airport;
Austin-Bergstrom International Airport;
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport;
Port Columbus International Airport (Columbus, OH);
Colorado Springs Municipal Airport;
Indianapolis International Airport;
Metropolitan Oakland International Airport;
Ontario International Airport (Ontario, CA);
Raleigh-Durham International Airport;
Reno/Tahoe International Airport;
San Antonio International Airport;
San Jose International Airport;
San Juan International Airport;
Sacramento International Airport;
Tampa International Airport.
[End of Figure]
In addition to reducing the number of facilities selected to receive
the newer technology, FAA has amended the cost and extended the
implementation dates for the ASDE-X program (see fig. 6). The 35 ASDE-
X systems were originally scheduled to be implemented by 2007. As of
August 2006, FAA had moved that date to 2011. FAA estimates the total
facilities and equipment cost of the ASDE-X program at about $550
million, which is approximately $40 million more than we reported in
2005.[Footnote 31] The costs of these new technologies mean that they
may never be deployed at all airports; therefore, it will be important
for FAA to continue prioritizing and maximizing its resources.
Figure 6: Changes in Cost and Schedule Targets for ASDE-X:
Dollars in millions.
Cost Targets;
2001 estimate: $424.3;
2005 estimate: $510.2;
Current estimate, 2006: $549.8.
Last-site implementation targets;
2001 estimate: 2007;
2005 estimate: 2009;
Current estimate, 2006: 2011.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA information.
[End of Figure]
FAA Faces Challenges in Having Controllers Prepared for the Next
Generation Air Transportation System:
To ensure a national airspace system that is safe, efficient, and
capable of meeting a growing demand of air transportation that is
expected to triple by 2025, the Joint Planning and Development Office
(JPDO) was created within FAA to plan for and coordinate the longer-
term transformation to the "next generation air transportation system"
(NGATS). JPDO was created in 2003 to develop an integrated plan for
NGATS and to include in the plan, among other things, a description of
the demand and required performance characteristics of the future
system, as well as a high-level, multiagency road map and concept of
operations for the future system.
FAA and JPDO face the challenge of adequately involving stakeholders in
the development of NGATS to ensure that the system meets users' needs,
especially air traffic controllers who will be end users of the new
technology and responsible for using it to maximize safety and
efficiency. In the past, air traffic controllers were permanently
assigned to FAA's major system acquisition program offices and provided
input into air traffic control modernization projects. In June 2005,
FAA terminated this arrangement because of budget constraints.
According to FAA, it now plans to obtain the subject-matter expertise
of air traffic controllers or other stakeholders as needed in major
system acquisitions. It remains to be seen whether this approach will
be sufficient to avoid problems such as FAA experienced when inadequate
stakeholder involvement in the development of new air traffic
controller workstations (known as the Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System (STARS)) contributed to unplanned work, significant
cost growth, and schedule delays.[Footnote 32]
FAA's Inspector and Controller Workload Will Be Challenged by Emerging
Industries and Established Sectors That May Need More Safety Oversight:
The changing aviation landscape poses further challenges for FAA. It is
expected that within the next few years several hundred VLJs[Footnote
33] will be in operation. FAA estimates that if 2 percent of airline
passengers switch to VLJs, air traffic controllers will have to handle
three times more take-offs and landings than currently. Additionally,
the industry predicts there may be as many as 5,000 to 10,000 VLJs
operating in the national airspace system by 2020. VLJ manufacturers
are reporting advance sales of thousands of these new jets, their
customers include air taxis, charter operators, and private owners. In
July 2006, FAA granted the first provisional certificate for a VLJ to
Eclipse Aviation Corporation. The provisional certificate allows
existing planes to be flown, but new ones cannot be delivered to
customers until the FAA grants a type certificate. According to Eclipse
Aviation, it has orders for over 2,350 aircrafts. DayJet, which
provides on-demand jet service, expects to be operating 50 Eclipse VLJs
by the end of 2007. In September 2006, FAA granted the first type
certificate to Cessna Aircraft Company. (See fig. 7.) Five other
companies are in the process of being issued certificates by FAA. If
this sector expands as quickly as expected, FAA inspectors could face
workload challenges to expeditiously issue and monitor certificates. In
addition, air traffic controllers could face the challenge of further
congested air space, especially at and near smaller airports, where
VLJs are expected to be prevalent because of their smaller size and
shorter runway requirements.
Figure 7: Cessna's Citation Mustang VLJ:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: FAA.
[End of Figure]
Unmanned aerial vehicles[Footnote 34] (UAV) are another emerging sector
that will add to FAA's workload and may require additional FAA
expertise. While historically UAVs have been used primarily by the
Department of Defense in military settings outside the United States,
there is growing demand to operate UAVs domestically in the national
airspace system. (See fig. 8.) Federal agencies such as the Customs and
Border Protection Service and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
and state and local law enforcement agencies are interested in UAVs for
purposes such as border security, search and rescue, firefighting, and
other law enforcement and homeland security initiatives. Some of these
activities are taking place today. For example, Customs conducts
surveillance along the border with Mexico. UAVs are also an emerging
sector of the commercial aviation industry, and possible commercial
uses include fire detection and firefighting management, digital
mapping, communications and broadcast services, and environmental
research and air quality management control. Currently, few regulations
or guidelines exist for UAVs or UAV-related technology. FAA issues a
certificate of authorization for the operation of a UAV and the
airspace is restricted during the period of operation.[Footnote 35] In
2006, FAA has issue 62 certificates of authorization for UAVs and
another 35 applications are pending review. FAA is receiving numerous
inquiries from federal agencies, and from local, county, and state
governments about how to operate UAVs in the national airspace system.
FAA has established an Unmanned Aircraft Program Office, responsible
for developing the regulatory framework and plan for the safe
integration of UAVs into the national airspace system. FAA faces the
challenge of working with industry to develop consensus standards for
command and control redundancies in case there is a disruption in
communication with the UAV, and detect and avoid capabilities so that
UAVs can sense and avoid other aircraft. Such standards will be
necessary before UAVs can be routinely integrated into the national
airspace system. Until UAVs are completely integrated into the national
airspace system, FAA will continue to evaluate each flight on a case-
by-case basis, adding to the agency's workload.
Figure 8: U.S. Air Force's Global Hawk UAV:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: Department of Defense.
[End of Figure]
Space tourism is an additional emerging sector that FAA is beginning to
respond to. Tourist launches are expected to take place at inland
locations and may have more impact on the national airspace system than
previous unmanned commercial space launches, which occurred at federal
launch sites near or over oceans. While UAVs pose a learning curve for
safety inspectors, engineers, and air traffic controllers, space
tourism launches pose a learning curve for FAA's commercial space
engineers who are responsible for licensing and monitoring commercial
space launches and nonfederal launch sites (called spaceports). The
prospect for commercial space tourism materialized in 2004 when
SpaceShipOne, developed by Scaled Composites, flew to space twice,
achieving a peak altitude of about 70 miles to win the Ansari X
Prize.[Footnote 36] Several entrepreneurial launch companies are
planning to start taking paying passengers on suborbital flights within
the next few years. Virgin Galactic intends to enter commercial
suborbital space flight service around 2008, launching from a spaceport
in New Mexico, and according to the company, plans to carry 3,000
passengers over 5 years, with 100 individuals having already paid the
full fare of $200,000. Several other companies, including former Ansari
X Prize competitors, continue to develop their vehicles for space
tourism. Several spaceports are being developed to accommodate
anticipated commercial space tourism flights and are expanding the
nation's launch capacity. As of August 2006, the United States had
seven federal launch sites, and seven spaceports, and an additional
eight spaceports have been proposed (see fig. 9). We will be issuing a
report later this year on FAA's oversight of commercial space launches.
Figure 9: Existing and Proposed Federal and Nonfederal Spaceports in
the United States, April 2006:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: FAA; GAO.
[End of Figure]
FAA Needs to Retain Its Leadership Role in International Safety
Standard Setting:
Maintaining U.S. position as a global leader in aviation safety calls
for robust participation in the setting of international safety
standards. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a
United Nations organization, develops standards and recommended
practices for aviation safety and security for 188 member
states.[Footnote 37] In 2002, the Commission on the Future of the
United States Aerospace Industry[Footnote 38] reported that the United
States had not devoted enough resources to ICAO and was, therefore,
losing its position as the de facto standard setter. Furthermore, the
position of U.S. ambassador to ICAO, which was filled earlier this
year, had been vacant for more than a year, which may have affected the
U.S. impact on international aviation issues. To ensure that qualified
U.S. applicants apply for U.S. positions at ICAO, FAA has supported a
number of activities, including outreach efforts, incentive pay
programs, and a fellowship program that sends FAA employees to work at
ICAO for up to 12 months. However, as of December 2005, FAA had filled
only 13 of the 31 positions allocated to the United States at ICAO. FAA
faces difficulty in filling the allocated positions for reasons beyond
its control. For example, while FAA can recruit applicants, it does not
make the final hiring decisions. With unfilled positions at ICAO, it
will remain important for FAA to continue these efforts to enhance the
presence of the United States in the international aviation community.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L.
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making
key contributions to this testimony include Teresa Spisak, Jessica
Evans, Colin Fallon, David Hooper, and Rosa Leung.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Extent to Which FAA Follows Effective Management Practices
for Inspector Training:
Figure 10: Extent That FAA Follows Effective Management Practices in
Planning Technical Training:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of Figure]
Figure 11: Extent That FAA Follows Effective Management Practices in
Developing Technical Training:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[A] This management practice is not specifically identified in our
assessment guide. However, a management approach that assesses training
needs holistically rather than on a course-by-course basis can provide
for a more systematic assessment of whether and how training will help
meet organizational needs.
[End of Figure]
Figure 12: Extent That FAA Follows Effective Management Practices in
Delivering Technical Training:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of Figure]
Figure 13: Extent That FAA Followed Effective Management Practices in
Evaluating Its Training Program:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of Figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Deployment of Surface Detection Equipment at Airports:
Figure 14: Airports with Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS):
[See PDF for Image]
Source: FAA.
[End of Figure]
Figure 15: Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X)
Deployment Sites:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: FAA.
[End of Figure]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Oversight System Is Effective but Could
Benefit from Better Evaluation of Its Programs' Performance. GAO-06-
266T. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005.
Aviation Safety: System Safety Approach Needs Further Integration into
FAA's Oversight of Airlines. GAO-05-726. Washington, D.C.: September
28, 2005.
Aviation Safety: FAA Management Practices for Technical Training Mostly
Effective; Further Actions Could Enhance Results. GAO-05-728.
Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005.
Aviation Safety: Oversight of Foreign Code-Share Safety Program Should
Be Strengthened. GAO-05-930. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2005.
Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Strengthen the Management of Its Designee
Programs. GAO-05-40. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2004.
Aviation Safety: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Improve FAA's
Safety Enforcement and Compliance Efforts. GAO-04-646. Washington,
D.C.: July 6, 2004.
Aviation Safety: Information on FAA's Data on Operational Errors at Air
Traffic Control Towers. GAO-03-1175R. Washington, D.C.: September 23,
2003.
Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Update the Curriculum and Certification
Requirements for Aviation Mechanics. GAO-03-317. Washington, D.C.:
March 6, 2003.
Aviation Safety: FAA and DOD Response to Similar Safety Concerns. GAO-
02-77. Washington. D.C.: January 22, 2002.
Aviation Safety: Safer Skies Initiative Has Taken Initial Steps to
Reduce Accident Rates by 2007. GAO/RCED-00-111. Washington, D.C.: June
30, 2000.
(540136):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Other industry partnership programs include the Aviation Safety
Action Program, which allows for the self-reporting of safety incidents
by employees of air carriers and repair stations; the Aviation Safety
Reporting Program, which allows any participant in the national
airspace system, such as air traffic controllers, pilots, and flight
attendants, to self-report safety incidents; and the Flight Operation
Quality Assurance Program, whose participant airlines equip their
aircraft to record flight data, which the airlines analyze for safety
trends that are provided to FAA.
[2] The remaining approximately 1,500 inspectors oversee general
aviation.
[3] As of June 2006. This number includes about 2,380 traffic
management coordinators and operations supervisors.
[4] A runway incursion is any occurrence at an airport involving an
aircraft, vehicle, person or object on the ground that creates a
collision hazard or results in a loss of separation with an aircraft
taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land.
[5] In December 2005, a Southwest Airlines airplane slid off a runway
at Chicago's Midway Airport, went through a barrier fence and onto a
roadway, killing a passenger in a passing automobile. Also in December
2005, a Chalk's Ocean Airways aircraft experienced an in-flight breakup
shortly after takeoff in Miami, resulting in 20 fatalities. On January
16, 2006, a Continental Airlines ground worker was fatally injured in
El Paso, Texas. In August 2006, a Comair flight crashed while
attempting take-off from the Lexington, Kentucky, airport, resulting in
49 fatalities.
[6] FAA's performance target for fiscal year 2006 is 0.018 fatal
accidents per 100,000 departures over the last 3 years.
[7] According to FAA, accidents impacting a single person, although
they may be serious, are isolated to ground workers or a single
passenger who may walk into a propeller or who may fall while boarding
or deplaning. Removing these isolated risk accidents from the data
helps achieve a more informative comparison of accident data, according
to the agency.
[8] Comprehensive activity data regarding emergency medical services
operations (for example, exposure rates and missions flown) are limited
because the sources for these data are generally poor. Therefore,
accident rates cannot be calculated.
[9] An operational error is a violation of FAA separation standards
that define minimum safe distances between aircraft, between aircraft
and other physical structures, and between aircraft and otherwise
restricted airspace.
[10] GAO, Aviation Safety: System Safety Approach Needs Further
Integration into FAA's Oversight of Airlines, GAO-05-726 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 28, 2005).
[11] The airlines are Champion, American Eagle, ExpressJet, and
SkyWest.
[12] For example, we found that when Champion Airlines became part of
ATOS in January 2005, FAA has, in this one case, revised its procedures
to allow the Northwest Airlines inspection team to share its data
analyst and manager with the Champion inspection team.
[13] GAO, Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Strengthen the Management of
Its Designee Programs, GAO-05-40 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004).
[14] Examples of companies that are organizational designees include
Boeing, Gulfstream, United Airlines, and Continental Airlines, as well
as smaller companies.
[15] DOT Inspector General, Air Carriers' Use of Aircraft Repair
Stations (Washington, D.C; July 8, 2003).
[16] GAO, Aviation Safety: Better Management Controls Are Needed to
Improve FAA's Safety Enforcement and Compliance Efforts, GAO-04-646
(Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2004).
[17] These databases are the Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem,
National Vital Information Subsystem, Designee Information Network, and
Airmen Medical Certification Information Subsystem.
[18] We define technical training as training in aviation technologies.
FAA includes in its definition of technical training topics such as
system safety and risk analysis, inspector job skills, data analysis,
and training in software packages.
[19] GAO, Aviation Safety: FAA Management Practices for Technical
Training Mostly Effective; Further Actions Could Enhance Results, GAO-
05-728 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005). We compared FAA's management
of its inspector technical training efforts with effective management
practices in GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic
Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2004).
[20] GAO, Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Update the Curriculum and
Certification Requirements for Aviation Mechanics, GAO-03-317
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2003).
[21] After a fourth fatal accident occurred in August 2006, FAA
estimated that 0.023 fatal accidents per 100,000 departures had
occurred over the last 3 years. Since the fatal accident rate is small
and could significantly fluctuate from year to year due to a single
accident, FAA's performance measure is a 3-year average, which helps to
smooth the fluctuation that may occur in any given year.
[22] The risk factors that may affect the safety record of cargo
carriers include operating a large number of flights at night and the
age of cargo aircraft. FAA estimates the median age of in-service
passenger jets was 6.25 years, compared with the median age of cargo
jets of over 25 years.
[23] We have ongoing work for this subcommittee that is examining in
detail FAA's oversight of air ambulances.
[24] The high percentage of retirements is attributable to the 1981
controller strike, when President Ronald Reagan fired over 10,000 air
traffic controllers, and the consequent need to quickly rebuild the
controller workforce. From 1982 through 1991, FAA hired an average of
2,655 controllers per year. These controllers will become eligible for
retirement during the next decade.
[25] FAA, A Plan for the Future, 2006-2015 (Washington, D.C.: June
2006).
[26] Enroute air traffic controllers issue clearances and instructions
for airborne aircraft.
[27] To bypass initial Academy training, individuals must have
successfully completed an aviation-related program of study from a
school under FAA's collegiate training initiative program. FAA has
agreements with 13 schools for this program.
[28] AMASS processes data from Airport Surface Detection Equipment
Model 3 (ASDE-3) systems and uses visual and sound signals to warn
controllers of potential conflicts between arriving aircraft, and
aircraft and vehicles on the ground. ASDE-X is the upgraded digitally
based technology that enables air traffic controllers to detect
potential runway conflicts by providing detailed coverage of movement
on runways and taxiways. Both systems warn the controllers of potential
incursions. Among the systems, only ASDE-X works in poor weather
conditions.
[29] By December 2003, FAA had installed AMASS at the 34 airports.
[30] Ten airports that were scheduled to receive ASDE-X already had
AMASS.
[31] GAO, National Airspace System: FAA Has Made Progress but Continues
to Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic Control Systems, GAO-
05-331 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).
[32] GAO-05-331.
[33] Very light jets are jet aircraft weighing 10,000 pounds or less
maximum certificated take-off weight and certificated for single pilot
operations. Aircraft possess at least some of the following features:
(1) advanced cockpit automation, such as moving map GPS and
multifunction displays; (2) automated engine and systems management;
and (3) integrated auto-flight, autopilot and flight-guidance systems.
[34] Unmanned aerial vehicles do not carry a human operator; they are
either programmed for autonomous flight (called a "drone") or are flown
remotely by a ground operator.
[35] A certificate of authorization allows an operator to use defined
airspace for a specified time (up to one year, in some cases) and
includes special provisions unique to each operation. For instance, a
certificate may include a requirement to operate only under visual
flight rules.
[36] The X Prize Foundation was established in 1995 to award $10
million to the first team to launch a suborbital reusable launch
vehicle capable of carrying three people to an altitude of 70 miles,
return safely to Earth, and repeat the exercise within 2 weeks using
the same vehicle. Twenty-seven teams from seven countries competed.
[37] ICAO also addresses issues such as air navigation, airspace
capacity, and environmental concerns such as engine noise and
emissions.
[38] Final Report of the Commission on the Future of the United States
Aerospace Industry (Arlington, Va; November 2002).
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