Highway Bridge Program
Clearer Goals and Performance Measures Needed for a More Focused and Sustainable Program Gao ID: GAO-08-1127T September 10, 2008The August 1, 2007, collapse of a Minnesota bridge raised nationwide questions about bridge safety and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) prioritization of bridge resources. The Highway Bridge Program (HBP), the primary source of federal funding for bridges, provided over $4 billion to states in fiscal year 2007. This testimony, based on a report GAO is releasing today, addresses (1) how states use HBP funds and select bridge projects for funding, (2) what data indicate about bridge conditions and the HBP's impact, and (3) the extent to which the HBP aligns with principles we developed, based on our prior work and federal laws and regulations, for reexamining surface transportation programs. The testimony also discusses the implications of our work for related sections of proposed legislation under review by this committee, the National Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act of 2008 (S.3338).
As context for understanding GAO's findings on the HBP, based on information gathered during bridge inspections that are generally conducted every 2 years, the HBP classifies bridge conditions as deficient or not; assigns each bridge a sufficiency rating reflecting its structural adequacy, safety, serviceability, and relative importance for public use; and uses that information to distribute funding to states to improve bridges. Deficient bridges include those that are structurally deficient, with one or more components in poor condition, and those that are functionally obsolete, with a poor configuration or design that may no longer be adequate for the traffic they serve. Use of HBP funds and project selection: The HBP affords states discretion to use HBP funds and select bridge projects in a variety of ways. Some states are focused on reducing their number of deficient bridges, while other states are pursuing different bridge priorities. For example, California has focused on seismically retrofitting bridges, a safety concern for that state. Furthermore, some states have developed tools and approaches for selecting bridge projects that go beyond those required by the HBP--such as bridge management systems and state-specific bridge condition rating systems. Bridge conditions and impact of HBP: Bridge conditions, as measured by the number of deficient bridges and average sufficiency rating of all bridges, improved from 1998 through 2007. However, the impact of the HBP on that improvement is difficult to determine because (1) the program provides only a share of what states spend on bridges and there are no comprehensive data for state and local spending on bridges and (2) HBP funds can, in some cases, be used for a variety of bridge projects without regard to a bridge's deficiency status or sufficiency rating. Alignment of HBP with GAO principles: The HBP does not fully align with GAO's principles in that the program lacks focus, performance measures, and sustainability. For example, the program's statutory goals are not focused on a clearly identified federal interest, but rather have expanded from improving deficient bridges to supporting seismic retrofitting, preventive maintenance, and many other projects, thus expanding the federal interest to potentially include almost any bridge in the country. In addition, the program lacks measures linking funding to performance and is not sustainable, given the anticipated deterioration of the nation's bridges and the declining purchasing power of funding currently available for bridge maintenance, rehabilitation, and replacement. The results of our work are generally consistent with provisions of S.3338 that call for a risk-based prioritization process for selecting bridge projects, 5-year performance plans, and bridge management systems. Our work does raise some questions about the legislation's focus on all deficient bridges because some deficient bridges do not need immediate repairs to carry traffic safely.
GAO-08-1127T, Highway Bridge Program: Clearer Goals and Performance Measures Needed for a More Focused and Sustainable Program
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, September 10, 2008:
Highway Bridge Program:
Clearer Goals and Performance Measures Needed for a More Focused and
Sustainable Program:
Statement of Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director Physical
Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-08-1127T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-1127T, a testimony before the Committee on
Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The August 1, 2007, collapse of a Minnesota bridge raised nationwide
questions about bridge safety and the Department of Transportation‘s
(DOT) prioritization of bridge resources. The Highway Bridge Program
(HBP), the primary source of federal funding for bridges, provided over
$4 billion to states in fiscal year 2007. This testimony, based on a
report GAO is releasing today, addresses (1) how states use HBP funds
and select bridge projects for funding, (2) what data indicate about
bridge conditions and the HBP‘s impact, and (3) the extent to which the
HBP aligns with principles we developed, based on our prior work and
federal laws and regulations, for re-examining surface transportation
programs. The testimony also discusses the implications of our work for
related sections of proposed legislation under review by this
committee, the National Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection
Act of 2008 (S.3338).
What GAO Found:
As context for understanding GAO‘s findings on the HBP, based on
information gathered during bridge inspections that are generally
conducted every 2 years, the HBP classifies bridge conditions as
deficient or not; assigns each bridge a sufficiency rating reflecting
its structural adequacy, safety, serviceability, and relative
importance for public use; and uses that information to distribute
funding to states to improve bridges. Deficient bridges include those
that are structurally deficient, with one or more components in poor
condition, and those that are functionally obsolete, with a poor
configuration or design that may no longer be adequate for the traffic
they serve.
Use of HBP funds and project selection: The HBP affords states
discretion to use HBP funds and select bridge projects in a variety of
ways. Some states are focused on reducing their number of deficient
bridges, while other states are pursuing different bridge priorities.
For example, California has focused on seismically retrofitting
bridges, a safety concern for that state. Furthermore, some states have
developed tools and approaches for selecting bridge projects that go
beyond those required by the HBP”such as bridge management systems and
state-specific bridge condition rating systems.
Bridge conditions and impact of HBP: Bridge conditions, as measured by
the number of deficient bridges and average sufficiency rating of all
bridges, improved from 1998 through 2007. However, the impact of the
HBP on that improvement is difficult to determine because (1) the
program provides only a share of what states spend on bridges and there
are no comprehensive data for state and local spending on bridges and
(2) HBP funds can, in some cases, be used for a variety of bridge
projects without regard to a bridge‘s deficiency status or sufficiency
rating.
Alignment of HBP with GAO principles: The HBP does not fully align with
GAO‘s principles in that the program lacks focus, performance measures,
and sustainability. For example, the program‘s statutory goals are not
focused on a clearly identified federal interest, but rather have
expanded from improving deficient bridges to supporting seismic
retrofitting, preventive maintenance, and many other projects, thus
expanding the federal interest to potentially include almost any bridge
in the country. In addition, the program lacks measures linking funding
to performance and is not sustainable, given the anticipated
deterioration of the nation‘s bridges and the declining purchasing
power of funding currently available for bridge maintenance,
rehabilitation, and replacement.
The results of our work are generally consistent with provisions of
S.3338 that call for a risk-based prioritization process for selecting
bridge projects, 5-year performance plans, and bridge management
systems. Our work does raise some questions about the legislation‘s
focus on all deficient bridges because some deficient bridges do not
need immediate repairs to carry traffic safely.
What GAO Recommends:
In the report released today, GAO made recommendations to improve the
focus, performance, and sustainability of the HBP and DOT officials
said they generally agreed with those recommendations. The DOT
officials also commented that GAO‘s principles had broader
applicability than the HBP, noting that they had incorporated the
principles into the department‘s recent proposal for reforming surface
transportation programs.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1127T]. For more
information, contact Katherine Siggerud at (202) 512-2834 or
siggerudk@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Boxer and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to participate in this hearing on federal
efforts to address the condition of our nation's bridges. The August 1,
2007, collapse of the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota, raised
questions about the condition and safety of our nation's bridges and
about the federal government's ability to prioritize resources for
bridges. Bridges are critical elements of the nation's transportation
network, supporting commerce, economic vitality, and personal mobility.
The Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Highway Bridge Program
(HBP), the primary source of federal funding for bridges, provided over
$4 billion to states in fiscal year 2007. This program, which provides
funding assistance to states to improve the condition of their bridges,
specifies a large variety of activities that states may undertake with
program funds.[Footnote 1]
Since the Minnesota bridge collapse, there have been calls for
increased federal investment in bridge infrastructure. In July 2008,
the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3999, the National Highway
Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act of 2008, authorizing an
additional $1 billion for fiscal year 2009[Footnote 2] from the U.S
Treasury's general fund[Footnote 3] to address bridges, and shortly
thereafter, a Senate companion bill to that legislation (S. 3338) was
introduced in this committee. These calls for increased investment in
bridge infrastructure coincide with strains on traditional funding for
infrastructure projects because the Highway Trust Fund, which funds the
HBP and other highway programs, is projected to incur significant
deficits in the years ahead. We have also recently called for a
fundamental re-examination of surface transportation programs and
commitments to address emerging needs by eliminating outdated or
ineffective programs, more sharply defining the federal role in
relation to state and local roles, and modernizing relevant
programs.[Footnote 4]
Given these concerns, my testimony today addresses (1) how states use
their HBP funds and select specific bridge projects for funding, (2)
what available data indicate about national trends in bridge conditions
and the impact of the HBP, and (3) the extent to which the HBP aligns
with principles we developed to guide the re-examination of surface
transportation programs. Additionally, I am providing a perspective on
related sections of the proposed bridge legislation under review by
this committee (S.3338). My testimony is based on a report that we are
releasing today.[Footnote 5]
To determine how state transportation departments use their HBP funds
and select specific bridge projects for funding, we visited six states-
-California, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington--
where we interviewed federal, state, and local transportation
officials, including bridge owners and inspectors. We selected these
states because they have relatively high levels of federal bridge
funding, large bridge inventories, and large inventories of bridges
eligible for replacement or rehabilitation. To determine what available
data indicate about trends in the condition of the nation's bridges and
the impact of the HBP, we analyzed data in FHWA's National Bridge
Inventory (NBI)--the primary source of information on the nation's
bridges--which contains information on each bridge's location, size,
age, condition, inspection dates, and other information; reviewed
relevant legislation and program documents; and interviewed federal,
state, and local transportation officials. To determine the extent to
which the HBP aligns with our principles for re-examining federal
programs, we compared HBP practices to the four key principles we
identified in our previous work, including identifying clear federal
goals and roles, incorporating performance and accountability into
funding decisions, using best tools and approaches, and ensuring fiscal
sustainability.[Footnote 6] We conducted our review from October 2007
through September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained meets these
standards.
Summary:
The HBP affords states discretion to use HBP funds and select bridge
projects in a variety of ways. Some states are focused on reducing
their number of deficient bridges,[Footnote 7] while other states are
pursuing different bridge priorities. For example, California has
focused on seismically retrofitting bridges, a safety concern for that
state. In addition, some states transfer a portion of their HBP funds
to other transportation priorities as allowed by the program, though
some of these transferred HBP funds may still be spent on bridges, as
well as other work on roadways. Furthermore, some states have also
developed tools and approaches for selecting potential bridge projects
that go beyond those required by the HBP--such as bridge management
systems, highly detailed inspections of bridge elements, state-specific
bridge condition ratings, and various prioritization processes--to help
them better gauge bridge conditions and further inform their selection
of bridge projects for funding. For example, all six states we visited
have adopted, or are considering, some form of bridge management system
to help them manage their bridge assets and more efficiently allocate
their HBP and other bridge funds among competing bridge priorities.
Bridge conditions, as measured by the number of deficient bridges and
the average sufficiency rating of all bridges in the NBI,[Footnote 8]
improved from 1998 through 2007. For example, the number of
structurally deficient bridges decreased by 22 percent from 1998
through 2007, from 93,118 to 73,519 bridges nationwide. The average
sufficiency rating of all bridges also improved slightly during that
period, with the improvements most notable in bridges owned by local
agencies and on rural routes. However, the impact of the HBP on that
improvement is difficult to determine, in part, because (1) the program
provides only a share of what state and local governments spend on
bridges and there are no comprehensive data for state and local
spending on bridges and (2) HBP funds can, in some cases, be used for a
variety of bridge projects without regard to a bridge's deficiency
status or sufficiency rating.
The HBP does not fully align with the re-examination principles that we
previously identified in our work in that the program lacks focus on
federal or national interests, performance measures, and
sustainability. For example, the program's goals--which are established
in federal statute[Footnote 9]--are not focused on a clearly identified
federal interest. Rather, the goals have expanded from improving
deficient bridges to supporting seismic retrofitting, preventive
maintenance, and many other projects, thus expanding the federal
interest to potentially include almost any bridge in the country. In
addition, the HBP lacks measures linking funding to performance, and it
is not sustainable, given the anticipated deterioration of the nation's
bridges and the declining purchasing power of funding currently
available for bridge maintenance, rehabilitation, and replacement. Once
the federal interest in bridges is clearly defined, policymakers can
clarify the goals for federal involvement and align the program to
achieve those goals. HBP sustainability may also be improved by
identifying and developing performance measures and re-examining
funding mechanisms. In our report released today, we recommend that DOT
work with Congress to improve the focus, performance, and
sustainability of the HBP by defining specific national goals,
establishing and implementing performance measures, evaluating best
tools and practices, and evaluating HBP's funding mechanisms to better
support a targeted and sustainable program. In commenting on a draft of
the report, DOT officials said that they generally agreed with our
findings and recommendations, and they provided technical
clarifications which we incorporated in the report and this testimony,
as appropriate. DOT officials also commented that our re-examination
principles had broader applicability than the HBP--noting that they had
incorporated the principles into the Department's recent proposal for
reforming surface transportation programs.
Finally, our work on the HBP has implications for several provisions of
the proposed legislation under review by this committee, the National
Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act of 2008 (S.3338). In
particular, the results of our work are consistent with the overall
provisions calling for the establishment of a risk-based prioritization
process for selecting bridge projects, 5-year performance plans, and
bridge management systems. Our work does raise some questions about the
scope of these activities, particularly the legislation's focus on all
deficient bridges, because all deficient bridges are not necessarily
unsafe, according to many of the state transportation officials we
interviewed.
Background:
Bridge safety first emerged as a high-priority issue in the United
States in the 1960s, following the collapse of the Silver Bridge
between Ohio and West Virginia, which killed 46 people. That collapse
prompted national concerns about bridge conditions and safety and
highlighted the need to repair and replace bridges before they
collapse. Congress responded by establishing two major federal bridge
programs: (1) the National Bridge Inspection Program (NBIP) to ensure
periodic safety inspection of bridges and (2) what is now known as the
HBP to provide a funding mechanism to assist states in replacing and
rehabilitating bridges. Both of these programs generally define
applicable bridges as publicly owned, over 20 feet in length, and
located on public roads. Although the NBIP and HBP are separate
programs, they are linked by the data collected through bridge
inspections. For example, bridge information gathered through NBIP
inspections is one factor used to determine the amount of HBP funding
apportioned to states.
The NBIP establishes federal standards, known as the National Bridge
Inspection Standards, and program requirements for the proper safety
inspection and evaluation of bridges. These standards establish by
whom, with what frequency, and how bridge inspections are to be
completed. For example, state departments of transportation (DOTs)
carry out the federal-level policies, procedures, and requirements for
inventory, inspection, bridge load ratings, quality assurance, and
reports. Routine bridge inspections are generally conducted every 2
years, but with FHWA approval, the inspection interval may be extended
to 4 years on certain bridges. Bridges may be inspected more often than
every 2 years, when past inspection findings justify an increased
inspection frequency. Bridge inspectors must record bridge data,
including bridge conditions, during the inspection and report that
information to the NBI, maintained by FHWA headquarters.
Based on information gathered during bridge inspections and reported to
the NBI, the HBP classifies bridge conditions as deficient or not;
assigns each bridge a sufficiency rating reflecting its structural
adequacy, safety, serviceability, and relative importance; and uses
that information to provide funding for states to improve bridges.
Deficient bridges include those that are structurally deficient, with
one or more components in poor condition, and those that are
functionally obsolete, with a poor configuration or design that may no
longer be adequate for the traffic they serve. FHWA uses information in
the NBI to annually apportion HBP funds to the states. While each
state's HBP apportionment amount is largely determined by bridge
conditions and bridges generally must be below a certain condition
threshold to qualify for HBP funding, other bridges are also eligible
for HBP funds because states may use the funds for a broad array of
other purposes, such as bridge preventive maintenance projects.
All bridges are grouped into one of two general categories: Federal-aid
highway bridges and bridges not on Federal-aid highways. The NBIP and
the HBP generally apply to both categories of bridges located on public
roads.[Footnote 10] Federal-aid highway bridges are generally located
on the National Highway System, a 160,000-mile network that carries
over 40 percent of the nation's highway traffic.[Footnote 11] Non-
Federal-aid highway bridges are generally located on local or rural
roads that carry lower volumes of traffic than state-owned bridges.
State DOTs Exercise Discretion in Determining How to Use HBP Funds and
Select Bridge Projects for Funding:
The HBP affords state DOTs discretion in determining how to use their
HBP funds, and as a result, states use HBP funds and select bridge
projects in a variety of ways. The HBP gives states three key
flexibilities in determining how to use their HBP resources. First, the
HBP has evolved to allow states to use program funds not only for
bridge replacement and rehabilitation, but also for a broad array of
purposes--including painting, seismic retrofitting, systematic
preventive maintenance, installation of scour countermeasures (to
address the effects of sediment erosion around bridge piers and
abutments), and anti-icing or deicing applications--regardless of the
bridge's condition. In addition, FHWA has determined that the costs for
personnel and equipment used in bridge inspections and for bridge
management systems are consistent with the purpose of the HBP and
therefore are also eligible uses for HBP funds. Thus, states have the
flexibility to use HBP funds on bridge projects that may not
immediately reduce their inventory of deficient bridges. Secondly,
states have flexibility in determining how to split HBP resources
between state and locally owned bridges. Aside from a requirement to
distribute funds equitably, the only HBP requirement applicable to
states' allocation of program funds is that states must spend a minimum
(15 percent) on non-Federal-aid highway bridges. Third, states may also
spend program funds on other, nonbridge, transportation priorities by
transferring up to 50 percent of their annual HBP funding to other core
Federal-aid highway programs,[Footnote 12] though a penalty is invoked
by reducing the state's HBP funds in the succeeding year by the amount
transferred. Many states have taken advantage of this provision over
the years and transferred some of their HBP funding to other programs,
although FHWA officials pointed out that some of the transferred HBP
funds may still be spent on bridges and funds from other Federal-aid
highway programs may also be spent on bridges. FHWA data show that
significant funds have flowed toward bridges from other programs which,
from a national perspective, exceed outflows from the HBP. Finally,
planning for how HBP funds are spent is generally under the control of
state DOTs; once states select bridge projects, they may apply to FHWA
for the federal share of the costs, which is generally 80 percent of
the project cost.[Footnote 13]
In part due to these flexibilities, state DOTs we visited have
established a range of priorities for their HBP funds--from reducing
the number of their deficient bridges to seismically retrofitting their
bridges--and some opted to transfer their HBP funds to fund other
transportation priorities. Although the key purpose of the HBP is to
enable states to improve the condition of their deficient bridges, some
state transportation officials we interviewed explained that they do
not focus on reducing their inventories of deficient bridges for
several reasons:
* Deficient bridges are not necessarily unsafe. Many state
transportation officials we interviewed told us that some of the
deficient bridges in their states are in at least reasonably good
condition and are safe. In addition, FHWA reported in 2007 that
classifying a bridge as deficient does not immediately imply that it is
likely to collapse or that it is unsafe.[Footnote 14] According to the
FHWA report, if proper vehicle weight restrictions are posted and
enforced, deficient bridges can continue to serve most traffic
conditions. FHWA requires that bridge owners close to traffic any
bridges that they determine to be unsafe.
* The HBP apportionment formula may create a disincentive to improve
deficient bridges. Many federal and state officials we met with noted
this potential disincentive that occurs because reducing the number and
deck area of deficient bridges reduces a state's HBP funding
eligibility.[Footnote 15]
* Some deficient bridge projects can be cost-prohibitive. Some state
officials explained that certain large-scale bridge projects--often the
most traveled, urban bridges on interstate corridors--are too expensive
to be implemented with HBP funds alone, especially costly "mega"
projects that have an estimated total cost greater than $500 million.
State DOTs use a variety of criteria, tools, and methods to select
among potential bridge projects. Officials in the six states we visited
use criteria such as bridge condition ratings, average daily traffic
over bridges, local transportation priorities, or funding availability
when prioritizing and selecting among potential bridge projects. Some
states have also developed tools and approaches beyond those required
by the HBP--such as bridge management systems, element-level
inspections, state-specific condition ratings, and various
prioritization approaches--to help them gauge bridge conditions and
further inform their selection of bridge projects for funding. For
example, all of the states we visited have adopted, or are considering,
some form of bridge management system for gathering and analyzing
bridge data to help manage their bridge assets and more efficiently
allocate limited HBP resources among competing bridge priorities.
States use these systems to predict future bridge conditions, estimate
bridge maintenance and improvement needs, determine optimal policies
for rehabilitation and replacement, and recommend projects and
schedules within budget and policy constraints. FHWA has actively
encouraged, but has not required, states to use bridge management
systems, in part, by providing state transportation officials with
relevant training and technical support.[Footnote 16] In addition, all
of the states we visited required bridge inspectors to gather more
detailed "element-level" bridge condition data, thereby exceeding the
federal inspection requirements that require inspection of only the
three major bridge components (superstructure, substructure, and
deck).[Footnote 17] Furthermore, some state DOTs use their own bridge
rating systems to better gauge bridge conditions and to inform their
selection of bridge projects for funding. For example, the New York
State DOT uses its own condition rating scale, which is based on an
assessment of 47 individual bridge elements, to prioritize bridge
projects. Finally, state DOTs use different methods to prioritize and
select bridge projects for funding. Whereas some states we visited had
highly centralized prioritization processes, others allowed the process
to vary across the state.
Available Data Indicate That the Overall Condition of the Nation's
Bridges Has Improved, but the Impact of the HBP Is Difficult to
Determine:
Bridge conditions, as measured by the number of deficient bridges and
average sufficiency rating, improved from 1998 through 2007. According
to NBI data, the total number of deficient bridges-- including both
structurally deficient and functionally obsolete bridges--has decreased
over the last 10 years, even as the total number of bridges has
increased. From 1998 through 2007, the number of deficient bridges
declined by nearly 12 percent, from 172,683 to 152,317, even with the
addition of more than 16,000 new bridges to the NBI (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Trends in Numbers of Bridges and Deficient Bridges, 1998
through 2007:
This figure is a bar chart showing trends in numbers of bridges and
deficient bridges, 1998 through 2007. The X axis represents the year,
and the Y axis represents the number of bridges (in thousands). The
line represents all bridges, and the bars represent deficient bridges.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of FHWA data.
Note: Deficient bridges include both structurally deficient and
functionally obsolete bridges.
[End of figure]
The decline in the overall number of deficient bridges over the past
decade reflects a reduction in the number of structurally deficient
bridges. From 1998 through 2007, the number of structurally deficient
bridges decreased by 22 percent, from 93,118 to 72,519 (see fig. 2).
During that same period, the number of functionally obsolete bridges
increased slightly from 79,565 to 79,798, an increase of 233 bridges.
The reduction in the number of structurally deficient bridges, rather
than functionally obsolete bridges, over this time period may reflect
bridge owners' efforts to address the deterioration or damage that are
characteristic of structurally deficient bridges. Although reducing or
eliminating structurally deficient bridges may not always be a state's
highest priority, structurally deficient bridges often require
maintenance and repair to remain in service. By contrast, functionally
obsolete bridges do not necessarily require repair to remain in service
and, therefore, are unlikely to be transportation officials' top
priority for rehabilitation or replacement.
Figure 2: Number of Structurally Deficient and Functionally Obsolete
Bridges, 1998 through 2007:
This figure is a combination line graph showing number of structurally
deficient and functionally obsolete bridges, 1998 through 2007. The X
axis represents the year, and the Y axis represents the number of
bridges (in thousands). One line represents structurally deficient
bridges, and the other line represents functionally obsolete bridges.
Fiscal year: 1998;
Structurally deficient bridges: 93,118;
Functionally obsolete bridges: 79,565.
Fiscal year: 1999;
Structurally deficient bridges: 88,184;
Functionally obsolete bridges: 81,942.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Structurally deficient bridges: 86,721;
Functionally obsolete bridges: 80,918.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Structurally deficient bridges: 83,631;
Functionally obsolete bridges: 81,483.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Structurally deficient bridges: 81,297;
Functionally obsolete bridges: 81,565.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Structurally deficient bridges: 79,807;
Functionally obsolete bridges: 81,006.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Structurally deficient bridges: 77,772;
Functionally obsolete bridges: 80,591.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Structurally deficient bridges: 75,948;
Functionally obsolete bridges: 80,428.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Structurally deficient bridges: 73,796;
Functionally obsolete bridges: 80,316.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Structurally deficient bridges: 72,519;
Functionally obsolete bridges: 79,798.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of FHWA data.
[End of figure]
The average sufficiency rating of all bridges--including both deficient
and not deficient bridges--also improved slightly between 1998 and
2007, from 75 to 79 on the sufficiency rating's 100-point
scale.[Footnote 18] Additionally, while structurally deficient bridges
generally have lower sufficiency ratings (average rating of 42 in 2007)
than functionally obsolete bridges (average rating of 69 in 2007), the
average sufficiency ratings of both types of deficient bridges improved
slightly over the last decade.
Improvements were most notable in bridges owned by local agencies and
on rural routes, which may be attributable, in part, to the federal
bridge program requirement--under HBP and some of its predecessor
programs--that states spend a minimum amount of their apportionment on
non-Federal-aid highway bridges.[Footnote 19] For example, from 1998
through 2007, the average sufficiency rating for bridges owned by local
agencies improved from 71 to 77, and the number of deficient bridges
decreased by over 17 percent, from 99,492 to 82,101. During that same
period, for bridges owned by state agencies, the average sufficiency
rating improved from 79 to 82, and the number of deficient bridges
decreased by 4 percent, from 70,066 to 67,232 (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Number of Deficient Bridges, by Bridge Owner, 1998 through
2007:
This figure is a combination line graph showing number of deficient
bridges, by bridge owner, 1998 through 2007. The X axis represents
year, and the Y axis represent the number of deficient bridges (in
thousands). One line represents locally owned deficient bridges, and
the other line represents state owned deficient bridges.
Fiscal year: 1998;
State owned deficient bridges: 70,066;
Locally owned deficient bridges: 99,492.
Fiscal year: 1999;
State owned deficient bridges: 69,591;
Locally owned deficient bridges: 96,642.
Fiscal year: 2000;
State owned deficient bridges: 68,962;
Locally owned deficient bridges: 95,405.
Fiscal year: 2001;
State owned deficient bridges: 68,613;
Locally owned deficient bridges: 93,084.
Fiscal year: 2002;
State owned deficient bridges: 68,377;
Locally owned deficient bridges: 91,126.
Fiscal year: 2003;
State owned deficient bridges: 67,994;
Locally owned deficient bridges: 89,785.
Fiscal year: 2004;
State owned deficient bridges: 67,638;
Locally owned deficient bridges: 87,694.
Fiscal year: 2005;
State owned deficient bridges: 67,759;
Locally owned deficient bridges: 85,572.
Fiscal year: 2006;
State owned deficient bridges: 67,583;
Locally owned deficient bridges: 83,568.
Fiscal year: 2007;
State owned deficient bridges: 67,232;
Locally owned deficient bridges: 82,101.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of FHWA data.
Note: Deficient bridges include both structurally deficient and
functionally obsolete bridges.
[End of figure]
With respect to urban and rural bridges, the number of deficient rural
bridges declined from 1998 through 2007 and the number of deficient
urban bridges increased.[Footnote 20] From 1998 through 2007, the
number of deficient rural bridges decreased by about 19 percent, from
130,910 to 106,209.[Footnote 21] During that same period, the number of
deficient urban bridges increased by about 11 percent, from 41,659 to
46,086 (see fig. 4). The average sufficiency rating for both rural and
urban bridges improved slightly from 1998 through 2007; for rural
bridges, the average rating increased from 74 to 78, and for urban
bridges, the average rating increased from 79 to 82.
Figure 4: Number of Deficient Bridges, by Rural and Urban
Classification, 1998 through 2007:
This figure is a combination line graph showing number of deficient
bridges, by rural and urban classification, 1998 through 2007. The X
axis represents the year, and the Y axis represents the number of
deficient bridges (in thousands). The X axis represents the year, and
the Y axis represents the number of deficient bridges (in thousands).
One line represents the number of rural deficient budget, and the other
represents the number of urban deficient bridges.
Fiscal year: 1998;
Rural deficient bridges: 130,910;
Urban deficient bridges: 41,659.
Fiscal year: 1999;
Rural deficient bridges: 128,014;
Urban deficient bridges: 42,032.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Rural deficient bridges: 125,520;
Urban deficient bridges: 42,031.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Rural deficient bridges: 122,944;
Urban deficient bridges: 42,088.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Rural deficient bridges: 120,608;
Urban deficient bridges: 42,176.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Rural deficient bridges: 118,535;
Urban deficient bridges: 42,200.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Rural deficient bridges: 115,851;
Urban deficient bridges: 42,482.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Rural deficient bridges: 112,341;
Urban deficient bridges: 43,990.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Rural deficient bridges: 109,201;
Urban deficient bridges: 44,875.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Rural deficient bridges: 106,209;
Urban deficient bridges: 46,086.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of FHWA data.
Note: Deficient bridges include both structurally deficient and
functionally obsolete bridges.
[End of figure]
The impact of the HBP on the improvements in bridge conditions is
difficult to determine for several reasons, including lack of
information on state and local bridge spending, the expansion of bridge
project eligibility, and limitations in the NBI data. First, the impact
of the federal investment in the HBP is difficult to measure in part
because there are no comprehensive data for state and local spending on
bridges. FHWA does track a portion of each state's capital spending on
bridges, and the agency has generated a single, national level estimate
for total bridge expenditures by all government levels; however, there
are significant gaps in this information, and neither source is
comprehensive or detailed enough to be used to determine the impact of
the HBP.[Footnote 22] The state transportation officials we spoke with
during our site visits estimated that state and local spending on
bridges ranged from the minimum match amount (generally 20 percent of
the HBP apportionment amount) to more than four times the state's
apportioned HBP funds. Our previous work has shown that although
federal investment in HBP and other Federal-aid highway programs has
increased over time, this investment has not resulted in commensurate
increases in the nation's total government spending (federal, state,
and local) on its highway system.[Footnote 23] In particular, as the
level of federal funding has increased since the mid-1990s, states have
not maintained their level of effort in highway spending, and federal
funds have increasingly been substituted for state funds. This suggests
that increased federal highway funding influences states and localities
to substitute federal funds for state and local funds they otherwise
would have spent on highways and bridges.
Second, the impact of the HBP is also difficult to measure because HBP
funds can, in some cases, be used for a variety of bridge projects
without regard to a bridge's deficiency status or sufficiency rating.
Therefore, simply measuring changes in the number of structurally
deficient or functionally obsolete bridges does not reflect the full
impact of the program since these measures do not capture the impact of
the HBP investment in the other eligible activities that do not
necessarily result in an immediate reduction in the number of deficient
bridges. Without quantifiable performance measures to track the full
range of desired outcomes for the HBP, it is difficult to measure the
program's impact and determine the extent to which the program is
serving its stated purpose.
Finally, another difficulty in determining the impact of HBP funding
occurs because the NBI does not readily permit changes in the condition
of a group of bridges to be tracked across time. Each bridge in the NBI
is assigned an identifying number by the relevant state DOT. However,
the identifying number for a bridge at a specific location may change
over the life of that bridge. Such a change may occur when a state
renumbers, replaces, or closes and subsequently reopens a bridge. As a
result, it is difficult to track changes in the condition of any
specific bridge or group of bridges to determine if, for example, the
same bridges that were deficient in 1998 are still deficient today, to
see how many bridges have been replaced, or to determine the impact of
new bridges added to the inventory (which may not be funded by the HBP)
on the overall condition of the nation's bridges.
Evaluating the impact of the HBP is important not only to understand
the outcomes of past spending but also to determine how to sensibly
invest future federal resources. The number of HBP-eligible bridges is
expected to increase as a large share of the nation's bridges built in
the 1960s and early 1970s age and become eligible for rehabilitation
and replacement as a group; as a result, states and local agencies may
see a spike in their need for bridge rehabilitation and replacement
funding. In this environment of increasing demand for limited
resources, it is especially important for FHWA and Congress to be able
to evaluate the impact of the HBP in order to ensure that the program
is providing an acceptable return on investment and addressing national
transportation priorities.
The HBP Lacks Focus, Performance Measures, and Sustainability:
The HBP, while generally helping to improve bridge conditions, does not
fully align with our principles for re-examining surface transportation
programs in that the bridge program lacks focus, performance measures,
and sustainability. Our principles, which are based on our prior work
and federal laws and regulations, include: (1) ensuring program goals
are well defined and focused on the federal or national interest, (2)
incorporating performance and accountability into funding decisions,
(3) employing the best tools and approaches to emphasize return on
targeted federal investment, and (4) ensuring fiscal sustainability.
First, HBP's goals are not focused on a clearly identified federal
interest. Over the years, the program's statutory goals have expanded
from improving deficient bridges to supporting seismic retrofitting,
preventive maintenance, and many other activities, thus expanding the
federal interest to potentially include almost any bridge in the
country. Our previous work has emphasized the importance of identifying
clear areas of federal interest as a first step in determining program
goals. For example, if mobility is determined to be a key federal
interest and a primary goal, the HBP could be targeted toward bridges
whose conditions have the most impact on congestion and economic
competitiveness and that carry higher levels of traffic or freight than
those bridges in remote areas that may serve only a few people each
day. If rehabilitating and reducing deficient bridges is determined to
be a key federal interest, then the program could be further targeted
toward that goal. The federal interest may also be greater in bridge
projects that are too expensive for states to undertake without
additional federal assistance or in projects that extend beyond the
borders of a single state. Once the federal interest has been
determined, our principles call for basing the federal share of the
cost of bridge projects on the level of federal interest.
Second, there is no clear tie between HBP funding and performance. HBP
funds are apportioned to states without regard to program performance
because the HBP formula is based on a calculation of needed repairs to
deficient bridges but does not consider a state's efforts or
effectiveness in reducing its inventory of deficient bridges or
controlling costs. Because the formula does not factor in other
eligible program activities, such as systematic preventive maintenance,
there is no link between the apportionment formula and the states'
performance of these activities. Without performance measures to link
funding to performance, states lack an incentive to improve the return
on the federal investment and are not held accountable for the results
of their investments. Our work has shown that an increased focus on
performance and accountability for results can help the federal
government better target limited federal resources.
Third, the HBP generally lacks sufficient tools to determine the
effects of the federal investment in bridges. In this regard, bridge
management systems, which are currently used by many states but not
required by the program's authorizing legislation, may be useful for
prioritizing projects and making funding decisions to improve results
and emphasize return on investment.
Finally, the HBP's fiscal sustainability remains a challenge in light
of aging bridge infrastructure, coupled with the declining purchasing
power of funding currently available for bridge maintenance,
rehabilitation, replacement and the recent growth in construction
costs. Based on our prior work, two tools that could possibly improve
the sustainability of the HBP are a maintenance-of-effort requirement
and tolling. A maintenance-of-effort requirement, whereby state or
local grantees would be required to maintain their own level of funding
in order to receive HBP funds, could reduce the potential substitution
of federal funds for state and local funds under the program. In
addition, our prior work has shown that removing barriers to, or even
promoting, tolling can lead to more efficient management of existing
infrastructure and capacity.[Footnote 24] Addressing the HBP's future
fiscal sustainability is critical, given the overall fiscal imbalance
facing the nation and the lack of assurance that HBP funding is
allocated to projects that are in the federal interest and provide the
best return on investment.
Observations on Proposed Bridge Legislation:
Our work on the HBP can provide some perspective on several provisions
in the proposed legislation under review by this committee, the
National Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act of 2008 (S.
3338). The legislation proposes, among other things, to authorize an
additional $1 billion for fiscal year 2009 from the U.S. Treasury's
general fund to address bridge infrastructure. The legislation would
also require DOT to strengthen bridge inspection standards, adopt a
risk-based process for prioritizing certain bridge rehabilitation and
replacement projects, and require that states develop 5-year
performance plans for bridge inspections and for the rehabilitation or
replacement of deficient bridges.
As summarized below, our work on the HBP is related to several
provisions in the proposal:
* For example, the legislation calls for DOT to apply a risk-based
prioritization process to every structurally deficient or functionally
obsolete bridge in the nation. While such a process could potentially
help target scarce federal resources to bridges that are most critical
to safety and mobility, many state transportation officials we
interviewed during our work raised questions about the appropriateness
of focusing on all deficient bridges, noting that all deficient bridges
are not necessarily unsafe and some large-scale deficient bridge
projects can be too cost-prohibitive to be implemented with HBP funds
alone. Also, the legislation is unclear about how, if at all, the new
risk-based prioritization process will differ from or relate to DOT's
established sufficiency rating process. FHWA uses sufficiency ratings
primarily to determine HBP eligibility and apportion funds. We found
that states may consider sufficiency ratings in their prioritization
processes but generally do not rely on these to prioritize bridge
projects.
* In addition, the legislation calls for DOT to require states to
develop 5-year performance plans covering the inspection and
rehabilitation or replacement of all structurally deficient or
functionally obsolete bridges. We support the use of performance plans
to articulate program goals that are in the federal interest, encourage
accountability for results, and help ensure that the federal government
targets resources to programs that best achieve intended outcomes and
national priorities. Our work has shown that the current HBP funding
formula is not linked to a state's performance in reducing its
inventories of deficient bridges and we are recommending in our report
being issued today that DOT work with Congress to define specific
national goals and performance measures for the HBP. This legislative
provision might be strengthened by requiring states to report on their
progress in achieving their goals as part of each annual update to
their performance plan. Also, the legislation requires that the
performance plans be focused on all deficient bridges, and the same
issue that I raised earlier about the appropriateness of this focus
applies here as well.
* The legislation also calls for DOT to require the states to develop
and implement a bridge management system. In our work on the HBP, all
six states we visited had adopted, or were considering, some form of
bridge management system to help manage their bridge assets and more
efficiently allocate limited HBP resources among competing bridge
priorities. In the report we are releasing today, we are recommending
that DOT evaluate and incorporate into the HBP best tools and
practices, such as bridge management systems.
Conclusions and Recommendations:
Although many aspects of the HBP are carried out at the state level--
with ultimate responsibility for bridge inspection and project
selection residing with the states--the federal government bears
responsibility for ensuring that the program achieves results that are
in the federal interest and that the program's resources are allocated
efficiently. The purpose of the HBP has greatly expanded over the
years, making nearly any bridge potentially eligible for federal
funding, and as a result, the federal interest in bridges lacks focus.
Additionally, many state officials told us that measures used by the
HBP to apportion federal funds--bridge deficiency status and
sufficiency ratings--are not necessarily good proxies for the safety or
risk associated with specific bridges. Even though data indicate that
the number of structurally deficient bridges has declined over the last
10 years, most of this improvement has been in locally owned and rural
bridges. Oftentimes, the largest and most critical bridges carrying
more interstate commerce are too expensive to be funded by the HBP and
so require other funding sources to be replaced or rehabilitated.
Moreover, without comprehensive data on state and local spending on
bridges, it is impossible either to distinguish the impact of HBP
funding from the impact of state and local bridge funding or to
determine the extent to which states are substituting HBP funding for
state and local funds that would otherwise have been spent on bridges.
Absent clear goals and related performance measures for the HBP, it is
difficult to determine the overall effectiveness of the program's
investment in bridges.
Our principles have suggested several ways to improve the HBP to ensure
that it is more focused and performance-based in the future. For
example, tools such as bridge management systems provide bridge
managers with a more systematic approach to prioritizing projects and
making funding decisions. Our work has shown that some states are using
bridge management systems and other tools that generally exceed federal
standards. Additionally, linking program goals to performance measures
to determine whether goals are met and using that information to select
projects and make funding decisions, can create incentives for state
and local governments to improve the performance of their bridge
programs, as well as the overall transportation system. As the
projected revenue shortfall in the Highway Trust fund rapidly
approaches and as bridge costs rise and infrastructure continues to
age, incorporating strategies to better ensure the fiscal
sustainability of the HBP is also critical.
To improve the focus, performance, and sustainability of the HBP, the
report we are releasing at this hearing recommends that the Secretary
of Transportation work with Congress to take the following actions:
* identify and define specific national goals for the HBP;
* determine the performance of the program by developing and
implementing performance measures related to the goals for the HBP;
* identify and evaluate best tools and practices that can potentially
be incorporated into the HBP, such as bridge management systems; and:
* review and evaluate HBP funding mechanisms to align funding with
performance and support a targeted and sustainable federal bridge
program.
In reviewing a draft of the report, DOT officials said that they
generally agreed with our findings and recommendations, and they
provided technical comments which we incorporated in the report and
this testimony, as appropriate. DOT officials also commented that they
thought our re-examination principles had broader applicability than
just the HBP--noting that DOT had incorporated our principles into the
Department's recent proposal for reforming surface transportation
programs. DOT's reform proposal, released in July 2008, recommends
consolidating the existing network of over 100 surface transportation
programs into eight broad, intermodal programs.[Footnote 25] The
officials noted that DOT's reform proposal articulates a narrower
federal interest and a framework for performance management tied to
clearer goals for surface transportation programs. We have not
commented on DOT's reform proposal, and the outcome of that proposal in
the surface transportation reauthorization debate that will occur
during 2009 is uncertain. However, we agree with DOT that our re-
examination principles are applicable at a broader level than a
specific program like HBP; in fact, we developed our principles because
of (1) our concerns, raised in prior work, that many federal surface
transportation programs are not effective at addressing key
transportation challenges such as growing congestion and freight demand
and (2) our conclusion that our principles could help drive the re-
examination of those programs and help assess options for restructuring
the entire federal surface transportation program.[Footnote 26]
Chairman Boxer, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy
to respond to any questions that you or members of the committee may
have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this statement, please contact Katherine
Siggerud at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony were Rita Grieco, Assistant Director;
Claudia Becker; Stephanie Fain; Carol Henn; Bert Japikse; Delwen Jones;
Leslie Locke; and Sara Ann Moessbauer.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] States may use HBP funds for seven types of bridge-related
activities, including replacement, rehabilitation, painting, seismic
retrofitting, systematic preventive maintenance, installation of scour
countermeasures (to address the effects of sediment erosion around
bridge piers and abutments), and anti-icing or deicing activities.
[2] The $1 billion represents an amount in addition to what was
authorized for 2009 for HBP and other related programs in the most
recent surface transportation authorizing legislation enacted in 2005.
[3] The federal budget consists of several types of funds, including
the general fund, trust funds (such as the Highway Trust Fund), and
others. General funds are federal revenues not designated for specific
purposes and they are used to fund, among other things, national
defense, interest on the public debt, operating expenses of most
federal agencies, and some entitlements and grants to state and local
governments.
[4] GAO, Surface Transportation: Restructured Federal Approach Needed
for More Focused, Performance-Based, and Sustainable Programs, GAO-08-
400 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2008).
[5] GAO, Highway Bridge Program: Clearer Goals and Performance Measures
Needed for a More Focused and Sustainable Program, GAO-08-1043
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008).
[6] These principles were developed in our earlier work on 21st century
challenges and were based on our institutional knowledge, our extensive
program evaluation and performance assessment work for the Congress,
and federal laws and regulations. See GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Re-
examining the Base of the Federal Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005) and GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007).
[7] The HBP classifies bridge conditions as deficient or not. Deficient
bridges include those that are structurally deficient, with one or more
components in poor condition, and those that are functionally obsolete,
with a poor configuration or design that may no longer be adequate for
the traffic they serve.
[8] In addition to classifying bridges as deficient or not, the HBP
also assigns each bridge a sufficiency rating reflecting its structural
adequacy, safety, serviceability, and relative importance, and it uses
this information in distributing HBP funding to the states.
[9] See 23 U.S.C. § 144.
[10] The NBIP standards do not apply to pedestrian or railroad bridges,
bridges on private roads, or tunnels. FHWA encourages states to require
private organizations to inspect privately owned bridges according to
those standards. States are not responsible for the inspection of
bridges owned by federal agencies.
[11] The National Highway System (NHS) is made up of five components,
including (1) the Interstate System, (2) selected other principal
arterials, (3) the Strategic Highway Network, (4) Major Strategic
Highway Network connectors, and (5) intermodal connectors that provide
access between major intermodal passenger and freight facilities and
other NHS components.
[12] The majority of Federal-aid highway infrastructure funding is
distributed through seven major programs, often referred to as core
highway programs. These programs are the National Highway System
Program, Surface Transportation Program, Interstate Maintenance
Program, HBP, Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement
Program, Highway Safety Improvement Program, and the Equity Bonus
Program.
[13] The federal share for bridge projects on the Interstate System is
90 percent.
[14] DOT, 2006 Status of the Nation's Highways, Bridges, and Transit:
Conditions and Performance (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2007).
[15] FHWA apportions, or divides, the annually authorized HBP funds
among the states according to a statutory apportionment process that
considers a number of factors, including a state's total deficient
bridge deck area. Therefore, reducing the number and total deck area of
deficient bridges reduces a state's HBP funding eligibility.
[16] There is currently no federal requirement that states use a bridge
management system. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
of 1991 introduced a requirement that states implement bridge
management systems by December 1993, but this requirement was repealed
by the National Highway System Designation Act of 1995.
[17] The superstructure is the portion of a bridge's structure that
spans the obstacle the bridge is intended to cross (e.g., a waterway).
The substructure consists of all parts that support the superstructure.
[18] The sufficiency rating is a score from 0 to 100 assigned to each
bridge, reflecting its structural adequacy, safety, serviceability, and
essentiality or relative importance for public use. A rating of 100
represents an entirely sufficient bridge and a 0 represents an entirely
insufficient bridge.
[19] Since 1978, a minimum of each state's apportionment has to be
spent on bridges that are off the Federal-aid highway system. Until the
enactment of the 2005 surface transportation authorizing legislation,
there was also a maximum ceiling, 35 percent, that could be spent on
non-Federal-aid highway bridges.
[20] A bridge is classified as rural in the NBI database if it is not
located inside a designated urban area.
[21] Approximately 75 percent of the nation's bridges are rural, and 25
percent are urban.
[22] For example, while FHWA does track a portion of bridge capital
spending on a state by state basis, the data does not include (1) state
spending on bridges located on local roads and (2) most local
government spending on bridges. In addition, while FHWA generates a
single, national-level estimate for total bridge expenditures at all
government levels, this estimate cannot be used to determine the impact
of the HBP by state or by bridge because it is a national aggregate.
Moreover, neither of these two FHWA data sources on bridge spending
includes noncapital activities funding by the HBP, such as systematic
preventive maintenance, anti-icing and deicing applications, and
painting.
[23] GAO, Federal-Aid Highways: Trends, Effect on State Spending, and
Options For Future Program Design, GAO-04-802 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
31, 2004).
[24] GAO, Highway Finance: States' Expanding Use of Tolling Illustrates
Diverse Challenges and Strategies, GAO-06-554 (Washington, D.C.: June
28, 2006).
[25] DOT, Refocus, Reform, Renew: A New Transportation Approach for
America (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2008).
[26] See GAO-08-400.
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