Railroad Bridges and Tunnels
Federal Role in Providing Safety Oversight and Freight Infrastructure Investment Could Be Better Targeted
Gao ID: GAO-07-770 August 6, 2007
Freight railroads account for over 40 percent (by weight) of the nation's freight on a privately owned network that was largely built almost 100 years ago and includes over 76,000 railroad bridges and over 800 tunnels. As requested, GAO provides information on this infrastructure, addressing (1) the information that is available on the condition of railroad bridges and tunnels and on their contribution to railroad congestion, (2) the federal role in overseeing railroad bridge and tunnel safety, (3) the current uses of public funds for railroad infrastructure investments, and (4) criteria and a framework for guiding any future federal role in freight infrastructure investments. GAO reviewed federal bridge safety guidelines and reports, conducted site visits, and interviewed federal, state, railroad, and other officials.
Little information is publicly available on the condition of railroad bridges and tunnels and on their contribution to congestion because the railroads consider this information proprietary and share it with the federal government selectively. Major (Class I) railroads maintain detailed repair and inspection information, while other (Class II and III) railroads vary, from keeping detailed records, to lacking basic condition information. Despite their age, bridges and tunnels are not the main cause of congestion, although some do constrain capacity. Because bridge and tunnel work is costly, railroads typically make other investments to improve mobility first. The federal role in overseeing the safety of railroad bridges and tunnels is limited because the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has determined that most railroads are sufficiently ensuring safe conditions. FRA has issued bridge management guidelines, makes structural observations, and may take enforcement actions to address structural problems. However, FRA bridge specialists use their own, not a systematic, consistent, risk-based, methodology to select smaller railroads for safety surveys and therefore may not target the greatest safety threats. Federal funds are used to meet many different goals, but are not invested under any comprehensive national freight strategy, nor are the public benefits they generate aligned with any such strategy. Some state investments are structured to produce state and local economic and safety benefits, and public-private partnerships have facilitated investments designed to produce public and private benefits. GAO has identified critical questions that can serve as criteria for reexamining the federal role in freight investments--including railroad bridge and tunnel investments--and a framework for implementing that role that includes identifying national goals, clarifying stakeholder roles, and ensuring that revenue sources and funding mechanisms achieve maximum national public benefits. The Department of Transportation's draft Framework for a National Freight Policy takes a step forward, but more is needed to guide the implementation of a federal role in freight transportation investments.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
Phone:
GAO-07-770, Railroad Bridges and Tunnels: Federal Role in Providing Safety Oversight and Freight Infrastructure Investment Could Be Better Targeted
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-07-770
entitled 'Railroad Bridges and Tunnels: Federal Role in Providing
Safety Oversight and Freight Infrastructure Investment Could Be Better
Targeted' which was released on August 30, 2007.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2007:
Railroad Bridges And Tunnels:
Federal Role in Providing Safety Oversight and Freight Infrastructure
Investment Could Be Better Targeted:
Railroad Bridges and Tunnels:
GAO-07-770:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-770, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
Freight railroads account for over 40 percent (by weight) of the
nation‘s freight on a privately owned network that was largely built
almost 100 years ago and includes over 76,000 railroad bridges and over
800 tunnels. As requested, GAO provides information on this
infrastructure, addressing (1) the information that is available on the
condition of railroad bridges and tunnels and on their contribution to
railroad congestion, (2) the federal role in overseeing railroad bridge
and tunnel safety, (3) the current uses of public funds for railroad
infrastructure investments, and (4) criteria and a framework for
guiding any future federal role in freight infrastructure investments.
GAO reviewed federal bridge safety guidelines and reports, conducted
site visits, and interviewed federal, state, railroad, and other
officials
What GAO Found:
Little information is publicly available on the condition of railroad
bridges and tunnels and on their contribution to congestion because the
railroads consider this information proprietary and share it with the
federal government selectively. Major (Class I) railroads maintain
detailed repair and inspection information, while other (Class II and
III) railroads vary, from keeping detailed records, to lacking basic
condition information. Despite their age, bridges and tunnels are not
the main cause of congestion, although some do constrain capacity.
Because bridge and tunnel work is costly, railroads typically make
other investments to improve mobility first.
The federal role in overseeing the safety of railroad bridges and
tunnels is limited because FRA has determined that most railroads are
sufficiently ensuring safe conditions. FRA has issued bridge management
guidelines, makes structural observations, and may take enforcement
actions to address structural problems. However, FRA bridge specialists
use their own, not a systematic, consistent, risk-based, methodology to
select smaller railroads for safety surveys and therefore may not
target the greatest safety threats.
Federal funds are used to meet many different goals, but are not
invested under any comprehensive national freight strategy, nor are the
public benefits they generate aligned with any such strategy. Some
state investments are structured to produce state and local economic
and safety benefits, and public-private partnerships have facilitated
investments designed to produce public and private benefits.
GAO has identified critical questions that can serve as criteria for
reexamining the federal role in freight investments”including railroad
bridge and tunnel investments”and a framework for implementing that
role that includes identifying national goals, clarifying stakeholder
roles, and ensuring that revenue sources and funding mechanisms achieve
maximum national public benefits. The Department of Transportation‘s
draft Framework for a National Freight Policy takes a step forward, but
more is needed to guide the implementation of a federal role in freight
transportation investments.
Figure: FRA Bridge Safety Survey and Double-Stack Train in Modified
Tunnel.
Source: left to right: GAO and BNSF Railway 9 (used with permission).
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOT (1) develop a systematic, risk-based
methodology for selecting railroads for bridge safety surveys and (2)
ensure that its Framework for a National Freight Policy identifies
national goals, stakeholder roles, and funding mechanisms and revenue
sources to maximize the national public benefits of federal freight
infrastructure investments. DOT agreed with the first recommendation
and said that it would consider the second recommendation.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-770].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact JayEtta Z. Hecker at
(202) 512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Little Information Is Publicly Available on Bridge and Tunnel
Conditions and Congestion, Although Major Railroads Collect, Maintain,
and Use This Information to Prioritize Investments:
The Federal Role in Overseeing Railroad Bridge and Tunnel Safety Is
Limited:
Federal Investments in Freight Railroad Infrastructure Are Typically
Not Targeted to Maximize National Benefits, Whereas Some State and
Private Investments Are Strategically Targeted:
Federal Funding for Freight Railroad Infrastructure Is Not Guided by a
National Freight Strategy and Is Generally Not Targeted to Maximize
National Benefits:
Examining Critical Questions and Implementing a Framework That
Identifies Goals, Stakeholder Roles, Revenue Sources, and Funding
Mechanisms Could Guide a Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure
Investments:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Examples of Bridge and Tunnel Maintenance, Component and
Structural Replacement Costs on Selected Railroads:
Appendix III: Considerations of Funding Sources and Mechanisms
Available for Federal Funding of Freight-Related Infrastructure:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Examples of Federal Funding Mechanisms That Support Freight
Railroad Infrastructure:
Table 2: GAO's Critical Factors and Questions for Determining the
Appropriateness of a Federal Role in Freight-Related Transportation:
Table 3: Three Components of GAO's Framework Applied to Federal
Involvement in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investments:
Table 4: Names and Headquarters Locations of Entities Contacted:
Figures:
Figure 1: Annual Train-Miles per Track-Mile for Class I Railroads, 1978
to 2004:
Figure 2: Class I Railroad Annual Ton-Miles per Route-Mile Owned:
Figure 3: Howard Street Tunnel (Baltimore, Maryland) West entrance
(left) and East entrance:
Figure 4: Range of Railroad Infrastructure Improvement Costs (Dollars
in thousands per linear foot):
Figure 5: Structural Failure of a Bridge in Mississippi:
Figure 6: Barge Navigating through the Narrow Channel of a Moveable
Railroad Bridge Eligible for Truman-Hobbs Funding on the Mississippi
River in Iowa:
Figure 7: Kansas City Flyovers:
Abbreviations:
AAR: Association of American Railroads:
AASHTO: American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials:
ASLRRA: American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association:
CBO: Congressional Budget Office:
CREATE: Chicago Region Environmental and Transportation Efficiency:
program:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FHWA: Federal Highway Administration:
FRA: Federal Railroad Administration:
RRIF: Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing:
STRACNET: Strategic Rail Corridor Network:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 6, 2007:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Chairman:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Ranking Republican Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings:
House of Representatives:
Freight railroads have been an important part of the U.S.
transportation network for over 150 years and account for over 40
percent of the ton-miles[Footnote 1] of the intercity freight
transported in the United States. Much of the current U.S. freight
railroad network was originally built by private corporations in the
late 1800s and early 1900s and is still privately owned, including most
of the nation's over 76,000 railroad bridges and over 800 railroad
tunnels. While many parts of the railroad infrastructure, such as
signals and track, have been replaced and upgraded, bridges and
tunnels, which are the single most expensive railroad infrastructure
components, have not been replaced and are still being used, some long
after their originally predicted useful life. In the future, however,
with projected increases in railroad traffic and further aging, these
expensive components may need replacement, presenting funding
challenges to private railroads.
This report responds to your request for information on issues related
to bridges and tunnels on the national freight railroad network.
Specifically, this report addresses the following questions:
(1) What information is available on the condition of railroad bridges
and tunnels and on the contribution of this infrastructure to railroad
network congestion?
(2) What is the federal role in overseeing railroad bridge and tunnel
safety?
(3) How are public funds currently used for freight railroad
infrastructure capital investments, including those for bridges and
tunnels?
(4) What criteria and framework could be used to guide the future
federal role, if any, in freight-related capital investments, including
those for railroad bridges and tunnels?
Our overall approach to addressing these topics was to (1) review
federal legislation, regulations, and guidance; transportation planning
literature; and forecasts of future freight railroad demand and
capacity from private railroads, public agencies, and industry
organizations; (2) interview a wide variety of representatives; and (3)
review pertinent documentation from railroads of various sizes;
federal, regional, state, and local governments; and industry groups.
In particular, we interviewed representatives from six Class I
railroads, two Class II railroads, and nine Class III
railroads.[Footnote 2] At the federal and state levels, we interviewed
officials from six federal agencies that have some relationship dealing
with railroad bridges and tunnels on the freight railroad network--
including officials in the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA), which has primary responsibility for
overseeing the safety of the nation's freight railroad network--as well
as officials in nine state DOTs. We selected the railroads and the
state and local government agencies for interviews to include a cross
section of characteristics, including geographic diversity, the
presence of noteworthy public-private partnerships between the
railroads and government agencies, and state DOTs that actively
participated in planning or funding railroad infrastructure projects.
We conducted our review from June 2006 through July 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix I
for further details about our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
Little information is publicly available on the condition of railroad
bridges and tunnels, and on their contribution to congestion, but
private freight railroads collect and maintain this information to
varying degrees and use it to set investment priorities. This
information will be increasingly important to the railroads as the
demand for freight transportation grows, aggravating existing freight
railroad congestion problems and further straining the railroads'
infrastructure, which includes aging and expensive bridges and tunnels.
Class I freight railroads collect and maintain detailed information on
the condition of their bridges and tunnels--including inspection
reports, condition information, structural ratings, design drawings,
and maintenance and repair histories--and on the extent to which these
structures contribute to network congestion. Class II and III railroads
vary in the amount of information they collect and maintain on their
bridges and tunnels, with some maintaining the same level of detailed
information as the Class I railroads and others lacking the information
needed to produce a complete list of their bridges, having no
maintenance records, and keeping inaccurate or incomplete records of
inspection, according to our review of FRA records. Freight railroads
of all classes view condition and congestion information as proprietary
and share it with the federal government selectively; and the
government plays a limited role in collecting such information because
there are no FRA regulations governing railroad bridges and tunnels.
Furthermore, according to FRA's Chief Structural Engineer, the expense
of collecting and maintaining the information may not be justified by
the potential safety benefits. While most bridges and tunnels are not
the main cause of freight railroad congestion, some structures are
chokepoints and do constrain capacity. For example, opening a movable
bridge operated by a Class I railroad over the Mississippi River for
more than an hour during peak periods can delay that railroad's traffic
all the way to the West Coast. Freight railroads use bridge and tunnel
condition and network congestion information, along with other
information, to set investment priorities to generate the greatest
private return on their investment. According to several Class I
railroad representatives, railroad bridge replacement typically has a
lower rate of return on investment, making it more likely that
railroads would invest in other enhancements before rehabilitation or
replacement of railroad bridges.
The federal role in overseeing railroad bridge and tunnel safety is
limited because FRA has determined that railroads responsible for
bridges and tunnels are sufficiently ensuring these structures'
stability. Historically, FRA track personnel have provided bridge and
tunnel safety oversight. Under the authority originally granted by the
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, FRA has the authority to enforce
railroad safety; and in the 1970s and early 1980s, FRA had considered
issuing bridge safety regulations. However, FRA determined that
railroads were already inspecting bridges using industry standards. As
a result, in 1995 FRA decided to issue guidelines instead of
regulations to guide railroad bridge management programs, and hired
bridge specialists to make observations about bridge and tunnel
conditions under these guidelines. If FRA identifies a structural
concern, it attempts to work cooperatively with the railroad and takes
enforcement action only if there is an immediate concern for safety.
Other federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast
Guard, also have limited roles in railroad bridge and tunnel safety
related to their particular missions. FRA bridge specialists have
conducted safety surveys of all seven Class I railroads' bridge
management programs and assessed those programs using FRA guidelines.
These specialists also conduct 25 to 35 safety surveys per year of
Class II and III railroads, covering a small portion of the nation's
549 Class II and III railroads. The specialists use their own criteria
to select these railroads. FRA has not established a systematic,
consistent risk-based methodology for selecting the Class II and III
railroads for bridge safety surveys; and as a result, FRA may not be
targeting those whose bridges or tunnels are most likely to present
safety risks. We are therefore recommending that FRA implement such a
methodology for selecting Class II and III railroads for bridge safety
surveys. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOT and FRA officials
agreed with the need for a consistent, risk-based selection
methodology; and FRA officials noted that it had already begun to
implement our recommendation.
Public funds may currently be used for a variety of capital investments
in freight railroad infrastructure, including bridges and tunnels, but
federal investments are typically not targeted to maximize national
public benefits, whereas some state and public-private partnership
investments are strategically targeted to achieve specific state,
local, and private benefits. Overall, the current federal investment in
freight railroad infrastructure is small compared with the railroads'
own investment. For example, in calendar year 2006, Class I, II, and
III railroads invested an estimated $9 billion in freight railroad
infrastructure while the federal government provided an estimated $263
million during fiscal year 2006. A number of federal agencies make
federal funding available for freight-related infrastructure projects
through different funding mechanisms to achieve certain transportation
goals. However, the extent to which these mechanisms have been used for
freight railroad infrastructure is generally limited, and much of the
funding has gone for projects that primarily benefit localities or
regions, such as railroad-highway grade crossing improvements or
infrastructure improvements for Class II and III railroads, rather than
projects that would maximize national public benefits, such as capacity-
enhancing improvements to bridges and tunnels on major freight routes.
DOT has taken an important step toward targeting federal freight-
related transportation investments by issuing a draft Framework for a
National Freight Policy;[Footnote 3] however, the objectives of this
framework are not always clear, and the document does not explicitly
identify criteria for federal investment, opportunities to incentivize
more private investment, or opportunities to leverage private and other
public funds to add freight transportation capacity. At the state
level, some states target investments in freight railroad
infrastructure to produce various state and local benefits. For
example, the Kansas DOT administers a loan program for short
line[Footnote 4] railroads in the state that haul locally produced
agricultural products. Public-private partnerships have also
facilitated investments designed to produce both public and private
benefits. Although the current federal investment in freight railroad
infrastructure is relatively small, growing congestion--resulting from
the aging of the nation's freight transportation infrastructure and
projected increases in demand for freight transportation--is expected
to spur calls for a greater federal role in freight transportation,
especially greater federal funding for freight-related infrastructure
such as expensive railroad bridges and tunnels that constrain capacity
on key freight routes. Federal funding is, however, constrained by the
nation's long-term fiscal imbalance; and, as we have reported, federal
funding mechanisms favor truck and marine transport over railroad
transport and distort competition in freight transportation.
In our past work reexamining the federal role in transportation and
other policy areas, we identified a number of critical factors and
questions--involving the relevance and purpose of the federal role,
performance measurement, targeting of benefits, affordability, and cost
effectiveness--that could be used as criteria to examine the future
federal role in freight-related transportation investments, including
investments in railroad bridges and tunnels.[Footnote 5] These factors
underscore the need for a federal role that promotes equitable, mode-
neutral investments of scarce federal funds in projects designed to
achieve national goals and produce national benefits. While DOT's draft
Framework represents an important step toward determining the federal
role in freight transportation, it lacks several components that we
have identified as key to such an approach, including setting national
goals for federal investment in freight-related infrastructure across
all modes; clearly defining federal and other stakeholder roles; and
identifying cost-effective revenue sources and funding mechanisms that
can be applied to maximize the national benefits of federal
investments.[Footnote 6] Accordingly, we are recommending that DOT
ensure that its draft Framework includes clear national goals,
establishes roles, and identifies funding mechanisms for federal
freight-related infrastructure investments, including freight railroad
investments. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOT officials
said they are considering this recommendation.
Background:
Currently, seven Class I railroads own and maintain over 61,000 bridges
and over 800 tunnels, and 40 Class II and 509 Class III railroads own
and maintain over 15,000 bridges.[Footnote 7] According to FRA
documents, in 2002, the U.S. railroad network contained approximately
one bridge for every 1.4 miles of track. Class I railroads operate on
approximately 70 percent of the total route miles in the United States
and generate 90 percent of total railroad revenues. Class II and III
railroads also play a critical role in the national freight railroad
network, serving as feeders to Class I main lines. According to the
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), Class
II and III railroads handle one out of every four carloads moved on the
U.S. freight railroad system.
Between 1978 and 2004, railroad traffic on Class I railroads increased
dramatically while the number of railroad track miles decreased, as
evidenced by an increase in the ratio of train-miles to track-miles
(see fig. 1).[Footnote 8] In addition, freight volumes increased, as
evidenced by a 105 percent increase in ton-miles per route-
mile[Footnote 9] since 1990, from 8.63 million in 1990 to 17.70 million
in 2005 (see fig. 2). These changes have focused more and heavier
traffic over fewer core lines, thereby increasing both the strain on
and the importance of key bridges and tunnels, such as those over the
Mississippi River and underneath Baltimore.
Figure 1: Annual Train-Miles per Track-Mile for Class I Railroads, 1978
to 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Class I Railroad Annual Ton-Miles per Route-Mile Owned:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Association of American Railroads (AAR).
[End of figure]
Bridges and tunnels on the freight railroad network are aging and are
susceptible to a variety of conditions that may cause wear or
deterioration. Railroad bridges are constructed from timber, steel,
masonry or concrete, or a combination of these materials. According to
an FRA bridge survey completed in 1993, more than half of the nation's
railroad bridges were built before 1920.[Footnote 10] This survey,
which FRA's Chief Structural Engineer told us is largely applicable
today, found that 36 percent of railroad bridges were made of timber,
32 percent of steel, and 20 percent of masonry; the remaining 12
percent of bridges were not identified by bridge type. Increased weight
and traffic can cause fatigue in timber and steel bridges. Timber
bridges are also susceptible to decay from weather and insects, and
steel bridges near salt water may be susceptible to high rates of
corrosion. Masonry bridges are more vulnerable to the effects of time
and nature than to the weight of traffic, but reinforced concrete
bridges are susceptible to the effects of traffic loads. According to
FRA, from 1998 through 2006 a total of 22 train accidents, involving
one injury and no fatalities, were attributed to bridge structural
failures. The most recent fatality resulting from a bridge structural
failure occurred in 1957. Likewise, very few major railroad tunnels
have been built within the last 50 years, according to FRA's Chief
Structural Engineer, although some have undergone maintenance or
capacity expansion in recent years. Some tunnels are driven directly
through rock; some are lined with brick or stone masonry, concrete, or
timber; and many tunnels include two or more types of construction.
Tunnels do not take stress from train traffic in the same way that
bridges do, but they are susceptible to drainage issues, and timber-
lined tunnels are particularly susceptible to fires. According to FRA,
from 1982 through 2006 there were five reportable train accidents whose
cause could have been related to the tunnel structure. One of these
accidents resulted in two injuries, and none of the accidents resulted
in a fatality.
Many railroad bridges and tunnels were designed to have long useful
life-spans, but were built for use by different types of trains. Until
recent years, stress from locomotives and cars did not exceed the
original design loads for bridges. For example, steel bridges built
between 1895 and 1916 were engineered for steam locomotives that
inflicted greater stress on bridges than today's locomotives. However,
because of their increased weight, freight cars are approaching the
design load limits of older bridges. Railcar weight standards have
increased from 263,000 pounds to 286,000 pounds, and some cars now
weigh as much as 315,000 pounds; however, approximately 45 percent of
Class II and III railroad lines are not equipped with track capable of
handling 286,000 pound cars, according to ASLRRA. In addition, freight
cars have increased in height as increased intermodal freight traffic
has led to double-stacking intermodal containers on railroad cars. Some
bridges and tunnels do not have the clearance needed to accommodate
these double-stack intermodal trains.
The majority of the freight railroad network is privately owned, and
federal economic regulation of freight railroads has decreased since
the federal government deregulated the railroad industry in 1980. All
seven Class I railroads are privately owned, and according to ASLRRA,
approximately 95 percent of Class II and III railroads are privately
owned, with the rest owned by government entities. Private railroads
have an incentive to maintain their infrastructure in order to maintain
business operations, and most railroads privately finance their
infrastructure maintenance and improvement projects.
Railroads invest large amounts in fixed assets such as track, signals,
bridges, and tunnels. The Association of American Railroads (AAR)
estimates that in calendar year 2006 Class I railroads alone invested
over $8 billion in "capital commitments," that is, expenditures for
capital projects and operating leases. Compared with other industries,
railroads invest a higher percentage of revenue in their
infrastructure. For example, in 2000, the average U.S. manufacturer
spent 3.7 percent of revenue on capital spending, while railroads spent
17.8 percent--almost five times as much, according to an analysis of
U.S. Census data prepared by the American Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO).[Footnote 11] As railroads take
steps to increase their capacity--by increasing the size or weight of
railroad cars or by adding track--some of their bridges and tunnels may
require alterations. A bridge's configuration and condition dictates
weight restrictions, and most bridges and tunnels cannot accommodate
the additional track, if needed, without replacement or significant
reconstruction. Similarly, the dimensions of some bridges and tunnels
restrict railroad car height and width. Because bridges and tunnels are
the most expensive pieces of railroad infrastructure, with replacement
and construction costs ranging from 11 to 550 times as much per linear
foot as regular track, capacity expansion projects involving bridge and
tunnel work require significant capital investment.
While the freight railroad industry is projected to grow substantially
with expected increases in freight traffic, the industry's ability to
fund this projected growth, including making needed capital
infrastructure investments in railroad bridges and tunnels, is largely
uncertain. For private companies seeking to maximize returns to
stakeholders, railroad investment poses a substantial risk. A railroad
contemplating an infrastructure investment must be confident that the
market demand for that infrastructure will hold up for 30 to 50 years.
Furthermore, while railroads own and maintain their own infrastructure,
some other modes of transportation, such as the trucking and maritime
barge industries, use infrastructure that is owned and maintained by
the government, providing them with a competitive price advantage over
railroads. We have previously reported that railroad investment is
critical to freight mobility and economic growth, and investments in
railroad projects can produce public benefits, such as (1) reducing
highway congestion, (2) strengthening intermodal connections and the
efficiency of the publicly owned transportation system, and (3)
enhancing public safety and the environment.[Footnote 12] (See the list
of related GAO products at the end of this report.) However, even when
the public benefits of freight projects may be sufficient to warrant
public funding, federal funding mechanisms may not be well tailored to
freight projects. Whereas freight projects are frequently intermodal,
most federal funding mechanisms are focused on one mode. In addition,
freight projects generate private benefits, raising questions about
whether and how to provide public support for them.
Little Information Is Publicly Available on Bridge and Tunnel
Conditions and Congestion, Although Major Railroads Collect, Maintain,
and Use This Information to Prioritize Investments:
Major railroads[Footnote 13] collect and maintain detailed information
on the condition of their bridges and tunnels and on the extent to
which these structures contribute to network congestion, but less is
known about how much information Class II and III railroads collect.
Freight railroads generally consider this information proprietary,
citing concerns over security and liability, and they selectively share
bridge and tunnel information with the government. Meanwhile, the
federal government plays a limited role in collecting information on
railroad bridges and tunnels because they are privately owned and
maintained. In addition, FRA has no regulations or standards for
railroad bridges and tunnels; and, in FRA's view, the safety benefits
that might accrue from collecting and maintaining information on their
condition would not justify the expense. Various other federal agencies
collect some information on railroad bridges and tunnels that pertain
to their mission. While most bridges and tunnels are not the main cause
of freight railroad congestion, some structures are chokepoints and do
constrain capacity. Freight railroads set maintenance and investment
priorities by considering bridge and tunnel information, together with
comparable information on other components of their network
infrastructure, and identify those repairs and improvements that will
improve safety, provide the highest return on investment, and increase
capacity. A bridge or tunnel is likely to cost more to repair--and much
more to replace--than other components of railroad infrastructure
networks, such as track or signals. As a result, railroads of all
classes are more likely to invest in other components sooner and to
consider extensive bridge or tunnel repair or replacement as one of
their last investment options.
Railroads Collect and Maintain Information on the Condition of Their
Bridges and Tunnels to Varying Degrees:
Class I railroads, which own over 75 percent of U.S. railroad bridges
and over 800 tunnels, maintain detailed information on the condition of
their bridges and tunnels and generally have the resources to invest in
a robust maintenance and inspection regime; however, less is known
about the information Class II and III railroads collect on bridge and
tunnel conditions, according to FRA's Chief Structural Engineer.
Officials from five of six Class I railroads with whom we spoke said
they maintain bridge and tunnel information electronically in
databases--including data on location, age, and other characteristics
of the structures; inspection reports; condition information,
maintenance histories, design drawings or construction documents; and
other pertinent information.[Footnote 14] While Class I railroad bridge
departments vary in size, these departments all have in-house bridge
inspectors, engineers, and maintenance-of-way crews that conduct
inspections, carry out maintenance and repair activities, and may also
design and construct bridges. Class I railroads use in-house bridge
inspectors to conduct inspections at least once a year on all bridges
and tunnels to monitor safety and assess current conditions.[Footnote
15] For example, one Class I railroad we interviewed has over 100
personnel dedicated to bridge inspections on their network.
According to the limited data we have, Class II and III railroads
collect and maintain less information on their bridges and tunnels, and
the reliability of the data collected may be poor. Based on our
discussions with two Class II and nine Class III railroads, and on the
documentation of 43 bridge safety surveys of Class II and III railroads
that FRA completed from January 2004 through March 2007,[Footnote 16]
Class II and III railroads collect less information on the condition of
their bridges and tunnels, generally contract out bridge and tunnel
inspection and repair work, and have less in-house bridge expertise.
For example, 18 of the 43 Class II and III railroads reviewed by FRA
since January 2004 could not produce some critical documentation
related to the safety of their bridges, including past bridge
inspection reports, design documents, or complete bridge inventories.
Furthermore, only 16 of 43 Class II and III railroads, surveyed by the
FRA inspect their bridges at least once a year. Also, according to FRA
officials, many Class II and III railroads lack the in-house bridge
expertise to conduct their own bridge inspections and rely instead on
outside consultants. For example, according to the 43 FRA bridge safety
surveys of Class II and III railroads, 26 of the railroads contracted
out bridge inspections, 7 did not conduct bridge inspections, 4 did not
mention who conducted the railroad's bridge inspections, 4 conducted
inspections in-house, 1 had an informal inspection arrangement, and 1
was found to have no bridges. In addition, 8 bridge safety surveys
provided to us by FRA either found inconsistencies between bridge
inspection reports and actual bridge conditions or found insufficient
detail in inspection reports.
One Class III railroad representative with whom we spoke stated that
the true condition of that railroad's bridges, all of which were built
by railroads not in existence today, is unknown because the railroad
does not have design or construction documents, lacks past maintenance
and inspection records, and has never conducted a complete engineering
study to determine its bridges' load-carrying capacity. FRA officials
stated that, based on the limited data they have, they believe that
some Class III railroads do not have the training or experience needed
to recognize critical structural deficiencies or even understand the
severity and urgency of identified bridge or tunnel defects. However,
FRA officials also stated that some Class II and III railroads have
very good bridge management practices because they use qualified
outside consultants to perform safety and inspection processes.
The Federal Government Does Not Have Comprehensive Data on the Nation's
Railroad Bridges and Tunnels:
The federal government's efforts to collect data on railroad bridges
and tunnels are limited in scope, and the data are not updated
regularly. FRA collects railroad traffic information and maintains
geographic data on U.S. freight railroad lines; however, this
information does not show the location of bridges or tunnels on these
routes. FRA maintains records of railroad accident and incident
reports, some involving bridges and tunnels, dating back to 1982, but
the information collected is limited to accident descriptions, repair
costs, structure locations, and information about the train, crew, and
track involved in the accidents and does not show bridge or tunnel
condition, age, structure type, or design documents. In addition, as
part of the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF)
loan application process,[Footnote 17] FRA's Office of Railroad
Development hires independent engineering firms to verify the condition
of the infrastructure and the feasibility of proposed infrastructure
improvements. These assessments may provide detailed information on
specific railroad infrastructure, including bridges and tunnels;
however, the data are limited to the projects submitted in the RRIF
loan application process. Furthermore, while FRA collects and updates
data on track defects from its track inspections, it collects less
information on bridges and tunnels, because the FRA has regulations
detailing track standards but only guidelines for bridges.
Although FRA has authority to obtain records related to the safety of
railroad operations, including those involving bridges and tunnels, FRA
officials expressed concern about the agency becoming a repository for
railroad bridge and tunnel data. In addition, FRA's Chief Structural
Engineer stated that the expense of collecting and maintaining a
comprehensive railroad bridge and tunnel inventory could not be
justified from a safety standpoint because railroads already maintain
inventories of their own bridges and tunnels, which FRA officials
review.
No comprehensive inventory exists on the nation's railroad bridges and
tunnels; however, through unrelated initiatives over the years, FRA has
obtained some information on bridges and tunnels, although, in some
cases, this information has not been updated regularly. For example, in
1993, FRA compiled a list of railroad bridges over navigable waterways
based on data from the U.S. Coast Guard. However, the list has not been
regularly updated. Other federal agencies collect some information on
railroad infrastructure as it pertains to their mission, but this
information is not comprehensive or exclusive to railroad structures.
This information is mainly collected by Department of Defense (DOD),
DHS, TSA, the Coast Guard, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the
Environmental Protection Agency and centers on either security or
construction permitting functions.
Railroad Bridges and Tunnels Are Aging but Are Not Generally the Main
Cause of Freight Railroad Congestion, Although Some Are Chokepoints:
While railroad bridges and tunnels are aging, their condition is not
the main cause of freight railroad congestion; however, some critical
bridges and tunnels are chokepoints on the freight railroad
network.[Footnote 18] According to FRA officials and railroad
representatives with whom we spoke, many of these structures are
reaching or have exceeded their originally estimated useful life. For
example, an FRA bridge survey completed in 1993 found that more than
half of the nation's railroad bridges were built before 1920 and,
according to FRA's Chief Structural Engineer, very few railroad tunnels
have been built within the last 50 years. As a bridge ages, it
undergoes natural deterioration, including corrosion, and weather-
related stresses. In addition, fatigue may occur in some components of
older bridges because of stress resulting from repeated heavy freight
train operations. FRA's Chief Structural Engineer told us that, as
bridges and other components of railroad infrastructure age and their
condition worsens, the railroads may need to increase their investment
in inspection, maintenance, and replacement to keep existing railroad
lines serviceable. One Class I railroad representative said his
railroad has a growing inventory of about 300 to 400 older bridges that
are deteriorating and therefore need additional inspections and
assessments. Quantifying the future maintenance and replacement needs
of the freight railroad network is difficult, since private railroads
do not make information on the condition of railroad bridges and
tunnels publicly available because of concerns over sharing proprietary
information and losing competitive advantage. However, the American
Society of Civil Engineers gave railroad infrastructure a "C-" grade in
its 2005 assessment of the nation's infrastructure, noting that limited
capacity on the freight railroad network has created significant
chokepoints and delays.[Footnote 19]
Although officials at a few railroads with whom we spoke expressed some
concerns about the effect of aging bridges on congestion, they were
more concerned about the effect of increased train traffic on
congestion. Demand for freight railroad capacity has increased over the
last decade with some Class I railroads reaching record traffic levels,
especially in ethanol, coal, and intermodal traffic. The demand for
such capacity is expected to continue increasing. For example, the DOT
has projected a 55 percent increase in freight railroad traffic from
2000 to 2020. Increased train traffic places additional stress on
existing infrastructure, especially railroad bridges; requires capacity
expansion investments in rolling stock, infrastructure, and personnel;
and increases congestion on the railroad network.
Class I railroads consider congestion a networkwide problem whereas
officials of the Class II and III railroads with whom we spoke said
they generally experience congestion around crossings, yards, and
interchanges with Class I railroads. Although officials from four of
the nine Class II and III railroads with whom we spoke said they
currently experience congestion on their entire networks, generally,
those railroads were more concerned about upgrading existing
infrastructure to handle the heavier railcars and longer trains being
demanded by Class I railroads than they were with increasing capacity.
The American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association estimates
that out of the 48,000 miles of track owned by Class II and III
railroads, 20,000 to 25,000 miles need to be upgraded to handle the
heavier railcars that are becoming the industry standard. ASLRRA
estimated these upgrades would cost $7 billion to $11 billion.
Officials at seven of the nine Class II and III railroads with whom we
spoke said the railroads had completed or needed to complete track or
bridge upgrades to accommodate heavier railcars.
Several factors contribute to congestion on freight railroad networks,
including grade crossings and passenger trains, both of which can
decrease freight railroad capacity and cause freight train delays.
Bridges or tunnels may also cause network congestion. For example,
single-track bridges and tunnels constrain capacity on double-track
lines, as do low clearances that do not accommodate double-stack
intermodal trains, bridges that open for marine traffic,[Footnote 20]
and other structural characteristics such as sharp curves and steep
grades that require slower train speeds. Deteriorated bridge and tunnel
conditions can also contribute to congestion by requiring reduced train
speeds, closures, and increased time out of service for maintenance.
Where repairs or improvements to bridges and tunnels may not be
financially viable or sufficiently profitable, railroads may institute
slow orders or shut down lines and reroute traffic. In some cases,
especially for Class III railroads, a bridge or tunnel closure can
isolate a shipper and cripple a railroad's entire network.
Although FRA officials estimated that 10 percent or less of freight
railroad congestion is attributable to capacity constraints caused by
railroad bridges and tunnels, railroad officials whom we spoke with
identified some key bridges and tunnels as chokepoints on their
networks. For example, one chokepoint is a moveable bridge that is one
of only a few bridges across the Mississippi River owned by a Class I
railroad. According to railroad officials, during peak periods, the
bridge must open up to 15 times per day for river traffic while
accommodating between 65 and 70 trains per day. Each opening for river
traffic generally takes an average of 25 to 30 minutes, although the
bridge is sometimes open for more than an hour, causing train delays as
far as the West Coast. In addition, this bridge is closed for routine
maintenance for over an hour several times a week. Another chokepoint
is the 1.7 mile Howard Street Tunnel (see fig. 3), constructed in 1895
under downtown Baltimore, Maryland, which is the largest and most
expensive obstacle to transporting double-stack railcars from Baltimore
to Chicago. The tunnel regularly causes passenger and freight train
delays in the Baltimore area and beyond because it is a single-track
tunnel with insufficient clearance for double-stack railcars on a
double-track main line. Grades in and curves near the Howard Street
tunnel also contribute to congestion, constraining freight traffic to
25 miles per hour through the tunnel. In addition, during a fire in the
tunnel in 2001, freight traffic was rerouted, resulting in 18-to 36-
hour delays.
Figure 3: Howard Street Tunnel (Baltimore, Maryland) West entrance
(left) and East entrance:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Railroads Use Condition and Congestion Information with Other
Information to Prioritize Investment, Including Projects Designed to
Address Deterioration and Congestion:
Freight railroad officials with whom we spoke consider information on
bridge and tunnel conditions and congestion, along with information on
demand, cost, and other factors, to set infrastructure maintenance and
investment priorities. According to all of the Class I railroad
officials with whom we spoke, maintaining or increasing safety is one
of their highest investment priorities, along with return on
investment. Hence, most Class I railroad officials with whom we spoke
said the railroads consider immediate safety concerns first, ongoing
maintenance and asset replacement next, and capacity expansion last
when prioritizing bridge and tunnel projects.
Bridge and tunnel rehabilitation or replacement is expensive, and the
costs are highly variable, depending on the complexity of the
structure's design, the length and location of the structure, the
construction materials, and the type of replacement structure. The cost
of replacing a bridge can range from $600,000 for a small timber
trestle bridge on a lightly trafficked Class III railroad line to $100
million to replace a large steel bridge with a 2,500-foot moveable span
located on a Class I railroad's main line. See appendix II for more
examples of railroad bridge and tunnel costs. Because replacement costs
are high, railroads prefer to use asset extension programs and replace
components rather than replacing entire structures to address
deterioration and extend the useful life of their bridges and tunnels.
Often, an individual component of a bridge may deteriorate faster than
other components; therefore, replacing the component could
significantly extend the life of the entire bridge.
Bridge and tunnel replacement is typically one of the last options
railroads choose to address infrastructure deterioration and mitigate
congestion. Railroads typically try to improve their processes before
enhancing infrastructure to mitigate congestion. Process improvements
and other strategies generally cost less and are more cost effective
than infrastructure enhancements. Class I railroads have used a number
of process improvements to mitigate congestion, including updating
their operating plans to reflect changes in business volume and traffic
mix, increasing train lengths and the number of fully loaded cars per
train, double-stacking trains, decreasing car cycle times, increasing
service, hiring more train crews, and using pricing strategies to shape
demand.
When process improvements can no longer reduce congestion, railroads
use infrastructure enhancements to expand the capacity of their
networks. Infrastructure enhancements include adding sidings or track,
expanding yards and terminals, upgrading signal systems, and
rehabilitating or replacing bridges and tunnels. Per linear foot,
bridge and tunnel replacement costs more than other infrastructure
improvements, as shown in figure 4. Moreover, according to several
Class I railroad representatives with whom we spoke, bridge replacement
typically has a lower return on investment than other infrastructure
improvements. Consequently, railroads invest in other enhancements
before rehabilitating or replacing bridges.
Figure 4: Range of Railroad Infrastructure Improvement Costs (Dollars
in thousands per linear foot):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis based on interviews with railroad and industry
association officials and estimates from other rail infrastructure
studies.
[A] Generally timber bridges are not being replaced with another timber
bridge, but rather they are being replaced by either culverts or
bridges with concrete and steel components. The low-end example
represents a timber bridge replaced by a culvert and the high-end
example represents a timber bridge replaced by a steel and concrete
structure.
[End of figure]
While bridge and tunnel work is expensive for all freight railroads,
railroads vary in their ability to make these investments. Class I
railroads generally have more resources than Class II and III railroads
to invest in bridge and tunnel inspection, maintenance, rehabilitation,
and replacement. According to AAR, in 2006, the seven Class I railroads
spent an average of $1.2 billion each for capital investments, while
all the Class II and III railroads surveyed by ASLRRA spent an average
of over $795,000 each in 2004. Class II and, to a greater extent, Class
III railroads face challenges in funding bridge and tunnel
rehabilitation or replacement efforts because they may have limited
funds, lack in-house bridge and tunnel expertise, and own bridges and
tunnels purchased from Class I railroads on lines that those railroads
had disinvested in. When repairs or improvements to bridges or tunnels
are not financially feasible for Class II or III railroads, the
railroads may instead modify their operations--by, for example,
reducing train speeds over bridges or in tunnels. According to ASLRRA,
some railroads may even stop operating on routes when bridge or tunnel
repairs are both unavoidable and unaffordable. As a result, according
to FRA officials, fewer serious problems are found on bridges and in
tunnels owned by Class I railroads than on bridges or in tunnels owned
by smaller railroads. Nonetheless, in response to several accidents
caused by bridge failures, near accidents involving bridges, and
results from its bridge safety surveys, FRA is developing a formal rail
safety advisory on railroad bridges, to be released in late 2007, that
will urge all railroads to increase their attention on bridge safety
and bridge management programs.
The Federal Role in Overseeing Railroad Bridge and Tunnel Safety Is
Limited:
Freight railroads are responsible for the structural safety of their
bridges and tunnels; moreover, the federal government does not regulate
railroad bridge and tunnel inspection requirements or conditions. In
1995, after determining that railroads were already inspecting bridges
according to detailed industry standards, FRA decided to issue advisory
guidelines for railroad bridge management instead of regulations.
Because FRA has general authority over railroad infrastructure safety,
it may make observations of and assess bridge and tunnel conditions,
but it does not routinely inspect these structures to monitor their
condition. FRA bridge specialists may make observations while
investigating complaints, following up on track inspectors' concerns,
and conducting bridge safety surveys. If an FRA bridge specialist
determines that there is a safety problem, FRA attempts to work
cooperatively with the railroad to correct the problem rather than shut
down the railroad's operations. FRA has taken enforcement action to
protect public safety when there is a documented problem of immediate
concern over a structure's stability. Other federal agencies also have
limited roles in railroad bridge and tunnel safety. FRA's bridge safety
oversight has evolved; however, bridge specialists individually apply
different criteria in their selection of railroads for bridge safety
surveys. FRA has not established a systematic, consistent risk-based
approach to selecting Class II and III railroads for bridge safety
surveys. As a result, FRA may not be selecting the railroads whose
bridges or tunnels are most likely to present safety issues.
Federal Railroad Bridge and Tunnel Safety Efforts Are Limited Because
FRA Has Determined That Railroads Are Sufficiently Ensuring Structural
Stability:
Historically, the federal role in railroad bridge and tunnel safety has
been narrow. The federal government does not routinely inspect railroad
bridges or tunnels and does not regulate their condition. After a
highway bridge collapsed in 1967, Congress debated instituting bridge
inspection standards that would apply to railroad bridges, but
railroads were already inspecting their bridges according to their
established industry standards. In 1968, Congress required national
inspection standards for highway bridges; however, current law does not
regulate railroad bridge conditions or establish inspection standards.
Under the authority originally granted to it by the Railroad Safety Act
of 1970[Footnote 21] to issue safety regulations as necessary, from
1975 to 1981 FRA considered establishing bridge safety regulations
based on industry standards created by the American Railway Engineering
and Maintenance of Way Association. However, according to FRA, these
standards are actually recommendations for a thorough bridge management
program, including very detailed specifications for particular types of
bridges, rather than minimum inspection standards. In light of the
industry's detailed safety standards and the low frequency of accidents
caused by structural conditions on bridges or in tunnels, FRA
determined that regulating bridge or tunnel structural conditions or
requiring inspections would not be cost-effective to FRA when
considering the cost of implementation and enforcement. Additionally,
while establishing minimum standards might improve some railroads'
structural management policies and procedures, it could also influence
some railroads to reduce the frequency or effectiveness of their
inspections.
FRA observes and assesses bridge and tunnel conditions, but does not
inspect these structures to regulate their condition. Although FRA does
not regulate bridge and tunnel conditions, it does regulate track
conditions, and it uses track inspectors, as well as bridge
specialists, to identify potential bridge and tunnel safety issues.
Historically, FRA track personnel have overseen bridge and tunnel
safety.[Footnote 22] Under the authority originally granted by the
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, an FRA track inspector may take
action to address a structural concern identified on a bridge or in a
tunnel, such as a visible crack in a steel beam, to ensure the safety
of the public and railroad employees. Additionally, in 1992, FRA's
Office of Safety established the position of Bridge Engineer (currently
filled by FRA's Chief Structural Engineer) to assist track personnel in
identifying and resolving issues of bridge structural integrity and to
oversee standards regulating the safety of railroad bridge
workers.[Footnote 23] After completing a bridge survey in 1993, FRA
concluded that most railroads were inspecting bridges to a higher
standard than would be required by any FRA-issued minimum standards,
which prompted FRA to issue guidelines for bridge management rather
than regulations. In 1995, FRA began implementing these guidelines as
part of its Bridge Safety Assurance Program. FRA has hired five full-
time bridge specialists since 2000 to implement this program.[Footnote
24] These specialists provide expertise to track personnel and work
with them to relieve some of the track personnel's inspection workload
related to railroad structures as well as carry out other activities to
promote bridge safety. Besides the Chief Structural Engineer, the
program now includes one bridge specialist at FRA headquarters[Footnote
25] and four bridge specialists in the field. Each field bridge
specialist is responsible for all of the passenger and freight railroad
infrastructure in two FRA regions and one or two Class I railroads
(whose infrastructure usually spans multiple FRA regions). In addition
to addressing bridge structural concerns, FRA bridge specialists
address tunnel structural concerns. However, FRA's involvement in
tunnels is not as extensive as its involvement in bridges, since
bridges are more affected by stress from trains moving over them than
tunnels are from trains moving through them.[Footnote 26] In addition,
there are many more railroad bridges in the United States than there
are tunnels.
In observing bridge conditions, FRA bridge specialists use FRA advisory
guidelines for railroad bridge management programs.[Footnote 27] These
guidelines recommend, among other things, that organizations
responsible for the safety of a bridge ensure that a qualified engineer
determines the weight-bearing capability of a bridge; collect bridge
design, construction, maintenance, and repair records; and have a
competent inspector periodically inspect structures. The guidelines do
not pertain to tunnels or other types of structures on railroad
property. FRA encourages, but does not require, that railroads comply
with these guidelines because the railroads are responsible for
inspecting, maintaining, and ensuring the safety of bridges and tunnels
that carry their track. However, when a bridge or tunnel owner fails to
resolve a structural problem, FRA can use legal means, including
emergency orders, to ensure safety.[Footnote 28]
Federal Enforcement of Bridge and Tunnel Structural Safety Is Primarily
Limited to Addressing Immediate Safety Concerns:
FRA is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing the safety
and structural integrity of railroad bridges and tunnels. FRA bridge
specialists perform both enforcement and nonregulatory activities aimed
at ensuring the safety of railroad structures. Other federal agencies
have more limited roles in railroad bridge and tunnel safety related to
their particular missions.
FRA bridge specialists play a number of roles[Footnote 29] intended to
promote bridge and tunnel safety, most of which involve responding to
identified safety issues. One of their principal roles is to alert
FRA's Chief Structural Engineer when they encounter an immediate bridge
or tunnel safety concern so that an emergency order may be issued if
necessary. These safety concerns may be identified in response to a
track inspector's findings, in response to an accident or a complaint,
or through independent observation of a railroad's bridges or tunnels.
Each bridge specialist has numerous safety responsibilities as part of
the Bridge Safety Assurance Program. In particular, the FRA bridge
specialists are involved in the following activities:
* Enforcement. If a bridge specialist notices a track defect on or near
a bridge or tunnel, the specialist typically first recommends remedial
actions, such as a reduction in train speeds over the affected track
segment. If conditions warrant, the FRA Administrator may issue an
emergency order. However, FRA prefers to seek cooperative solutions
with railroads and has issued only three emergency orders for bridges
and none for tunnels since 1970.
* Accident Investigation. When an accident occurs on a bridge or in a
tunnel, one or more bridge specialists may conduct an on-site
investigation. In the case of a bridge or tunnel structural failure,
the bridge specialist may identify the individual component that caused
the failure, although the entire structure may need to be replaced
after the accident (see fig. 5).
Figure 5: Structural Failure of a Bridge in Mississippi:
[See PDF for image]
Source: FRA.
[End of figure]
* Complaint Investigation. Bridge specialists are responsible for
addressing and investigating almost all formal complaints concerning
bridges and tunnels filed by the general public, Members of Congress,
and railroad employees. According to FRA, most formal bridge complaints
from the public are related to aesthetic issues rather than the
stability or safety of a structure. Bridge specialists may also conduct
structural evaluations in response to concerns identified by FRA track
personnel or as part of a complaint investigation.
* Monitoring Compliance Agreements. In response to systemic safety
concerns that FRA identifies on a railroad through the bridge
specialists' or track personnel's activities, FRA may work with the
railroad to implement a compliance agreement to improve safety across
the entire railroad. FRA often initiates a compliance agreement to
avoid issuing an emergency order for the railroad to cease operations
on a bridge. FRA has found that compliance agreements can be an
effective tool to address systemic weaknesses in a railroad's bridge
management practices, while emergency orders usually address serious
safety problems on specific bridge structures.
* Training. At FRA conferences, the bridge specialists teach FRA track
inspectors about bridge conditions. This training supports
communication between FRA track staff and bridge specialists and is
designed to increase the number of FRA personnel that can detect
immediate safety concerns on bridges.
* Conducting Bridge Safety Surveys. During a bridge safety survey, a
bridge specialist interviews railroad bridge staff and uses FRA
guidelines as criteria for reviewing a railroad's bridge management
policies, procedures, and records. After reviewing the railroad's
records and policies, the bridge specialist observes a sample of the
railroad's bridges and compares the results of the sample observation
with the railroad's bridge inspection reports to determine the
inspection reports' reliability. The bridge specialist documents the
findings and follows up with the railroad to document any necessary
repairs to structures or improvements to bridge management procedures.
Besides FRA, several federal agencies have responsibilities related to
railroad bridges and tunnels in areas such as security and clearance
for maritime traffic. Within DHS, TSA has issued freight railroad
security action items in cooperation with the railroad industry, but
compliance with these action items is voluntary. Much as FRA monitors
compliance with its guidelines, TSA security inspectors assess a
railroad's compliance with TSA's action items and may make
recommendations if the railroad does not comply with certain items.
Additionally, TSA issued a proposed rule in December 2006 that would
require freight railroads and other transportation entities to allow
TSA and DHS to enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, and
records relevant to railroad security. Also within DHS, the U.S. Coast
Guard is responsible for overseeing all bridges over navigable
waterways and for assessing obstructions to maritime traffic. The Coast
Guard regulates movable bridge schedules and prescribes bridge lighting
for navigational safety. Within the DOD, the Transportation Engineering
Agency designates STRACNET, a network of railroad lines that form the
minimum railroad network required to meet the transportation needs of
the military. The Transportation Engineering Agency does not directly
oversee the condition of bridges or tunnels on this network.
FRA Is Not Using a Systematic, Consistent, Risk-Based Methodology to
Target Bridge Safety Surveys to Class II and III Railroads:
FRA's field bridge specialists monitor bridges and tunnels in a large
area and have not been able to assess the bridge policies or the
bridges and tunnels of many of the Class II or Class III railroads in
the specialists' assigned areas. Furthermore, as previously discussed,
the railroads share information on the condition of their bridges and
tunnels with the federal government selectively. As a result, the
structural conditions of some bridges and tunnels and the practices
used to inspect and maintain them, particularly on Class III railroads,
are largely unknown to the federal government. According to ASLRRA,
there are 549 Class II and III railroads in the United States. Although
FRA has conducted bridge safety surveys on all of the Class I
railroads, FRA officials estimate that they have conducted, on average,
approximately 25 to 35 bridge safety surveys per year on Class II and
III railroads since the introduction of the field bridge specialists in
2004. As we mentioned earlier, our analysis of FRA's completed bridge
safety surveys during this period showed that some of the surveyed
Class II and III railroads had sound bridge management practices and
records, but most did not. The limited number of bridge safety surveys
that the FRA bridge specialists have been able to accomplish relative
to the number of Class II and III railroads could indicate potential
bridge and tunnel safety concerns on railroads that FRA has not
surveyed.
According to FRA, the goal of the Bridge Safety Assurance Program is
not to monitor all railroads, but rather to identify railroads whose
bridge management policies and bridge conditions may lead to safety
threats. However, the FRA bridge specialists do not select Class II and
III railroads for bridge safety surveys using a consistent methodology
based on a comprehensive, prioritized assessment of safety issues that
could focus FRA's inspection and enforcement resources on those
railroads that could have the greatest safety risks. Each field bridge
specialist uses individually developed criteria, based on personal
experience and other available information--such as whether a
railroad's bridges carry passenger traffic--to help identify Class II
and III railroads as candidates for bridge safety surveys. This is in
contrast to how FRA implements its National Inspection Plan to target
inspections of other railroad safety areas. This plan provides guidance
to each FRA regional office on how its inspectors should divide their
work, by railroad and by state, on the basis of trend analyses of
available accident, inspection, and other data. Before implementing
this plan, FRA had a less structured, less consistent, and less data
driven approach to planning inspections, under which each region
prepared its own inspection plan, on the basis of judgments and
available data. The use of data was not consistent from region to
region, and individual inspectors had greater discretion to select
sites for inspection using their own knowledge of their inspection
territories.
In our previous work, we have noted that risk management can help to
improve safety by systematically identifying and assessing risks
associated with various safety hazards, prioritizing them so that
resources may be allocated to address the highest risk first, and
ensuring that the most appropriate alternatives to prevent or mitigate
the effects of hazards are designed and implemented.[Footnote 30] FRA's
safety oversight role in other areas, such as operating practices and
track, includes inspections that focus on compliance with minimum
standards; however, these inspections do not attempt to determine how
well railroads are managing safety risks on their systems. In contrast,
by examining how railroads manage safety risks during its bridge safety
surveys, FRA is, in part, addressing risk-management issues, even
though it has not established a systematic, risk-based methodology to
select Class II and III railroads that may need additional oversight.
For example, one bridge specialist is contacting all Class III
railroads in one region to obtain specific information on their bridge
management policies, such as whether a railroad has regular inspections
by a qualified civil engineer and how the railroad records and uses the
bridge inspection data, to better identify railroads for bridge safety
surveys. Additionally, FRA's Chief Structural Engineer is considering a
research project that would use new technology to measure the stress
trains inflict on timber bridges. If this project were implemented, FRA
would analyze stress data that might indicate bridge problems and a
need for monitoring problematic bridges.
Federal Investments in Freight Railroad Infrastructure Are Typically
Not Targeted to Maximize National Benefits, Whereas Some State and
Private Investments Are Strategically Targeted:
Federal, state, and local governments make limited investments in
freight railroad infrastructure, including bridges and tunnels, in an
effort to enhance the public benefits associated with freight and
passenger transportation. However, federal investments in all modes of
freight-related infrastructure are not aligned with a national freight
policy or with a strategic federal freight transportation plan. DOT has
developed a draft Framework for a National Freight Policy, but it lacks
a strategic federal component that specifies federal goals, roles, and
revenue sources and funding mechanisms. In contrast, some states
structure their investments in freight railroad infrastructure to
produce public benefits at the state and local levels, and some public-
private partnerships have facilitated investments designed to produce
public and private benefits. Freight congestion and demand are expected
to increase, and given the highly constrained fiscal environment, the
federal government may be challenged to increase the efficiency of the
national multimodal freight transportation system.
Federal Funding for Freight Railroad Infrastructure Is Not Guided by a
National Freight Strategy and Is Generally Not Targeted to Maximize
National Benefits:
While the private sector is largely responsible for investing in the
freight railroad infrastructure that it owns and maintains--an
estimated $9 billion during calendar year 2006--the federal government
invests some public funds in this infrastructure as well--an estimated
$263 million during fiscal year 2006. The federal government funds
freight railroad infrastructure investments through the General Fund
and the Highway Trust Fund, and funding mechanisms include loans,
grants (such as formula grants and legislative earmarks), and tax
expenditures (such as tax credits). However, these funding mechanisms
are (1) targeted toward individual transportation modes and address
different transportation safety and economic issues, (2) are
administered by different agencies that have different missions, and
(3) are not coordinated by a strategic federal multimodal freight
transportation policy to maximize specific national public freight
transportation benefits[Footnote 31] (see table 1). For example, in
accordance with its mission to protect maritime economic interests, the
U.S. Coast Guard administers the Truman-Hobbs program to alter railroad
and highway bridges that obstruct maritime traffic (see fig.
6).[Footnote 32] While this program can enhance maritime, railroad, and
highway freight mobility, it is targeted toward maritime traffic and is
not coordinated with other DOT freight mobility investments.
Table 1: Examples of Federal Funding Mechanisms That Support Freight
Railroad Infrastructure:
Funding mechanism: Loan;
Revenue source: General Fund;
Example: RRIF loans can be used by railroads, state and local
governments, and other entities to finance certain activities such as
track and bridge rehabilitation;
Federal agency: FRA.
Funding mechanism: Grant[A];
Revenue source: General Fund;
Example: The Truman-Hobbs program funds the alteration of railroad and
highway bridges that are deemed hazards to maritime navigation;
Federal agency: U.S. Coast Guard.
Funding mechanism: Grant [A];
Revenue Source: Highway Trust Fund;
Example: Legislative earmarks have been used to fund federally
designated Projects of National and Regional Significance that include
railroad components, such as the Heartland Corridor Project, which will
increase tunnel clearances to accommodate double-stacked trains.
Federal agency: Federal Highway Administration.
Funding mechanism: Tax expenditure;
Revenue source: General Fund revenue forgone;
Example: The Railroad Track Maintenance Credit is available to Class II
and III railroads for 50 percent of their qualified track maintenance
expenses during a taxable year;
Federal agency: Internal Revenue Service.
Source: GAO analysis of programmatic and fiscal year 2006 financial
data from FHWA, FRA, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Joint Committee on
Taxation.
[A] Examples of other federal grant programs that also fund, to some
extent, freight railroad infrastructure investments include High
Priority Projects, Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality,
Transportation Improvements, Public Lands Highways, and Railway-
Highway Crossings (Section 130).
[End of table]
Figure 6: Barge Navigating through the Narrow Channel of a Moveable
Railroad Bridge Eligible for Truman-Hobbs Funding on the Mississippi
River in Iowa:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Today's federal investments in freight railroad infrastructure are not
guided by a clear federal freight strategy. In 2006, DOT attempted to
move beyond the traditional modal approach to freight transportation by
developing a draft Framework for a National Freight Policy, which,
among other things, incorporates some previously established federal
freight railroad infrastructure funding mechanisms. Although this draft
Framework represents an important step toward developing a national
intermodal freight transportation policy, it does not go far enough, in
our view, toward delineating a clear federal role and strategy for
carrying out that policy. DOT describes its draft Framework as a living
document and emphasizes that the nation's freight transportation
challenges are of such a nature and magnitude that governments at all
levels and the private sector must work together to address them. We
agree, and we note that as the draft Framework evolves, DOT and other
stakeholders will have an opportunity to clarify their respective
freight strategies.
As we have reported, the federal approach to a given transportation
strategy should include clearly and consistently defined goals, roles,
revenue sources, and funding mechanisms to ensure that federal
investments in the nation's intermodal freight transportation
infrastructure will maximize national public benefits.[Footnote 33]
DOT's draft Framework sets forth some "objectives" for freight
transportation, together with strategies and tactics for achieving
them; acknowledges that a variety of public and private stakeholders
play important roles in freight transportation; and identifies some
funding mechanisms and other tools that the federal government can use
to support freight infrastructure. However, in some instances, these
objectives are vague, and federal and other stakeholders' roles and
funding mechanisms are not clearly and consistently defined. For
example, one DOT draft Framework objective is to "add physical capacity
to the freight transportation system in places where investment makes
economic sense," with supporting strategies and tactics that include
focusing on facilitating regionally based solutions for freight
gateways and projects of national or regional significance and
utilizing and promoting new and expanded financing tools, such as RRIF,
to incentivize private sector investment. To implement this objective,
DOT would need to define "economic sense" and develop criteria--as the
draft Framework says--to identify specific freight gateways and
projects of national or regional significance; and determine whether
federal revenues should be used to help subsidize any project
components and, if so, which federal funding mechanisms would be most
appropriate.
As we have also reported, federal investments should be directed to
maximize national public benefits. Allocating benefits and their costs
among beneficiaries is difficult[Footnote 34] and may be subject to
interpretation. Hence, it will be important for DOT to define national
benefits and to establish criteria for determining whether federal
investments are warranted. DOT's draft Framework suggests, but does not
explicitly identify as such, certain criteria for federal investment,
such as a project's national or regional significance, opportunities to
incentivize more private investment in transportation infrastructure,
and opportunities to leverage private and other public funds to add
freight transportation capacity.
Without a federal freight strategy, the existing federal freight
funding mechanisms are not designed to maximize national public
benefits. For example, although all railroads may apply for RRIF loans,
the only freight railroads that have been awarded loans have been Class
II and III railroads, whose operations tend to be more regional and
local. Also, the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Section 130
grant program mainly benefits localities by improving or eliminating
railroad-highway grade crossings and the public safety benefits of the
program are more local than national. Benefits from the Truman-Hobbs
program's investments directly accrue primarily to private maritime
shipping and secondarily to railroad companies by improving each mode's
infrastructure, thereby enhancing the efficiency of freight
transportation. On the other hand, depending on the project,
legislative earmarks can generate public and private benefits that
could be national, regional, and local in scope; however, these
projects do not compete for funding against other alternatives. For
example, through the Projects of National and Regional Significance
program, Congress earmarked funds to support the Chicago Region
Environmental and Transportation Efficiency (CREATE) project, which is
mainly designed to reduce railroad congestion in the nation's largest
railroad hub[Footnote 35]--the effects of which, among other things,
could improve the mobility of the national freight railroad network,
improve local commuter railroad service, and reduce railroad-highway
grade crossing hazards and congestion. Finally, Class II and III
railroads can use the Railroad Track Maintenance Credit--a tax credit-
-to offset capital investment expenditures, but as previously stated,
individual Class II and III railroad operations tend to benefit the
private and local sectors more than the nation as a whole.
Some State Investments in Freight Railroad Infrastructure Are Targeted
to Achieve State and Local Benefits:
In contrast to the federal government, some states that invest in
freight railroads administer various goal-oriented and criteria-based
programs that are funded through a mixture of state and federal
resources specifically to produce anticipated state and local benefits.
Some states have been helping short line railroads maintain track in
their jurisdictions for almost 20 years. For example, the Tennessee DOT
provides approximately $8 million in grants annually to 18 of 20 Class
III railroads in the state to fund track and bridge work, including
bridge inspections and rehabilitation projects. As we have previously
reported, governments at all levels--including states--have
increasingly been providing support for freight railroad improvement
projects that offer potential public benefits, and over 30 states have
published freight plans that describe their goals and approach to
freight-related investments.[Footnote 36] The scope of state-
administered freight railroad programs includes railroad infrastructure
improvements, construction of intermodal facilities, elimination of
public railroad-highway grade crossings, and inspection of bridges. For
example, the Pennsylvania DOT administers a matching grant program--
funded at $10.5 million as of October 2006--to support freight railroad
maintenance and construction costs; and eligible recipients include
freight railroads, transportation organizations, municipalities,
municipal authorities, and other eligible users of freight railroad
infrastructure.
Officials from three of the nine state DOTs whom we interviewed are
developing and implementing multimodal freight policies. However, such
initiatives may be limited by state and federal funding criteria that
restrict most state transportation spending to highway infrastructure.
As we have reported, efforts to improve freight mobility are hampered
by the highly compartmentalized structure and funding of federal
transportation programs--often by transportation mode--that gives state
and local transportation agencies little incentive to systematically
compare the trade-offs between investing in different transportation
alternatives to meet mobility needs because funding is tied to certain
programs or types of projects.[Footnote 37] Officials from several
state agencies and oversight organizations whom we interviewed stated
that funding available for freight projects, regardless of mode, would
be more useful than "stovepiped" funding that would be available only
for investment in certain transportation modes.
Officials at six of the state agencies and oversight organizations whom
we interviewed administer freight railroad programs that have
identified programmatic goals, eligibility criteria, and funding
sources aimed at generating state and local benefits. For example,
officials from the Kansas DOT told us that the goals of its loan
program for local and regional railroads are to improve railroad lines,
enhance railroads' customer service to shippers, limit the number of
trucks on highways, and increase state and local economic vitality by
transporting local agricultural products. While officials from some
state agencies that we interviewed acknowledged that public benefits
are difficult to quantify for any public investments, six state
agencies and oversight organizations we interviewed were trying to
quantify them. For example, the Kansas DOT sponsored a study which
found that the short line railroad system saves the state an estimated
$49 million annually in pavement damage costs.
The scope of state freight railroad programs may be either broad,
including infrastructure investments of all kinds for railroads of all
sizes, or narrow, focusing on eligible projects and award recipients.
For example, the Pennsylvania DOT has two broad grant programs for
freight railroads and shippers, both of which may be used to fund
maintenance and new construction projects. In contrast, the Tennessee
DOT makes funds available specifically to Class III railroads by
allocating funds for track and bridge rehabilitation. State freight
railroad initiatives have supported investments in track rehabilitation
and other infrastructure improvements, railroad acquisition and line
preservation assistance, intermodal facility construction and increased
industrial access to railroads, and road and railroad-highway crossing
safety enhancements.
Some of the state entities we interviewed reported using a number of
funding mechanisms for their freight railroad programs. Specifically, 6
of the 12 said they provide grants and long-term below-market rate
loans, and one state reported issuing tax-exempt bonds. Some of these
states require that entities applying for loans or grants secure
matching funds. States fund freight railroad programs through state
general funds, user fees, federal Section 130 and other grants, and
other sources. Some states have taken an innovative approach to funding
freight railroad infrastructure. For example, Tennessee created a user-
fee based Transportation Equity Fund to support investments in
nonhighway infrastructure, including short line freight railroad track
and bridge rehabilitation. The fund is financed through the revenue
from state sales taxes on diesel fuel paid by railroad, air, and water
transportation modes; and the portion available for the Tennessee Short
Line Railroad Rehabilitation Track and Bridge grant program is
typically $7 million to $8 million annually. The program's purpose is
to preserve freight railroad service and thereby contribute to the
state's economic development. Construction grants are funded at a 90
percent state and 10 percent local (nonstate) matching share. Each
grant can be matched with in-kind work, cash contributions or both.
Public-Private Partnerships Have Supported Some Freight Railroad
Investments Designed to Produce Both Public and Private Benefits:
States, localities, and railroads have used public-private partnerships
as a strategic approach to develop freight-related transportation
solutions that benefit both sectors.[Footnote 38] In using this
approach to resolve freight issues, public and private participants of
the partnerships we reviewed identified common goals, individual roles,
and funding sources and mechanisms, which have affected partnership
outcomes. In some cases, these partnerships have supported railroad
bridge and tunnel projects. A well-structured partnership balances the
various strengths, limitations, and respective contributions of both
the public sector--federal, state, local, and regional--and private
sector participants in order to secure specific public and private
freight-related benefits.
Both the public and the private sectors have initiated freight railroad
public-private partnerships. For example, according to AASHTO
representatives we interviewed, in 2002 the Delaware DOT approached a
Class I railroad to reopen the Shellpot Bridge, which had been out of
service since 1994. The state associated the abandonment of this bridge
with increased congestion on the Northeast Corridor and saw it as a
threat to the competitiveness of the Port of Wilmington in attracting
freight traffic. The state and the railroad jointly developed the
project's goals, roles, and funding mechanisms. The state agreed to
finance the approximately $13.5 million cost of restoring the bridge by
contributing $5 million in state grant appropriations and funding the
remainder by issuing tax-exempt bonds. The railroad agreed to
compensate the state over a 20-year period by paying a fee for each
train car that uses the bridge. In another public-private partnership,
members of the Kansas City Terminal Railway Company[Footnote 39]and
their project designer approached the state of Missouri and the Unified
Government of Kansas City/Wyandotte County, Kansas, to propose
assisting in financing the construction of two flyovers and the
rehabilitation of a bridge. The purpose of these three infrastructure
improvement projects was to separate freight trains from different
railroads at several points where they came together to form what
amounted to four-way stops for trains in the Kansas City region and
caused a significant chokepoint on the U.S. freight railroad network
(see fig. 7). The railroads had already determined the goals of their
proposed public-private partnership and came to the bargaining table
with proposed roles and funding mechanisms. The railroads acknowledged
that they could pursue the project using strictly private market
resources; however, a wholly private project would have taken longer to
complete. The state and county saw value in relieving their communities
of the grade-crossing congestion this chokepoint caused, determined the
project risk was acceptable, and each agreed to issue tax-exempt bonds
that totaled over $190 million, which will be repaid by the railroads
through user fees. In both the Delaware and Kansas City cases, the
entities that initiated the partnership brought well-defined goals,
identified stakeholder roles, and guaranteed a set amount of funding to
the public-private partnership over a period of years.
Figure 7: Kansas City Flyovers:
[See PDF for image]
Source: BNSF (used with permission) and GAO digitally altered.
[End of figure]
Public-private partnerships can make funds available and define goals
and roles for all stakeholders for large, expensive freight railroad
projects when it is difficult for a public or private entity to fund
the entire project on its own, or when a project is not part of a
railroad's strategic plan, but would be beneficial to a locality's or a
region's quality of life. For example, public and private players bring
various strengths and limitations to the partnerships. The private
sector often can bring a more global view of freight needs to the
project planning process, help identify and implement projects,
contribute significant funds, and promote efficient use of
infrastructure. The public sector can offer various public financing
tools, such as low-interest loans and private activity bonds,[Footnote
40] to create incentives for private investments in freight railroads
that would not otherwise be made and to generate anticipated public
benefits.
Public-private partnerships also present certain challenges. As we
heard from both public and private freight railroad stakeholders, the
extent to which the public sector can engage the private sector,
identify anticipated public benefits from railroad investments, and
provide funding that is commensurate with those benefits, affects
partnership outcomes. Our past work has shown that an integral part of
public-private partnerships is ensuring that sound analytical
approaches are being applied locally and meaningful data are available,
not only to evaluate and prioritize infrastructure investments but also
to determine whether public support is justified in light of a wide
array of social and economic costs and benefits.[Footnote 41] Moreover,
as private entities that own most of the nation's railroad
infrastructure, freight railroads typically have not worked with the
public sector because of concerns about the requirements and
regulations associated with federal funding.[Footnote 42] These
railroads need to be convinced that a proposed infrastructure project
will yield financial returns for the company. Still another challenge
is to reconcile the lengthy planning and construction time associated
with public infrastructure projects with the shorter planning and
investment horizons of private companies.
Growing Freight Congestion and Demands May Challenge the Federal
Government to Strategically Invest Limited Funds to Maximize National
Public Benefits:
Overcoming congestion and improving mobility is one of the biggest
transportation challenges facing the nation. Congestion increases
delays and creates economic losses that cost Americans roughly $200
billion a year, according to DOT estimates.[Footnote 43] As we have
previously reported, increases in freight traffic on all modes over the
next 10 to 15 years are expected to put greater strain on ports,
highways, airports, and railroads.[Footnote 44] In addition, we have
found that this increase in freight transportation demand seems to be
particularly acute on highways, since trucks transport over 70 percent
of all freight tonnage nationally and freight truck traffic on urban
highways more than doubled from 1993 through 2001. The increased
congestion, coupled with long lead times for completing infrastructure
projects (5 to 15 years), may put pressure on all stakeholders,
including the federal government, to find other more effective
investments to increase freight mobility.
Increasing the capacity of the nation's freight railroad network could
be one way to meet future growth in freight transportation demand.
However, as mentioned previously, aging railroad bridges and tunnels
present physical constraints to meeting this projected increased demand
for freight railroad transportation on key routes, thereby constraining
capacity. For example, as we previously mentioned, 100-year-old bridges
and tunnels that are currently in use--such as the moveable bridge over
the Mississippi River and the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore--create
chokepoints on the freight railroad network due to their operating
conditions or outdated design. Currently, freight railroads are
investing billions of dollars in freight railroad infrastructure to
increase capacity, but because they invest in projects that will
maintain or increase safety or provide the highest return on its
investment, other investments may take priority over their most
expensive pieces of infrastructure, bridges and tunnels. In addition,
we have found that the railroads' long-term ability to meet the
projected growth in demand for freight railroad transportation is
uncertain, which may increase pressure for public investment in private
railroad infrastructure.
As we have previously reported, Congress is likely to receive further
requests for funding and face additional decisions about how to invest
in the nation's freight railroad infrastructure.[Footnote 45] However,
Congress's ability to respond to these requests may be limited by (1)
federal funding constraints and increased demand for infrastructure
investment in other transportation modes, (2) differences in federal
funding for different transportation modes, and (3) the lack of a
strategic federal freight transportation plan to guide federal
investments in freight transportation infrastructure.
Revenue from current federal transportation sources may not be
sustainable. Because revenue from traditional transportation funding
mechanisms such as the Highway Trust Fund may not keep pace with the
increase in transportation demand, we designated transportation
financing as a high-risk area in January 2007.[Footnote 46] The
recently enacted transportation funding authorization, the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act - A Legacy
for Users (SAFETEA-LU), is expected to outstrip the growth in trust
fund receipts. As a result, the Department of the Treasury and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) are forecasting that the trust fund
balance will steadily decline and be negative by the end of fiscal year
2011. In addition, the nation's long-term fiscal challenges will
constrain decision makers' ability to use other funding mechanisms,
such as grants and tax expenditures, for transportation needs.
Differences in federal funding for different transportation modes have
created a competitive disadvantage for freight railroads. Because the
federal government has an interest in an efficient national freight
transportation system, the federal role in freight transportation needs
to recognize that the freight transportation system encompasses many
modes that operate in a competitive marketplace and are owned, funded,
and operated by both the private and the public sectors. However,
current federal transportation policy treats each freight
transportation mode differently, thereby creating competitive
advantages for some modes over others. For example, trucking companies
and barges use infrastructure that is owned and maintained by the
government, while railroads use infrastructure that they pay taxes on,
own, and maintain. Trucking and barge companies pay fees and taxes for
the government-funded infrastructure they use, but their payments
generally do not cover the costs they impose on highways and waterways.
The federal subsidy that makes up the difference between the
government's costs and users' payments gives trucking and barge
companies a competitive advantage over the railroads.[Footnote 47] CBO
has observed that if all modes do not pay their full costs, the result
is inefficient use of roads and waterways and greater government
spending than otherwise would be necessary if capacity investments are
made in anticipation of demand that does not occur.
Examining Critical Questions and Implementing a Framework That
Identifies Goals, Stakeholder Roles, Revenue Sources, and Funding
Mechanisms Could Guide a Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure
Investments:
As noted earlier in this report, the federal government lacks a
strategic freight transportation plan to guide its involvement in
freight-related capital infrastructure investments. DOT's draft
Framework for a National Freight Policy represents an initial step
toward such a plan, but it assumes a federal role without indicating
whether federal involvement is appropriate or, when appropriate, what
the goals of federal investment should be, what specific roles the
federal government and other stakeholders should play, and what federal
revenue sources and funding mechanisms should be used to support
freight-related investments. As we have previously reported, critical
factors and questions can be used as criteria for determining the
appropriateness of a federal role and a framework with components that
we believe would be helpful in guiding any future federal freight-
related investments. Implementing this GAO framework would include
setting national goals for federal investment in freight-related
infrastructure, clearly defining federal and other stakeholder roles,
and identifying sustainable revenue sources and cost-effective funding
mechanisms that can be applied to maximize the national public benefits
of federal investments.
GAO's Critical Questions and Framework Could Guide Future Federal
Investment in Freight-Related Infrastructure:
In light of the federal government's long-term fiscal imbalance, it is
important for federal policy makers to determine how the federal
government can support efficient, mode-neutral, transparent, and
sustainable investments in freight-related infrastructure. In our
report on 21st century challenges facing the federal government, we
defined critical factors and questions that are useful as criteria for
determining the appropriate federal role in a government program,
policy, function, or activity.[Footnote 48] These critical factors and
questions are designed to address the legislative basis for a program,
its purpose and continued relevance, its effectiveness in achieving
goals and outcomes, its efficiency and targeting, its affordability and
sustainability, and its management. The factors and questions can be
used as criteria for determining the appropriateness of federal
involvement in freight-related transportation, including freight
railroad projects, as shown in table 2.
Table 2: GAO's Critical Factors and Questions for Determining the
Appropriateness of a Federal Role in Freight-Related Transportation:
Factors: Relevance and purpose of the federal role;
Questions: Are some freight transportation issues of nationwide
interest? If so, is a federal role warranted based on the likely
failure of private markets or state and local governments to address
underlying freight problems or concerns? Does current federal
involvement in freight infrastructure encourage or discourage the
private and other public sectors from investing their own resources to
address the problem?.
Factors: Measuring success;
Questions: Do current federal funding mechanisms and programs for
freight-related infrastructure have outcome-based performance measures
and are all applicable costs and benefits considered?.
Factors: Targeting benefits;
Questions: Are current funding mechanisms for freight-related
infrastructure targeted to generate national benefits in areas with the
greatest needs and the least capacity to meet those needs?.
Factors: Affordability and cost effectiveness;
Questions: Do current revenue sources and funding mechanisms for
federal freight-related infrastructure encourage state and local
governments and the private sector to invest their own resources? Are
these revenue sources sustainable and are the funding mechanisms
affordable in the long term? Do these funding mechanisms use the most
cost-effective or net beneficial approaches when compared with other
tools and program designs?.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
If federal policy makers determine that there is an appropriate role
for the federal government in freight infrastructure investments,
including those related to railroads, the implementation of that role
should have several components. From our past work on transportation
investment--in such areas as intercity passenger rail, intermodal
transportation, and marine transportation--we have defined a systematic
framework that can also guide the implementation of any future federal
role in freight-related infrastructure investments.[Footnote 49] Our
framework's components include setting national goals, establishing
clear stakeholder roles, and providing sustainable funding (see table
3).
Table 3: Three Components of GAO's Framework Applied to Federal
Involvement in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investments:
Component: Set national goals;
Description: These goals, which would establish what federal
participation in the freight transportation system is designed to
accomplish, should be specific, measurable, achievable, and outcome-
based.
Component: Establish and clearly define stakeholder roles, especially
the federal role relative to the roles of state and local governments
and private railroads;
Description: The federal government is one of many stakeholders
involved in freight-related investments, including those involving
freight railroads. Others include state and local governments, port
authorities, shippers, and the railroads themselves. Given the broad
range of beneficiaries, it is important to gain consensus on what the
transportation system is to achieve and to help ensure that the federal
role does not negatively affect the participation or role of other
stakeholders.
Component: Determine which revenue sources and funding mechanisms will
maximize the impact of any federal expenditures and investment;
Description: This component can help expand the ability to provide
funding resources and to promote cost-sharing responsibilities. Given
the current budgetary environment and the long-range fiscal challenges
confronting the nation, federal funding for future freight-related
transportation projects, including those involving freight railroads,
will require a high level of justification and should be prioritized to
maximize national public benefits.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
In conjunction with GAO's framework, it would also be important to
evaluate freight investments periodically to determine the extent to
which expected benefits are being realized. Evaluations also create
opportunities for periodically reexamining established goals,
stakeholder roles, and funding approaches, and provide a basis for
modifying them as necessary.[Footnote 50] In addition, evaluations help
to ensure accountability and provide incentives for achieving results.
Encouraging or requiring the identification of all project costs and of
all parties who will bear the costs can help ensure that the costs are
apportioned among all stakeholders equitably.[Footnote 51] Leading
private and public organizations that we have studied in the past have
stressed the importance of developing performance measures and then
linking investment decisions and their expected outcomes to overall
strategic goals and objectives.[Footnote 52]
Goals of a Future Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure
Investment Should Be Structured to Maximize National Benefits:
The first component of GAO's framework for guiding the federal role in
freight-related infrastructure investment is a set of clearly defined
national goals.[Footnote 53] Such goals can help chart a clear
direction, establish priorities among competing demands, and specify
the desired results of any federal investment. Since many stakeholders
are involved in the freight transportation system, the achievement of
national goals for the system hinges on the federal government's
ability to forge effective partnerships with nonfederal entities.
Decision makers need to balance national goals with the unique needs
and interests of all nonfederal stakeholders in order to leverage the
resources and capabilities of state and local governments and the
private sector. National goals should be structured in a way that
allows for reliably estimating and comparing national public benefits
and national public costs. As we have previously reported,[Footnote 54]
quantifying public benefits can be difficult, yet an effort should be
made to determine that the anticipated public benefits are sufficient
to justify the proposed levels of public investment.[Footnote 55] For
example, at the state level, the Pennsylvania DOT evaluates and
justifies freight railroad investments, in part, by estimating the wear
and tear imposed by trucks on highways.
The primary goal of federal investments in freight infrastructure
should be to maximize the national public benefits of the investments.
One way to focus these goals could be through federally designated
Projects of National and Regional Significance, a program that has been
designed to address critical national economic and transportation needs
and has funded highway and railroad infrastructure projects. For
example, one goal could be to improve intermodal freight mobility--
which encompasses air, railroad, water, and highway facilities and
infrastructure--at designated ports of national significance that serve
multistate regions and/or large populations.
Federal policy makers and other stakeholders could define their
respective roles in many different ways once the goals for the federal
role in freight transportation infrastructure have been established.
However, the key elements in defining the federal and other stakeholder
roles would be to create incentives for collaboration, secure benefits,
and promote equity for all stakeholders, both public and private, that
invest in freight-related infrastructure projects. Defining these
elements is especially important for the federal role in freight
railroad infrastructure investments because, while most of that
infrastructure is privately owned, investments to improve safety and
increase capacity may benefit stakeholders at all levels (national,
regional, state, local and private sector).
Public and Private Stakeholder Roles for Future Involvement in Freight-
Related Infrastructure Investments Should Be Clearly Defined:
In our prior work, we have found that, in defining stakeholder roles,
it is important to match capabilities and resources with appropriate
goals.[Footnote 56] This is important for federal participation because
other stakeholders may want to emphasize other priorities and use
federal funds in ways that may not achieve national public benefits.
This can happen if other stakeholders seek to (1) transfer a previously
local function to the federal arena or (2) use federal funds to reduce
their traditional levels of commitment. One aim of federal
participation in infrastructure investments is to promote or supplement
expenditures that would not occur without federal funding--to avoid
substituting federal funding for funding that would otherwise have been
provided by private or other public investors.[Footnote 57]
Further refinements to DOT's draft Framework could help to define
stakeholder roles in two ways, first by acknowledging that the
interests of federal, state, and local entities may compete, and second
by recognizing where public and private sector interests meet and
diverge. When the federal government invests in freight railroad
infrastructure, it could justify its involvement by establishing
criteria for projects that (1) are based on national freight goals, (2)
are designed to capture national freight transportation benefits, and
(3) direct funds to state, local, and private entities that would spend
the funds in accordance with the national goals. For example, the
federal government might justify its investment in a project that had
national goals of improving interstate freight mobility, reducing
pollution and congestion, and enhancing safety on a multistate railroad
and highway transportation corridor. In contrast, states and localities
seek public benefits that accrue within their jurisdictions, such as
improved automobile safety at grade crossings and reduced air pollution
within a regional attainment area, and are able to channel state,
local, and discretionary federal funds accordingly. When examining
public versus private interests, public stakeholders must recognize
that railroads are privately owned and invest resources to maximize
shareholder returns and enhance the efficiency and capacity of their
operations. Some railroad infrastructure projects have spillover
effects that produce public benefits, such as more efficient goods
movement. Yet other railroad infrastructure projects that could benefit
the public do not meet railroads' internal return-on-investment
criteria, and therefore the railroads would not invest in them, and the
public would not realize the benefits.
One possible way of defining stakeholder roles could be through public-
private partnerships. As we have stated earlier, public-private
partnerships create a forum for bringing diverse stakeholders together
around an issue of mutual interest to determine how best to share
resources, identify stakeholder responsibilities, and achieve public
and private benefits. Encouraging public-private partnerships to
provide efficient solutions to freight transportation needs could
increase the likelihood that the most worthwhile improvements would be
implemented and that projects would be operated and maintained
efficiently.[Footnote 58] One example of a public-private partnership
that addresses various private and public stakeholder interests in
railroad infrastructure is the CREATE project in the Chicago area. The
drive to make significant investments in the Chicago area's railroad
infrastructure came from public and private railroad stakeholders
because of their concern over the heavy railroad congestion in that
area.[Footnote 59] Under the CREATE project, stakeholders established
individual roles that included owning and managing specific projects
and assuming joint financial obligations. The railroads initially
invested $100 million to begin addressing their interests, the federal
government has added $100 million by designating CREATE as a Project of
National or Regional Significance, and the state of Illinois and the
city of Chicago have pledged $100 million and $30 million,
respectively, to begin addressing passenger railroad projects. CREATE
stakeholders also plan to leverage other federal, state, and private
funds over the lifetime of the project. The Alameda Corridor Program in
the Los Angeles area provides another example of how effective
partnering allowed the capabilities of the various stakeholders to be
more fully utilized. Called the Alameda Corridor because of the street
it parallels, the program created a 20-mile, $2.4 billion railroad
express line connecting the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to the
transcontinental railroad network east of downtown Los Angeles. The
express line eliminates approximately 200 street-level railroad
crossings, relieving congestion and improving freight mobility for
cargo. This project made substantial use of local stakeholders' ability
to raise funds. While the federal government participated in the cost,
its share was about 20 percent of the total. In addition, about 80
percent of the federal assistance is in the form of a loan rather than
a grant.
Future Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investments
Should Meet Federal Goals While Recognizing Federal Financial
Constraints:
A well-designed and strategic national freight transportation policy--
of which there is a federal component--can help encourage investment by
other public and private stakeholders and maximize the application of
limited federal dollars for freight-related infrastructure.[Footnote
60] While it is important to ensure that such a policy promotes federal
investments in freight infrastructure that generate national public
benefits, especially when those investments are in privately owned and
operated freight railroad infrastructure, it is also important to note
that any federal investments will face federal financial constraints.
Although federal investments could be crucial to securing the national
public benefits of certain freight-related infrastructure projects that
would not otherwise proceed, the scarcity of federal funds puts a
premium on justifying and targeting the use of federal funds for these
projects to address critical needs and maximize benefits.
As we have previously reported, determining the scope of government
involvement in transportation investments entails three major steps:
(1) determining that the project is worthwhile by applying a rigorous
cost-benefit analysis or similar study; (2) justifying government
involvement on the basis of known criteria; and (3) deciding on the
level of public subsidy consistent with local, state, regional, or
national interests and benefits.[Footnote 61] Currently, most federal
freight investments come from the fiscally constrained General Fund and
Highway Trust Fund; and typically these investments are not subject to
a thorough benefit-cost analysis or to the consistent application of
project criteria, nor are they funded with the assurance that the
funding provided by public and private beneficiaries is commensurate
with the benefits these parties receive.
Federal investments in freight infrastructure must be justified and
meet objective criteria to maximize the impact of federal funds.
Justifying government involvement in freight infrastructure projects
involves identifying and quantifying project costs and public and
private benefits, and having clear guidelines specifying the conditions
under which public involvement is warranted. Given constraints on
federal, state, and local funding, we have advocated that public
entities implement project justification tools such as benefit-cost
analysis to better assess proposed transportation investments and
accordingly target limited funds.[Footnote 62] Results-oriented
assessments can be used to determine what is needed to obtain specific
national outcomes.[Footnote 63] In October 2006, we recommended that
DOT, as it continues to draft the Framework for a National Freight
Policy, consider strategies to create a level playing field for all
freight modes and recognize the highly constrained federal fiscal
environment by developing mechanisms to assess and maximize public
benefits from federally financed freight transportation
investments.[Footnote 64] Furthermore, as we testified in March 2007,
the federal government should make ensuring accountability for results,
as well as maximizing benefits, high priorities in deciding on federal
investments in transportation infrastructure.[Footnote 65]
Unfortunately, we have found that formal analyses are not often used in
deciding among alternative projects, evaluations of outcomes are not
typically conducted, and the evaluations that are done show that
projects often do not produce anticipated outcomes. The public sector
faces many challenges in quantifying national, regional, state, and
local benefits, while railroads are more able to determine the monetary
and operational benefits of proposed infrastructure projects and can
invest accordingly. For example, railroads can assess how much each
hour of train delay costs them, but public entities cannot easily
quantify the environmental benefits of faster freight railroad
transport and less truck traffic.[Footnote 66] Representatives of three
state DOTs we interviewed acknowledged the difficulty of quantifying
public benefits, which may make it difficult to judiciously allocate
scarce transportation funds to those projects that may accrue the
highest public benefits.
According to the Transportation Research Board (TRB), public support
for freight infrastructure projects must be established on a project-
by-project basis to determine if a project produces certain benefits,
such as reductions in the external costs of transportation,
efficiencies in the transportation system beyond those recognized by
the private sector, or improvements in public safety.[Footnote 67] TRB
stated that if government involvement cannot be justified on one of
these grounds, the private sector should undertake the project. One
federal program that awards funds using project justification criteria
is the Federal Transit Administration's discretionary New Starts
program. This program is the federal government's primary source of
funds for capital investment in locally planned, implemented, and
operated transit. Potential New Starts projects must meet certain
project justification criteria (e.g., mobility improvements and
operating efficiencies) and demonstrate adequate local financial
support (e.g., the ability of the sponsoring agency to fund the
operation and maintenance of the entire system once the project is
built). A comparable approach could be designed so that freight
railroad infrastructure investments--proposed by state or local
governments, private railroads, or public-private partnerships--meet
appropriate project justification criteria, demonstrate public and
private support, and provide the lowest cost to the federal government.
Different funding mechanisms and revenue sources could also be used to
implement any future federal role in freight infrastructure
investments. See appendix III for a more complete discussion of these
revenue sources and funding mechanisms.
Conclusions:
Projected increases in freight transportation demand will likely
increase the importance of the nation's freight railroad
infrastructure. Bridges and tunnels are critical and expensive parts of
infrastructure. Because most of the freight railroad network is
privately owned, the railroads have a keen financial interest in
maintaining and investing in their bridges and tunnels. The federal
role in overseeing the public safety of these structures, and in
funding improvements to them, has been limited.
Concerning the safety area, we have found in our prior work that a risk-
management approach to oversight of companies' overall management of
safety risks provides an additional assurance of safety in conjunction
with inspections. FRA has adopted this risk-management approach in
applying its guidelines for bridge management during its bridge safety
surveys of individual railroads. However, a more consistent and
systematic approach in selecting railroads for bridge safety surveys
based on data about railroads' bridge management programs, such as
whether or not the railroads have regular inspections by a qualified
civil engineer and how they record and use that bridge inspection data,
could enhance the effectiveness of the FRA's limited resources
available for bridge and tunnel safety. This approach could help target
FRA's limited bridge inspection resources toward railroads that present
the greatest safety risk, especially numerous short lines that may have
more deteriorated infrastructure and less technical and financial
resources to maintain their bridges and tunnels.
With respect to the federal role in freight-related infrastructure,
including railroad bridges and tunnels, the federal approach to such
investments needs to be better structured to maximize achieving
national public benefits such as increased freight mobility, reduced
congestion, and improved environmental quality. Although the current
federal structure of loans, credits, and grants administered by
different agencies with different missions from disparate funding
sources may attain some national public benefits, that structure is not
guided by a national freight strategy and may miss opportunities for an
even higher return of national public benefits for federal
expenditures. DOT has taken a first step in the direction of
articulating such a strategy by developing its Framework for a National
Freight Policy, but we believe that the agency needs to go further in
developing a true national freight transportation strategy that can
help organize and unify the current structure to achieve that higher
return. Our past work on public investments in transportation has found
that such a strategy should focus on national freight transportation
related goals, involve all public and private stakeholders, and
distribute costs equitably across all public and private beneficiaries.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
* To enhance the effectiveness of its bridge and tunnel safety
oversight function, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation
direct the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration to
devise a systematic, consistent, risk-based methodology for selecting
railroads for its bridge safety surveys to ensure that it includes
railroads that are at higher risk of not following the FRA's bridge
safety guidelines and of having bridge and tunnel safety issues.
* To help better focus limited federal resources, we recommend that the
Secretary of Transportation ensure that its draft Framework for a
National Freight Policy :
* includes clear national goals for federal involvement in freight-
related infrastructure investments across all modes, including freight
railroad investments;
* establishes and clearly defines roles for all public and private
stakeholders; and:
* identifies funding mechanisms for federal freight-related
infrastructure investments, including freight railroad investments,
which provide the highest return in national public benefits for
limited federal expenditures.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment prior
to finalizing the report. DOT and FRA officials--including FRA's
Associate Administrator for Safety--generally agreed with the
information in this report, and they provided technical clarifications,
which we have incorporated in this report as appropriate. These
officials agreed with the recommendation related to the methodology for
selecting railroads for bridge safety surveys and said that they are
already taking steps to implement it, and DOT officials said that they
would consider the recommendation concerning changes to DOT's draft
Framework for a National Freight Policy.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the
appropriate congressional committees and to the Secretary of
Transportation. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web Site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff that made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
JayEtta Z. Hecker:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine what information is maintained by railroads on the
condition of their bridges and tunnels, and the contribution of this
infrastructure to congestion, we reviewed documentation from railroads
on bridge and tunnel data management policies, inspection procedures,
sample inspection reports, and capital improvement plans. We also
determined the federal role in collecting and reporting information on
railroad bridges and tunnels by interviewing officials from federal
agencies, state agencies, freight railroads, and industry associations
(see table 4), and by reviewing bridge and tunnel data collected and
maintained by these federal agencies. To determine to what extent
bridges and tunnels contribute to freight railroad congestion, we
reviewed literature on freight railroad congestion, railroad corridor
plans, and freight demand studies to identify current levels of freight
railroad congestion, major factors contributing to congestion, and
proposed solutions. We also interviewed representatives from industry
associations and railroads to understand how this information is used,
what challenges railroads face in maintaining and replacing railroad
bridges and tunnels, and what strategies railroads use to enhance
capacity and alleviate congestion. We did not independently verify the
accuracy of public or private bridge and tunnel condition information,
inspection reports, or congestion information. In addition, we did not
independently assess the conditions of bridges and tunnels.
To identify the federal role in overseeing railroad bridge and tunnel
safety, we reviewed public laws and interviewed officials from the
public agencies and railroads listed in table 4. In particular, we
discussed the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) structural safety
oversight role with FRA's Chief Structural Engineer, all five FRA
bridge specialists, and one FRA regional track specialist, and asked
railroads about their interactions with FRA. We reviewed examples of
FRA's bridge safety survey documentation to determine the content of
these surveys and what actions FRA takes after assessing a railroad's
bridge conditions. We also accompanied an FRA bridge specialist on a
bridge safety survey and other informal bridge and tunnel observations.
We reviewed examples of FRA emergency orders, compliance agreements,
and structural observation reports to determine how FRA enforces its
oversight role. Because there are more bridges than tunnels in the
United States and because FRA has established a policy on bridge
safety, we reviewed more information on railroad bridges than on
tunnels. Moreover, because we used FRA's records to understand FRA
processes and actions, we did not independently verify the reliability
of the data in this sample of FRA's observation records.
To determine how public funds are currently used for railroad
infrastructure investments, including those for bridges and tunnels, we
interviewed the entities included in table 4 and synthesized relevant
information from these entities, as well as from the Federal Highway
Administration and the Joint Committee on Taxation. We did not
independently verify the accuracy of the self-reported cost information
provided by the railroads, public agencies, and professional
associations. We reviewed Department of Transportation's (DOT) draft
Framework for a National Freight Policy. We also analyzed pertinent
legislation and analyzed and synthesized relevant information from our
reports and other ongoing work.
To determine what criteria and framework could be used to guide the
future federal role in freight-related infrastructure investments,
including those for railroad bridges and tunnels, we relied extensively
on perspectives gained from our past work in transportation and
infrastructure systems and federal investment strategies. We also
reviewed DOT's Draft Framework for a National Freight Policy. We used
our prior work and conventional economic reasoning to identify key
considerations regarding possible revenue sources and funding
mechanisms for federal government support for freight-related
infrastructure investment and to evaluate potential revenue sources and
funding mechanisms on the basis of those considerations.
In addressing all of our objectives, we conducted five site visits to:
* observe the conditions of selected bridges and tunnels on Class I,
II, and III railroads;
* understand maintenance and deterioration issues inherent in different
geographies and structure types;
* interview railroad and state agency personnel who manage, inspect,
and maintain these structures;
* interview railroad operations personnel who monitor traffic capacity
and congestion and finance personnel who determine capital investment
priorities and allocations; and:
* meet with state and local transportation agency officials.
For a complete list of all entities interviewed, including those
interviewed as part of our site visits, see table 4. We selected our
site visit locations--Baltimore, Maryland and Washington, D.C; Illinois
and Iowa; Kansas and Missouri; Ohio and West Virginia; and Oregon--
based on geographic distribution and the presence of large and small
railroads, private-public partnership stakeholders, and state DOTs
involved in freight railroad or large freight railroad public- private
partnerships.
In addition to interviews conducted as part of our site visits, we
interviewed representatives from the six largest Class I freight
railroads in the United States;[Footnote 68] Amtrak; industry
associations; federal, state, and local transportation officials; and
federal agencies involved with collecting information on, overseeing,
or providing funding for railroad bridges and tunnels. We also
interviewed additional state agencies based on their involvement in
railroad bridge and tunnel oversight, freight railroad funding, or
major freight railroad public-private partnerships. Table 4 lists the
names and locations of all railroads; federal, state, and local
agencies; industry associations; and transportation, engineering, and
academic experts we interviewed as part of our review.
Table 4: Names and Headquarters Locations of Entities Contacted:
Name: Class I freight railroads: BNSF Railway Company[A];
Headquarters location: Fort Worth, TX.
Name: Class I freight railroads: Canadian National Railway[A];
Headquarters location: Montreal, Quebec.
Name: Class I freight railroads: CSX Transportation[A];
Headquarters location: Jacksonville, FL.
Name: Class I freight railroads: Kansas City Southern Railway[A];
Headquarters location: Kansas City, MO.
Name: Class I freight railroads: Norfolk Southern[A];
Headquarters location: Norfolk, VA.
Name: Class I freight railroads: Union Pacific Railroad Company[A];
Headquarters location: Omaha, NE.
Name: Class I passenger railroads: National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak)[A];
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C.
Name: Class II freight railroads: Iowa Interstate Railroad[A];
Headquarters location: Cedar Rapids, IA.
Name: Class II freight railroads: Wheeling and Lake Erie Railway
Co.[A];
Headquarters location: Brewster, OH.
Name: Class III freight railroads: Albany and Eastern Railroad
Company[A];
Headquarters location: Lebanon, OR.
Name: Class III freight railroads: Belt Railway Company of Chicago[A];
Headquarters location: Bedford Park, IL.
Name: Class III freight railroads: Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railway
Co. (CRANDIC)[A];
Headquarters location: Cedar Rapids, IA.
Name: Class III freight railroads: Iowa Northern Railway Company[A];
Headquarters location: Cedar Rapids, IA.
Name: Class III freight railroads: Kansas City Terminal Railway Co.[A];
Headquarters location: Kansas City, KS.
Name: Class III freight railroads: Ohio Central Railroad Company[A];
Headquarters location: Coshocton, OH.
Name: Class III freight railroads: Port of Tillamook Bay Railroad[A];
Headquarters location: Tillamook, OR.
Name: Class III freight railroads: SEMO Port Railroad[A];
Headquarters location: Scott City, MO.
Name: Class III freight railroads: Watco Companies, Inc.[A];
Headquarters location: Pittsburg, KS.
Name: Federal agencies: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C.
Name: Federal agencies: U.S. Department of Defense Surface Deployment
and Distribution Command: Transportation Engineering Agency;
Headquarters location: Newport News, VA.
Name: Federal agencies: U.S. Department of Energy;
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C.
Name: Federal agencies: U.S. Department of Homeland Security United
States Coast Guard Transportation Security Administration;
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C;
Washington, D.C;
Arlington, VA.
Name: Federal agencies: U.S. DOT;
Federal Highway Administration;
Federal Railroad Administration;
Office of Safety and Compliance[A] Office of Railroad Development
Office of Policy and Program Development;
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C.
Name: Federal agencies: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency;
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C.
Headquarters location: NameIllinois DOT[A]: [Empty].
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Illinois DOT[A];
Headquarters location: Springfield, IL.
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Kansas DOT[A];
Headquarters location: Topeka, KS.
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Louisiana DOT and
Development;
Headquarters location: Baton Rouge, LA.
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Maryland DOT[A];
Headquarters location: Hanover, MD.
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Missouri DOT[A];
Headquarters location: Jefferson City, MO.
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Ohio DOT[A];
Headquarters location: Columbus, OH.
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Ohio Rail Development
Commission[A];
Headquarters location: Columbus, OH.
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Oregon DOT[A];
Headquarters location: Salem, OR.
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Pennsylvania DOT;
Headquarters location: Harrisburg, PA.
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Pennsylvania Public
Utilities Commission;
Headquarters location: Harrisburg, PA.
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio[A];
Headquarters location: Columbus, OH.
Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Tennessee DOT;
Headquarters location: Nashville, TN.
Name: Local agencies: Chicago DOT[A];
Headquarters location: Chicago, IL.
Name: Local agencies: Columbus Regional Airport Authority[A];
Headquarters location: Columbus, OH.
Name: Local agencies: Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas
City, Kansas[A];
Headquarters location: Kansas City, KS.
Name: Industry associations: The American Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials;
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C.
Name: Industry associations: American Short Line and Regional Railroad
Association;
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C.
Name: Industry associations: The Association of American Railroads;
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C.
Name: Industry associations: Dr. Kazuya Kawamura, University of
Illinois at Chicago;
Headquarters location: Chicago, IL.
Name: Industry associations: National Academy of Railroad Sciences[A];
Headquarters location: Overland Park, KS.
Name: Industry associations: TranSystems[A];
Headquarters location: Kansas City, MO.
Name: Industry associations: URS Corporation[A];
Headquarters location: San Francisco, CA.
Source: GAO.
[A] Indicates representatives were included in a site-visit.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Examples of Bridge and Tunnel Maintenance, Component and
Structural Replacement Costs on Selected Railroads:
Bridge type: Maintenance: Bridge ties;
Description of work: Replacing a bridge tie;
Cost estimates: $450 per tie.
Bridge type: Maintenance: Moveable steel bridge;
Description of work: Moveable bridge annual maintenance;
Cost estimates: $50,000 to $1 million.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Timber bridge;
Description of work: Replaced several timber components;
Cost estimates: $40,000 to $50,000.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Timber bridge;
Description of work: Replacing timber approach span;
Cost estimates: $239,000.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Timber bridge;
Description of work: Replacing timber substructure and deck with steel
and concrete components;
Cost estimates: $3 - $3.5 million.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Concrete bridge;
Description of work: Concrete bridge pier replacement;
Cost estimates: $225,000.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Concrete bridge;
Description of work: Abutment replacement;
Cost estimates: $75,000.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Concrete bridge;
Description of work: Replacing stone arches with culverts;
Cost estimates: $50,000.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Steel bridge;
Description of work: Upgrade steel to handle 286,000-lbs. railcars;
Cost estimates: $100,000.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Moveable steel bridge;
Description of work: Replacement of several steel components;
Cost estimates: $1 million.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Moveable steel bridge;
Description of work: Fender system replacement caused by barge strike;
Cost estimates: $200,000 to $600,000.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Tunnel;
Description of work: Replacing timber lining in tunnel with concrete
lining;
Cost estimates: $800,000.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Tunnel;
Description of work: Upgrading ventilation system;
Cost estimates: $3.5 million.
Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Tunnel;
Description of work: Opening or "day- lighting" tunnel;
Cost estimates: $3 million.
Bridge type: Replacement: Timber bridge;
Description of work: Timber bridge replacement;
Cost estimates: $600,000 to $700,000.
Bridge type: Replacement: Steel bridge;
Description of work: Steel bridge replacement;
Cost estimates: $22 - $44 million.
Bridge type: Replacement: Moveable steel bridge;
Description of work: Moveable swing span replacement;
Cost estimates: $25 - $40 million.
Bridge type: Replacement: Moveable steel bridge;
Description of work: Replacement of a moveable swing span bridge with a
lift span bridge;
Cost estimates: $100 million.
Source: GAO analysis of interviews with railroad officials.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Considerations of Funding Sources and Mechanisms
Available for Federal Funding of Freight-Related Infrastructure:
Different funding mechanisms and revenue sources can be used to
implement any future federal role in freight infrastructure
investments. Two main revenue sources are available to the federal
government in financing freight infrastructure investments: (1) general
revenue, which comes primarily from broad-based personal and business
income taxes and (2) beneficiary financing revenue (such as user fees
or fuel taxes), which comes from taxes or fees assessed to specific
groups that would benefit from the federal investment. Revenue from
both of these sources could be used to increase investment in freight
railroad infrastructure beyond the level that the railroads would
provide without federal support. We note, however, that all revenue
sources do have opportunity costs, that is, the costs of any benefits
forgone from alternative investments that could have been made with
that revenue.
As discussed earlier in this report, the federal government currently
uses three main funding mechanisms to support freight railroad
infrastructure: grants, loans, and tax credits.[Footnote 69] Each
funding mechanism has its own advantages and limitations, but some
implications would apply to each. For example, while the three
mechanisms may make federal subsidies available for freight
infrastructure investments, they may not necessarily increase the total
amount of funding provided for those investments. Instead, these
subsidies might result in the substitution of federal funds for the
railroads' own funds for investments that they would have made
themselves, even without federal support. Revenue sources and potential
funding mechanisms need to be evaluated in terms of several key
considerations--including equity, sustainability, and efficiency for
revenue sources, and efficiency and transparency for funding
mechanisms--as discussed below.
* Equity - Equity is often assessed according to two principles: the
benefit principle and the ability-to-pay principle. Equity occurs
according to the benefit principle when those who pay for a service are
the same as those who benefit from the service. Under the ability-to-
pay principle, those who are more capable of bearing the burden of
taxes or fees pay more in taxes and fees than those with less ability
to pay, and a tax or fee structure is generally considered more
equitable if that is the case. The use of general revenues is most
equitable according to the benefit principle when the benefits are
diffused across all taxpayers. Benefit financing sources (per-container
or per-railroad-car fees or commodity-specific taxes) can be a more
equitable funding source when the benefits are more focused on a
locality or set of users and it is possible to collect the additional
revenues from beneficiaries through higher fees or taxes. Either
approach could be consistent with the ability-to-pay principle
depending on how the revenue source is structured. A combination of
beneficiary financing, federal general revenue, and local matching
funds could also be used to enhance equity in order to link the amount
of payment for an infrastructure investment to the anticipated amount
of private, national, and local benefits gained, although these
benefits may be hard to quantify.
* Sustainability - Sustainability can be defined as the ability of a
revenue source to maintain a given level of federal expenditure for an
investment over time. Technological change or inflation could affect
the sustainability of some beneficiary financing revenue sources by
influencing revenue levels or their purchasing power. But these sources
can be more sustainable if they have the flexibility to respond to
reductions in demand or consumption and can be indexed to inflation or
otherwise periodically adjusted. The sustainability of general revenue
could be affected by the federal government's long-term structural
fiscal imbalance.
* Efficiency - Efficiency implications exist for both the choice of
revenue source and the choice of funding mechanism. For revenue
sources, efficiency can be assessed based on the impact of economic
behavioral changes likely to result from use of each source and by how
much accountability[Footnote 70] is provided. Using general revenue
rather than beneficiary financing revenue sources is likely to cause
smaller behavioral changes than using beneficiary financing.
Beneficiary financing is likely to cause larger behavioral changes in
raising a given amount of revenue because the impacts of a revenue
increase would be more concentrated in a geographic location (for
example, a user fee assessed for using a specific bridge or other
structure) or on a group of beneficiaries (for example, a diesel fuel
tax assessed only on railroads). However, these behavioral changes can
have either negative or positive consequences on economic efficiency,
such that in different circumstances increasing revenues from either
funding source could be less efficient or more inefficient. In terms of
accountability, the efficiency of a revenue source can be enhanced by
collecting funds from the groups that are benefiting from federal
investments in freight infrastructure. For funding mechanisms,
efficiency can be defined as the amount of benefit gained for the
amount of federal resources provided. Grants may generally be more
efficient than loans in that their administrative costs may be lower.
For tax credits, efficiency--or the benefits gained for the forgone tax
revenue--is both difficult to calculate and difficult to control,
because private firms often control the use of the credited funds
rather than the government. Therefore, the government may have less
opportunity to direct the funds toward generating specified national
public benefits than it does for grants or loans.[Footnote 71] To
increase the efficiency of grants, maintenance of effort
provisions[Footnote 72] could be incorporated to decrease the
likelihood that the funding provided through them will be substituted
for other funds, rather than combined with other funds to increase the
total investment. Although tax credits do not involve outlays of
federal funds, they do have analogous costs in forgone tax revenue that
would have to be considered in evaluating their efficiency.
* Transparency - Transparency can be defined as the extent to which the
costs of federal infrastructure investments are visible when using a
funding mechanism. The commitment of federal resources is visible if
there is a direct appropriation for a federal grant or loan program.
With a grant or a loan, the federal government can readily demonstrate
how much money was invested in what infrastructure. These funding
mechanisms can also be guided by objective, transparent criteria in
conjunction with congressional control over annual funding levels. With
tax credits for railroad infrastructure investment, however, it is less
visible how much the investment is costing the government through
forgone revenue, and it is harder for Congress to make trade-offs with
other discretionary spending programs.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
JayEtta Z. Hecker, (202) 512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Rita Grieco (Assistant
Director); Jay Cherlow; Steve Cohen; Elizabeth Eisenstadt; Alana
Finley; Greg Hanna; Carol Henn; Bert Japikse; Richard Jorgenson; Denise
McCabe; Elizabeth McNally; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Josh Ormond; Laura
Shumway; Ryan Siegel; and James Wozny made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Performance and Accountability: Transportation Challenges Facing the
Congress and the DOT. GAO-07-545T. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2007.
High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January
2007.
Rail Safety: The Federal Railroad Administration Is Taking Steps to
Better Target Its Oversight, but Assessment of Results Is Needed to
Determine Impact. GAO-07-149. Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2007.
Intercity Passenger Rail: National Policy and Strategies Needed to
Maximize Public Benefits from Federal Expenditures. GAO-07-15.
Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2006.
Freight Railroads: Industry Health Has Improved, but Concerns about
Competition and Capacity Should Be Addressed. GAO-07-94. Washington,
D.C.: October 6, 2006.
Government Performance and Accountability: Tax Expenditures Represent a
Substantial Federal Commitment and Need to Be Reexamined. GAO-05-690.
Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2005.
Freight Transportation: Short Sea Shipping Option Shows Importance of
Systematic Approach to Public Investment Decisions. GAO-05-768.
Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005.
21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government. GAO-05-325SP. Washington, D.C.: February 2005.
Highway and Transit Investments: Options for Improving Information on
Projects' Benefits and Costs and Increasing Accountability for Results.
GAO-05-172. Washington, D.C.: January 24, 2005.
Surface Transportation: Many Factors Affect Investment Decisions. GAO-
04-744. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Freight Transportation: Strategies Needed to Address Planning and
Financing Limitations. GAO-04-165. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2003.
Marine Transportation: Federal Financing and a Framework for
Infrastructure Investments. GAO-02-1033. Washington, D.C.: September 9,
2002.
Surface and Maritime Transportation: Developing Strategies for
Enhancing Mobility: A National Challenge. GAO-02-775. Washington, D.C.:
August 30, 2002.
U.S. Infrastructure: Funding Trends and Federal Agencies' Investment
Estimates. GAO-01-986T. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2001.
Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision Making. GAO/
AIMD-99-32. Washington, D.C.: December 1998.
Federal Budget: Choosing Public Investment Programs. GAO/AIMD-93-25.
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993.
Railroad Competitiveness: Federal Laws and Policies Affect Railroad
Competitiveness. GAO/RCED-92-16. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 1991.
Footnotes:
[1] A ton-mile is a standard industry measure that represents 1 ton of
freight transported 1 mile.
[2] For 2006, the Surface Transportation Board, a bipartisan,
independent adjudicatory agency administratively housed within DOT
responsible for resolving railroad rate issues, has defined Class I
railroads as railroads earning adjusted annual operating revenues of
$319.3 million or more. Class II railroads are those earning between
$25.5 million and $319.3 million, and Class III railroads are those
earning less than $25.5 million. The scope of this report covers
freight railroads of all classes.
[3] DOT, Framework for a National Freight Policy (Draft), (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 10, 2006).
[4] According to the American Short Line and Regional Railroad
Association (ASLRRA), short line railroads are generally Class III
railroads that are less than 350 miles long or provide switching and/or
terminal services.
[5] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005) and GAO,
Intercity Passenger Rail: National Policy and Strategies Needed to
Maximize Public Benefits from Federal Expenditures, GAO-07-15
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
[6] GAO-07-15. GAO, Intermodal Transportation: Potential Strategies
Would Redefine Federal Role in Developing Airport Intermodal
Capabilities, GAO-05-727 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2005), pp. 26-27;
and GAO, Marine Transportation: Federal Financing and a Framework for
Infrastructure Investments, GAO-02-1033 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2002), p. 17.
[7] ASLRRA does not maintain a precise count of the number of tunnels
on Class II and III railroads. The association's General Superintendent
of Safety and Operating Practices estimates that there are at least 30
tunnels of or over 100 feet in length on these railroads.
[8] A track-mile is equivalent to 1 mile of track, which includes main
track, yard tracks, and sidings. A train-mile refers to a train
traveling a distance of 1 mile.
[9] A route-mile is the measure of 1 mile of aggregate roadway, which
excludes yard tracks and sidings, and does not consider that a mile of
roadway may include parallel tracks.
[10] FRA survey results were reported in DOT, Office of Inspector
General, Audit Report: FRA's Interim Statement of Policy on the Safety
of Railroad Bridges, TR-1999-077 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 1999).
[11] AASHTO, Transportation--Invest in America: Freight-Rail Bottom
Line Report, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 16, 2003).
[12] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 31, 2007), pp. 18-19.
[13] Major railroads refers to Class I railroads.
[14] Officials with whom we spoke from the other Class I railroad said
the railroad is converting its paper inspection materials to an online
database.
[15] Some Class I railroads inspect a subset of bridges and tunnels
more frequently--based on condition, structure type, bridge type, age,
or traffic levels--such as requiring an inspection every 6 months for
timber trestle bridges and pin-connected steel bridges, because of
their increased potential for deterioration.
[16] FRA officials told us that they conduct, on average, about 25 to
35 bridge safety surveys per year of Class II and III railroads, but
they retained documentation on only 43 completed bridge safety surveys
of Class II and III railroads that they conducted from January 2004 to
March 2007.
[17] The RRIF program was established by the Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century (TEA-21) and amended by the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users.
Under this program, FRA is authorized to provide direct loans and loan
guarantees for the acquisition, improvement, or rehabilitation of
intermodal or railroad equipment or facilities, including track, rail,
bridges, yards, and buildings.
[18] A chokepoint is a place where there is recurring congestion or
delay.
[19] American Society of Civil Engineers, 2005 Report Card for
America's Infrastructure (Washington, D.C.: 2005).
[20] 33 C.F.R. Ch. 1, Part 117. Railroad bridges over navigable
waterways are required by law to open for marine traffic.
[21] The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 has been codified at 49
U.S.C. Chapter 201. Applicable civil and criminal penalties are found
at 49 U.S.C. Chapter 213.
[22] Prior to 1981, regional track engineers oversaw bridges and
tunnels, but by 1982 FRA had reclassified these employees as safety
specialists. Engineering qualifications are not required for this
revised role, and incoming safety specialists sometimes lacked the
bridge and tunnel knowledge of the previous regional track engineers.
[23] 49 C.F.R. §§214.101-214.117. Bridge worker safety regulations
include provisions such as requirements for railroads to provide
personal protective equipment and for railroad workers to use fall
protection systems when necessary.
[24] FRA also has a position for a second Structural Engineer in the
Office of Safety Headquarters. The position has been vacant for several
months, and FRA is presently recruiting a successor.
[25] The bridge specialist at FRA headquarters is not assigned to
particular railroads or regions. The specialist works with field
specialists on larger investigations that require two or more persons.
The specialist also coordinates complaint investigations and other
issues that come through FRA headquarters, and conducts training for
bridge specialists and FRA track and signal inspectors.
[26] The forces caused by the weight and movement of a train through a
tunnel are distributed through the supporting bedrock or stable ground.
By contrast, individual bridge components experience direct stress from
a passing train. Therefore, bridges are more subject to degradation
from heavier loads than are tunnels.
[27] FRA's bridge inspection guidelines, issued in 2000, can be found
in the Statement of Agency Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges 49
C.F.R. §213, app. C.
[28] 49 C.F.R. §§216.21 - 216.27.
[29] FRA bridge specialists also have the authority to enforce FRA
track safety standards and bridge worker safety regulations.
[30] GAO, Rail Safety: The Federal Railroad Administration Is Taking
Steps to Better Target Its Oversight, but Assessment of Results Is
Needed to Determine Impact, GAO-07-149 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26,
2007), p. 35.
[31] Potential public benefits of public investment in freight railroad
transportation include supporting economic development, enhancing
transportation system efficiency, improving mobility and decreasing
congestion, improving the environment and air quality, and enhancing
safety and security. On a national scale, these benefits could accrue
to regions of national interest whose freight flows impact multiple
states, large urban areas, and international gateways.
[32] 33 C.F.R. §§116.01. Alterations may include structural changes,
replacement, or removal of a bridge.
[33] GAO-02-1033, p. 17 and GAO-07-15, p. 90.
[34] GAO, Highway and Transit Investments: Options for Improving
Information on Projects' Benefits and Costs and Increasing
Accountability for Results, GAO-05-172 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24,
2005).
[35] One-third of all freight railroad traffic in the United States
originates, terminates, or passes through the Chicago area.
[36] GAO, Freight Railroads: Industry Health Has Improved, but Concerns
about Competition and Capacity Should Be Addressed, GAO-07-94
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 2006), p. 59.
[37] For example, while passenger and freight travel occurs on all
modes, federal funding and planning requirements focus largely on
highways and transit, making it difficult for freight projects to be
integrated into the transportation system. See GAO, Freight
Transportation: Short Sea Shipping Option Shows Importance of
Systematic Approach to Public Investment Decisions, GAO-05-768
(Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005), p. 35.
[38] For purposes of this report, a public-private partnership is a
strategy that public and private entities mutually agree to use to
implement a specific freight railroad project or group of projects.
Some representatives of state DOTs and railroads told us that they
consider any investment that is supported by public and private funds,
such as a grade crossing or siding project, to be a public-private
partnership.
[39] The Kansas City Terminal Railway Company is made up of four Class
I and one Class II railroads that meet in Kansas City, Missouri.
[40] Qualified private activity bonds are tax-exempt bonds issued by a
state or local government, the proceeds of which are used for a defined
qualified purpose by an entity other than the government issuing the
bonds.
[41] GAO, Freight Transportation: Strategies Needed to Address Planning
and Financing Limitations, GAO-04-165 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19,
2003), p. 5.
[42] GAO, Surface Transportation: Many Factors Affect Investment
Decisions, GAO-04-744 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004), p. 32.
[43] GAO, Performance and Accountability: Transportation Challenges
Facing Congress and the DOT, GAO-07-545T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6,
2007), p. 7.
[44] GAO-07-545T, p. 11.
[45] GAO-07-94, p. 5.
[46] GAO-07-310, p. 16.
[47] GAO-07-94, p. 62.
[48] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005), p. 14.
[49] See GAO-07-15, p. 90; GAO-05-727, pp. 26-27; and GAO-02-1033, p.
17.
[50] GAO-07-15, p. 90.
[51] One commonly used definition of the term "equitable" is the
principle that beneficiaries should pay for project costs, commensurate
with the benefits they receive from projects. However, in some cases,
the combined private and public benefits may substantially exceed the
combined costs. For example, if the cost of a project is $100 million,
and private benefits are $80 million and public benefits are $80
million, then in this case, an equitable public sharing of the cost
could be 80 percent private and 20 percent public, which would not
displace private investments that would have occurred in the absence of
public funding. See GAO-05-768, p. 31.
[52] GAO-07-15, p. 90.
[53] GAO, Marine Transportation: Federal Financing and a Framework for
Infrastructure Investments, GAO-02-1033 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2002), p. 18.
[54] GAO-04-744, p. 22.
[55] GAO-04-165, p. 40.
[56] GAO-02-1033, p. 22.
[57] Ibid.
[58] GAO-05-768, p. 31.
[59] The Chicago area is the largest railroad hub in the nation, with
one-third of all railroad traffic originating, terminating, or passing
through the area.
[60] GAO-02-1033, p. 22.
[61] GAO-04-165, p. 42.
[62] GAO-07-94, pp. 61 and 63.
[63] GAO-02-1033, pp. 19-20.
[64] GAO-07-94, p. 62.
[65] GAO-07-545T, p. 14.
[66] In an attempt to address this issue, in March 2005, DOT publicly
released the Intermodal Transportation and Inventory Cost software
model that enables users to identify the effects of traffic diverted
from trucks to railroads.
[67] According to TRB, external costs are borne by nonshippers or the
general public. Examples of external costs include health and other
damages caused by air pollution; noise generated by trucks, towboats,
and locomotives; and the traffic delays and congestion that an
additional truck or barge imposes on other users of roadways and
waterways. See Transportation Research Board, Special Report 252:
Policy Options for Intermodal Freight Transportation (Washington, D.C.:
1998) and Transportation Research Board, Special Report 271: Freight
Capacity for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: 2002).
[68] We did not interview Canadian Pacific, whose railroad lines in the
United States comprise the smallest Class I freight railroad.
[69] Tax credits are reductions in tax liabilities based on
preferential provisions of the tax code, resulting in forgone tax
revenue for the federal government.
[70] Accountability can be defined as ensuring that the beneficiaries
of a service pay the full social cost of that service. Although this
concept is similar to the benefit principle for assessing equity, in
discussing the effects of accountability on efficiency, we are
concerned with the accountability it provides rather than the fairness.
For example, if the beneficiaries do not pay the full social cost of a
benefit, they may seek to have more of the service provided by the
government even when the additional amounts of that service cost more
than their actual value to provide.
[71] In some cases, the government controls the allocation of funds for
certain tax credits. For example, officials from the Department of the
Treasury (and a group of external reviewers) review and score New
Markets Tax Credit applications and then make specific allocations of
the Credit itself to qualified applicants. See GAO, Tax Policy: New
Markets Tax Credit Appears to Increase Investment by Investors in Low-
Income Communities, but Opportunities Exist to Better Monitor
Compliance, GAO-07-296 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007) p. 7.
[72] Maintenance of effort provisions would require the entity
receiving the grant to maintain a certain level of spending over the
duration of the grant in order to receive the grant.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Susan Becker, Acting Manager, Becker@gao.gov (202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: