Runway Safety
Progress on Reducing Runway Incursions Impeded by Leadership, Technology, and Other Challenges Gao ID: GAO-08-481T February 13, 2008While aviation accidents in the United States are relatively infrequent, recent incidents have heightened concerns about safety on airport runways. As the nation's aviation system becomes more crowded every day, increased congestion at airports may exacerbate ground safety concerns. This statement discusses (1) the trends in runway incursions, (2) what FAA has done to improve runway safety, and (3) what more could be done. This statement is based on GAO's November 2007 report issued to this committee on runway safety. GAO's work on that report included surveying experts on the causes of runway incidents and accidents and the effectiveness of measures to address them, reviewing safety data, and interviewing agency and industry officials. This statement also contains information from FAA on recent incursions and actions taken since November 2007.
Recent data indicate that runway incursions, which are precursors to aviation accidents, are growing. Although the number and rate of incursions declined after reaching a peak in fiscal year 2001 and remained relatively constant for the next 5 years, they show a recent upward trend. From fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2007, the number and rate of incursions increased by 12 percent and both were nearly as high as their 2001 peak. Furthermore, the number of serious incursions--where collisions are narrowly or barely avoided--increased from 2 during the first quarter of fiscal year 2007 to 10 during the same quarter in fiscal year 2008. FAA has taken steps to address runway safety, but further progress has been impeded by the lack of leadership and coordination, technology challenges, lack of data, and human factors-related issues. FAA's actions have included deploying and testing technology designed to prevent runway collisions and promoting changes in airport layout, markings, signage, and lighting. However, until recently, FAA's Office of Runway Safety did not have a permanent director. Also, FAA has not updated its national runway safety plan since 2002, despite agency policy that such a plan be prepared every 2 to 3 years, resulting in uncoordinated efforts within the agency. Moreover, runway safety technology currently being installed, which is designed to provide air traffic controllers with the position and identification of aircraft on the ground and alerts of potential collisions, is behind schedule and experiencing cost increases and operational difficulties with its alerting function. FAA also lacks reliable runway safety data and the mechanisms to ensure that the data are complete. Furthermore, air traffic controller fatigue, which may result from regularly working overtime, continues to be a matter of concern for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and others. FAA could take additional measures to improve runway safety. These measures include implementing GAO's recommendations to prepare a new national runway safety plan, address controller overtime and fatigue, and start a nonpunitive, confidential, voluntary program for air traffic controllers to report safety risks in the national airspace system, which would be similar to a program that FAA has already established for pilots and others in the aviation community. Such a program could help the agency to understand the causes and circumstances regarding runway safety incidents. Additional improvements, suggested by experts and NTSB, include developing and deploying technology to provide alerts directly to pilots.
GAO-08-481T, Runway Safety: Progress on Reducing Runway Incursions Impeded by Leadership, Technology, and Other Challenges
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST:
Wednesday, February 13, 2008:
Runway Safety:
Progress on Reducing Runway Incursions Impeded by Leadership,
Technology, and Other Challenges:
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Runway Safety:
GAO-08-481T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-481T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
While aviation accidents in the United States are relatively
infrequent, recent incidents have heightened concerns about safety on
airport runways. As the nation‘s aviation system becomes more crowded
every day, increased congestion at airports may exacerbate ground
safety concerns. This statement discusses (1) the trends in runway
incursions, (2) what FAA has done to improve runway safety, and (3)
what more could be done. This statement is based on GAO‘s November 2007
report issued to this committee on runway safety. GAO‘s work on that
report included surveying experts on the causes of runway incidents and
accidents and the effectiveness of measures to address them, reviewing
safety data, and interviewing agency and industry officials. This
statement also contains information from FAA on recent incursions and
actions taken since November 2007.
What GAO Found:
Recent data indicate that runway incursions, which are precursors to
aviation accidents, are growing. Although the number and rate of
incursions declined after reaching a peak in fiscal year 2001 and
remained relatively constant for the next 5 years, they show a recent
upward trend. From fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2007, the
number and rate of incursions increased by 12 percent and both were
nearly as high as their 2001 peak. Furthermore, the number of serious
incursions”where collisions are narrowly or barely avoided”increased
from 2 during the first quarter of fiscal year 2007 to 10 during the
same quarter in fiscal year 2008.
FAA has taken steps to address runway safety, but further progress has
been impeded by the lack of leadership and coordination, technology
challenges, lack of data, and human factors-related issues. FAA‘s
actions have included deploying and testing technology designed to
prevent runway collisions and promoting changes in airport layout,
markings, signage, and lighting. However, until recently, FAA‘s Office
of Runway Safety did not have a permanent director. Also, FAA has not
updated its national runway safety plan since 2002, despite agency
policy that such a plan be prepared every 2 to 3 years, resulting in
uncoordinated efforts within the agency. Moreover, runway safety
technology currently being installed, which is designed to provide air
traffic controllers with the position and identification of aircraft on
the ground and alerts of potential collisions, is behind schedule and
experiencing cost increases and operational difficulties with its
alerting function. FAA also lacks reliable runway safety data and the
mechanisms to ensure that the data are complete. Furthermore, air
traffic controller fatigue, which may result from regularly working
overtime, continues to be a matter of concern for the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and others.
FAA could take additional measures to improve runway safety. These
measures include implementing GAO‘s recommendations to prepare a new
national runway safety plan, address controller overtime and fatigue,
and start a nonpunitive, confidential, voluntary program for air
traffic controllers to report safety risks in the national airspace
system, which would be similar to a program that FAA has already
established for pilots and others in the aviation community. Such a
program could help the agency to understand the causes and
circumstances regarding runway safety incidents. Additional
improvements, suggested by experts and NTSB, include developing and
deploying technology to provide alerts directly to pilots.
Figure:
This is a figure of an airline portraying "Incursion."
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
In prior work, GAO recommended that FAA take several measures to
enhance runway safety, such as updating its national runway safety
plan, collecting more complete data on runway incidents, and addressing
air traffic controller fatigue. The agency agreed to consider the
recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http:///www.GAO-08-481T]. For more information, contact
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on runway safety. While
aviation accidents in the United States are relatively infrequent,
recent incidents have heightened concerns about safety on airport
runways. On August 16, 2007, for example, at Los Angeles International
Airport--one of the nation's busiest airports--two commercial aircraft
carrying 296 people came within 37 feet of colliding, resulting in an
incident that is called a runway incursion. As the nation's aviation
system becomes more crowded every day, increased congestion at airports
may exacerbate ground safety concerns. At airports, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) focuses its safety oversight on the
movement areas--runways and taxiways[Footnote 1]--where the chances of
catastrophic accidents are greater than other areas.
My testimony today is focused on (1) the trends in runway incursions,
(2) what steps FAA has taken to improve runway safety, and (3) what
more could be done. This statement is based on our November 2007 report
on runway safety[Footnote 2] and work that we conducted between January
2008 and February 2008 to obtain updated information on recent
incursions and actions taken by FAA since our report was issued. Our
work on the November 2007 report included surveying experts on the
causes of runway incidents and accidents, the effectiveness of measures
that are being taken to address them, and what additional measures
could be taken. We conducted this work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives.
Summary:
* Recent data indicate that runway incursions, which are precursors to
aviation accidents, are growing. Although the number and rate of
incursions declined after reaching a peak in fiscal year 2001 and
remained relatively constant for the next 5 years, they show a recent
upward trend. From fiscal years 2006 through 2007, the number and rate
of incursions increased by 12 percent and were nearly as high as when
they reached their 2001 peak. Furthermore, the number of serious
incursions--where collisions were narrowly or barely avoided--
increased substantially during the first quarter of fiscal year 2008,
compared to the same quarter in fiscal year 2007.
* FAA has taken steps to address runway safety, but the lack of
leadership and coordination, technology challenges, lack of data, and
human factors-related issues impede further progress. To improve runway
safety, FAA has deployed and tested technology designed to prevent
runway collisions; promoted changes in airport layout, markings,
signage, and lighting; and provided training for pilots and air traffic
controllers. However, until recently, FAA's Office of Runway Safety did
not have a permanent director. Also, FAA has not updated its national
runway safety plan since 2002, despite agency policy that such a plan
be prepared every 2 to 3 years, which resulted in uncoordinated runway
safety efforts by individual FAA offices. Moreover, the runway safety
technology that FAA is currently installing, which is designed to
provide air traffic controllers with the position and identification of
aircraft on the ground and alerts of potential collisions, is behind
schedule and experiencing cost increases and having operational
difficulties with its alerting function. Additional technology to
prevent runway incursions is years away from deployment. FAA also lacks
reliable runway safety data and the mechanisms to ensure that the data
are complete. Furthermore, air traffic controller fatigue, a human
factors issue that may result from regularly working overtime,
continues to be a matter of concern for the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) and other aviation stakeholders.
* FAA could take additional measures to improve runway safety. In our
November 2007 report, we recommended that FAA prepare a new national
runway safety plan; address controller overtime and fatigue; and start
a nonpunitive, confidential, voluntary program for air traffic
controllers to report safety risks in the national airspace system,
similar to a program that FAA has already established for pilots and
others in the aviation community. Such a program could help the agency
to understand the causes and circumstances regarding runway safety
incidents. The agency agreed to consider our recommendations.
Additional improvements, suggested by experts we surveyed and NTSB,
include developing and deploying technology that provided alerts of
potential incursions directly to pilots.
Number and Rate of Incursions Show Upward Trend:
Runway safety is a longstanding major aviation safety concern;
prevention of runway incursions, which are precursors to aviation
accidents, has been on NTSB's list of most wanted transportation
improvements since 1990 because runway collisions can be catastrophic.
Recent data indicate that runway incursions are growing and may become
even more numerous as the volume of air traffic increases. The number
and rate of incursions declined from a peak in fiscal year 2001 and
remained relatively constant for the next 5 years. However, from fiscal
years 2006 through 2007, the number and rate of incursions increased by
12 percent and nearly regained the 2001 peak (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Number and Rate of Runway Incursions from Fiscal Year 1998
through Fiscal Year 2007:
This figure is a combination line and bar graph showing the number and
rate of runway incursions from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year
2007. The X axis is the fiscal year, the left Y axis is the number of
runway incursions, and the right Y axis is the rate of runway
incursions. The bars represent the number of runway incursions, and the
line represents the rate of runway incursions (per 1 million tower
operations.)
[See PDF for image]
Source: FAA.
Note: Table 1 in the appendix shows data for fig. 1.
[End of figure]
Additionally, data for the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 show that
the number of incursions increased substantially after FAA began using
a definition of incursions developed by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations specialized
agency.[Footnote 3] Using the ICAO definition, FAA is now counting some
incidents as incursions that had been formerly classified as surface
incidents.[Footnote 4] During the first quarter of fiscal year 2008,
using the ICAO definition, FAA counted 230 incursions. If FAA had
continued to use its previous definition, it would have counted 94
incursions. According to an FAA official, by adopting the ICAO
definition, FAA expects to report about 900 to 1,000 incursions this
year. Fig. 2 shows the number and rate of incursions, by quarter,
during fiscal year 2007 and during the first quarter of fiscal year
2008.
Figure 2: Incursions, by Quarter, during Fiscal Year 2007 and the First
Quarter of Fiscal Year 2008:
This figure is a combination line and bar chart showing incursions, by
quarter, during fiscal year 2007 and the first quarter of fiscal year
2008. The X axis represents the quarter, the left Y axis represents the
number of incursions, and the right Y axis represents the rate of
incursions. One of the lines represents incursion rate per 1 million
tower operations (old definition), and the other line represents
incursion rate per 1 million tower operations (new definition). One bar
represents incursions (old definition), and the other represents
incursions (new definition).
[See PDF for image]
Source: FAA.
Note: Table 2 in the appendix provides the data for fig. 2.
[End of figure]
Moreover, the number and rate of serious incursions--where collisions
were narrowly or barely avoided--increased substantially during the
first quarter of fiscal year 2008, compared to the same quarter in
fiscal year 2007.[Footnote 5] During the first quarter of fiscal year
2008, 10 serious incursions occurred, compared to 2 serious incursions
during the first quarter of fiscal year 2007. (See fig. 3.)
Figure 3: Serious Incursions, by Quarter, during Fiscal Year 2007 and
the First Quarter of Fiscal Year 2008:
This figure is a combination line and bar graph showing serious
incursions, by quarter, during fiscal year 2007 and the first quarter
of fiscal year 2008. The X axis is the quarter, the left Y axis is the
number of incursions, and the right Y axis represents the rate of
incursions. The line represents the incursion rate, and the bars
represent incursions.
[See PDF for image]
Source: FAA.
Note: FAA's adoption of the ICAO definition of incursions during the
first quarter of fiscal year 2008 did not affect the number or rate of
serious incursions. Table 2 in the appendix provides data for fig. 3.
[End of figure]
Most runway incursions involve general aviation aircraft. According to
FAA, 72 percent of incursions from fiscal years 2003 through 2006
involved at least one general aviation aircraft. However, about one-
third of the most serious incursions from fiscal years 2002 through
2007--about 9 per year--involved at least one commercial aircraft that
can carry many passengers. That number includes two serious incursions
that occurred just two months ago, in December 2007. (See table 3 in
the appendix for additional information on recent serious incursions.)
Figure 4 shows the number of serious incursions involving commercial
aircraft from fiscal years 2001 through 2007.
Figure 4: Total Number of Serious Incursions and Number of Serious
Incursions Involving At Least One Commercial Aircraft, Fiscal Year 2001
through Fiscal Year 2007:
This figure is a shaded bar chart showing the total number of serious
incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft, fiscal year 2001
through fiscal year 2007. The X axis represents the fiscal year, and
the Y axis represents the number of incursions. One bar represents
serious incursions not involving commercial aircraft, and the other bar
represents serious incursions involving at least one commercial
aircraft.
[See PDF for image]
Source: FAA.
Note: Table 4 in the appendix provides the data for fig. 4.
[End of figure]
In the United States, most incursions have occurred at major commercial
airports, where the volume of traffic is greater. Los Angeles
International Airport and Chicago O'Hare International Airport had the
greatest number of runway incursions from fiscal years 2001 through
2007, as shown in fig. 5.
Figure 5: U.S. Airports that Experienced the Most Runway Incursions
from Fiscal Year 2001 through Fiscal Year 2007:
This figure is a combination bar chart showing U.S. airports that
experienced the most runway incursions from fiscal year 2001 through
fiscal year 2007. The X axis represents the number of incursions, and
the Y axis represents the airports. One bar represents serious
incursions (categories A and B), and the other bar represents all other
incursions (categories C and D).
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
Note: Information was compiled from a list of airports that experienced
20 or more incursions from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007
and were certificated under 14 CFR Part 139. This information expands
upon the information we presented in GAO-08-29 (fig. 4), which only
included the top 10 airports experiencing incursions from fiscal years
2001 to 2006. In addition, we now include three airports--Long Beach-
Daugherty Field, John Wayne-Orange County, and North Las Vegas--which
were previously identified as general aviation airports. Table 5 in the
appendix provides the data for fig. 5.
[End of figure]
The primary causes of incursions, as cited by experts we surveyed and
some airport officials, include human factors issues, such as
miscommunication between air traffic controllers and pilots, a lack of
situational awareness on the airfield by pilots, and performance and
judgment errors by air traffic controllers and pilots. According to
FAA, 57 percent of incursions during fiscal year 2007 were caused by
pilot errors, 28 percent were caused by air traffic controller errors,
and 15 percent were caused by vehicle operator or pedestrian errors
(see fig. 6).
Figure 6: Causes of Incursions during Fiscal Year 2007:
This figure is a pie chart showing causes of incursions during fiscal
year 2007.
Pilot errors: 57%;
Controller errors: 28%;
Vehicle driver/pedestrian errors: 15%.
[See PDF for image]
Source: FAA.
[End of figure]
Challenges Remain Despite Numerous Efforts to Address Runway Safety:
FAA, airports, and airlines have taken steps to address runway safety,
but the lack of leadership and coordination, technology challenges,
lack of data, and human factors-related issues impede further progress.
To improve runway safety, FAA has deployed and tested technology
designed to prevent runway collisions; promoted changes in airport
layout, markings, signage, and lighting; and provided training for
pilots and air traffic controllers. In addition, in August 2007,
following several serious incursions, FAA met with aviation community
stakeholders and agreed on a short-term plan to improve runway safety.
In January 2008, FAA reported on the status of those actions, which
included:
* accelerating the upgrading of airport markings, which were originally
required to be completed by June 30, 2008, at medium and large
airports,
* upgrading markings at smaller commercial airports, which had not been
required,
* completing a runway safety review of 20 airports that were selected
on the basis of runway incident data, and:
* requiring that nonairport employees, such as airline mechanics,
receive recurrent driver training at 385 airports.
According to FAA, since the August 2007 meeting, all 112 active air
carriers have reported that they are (1) providing pilots with similar
or other training that incorporates scenarios from aircraft pushback
through taxi, and (2) reviewing procedures to identify and develop a
plan to address elements that contribute to pilot distraction while
taxiing. FAA also indicated that it had completed an analysis of air
traffic control procedures pertaining to taxi clearances and found that
more explicit taxi instructions are needed, and that it had signed a
partnership agreement with the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association to create a voluntary safety reporting system for air
traffic controllers.
In our November 2007 report, we found that FAA's Office of Runway
Safety had not carried out its leadership role to coordinate and
monitor the agency's runway safety efforts. Until recently, the office
did not have a permanent director for the previous 2 years and staffing
levels declined. FAA took a positive step by hiring a permanent
director at the Senior Executive Service level for the office in August
2007. The new director has indicated he is considering several
initiatives, including establishing a joint FAA-industry working group
to analyze the causes of incursions and track runway safety
improvements. In our November 2007 report, we also found that FAA had
not updated its national runway safety plan since 2002, despite agency
policy that such a plan be prepared every 2 to 3 years. The lack of an
updated plan resulted in uncoordinated runway safety efforts by
individual FAA offices. For example, in the absence of an updated
national runway plan, each FAA office is expected to separately include
its runway safety initiatives in its own business plan. However, this
practice does not provide the same national focus and emphasis on
runway safety that a national plan provides. Furthermore, not all
offices with runway safety responsibilities included efforts to reduce
incursions in their business plans. Until the national runway safety
plan is updated, the agency lacks a comprehensive, coordinated strategy
to provide a sustained level of attention to improving runway safety.
The deployment of surface surveillance technology to airports is a
major part of FAA's strategy to improve runway safety, but it has
presented challenges. To provide ground surveillance, FAA has deployed
the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS), which uses the Airport
Surface Detection Equipment-3 (ASDE-3) radar,[Footnote 6] at 34 of the
nation's busiest airports and is deploying an updated system, ASDE-X,
at 35 major airports. The current deployment schedule will result in a
total of 44 airports having AMASS and/or ASDE-X (see table 5 in the
appendix). Both systems are designed to provide controllers with alerts
when they detect a possible collision on the ground. As of January
2008, ASDE-X was commissioned[Footnote 7] at 11 of the 35 airports
scheduled to receive it. FAA is also testing runway status lights,
which are a series of lights embedded in the runways that give pilots a
visible warning when runways are not clear to enter, cross, or depart
on, at the Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport and the San Diego
International Airport. The agency made an initial investment decision
last year to deploy the system at 19 airports, starting in November
2009, and is planning to make a final investment decision in June 2008.
In addition, FAA is testing the Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal
at the Long Beach-Daugherty Field airport in California, which
activates a flashing light visible to aircraft on approach as a warning
to pilots when a runway is occupied and hazardous for landing.
However, FAA risks not meeting its current ASDE-X cost and schedule
plans, which have been revised twice since 2001, and the system is
experiencing operational difficulties with its alerting function.
Although it took about 4 years for ASDE-X to be commissioned at 11
airports, FAA plans to deploy the system at the remaining 24 additional
airports by 2010.[Footnote 8] In addition, not all 11 ASDE-X airports
have key safety features of the system. For example, as of January
2008, two ASDE-X airports did not have safety logic, which generates a
visible and audible alert to an air traffic controller regarding a
potential runway collision. Furthermore, the ASDE-X airports are
experiencing problems with false alerts, which occur when the system
incorrectly predicts an impending collision, and false targets, which
occur when the system incorrectly identifies something on the airfield
as an aircraft or vehicle and could generate a false alert. Moreover,
most airports in the United States have no runway safety technology to
supplement a controller's vision of the airfield and will not have such
technology even after FAA completes its plan to deploy ASDE-X at 35
major airports. While FAA is testing additional technology to prevent
runway collisions, such as the Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal,
the systems are years away from deployment. Another technology, runway
status lights, have had positive preliminary test evaluations, but need
a surface surveillance system such as ASDE-3/AMASS or ASDE-X to
operate. In addition, FAA is still testing a low cost surface
surveillance system that already is being used at 44 airports outside
of the United States. Furthermore, systems that provide direct
collision warnings to flight crews, which NTSB and experts have
recommended, are still being developed.
FAA lacks reliable runway safety data and the mechanisms to ensure that
the data are complete. Although FAA collects information about runway
incursions and classifies their severity, its tabulation of the number
of incursions does not reflect the actual number of incidents that
occur. FAA only counts incursions that occur at airports with air
traffic control towers, so the actual number of incursions, which
includes those that occurred at airports without air traffic control
towers, is higher than FAA reports. While the change in definition of
incursions that FAA adopted at the beginning of fiscal year 2008 will
increase the number of incursions counted, it will not address this
problem. In addition, an internal agency audit of 2006 incursion data
questioned the accuracy of some of the incursion severity
classifications. FAA plans to start a nonpunitive, confidential,
voluntary program for air traffic controllers similar to a program that
FAA has already established for pilots and others in the aviation
community. The new program will enable air traffic controllers to
report anything that they perceive could contribute to safety risks in
the national airspace system. The benefit of such program is that the
information obtained might not be reported otherwise, and could
increase the amount of data collected on the causes and circumstances
of runway incursions. However, FAA has not indicated when such a
program would be implemented.
FAA has also taken some steps to address human factors issues through
educational initiatives, such as developing simulated recreations of
actual incursions to enhance air traffic controller training. However,
air traffic controller fatigue, which may result from regularly working
overtime, continues to be a human factors issue affecting runway
safety. NTSB, which investigates transportation accidents, has
identified four instances from 2001 through 2006 when tired controllers
made errors that resulted in serious incursions. We found that, as of
May 2007, at least 20 percent of the controllers at 25 air traffic
control facilities, including towers at several of the country's
busiest airports, were regularly working 6-day weeks. (See table 7 in
the appendix for additional information.)
Experts we surveyed indicated that the actions that FAA could take with
the greatest potential to prevent runway incursions, considering costs,
technological feasibility, and operational changes, were measures to
provide information or alerts directly to pilots. Experts believed that
lighting systems that guide pilots as they taxi at the airport, and
technology that provides enhanced situational awareness on the airfield
and alerts of potential incursions, would be of particular importance.
Recommendations:
In our November 2007 report, we recommended that FAA (1) prepare a new
national runway safety plan, (2) develop an implementation schedule for
establishing a nonpunitive voluntary safety reporting program for air
traffic controllers, and (3) develop a mitigation plan for addressing
controller overtime. The agency agreed to consider our recommendations.
In closing, although FAA has taken many actions to improve runway
safety, the number of serious incursions that are continuing to occur-
-many of which involved aircraft carrying hundreds of passengers--
suggests that this country continues to face a high risk of a
catastrophic runway collision. FAA must provide sustained attention to
improving runway safety through leadership, technology, and other
means. As the volume of air traffic continues to increase, providing
sustained attention to runway safety will become even more critical.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions from you or other members of the
Subcommittee.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L.
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making
key contributions to this testimony include Teresa Spisak, Bob Homan,
and David Goldstein.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Additional Runway Incident Data:
Table 1: Number and Rate of Runway Incursions from Fiscal Year 1998
through Fiscal Year 2007:
Fiscal year: 1998; Number of incursions: 304;
Rate per 1 million tower operations: 4.66.
Fiscal year: 1999;
Number of incursions: 329;
Rate per 1 million tower operations: 4.83.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Number of incursions: 405;
Rate per 1 million tower operations: 5.9.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Number of incursions: 407;
Rate per 1 million tower operations: 6.1.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Number of incursions: 339;
Rate per 1 million tower operations: 5.2.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Number of incursions: 323;
Rate per 1 million tower operations: 5.1.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Number of incursions: 326;
Rate per 1 million tower operations: 5.2.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Number of incursions: 327;
Rate per 1 million tower operations: 5.2.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number of incursions: 330;
Rate per 1 million tower operations: 5.4.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of incursions: 370;
Rate per 1 million tower operations: 6.05.
Source: FAA.
[End of table]
Table 2: Number and Rate of Incursions, by Quarter, during Fiscal Year
2007 and the First Quarter of Fiscal Year 2008:
Quarter and fiscal year: First quarter 2007;
Number of incursions: 90;
Incursion rate per 1 million tower operations: 6.03;
Number of serious incursions: 2;
Rate of serious incursions per 1 million tower operations: 0.134.
Quarter and fiscal year: Second quarter 2007;
Number of incursions: 79;
Incursion rate per 1 million tower operations: 5.533;
Number of serious incursions: 5;
Rate of serious incursions per 1 million tower operations: 0.3502.
Quarter and fiscal year: Third quarter 2007;
Number of incursions: 106;
Incursion rate per 1 million tower operations: 6.709;
Number of serious incursions: 10;
Rate of serious incursions per 1 million tower operations: 0.6329.
Quarter and fiscal year: Fourth quarter 2007;
Number of incursions: 95;
Incursion rate per 1 million tower operations: 5.891;
Number of serious incursions: 7;
Rate of serious incursions per 1 million tower operations: 0.4341.
Quarter and fiscal year: First quarter 2008, using previous FAA
incursion definition;
Number of incursions: 94;
Incursion rate per 1 million tower operations: 6.434;
Number of serious incursions: 10;
Rate of serious incursions per 1 million tower operations: 0.685.
Quarter and fiscal year: First quarter 2008, using ICAO incursion
definition;
Number of incursions: 230;
Incursion rate per 1 million tower operations: 15.744;
Number of serious incursions: 10;
Rate of serious incursions per 1 million tower operations: 0.685.
Source: FAA.
[End of table]
Table 3: Serious Incursions Involving At Least One Commercial Aircraft
from Fiscal Year 2006 through the First Quarter of Fiscal Year 2008.
Date: October 13, 2005;
Location: Gulfport-Biloxi International, MS;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Northwest Airlines DC9 and Cessna
C172;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: March 21, 2006;
Location: Chicago O'Hare International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Lufthansa Airbus A319 and Chautauqua
Embraer E145;
Number of air passengers: 78.
Date: April 29, 2006;
Location: Phoenix Sky Harbor International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: US Airways Airbus A320 and
pedestrian;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: May 25, 2006;
Location: Miami International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Boeing 747 and American Eagle
Aerospatiale AT43;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: July 18, 2006;
Location: Chicago O'Hare International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: American Eagle Canadair CRJ-700 and
US Airways Boeing 737;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: July 23, 2006;
Location: Chicago O'Hare International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: ATLAS Boeing 747 and United Airlines
Boeing 737;
Number of air passengers: 131.
Date: July 26, 2006;
Location: Los Angeles International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Mesa Canadair CRJ-200 and Skywest
Embraer E120;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: August 8, 2006;
Location: Southwest Florida International, Ft. Myers, FL;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Southwest Boeing 737 and vehicle;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: September 30, 2006;
Location: Los Angeles International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Gulfstream GLF5 and Skywest Canadair
CRJ-700;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: January 5, 2007;
Location: Denver International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Key Lime Air Swearingen SW4 and
Frontier Airbus A319;
Number of air passengers: 50.
Date: February 2, 2007;
Location: Denver International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: United Boeing 737 and snowplow;
Number of air passengers: 101.
Date: May 4, 2007;
Location: Cyril E. King Airport, Charlotte Amalie, VI;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: American Airlines Boeing 757 and
Cessna C208;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: May 6, 2007;
Location: Los Angeles International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Skywest Embraer 120 and Virgin Air
Airbus A340;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: May 26, 2007;
Location: San Francisco International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Republic Airlines Embraer 170 and
Skywest Airlines Embraer 120;
Number of air passengers: 27.
Date: July 11, 2007;
Location: Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International, FL;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Delta Air Lines Boeing 757 and United
Airlines Airbus A320;
Number of air passengers: 172.
Date: July 19, 2007;
Location: Chicago O'Hare International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: United Airlines Boeing 737 and US
Airways Boeing 737;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: August 16, 2007;
Location: Los Angeles International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: WestJet Boeing 737 and Northwest
Airlines Airbus A320;
Number of air passengers: 296.
Date: December 2, 2007;
Location: Baltimore-Washington International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: US Airways/America West Airbus A320
and Comair Canadair CRJ-100;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Date: December 6, 2007;
Location: Newark Liberty International;
Airline(s) and aircraft involved: Continental Airlines Boeing 737 and
Continental Express Embraer E145;
Number of air passengers: N/A.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA and NTSB data.
Note: N/A indicates that the information was not contained in the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) incident reports.
[End of table]
Table 4: Total Number of Incursions and Number of Serious Incursions
Involving at Least One Commercial Aircraft, Fiscal Year 2001 through
Fiscal Year 2007:
Fiscal year: 2001;
Serious incursions: 53;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 26.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Serious incursions: 37;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 11.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Serious incursions: 32;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 9.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Serious incursions: 28;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 9.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Serious incursions: 29;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 9.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Serious incursions: 31;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 10.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Serious incursions: 24;
Serious incursions involving at least one commercial aircraft: 8.
Source: FAA.
[End of table]
Table 5: U.S. Airports that Experienced the Most Runway Incursions from
Fiscal Year 2001 through Fiscal Year 2007:
Airport: Los Angeles International;
Number of serious incursions: 10;
Number of total incursions: 55.
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International;
Number of serious incursions: 9;
Number of total incursions: 55.
Airport: North Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV;
Number of serious incursions: 5;
Number of total incursions: 48.
Airport: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International;
Number of serious incursions: 3;
Number of total incursions: 41.
Airport: John Wayne-Orange County, Santa Ana, CA;
Number of serious incursions: 0;
Number of total incursions: 41.
Airport: Philadelphia International;
Number of serious incursions: 2;
Number of total incursions: 40.
Airport: Long Beach-Daugherty Field, CA;
Number of serious incursions: 2;
Number of total incursions: 36.
Airport: Boston Logan International;
Number of serious incursions: 2;
Number of total incursions: 36.
Airport: Dallas-Ft. Worth International;
Number of serious incursions: 3;
Number of total incursions: 35.
Airport: Phoenix Sky Harbor International;
Number of serious incursions: 4;
Number of total incursions: 31.
Airport: Lambert-St. Louis International;
Number of serious incursions: 2;
Number of total incursions: 30.
Airport: Las Vegas McCarran International;
Number of serious incursions: 1;
Number of total incursions: 30.
Airport: Newark Liberty International;
Number of serious incursions: 3;
Number of total incursions: 25.
Airport: General Mitchell International, Milwaukee, WI;
Number of serious incursions: 1;
Number of total incursions: 25.
Airport: Minneapolis-St. Paul International;
Number of serious incursions: 0;
Number of total incursions: 25.
Airport: Teterboro, NJ;
Number of serious incursions: 3;
Number of total incursions: 23.
Airport: Miami International;
Number of serious incursions: 3;
Number of total incursions: 22.
Airport: Ted Stevens Anchorage International;
Number of serious incursions: 0;
Number of total incursions: 22.
Airport: Reno-Tahoe International, NV;
Number of serious incursions: 1;
Number of total incursions: 20.
Airport: Cleveland Hopkins International;
Number of serious incursions: 1;
Number of total incursions: 20.
Source: FAA.
Note: Information was compiled from a list of airports that experienced
20 or more incursions from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007
and were certificated under 14 CFR Part 139. This information expands
upon the information we presented in GAO-08-29 (fig. 4), which only
included the top 10 airports experiencing incursions from 2001-2006. In
addition, we now include three airports--Long Beach-Daugherty Field,
John Wayne-Orange County, and North Las Vegas--which were previously
identified as general aviation airports.
[End of table]
Table 6: Airports with Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model 3
(ASDE-3)/Airport Movement Area Safety Systems (AMASS) or the Airport
Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) or Scheduled to Receive
ASDE-X:
Airport: Baltimore Washington International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: April 2010.
Airport: Boston Logan International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: ¸;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: July 2009.
Airport: Bradley International, Windsor Locks, CT;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Camp Springs Andrews Air Force Base;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Charlotte Douglas International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE- X commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Chicago Midway;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: June 2010.
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Cleveland Hopkins International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Covington/Cincinnati Northern Kentucky International;
ASDE-3/ AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Dallas-Ft. Worth International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: April 2010.
Airport: Denver International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: November 2009.
Airport: Detroit Metro Wayne County;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: June 2008.
Airport: Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood International, FL;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: April 2009.
Airport: General Mitchell International, Milwaukee, WI;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: George Bush Intercontinental, Houston, TX;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: November 2009.
Airport: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Honolulu International-Hickam Air Force Base;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: May 2010.
Airport: John F. Kennedy International, New York, NY;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: August 2008.
Airport: John Wayne-Orange County, Santa Ana, CA;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: February 2010.
Airport: Kansas City International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Lambert-St. Louis International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE- X commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Las Vegas McCarran International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: December 2009.
Airport: Los Angeles International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: June 2009.
Airport: Louis Armstrong New Orleans International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Louisville International-Standiford Field;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: [Empty].
Airport: Memphis International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: April 2011.
Airport: Miami International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: March 2010.
Airport: Minneapolis-St. Paul International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: March 2010.
Airport: New York LaGuardia;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: December 2010.
Airport: Newark Liberty International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: July 2009.
Airport: Orlando International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Philadelphia International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: December 2009.
Airport: Phoenix Sky Harbor International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE- X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: December 2008.
Airport: Pittsburgh International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Portland International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Ronald Reagan Washington National;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: June 2010.
Airport: Salt Lake City International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: May 2010.
Airport: San Diego International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: August 2010.
Airport: San Francisco International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Seattle-Tacoma International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Ted Stevens Anchorage International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Theodore Francis Green State, Providence, RI;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Airport: Washington Dulles International;
ASDE-3/AMASS: Check;
ASDE-X commissioned: [Empty];
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: July 2008.
Airport: William P. Hobby, Houston, TX;
ASDE-3/AMASS: [Empty];
ASDE-X commissioned: Check;
Scheduled ASDE-X deployment[A]: .
Source: FAA.
[A] Represents when the facility first declares the system ready for
conditional use. Once the system is formally accepted by the facility,
the system is commissioned. FAA's draft accelerated schedule, shown in
this table, targets completing ASDE-X deployment by the Fall of 2010,
with the exception of the New York LaGuardia and Memphis International
airports, where the agency is coordinating ASDE-X implementation with
the completion of new air traffic control towers.
Note: As indicated above, 28 airports currently have ASDE-3/AMASS. Six
additional airports (Seattle-Tacoma International, Lambert St.-Louis
International, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International, Louisville
International-Standiford Field, Chicago O'Hare International, and
Charlotte Douglas International) originally had ASDE-3/AMASS, but the
equipment has since been upgraded to ASDE-X.
[End of table]
Table 7: Air Traffic Control Facilities with 20 Percent or More
Employees Working 6-Day Weeks from February through May 2007:
Facility: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 52.09;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 85.
Facility: Long Beach-Daugherty Field, CA;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 44.01;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 27.
Facility: Atlanta Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON);
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 42.65;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 48.
Facility: Shreveport Regional, LA;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 40.94;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 83.
Facility: Jacksonville International, FL;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 39.77;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 66.
Facility: Daytona Beach International, FL;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 39.62;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 65.
Facility: Helena Regional, MT;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 38.89;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime:
100.
Facility: Buchanan Field, Concord, CA;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 34.64;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime:
100.
Facility: Boise, ID;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 33.39;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 81.
Facility: Orlando International;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 32.53;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 30.
Facility: Blue Grass, Lexington, KY;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 32.38;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 90.
Facility: Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood International, FL;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 31.12;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 65.
Facility: Palm Beach International, West Palm Beach, FL;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 30.87;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 61.
Facility: Reno-Tahoe International, NV;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 29.01;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 65.
Facility: Camarillo, CA;
Average percentage of controllers working 6- day weeks: 29.00;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 43.
Facility: Ted Stevens Anchorage International;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 28.66;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 58.
Facility: Nashville International;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 28.63;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 75.
Facility: Las Vegas TRACON;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 27.66;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 49.
Facility: Bradley International, Windsor Locks, CT;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 26.98;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 62.
Facility: Monroe Regional, LA;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 26.90;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 82.
Facility: Sioux Gateway, IA;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 26.83;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 0.
Facility: Los Angeles International;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 25.73;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 53.
Facility: Phoenix TRACON;
Average percentage of controllers working 6- day weeks: 24.77;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 75.
Facility: George Bush Intercontinental Houston, TX;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 23.28;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 97.
Facility: Southern California TRACON;
Average percentage of controllers working 6-day weeks: 21.96;
Average percentage of controllers who volunteered to work overtime: 64.
Source: FAA.
Note: Also represents facilities where 4 percent or greater of the
employees' work hours were covered by overtime.
[End of table]
[End of section]
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Footnotes:
[1] Taxiways are routes that aircraft follow to and from runways.
[2] GAO, Aviation Runway and Ramp Safety: Sustained Efforts to Address
Leadership, Technology, and Other Challenges Needed to Reduce Accidents
and Incidents, GAO-08-29 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2007).
[3] ICAO's definition of an incursion is any occurrence at an airport
involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on
the protected area of a surface designated for the landing or take-off
of aircraft. Through September 2007, FAA defined a runway incursion as
"any occurrence in the runway environment involving an aircraft,
vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a collision
hazard or results in a loss of required separation when an aircraft is
taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land."
[4] Runway incidents that were classified as surface incidents can be
serious, including an August 2006 crash of a Comair regional jet in
Lexington, KY. That aircraft crashed after taking off on a runway that
was too short for the aircraft, killing all but one of the 50 people
aboard. FAA had defined a surface incident as any event where
unauthorized or unapproved movement occurs within a movement area
associated with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could
affect the safety of flight.
[5] FAA classifies the severity of runway incursions into four
categories. FAA defines category A as separation decreases and
participants take extreme action to narrowly avoid a collision, or the
event results in a collision; category B, separation decreases and
there is a significant potential for a collision; category C,
separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a
potential collision; and category D, there is little or no chance of
collision. Category A and B incursions are considered serious.
[6] AMASS is essentially the safety logic, which is designed to detect
potential collisions, for ASDE-3. This combined technology is usually
referred to as ASDE-3/AMASS.
[7] FAA refers to ASDE-X as being commissioned after the system has
been tested at an airport and demonstrated that the field site
personnel can fully operate and maintain it.
[8] According to FAA, the agency's ability to meet its accelerated
ASDE- X deployment schedule depends on several factors such as the
availability of funding and the cooperation of external organizations.
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