Next Generation Air Transportation System
Status of Key Issues Associated with the Transition to NextGen
Gao ID: GAO-08-1154T September 11, 2008
To prepare for forecasted air traffic growth, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in partnership with other federal agencies and the aviation industry, is planning and implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new, satellite-based air traffic management system that is expected to increase the safety and enhance the capacity of the air transport system. NextGen will replace the current radar-based air traffic control (ATC) system. Within FAA, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is responsible for implementing the transition to NextGen, and ATO's Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) is coordinating efforts to plan for this transition, including developing a 20-year research and development (R&D) agenda for NextGen. JPDO has drafted three basic planning documents for NextGen--a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan (IWP). This testimony responds to six questions about NextGen and JPDO raised by the House Committee on Science and Technology, and addresses two related challenges identified by GAO. The statement is based on recent related GAO reports and testimonies, including a report issued today that reflects GAO's analysis of interviews with 25 key NextGen stakeholders about progress and challenges involved in the transition to NextGen.
Have the Views of Industry and Air Traffic Controllers Been Adequately Incorporated in NextGen Planning Documents? FAA and JPDO have established mechanisms for obtaining stakeholder views. However, given the large number of NextGen stakeholders and the evolution of opportunities for participation in NextGen, we believe that stakeholders will continue to differ on how adequately their views have been incorporated in NextGen planning. Is the Current Version of IWP Sufficiently Detailed for Effective Use in Overseeing and Managing NextGen? No. The current version lacks some needed information, but the next version, to be released this month, is to contain more detail, including schedule information, and is automated and searchable, making it more user friendly and useful for oversight. How Confident Should Congress Be that IWP Will Provide a Sufficient Basis for Achieving NextGen's Goals? The current plan does not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to be confident. The upcoming version will provide a firmer basis for confidence, but additional R&D issues that are not part of the plan will have to be addressed, including technology transfer issues. Can JPDO Continue to Be Viewed as an "Honest Broker" in Light of FAA's Recent Restructuring? The restructuring made JPDO a component of ATO rather than an independent office, but other federal agencies are reportedly still cooperating with JPDO, suggesting that they continue to view it as an honest broker. However, it is too early to tell if the restructuring addresses stakeholders' concerns about the fragmentation of management responsibility for NextGen activities. What Needs to Be Done to Move JPDO from Proposing R&D to Articulating a Clear R&D Program with Defined and Prioritized Tasks? The move is underway. JPDO needs to continue collaborating with its partner agencies to identify and prioritize R&D and leverage their R&D programs. It is too soon to assess the results of steps JPDO and the partner agencies have taken thus far. What Metrics Should Congress Use to Evaluate the Progress of NextGen? Schedule information in the upcoming version of IWP and cost information in the subsequent version will help provide Congress with metrics for evaluating NextGen's progress. Additional Infrastructure and Human Capital Challenges Identified by GAO. NextGen's implementation further depends on FAA's reconfiguring and maintaining its ATC facilities, expanding runways, and hiring staff with the engineering and contract management skills needed to provide oversight.
GAO-08-1154T, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of Key Issues Associated with the Transition to NextGen
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Science and Technology, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, September 11, 2008:
Next Generation Air transportation system:
Status of Key Issues Associated with the Transition to NextGen:
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-08-1154T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-1154T, a testimony before the Committee on Science
and Technology, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
To prepare for forecasted air traffic growth, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), in partnership with other federal agencies and
the aviation industry, is planning and implementing the Next Generation
Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new, satellite-based air traffic
management system that is expected to increase the safety and enhance
the capacity of the air transport system. NextGen will replace the
current radar-based air traffic control (ATC) system. Within FAA, the
Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is responsible for implementing the
transition to NextGen, and ATO‘s Joint Planning and Development Office
(JPDO) is coordinating efforts to plan for this transition, including
developing a 20-year research and development (R&D) agenda for NextGen.
JPDO has drafted three basic planning documents for NextGen”a Concept
of Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan
(IWP). This testimony responds to six questions about NextGen and JPDO
raised by the House Committee on Science and Technology, and addresses
two related challenges identified by GAO. The statement is based on
recent related GAO reports and testimonies, including a report issued
today that reflects GAO‘s analysis of interviews with 25 key NextGen
stakeholders about progress and challenges involved in the transition
to NextGen.
What GAO Found:
Have the Views of Industry and Air Traffic Controllers Been Adequately
Incorporated in NextGen Planning Documents? FAA and JPDO have
established mechanisms for obtaining stakeholder views. However, given
the large number of NextGen stakeholders and the evolution of
opportunities for participation in NextGen, we believe that
stakeholders will continue to differ on how adequately their views have
been incorporated in NextGen planning.
Is the Current Version of IWP Sufficiently Detailed for Effective Use
in Overseeing and Managing NextGen? No. The current version lacks some
needed information, but the next version, to be released this month, is
to contain more detail, including schedule information, and is
automated and searchable, making it more user friendly and useful for
oversight.
How Confident Should Congress Be that IWP Will Provide a Sufficient
Basis for Achieving NextGen‘s Goals? The current plan does not provide
a sufficient basis for Congress to be confident. The upcoming version
will provide a firmer basis for confidence, but additional R&D issues
that are not part of the plan will have to be addressed, including
technology transfer issues.
Can JPDO Continue to Be Viewed as an ’Honest Broker“ in Light of FAA‘s
Recent Restructuring? The restructuring made JPDO a component of ATO
rather than an independent office, but other federal agencies are
reportedly still cooperating with JPDO, suggesting that they continue
to view it as an honest broker. However, it is too early to tell if the
restructuring addresses stakeholders‘ concerns about the fragmentation
of management responsibility for NextGen activities.
What Needs to Be Done to Move JPDO from Proposing R&D to Articulating a
Clear R&D Program with Defined and Prioritized Tasks? The move is
underway. JPDO needs to continue collaborating with its partner
agencies to identify and prioritize R&D and leverage their R&D
programs. It is too soon to assess the results of steps JPDO and the
partner agencies have taken thus far.
What Metrics Should Congress Use to Evaluate the Progress of NextGen?
Schedule information in the upcoming version of IWP and cost
information in the subsequent version will help provide Congress with
metrics for evaluating NextGen‘s progress.
Additional Infrastructure and Human Capital Challenges Identified by
GAO. NextGen‘s implementation further depends on FAA‘s reconfiguring
and maintaining its ATC facilities, expanding runways, and hiring staff
with the engineering and contract management skills needed to provide
oversight.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
GAO-08-1154T. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham at
(202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the status of issues associated with the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen)--the planned air traffic management
system intended to address current and anticipated aviation congestion.
Today, the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system is experiencing
some of the worst delays in recent times, with one in four flights
delayed. Currently, the U.S. air transportation system handles roughly
50,000 flights over a 24-hour period. By 2025, air traffic is projected
to double or triple, increasing to 100,000 to 150,000 flights every 24
hours. Stakeholders acknowledge that the current air transportation
system will not be able to meet these air traffic demands.
Recognizing the need to transform the current system and to prepare for
the forecasted growth in air traffic, Congress in 2003 mandated the
creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)[Footnote
1] to conceptualize and plan for NextGen. JPDO works in partnership
with the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense (DOD), and
Homeland Security (DHS); the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy; and the private sector. Housed
within FAA--first as an independent office and now, following
restructuring, as a component of FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO)-
-JPDO is responsible for coordinating the related efforts of these
partners to plan the transformation to NextGen. JPDO initially prepared
three basic planning documents for NextGen--the Concept of Operations,
Enterprise Architecture, and Integrated Work Plan (IWP)--which,
collectively, form the basis of the joint planning environment for
NextGen.
My statement today responds to the six questions you raised about
NextGen and JPDO and addresses two related challenges that we have
identified in the course of our work--infrastructure issues associated
with the configuration of ATC facilities and the capacity of airport
runways and staffing issues related to FAA's in-house technical
expertise. Your six questions are as follows:
1. Have the views of industry and active air traffic controllers been
adequately incorporated in NextGen plans, such as those embodied in the
Concept of Operations, Enterprise Architecture, and IWP?
2. Is the current version of IWP sufficiently detailed and prioritized
for effective use in overseeing and managing the NextGen-related
research of multiple agencies?
3. How confident should Congress be that progress in meeting the
research, development, and testing activities set out in IWP will
provide a sufficient basis for achieving NextGen's goals and timetable
for quieter, cleaner, and more efficient air traffic operations?
4. Can the other partner agencies continue to view JPDO as an "honest
broker" in light of FAA's recent restructuring action?
5. What needs to be done to move JPDO from proposing research and
development (R&D) for NextGen to articulating a clear R&D program with
defined and prioritized tasks?
6. What metrics should Congress use to evaluate the progress of the
NextGen initiative?
This statement is based on recent related GAO reports and testimonies,
including a report to this committee and other congressional requesters
we are issuing today.[Footnote 2] Our work on this most recent report
included interviewing 25 key NextGen stakeholders about the progress of
and challenges to planning for and achieving the transition to NextGen.
We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the work to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
NextGen is a multidecade, multiagency effort to transform the current
ATC system to the next generation air transportation system by moving
from relying largely on ground-based radars to using precision
satellites; digital, networked communications; and an integrated
weather system. Often characterized as "curb to curb," NextGen involves
every aspect of air transportation, from arrival at the airport to
departure from the destination airport, and it is expected to increase
the safety and enhance the capacity of the air transport system. JPDO
was charged with coordinating the research activities of the federal
partner agencies with the goal of developing a 20-year R&D agenda for
NextGen. FAA will play the central role in implementing NextGen, since
it will be responsible for acquiring, integrating, and operating the
new ATC systems. Industry stakeholders will also play a key role in
implementing NextGen because they are expected to develop, finance, and
operate many of the new NextGen systems that will need to be installed
in aircraft. FAA plans to spend roughly $5.4 billion from fiscal years
2009 through 2013 on NextGen development and capital costs. JPDO
estimated that total federal spending for NextGen may range from $15
billion to $22 billion through 2025. The agency also noted that it
expects system users to incur $14 billion to $20 billion in costs to
equip themselves with the advanced avionics necessary to realize the
full benefits of some NextGen technologies.
JPDO's authorizing legislation requires the office to create an R&D
plan for the transition to NextGen. This requirement led JPDO to
develop initial versions of the Concept of Operations, Enterprise
Architecture, and IWP. The Concept of Operations is the fundamental
planning document from which the other two documents flow. Version 2 of
the Concept of Operations, issued in June 2007, describes how the
NextGen system is envisioned to operate in 2025. Version 2 of the
Enterprise Architecture, issued in July 2007, is a technical
description of the NextGen system, akin to blueprints for a building.
The Enterprise Architecture provides a means for coordinating among the
partner agencies and private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant
R&D activities, and integrating equipment. Version 0.2 of IWP describes
the integrated framework needed to transition to NextGen from the
current system to the end state and will continually be refined and
enhanced to reflect current priorities, budgets, and programs. It is
JPDO's plan for achieving NextGen. Version 1.0 of IWP is scheduled to
be released at the end of this month.
Have the Views of Industry and Air Traffic Controllers Been Adequately
Incorporated in NextGen Planning Documents?
JPDO, FAA, and industry stakeholders have different perspectives on
whether the views of industry and air traffic controllers have been
adequately incorporated in NextGen planning. JPDO's organizational
structure and processes provide for industry representatives and, to a
lesser extent, air traffic controllers to participate in NextGen
planning, but nearly all the industry stakeholders we spoke with
questioned both the meaningfulness of their involvement and the
usefulness of the NextGen planning documents. Furthermore, active air
traffic controllers maintain that they have not participated in NextGen
development activities. According to FAA, however, their involvement
will increase as NextGen efforts shift from planning to implementation.
JPDO includes several organizations with industry participants, and
industry representatives have reviewed and provided input to key JPDO
planning documents. For example, JPDO's NextGen Institute serves as a
vehicle for incorporating the expertise of industry, state and local
governments, and academia into the NextGen planning process.
Additionally, the Institute Management Council, composed of top
officials and representatives from the aviation community, including
air traffic controllers, oversees the policies, recommendations, and
products of the Institute and provides a means for advancing consensus
positions on critical NextGen issues. JPDO also includes nine working
groups,[Footnote 3] through which federal and private sector
stakeholders come together to plan for and coordinate the development
of NextGen technologies. JDPO created the working groups in early 2007
to replace its integrated product teams and, in part, to address
concerns expressed by stakeholders about their participation. Unlike
the previous teams, which were chaired by a representative from a
federal agency, the working groups, which have the same members as the
previous teams, are jointly led by government and industry officials.
(See table 1.) JPDO expected the working groups to be more efficient
and output-or product-focused than the integrated product teams.
Currently, 265 industry representatives participate in JPDO. In
addition, JPDO provided a draft of the Concept of Operations and IWP to
industry representatives for review and comment. For example, version
0.2 of IWP was circulated to stakeholders and, according to a senior
JPDO official, the office received about 1,100 stakeholder comments,
which were addressed and incorporated in version 1.0 of the document.
Table 1: JPDO's Working Groups, Strategies, and Agency and Industry
Leads:
Working group: Airport;
Strategy: Develop airport infrastructure to meet future demand;
Agency lead: FAA;
Industry lead: Trillion Aviation.
Working group: Security;
Strategy: Establish an effective security system without limiting
mobility or civil liberties;
Agency lead: DHS;
Industry lead: Global Initiative.
Working group: Air Navigation Services;
Strategy: Develop air traffic management and air traffic control
procedures for safe and efficient flight operations;
Agency lead: FAA;
Industry lead: Computer Sciences Corporation.
Working group: Aircraft;
Strategy: Develop plans and recommendations for the performance,
function, and capabilities of aircraft that will enable NextGen
operations;
Agency lead: FAA;
Industry lead: Boeing.
Working group: Net-Centric Operations;
Strategy: Develop a robust, globally interconnected network in which
information is shared in a timely and consistent way among aviation
users;
Agency lead: DOD;
Industry lead: Boeing.
Working group: Safety;
Strategy: Establish a comprehensive and proactive approach to safety;
Agency lead: FAA;
Industry lead: Boeing.
Working group: Environment;
Strategy: Develop environmental protection that allows sustained
aviation growth;
Agency lead: FAA;
Industry lead: Aerospace Industries Association.
Working group: Weather;
Strategy: Develop a systemwide capability to reduce weather impacts;
Agency lead: Department of Commerce;
Industry lead: National Business Aviation Association.
Working group: Global Harmonization;
Strategy: Harmonize equipment and operations globally;
Agency lead: FAA;
Industry lead: Lockheed Martin.
Sources: GAO and JPDO.
[End of table]
With these efforts, JPDO has sought to obtain participation from
industry stakeholders and air traffic controllers in its planning
activities, and we have reported that many stakeholders felt they did
have an opportunity to participate.[Footnote 4] In fact, one industry
stakeholder group told us that it worked closely with JPDO to help
revise an early version of the Concept of Operations. However, other
stakeholders said they frequently attended meetings, but were
frustrated by a lack of tangible products being developed and a lack of
progress being made during these meetings. Furthermore, 13 of 15
stakeholders who discussed the issue stated that they did not feel that
their level of participation in either JPDO's planning for or FAA's
implementation of NextGen allowed for sufficient or meaningful input
toward decision making. Some stakeholders expressed concern that JPDO
and FAA did not include their input in planning documents and other
products. In their view, critical issues they raised are not being
addressed or incorporated in NextGen plans. In particular, some
stakeholders noted that planning documents were drafted by JPDO staff
and then provided to them for review and comment. This approach, one
industry stakeholder noted, did not take full advantage of
stakeholders' capabilities. Others were critical of FAA's decision-
making structure for implementing NextGen and indicated they felt that
FAA and JPDO should lay out the broad plans and schedules for NextGen
and then obtain industry input on the best ways to accomplish the
technical changes for NextGen. Another stakeholder indicated it had the
opportunity to provide input to FAA on decisions such as the deployment
of ADS-B technology, but did not feel its input was considered by the
agency. Still others felt that FAA provided sufficient briefings on
NextGen activities, but allowed no opportunity for their input or
comments.
A number of stakeholders also expressed concerns about the usefulness
of JPDO's three planning documents and of FAA's implementation plan for
NextGen (a document previously known as the Operational Evolution
Partnership and now called the NextGen Implementation Plan). Nineteen
of 21 industry stakeholders who discussed the issue said that these
planning documents lack the information that industry participants need
for successful planning. Many of the stakeholders we interviewed said
that while the planning documents provide a high-level view of NextGen
benefits, they do not provide specific details such as a catalog of
critical needs, clearly defined and prioritized intermediate
objectives, and a structured plan for achieving tangible results.
According to stakeholders who manufacture aviation equipment, the plans
lack specific details to inform them about the types of technology they
need to design for NextGen or to provide insights to market, build, and
install systems that support NextGen. Some industry stakeholders
further noted that the current planning does not identify all of the
key research for NextGen, establish priorities for R&D, or show how to
obtain those results. In addition, several stakeholders characterized
the documents as long and confusing--qualities that detracted from
their usefulness. We agree that the latest publicly available versions
of these documents lack information that various stakeholders need. For
example, the documents do not include key elements such as scenarios
illustrating NextGen operations; a summary of NextGen's operational
impact on users and other stakeholders; and an analysis of the
benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs that were considered for
NextGen. Our review of the upcoming version of IWP confirmed that it is
to have information that is lacking in the current document. According
to JPDO and FAA officials, it includes schedule information that has
been updated to reflect newly available information, coordination with
FAA's schedule and plans, and revisions in response to public comments
received on the previous version. In addition, a senior JPDO official
noted and we agree that these documents are not the appropriate place
for some of the detailed information stakeholders would like and need,
such as specific information on the types of technology stakeholders
need to design or install.
Active air traffic controllers are represented on JPDO's Institute
Management Council, and other controllers and aviation technicians
participate in certain JPDO efforts. However, stakeholders from the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association--an FAA employee union--
have indicated that although the union participates in FAA meetings and
briefings related to NextGen, it does so as a recipient of information
rather than an equal party in the development of NextGen. Technicians
in another FAA employee union--the Professional Aviation Safety
Specialists--have indicated that they do not participate in NextGen
planning or development activities. Although air traffic controllers
and technicians will be responsible for a major part of the
installation, operations, and maintenance of the systems that NextGen
will comprise, our work has shown that these stakeholders have not
fully participated in the development of NextGen. Insufficient
participation on the part of these employees could delay the
certification and integration of new systems and result in increased
costs, as we have seen in previous ATC modernization efforts.
FAA officials, however, note that both unions are represented on its
NextGen Management Board, a decision-making body for resolving emerging
NextGen implementation issues. Furthermore, FAA has indicated that air
traffic controllers, pilots, and airline operations center personnel
will be a part of the extended team that is directly involved in the
planning and execution of a gradual rollout of NextGen technologies and
procedures in a Florida demonstration. In addition, according to FAA,
these stakeholders will continue to be heavily involved in NextGen
throughout its life cycle through their participation on advisory
committees such as RTCA,[Footnote 5] the Air Traffic Management
Advisory Committee,[Footnote 6] the Performance-Based Operations
Aviation Rulemaking Committee,[Footnote 7] and the Research,
Engineering and Development Advisory Committee.[Footnote 8]
FAA and JPDO have established mechanisms for obtaining stakeholder
views. However, given the large number of NextGen stakeholders and the
evolution of opportunities for participation in NextGen, we believe
that stakeholders will continue to differ on how adequately their views
have been incorporated in NextGen planning.
Is the Current Version of IWP Sufficiently Detailed for Effective Use
in Overseeing and Managing NextGen?
Our work indicates that the current version of the IWP lacks critical
information and is not sufficiently "user friendly" to be effectively
used to oversee and manage NextGen activities. For instance, 19 of the
21 stakeholders who discussed the issue said that the planning
documents did not provide specific details such as a catalog of
critical needs, clearly defined and prioritized intermediate
objectives, and a structured plan for achieving tangible results.
However, the next version of the plan, to be released at the end of
September, is to have further details and research priorities that
should be useful for NextGen oversight. According to senior JPDO
officials, this next version will identify the specific operational
improvements and capabilities that NextGen will incorporate and will
show what policies, research, and other activities are needed to enable
those improvements and capabilities, when they are needed, and what
entities are responsible for them. Moreover, this version includes
schedule information that has been updated to reflect newly available
information, coordination with FAA schedules and plans, and public
comments received on the previous version, according to JPDO and FAA
officials. Our review of the upcoming version--which is an automated,
searchable, user-friendly database--verified that it will have the
capability to track dates and identify programs that are behind
schedule, making it useful, but not sufficient, for oversight.
Senior JPDO officials expect subsequent versions of IWP to include cost
information and more detail on which programs are responsible for
completing particular actions. We believe that JPDO's upcoming version
of the work plan shows progress in providing needed details and making
the document more useful than earlier versions. With cost information,
subsequent versions of the plan should be even more useful for NextGen
oversight.
How Confident Should Congress Be that IWP Will Provide a Sufficient
Basis for Achieving NextGen's Goals?
The research, development, and testing activities set out in the
current IWP do not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to be
confident that the goals of NextGen will be achieved. However, the
enhanced information that is planned for inclusion in the upcoming
version will provide a firmer basis for congressional confidence. The
current plan can best be viewed as a necessary but not a sufficient
step in the planning and early implementation of NextGen. However,
additional issues that are not part of the current plan will have to be
addressed to achieve NextGen goals, such as obtaining the necessary
funding, establishing the infrastructure to support the scope of needed
R&D, and filling the gap that may exist between basic research and the
research needed to bring technologies far enough along for transfer to
industry for further development.
JPDO and FAA have determined that research gaps now exist because of
cuts in NASA's aeronautical research funding and NextGen's expanded
research requirements. In the past, NASA performed a significant
portion of aeronautics R&D. However, NASA's aeronautic research budget
declined from about $959 million in fiscal year 2004 to $511 million in
fiscal year 2008. While NASA still plans to focus some of its research
on NextGen needs, the agency has moved toward a focus on fundamental
research and away from developmental work and demonstration projects.
As a result, in some cases, NASA's research focuses on developing
technologies to a lower--and therefore less readily adopted--maturity
level than in the past.
Budget requests for FAA have increased to help provide the needed R&D
funding for NextGen. According to FAA, the agency will spend an
estimated $740 million on NextGen-related R&D during fiscal years 2009
through 2013. The administration's proposed budget for fiscal year 2009
requests $56.5 million for FAA R&D to support the integration and
implementation of NextGen programs, a substantial increase over the
$24.3 million authorized for fiscal year 2008. The actual and projected
increase in FAA's overall R&D funding reflects the expected increases
in NextGen research funding. (See fig. 1.) In addition, increased
funding for NextGen R&D is contained in proposed legislation to
reauthorize FAA, although that legislation has not been enacted.
Figure 1: FAA's R&D Budget for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008 and
Proposed Budget through Fiscal Year 2013, in Constant 2008 Dollars:
This figure is a horizontal line graph showing FAA's R&D budget for
fiscal years 2006 through 2008 and proposed budget through fiscal year
2013, in constant 2008 dollars. The X axis represents the fiscal year,
and the Y axis represents the dollars in millions.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Dollars in millions: 137.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Dollars in millions: 237.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Dollars in millions: 271.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Dollars in millions: 337.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Dollars in millions: 419.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Dollars in millions: 431.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Dollars in millions: 431.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Dollars in millions: 436.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
If FAA is authorized to receive increased R&D funding for NextGen, some
observers believe that the agency lacks the R&D infrastructure to
adequately address the developmental research needed for NextGen.
According to a draft report by the Research, Engineering and
Development Advisory Committee, establishing the infrastructure within
FAA to conduct the necessary R&D could delay the implementation of
NextGen by 5 years. Unless an adequate R&D infrastructure is in place
as funds become available, the implementation of NextGen could be
delayed.
One critical area in which an R&D gap has been identified is the
environmental impact of aviation. According to a JPDO analysis,
environmental impacts will be the primary constraint on the capacity
and flexibility of the national airspace system unless these impacts
are managed and mitigated. FAA's Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions,
and Noise (CLEEN) initiative, in which NASA would participate as an
adviser, is intended to address the gap between NASA's fundamental
research in noise reduction and the need for near-term demonstrations
of technology. This program would establish a research consortium of
government, industry, and academic participants that would allow for
the maturation of these technologies via demonstration
projects.[Footnote 9] In proposed legislation reauthorizing FAA, $111
million for fiscal years 2008 through 2011 may be used for a new FAA
program to reduce aviation noise and emissions.[Footnote 10] This
program would, over the next 10 years, facilitate the development,
maturation, and certification of improved airframe technologies.
The CLEEN program would be a step toward further maturing emissions and
noise reduction technologies, but experts agree that the proposed
funding is insufficient to achieve needed emissions reductions. While
acknowledging that CLEEN would help bridge the gap between NASA's R&D
and manufacturers' eventual incorporation of technologies into aircraft
designs, aeronautics industry representatives and experts we consulted
said that the program's funding levels may not be sufficient to attain
the goals specified in the proposal. According to these experts, the
proposed funding levels would allow for the further development of one
or possibly two projects. Moreover, in one expert's view, the funding
for these projects may be sufficient to develop the technology only to
the level that achieves an emissions-reduction goal in testing, not to
the level required for the technology to be incorporated into a new
engine design. Although we believe that this level of funding is a step
in the right direction, additional funds would permit the agency to
"buy down" R&D risks--that is, the more projects that can be funded,
the greater the chance that at least one of the projects will yield a
product for the next stage of development. FAA recognizes the
implications of the proposed funding structure for CLEEN and
characterizes the program as a "pilot."
We are guardedly optimistic that the NextGen goals and timetable for
quieter, cleaner, and more efficient air traffic operations can be
achieved. The administration has requested increased funding for
NextGen R&D and FAA and JPDO recognize the need to establish an R&D
infrastructure and fill any gaps that may exist between basic research
and the transfer to industry for further development.
Can JPDO Continue to Be Viewed as an "Honest Broker" in Light of FAA's
Recent Restructuring?
Prior to May 2008, when FAA restructured ATO, JPDO reported directly to
both the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of ATO and the FAA
Administrator. Figure 2 shows FAA's management structure as of November
2007, with the shaded boxes showing offices with responsibilities for
NextGen activities. We expressed concerns about this dual reporting
status, suggesting that it might keep JPDO from interacting on an equal
footing with ATO and the other partner federal agencies.[Footnote 11]
We recognized that JPDO needed to counter the perception that it was a
proxy for ATO and, as such, was not able to act as an "honest broker"
between ATO and the partner federal agencies, but we also understood
that JPDO must continue to work with ATO and its partner agencies in a
partnership in which ATO is the lead implementer of NextGen. Therefore,
we reported that it was important for JPDO to have some independence
from ATO and pointed out that, to address this issue, the JPDO Director
could report directly to the FAA Administrator. We observed that such a
change could also lessen what some stakeholders perceived as
unnecessary bureaucracy and red tape associated with decision making
and other JPDO and NextGen processes.
Figure 2: FAA Organization, November 2007:
This figure is a chart showing the hierarchy of the FAA organization.
[See PDF for image]
Source: FAA.
[End of figure]
Since ATO was reorganized in May 2008, JPDO has been housed within the
new NextGen and Operations Planning Office and reports through the
Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning only to ATO's
COO. (See fig. 3.) Now that JPDO is no longer a separate, independent
office within FAA and no longer reports directly to the FAA
Administrator, its organizational position within FAA has declined.
Nonetheless, we believe that it is too early to tell whether JPDO will
be able to act as an "honest broker" between FAA and the other federal
partner agencies. Currently, according to a senior JPDO official,
JPDO's partner agencies are cooperating with JPDO, indicating that the
office is apparently maintaining its status as an honest broker.
Figure 3: ATO Organization, July 2008:
This figure is a flowchart of the hierarchy of the ATO organization.
[See PDF for image]
Source: FAA.
[End of figure]
However, it is also too early to tell if ATO's reorganization
sufficiently addresses concerns that many industry stakeholders
expressed about the adequacy of the previous organizational
relationship between FAA and JPDO--when JPDO reported directly to both
the COO and the Administrator--for the transition to NextGen. Proposed
legislation reauthorizing FAA would address the earlier concern of
stakeholders by designating the Director of JPDO as the Associate
Administrator for the Next Generation Air Transportation System,
appointed by and reporting directly to the Administrator.[Footnote 12]
The proposed legislation would also address observations we have made
about JPDO's organizational placement within FAA.
Finally, it is too early to tell if the reorganization of FAA's
management structure addresses concerns that stakeholders have
expressed about the fragmentation of management responsibility for
NextGen activities. Specifically, some industry stakeholders expressed
frustration that a program as large and important as NextGen does not
follow the industry practice of having one person authorized to make
key decisions. They pointed out that although FAA's COO is nominally in
charge of FAA's NextGen efforts, the COO must also manage the agency's
day-to-day air traffic operations and may therefore be unable to devote
enough time and attention to managing NextGen. In addition, these
stakeholders noted that many of NextGen's capabilities span FAA
operational units both within and outside ATO. The reorganization does
not address concerns about this fragmentation, since other offices in
ATO and FAA continue to have responsibility for parts of NextGen and
the division of responsibility for NextGen efforts among them is not
clear. A senior FAA official noted that ATO executives are
knowledgeable and supportive of the reorganization, but that the agency
could better communicate the changes to stakeholders outside of FAA. A
focused outreach to industry stakeholders would help to get their buy-
in and support of FAA's efforts.
What Needs to Be Done to Move JPDO from Proposing R&D to Articulating a
Clear R&D Program with Defined and Prioritized Tasks?
To articulate a clear R&D program with defined and prioritized tasks,
JPDO must continue to collaborate with its partner agencies--FAA, NASA,
DOD, DHS, and Commerce--to identify and prioritize the R&D needed for
NextGen. As it issues new versions of IWP, JPDO continues to update the
R&D plans of the partner agencies. However, JPDO has not yet determined
what NextGen R&D needs to be done first and at what cost to demonstrate
and integrate NextGen technologies into the national airspace system.
The next version of IWP, scheduled to be released later this month, is
to identify the sequence of research activities that the partner
agencies must complete before specific NextGen capabilities can be
implemented. The plan should serve as a useful tool in prioritizing and
tracking NextGen research. In addition, JPDO has worked with the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop a process that allows OMB to
identify NextGen-related research and acquisition projects across the
partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency
program. Under this process, JPDO and its partner agencies can jointly
present OMB with business cases for the partner agencies' NextGen-
related efforts, and these business cases can be used as inputs to
funding decisions for NextGen research and acquisitions across the
agencies.
In addition, JPDO needs to continue to leverage the R&D programs of the
partner agencies, which will conduct and define the research. For
example, JPDO monitors NASA's and FAA's efforts to coordinate their
research. NASA and FAA have developed a strategy to identify, conduct,
and transfer to FAA the R&D needed for NextGen. The strategy
establishes four "research transition teams"[Footnote 13] that align
with JPDO's planning framework and outlines how the two agencies will
jointly develop research requirements--FAA will provide user
requirements and NASA will conduct the research and provide an
understanding of the engineering rationale for design decisions. In
addition, the strategy calls for clearly defining metrics for
evaluating the research. According to JPDO, as of August 2008, four
teams had been established and have conducted initial meetings.
JPDO has begun to move from proposing research to articulating a
defined and prioritized R&D program. In addition, JPDO, FAA, and NASA
have established mechanisms, such as research transition teams, to
define and prioritize R&D. We believe, however, that it is still too
early to assess the adequacy of these efforts.
What Metrics Should Congress Use to Evaluate the Progress of NextGen?
Version 1.0 of IWP, scheduled to be released later this month, will
provide a baseline for measuring NextGen progress. Congress can use the
information contained in the plan to help evaluate whether the actions
needed to achieve NextGen are on schedule and whether the specific
operational improvements and capabilities that will make up NextGen are
being accomplished. Specifically, subsequent versions of the plan will
allow the development of metrics to show progress, by agency, in (1)
achieving key activities and deploying technology, (2) issuing policies
and guidance, and (3) prioritizing resources.
Furthermore, subsequent versions of IWP are expected to include cost
information that decision makers can use to help understand the
rationale for budget requests, monitor costs, and improve future cost
estimates for acquisitions. This information will be helpful to
decision makers when budget constraints do not allow all system
acquisitions to be fully funded at planned and approved levels and they
must decide which programs to fund and which to cut or delay according
to their priorities.
Two Related Challenges:
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly discuss two
additional issues that present challenges to realizing the full
potential of NextGen. The first, an infrastructure challenge, is to
implement NextGen plans for a new configuration of ATC facilities and
enhanced runway capacity. The second, a human capital challenge, is to
ensure that FAA staff have the knowledge and skills needed to implement
NextGen.
To fully realize NextGen's capabilities, a new configuration of ATC
facilities and enhanced runway capacity will be required to go along
with new technologies and procedures. According to a senior ATO
official, the agency plans to report on the cost implications of
reconfiguring its facilities in 2009. However, FAA has no comprehensive
plan for reconfiguring its facilities. Until the cost analysis is
completed and a plan for facilities reconfiguration has been developed,
the configurations needed for NextGen cannot be implemented and
potential savings that could help offset the cost of NextGen will not
be realized. Some FAA officials have said that planned facility
maintenance and construction based on the current ATC system are
significant cost drivers that could, without reconfiguration,
significantly increase the cost of NextGen. Additionally, some of the
capacity and efficiency enhancements expected from the implementation
of NextGen maybe curtailed if the system's infrastructure needs are not
fully addressed.
In the meantime, FAA faces an immediate task to maintain and repair
existing facilities so that the current ATC system continues to operate
safely and reliably. The agency is currently responsible for
maintaining over 400 terminal facilities. While FAA has not assessed
the physical condition of all of these facilities, the agency rated the
average condition of 89 of them as "fair." Based on its assessment of
these 89 facilities, FAA estimated that a one-time cost to repair all
400 terminal facilities would range from $250 million to $350 million.
Two FAA employee unions (NATCA and PASS) contend that many of the 400
facilities are deteriorating for lack of maintenance and that working
conditions are unsafe because of leaking roofs, deteriorating walls and
ceilings, and obsolete air-conditioning systems. According to FAA
officials, while some of these facilities can accommodate NextGen's new
technologies and systems, many of them are not consistent with the
configurations that will be needed under NextGen. Once FAA develops and
implements a facility consolidation plan, the costs of facility repairs
and maintenance may be reduced. In the meantime, FAA will have to
manage its budgetary resources so that it can maintain legacy systems
and legacy infrastructure while configuring the national airspace
system to accommodate NextGen technologies and operations.
The transformation to NextGen will also depend on the ability of
airports to handle greater capacity. While NextGen technologies and
procedures will enhance this ability, new or expanded runways will
likely be needed also to handle the expected increases in traffic. FAA
has developed a rolling 10-year plan for capacity improvements at the
nation's 35 busiest airports, and some airports are building new
runways. However, even with these planned runway improvements, FAA
analyses indicate that 14 more airports will still need additional
capacity. Moreover, without significant reductions in emissions and
noise around some of the nation's airports, efforts to expand their
capacity could be stalled or the implementation of NextGen delayed. We
believe that this is a significant issue that FAA and JPDO will have to
address.
To manage the implementation of NextGen, FAA will need staff with
technical skills, such as systems engineering and contract management
expertise. Because of the scope and complexity of the NextGen effort,
the agency may not currently have the in-house expertise to manage the
transition to NextGen without assistance. In November 2006, we
recommended that FAA assess the technical and contract management
skills FAA staff will need to define, implement, and integrate the
numerous complex programs that will be involved in the transition to
NextGen.[Footnote 14] In response to our recommendation, FAA contracted
with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to determine
the mix of skills and number of skilled persons, such as technical
personnel and program managers, needed to implement NextGen and to
compare those requirements with FAA's current staff resources. NAPA
expects to complete its assessment in September 2008. We believe this
is a reasonable approach that should help FAA begin to address this
issue, recognizing that once the right skills have been identified, it
may take considerable time to select, hire, and integrate what FAA
estimates could be 150 to 200 more staff. This situation could
contribute to delaying the integration of new technologies and the
transformation of the national airspace system.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you or other members of the Committee
may have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L.
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making
key contributions to this testimony include Teresa Spisak, Kevin Egan,
Bess Eisenstadt, Bert Japikse, Taylor Reeves, and Richard Scott.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Vision 100--The Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub.L. No.
108-176, § 709.
[2] Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of Systems
Acquisition and the Transition to the Next Generation Air
Transportation System, GAO-08-1078 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2008);
Aviation and the Environment: NextGen and Research and Development Are
Keys to Reducing Emissions and Their Impact on Health and Climate, GAO-
08-706T (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2008); Aviation and the Environment:
FAA's and NASA's Research and Development Plans for Noise Reduction Are
Aligned but the Prospects of Achieving Noise Reduction Goals Are
Uncertain, GAO-08-384 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2008); Next
Generation Air Transportation System: Status of the Transition to the
Future Air Traffic Control System, GAO-07-784T (Washington, D.C.: May
9, 2007); Joint Planning and Development Office: Progress and Key
Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next Generation Air
Transportation System,
GAO-07-693T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2007); and Federal Aviation
Administration: Key Issues in Ensuring the Efficient Development and
Safe Operation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System, GAO-
07-636T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2007).
[3] The nine working groups are Airport, Security, Air Navigation
Services, Aircraft, Net-centric Operations, Safety, Environment,
Weather, and Global Harmonization.
[4] GAO-08-1078.
[5] Once called the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, RTCA is
a private, not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based
performance standards for ATC systems.
[6] The Air Traffic Management Advisory Committee, a component of RTCA,
provides FAA with consensus-based, recommended investment priorities
that are expected to improve the safety, capacity, and efficiency of
the air transportation system.
[7] The Performance-Based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee was
established by FAA to provide a forum for the U.S. aviation community
to discuss, prioritize, and resolve issues; provide direction for U.S.
flight operations criteria; and produce U.S. consensus positions for
global harmonization.
[8] The Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee
advises the FAA Administrator on R&D issues and coordinates FAA's
research, engineering, and development activities with industry and
other government agencies.
[9] GAO-08-384.
[10] H.R. 2881, § 505.
[11] GAO, Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on the Future
of Air Traffic Control Modernization, GAO-07-928R (Washington, D.C.:
May 30, 2007).
[12] H.R. 2881, § 202.
[13] The four teams are organized along the framework for near-, mid-,
and long-term research goals established in JPDO's IWP. The teams are
Separation Management, Trajectory Management, Flow Contingency
Management, and Capacity Management.
[14] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace
System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
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