Review of the Transportation Security Administration's Air Cargo Screening Exemptions Report
Gao ID: GAO-08-1055R August 15, 2008This report formally transmits the attached briefing in response to section 1602(b) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The act requires the Comptroller General to provide an assessment of the methodology used by the Secretary of Homeland Security for maintaining, changing or eliminating an exemption under 49 U.S.C. 44901(i)(1). We provided the mandated reporting committees with a restricted version of this briefing in July 2008. Based on the results of our review, we are not making any recommendations for congressional consideration or agency action. All information considered Sensitive Security Information by the Transportation Security Administration has been removed from this product.
GAO-08-1055R, Review of the Transportation Security Administration's Air Cargo Screening Exemptions Report
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Washington, DC 20548:
August 15, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Review of the Transportation Security Administration's Air
Cargo Screening Exemptions Report:
This report formally transmits the attached briefing in response to
section 1602(b) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007. The act requires the Comptroller General to
provide an assessment of the methodology used by the Secretary of
Homeland Security for maintaining, changing or eliminating an exemption
under 49 U.S.C. § 44901(i)(1). We provided the mandated reporting
committees with a restricted version of this briefing in July 2008.
Based on the results of our review, we are not making any
recommendations for congressional consideration or agency action. All
information considered Sensitive Security Information by the
Transportation Security Administration has been removed from this
product.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested
parties. This report will also be available at no charge on our Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Should you or your staff have
any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-
3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report were Steve Morris,
Assistant Director; Lara Kaskie; Thomas Lombardi; Meg Ullengren; and
Margaret Vo.
Signed by:
Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure: Briefing Slides:
Review of the Transportation Security Administration‘s (TSA) Air Cargo
Screening Exemptions Report:
Briefing to Congressional Committees:
July 8, 2008:
Overview:
* Introduction;
* Objectives, Scope, and Methodology;
* Summary;
* Background;
* Results;
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation;
Introduction:
Section 1602(b) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53) requires TSA to submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress and GAO a report containing an
assessment of each exemption granted under 49 U.S.C. § 44901(i)(1) for
the screening of cargo transported on passenger aircraft and an
analysis of the risk of maintaining each exemption. The report is
required to include (1) the rationale for each exemption; (2) the
percentage of cargo not screened in accordance with 49 U.S.C. §
44901(g) (which defines ’screening“ in this context to mean a physical
examination or nonintrusive method of assessing whether cargo poses a
threat to transportation security); (3) the impact of each exemption on
aviation security; (4) the projected impact on the flow of commerce of
eliminating an exemption; and (5) plans and rationale for maintaining,
changing, or eliminating each exemption.
Section 1602(b) of the act also requires GAO to provide an assessment
of the methodology of determinations made by TSA for maintaining,
changing, or eliminating an exemption under section 44901(i)(1).
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
In conducting our study, we reviewed TSA‘s methodology for determining
which air cargo screening exemptions to maintain, revise, or eliminate.
Specifically, our objectives were to determine:
1) the extent to which TSA‘s methodology for determining whether to
maintain, revise, or eliminate an exemption addresses the requirements
set forth in the act was risk-based and was consistent with the mission
of TSA‘s air cargo program to balance security with the flow of
commerce; and:
2) any challenges TSA may face in implementing its plans to maintain,
revise or eliminate air cargo screening exemptions, and potential
vulnerabilities that may continue to exist as a result of cargo being
exempt from physical screening.
This review is focused on TSA's air cargo screening exemptions
report.[Footnote 1] In conducting our study, we:
* Reviewed TSA‘s Air Cargo Strategic Plan, security directives, and
other documents that provide details on existing air cargo screening
exemptions to obtain an understanding of TSA‘s current air cargo
screening requirements.
* Compared the results from TSA's report to our previous
findings[Footnote 2] on air cargo screening exemptions to determine
whether the continued use of alternative means to secure air cargo
exempt from physical screening[Footnote 3] may result in any
vulnerabilities, as identified by TSA and other stakeholders.
Assessed the extent to which TSA sought to balance security with the
flow of commerce when analyzing the exemptions, consistent with the
mission of the agency‘s air cargo program.
Met with TSA officials to:
* determine the extent to which TSA addressed the reporting
requirements set forth in the act and to determine the agency‘s
methodology for completing its assessment;
* discuss the extent to which the agency used risk assessments when
conducting its review of air cargo screening exemptions (GAO did not
conduct an independent review of TSA‘s risk assessments); and:
* discuss the extent to which the agency may face challenges as it
proceeds with its plans to maintain, revise, or eliminate air cargo
screening exemptions.
Contacted air cargo associations to determine their input, if any, to
TSA‘s assessment.
We provided the mandated reporting committees with a restricted version
of this briefing in July 2008. All information considered Sensitive
Security Information[Footnote 4] by TSA has been removed from this
product.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 to July 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our
audit objectives.
Summary:
TSA‘s report addresses the five key areas required by section 1602(b)
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007,[Footnote 5] and its methodology was consistent with TSA‘s mission
for the air cargo program to balance security with the flow of
commerce. As part of their assessment, TSA officials stated that they
considered and determined the threat to and vulnerability of the
exempted cargo types, and relied primarily on professional judgment for
determining which screening exemptions to revise, maintain, or
eliminate.[Footnote 6] However, TSA has yet to complete its air cargo
vulnerability assessments, which could help to identify potential
security vulnerabilities associated with the exemptions. Without such
information, TSA is limited in its ability to make risk-based decisions
regarding the security of air cargo. TSA acknowledges the importance of
completing air cargo vulnerability assessments and has plans to
complete additional assessments by the end of calendar year 2009.
TSA may face potential resource challenges as the agency moves forward
with its plans to maintain, revise or eliminate domestic and outbound
screening exemptions. In addition, TSA has not yet assessed the
potential vulnerabilities posed by inbound air cargo screening
exemptions, which are similar to those posed to domestic and outbound
air cargo.[Footnote 7]
Background:
According to TSA‘s Air Cargo Strategic Plan, issued in November 2003,
the agency‘s mission for the air cargo program is to secure the air
cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding the flow of
commerce.
Participants in the air cargo transportation system include individuals
and businesses that ship their cargo on all-cargo and passenger
aircraft, freight forwarders that consolidate shipments and deliver
them to air carriers, and passenger and all-cargo air carriers that use
their cargo facilities to store cargo until it is placed onboard an
aircraft for transport.
Assessing risk, a critical component of a risk-management approach in a
homeland security setting, typically involves three key elements-
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences-that provide input into the
decision-making process for homeland security.[Footnote 8]
In October 2005 and April 2007, we reported that TSA had established
requirements for air carriers to randomly screen air cargo, but had
exempted some domestic, outbound, and inbound cargo from
screening.[Footnote 9] Among other things, we identified potential
vulnerabilities resulting from these exemptions and recommended that
TSA examine the rationale for existing screening exemptions and
determine whether such exemptions left the air cargo system
unacceptably vulnerable. Since we have issued these reports, TSA has
revised some of its screening exemptions for domestic and outbound air
cargo carried on passenger aircraft. TSA has not revised its screening
exemptions for inbound air cargo.
In accordance with section 1602(a) of the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, TSA is developing a system to
physically screen 50 percent of air cargo originating in the United
States carried on passenger aircraft by February 2009 and 100 percent
of such cargo by August 2010.[Footnote 10]
To meet this requirement, TSA has begun development of a Certified
Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), which is to allow Certified Cargo
Screening Facilities (CCSFs) to screen cargo prior to acceptance by a
freight forwarder or air carrier. Manufacturing facilities and freight
forwarders, among others, can apply to become a CCSF. In January 2008,
TSA initiated its pilot test of the CCSP in three cities, which
includes identifying participants for the voluntary program. TSA plans
to expand the pilot to up to six additional cities during the first
half of 2008.
Results - Finding 1:
TSA‘s Report Addresses the Requirements Set Forth in the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act:
TSA‘s report addresses the five key areas required by the act:
1. the rationale for each exemption;
2. the percentage of cargo not screened in accordance with 49 U.S.C. §
44901(g);
3. the impact of each exemption on aviation security;
4. the projected impact on the flow of commerce of eliminating an
exemption; and:
5. the plans and rationale for maintaining, changing, or eliminating
each exemption.
According to TSA‘s report and subsequent discussions with agency
officials, TSA plans to maintain six screening exemption categories,
make revisions to two categories, and eliminate another two categories.
TSA officials stated that the changes to the screening exemptions will
be effective as of January 2009.
Although TSA‘s report does not specifically provide a percentage of
cargo not screened in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g), it does
provide details on the types of such cargo not screened. In addition,
TSA officials told us that they believe that approximately 5 percent of
cargo carried on passenger aircraft will not be physically screened in
accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g) after the changes to the
exemptions are implemented in January 2009.
TSA Incorporated Elements of a Risk-Based Approach When Determining
Whether to Maintain, Revise, or Eliminate Each Screening Exemption, But
Has Not Completed Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessments:
According to TSA officials, the agency used the results of select air
cargo vulnerability assessments as well as compliance inspection
results when determining which screening exemptions to maintain,
revise, or eliminate; and also considered the introduction of an
explosive device on a passenger aircraft, which the agency has
identified as the primary threat to such cargo.
In October 2005 and in April 2007,[Footnote 11] we reported that TSA
had not conducted an assessment to identify the range of security
weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists related to air cargo
operations, and recommended that TSA develop a methodology and schedule
for completing vulnerability assessments. Partly in response to our
recommendation, and consistent with direction specified in
law,[Footnote 12] TSA implemented an Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessment
Program in November 2006. TSA officials reported that as of May 2008,
the agency has completed air cargo vulnerability assessments at six
domestic airports and plans to complete air cargo vulnerability
assessments at all 27 domestic Category X airports[Footnote 13] by the
end of calendar year 2009.
Absent the results of these assessments, which could help to identify
potential security vulnerabilities associated with the exemptions, TSA
is limited in its ability to make risk- based decisions regarding the
security of air cargo. TSA officials acknowledge the importance of
completing air cargo vulnerability assessments. Officials noted that as
the agency conducts additional air cargo vulnerability assessments,
officials will assess these results to determine whether existing
screening exemptions should be revised or eliminated.
TSA‘s Methodology Was Consistent with its Goal to Balance Security with
the Flow of Commerce:
Consistent with the mission of TSA‘s air cargo program, TSA considered,
among other things, the balance between security and the flow of
commerce in determining which air cargo screening exemptions to
maintain, revise, or eliminate. In follow-up discussions with TSA
officials, they stated that they relied primarily on professional
judgment to determine which screening exemptions to revise, maintain,
or eliminate. In addition, TSA officials told us that they took the
following actions to assist in their determinations:
* Reviewed recommendations related to revising screening exemptions
made by TSA‘s internal cargo policy working group in March 2006.
* Held discussions with select air cargo industry stakeholders to
discuss the potential impact on industry of revising or eliminating
screening exemptions. However, according to TSA officials, there was no
formal process by which they solicited industry input as a part of
TSA‘s assessment of each exemption.
Results-Finding 2:
TSA‘s Plans to Maintain, Revise, or Eliminate Screening Exemptions May
Pose Potential Resource Challenges to the Agency:
As TSA moves forward with its plans to maintain, revise, or eliminate
domestic and outbound air cargo screening exemptions, the agency may
face resource challenges, including the following:
Screening Resources: Although TSA plans to expand the use of TSA-
certified explosives detection canine teams to screen air cargo before
it is placed on passenger planes, TSA has not assessed how the agency‘s
plans to maintain, revise, or eliminate screening exemptions may impact
canine team needs. TSA is in the process of adding 170 canine teams, of
which 85 will be primarily used to screen air cargo.[Footnote 14] These
teams are to be primarily located at the 20 airports that, according to
TSA officials, receive approximately 65 percent of all air cargo
transported within the United States. TSA officials could not tell us
whether the additional 85 canine teams will be sufficient to meet the
agency‘s increasing screening needs.
Compliance Resources: TSA officials stated that although they believe
the revisions and eliminations of domestic and outbound air cargo
screening exemptions should not severely impact the workload of
Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs), TSA has not conducted an
assessment to determine how the changes to air cargo screening
exemptions may impact TSI resources. According to TSA officials, there
may not be enough TSIs to conduct compliance inspections of all the
entities that could be a part of the CCSP once the program is fully
implemented in August 2010.
TSA Has Not Assessed the Vulnerabilities Posed by Inbound Air Cargo
Security Exemptions:
Although TSA plans to conduct vulnerability assessments as part of its
risk-based approach to securing inbound air cargo, the agency has not
established a time frame for doing so. Such assessments could provide
information on the potential vulnerabilities posed by inbound air cargo
screening exemptions. We reported in April 2007 that TSA officials told
us that they would conduct vulnerability assessments of inbound air
cargo after they had assessed the vulnerability of domestic air
cargo.[Footnote 15] Nevertheless, TSA officials acknowledged that
vulnerabilities to inbound air cargo exist and that these
vulnerabilities are in some cases similar to those facing the domestic
air cargo supply chain.
In April 2007, we reported on the potential vulnerabilities associated
with inbound air cargo screening exemptions.[Footnote 16] Specifically,
we reported that screening exemptions could pose a risk to the inbound
air cargo supply chain because TSA has limited information on the
background of and security risks posed by foreign freight forwarders
and shippers whose cargo may fall into one of the exemption categories.
We recommended that TSA assess whether existing inbound air cargo
screening exemptions pose an unacceptable vulnerability to the air
cargo supply chain and if necessary, address these vulnerabilities. TSA
agreed with this recommendation and noted that the agency had recently
revised and eliminated domestic and outbound air cargo screening
exemptions. TSA, however, has yet to fully address our recommendation
for assessing inbound air cargo screening exemptions.
TSA acknowledges that some categories of exempted cargo pose a
potential vulnerability to the domestic air cargo supply chain and will
be eliminated. TSA officials stated that the agency will evaluate these
exemptions for inbound cargo in the future. TSA officials also noted
that they do plan to increase the percentage of inbound air cargo
required to be screened, but the screening exemptions for such cargo
would be maintained. According to TSA officials, the requirement to
screen an increased percentage of inbound air cargo will be implemented
in early 2009.
In response to a request by the Chairman of the House Homeland Security
Committee and Congressman Edward Markey, GAO will initiate a review of
TSA‘s efforts to meet the requirement to screen 100 percent of air
cargo carried on passenger aircraft.[Footnote 17] As part of this
review, GAO will likely examine TSA‘s plans to screen inbound air
cargo.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of the information included in this briefing to TSA
for review and comment. On June 25, 2008, TSA officials provided oral
comments to the briefing slides. The Air Cargo Division General Manager
noted that he generally agreed with the information presented and our
findings. TSA also provided us with technical written comments to the
slides, which we incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Transportation Security Administration, Report to Congress on Air
Cargo Subject to Alternate Screening, February 2008.
[2] See GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen
Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: October 17,
2005) and GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound
Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660
(Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2007).
[3] For certain types of cargo, TSA has authorized the use of TSA-
approved alternative methods for screening cargo carried on passenger
aircraft. Alternative methods can include verifying shipper and cargo
information and conducting a visual inspection of the cargo shipment.
For the purposes of this briefing and to remain consistent with our
prior work on air cargo security, the term screening exemption refers
to cargo screened in accordance with such alternative methods; to the
extent such cargo is no longer ’exempt,“ TSA has determined that such
cargo must be screened in accordance with current TSA requirements for
the physical screening of cargo carried on board passenger aircraft.
[4] 4 See 49 C.F.R. pt. 1520.
[5] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602(b), 121 Stat. 266, 479-80 (2007).
[6] TSA does not take any exemptions under 49 U.S.C. § 44901(i), as
contemplated by the mandate. According to TSA, no cargo transported on
passenger aircraft is truly exempt screening.
[7] Air cargo bound for the United States from a foreign country is
referred to as inbound air cargo. Cargo transported by air within the
United States is referred to as domestic air and cargo transported by
air from the United States to a foreign location is referred to as
outbound air cargo.
[8] A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on
the basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past
activities. A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may
be exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address
those weaknesses. An assessment of consequences evaluates the personal,
physical, and economic consequences to an area of a successful attack.
[9] See GAO-06-76 and GAO-07-660. TSA does not presently plan for this
system to address inbound cargo.
[10] See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g).
[11] See GAO-06-76 and GAO-07-660.
[12 See Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112, 140-41 (2007) (providing
that the $80 million appropriated for air cargo shall be used to
complete air cargo vulnerability assessments for all Category X
airports, among other purposes).
[13] TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States into
one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, and IV). In
general, Category X airports have the largest number of passenger
boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest. Categories X, I,
II, and III airports account for more than 90 percent of the nation‘s
air traffic.
[14] There are currently 370 TSA-certified explosives detection canine
teams that are cross-trained to work in multiple aviation environments,
including air cargo.
[15] See GAO-07-660.
[16] See GAO-07-660.
[17] See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g).
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