Freight Rail Security
Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy Can Be Strengthened and Security Efforts Better Monitored Gao ID: GAO-09-243 April 21, 2009An attack on the U.S. freight rail system could be catastrophic because rail cars carrying highly toxic materials often traverse densely populated urban areas. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the federal entity primarily responsible for securing freight rail. GAO was asked to assess the status of efforts to secure this system. This report discusses (1) stakeholder efforts to assess risks to the freight rail system and TSA's development of a risk-based security strategy; (2) actions stakeholders have taken to secure the system since 2001, TSA's efforts to monitor and assess their effectiveness, and any challenges to implementing future actions; and (3) the extent to which stakeholders have coordinated efforts. GAO reviewed documents, including TSA's freight rail strategic plan; conducted site visits to seven U.S. cities with significant rail operations involving hazardous materials; and interviewed federal and industry officials.
Federal and industry stakeholders have completed a range of actions to assess risks to freight rail since September 2001, and TSA has developed a security strategy; however, TSA's efforts have primarily focused on one threat, and its strategy does not fully address federal guidance or key characteristics of a successful national strategy. Specifically, TSA's efforts to assess vulnerabilities and potential consequences to freight rail have focused almost exclusively on rail shipments of certain highly toxic materials, in part, because of concerns about their security in transit and limited resources. However, other federal and industry assessments have identified additional potential security threats, including risks to critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. Although many stakeholders agreed with TSA's initial strategy, going forward TSA has agreed that including other identified threats in its freight rail security strategy is important, and reported that it is reconsidering its strategy to incorporate other threats. Additionally, in 2004, GAO reported that successful national strategies should identify performance measures with targets, among other elements. TSA's security strategy could be strengthened by including targets for three of its four performance measures and revising its approach for the other measure to ensure greater consistency in how performance results are quantified. Federal and industry stakeholders have also taken a range of actions to secure freight rail, many of which have focused on securing certain toxic material rail shipments and have been implemented by industry voluntarily; however, TSA lacks a mechanism to monitor security actions and evaluate their effectiveness, and new requirements could pose challenges for future security efforts. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for controls to be designed to ensure ongoing monitoring. While the freight rail industry has taken actions to better secure shipments and key infrastructure, TSA has limited ability to assess the impacts of these actions because it lacks a mechanism to systematically track them and evaluate their effectiveness. Having such information could strengthen TSA's efforts to efficiently target its resources to where actions have not been effective. New, mandatory security planning and procedural requirements will also necessitate additional federal and industry efforts and resources, and may pose some implementation challenges for both federal and industry stakeholders. Federal and industry stakeholders have also taken a number of steps to coordinate their freight rail security efforts; however, federal coordination can be enhanced by more fully leveraging the resources of all relevant federal agencies. GAO previously identified a number of leading practices for effective coordination that could help TSA strengthen coordination with federal and private sector stakeholders.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-243, Freight Rail Security: Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy Can Be Strengthened and Security Efforts Better Monitored
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2009:
Freight Rail Security:
Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy
Can Be Strengthened and Security Efforts Better Monitored:
GAO-09-243:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-243, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
An attack on the U.S. freight rail system could be catastrophic because
rail cars carrying highly toxic materials often traverse densely
populated urban areas. The Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the federal entity
primarily responsible for securing freight rail. GAO was asked to
assess the status of efforts to secure this system. This report
discusses (1) stakeholder efforts to assess risks to the freight rail
system and TSA‘s development of a risk-based security strategy; (2)
actions stakeholders have taken to secure the system since 2001, TSA‘s
efforts to monitor and assess their effectiveness, and any challenges
to implementing future actions; and (3) the extent to which
stakeholders have coordinated efforts. GAO reviewed documents,
including TSA‘s freight rail strategic plan; conducted site visits to
seven U.S. cities with significant rail operations involving hazardous
materials; and interviewed federal and industry officials.
What GAO Found:
Federal and industry stakeholders have completed a range of actions to
assess risks to freight rail since September 2001, and TSA has
developed a security strategy; however, TSA‘s efforts have primarily
focused on one threat, and its strategy does not fully address federal
guidance or key characteristics of a successful national strategy.
Specifically, TSA‘s efforts to assess vulnerabilities and potential
consequences to freight rail have focused almost exclusively on rail
shipments of certain highly toxic materials, in part, because of
concerns about their security in transit and limited resources.
However, other federal and industry assessments have identified
additional potential security threats, including risks to critical
infrastructure and cybersecurity. Although many stakeholders agreed
with TSA‘s initial strategy, going forward TSA has agreed that
including other identified threats in its freight rail security
strategy is important, and reported that it is reconsidering its
strategy to incorporate other threats. Additionally, in 2004, GAO
reported that successful national strategies should identify
performance measures with targets, among other elements. TSA‘s security
strategy could be strengthened by including targets for three of its
four performance measures and revising its approach for the other
measure to ensure greater consistency in how performance results are
quantified.
Federal and industry stakeholders have also taken a range of actions to
secure freight rail, many of which have focused on securing certain
toxic material rail shipments and have been implemented by industry
voluntarily; however, TSA lacks a mechanism to monitor security actions
and evaluate their effectiveness, and new requirements could pose
challenges for future security efforts. GAO‘s Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government calls for controls to be designed to
ensure ongoing monitoring. While the freight rail industry has taken
actions to better secure shipments and key infrastructure, TSA has
limited ability to assess the impacts of these actions because it lacks
a mechanism to systematically track them and evaluate their
effectiveness. Having such information could strengthen TSA‘s efforts
to efficiently target its resources to where actions have not been
effective. New, mandatory security planning and procedural requirements
will also necessitate additional federal and industry efforts and
resources, and may pose some implementation challenges for both federal
and industry stakeholders.
Federal and industry stakeholders have also taken a number of steps to
coordinate their freight rail security efforts; however, federal
coordination can be enhanced by more fully leveraging the resources of
all relevant federal agencies. GAO previously identified a number of
leading practices for effective coordination that could help TSA
strengthen coordination with federal and private sector stakeholders.
What GAO Recommends:
Among other things, GAO recommends that TSA reflect all security
threats in strategy, strengthen its performance measures, better assess
and track actions being taken, and more closely work with some federal
stakeholders. DHS generally concurs with our recommendations and has
initiated action on some; however, these actions will not fully address
all of the recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-243]. For more
information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or
berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Federal Government and Industry Have Assessed Threats,
Vulnerabilities, and Consequences to Freight Rail, but TSA's Security
Strategy Does Not Fully Address Identified Threats or Key Federal
Guidance for National Strategies:
Federal Efforts Have Guided Voluntary Industry Actions and Generally
Focused on TIH, but New Requirements Could Pose Challenges:
Stakeholders Have Implemented Several Strategies to Coordinate Their
Efforts to Secure the Freight Rail System, but Opportunities Exist to
Improve Coordination between Federal Stakeholders and Their Sector
Partners:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Federal and Industry Freight Rail Security Vulnerability
and Consequence Assessment Activities Conducted since 2001:
Appendix III: TSA Did Not Consistently Measure Results for Its Key
Performance Measure:
Appendix IV: Summary of Key Actions Taken to Secure Freight Rail:
Appendix V: Federal and Industry Stakeholders Also Report Facing
Technology Challenges to Enhancing the Security of TIH:
Appendix VI: Summary of 9/11 Commission Act Requirements Pertaining to
Freight Rail Security:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: The NIPP Risk Management Framework:
Table 2: Three Elements of Risk Assessment:
Table 3: Federal and Rail Industry Assessments Conducted since
September 11, 2001, to Determine Freight Rail Security Threats,
Vulnerabilities, and Consequences:
Table 4: Summary of Key Characteristics for a Successful National
Strategy and Related Executive Order Factors:
Table 5: Sector Goals and Freight Rail Subordinate Objectives to
Complete Sector Goals:
Table 6: Key Federal Security Actions Taken since September 11, 2001:
Table 7: Key Rulemakings and Legislative Requirements Affecting Freight
Rail Security:
Table 8: Key Agreements Signed Involving Federal Agencies and Their
Industry Partners:
Table 9: Formal Committees and Other Entities Established by Federal
and Industry Stakeholders to Facilitate Coordination:
Table 10: Names and Locations of Organizations Contacted:
Table 11: AAR Industrywide Security Management Plan's Four Alert
Levels:
Table 12: Key Provisions from the 9/11 Commission Act That Are Relevant
to Freight Rail Security:
Figures:
Figure 1: Rail Yard in New Jersey Holding Numerous Hazardous Materials
Tank Cars:
Figure 2: Rail Bridge in Louisiana:
Figure 3: View from Observation Tower at a Rail Yard:
Figure 4: Camera System Located in the Upper-Right-Hand Corner of the
Tunnel:
Figure 5: Light Towers at a Rail Yard in Houston:
Figure 6: Perimeter Fencing at a Rail Yard in Houston:
Figure 7: TIH Rail Customer Facility with Barbed Wire Fencing around
the Perimeter:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 21, 2009:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Chairman:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Corrine Brown:
Chair:
The Honorable Bill Shuster:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings:
House of Representatives:
Freight railroads are a key component of the nation's transportation
network, operating on more than 140,000 miles of track, traversing
thousands of bridges and tunnels, and carrying millions of tons of
freight annually. As a principal carrier of freight in the United
States, freight railroads are vital to the U.S. economy, transporting
nearly 13 percent of the nation's goods and generating $42 billion in
annual revenues.[Footnote 1] Freight railroads carry many major
commodities, including coal, grain and other agricultural products,
food, steel, motor vehicles, and highly hazardous chemicals, such as
chlorine and ammonia. Freight railroad companies are also the primary
owners of the infrastructure and rail lines over which they operate and
pay billions of dollars each year to construct, maintain, and renew
their tracks and equipment, according to the Association of American
Railroads (AAR).[Footnote 2]
While there are currently no specific threats to U.S. freight rail,
experts consider the U.S. rail system to be an attractive terrorist
target because of its public accessibility, long stretches of open and
unattended track, and the difficulty of securing a wide array of rail
assets that are difficult to patrol. Further, an attack on the U.S.
freight rail system could lead to catastrophic loss of life because the
system often traverses densely populated urban areas carrying highly
hazardous materials. According to the Department of Transportation
(DOT), freight rail is the primary mode by which hazardous materials
are transported throughout the nation, with railroads typically
carrying from 1.7 million to 1.8 million carloads of hazardous
materials annually.[Footnote 3] The category of hazardous materials
considered to be the most dangerous to the public are Toxic Inhalation
Hazards (TIH), which can be fatal if inhaled. TIH materials include
chlorine (used in water treatment) and anhydrous ammonia (used in
agriculture).[Footnote 4] In addition, shipments of TIH, especially
chlorine, frequently move through densely populated areas to reach, for
example, water treatment facilities that use these products. If
released from a railcar in large quantities under certain atmospheric
conditions, TIH materials could result in fatalities to the surrounding
population.[Footnote 5] For example, an accidental train derailment in
Graniteville, South Carolina, in 2005 unintentionally caused the
release of several tons of TIH materials into the atmosphere, resulting
in nine deaths, the treatment of 75 people for chlorine exposure, and
the evacuation of over 5,400 people within a 1-mile radius for several
days. As a result, concern exists that similar scenarios deliberately
executed on a larger scale by terrorist groups could pose serious risks
of fatalities and injuries. In addition to the potential for physical
harm to the public caused by a hazardous materials release, concern
also exists regarding the critical role that certain rail
infrastructure plays in the efficient operation of the rail network,
including the interdependency of passenger and freight rail networks as
a result of shared infrastructure. As such, the degradation or
destruction of critical rail infrastructure could potentially have
negative economic consequences affecting both passenger and freight
rail modes.
Securing the nation's freight rail system is a shared responsibility
requiring coordination between multiple stakeholders. Specifically, the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP) identifies the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) as the sector-specific agency (SSA) responsible
for securing all modes of surface transportation, including freight
rail.[Footnote 6] Furthermore, in 2004, the Homeland Security Council
(HSC) requested that DHS and DOT identify and mitigate the security
risks associated with the rail transportation of TIH.[Footnote 7]
You asked us to evaluate the status of federal and industry efforts to
secure the freight rail system. In response, this report addresses the
following questions: (1) To what extent have federal and industry
freight rail stakeholders assessed the risks to the nation's freight
rail network, and has TSA developed a risk-based strategy--consistent
with applicable federal guidance and characteristics of a successful
national strategy for securing the system? (2) What actions have
federal and industry stakeholders taken to secure freight rail systems
since September 11, 2001; to what extent has TSA monitored their status
and effectiveness; and what, if any, challenges hinder the
implementation of future actions? (3) To what extent have federal and
industry stakeholders coordinated their efforts to secure the freight
rail system?
To assess the extent to which federal and industry freight rail
stakeholders assessed risks to the freight rail system, we reviewed
various threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments prepared by
DHS, DOT, and stakeholders outside of the federal government. Although
DHS, DOT, and industry characterized these assessments as threat,
vulnerability, and consequence assessments, we did not evaluate the
quality of the assessments nor did we determine the extent to which the
assessments were conducted consistent with requirements outlined in the
NIPP as this analysis was outside the scope of our work. However, we
did discuss the assessments' reported results with the respective
agencies and private entities that conducted them to ascertain the
efforts that were made to identify potential threats, vulnerabilities,
and consequences associated with an attack on the freight rail system.
We analyzed TSA's freight rail security strategy, or strategic plan--
the Freight Rail Modal Annex to the Transportation Sector-Specific Plan
(TSSP)--to determine the extent to which it addressed the threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences identified in the assessments we
reviewed.[Footnote 8] To determine the extent to which TSA has
developed a risk-based strategy for securing freight rail, we compared
TSA's strategy with requirements pertaining to freight rail security
assessments in Executive Order 13416, Strengthening Surface
Transportation Security;[Footnote 9] executive guidance, including the
NIPP and the TSSP; and GAO's guidance on six desirable characteristics
of an effective national strategy.[Footnote 10] We also analyzed the
methodology and data TSA used to determine how the agency was meeting
its main performance goal for freight rail. We had concerns about the
reliability of these data, which we discuss later in this report.
To determine federal and industry stakeholder actions taken to secure
freight rail, we reviewed documentation, such as summary reports on the
results of DHS and DOT freight rail security programs, and requirements
in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11
Commission Act).[Footnote 11] We also reviewed relevant TSA and DOT
rail safety and security rulemakings at various stages of
development.[Footnote 12] We conducted site visits in seven major U.S.
cities where TSA has conducted freight rail security assessments or
where railroads handle significant TIH rail shipments and interviewed
federal and industry stakeholders about actions taken and the
challenges they faced in implementing such actions. As part of our site
visits, we also monitored all three phases of TSA's Corridor Review in
Chicago, Illinois, to better understand the process and specific
security actions taken through these reviews.[Footnote 13] During our
site visits we also met with officials from the seven largest freight
railroads.[Footnote 14] Because we selected a nonprobability sample of
cities and railroads, the results from these visits cannot be
generalized to all U.S. cities or used to make inferences about the
views of all freight railroad officials. However, the results from
these visits provided us with a broad perspective of the types of
actions taken to secure freight rail and the challenges operators face
in doing so. During our site visits, we also discussed specific actions
individual railroads had taken to secure their shipments and
infrastructure and any challenges they faced in implementing these as
well as potential future actions. We also reviewed available agency
documentation regarding the type and scope of federal and industry
actions taken to secure freight rail, and we reviewed our Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government to further assist us in
evaluating TSA's efforts to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of
actions taken.[Footnote 15] To determine the extent to which freight
rail stakeholders have been coordinating security efforts, we analyzed
several memorandums of understanding (MOU) and cooperation that affect
freight rail security as well as specific mechanisms stakeholders have
implemented to coordinate their security efforts, and compared these
actions with criteria for coordination included in the NIPP as well as
leading practices for collaborating agencies.[Footnote 16] We also met
with federal and industry officials to discuss their views on
coordination among freight rail security stakeholders.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2007 through April
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
contains more details about our scope and methodology.
Background:
The Freight Rail System Is Inherently Vulnerable:
Certain characteristics of the freight rail system make it inherently
vulnerable and therefore difficult to secure. Specifically, America's
rail network is an open system, with expanses of infrastructure spread
over vast regions, and often traverses densely populated urban areas.
In addition, railroads operate in large and small rail yards and along
narrow rights-of-way containing thousands of miles of track that are
generally unprotected by fences or other barriers. As a result, freight
trains and individual railcars can be especially difficult to secure in
transit as shipments move from their points of origin to their
destinations. Trains and railcars often travel across multiple
railroads and rail lines and sometimes sit for periods of time on rail
tracks or in rail yards awaiting further shipment. At points of
connection, freight cars will typically sit in rail yards until they
can be moved into a train with the same destination as the freight.
This can be of particular concern for railcars carrying hazardous
materials, since many rail yards and storage locations are located
close to densely populated areas and may contain dozens of loaded
hazardous materials tank cars at any given time. Also, the difficulty
and cost associated with physically securing rail yards can leave these
cars accessible to trespassers. Figure 1 shows a rail yard holding
numerous hazardous materials tank cars.
Figure 1: Rail Yard in New Jersey Holding Numerous Hazardous Materials
Tank Cars:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Furthermore, the interdependency of freight and passenger rail
infrastructure--including common bridges, tunnels, control centers,
tracks, signals, and switches--increases the likelihood that incidents
affecting highly critical assets could affect the entire system,
including both freight and passenger rail carriers. Numerous passenger
and commuter rail systems throughout the country operate at least
partially over tracks or rights-of-way owned by freight railroads. For
example, Amtrak--the sole provider of intercity passenger rail
transportation in the United States--operates on more than 22,000 miles
of track owned by freight railroads through operating agreements.
[Footnote 17] As a result, certain assets are particularly critical to
the operation of the rail system. For example, control centers are a
key factor to the railroads' ability to manage their networks. Thus, an
attack on a control center could have widespread consequences.
Moreover, certain bridges, such as those over large rivers, play a key
role in the national railroad system because capacity constraints limit
options to reroute trains. As a result, incidents limiting or
preventing their use could negatively affect the economy by severely
delaying rail traffic for significant periods of time and causing
transportation system delays and disruption. Figure 2 shows a key rail
bridge in Louisiana, which is only one of a few rail bridges that go
over the Mississippi River.
Figure 2: Rail Bridge in Louisiana:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DHS.
[End of figure]
Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Securing Freight Rail
Systems:
Securing the nation's freight rail system is a shared responsibility
requiring coordination between multiple federal and industry
stakeholders.
Federal Government Stakeholders:
Within the federal government, DHS and DOT share responsibility for
securing the freight rail system. Prior to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, DOT was the primary federal entity involved in
regulating freight rail transportation. In response to the September
11, 2001, attacks, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act of 2001 (ATSA), which created and conferred upon TSA broad
responsibility for securing all modes of transportation, including the
freight rail system.[Footnote 18] Within TSA, the Transportation Sector
Network Management (TSNM) office manages all surface transportation
security issues, with divisions dedicated to each surface mode of
transportation, including freight rail.[Footnote 19] In addition, TSA's
Office of Intelligence (OI) is responsible for collecting and analyzing
threat information for threats affecting the entire transportation
network. In 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which
established DHS, transferred TSA from DOT to DHS, and assigned DHS
responsibility for protecting the nation from terrorism, including
securing the nation's transportation systems.[Footnote 20] Finally, in
2007, the 9/11 Commission Act was signed into law, which requires DHS
to establish several programs aimed at improving freight rail
security.[Footnote 21] The law requires that DHS, among other things,
identify high-risk railroads and issue regulations requiring high-risk
railroads to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop security
plans, establish a program for conducting security exercises for
railroad carriers, and issue regulations for a security training
program for frontline rail employees.
Within DHS, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD),
through the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), is
responsible for coordinating efforts to protect the nation's most
critical assets across all 18 sectors, including the transportation
sector.[Footnote 22] Within the transportation sector, DHS IP works
with TSA to identify nationally critical freight rail assets. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for
allocating and managing DHS grants for freight rail, primarily through
the DHS IP Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP) and TSA's freight rail
security grant program.[Footnote 23] While federal stakeholders play a
role in facilitating risk-based infrastructure security efforts,
implementation of asset-specific protective security measures remains
the responsibility of individual asset owners/operators, mostly
individual railroads.
DHS funding for freight rail security consists of a general
appropriation to TSA for its entire surface transportation security
program, which includes commercial vehicle and highway infrastructure,
rail and mass transit, pipeline, and freight rail security and
appropriations to FEMA for its State Homeland Security Grant Program
and Infrastructure Protection Program.[Footnote 24] Annual
appropriations to TSA for its surface transportation security program
were $36 million in fiscal year 2006, $37.2 million in fiscal year
2007, $46.6 million in fiscal year 2008, and $49.6 million in fiscal
year 2009. FEMA funding available under the two principal grant
programs ranged from about $2 billion to $2.5 billion for each fiscal
year from 2006 through 2009.
Although TSA has primary responsibility for freight rail security, DOT
maintains a regulatory role with respect to the transportation of
hazardous materials via rail.[Footnote 25] Specifically, the Homeland
Security Act clarified DOT's responsibility to include ensuring the
security, as well as the safety, of the transportation of hazardous
materials.[Footnote 26] Within DOT, the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is responsible for developing,
implementing, and revising security plan requirements for hazardous
materials carriers, while inspectors from the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) enforce these regulations in the rail industry
through periodic reviews of the content and implementation of these
security plans.[Footnote 27]
In 2003, PHMSA issued regulations intended to strengthen the security
of the transportation of hazardous materials.[Footnote 28] The
regulations require persons who transport or offer for transportation
certain hazardous materials to develop and implement security
plans.[Footnote 29] Security plans must assess the security risks
associated with transporting these hazardous materials and include
measures to address those risks.[Footnote 30] The regulations also
require that all employees who directly affect hazardous materials
transportation safety receive training that provides awareness of
security risks associated with hazardous materials transportation and
of methods designed to enhance transportation security. Such training
is also to instruct employees on how to recognize and respond to
possible security threats. Additionally, each employee of a firm
required to have a security plan must be trained concerning the plan
and its implementation. As described below, PHMSA issued a new
regulation on November 26, 2008, to further enhance the security and
safety of the rail movement of certain hazardous materials, including
shipments of certain explosive, TIH, and radioactive materials.
[Footnote 31]
Industry Stakeholders:
A number of national organizations and coordination groups exist to
represent the broad composition of freight rail security stakeholders,
which include seven national (Class I) railroads and hundreds of other
railroad companies that operate over shorter distances, known as
regional (Class II) or short line (Class III) railroads.[Footnote 32]
In addition to the railroads, chemical companies, such as BASF and Dow
Chemical, ship highly hazardous materials via U.S. rail networks and
also play a role in ensuring the safety and security of their rail
shipments. Some industry organizations also play a role in
disseminating pertinent information, such as threat communications from
DHS and DOT, to their members. For example, AAR has played a key role
in representing the interests of member railroads by establishing a
Rail Alert Network to coordinate security actions industrywide. AAR
also routinely collaborates with federal entities to assist its members
in enhancing freight rail security.
In the freight rail industry, under many circumstances, rail carriers
may be required to transport hazardous materials and bear many of the
costs associated with ensuring the safety and security of these rail
shipments. Under what is known as common carrier obligations, freight
rail carriers must provide transportation or service upon reasonable
request.[Footnote 33] While shipments of materials such as TIH account
for about 1 percent of all railroad business, railroad representatives
reported that insurance premiums associated with the transportation of
TIH materials account for over 50 percent of their insurance costs.
Chemical companies we met with also reported an increase in shipping
rates associated with transporting TIH as well as other costs
associated with implementing security measures to protect hazardous
material rail shipments as required by the DHS Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards Program.[Footnote 34]
A Risk-Based Approach to Freight Rail Security:
In recent years, we, along with Congress (most recently through the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004), the
executive branch (e.g., in presidential directives), and the 9/11
Commission have required or advocated that federal agencies with
homeland security responsibilities utilize a risk management approach
to help ensure that finite national resources are dedicated to assets
or activities considered to have the highest security priority. We have
concluded that without a risk management approach, there is limited
assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism can be properly
prioritized and focused. Thus, risk management, as applied in the
homeland security context, can help to more effectively and efficiently
prepare defenses against acts of terrorism and other threats.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) directed the
Secretary of Homeland Security to establish uniform policies,
approaches, guidelines, and methodologies for integrating federal
infrastructure protection and risk management activities. Recognizing
that each sector possesses its own unique characteristics and risk
landscape, HSPD-7 designates a federal government SSA for each of the
critical infrastructure sectors that are to work with DHS to improve
critical infrastructure security.[Footnote 35] On June 30, 2006, DHS
released the NIPP, which created a risk-based framework for the
development of SSA strategic plans, in accordance with HSPD-7.[Footnote
36] As the SSA for transportation, TSA developed the TSSP in 2007 to
document the process to be used in carrying out the national strategic
priorities outlined in the NIPP and the National Strategy for
Transportation Security (NSTS).[Footnote 37] The TSSP contains
supporting modal implementation plans for each transportation mode,
including the freight rail mode, which provides information on current
efforts to secure freight rail as well as TSA's overall goals and
objectives related to freight rail security.
The NIPP defines roles and responsibilities for security partners in
carrying out critical infrastructure and key resources protection
activities through the application of risk management principles. Table
1 provides details on the interrelated activities of the risk
management framework as defined by the NIPP.
Table 1: The NIPP Risk Management Framework:
Set security goals:
Define specific outcomes, conditions, end points, or performance
targets that collectively constitute an effective protective posture.
Identify assets, systems, networks, and functions:
Develop an inventory of the assets, systems, and networks that
comprises the nation's critical infrastructure, key resources, and
critical functions. Collect information pertinent to risk management
that takes into account the fundamental characteristics of each sector.
Assess risks:
Determine risk by combining potential direct and indirect consequences
of a terrorist attack or other hazards (including seasonal changes in
consequences and dependencies and interdependencies associated with
each identified asset, system, or network), known vulnerabilities to
various potential attack vectors, and general or specific threat
information.
Prioritize:
Aggregate and analyze risk assessment results to develop a
comprehensive picture of asset, system, and network risk; establish
priorities based on risk; and determine protection and business
continuity initiatives that provide the greatest mitigation of risk.
Implement protective programs:
Select sector-appropriate protective actions or programs to reduce or
manage the risk identified, and secure the resources needed to address
priorities.
Measure effectiveness:
Use metrics and other evaluation procedures at the national and sector
levels to measure progress and assess the effectiveness of national
CIKR.
Sources: GAO and DHS.
[End of table]
The NIPP requires that federal agencies use information collected
through the risk management framework to inform the selection of risk-
based priorities and continuous improvement of security strategies and
programs to protect people and critical infrastructure through the
reduction of risks from acts of terrorism. Within the risk management
framework, the NIPP also establishes baseline criteria for conducting
risk assessments. According to the NIPP, risk assessments are a
qualitative determination of the likelihood of an adverse event
occurring, a quantitative determination of the likelihood of such and
event, or both, and are a critical element of the NIPP risk management
framework. Risk assessments help decision makers identify and evaluate
potential risks so that countermeasures can be designed and implemented
to prevent or mitigate the effects of the risks. The NIPP characterizes
risk assessment as a function of three elements: threat, vulnerability,
and consequence. Information from these elements can lead to a risk
characterization and provide input for prioritizing security goals.
Table 2 provides specific information on these three elements.
Table 2: Three Elements of Risk Assessment:
Threat:
The likelihood that a particular asset, system, or network will suffer
an attack or an incident. In the context of risk from terrorist attack,
the estimate of this is based on the analysis of the intent and the
capability of an adversary; in the context of natural disaster or
accident, the likelihood is based on the probability of occurrence.
Vulnerability:
The likelihood that a characteristic of, or flaw in, an asset's,
system's, or network's design, location, security posture, process, or
operation renders it susceptible to destruction, incapacitation, or
exploitation by terrorists or to other intentional acts, mechanical
failures, and natural hazards.
Consequence:
The negative effects on public health and safety, the economy, public
confidence in institutions, and the functioning of government, both
direct and indirect, that can be expected if an asset, system, or
network is damaged, destroyed, or disrupted by a terrorist attack,
natural disaster, or other incident.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
The Federal Government and Industry Have Assessed Threats,
Vulnerabilities, and Consequences to Freight Rail, but TSA's Security
Strategy Does Not Fully Address Identified Threats or Key Federal
Guidance for National Strategies:
Federal and industry stakeholders have completed a range of threat,
vulnerability, and consequence assessments for freight rail since
September 11, 2001, and TSA has developed a strategy for securing
freight rail.[Footnote 38] However TSA's efforts have largely focused
exclusively on TIH rail shipments despite the identification of other
potential threats to freight rail infrastructure and cybersecurity
systems. TSA officials stated that the agency focused on securing TIH
for several reasons, including limited resources and the HSC's decision
in 2004 to prioritize TIH as a key risk requiring federal attention.
While other federal and industry freight rail stakeholders have agreed
that focusing on TIH was a sound initial strategy because it is a key
potential rail security threat and an overall transportation safety
concern, there are other security threats for TSA to consider and
evaluate as its freight rail strategy matures, such as potential
sabotage to critical infrastructure. In addition, TSA's security
strategy does not fully address characteristics that we have previously
identified as key practices for successful national strategies, such as
having targeted performance measures to gauge results or related
factors outlined in Executive Order 13416, such as the identification
of lead, support, and partner roles. Specifically, three of the four
performance measures in TSA's Freight Rail Modal Annex to the TSSP do
not identify any specific targets to gauge the effectiveness of federal
and industry programs in achieving the measures or the transportation
sector security goals outlined in the annex. Moreover, TSA has been
limited in its ability to measure the impact federal and industry
efforts are having in achieving the agency's key performance measure
for the freight rail program because the agency was unable to obtain
critical data necessary to consistently measure results.
Since 2001, Federal and Industry Stakeholders Have Conducted a Range of
Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Assessments, but TSA's Security
Efforts Have Largely Focused on TIH Rail Shipments:
Since September 11, 2001, federal and industry stakeholders have
conducted a range of threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments
for freight rail; however, of the federal assessment efforts completed
to date, TSA's have focused almost exclusively on TIH, while others
focused on more than just one threat. For example, federal threat
assessments considered multiple capabilities and tactics an adversary
may employ to attack the freight rail system, while the vulnerability
and consequence assessments were mixed--TSA's focused exclusively on
TIH as the threat, while other federal and industry assessments
included other areas of risk, such as the vulnerabilities and
consequences associated with critical infrastructure or cyberattacks.
[Footnote 39] See table 3 for a summary of the various federal and
industry assessments conducted since 2001. For more information on
these assessments, see appendix II.
Table 3: Federal and Rail Industry Assessments Conducted since
September 11, 2001, to Determine Freight Rail Security Threats,
Vulnerabilities, and Consequences:
Threat assessments:
Entity: TSA OI;
Time frame: 2003-present;
Description: Freight rail threat assessments: Analysis of threat
information from relevant foreign and domestic sources; include
discussions of plausible threat scenarios. These assessments are
developed annually and provide an overview of threats, including
possible attack tactics and targets to the freight rail system and its
infrastructure (e.g., bridges and tunnels);
Risk component: Threat: [Check];
Risk component: Vulnerability: [Empty];
Risk component: Consequences: [Empty].
Vulnerability and consequence assessments focusing on TIH:
Entity: PHMSA;
Time frame: 2003;
Description: TIH Summary Report: Vulnerability and consequence
assessment of 13 specific TIH materials. PHMSA chose these materials
because of, among other things, the volume carried on the railroads and
the toxicity of the 13 chemicals. The purpose of the assessment was to
better define the potential harm that could result from an attack on a
TIH railcar, and determine some of the general weaknesses of TIH
railcars and how a terrorist may breach one;
Risk component: Threat: [Empty];
Risk component: Vulnerability: [Check];
Risk component: Consequences: [Check].
Entity: TSA Freight Rail TSNM office;
Time frame: 2004-present;
Description: Rail Corridor Reviews: Assessments that determine the
vulnerabilities and potential consequences posed by TIH cars in major
urban areas by identifying locations within a city's rail network where
TIH cars are vulnerable to a terrorist attack. TSA also developed a
systematic methodology to quantitatively rate security risks at
locations;
Risk component: Threat: [Empty];
Risk component: Vulnerability: [Check];
Risk component: Consequences: [Check].
Entity: TSA Freight Rail TSNM office;
Time frame: 2007-present;
Description: TIH Rail Risk Reduction Program: Rail TIH transportation
security assessment in 46 major urban areas that uses industry data
about TIH car movements inside the urban area. TSA also audits the
security status of the cars while at rail yards, and assesses potential
consequences to the surrounding population;
Risk component: Threat: [Empty];
Risk component: Vulnerability: [Check];
Risk component: Consequences: [Check].
Other vulnerability and consequence assessments:
Entity: Freight rail industry;
Time frame: 2001-2008;
Description: Freight rail security assessment: Analysis of the railroad
industry's vulnerabilities and consequences in five major areas:
hazardous materials, critical infrastructure, information systems,
military shipments, and rail operations;
Risk component: Threat: [Empty];
Risk component: Vulnerability: [Check];
Risk component: Consequences: [Check].
Entity: TSA Freight Rail TSNM office;
Time frame: 2007-present;
Description: Corporate Security Reviews (CSR): Analysis of rail carrier
security plans and corporate-level procedures to enhance domain
awareness and identify vulnerabilities of Class I railroads, initially,
and, subsequently, short line railroads;
Risk component: Threat: [Empty];
Risk component: Vulnerability: [Check];
Risk component: Consequences: [Empty].
Entity: DHS IP;
Time frame: 2006-present;
Description: Prioritized critical infrastructure list: Identification
of nation's CIKR across all sectors, including freight rail assets such
as bridges, tunnels, and cyber-dispatch centers. Assets that appear on
this list are chosen based on criteria established by DHS IP in concert
with TSA;
Risk component: Threat: [Empty];
Risk component: Vulnerability: [Empty];
Risk component: Consequences: [Check].
Entity: DHS IP;
Time frame: 2006-present;
Infrastructure vulnerability assessments: Assessments intended to
provide DHS and other stakeholders with detailed vulnerabilities of
infrastructure for all CIKR sectors (including freight rail
infrastructure) to develop and prioritize mitigation efforts.
Assessments are one of two categories: (1) Site Assistance Visit (SAV):
Facility-level assessment conducted by DHS IP in partnership with asset
owners (2) BZPP: Assessment conducted around the buffer area of the
asset. BZPP reviews are conducted by local law enforcement in
coordination with DHS IP. The assessments focus on identifying
locations and weaknesses from which terrorists may conduct surveillance
or launch an attack on an asset;
Risk component: Threat: [Empty];
Risk component: Vulnerability: [Check];
Risk component: Consequences: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of DHS, DOT, and industry data.
Note: TSA, DHS IP, and PHMSA characterize completed assessments as
threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments; we did not evaluate
the quality of these assessments or the extent to which they were
conducted consistent with requirements outlined in the NIPP. DHS also
determined that the criteria and specific numbers related to the
prioritized critical infrastructure list are "For Official Use Only."
As a result, these data are not contained in this report.
[End of table]
TSA's Threat Assessments Have Identified Multiple Threats to Freight
Rail:
TSA's threat assessments have identified multiple potential threats to
freight rail, such as attacks on TIH rail shipments or destruction of
and sabotage to key infrastructure; however, TSA has previously
reported that there was no specific information that extremist groups
or individuals are planning to conduct an act of terrorism against the
U.S. freight rail system. TSA's OI has conducted periodic threat
assessments since 2003 and completed its most recent assessment in May
2008. These assessments have mostly been scenario based, meaning they
focus on potential attack scenarios that might be successful in
destroying or exploiting freight rail assets or systems.[Footnote 40]
According to TSA officials, this is the best available technique for
conducting these threat assessments, given the lack of specific threat
information related to freight rail. TSA officials also reported that
the threat scenarios identified in the 2008 freight rail threat
assessment primarily resulted from discussions and concerns about the
potential consequences and vulnerabilities associated with the
identified scenarios. Possible threats included hazardous materials
attacks, such as the breaching of a TIH tank car; destruction of or
sabotage to freight rail bridges and tunnels; and cyberattacks to the
rail system that could disrupt or cause the degradation of railroads'
signaling and dispatching systems.
The NIPP guidance states that risk assessments should provide a means
to estimate the likelihood of a threat occurring. However, TSA
officials said that calculating these values for freight rail is
difficult because of the lack of specific threat information. Despite
the difficulties of doing so, it is important for TSA to use available
information to attempt to estimate the likelihood of a threat occurring
to the freight rail system because estimating the likelihood of various
threats occurring, as directed by the NIPP, could provide TSA with
additional information with which to assess overall risks to freight
rail assets and systems.[Footnote 41]Although TSA has not estimated the
likelihood of various threats occurring, the agency has prioritized
certain threat scenarios as well as the overall threat to freight rail
compared to other modes. TSA officials have concluded, based on their
expert judgment and interpretation of available vulnerability and
potential consequence information, that the threat of an attack to a
TIH car in a high-threat urban area is the highest risk to freight
rail.[Footnote 42] In addition, the HSC identified the rail
transportation of TIH materials as a key security risk. According to a
former Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the President, this position
was based on the inherent openness and vulnerability of the rail
system, combined with the HSC's review of modeling studies that
estimated the potential for significant public harm associated with a
large TIH release in a highly populated area. TSA officials also told
us that based upon available information, the overall threat of an
attack to freight rail is relatively lower than the threat to other
modes of transportation, including passenger rail, mass transit, and
aviation modes. TSA reported that it based this conclusion primarily on
the lack of specific threat information related to freight rail, expert
judgment, and the lack of precedent for terrorist attacks using freight
rail as compared to other modes.
TSA and PHMSA Have Conducted Several Vulnerability and Consequence
Assessments Focusing Exclusively on TIH Rail Shipments:
Since 2003, both TSA and PHMSA have assessed the vulnerabilities and
potential consequences associated with an attack on TIH rail shipments.
According to TSA, it focused these assessments on TIH because the HSC
identified TIH as a security risk that the government needed to address
during 2002 and 2003. As directed by the HSC, in 2003, PHMSA conducted
an assessment of the vulnerabilities and potential consequences
associated with transporting certain TIH materials by rail.[Footnote
43] For more information on this assessment, see appendix II.
Shortly thereafter, in 2004, the HSC requested that TSA begin more
specific assessments, called Corridor Reviews, which focused
exclusively on identifying the vulnerabilities and potential
consequences posed by TIH rail shipments in 9 major U.S. cities.
[Footnote 44] As of March 2009, TSA had completed Corridor Reviews in
12 cities, including all 9 cities originally selected for review in
2004, and has reported that the agency will continue conducting these
reviews in 48 additional cities that have TIH rail shipments. For a
complete discussion of the Corridor Reviews, see appendix II.
More recently, in 2007, TSA began further assessing the potential risk
posed by TIH rail shipments in high-threat urban areas by gathering and
quantifying vulnerability and consequence information through a project
called the TIH Rail Risk Reduction Program. TSA officials stated that
the agency developed this assessment program to measure the impact
federal and industry efforts are having on achieving the agency's key
performance measure for the freight rail security program, which is to
reduce the risk associated with the transportation of TIH in major
cities, identified as high-threat urban areas, by 50 percent by the end
of 2008. According to TSA, this information also gives the agency a way
to closely compare the vulnerabilities and consequences related to TIH
transportation across various cities over time.[Footnote 45] For more
information on this assessment, see appendix II.
Federal and Industry Stakeholders Have Also Conducted Vulnerability and
Consequence Assessments Associated with Other Threats:
As discussed in table 3, federal and industry stakeholders have also
conducted vulnerability and consequence assessments associated with
other threats--such as attacks on rail critical infrastructure and
cyberattacks. These assessments ranged from narrow assessments of one
geographic area, specific asset, or rail carrier to broader assessments
that reviewed and ranked critical assets and infrastructure nationwide.
For more information on these assessments, see appendix II.
Federal Assessment Efforts:
DHS IP has conducted vulnerability and consequence assessments of
freight rail assets that focused on security threats other than TIH.
For example, DHS IP has developed a prioritized list of critical U.S.
infrastructure, including freight rail assets, that if destroyed or
disrupted, cause national or regional catastrophic effects.[Footnote
46] While TSA and DHS IP work together to develop criteria for
determining which assets belong on the list, TSA has not taken steps to
assess the security preparedness of these assets. However, after we
raised this issue in late 2008, TSA reported in February 2009 that it
intends to do so. Further, DHS IP has also conducted more detailed
assessments of some of these assets through the BZPP program. However,
TSA has not used the results of these assessments to inform its
security strategy. Using the results of these assessments could help
TSA, as the SSA for freight rail, further inform and refine its freight
rail security strategy to ensure the security preparedness of high-
priority freight rail assets. TSA officials told us that they
understand the importance of securing critical freight rail
infrastructure from terrorist attack and are reconsidering the agency's
approach for addressing threats to infrastructure in light of completed
federal and industry assessments.
In 2007, TSA conducted CSRs of all seven Class I railroads' security
plans to determine their compliance with TSA guidelines.[Footnote 47]
Unlike TSA's TIH-focused Corridor Reviews, a CSR is a broad review that
assesses a railroad carrier's security plan and the level of
implementation of security countermeasures in several key areas. While
these reviews provide TSA with an opportunity to review railroad
critical infrastructure information included in a company's security
plan, they do not provide information on the security preparedness of
specific freight rail infrastructure assets deemed nationally critical,
particularly those that have been identified through DHS IP's efforts.
TSA officials stated that they plan to eventually use the CSR results
to compile a list of industry best practices and to develop security
plan baseline standards for a future security plan regulation.
Industry Assessment Efforts:
In addition to federal assessment efforts, the freight rail industry
has also taken steps to independently assess security risks to the rail
network and its operations. The rail industry conducted the first
freight rail risk assessment shortly after September 11, 2001, which
identified security risks to the entire rail network. Although the
assessment, led by AAR, identified specific hazardous materials that
were the most dangerous, including TIH materials, it also identified
other vulnerabilities and consequences--including those associated with
the destruction or degradation of freight rail infrastructure, such as
key bridges, tunnels, tracks, and operation centers that electronically
direct and monitor train movements. In 2008, the rail industry updated
its security assessment to account for changes in the railroads'
operating environment since 2001, including the development of an
updated list of critical infrastructure as well as cybersecurity
vulnerabilities and concerns. The updated assessment resulted in the
industry identifying and prioritizing over 1,000 of its rail assets,
such as bridges, tunnels, and control centers.[Footnote 48] For more
information on the rail industry risk assessment and assessments
conducted by individual railroad companies, see appendix II.
TSA's Freight Rail Security Strategy Focuses on One Threat and Does Not
Fully Address Key Characteristics of a Successful National Strategy and
Factors Outlined in Executive Order 13416:
TSA's Freight Rail Strategy Focuses Almost Exclusively on TIH and Does
Not Address Other Identified Threats:
Since its inception, TSA's Freight Rail Program Office has focused its
freight rail security strategy almost exclusively on the threats posed
by TIH rail shipments, and the agency does not yet have a strategy for
addressing other identified threats. TSA officials said that they
intentionally focused on TIH transportation for a number of reasons.
For example, TSA officials reported that in 2003, when TSA's freight
rail office was first established, the HSC had recommended that DOT,
TSA, and other federal agencies focus on securing TIH because the HSC
had asserted that transporting TIH by rail was a significant public
security risk. Additionally, TSA officials and other federal officials
reported that studies had been conducted during that time identifying
the transportation of TIH as a significant security risk to public
health. For instance, a 2003 study conducted by the Naval Research Lab
determined that up to 100,000 people could be injured or killed in
Washington, D.C., if the contents of a chlorine tank car were released
under worst-case conditions.[Footnote 49] While most officials that we
interviewed questioned the severity of the study's casualty estimates,
they agreed that a large TIH release in an urban setting could cause
mass casualties.
TSA program officials also reported on several other issues that also
influenced how they set their early priorities for securing freight
rail, such as heightened media coverage regarding the ease with which
individuals could access TIH railcars and the possible public health
impacts of a TIH release. Specifically, news sources in 2002 and 2003
noted security concerns and vulnerabilities related to transporting TIH
by railcars in urban areas. Environmental groups had also raised
concerns regarding the possible dangers of shipping TIH chemicals by
rail. Adding to TSA's concerns, which included managing its
responsibility and authority for securing freight rail, around 2005
several cities proposed legislation to reroute or limit the
transportation of TIH in their jurisdictions. Specifically, cities such
as Cleveland, Baltimore, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., had proposed
legislation that would prohibit rail companies from carrying TIH
through their jurisdictions. Given its legal authorities and
responsibilities, TSA officials believed that the agency needed to act
to preempt local jurisdictions from creating their own potentially
conflicting regulations. Rail industry officials we spoke with said
that they had supported this approach, having recognized that they
would have to manage multiple requirements across the various
jurisdictions that their trains carrying TIH traversed if local
jurisdictions created their own regulations. According to TSA
officials, the agency's ability to develop a broader strategy was also
affected by the lack of personnel in its Freight Rail Program Office,
which had only four permanent staff members assigned to it in
2003.[Footnote 50] Given this staffing level, TSA officials said that
they initially lacked the resources to develop a broader strategy that
would include other risks, and that securing TIH shipments was a sound
initial focus. Security officials we interviewed from six of the seven
Class I railroads agreed that TIH security was a sound initial focus
for TSA's freight rail security strategy, because TIH was a key
security concern and remains a concern today.[Footnote 51]
TSA describes its strategic focus on TIH in the Freight Rail Modal
Annex, identifying the transportation of these commodities as having
the greatest potential consequence to harm the public and the economy.
However, while the annex has identified both the primary threat
scenario and two systematic security gaps--namely, security awareness
training and a lack of a robust, standardized corporate security
planning for railroads--TSA has not addressed other risks that have
been identified through threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments. In particular, the annex does not contain an approach for
mitigating threats to infrastructure, including major freight rail
bridges, tunnels, and other assets, nor does it discuss cybersecurity
risks, even though these risks have been identified collectively
through TSA threat assessments, DHS IP vulnerability and consequence
assessments, and the rail industry's nationwide rail risk assessment.
For instance, freight rail stakeholders told us that if certain key
bridges were destroyed, the flow of commerce could be severely
affected, causing delays and shortages in the delivery of raw materials
and other goods used for day-to-day living. Also, rail industry
stakeholders said that replacing certain key bridges could take months
and cost millions of dollars. Moreover, freight rail stakeholders told
us that protecting computer networks and other information systems
helps ensure that trains do not collide or switch lines improperly,
which could cause derailments of hazardous materials and destruction of
major infrastructure. Stakeholders also said that without restricting
access to electronic information, such as waybills and other specific
commodity information, terrorists could obtain this information to
determine the location of TIH tank cars to target them and thereby
maximize the impact of an attack on the surrounding population.
[Footnote 52]
The NIPP states that each SSA should consider threats, vulnerabilities,
and consequences in developing its programs and activities. Moreover,
since the Freight Rail Modal Annex's publication, the federal
government enacted the 9/11 Commission Act, which specifies that the
transportation modal security plan required under 49 U.S.C. § 114(s)
(in this case, the Freight Rail Modal Annex) must include information
on threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences for its respective mode.
[Footnote 53] TSA has acknowledged that reflecting all identified
threats to freight rail in the agency's strategy is important, and
reported that the agency is in the process of reconsidering its
security strategy to incorporate other threats as it updates its plan
to meet the requirements of the NIPP.[Footnote 54] TSA officials stated
that they intend to incorporate information from other security
assessments that identify additional threats unrelated to TIH
transportation, such as TSA OI's identification of cybersecurity as a
potential target for a terrorist attack and DHS IP's prioritized
critical infrastructure list. While TSA officials recognize that the
focus of their actions has been limited to securing TIH shipments, they
also told us that they understood their responsibility under ATSA for
securing all aspects of the freight rail sector and were aware of the
new requirements in the 9/11 Commission Act, which require the agency
to take broader actions. As TSA matures and moves forward with its rail
security efforts, a strategy that includes all threat, vulnerability,
and consequence information will help the agency make more informed
decisions and provide more comprehensive strategies. Furthermore, the
9/11 Commission Act, signed into law in 2007, requires DHS to establish
several programs aimed at strengthening freight rail security. These
requirements will likely further influence TSA to expand its strategy
and will also require the agency to have a greater regulatory oversight
role.[Footnote 55]
TSA's Freight Rail Modal Annex Does Not Fully Address Key
Characteristics of a Successful National Strategy and Related Factors
Outlined in Executive Order 13416:
While TSA's Freight Rail Modal Annex contains some information that is
consistent with our prior work on characteristics of a successful
national strategy and that is called for by Executive Order 13416, it
lacks other information that if incorporated, could strengthen the
annex. Our prior work identified six key characteristics of successful
national strategies, many of which are consistent with factors included
in Executive Order 13416, which is directed specifically at
strengthening surface transportation security.[Footnote 56] These
characteristics can assist responsible parties, such as TSA, in further
developing and implementing the nation's freight rail strategy, as well
as enhancing its usefulness in resource and policy decisions to better
ensure accountability. Where applicable, we also discuss relevant
sections of Executive Order 13416 to highlight the importance of
fulfilling these measures to strengthen the freight rail security
national strategy. Table 4 briefly describes five of the national
strategy characteristics and relevant Executive Order elements that are
discussed further below.[Footnote 57]
Table 4: Summary of Key Characteristics for a Successful National
Strategy and Related Executive Order Factors:
Purpose, scope, and methodology:
Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and
the process by which it was developed. A strategy might discuss the
specific impetus that led to its creation, such as statutory
requirements, executive mandates, or other events--like terrorist
attacks. In addition to describing what it is meant to do and the major
functions, mission areas, or activities it covers, a national strategy
would ideally also outline its methodology, such as discussing the
principles or theories that guided its development, what organizations
or offices drafted the document, whether it was the result of a working
group, or which parties were consulted in its development.
Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination:
Addresses which organizations will implement the strategy, their roles
and responsibilities, and mechanisms for collaboration. This
information considers who is in charge, not only during times of crisis
but also during all phases of combating terrorism, including
prevention, vulnerability reduction, and response and recovery. This
entails identifying the specific federal entities involved and, where
appropriate, the different levels of government or stakeholders, such
as state and local governments and private entities. Executive Order
13416 also calls for the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop
modal annexes that include a description of the respective roles,
responsibilities, and authorities of federal, state, local, and tribal
governments. A strategy could also describe the organizations that will
provide the overall framework for accountability and oversight,
identify specific processes for collaboration, and address how any
conflicts would be resolved.
Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures:
Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, steps to achieve
those results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and performance
measures to gauge results. At the highest level, a strategy could
provide a description of an ideal "end state," followed by a logical
hierarchy of major goals, subordinate objectives, specific activities,
and performance measures to achieve results.[A] Executive Order 13416
directs TSA to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of current
surface transportation security initiatives and calls for the annex to
identify processes for assessing compliance with security guidelines
and requirements and for assessing the need for revision of such
guidelines and requirements to ensure their continuing effectiveness--
something that could be accomplished with defined performance measures.
Resources, investments, and risk management:
Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and types of
resources and investments needed, and where resources and investments
should be targeted based on balancing risk reductions with costs.
Ideally, a strategy would identify criteria and appropriate mechanisms
to allocate resources, such as grants, in-kind services, and loans,
based on identified needs. Executive Order 13416 directs TSA to use
security grants authorized by law to assist in implementing security
requirements and guidelines issued pursuant to law. Pursuant to this
characteristic, such grants may be included in the modal annex.
Alternatively, the strategy might identify appropriate "tools of
government," such as regulations, tax incentives, and standards, or
stimulate nonfederal organizations to use their unique resources.
Integration and implementation:
Addresses how a national strategy relates to other strategies' goals,
objectives, and activities and to subordinate levels of government and
their plans to implement the strategy. For example, a national strategy
could discuss how its scope complements, expands upon, or overlaps with
other national strategies. Also, related strategies could highlight
their common or shared goals, subordinate objectives, and activities.
Executive Order 13416 requires that the modal annex identify existing
security guidelines and requirements. A strategy could address its
relationship to other agency strategies using relevant documents from
implementing organizations, such as strategic plans, annual performance
plans, or annual performance reports that the Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) requires of federal agencies. A strategy
might also discuss, as appropriate, various strategies and plans
produced by the state, local, or private sectors and could provide
guidance, for example, on the development of national standards, to
more effectively link the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of
the implementing parties.
Source: GAO.
[A] A goal (also known as a strategic goal or objective) constitutes a
specific set of policy, programmatic, and management objectives for the
programs and operations covered in the strategic plan, and serves as a
framework from which the annual objectives and activities are derived.
A goal is expressed in a manner that allows a future assessment to be
made regarding whether the goal was or is being achieved. Subordinate
objectives assist in focusing the mode's programs and activities to
meet the goals. Activities are specific programs and actions to achieve
the subordinate objectives. Performance measures are particular values
or characteristics used to measure output or outcome of activities,
objectives, and goals.
[End of table]
Purpose, Scope, and Methodology:
Although TSA's Freight Rail Modal Annex identifies the purpose and
scope of the annex and references several principal documents used to
develop the annex--including the Freight Rail Government Coordinating
Council (FRGCC) charter, the TSSP, and the NIPP--it does not describe
the process or methodology that was used to develop the annex or who
developed the annex. For example, the annex states that TSA's vision is
to protect the nation's freight rail network from terrorist or criminal
attacks and prevent terrorists or other criminals from using freight
rail conveyances and their cargoes as weapons of mass effect to attack
the public or critical infrastructure. The annex also discusses the
scope and type of various federal and industry freight rail security
efforts and aligns them with three broad DHS security goals for the
transportation sector, as outlined in the TSSP.[Footnote 58] In
addition, the TSSP also discusses the NIPP as the unifying structure
for securing all of the various sectors, including transportation, and
discusses several domestic and international terrorist attacks that
have occurred as evidence of the various security risks to the
transportation sector.[Footnote 59] However, the annex does not explain
the methodology used in its development, as called for in our prior
work on characteristics of a national strategy. For example, while the
annex references the NIPP and TSSP as providing the principles or
theories that guided its development, the annex does not describe the
process and information that were used to develop the strategy or
identify which organizations or entities contributed to its
development, which could make the document more useful to the
organizations responsible for implementing it, as well as to oversight
organizations such as Congress.
Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination:
The Freight Rail Modal Annex addresses this characteristic to only a
limited degree. For example, while the annex identifies some
stakeholder responsibilities, it does not identify lead, support, and
partner roles as called for in Executive Order 13416. Specifically, the
Freight Rail Modal Annex identifies some stakeholders'
responsibilities, such as identifying FRGCC as the primary mechanism
for establishing policies, guidelines, and standards, and that the
council is to coordinate with industry through the Freight Rail Sector
Coordinating Council (FRSCC). The annex also states that TSA, FRA, and
PHMSA have signed MOUs to maintain good intragovernmental
relationships, and identifies what entities were responsible for
conducting past actions to secure freight rail. However, the annex does
not identify the roles of federal and nonfederal stakeholders, such as
the TSA Freight Rail Security Division, DHS IP, FRA, PHMSA, and the
rail industry, in meeting identified freight rail security goals. The
inclusion of these subjects in a freight rail security strategy could
be useful to agencies and other stakeholders in fostering coordination
and clarifying specific roles, particularly where responsibilities
overlap or where there are security gaps. Defining specific roles and
responsibilities is especially important given the multiple federal and
industry stakeholders involved in securing freight rail and the scope
and complexity of the rail network.
Goals, Subordinate Objectives, Activities, and Performance Measures:
In conformance with this characteristic, the Freight Rail Modal Annex
identifies individual transportation sector-wide goals that apply to
all modes of transportation, and it also identifies subordinate
objectives to clarify how these goals will be met for the freight rail
mode, as illustrated in table 5. For each subordinate objective, TSA
presents information to explain what the agency, other federal
components, or industry is doing to meet the subordinate objective. For
instance, the agency identifies its Corridor Reviews and CSRs as
activities to accomplish implementing flexible, layered, and effective
security programs using risk management.
Table 5: Sector Goals and Freight Rail Subordinate Objectives to
Complete Sector Goals:
Goals and objectives: Sector goal;
Description: Prevent and deter acts of terrorism using or against the
transportation system.
Goals and objectives: Subordinate objectives;
Description:
* Implement flexible, layered, and effective security programs using
risk management;
* Increase vigilance of freight rail workers;
* Enhance information and intelligence sharing among freight rail
security partners.
Goals and objectives: Sector goal;
Description: Enhance resiliency of the U.S. transportation system.
Goals and objectives: Subordinate objectives;
Description:
* Manage and reduce risk associated with key nodes, links, and flows
within critical transportation systems to improve overall network
survivability;
* Enhance the capacity for rapid and flexible response and recovery to
all-hazards events.
Goals and objectives: Sector goal;
Description: Improve the cost-effective use of resources for
transportation security.
Goals and objectives: Subordinate objectives;
Description:
* Align sector resources with the highest-priority security risks using
both risk and economic analyses as decision criteria;
* Ensure robust sector participation in the development and
implementation of public sector programs for freight rail protection;
* Ensure coordination and enhanced risk-based prioritization of
research, development, testing, and evaluation efforts.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA information.
[End of table]
While TSA has also developed performance measures for its freight rail
program, their usefulness in helping the agency determine the extent to
which its sector goals are being met is limited by the lack of key data
to appropriately measure results and key elements typically associated
with effective performance measures. Ensuring that all necessary data
are included will help ensure that TSA is reporting consistent results,
which could help the agency more effectively prioritize its and
industry's resources for securing freight rail. In its Freight Rail
Modal Annex, TSA includes an outcome measure--to cumulatively reduce
the risk of TIH transportation in major cities by 50 percent by the end
of 2008--that contains both a target, or goal, and a specific time
frame for achieving the goal.[Footnote 60] The agency also established
additional yearly targets for this measure to cumulatively reduce the
risk of TIH by a total of 81 percent by the end of 2013.[Footnote 61]
TSA considers this measure its key overall performance indicator for
the freight rail security program, and has reported its progress in
meeting this indicator to Congress on several occasions. However, we
have concerns about this performance measure's reported results because
TSA was unable to obtain critical data necessary to consistently
calculate cumulative results for this measure over the time period for
which it had calculated them--from 2005 to 2008. In particular, some
baseline data needed to cumulatively calculate results for this measure
are historical and could not be collected. As a result, the agency used
a method for estimating risk for its baseline year that was different
than what it used for calculating results for subsequent years.
Although TSA made efforts to reconstruct the missing data as well as it
could by conducting interviews with relevant rail officials and using
its and industry's expert judgment to develop an estimated baseline,
any results reported using this measure depend on the collective
accuracy, judgment, and recollection of industry officials, rather than
on the timely collection of the relevant data. Moreover, our analysis
of the data that TSA collected for subsequent years (to calculate the
changed condition in risk between the baseline and subsequent years)
did not resolve our questions regarding the accuracy of the estimated
baseline data. Specifically, in 2007, the first year TSA measured risk
for this performance measure, the agency applied the same data estimate
of 80 percent to 23 of the 45 cities assessed in place of the baseline
2005 risk information it could not obtain.[Footnote 62] However, when
TSA surface inspectors had conducted site visits to these same cities
to gather this information, the data the inspectors gathered varied
greatly by city raising questions regarding the validity of TSA's
estimate and the appropriateness of applying the same estimate of risk
uniformly to 23 cities. Furthermore, the agency was unable to account
for any specific rail carrier actions that would explain why the data
varied greatly by city and from the agency's original estimate. As a
result, any cumulative results reported using this measure are of
questionable accuracy because the agency did not calculate results
consistently. This is particularly important because TSA has reported
results from this measure to Congress--indicating that over a 60
percent risk reduction had been achieved for freight rail from 2005
through 2008.
GPRA requires agencies to establish goals and targets to define the
level of performance to be achieved by a program and express such goals
in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form.[Footnote 63] In
addition, we have previously reported that to the greatest extent
possible, performance measures should be reasonably free of significant
bias or manipulation that would distort the accurate assessment of
performance and should not allow subjective considerations or judgments
to dominate the outcome of the measurement, which could distort the
measure.[Footnote 64] Furthermore, performance measures should provide
a reliable way to assess progress such that the same results would be
achieved if applied repeatedly to the same situation. Likewise, errors
in the accuracy of the data could skew the results and affect
conclusions regarding the extent to which performance goals have been
achieved. Therefore, the usefulness of agency performance information
depends to a large degree on the reliability of performance data. While
TSA had limited ability to collect some of the relevant data for its
baseline year, the agency has been able to collect the relevant data in
a timely manner since 2007. As a result, TSA would have the necessary
data to consistently measure results on an annual basis and a
cumulative basis--provided that the baseline year for any of these
calculations is 2007 or later. This approach would allow TSA to produce
reliable results for the key performance measure for its freight rail
security program. Furthermore, while TSA made significant efforts to
reconstruct and estimate the data it could not obtain, without more
certainty about the data's accuracy and the resulting risk measures,
TSA may not know the degree to which its and industry's security
efforts have been effective. As a result, it may be less able to ensure
the effective and efficient use of resources. Appendix III provides
additional information on the data TSA was unable to obtain for this
measure.
In addition to concerns about measurable data for this performance
measure, TSA lacks specific milestones or targets for its other three
measures included in the Freight Rail Modal Annex and time frames for
completing more long-term activities, such as TSA's reviews of freight
railroad security plans and procedures. For example, one of the three
performance measures listed in the annex is an output measure, the
"number of completed Corridor Reviews in DHS-designated high-threat
urban areas."[Footnote 65] However, TSA does not provide any targets or
time frames for this measure to identify the number of Corridor Reviews
the agency expects to complete or time frames to gauge progress toward
completion.
In addition, the subordinate objectives in the annex do not have
performance measures associated with them to show progress in meeting
the sector goals. For instance, as shown in table 5, TSA developed
three subordinate objectives to show progress in meeting the third
sector goal of improving the cost-effective use of resources for
transportation security. However, the annex contains no performance
measures or targets to link the effectiveness of these subordinate
objectives in achieving the sector goal. We have previously reported
that the linkage between long-term goals and subordinate objectives is
important because without this linkage, agency managers and Congress
may not be able to judge whether an agency is making annual progress
toward achieving its long-term goals.[Footnote 66] GPRA also supports
this point, stating that performance indicators are the reference
markers used to measure whether a goal is being achieved and to measure
output or outcome.
Resources and Investments:
While the Freight Rail Modal Annex has one section devoted to grant
programs and identifies how the grants align with requirements in
Executive Order 13416, it does not include freight rail security
resources that originate in other programs, such as DHS IP's BZPP,
which grants money to local authorities to protect critical
infrastructure, nor does it identify priorities for allocating future
grants. Including all resources and identifying priorities could help
implementing parties allocate grants according to priorities and
constraints, and could help stakeholders shift such investments and
resources as appropriate. Such guidance would also assist Congress and
the executive branch in developing more effective programs that
leverage finite resources.
Integration and Implementation:
While the Freight Rail Modal Annex delineates mechanisms to facilitate
stakeholder coordination, specifically the FRGCC and FRSCC, and
discusses other relevant industry security plans, it does not address
its relationship with strategic documents or activities of other
federal agencies that have roles in freight rail security, such as
those that guide DHS IP, whose responsibilities overlap with TSA's for
protecting freight rail critical infrastructure.[Footnote 67] For
example, the annex does not mention how DHS IP's initiatives, such as
the BZPP and SAV assessments of freight rail assets, fit into TSA's
overall strategy. In addition, the annex does not identify how it
complements, relates to, or builds upon the NSTS required by the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.[Footnote 68]
Without such information in TSA's national strategy for freight rail
security, the agency is missing opportunities to identify linkages with
other developed strategies and other organizational roles and
responsibilities and thus further clarify the relationships between
various implementing parties, both vertically and horizontally, which,
in turn, could foster more effective implementation.
While TSA has addressed aspects of the executive order as well as key
aspects of successful national strategies, more fully addressing the
characteristics discussed above and taking steps to be more consistent
with the provisions in Executive Order 13416 could assist TSA in
further developing and strengthening its Freight Rail Security Modal
Annex. These efforts could also enhance the strategy's usefulness in
resource and policy decisions to better ensure accountability by making
decision making more transparent and comprehensive.
Federal Efforts Have Guided Voluntary Industry Actions and Generally
Focused on TIH, but New Requirements Could Pose Challenges:
Since September 11, 2001, federal and industry stakeholders have
implemented a range of actions to secure the freight rail system, many
of which have focused on securing TIH shipments and have been
implemented by industry voluntarily. However, TSA's ability to assess
the impact of various security efforts is limited because the agency
lacks a mechanism to systematically track the actions being taken and
evaluate their effectiveness. Furthermore, a variety of new regulations
have recently been promulgated that will make some freight rail
security actions mandatory. Implementing these new requirements as well
as other security assessment and planning requirements stemming from
the 9/11 Commission Act is expected to necessitate additional efforts
and resources from both federal and industry stakeholders and may pose
some implementation challenges, such as TSA's requirement for handlers
of certain highly hazardous materials to implement steps to establish a
secure chain of custody and control for railcars in their possession
containing these materials.
TSA and DOT Actions Have Been Primarily Focused on Mitigating TIH
Threats and Have Been Presented to Industry as Voluntary Measures:
In keeping with TSA's strategy, since September 11, 2001, most federal
actions to enhance freight rail security have focused on mitigating the
risk of transporting TIH materials over the freight rail system, and
most of these efforts have been proposed as voluntary measures that
industry could implement. Overall, federal agencies, including TSA,
FRA, and PHMSA, have worked together and with the major private
industry stakeholders, such as AAR and numerous individual rail and
chemical companies, both large and small, to discuss, develop, and
implement TIH risk-mitigating actions. For example, TSA worked closely
with individual rail companies to develop and implement various
voluntary risk mitigation strategies as part of its Corridor Reviews.
TSA officials said that taking a voluntary approach allowed them to
work collaboratively with industry to identify, tailor, and implement
security actions in less time and with fewer resources than would have
been needed to develop and implement TIH security regulations. For
example, many of TSA's recommended actions provided to rail carriers
through its Corridor Reviews were developed collaboratively with each
rail carrier during TSA's on-site visits and were tailored to each
carrier's specific operations. In addition, TSA's and DOT's voluntary
security action items also provided rail carriers flexibility in their
implementation and allowed rail carriers to adopt measures best suited
to their particular circumstances. TSA officials told us that this
approach allowed them to more quickly address identified security gaps,
especially given the TIH risk and the open nature of the rail system.
Both federal and industry officials acknowledged the inherent openness
and accessibility of the rail system and also told us that it is
extremely challenging to completely secure the rail system because of
its size and the need for railcars to be able to continuously move on
tracks and in and out of rail yards. Limited resources were also a
factor in determining TSA's approach to working with the freight rail
industry and heavy focus on TIH shipments, according to agency
officials. As a result, agency officials reported focusing much of
their time to finding ways to secure TIH rail shipments through
implementing operational changes that required few resources. Key
federal agency security actions taken since September 11, 2001, are
summarized in table 6. Additional information is provided in appendix
IV.
Table 6: Key Federal Security Actions Taken since September 11, 2001:
TSA Corridor Review recommendations:
Through the Corridor Reviews, TSA identifies specific security actions
that rail carriers can voluntarily adopt to reduce freight rail
security risks involving TIH. TSA focuses its recommended actions at
rail yards containing TIH, locations where TIH cars are exchanged, or
other significant choke points where TIH railcars may stop and be
vulnerable to tampering. TSA officials reported focusing more on
recommending operational changes because they are often less costly for
the railroads to implement than physical security upgrades. Generally,
operational changes focus on reducing the amount of time TIH railcars
remain on rail tracks or in rail yards located in major urban areas and
on increasing the visibility of the cars by rail employees.
Voluntary freight rail security action items for the rail
transportation of TIH:
TSA and DOT issued 24 action items in June 2006, which were developed
in concert with key industry stakeholders and addressed system
security, access controls, and en route security.[A] In November 2006,
TSA and DOT issued an additional 3 action items, called supplemental
security action items, which also focused on TIH rail shipments. TSA
officials said that all 27 security action items were identified
through the information and findings that TSA and DOT had gathered from
previously conducted corridor reviews, site inspections, and security
plan reviews.
TSA surface transportation security inspectors (STSI):
STSIs conduct on-site inspections of U.S. rail systems working
collaboratively with freight rail carriers, the mass transit and
passenger rail industry, and applicable local, state, and federal
authorities to identify best security practices, evaluate security
system performance, and discover and correct deficiencies and
vulnerabilities in the industry's security systems, including
noncompliance with mandatory security requirements.[B] For freight
rail, STSIs have assessed the industry's implementation of 17 of the
original 24 voluntary freight rail security action items, and have
conducted site visits to rail yards in high-threat urban areas to
assess the attended status of TIH railcars as part of TSA's TIH Rail
Risk Monitoring Program.
DHS grant funding:
Since 2005, DHS has awarded a total of $7.5 million to the freight rail
industry to develop a risk assessment tool intended to assist railroads
in selecting safe and secure rail routes for their TIH shipments.[C] In
addition, in 2008, DHS established the Freight Rail Security Grant
Program (FRSGP), which provided $4.9 million in 2008 to six railroads,
among other things, to provide for a training program and conduct
vulnerability assessments.d Furthermore, through the end of 2008, FEMA
officials told us that they have awarded about $4.6 million, through
DHS IP's BZPP, for the purchase of security-related equipment to
protect freight rail assets from terrorist attack.e DHS IP also created
the National Capital Region Rail Pilot Project, which implemented a
remote intelligent video security system through the Washington, D.C.,
rail corridor. DHS IP, TSA, and the rail industry plan to brief and
demonstrate this project in other major cities to provide stakeholders
with an overview the system's capabilities, and DHS intends to provide
grant funding for installing similar systems in other cities.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS, DOT, and industry data.
[A] TSA and DOT coordinated with AAR and the American Short Line and
Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA) to develop the recommended
security action items. System security and access control refer to
practices affecting the security of the railroad and its property. En
route security refers to the actual movement and handling of railcars
containing TIH materials.
[B] In response to a directive in the conference report accompanying
the DHS appropriations act for fiscal year 2005, TSA established the
Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program. This program works
to build a collaborative working relationship with freight rail
carriers, the mass transit and passenger rail industry, as well as
applicable local, state, and federal authorities to identify best
security practices, evaluate security system performance, and discover
and correct deficiencies and vulnerabilities in the industry's security
systems, including noncompliance with mandatory security requirements.
[C] The Railroad Research Foundation, a not-for-profit research-
oriented corporation, established in November 1999 and affiliated with
AAR, has been overseeing the development of this project in
coordination with federal stakeholders.
[D] The FRSGP was created under the 9/11 Commission Act and is a new
component of the Transit Security Grant Program. The FRSGP defines
Security Sensitive Material as more than 2,268 kilograms in a single
carload of a Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosive; a tank car containing
a TIH material, as defined in 49 C.F.R. § 171.8, including anhydrous
ammonia, but excluding residue quantities of these materials; and a
highway route-controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive) materials
as defined in 49 C.F.R. § 173.403.
[E] Through BZPP, DHS provides grant money, through the states, to
local law enforcement agencies, including railroad police, to purchase
security-related equipment to protect rail assets. Examples of items
purchased include chemical protective clothing, bulletproof vests,
video surveillance equipment, and portable radios. Although DHS IP is
responsible for the assessment, FEMA, as the final approver of the
grant, ultimately awards the grant funding to the states. However, FEMA
officials told us that they capture program expenditures differently
than DHS IP. As a result, FEMA could not provide specific information
for roughly $180,000 of the $4.8 million DHS IP officials told us had
been disbursed through the program to protect freight rail assets.
[End of table]
While Many Industry Actions Focused on Securing TIH Rail Shipments,
Other Actions Addressed Non-TIH-Related Security Threats:
The freight rail and chemical industries have voluntarily taken various
actions to secure TIH rail shipments even beyond what TSA has
recommended, and some industry actions have addressed other identified
freight rail security threats.[Footnote 69] For example, in addition to
taking actions in response to TSA's recommendations resulting from the
Corridor Reviews, some rail industry stakeholders we spoke with have
implemented other types of operational and procedural changes to secure
their TIH rail shipments, such as making modifications to procedures
for how rail companies manage and schedule trains and railcars. These
changes have largely focused on reducing the amount of time that TIH
railcars remain on rail tracks or in rail yards located in major urban
areas. Railroad officials we interviewed from six of the seven Class I
railroads told us that they implemented these changes in response to
TSA's and DOT's supplemental security action items--issued in November
2006--and to address general federal, state, and local government
concerns over the secure transportation of these materials. These
railroad officials also stated that they had hoped their actions would
preempt future local or state restrictions attempting to force them to
reroute TIH and other highly hazardous materials rail shipments on to
longer, less desirable rail routes.
In addition, officials we met with from three railroads and two
chemical companies stated that they had also taken steps to attempt to
better track the movements of their TIH rail shipments by installing
Global Positioning System technology on their locomotives and tank
cars. The chemical industry is also leading an effort, in partnership
with rail and federal stakeholders, to research ways to construct a
rail tank car that is more resistant to rupture or breach in the event
of a derailment or intentional attack. The most significant rail
industry security action, however, has been the development of an
industrywide security management plan. This plan, developed in 2001 by
AAR in coordination with its member railroads and several chemical
industry associations, did not exclusively focus on securing TIH but
also addressed other threats, such as those to critical infrastructure
and the security of critical railroad information. For example, the
plan provides a ranking and prioritization of the industry's
infrastructure that it deemed most critical, such as key bridges,
tunnels, and operations centers. The plan also served as a template for
individual railroads to follow in developing or modifying their own
security plans. Individual rail and chemical companies have also
undertaken efforts to implement various physical enhancements to their
facilities, such as erecting fences and installing cameras at key rail
yards, bridges, and tunnels. In addition to the security plan, AAR
established the Rail Alert Network to coordinate alert-level security
actions industrywide. These measures help to mitigate the risks not
only from TIH, but other threats as well, for example, by helping to
secure facilities and assets from destruction or sabotage, which could
cause a degradation or shutdown of rail service. More information on
the various security actions taken by industry since September 11,
2001, is in appendix IV.
While industry has taken a range of actions to better secure their rail
networks, including making operational changes, furthering technology
and research and development efforts, and implementing physical
security upgrades at some facilities, industry stakeholders we met with
stated that it is difficult to completely secure their networks because
of the size and openness of the rail system.[Footnote 70] We also
observed this inherent challenge during our site visits to various rail
facilities. For example, while officials we interviewed from all seven
Class I railroads and six short line railroads reported installing
fencing at some of their rail facilities, such as intermodal yards and
key business facilities, most of the rail yards we visited during our
site visits did not have fencing, and most rail carriers told us that
they did not consider fencing a cost-effective security measure.
[Footnote 71] Specifically, larger rail yards, such as rail
classification or switching yards where TIH cars would likely be
located, can sometimes be over a mile or more in length, making them
difficult to fence. Also, rail officials said that fencing is not a
particularly difficult security measure to circumvent, and that it is
difficult to completely fence a rail yard since trains need to be able
to routinely move in and out.[Footnote 72] As a result, we observed
rail carriers relying more heavily on other types of security measures
at their larger facilities, such as surveillance cameras, enhanced
lighting, random security patrols, promoting the awareness and
vigilance of employees, and observation towers that could be used as
security lookouts. However, although many of the larger yards we
visited had observation towers, these towers sometimes did not provide
a clear view of the entire yard. Figure 3 shows the view from an
observation tower located in a rail yard we visited that regularly
holds TIH railcars.
Figure 3: View from Observation Tower at a Rail Yard:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Although TSA Has Made Some Progress Measuring the Impact of Its
Corridor Reviews, It Has Not Systematically Tracked or Assessed the
Impact of Many Actions to Secure Freight Rail:
While TSA has made some progress in measuring the degree to which rail
carrier actions taken through the Corridor Reviews have reduced risks,
it has not yet systematically tracked the full scope of actions being
taken or assessed their impact on reducing risks. TSA recently
implemented actions to determine the risk reduction achieved as a
result of its recommendations made through the Corridor Reviews and
subsequent railroad actions. For example, during its Chicago review in
late 2007, TSA began documenting how rail carrier actions implemented
at the time of TSA's Corridor Reviews have reduced risk by determining
a risk score for each asset or location both before and after rail
carrier actions were taken. In 2008, TSA reported that it began taking
steps to follow up with rail carriers operating in some previously
reviewed cities to identify any actions the carriers may have taken in
response to prior Corridor Review recommendations, and to determine how
those actions may have reduced risk for the corridor.[Footnote 73]
However, TSA has not yet fully developed a process for systematically
(1) following up with rail carriers about agency recommendations to
determine the full scope of actions that rail carriers may have taken
as a result of the Corridor Reviews, (2) documenting these actions, and
(3) assessing their impacts on risk reduction. For example, officials
at one Class I railroad we interviewed reported that they made an
operational change in Buffalo, New York, to address a security
vulnerability--involving loaded TIH cars being left unattended in a
rail yard for up to 36 hours--that TSA identified during the Corridor
Review in that region. However, TSA's Buffalo Corridor Review Summary
Report developed after the Buffalo review did not explain the
recommended action nor did it discuss any industry actions taken or
their impact on reducing risk. While TSA officials reported being able
to confirm some railroad actions though informal efforts--either
through direct contact with railroad officials or through feedback from
its STSIs during their visits to freight rail facilities--TSA has not
established a formal process for agency program officials or inspectors
to follow up on and track prior agency recommendations to determine if
rail carriers had implemented them. Pursuant to Executive Order 13416,
TSA is tasked with evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of
current federal government surface transportation security initiatives.
In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government
calls for controls to be designed to ensure that an agency has relevant
and reliable information about programs and that ongoing monitoring
occurs.[Footnote 74]
[Text box, separated from main report body: When we accompanied TSA's
officials during their site visits to rail carriers in Chicago, we
observed one rail carrier that prior to TSA's review, routinely stored
loaded TIH railcars in an unmanned rail yard over the weekend to be
delivered to a nearby customer facility on Monday mornings. As a
result, the cars sat unattended for 2 days, posing a risk to the
community. However, upon TSA's on-site recommendation, the railroad
agreed to immediately change its operating procedures to store the cars
during weekends at a yard that is manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
TSA then determined the degree to which this change reduced risk for
the corridor.]
TSA officials told us that implementing a process for following up on
prior agency recommendations and confirming their implementation is a
task that will likely be carried out by TSA's STSIs, as part of their
new Corridor Review responsibilities in 2009. Specifically, TSA
officials told us that STSIs are currently being trained to conduct
future reviews in cities for which they already have inspection
responsibilities. However, TSA officials told us that the STSIs are to
lead reviews for cities with smaller rail networks, and that TSA
headquarters officials are to remain the lead in conducting future
reviews for cities with larger rail networks. TSA also said that
headquarters officials are to continue to be the lead in conducting all
future tabletop scoring sessions at the end of the reviews, which
quantitatively score the risk posed by TIH rail shipments at various
rail locations within a city. However, TSA said that it will likely be
the STSIs' responsibility to follow up with rail carriers to confirm
the implementation of agency recommendations resulting from the
Corridor Reviews. While we believe that training the STSIs to take a
more active role in future Corridor Reviews is a positive step toward
better utilizing STSI local knowledge, it is too soon to know how
effective the STSIs will be in this effort and in systematically
determining the full scope of the actions being taken as a result of
the Corridor Reviews and how those actions have reduced risk.
TSA has also not yet assessed the impact of industry efforts to address
identified security risks unrelated to TIH rail shipments as required
by the NIPP. For example, railroads have taken action to better secure
their bridges and tunnels, operations centers, and even their fuel
depots, which, for example, contain millions of gallons of diesel fuel
and are critical to railroad operations. Failing to protect these
critical assets could impede the transportation of goods, possibly lead
to loss of life, and have an economic impact, according to several
industry officials we spoke with. Industry officials also reported that
efforts to harden critical infrastructure are important to help reduce
risk, and that some security enhancements they implemented were funded
through DHS grants. While TSA has conducted CSR visits, which provide
an opportunity to review railroad critical infrastructure information
included in a company's security plan, these reviews do not provide the
type of detailed information necessary to ensure that specific freight
rail infrastructure assets, particularly those deemed nationally
critical, are protected. For example, the DHS IP has taken action to
identify freight rail assets that, if destroyed or disrupted, could
cause national or regional catastrophic effects. However, TSA's CSRs do
not provide any specific information on the level of overall security
preparedness for these assets. Developing a mechanism to track the
protective security measures being implemented and assess their impact
on reducing risk could strengthen TSA's ability to determine the level
of overall security preparedness within the system and use this
information to effectively prioritize its resources.
New Requirements Outline a Mandatory Approach for Securing Freight
Rail, Which May Create Challenges for Some Stakeholders:
While the majority of actions taken to secure freight rail have been
taken on a voluntary basis, new TSA, PHMSA, and FRA regulations and the
9/11 Commission Act herald a new approach that sets forth mandatory
requirements, which may create challenges for both federal and industry
stakeholders. On November 26, 2008, TSA, PHMSA, and FRA issued new
regulations to enhance the security and safety of hazardous materials
transportation via rail. PHMSA's regulation describes, among other
things, steps that rail carriers must take to determine the safest and
most secure routing of highly hazardous materials, while FRA's
regulation describes the process the agency will follow in enforcing
the PHMSA routing rule, TSA's regulation outlines steps that handlers
of highly hazardous materials must take to establish a secure chain of
custody and control for hazardous materials railcars in their
possession. On April 1, 2008, PHMSA, in coordination with FRA, also
proposed a regulation that would, if finalized, enhance safety
performance standards for rail tank cars carrying certain highly
hazardous materials, and on January 13, 2009, PHMSA, in coordination
with FRA, issued a rule establishing interim standards for rail tank
cars transporting TIH materials. TSA, PHMSA, and FRA officials with
whom we spoke stated that many of the security-related requirements
outlined in these rulemakings were derived from findings gathered
during prior federal assessments and through federal inspections of
rail carrier facilities.
TSA officials also told us that their shift from a voluntary to a more
regulatory approach for securing freight rail was the result of several
factors, including the need to:
* clarify federal authority with respect to rail security as well as
authority for conducting security inspections at rail facilities;
* preempt future state or local government efforts to regulate certain
aspects of freight rail security, such as the routing of hazardous
materials;
* address certain rail carrier business operating practices that
routinely created security vulnerabilities, such as how TIH railcars
were exchanged; and:
* formalize security measures that rail carriers had already
implemented voluntarily and ensure that security measures are
maintained by these companies and any others that enter the market.
In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act provides a preview of other new
requirements that federal and industry freight rail security
stakeholders will face when these measures are implemented. Table 7
summarizes these new and proposed requirements. More detailed
information on these requirements and actions is contained in
appendixes IV and VI.
Table 7: Key Rulemakings and Legislative Requirements Affecting Freight
Rail Security:
PHMSA's rail safety and security rule:
PHMSA's rule requires rail carriers, among other things, to take the
following steps to enhance the safety and security of certain shipments
of security-sensitive hazardous materials, including TIH: compile
annual data on shipments of these materials; use the data to analyze
safety and security risks along rail routes where those materials are
transported; assess alternative routing options, including
interchanging the traffic with other railroad carriers; seek
information from state, local, and tribal officials regarding security
risks to high-consequence targets along or in proximity to the routes;
consider mitigation measures to reduce safety and security risks; and
select the practicable routes that pose the least overall safety and
security risks. FRA's enforcement rule discusses steps it may take to
require a railroad to use an alternative route to the one selected by
the railroad if FRA determines that the railroad's route analysis does
not support the railroad's original selected route, that safety and
security considerations establish a significant preference for an
alternative route, and that the alternative route is commercially
practicable. FRA's rule also establishes procedures to enable a
railroad to challenge any rail routing decisions made by FRA.[A]
PHMSA-proposed rail safety rule covering operations and tank car
standards:
PHMSA's proposed rail safety rule would enhance the performance
standards for tank cars used to transport highly hazardous materials
and implement operational restrictions to improve accident
survivability and enhance the cars' resistance to rupture or puncture
during a derailment. While this proposed regulation focused on safety,
FRA officials we spoke with said that these enhancements would also
have security benefits. Pending the completion of this rulemaking,
PHMSA, in coordination with FRA, issued a rule on January 13, 2009,
establishing enhanced performance standards for tank cars used to
transport TIH and imposing a 50 miles per hour maximum speed
restriction on all loaded TIH rail cars.[B]
TSA rail security rule:
TSA's rail security rule establishes general security requirements for
rail entities and additional security requirements for entities dealing
with certain hazardous materials, including TIH. The rule requires,
among other things, certain rail carriers, shippers, and receivers to
establish and provide for a secure chain of custody and control for
railcars in their possession that contain the selected hazardous
materials.[C]
The 9/11 Commission Act:
The act, signed into law on August 3, 2007, requires federal
stakeholders to take several steps to further secure the freight rail
system, including TIH shipments. For example, the act requires, among
other things, that DHS complete a nationwide railroad risk assessment,
assign each rail carrier to a tier of risk, and issue regulations
requiring each carrier assigned to a high-risk tier to conduct a
vulnerability assessment and implement a security plan. TSA must also
establish standards and guidelines for developing and implementing
these assessments and plans, and railroads assigned to a high-risk tier
must submit the vulnerability assessments and security plans to TSA for
approval. TSA must then review each assessment and plan, require
amendments to any plan that does not meet the applicable requirements,
and approve assessments and plans that meet the applicable
requirements. The act also requires DHS to conduct a vulnerability
assessment of railroad tank cars used to transport TIH materials and
submit various progress reports to Congress.[D]
Source: GAO analysis of DHS, DOT, TSA, and industry data.
[A] Hazardous Materials: Enhancing Rail Transportation Safety and
Security for Hazardous Materials Rail Shipments, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,182
(Nov. 26, 2008); Railroad Safety Enforcement Procedures; Enforcement,
Appeal and Hearing Procedures for Rail Routing Decisions, 73 Fed. Reg.
72,194 (Nov. 26, 2008).
[B] Hazardous Materials: Improving the Safety of Railroad Tank Car
Transportation of Hazardous Materials, 73 Fed. Reg. 17,818 (Apr. 1,
2008); 74 Fed. Reg. 1770 (Jan. 13, 2009).
[C] Rail Transportation Security, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,130 (Nov. 26, 2008).
[D] Specifically, the act requires that the NSTS include a 3-year and a
10-year budget for federal transportation security programs that will
achieve NSTS priorities, methods for linking the individual
transportation modal security plans, and a plan for addressing
intermodal transportation.
[End of table]
TSA's Rail Security Rule May Pose Challenges to Some Industry
Stakeholders:
Several industry stakeholders we spoke with raised concerns about TSA's
requirement that certain rail carriers, shippers, and receivers of
highly hazardous materials rail shipments implement operational
procedures to provide for a secure transfer or chain of custody and
control for these materials. Under this new rule, certain rail
shippers, carriers, and receivers must take specific actions in certain
circumstances, such as ensuring that a railcar is not left unattended
while waiting for a transfer of custody, which, according to industry
stakeholders, will likely create challenges for some rail carriers and
receivers, particularly smaller ones. Officials from smaller rail and
chemical companies that may be affected by this requirement expressed
concern about the cost implications for their companies.[Footnote 75]
For example, according to officials from smaller railroad and chemical
companies, railroads typically do not run a set schedule, which can
create problems in coordinating the exchanges of railcars between
carriers and receivers. For those companies that do not operate on a 24-
hour schedule, the interchange or delivery of TIH cars during
nonworking hours, or on holidays or weekends, can be problematic, and
many of the smaller railroads and chemical companies do not operate on
a 24-hour schedule, according to these officials. They also reported
having limited staffing resources to coordinate these exchanges.
Officials we spoke with from all seven Class I rail carriers commented
that difficulties coordinating the exchanges of railcars with other
carriers and customers will likely create resource and operational
challenges for them as well. For example, officials stated that
additional railroad personnel may have to be added to stay with the
railcars until the exchanges can be made, or railcars may have to be
returned to a local serving yard to ensure that they are attended, and
these returned cars would then likely occupy track space until they
could be redelivered at another time. This in turn could slow yard
operations and the network, and railroad officials commented that
railcars sitting idle in yards are not usually generating revenue for
them.
While industry officials with whom we spoke generally supported the
secure chain of custody and control requirement in concept, officials
from two Class I railroads we interviewed questioned its security
benefit. Industry officials questioned the benefit in part because of
the nature of railroad operations. For example, some trains can be up
to a mile long, making it difficult for someone, or even a small group
of people, to help secure railcars and respond to incidents. As a
result, rail officials questioned whether this rule will significantly
enhance the security of TIH railcars. However, TSA officials believe
that loaded TIH railcars sitting unattended in highly populated areas
present an unacceptable public risk. Furthermore, TSA's analyses,
especially those derived from early Corridor Reviews, concluded that
railroads, shippers, and receivers consistently lacked positive chain
of custody and control procedures for railcars as they moved through
the rail system and transferred from one entity to another. TSA
officials stated that they had observed unattended TIH railcars, and in
some cases trains, that rail carriers had left unattended for
significant periods of time while awaiting eventual pickup by another
rail carrier or the customer.[Footnote 76] Given the risk associated
with TIH materials, TSA stated that requiring rail carriers to adopt
this procedural change will mitigate this vulnerability during railcar
exchanges and reduce risks to the public.
Impact of PHMSA's Rule on Hazardous Material Route Selection Is
Uncertain:
It is uncertain what the impact of PHMSA's rule on enhancing the
security and safety of certain hazardous materials rail shipments will
be because the rule lacks direction and guidance for how rail carriers
are to apply and weigh the risk criteria for conducting the required
routing analysis. As a result, it is unclear to what degree rail
carriers will consistently apply these criteria in conducting their
analyses and making routing decisions. Specifically, the rule includes
27 specific risk criteria, such as proximity to iconic targets and
population density along the route, that rail carriers are required to
consider and use when conducting their routing analyses. However, the
rule does not contain any specific requirements, direction, or guidance
for how rail carriers are to apply and weigh the 27 risk criteria when
conducting their analyses. As a result, the impact of the required
analysis and rule is uncertain, raising questions regarding how
consistently the rail carriers will apply the criteria to their
analyses or routing decisions to ensure that the safest and most secure
rail routes are selected for their highly hazardous materials rail
shipments. However, PHMSA officials stated that they rejected more
prescriptive approaches to the routing analysis requirement because
they believe that rail carriers are in the best position to identify
and assess their systems and they expect carriers to make conscientious
efforts to develop logical and defendable route selections using the
criteria outlined in the rule. While PHMSA officials told us that they
agree that how the criteria are weighted and used is an extremely
important aspect of an overall safety and security risk assessment
methodology, PHMSA officials believe that a one-size-fits-all approach
to weighting the criteria provides insufficient flexibility for rail
carriers to address unique local conditions or concerns.[Footnote 77]
State and local governments and environmental groups have also raised
concerns about the lack of definitive guidance in the rule on how to
weigh the 27 criteria. Moreover, AAR stated that analyzing such factors
as population density, venues, and proximity to iconic targets, as
required under the rule, does not change the fact that railroad lines
link cities and entities within some of these cities that require the
delivery of some hazardous materials. As a result, the transportation
of security-sensitive hazardous materials by rail will likely continue
to occur on routes that pass through cities where people live and
iconic targets exist regardless of the routing analysis results. For
example, some chemical companies that use large amounts of TIH
chemicals for their business processes are located in major cities,
such as Newark, New Jersey. Also, many large rail-switching yards that
break apart trains and rebuild new ones are also located in major
cities. As such, many highly hazardous chemical railcars traverse major
cities to either arrive at their final destinations, or are within
major cities when added to trains headed to their final destinations.
New Requirements in the 9/11 Commission Act and TSA's Regulations May
Create Some Implementation and Resource Challenges for TSA:
The new requirements under the 9/11 Commission Act are expected to
create implementation and resource challenges for some federal and
industry stakeholders given the extent of the requirements and, in some
case, the short time frames required for their implementation. Many of
the requirements fall under DHS's purview and several deadlines for
implementing them have already passed. For example, the 9/11 Commission
Act required TSA to complete a national railroad risk assessment by
February 2008; however, TSA does not anticipate completing this
requirement until the first quarter of 2009. Moreover, the 9/11
Commission Act required TSA, by August 2008, to assign railroads to
tiers of risk and issue regulations requiring each railroad carrier
assigned to a high-risk tier to conduct a vulnerability assessment and
then prepare, submit to the Secretary of Homeland Security for
approval, and implement a security plan. However, TSA has not yet
fulfilled this requirement. Officials said that because of the
comprehensive scope of this and some other 9/11 Commission Act
requirements, as well as the need to coordinate these actions with
various entities as required by the legislation, many of the timetables
provided in the 9/11 Commission Act have been difficult to meet. TSA
officials also reported that for some of the requirements calling for
TSA to develop and issue regulations, they are considering
consolidating rulemakings across the freight rail, passenger rail, mass
transit, and motor carrier modes, which will likely further increase
the scope, complexity, and time required to complete these tasks. TSA
officials told us that the scope of some of the requirements in the act
and the short time frames they had in which to implement them were the
primary reasons why the agency has missed some of the act's deadlines.
The requirements in TSA's rail security rule and those included in the
9/11 Commission Act may also create challenges for TSA's STSIs.
Specifically, TSA program officials responsible for the STSI program as
well as all three STSIs we met with during our site visits told us that
their resources were already stretched thin, and new requirements for
additional inspection activities would pose challenges. Although
additional STSIs have been authorized and are expected to be added,
given the STSIs' current responsibilities plus the future actions that
may be required to enforce TSA's rule and the 9/11 Commission Act
requirements for several surface transportation modes, TSA will likely
face challenges prioritizing the STSIs' work to make the most efficient
use of its personnel resources. For example, in addition to various
freight rail security duties, STSIs' current responsibilities include
carrying out various initiatives for passenger rail, such as conducting
various on-site inspections of passenger rail facilities. Moreover,
since 2006, TSA has significantly increased the frequency of its
Visible Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) team operations,
which the STSIs typically participate in and support.[Footnote 78]
STSIs have seen their participation in these operations increase,
thereby decreasing the time they have available to meet freight rail
security requirements. However, TSA's rail security rule is expected to
add to the STSIs' duties because they will likely be tasked with
ensuring the freight rail carrier and chemical industries' compliance
with the new secure chain of custody and control rule. In addition,
STSIs may also be responsible for performing assessments of security
plans, vulnerability assessments, and training programs required under
the 9/11 Commission Act. Moreover, the 9/11 Commission Act requires TSA
to conduct additional assessment activities on other surface modes, and
TSA has reported that it plans to use its STSIs to conduct these
activities as well. For example, STSIs are expected to be involved in
the security reviews of the 100 most critical pipeline operators and to
perform a number of highway-related activities, including documenting
hazardous materials routes and tracking sensitive materials.
The 9/11 Commission Act requires DHS to employ up to 150 STSIs in
fiscal year 2008, up to 175 in fiscal year 2009, and up to 200 in
fiscal years 2010 and 2011. While TSA reported that it met the 9/11
Commission Act provision for hiring additional STSIs by the end of
fiscal year 2008, many of its newly hired STSIs did not begin
conducting field activities until early 2009, when they completed their
training program. TSA also plans to dedicate a portion of its newly
hired STSIs' workload to increased VIPR activities. Consequently, the
additional manpower TSA plans to add to its STSI program may provide
only limited relief to STSI field offices, which are already stretched
thin according to some TSA officials. As a result, even with these
additional resources, TSA's inspectors may face challenges in
fulfilling their current and future responsibilities.
Stakeholders Have Implemented Several Strategies to Coordinate Their
Efforts to Secure the Freight Rail System, but Opportunities Exist to
Improve Coordination between Federal Stakeholders and Their Sector
Partners:
While federal and industry partners responsible for freight rail
security have improved coordination by implementing several agreements
that clarify roles and responsibilities, and TSA has taken steps to
ensure that key stakeholders are included in coordination activities,
DHS can further enhance coordination activities by leveraging the
resources of its other components. In addition, both federal and
industry freight rail stakeholders have improved coordination by
creating and participating in various information-sharing mechanisms,
but FRA and TSA have not fully coordinated on some relevant inspection
activities, which could potentially result in an inefficient use of
already limited stakeholder resources.
Federal and Industry Stakeholders Have Coordinated Activities and More
Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities through Several Formal
Agreements, but Coordination Challenges Remain:
Multiple federal stakeholders have been working together since 2004 to
define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities for
securing freight rail and have clarified their roles by establishing
formal agreements; however, further coordination improvements can be
made. In October 2005, we reported that agencies can strengthen their
commitment to work collaboratively by articulating their agreements in
formal documents, such as MOUs.[Footnote 79] DHS and DOT components
have negotiated three annexes to the September 2004 MOU that better
define their respective roles and responsibilities for securing freight
rail, and have implemented strategies to facilitate the exchange of key
security data and threat information. See table 8 for an overview of
the agreements into which DHS, DOT, and industry have entered.
Table 8: Key Agreements Signed Involving Federal Agencies and Their
Industry Partners:
DHS and DOT MOU:
DHS and DOT signed an MOU in September 2004, followed by three annexes
that better defined department and agency roles and responsibilities
regarding freight rail security, among other things, and also described
how the agencies would coordinate to fulfill their respective roles.
The MOU stipulated that DHS has primary responsibility for
transportation security, while DOT would assist DHS with implementation
of DHS's security policies.
Annex to DHS/DOT MOU related to TIH:
In 2004, DHS and DOT signed the first annex, which described how each
department and relevant component would implement the HSC's 2004
recommendations regarding the safe transportation of TIH materials.
Specifically, this annex states that DHS and DOT will, among other
things, assess the vulnerabilities of high-population areas where TIH
materials are moved by rail in significant quantities and work with
industry to put measures in place to mitigate identified
vulnerabilities.
Annexes to DHS/DOT MOU related to TSA's coordination with FRA and
PHMSA:
In 2006, TSA signed two additional annexes to the MOU with FRA and
PHMSA to better delineate areas of responsibility and promote
coordination for hazardous materials transportation and freight rail
security, respectively. Both annexes identify TSA as the lead federal
agency for transportation security, including hazardous materials
security. In addition, the annexes describe how TSA will coordinate
with PHMSA and FRA, respectively, on certain program elements and
initiatives to develop and implement a hazardous materials security
strategy. Specifically, the annexes stipulate that the signatories
agree to hold meetings as necessary at both headquarters and regional
levels to discuss coordination of training for field inspectors, as
well as coordination of inspection and enforcement actions to minimize
disruption to entities being inspected and maximize inspector
resources.
Dow Chemical MOC:
In 2006 and 2007, Dow Chemical Company initiated the execution of three
memorandums of cooperation (MOC) to facilitate the joint development of
a safer, yet cost-effective rail tank car for transporting hazardous
materials. Dow Chemical is the lead for this project--called the Next
Generation Tank Car project--and is working on it with FRA, TSA,
Transport Canada,[A] Union Pacific, and Union Tank Car. According to
Dow Chemical officials, the project is in the final phases of
developing a prototype tank car that can withstand side impacts at four
times greater speed than current tank cars, yet can hold equal volumes
of material and travel under current track weight limits.b The MOC
addresses how the stakeholders are to collaborate on the tank car's
design. For example, the participants agree in the MOC to provide
technical assistance for, and to participate in, various research
tasks, and to share data, test results, and reports produced by the
research with other participants. Dow Chemical is funding 75 percent of
the project, while FRA is funding the remaining 25 percent.
TSA's MOU with AAR and Railinc:
In a separate collaboration effort between a federal agency and
industry, TSA signed a 2007 MOU with AAR and Railinc, which stipulates
that AAR and Railinc will provide industry data to TSA regarding the
movements of TIH rail shipments inside major U.S. cities.[C] Access to
these data has allowed TSA to measure the time period that loaded TIH
railcars traverse or are located within a city's boundaries. TSA has
been using these data since 2007 to assist in the agency's TIH Rail
Risk Monitoring Program, which we discuss later in our report.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Transport Canada is the Canadian agency responsible for
transportation safety and security.
[B] Currently, track weight limits are 286,000 pounds on most railroad
main lines.
[C] Railinc is a wholly owned subsidiary of AAR, and maintains industry
databases, applications, and services that are embedded in the rail
industry's operations and financial systems.
[End of table]
DHS Agencies Can Do More to Leverage Other Component Agency Resources:
While TSA has taken steps to coordinate various freight rail security
efforts, some DHS component agencies still face challenges in
effectively leveraging other components' resources. In October 2005, we
reported that by assessing their relative strengths and limitations,
collaborating agencies can identify opportunities to address resource
needs by leveraging each other's resources, thus obtaining additional
benefits that would not be available by working separately.[Footnote
80] Under the NIPP, DHS IP has broad responsibility for coordinating
critical infrastructure protection, and TSA, as the SSA for freight
rail, has the lead in securing freight rail assets and systems and for
developing the criteria that DHS IP uses to identify critical
infrastructure for the transportation sector. However, DHS IP and the
rail industry have completed much of the work assessing and securing
freight rail infrastructure with little involvement from TSA. Although
TSA and DHS IP coordinated their efforts for the 2006 Corridor Review
and BZPP assessments in New Jersey, which resulted in some rail
carriers obtaining funding under BZPP to implement some security
actions in that city, TSA and DHS IP did not continue conducting these
assessments collaboratively in other cities. TSA officials explained
that DHS IP assessments focused on securing freight rail facilities and
infrastructure while TSA Corridor Reviews focused on securing TIH rail
shipments. However, some of the actions taken through DHS IP's
assessments to secure freight rail yards may also have benefited the
security status of TIH rail shipments being held in those yards. For
example, through DHS IP's BZPP assessments in New Jersey, several
railroads operating in New Jersey received funding for physical
security enhancements, such as fencing and cameras, some of which were
implemented at rail yards that routinely hold TIH. While TSA officials
acknowledged the agency's responsibility for securing transportation
infrastructure and said that they plan to develop ways to enhance
freight rail infrastructure security, it is currently unclear how TSA
will coordinate with DHS IP to balance this overlapping responsibility
and ensure effective use of their respective resources.
TSA and DHS IP also missed opportunities to leverage industry
stakeholder resources concerning information on high-priority freight
rail assets by not coordinating with relevant industry stakeholders,
such as AAR. For example, although AAR reported sharing its 2001
critical infrastructure list with DHS IP, AAR officials said that DHS
IP did not share the list of freight rail assets included on its
prioritized critical infrastructure list until 2008. According to DHS
IP officials, this delay was due to their understanding that it was
TSA's responsibility to share this information with industry
stakeholders. Upon learning in 2008 that TSA was not doing this, DHS IP
officials said that they decided to collaborate with industry
stakeholders and at that time discovered that AAR's critical
infrastructure list was different from its list. AAR also expressed
concern that the DHS and industry lists did not agree; however, AAR
officials said that they were not able to share the entire list with
the federal government because of their concerns about the protection
of this information as they had not yet resolved, with DHS IP, what the
classification status of the AAR list would be once it is fully shared
within the federal government. Additionally, the TSSP explicitly states
TSA's responsibility for coordinating with the industry on identifying
critical assets, and this lack of coordination between DHS and AAR
affects their ability to jointly identify and agree on the most
critical freight rail system assets. Establishing a coordination
process to compare this information and reach consensus on the
vulnerability and potential consequences associated with these assets
could strengthen stakeholders' ability to effectively and efficiently
enhance the security of these high-priority assets.
Stakeholders Use Several Established Mechanisms to Share Threat and
Other Security-Related Information, but TSA and FRA Have Not Conducted
Joint Inspections:
While both federal and industry stakeholders have used several
established mechanisms to share threat and other security-related
information, challenges remain in coordinating other efforts, including
sharing inspection data and other information. A number of mechanisms
have been established to share security-related information related to
freight rail, such as the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, from
which several of the railroad and chemical company officials we
interviewed reported receiving freight rail security-related threat
information. See table 9 for more details on the information-sharing
mechanisms. However, TSA officials said that there is no specific
threat against the freight rail system, which has resulted in their
sharing limited freight rail security-related information with
stakeholders.
Despite these information-sharing mechanisms, FRA and TSA have not
coordinated on sharing some key data, and TSA could better leverage
FRA's resources related to information sharing. For example, TSA
officials said that they do not request the data FRA collects through
its rail carrier and chemical facility inspections because they believe
these data are safety related and would not be useful. However, FRA
officials stated that these data include deficiencies in security plans
and training activities--information that could be particularly useful
to TSA since the agency is currently developing a regulation to require
high-risk rail carriers to develop and implement security plans and
plans to continue conducting corporate security reviews of rail
carriers' security plans in the future. Our past work has highlighted
the need for agencies to share information regarding issues that cut
across more than one agency, especially in high-risk areas, such as
homeland security.[Footnote 81] Therefore, by not consulting FRA's
data, TSA is missing an opportunity to better target its rulemaking
efforts to areas where the railroads are more deficient.
Although TSA and FRA signed an annex to the MOU in 2006 to improve
coordination, in practice, TSA and FRA officials stated that
coordination occurs more at the headquarters and regional levels and
less at the field level. For example, both FRA and TSA field inspectors
in four locations we visited told us that they do not conduct joint
inspections with one another and are not regularly in contact with
inspectors from the other agency. As both TSA and FRA inspectors will
likely be responsible for enforcing their respective rules and
conducting various other activities required under the 9/11 Commission
Act, without effective coordination, they could miss opportunities to
more efficiently conduct their work. However, after reviewing a draft
copy of this report, FRA officials told us that they plan to conduct
joint inspections with TSA in the future when FRA and TSA inspectors
are fully trained on the new regulatory requirements recently issued by
both PHMSA and TSA.
Federal and Industry Stakeholders Have Developed Several Formal
Committees and Other Entities to Coordinate Activities, and TSA Has
Taken Steps to Include Key Stakeholders in These Activities:
Industry stakeholders established multiple coordinating committees that
have undertaken a range of issues of mutual concern, but not all
relevant stakeholders participate in these committees. On the industry
side, stakeholders, through several railroad and chemical industry
associations, have taken the initiative to establish committees as
recommended in the NIPP that provide opportunities for representatives
from multiple organizations to discuss freight rail issues and share
information. For example, both AAR and ASLRRA have established
committees that focus on freight rail security issues. See table 9 for
a description of the various formal committees and other established
entities.
Table 9: Formal Committees and Other Entities Established by Federal
and Industry Stakeholders to Facilitate Coordination:
AAR Railroad Security Task Force:
AAR established this task force soon after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks. It comprised AAR members, including all Class I
railroads; ASLRRA; and three chemical trade associations. It was
responsible for development of the 2001 AAR industrywide security
management plan.
AAR Tank Car Committee (TCC):
The TCC is responsible for developing and publishing mandatory
specifications for the design, construction, maintenance, and safe
operation of all rail tank cars used in North America. The TCC's
membership includes representatives of AAR, AAR's member railroads,
ASLRRA, the Railway Association of Canada, chemical industry
associations, and tank car builders and owners. The TCC has authority
to review applications for construction or modification of tank cars,
and approve or deny them based on their consistency with DOT
regulations. However, DOT has the authority to make all final policy
judgments regarding any modifications.[A]
Freight Rail Government Coordinating Council (FRGCC):
TSA established FRGCC[B] in 2006 for federal freight rail security
stakeholders to coordinate security strategies and activities;
establish policies, guidelines, and standards; and develop program
metrics and performance criteria.c FRGCC's membership includes TSA,
DHS, FRA, and PHMSA, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, the Surface Transportation Board (STB), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Defense (DOD). FRGCC
meets quarterly, and has met approximately six times. One current FRGCC
responsibility is to compile a nationwide risk assessment of rail
carriers, as required by the 9/11 Commission Act.
Freight Rail Sector Coordinating Council (FRSCC):
The freight rail industry established FRSCC in 2005 as the private
sector counterpart to FRGCC.[D] FRSCC is a self-organized, self-run,
and self-governed council led by the presidents of AAR and ASLRRA. The
council's membership consists of representatives of AAR, ASLRRA, all
Class I rail carriers, Amtrak, four regional freight rail carriers, and
two passenger railroads. According to AAR, FRSCC does not hold regular
meetings because its membership duplicates a preexisting railroad
industry security committee, which convenes regularly to discuss
freight rail coordination. As a result, FRSCC's primary function is to
convene formally to discuss freight rail security issues with FRGCC.
While the committees have only met once jointly, a TSA official said
that additional meetings will likely occur now that both TSA's and
DOT's rail security rules have been finalized.
Critical Infrastructure/Partnership Advisory Council:
TSA established this council in 2006 in response to recommendations in
the NIPP, and this advisory council was primarily a partnership between
government and private sector CIKR owners and operators. Its purpose
was to facilitate effective coordination of federal CIKR protection
activities, such as planning, coordination, NIPP implementation, and
operational activities, including incident response, recovery, and
reconstitution. Its membership consisted of FRGCC members and
representatives from AAR, ASLRRA, and all Class I railroads. However,
the council's only activity was to develop the initial 24 security
action items that TSA and DOT issued to enhance freight rail security.
DHS Executive Steering Committee (ESC):
DHS formed its ESC, comprising multiple federal agencies and DHS
components, including DOT, the Department of Justice (DOJ), DOD, and
TSA, to provide organizational oversight, guidance, and support to the
DHS Freight Rail Security Program projects and pilot initiatives.[E]
Activities under the program are to coordinate and support broader DHS
security programs and objectives and assist government policymakers in
making informed decisions to oversee the development and deployment of
demonstration projects that offer the potential for long-term
enhancement of freight rail security. According to DHS officials, input
from the executive steering committee helped DHS to oversee the
development of the rail corridor risk assessment tool.[F]
Section 333 conference:
Industry stakeholders have used this mechanism to discuss freight rail
security for the purpose of coordinating rail carrier operations and
facilities to achieve a more efficient, economical, and viable rail
system.[G] The conference provides participants with immunity from
antitrust liability for any discussions and agreements resulting from
the conference that receive FRA approval. In November 2005, AAR and the
American Chemistry Council (ACC) requested the first section 333
conference to discuss ways to enhance the safe and secure transport of
TIH materials. According to federal and industry officials, discussions
have focused on TIH routing options and have included FRA, PHMSA, STB,
DOJ, TSA, and railroad industry representatives. Chemical industry
representatives have been involved in separate meetings. According to
federal officials, although discussions have not resulted in routing
changes that would enhance TIH shipment security, the railroads have
made operational changes, such as improving the efficiency of their
service. Section 333 meetings were suspended pending the issuance of
DOT's final rule regarding the rail routing of TIH materials.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS, DOT, and industry data.
[A] 49 C.F.R. § 179.4 stipulates that the AAR TCC will review all
proposed changes and specifications for tank cars, and the resulting
recommendations will be considered by DOT in determining appropriate
action.
[B] Government coordinating councils comprise representatives of the
SSAs; other federal departments and agencies; and state, local, and
tribal governments.
[C] As the SSA for freight rail security, TSA has primary
responsibility for establishing formal mechanisms for coordinating on
security issues, such as government coordinating councils and advisory
councils, in accordance with the NIPP and TSSP.
[D] According to AAR, FRSCC was created in March 2005; however, it was
not officially recognized by DHS until August 2006.
[E] The Freight Rail Security Program is a federally funded, DHS public-
private partnership dedicated to assessing policies and technologies
for enhancing security throughout the freight rail industry.
[F] See appendix IV for a full description of the Web-based security
tool.
[G] 49 U.S.C. § 333 authorizes the Secretary of Transportation, at the
request of one or more railroads, to convene a conference on a proposed
coordination or unification project. The law also relieves participants
in such a conference from liability under antitrust laws for any
discussions at the conference or agreements that are reached at the
conference that are entered into with the approval of the Secretary.
The Secretary has delegated this authority to the FRA Administrator.
[End of table]
While TSA has no official role in determining the membership of
industry sector coordinating councils, TSA recognized the importance of
including the chemical industry in FRGCC/FRSCC discussions about
freight rail security and has attempted to encourage wider
representation on FRSCC. FRSCC does not include chemical trade
associations or companies in its membership, and AAR stated that the
council's membership should not include the chemical industry as it is
a railroad customer and the sector coordinating councils should remain
separate to protect information that should remain discrete. However,
according to AAR, in 2008, the FRSCC and the chemical sector
coordinating council created a joint task force to address matters
related to the security of hazardous materials transportation by rail.
A chemical industry trade association representative has expressed an
interest in being included in FRSCC's membership, stating that not
allowing the chemical companies to participate in FRSCC limits their
opportunities to discuss legitimate security concerns with freight rail
companies. TSA invited representatives of rail shipper organizations,
such as chemical trade associations, to serve as subject matter experts
at the first joint meeting between the two councils in September
2007.[Footnote 82] While the NIPP requires sector coordinating council
membership to be representative of a broad base of owners, operators,
associations, and other entities within a sector, the sector
coordinating councils are organized and run by the private sector.
In addition to establishing formal coordination mechanisms, DHS and DOT
reported that they frequently coordinate informally with various
industry and federal partners. For example, both TSA and DOT officials
said that they have communicated informally by phone or e-mail several
times a month as issues arose, and that they coordinated in developing
their respective rail security rulemakings. Moreover, TSA officials
reported that they have also coordinated informally with industry on
several matters. For example, TSA reported coordinating with rail
carriers on-site during rail facility inspections and during Corridor
Review assessments to determine actions that rail carriers could
implement to address identified vulnerabilities. In addition, TSA
officials said that they coordinated with rail carriers to schedule and
conduct agency reviews of rail carrier corporate security plans and
procedures. Finally, TSA officials said that they often communicated
informally with AAR through unscheduled phone calls to discuss relevant
issues, and that they often received briefings from AAR on various
industry activities.
Conclusions:
Because of its vast size and openness, securing the nation's freight
rail network is a monumental task that requires a coordinated effort by
numerous stakeholders, and we commend TSA for the efforts it has
undertaken to address this security challenge. TSA's strategy for
securing freight rail by reducing threats to TIH shipments has been a
reasonable initial approach when considering the serious public harm
that TIH materials potentially pose to the public, the results of early
assessments, and the freight rail security program's limited resources.
However, given the importance of the U.S. freight rail system to the
national economy, the potential for other rail security risks to be
exploited, and the new broadening legislative and regulatory
requirements, TSA should expand its focus to threats beyond TIH. This
effort should include developing estimates of the likelihood of various
threats occurring to the freight rail system. In addition, while TSA's
2007 Freight Rail Modal Annex represents a positive step toward better
conveying TSA's strategy for securing the freight rail mode, it lacks
important details needed to provide all stakeholders with a clear and
measurable path forward. The inclusion of clearly defined stakeholder
roles and responsibilities could be useful to agencies and other
stakeholders in fostering coordination and in helping to ensure that
certain roles are carried out, particularly where responsibilities
overlap. Additionally, the weakness of one performance measure and the
lack of targets for the others identified in the annex inhibit TSA's
and others' ability to evaluate their progress in achieving the
strategy's vision. The weakness in TSA's performance measure for
reporting TIH risk reduction is of particular concern. While we
recognize TSA's constructive efforts to develop its 2005 baseline data,
we have concerns about data reliability and inconsistency in how TSA
measured its risk reduction results. Since 2007, however, TSA has been
able to collect the necessary data and has used them to develop a
better approach--with a more consistent methodology--for measuring its
progress and reporting results. We believe that TSA, the public, and
Congress would be better informed if, going forward, TSA were to use
this new approach with the 2007 data serving as its baseline measure.
Although this limits TSA's ability to report on early actions taken to
secure freight rail, under the new approach TSA could set new targets
and have better assurance that the agency is more accurately measuring
future progress in reducing TIH risks. Also, the lack of specific time
frames in the annex for program completion hinders accountability by
not clearly setting expectations for when security gaps should be
addressed. Ensuring that the updated annex includes information on its
development, including the entities that contributed to its development
and the methodology they used, could also strengthen it and make it
more useful to interested parties.
In addition, TSA has not systematically tracked the various actions
taken to secure freight rail, nor has it assessed the degree to which
those actions have mitigated identified security risks. Developing a
mechanism to track these actions and assess their impact on risk could
strengthen TSA's ability to determine the level of overall security
preparedness within the system and to use this information to
effectively prioritize its resources. Additionally, TSA and industry's
efforts thus far in voluntarily working together to secure freight rail
in the absence of significant federal rail security regulations have
been noteworthy. Although they did not initially include all relevant
stakeholders, TSA's Corridor Reviews were a positive step toward
enhancing awareness of the specific risks that TIH rail shipments posed
in major cities. These reviews also strengthened relationships among
rail stakeholders and resulted in industry actions that helped to
secure TIH shipments. However, a significant transition lies ahead. The
implementation of new federal requirements will alter the current
approach for securing freight rail from a voluntary to a more
regulatory approach, and it will be important for both TSA and industry
stakeholders to manage this transition successfully. We also recognize
the inherent challenge of securing nonfixed assets, such as TIH rail
cars, as they travel throughout the United States. However, the
implementation of new federal requirements will present new challenges
for both TSA and industry stakeholders. To meet these challenges, it
will be important for TSA to engage federal and industry partners in
ensuring that the actions taken to secure freight rail are both
effectively and efficiently targeted toward risk reduction.
Finally, since multiple stakeholders share responsibility for securing
freight rail, differences in missions, cultures, and established ways
of doing business can impede coordination. The involvement of numerous
stakeholders in securing freight rail highlights the importance of
federal agencies working together to facilitate appropriate access to
relevant information and resources to ensure efficiency and avoid
duplication of efforts. While coordination efforts thus far have been
generally positive, establishing a coordination process to ensure that
all relevant threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments are
shared and field inspector resources are fully leveraged could
strengthen the federal government's ability to ensure the security of
freight rail. Given the additional responsibilities under the 9/11
Commission Act and new regulations, federal and industry cooperative
efforts remain important.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that the federal government's strategy for securing the U.S.
freight rail system fully addresses factors in Executive Order 13416
and contains characteristics we identified as key to successful
national strategies, and to better ensure that TSA is able to
successfully prioritize its resources and assess the progress of
federal and industry efforts to secure the freight rail system from
acts of terrorism, we are recommending that DHS's Assistant Secretary
for the Transportation Security Administration take the following five
actions:
* To ensure that the federal strategy to secure the freight rail system
is comprehensive and considers a wider range of risk information,
develop a plan for addressing identified security threats to freight
rail other than TIH, such as destruction of or sabotage to freight rail
bridges and tunnels and cyberattacks to the rail system, and
incorporate this information and other related strategic updates into
TSA's Freight Rail Modal Annex. As part of this effort, further
evaluate methods for estimating the likelihood of various threats
occurring and ensure that this information is also considered when
developing future risk assessments and strategic updates.
* To better ensure that relevant federal and industry partners
effectively leverage their resources to achieve the strategic vision of
TSA's Freight Rail Modal Annex, ensure that future updates to TSA's
annex more comprehensively address factors contained in Executive Order
13416 and identified key characteristics of a successful national
strategy, including:
- describing the methodology used to develop the strategy and which
organizations and entities contributed to its development;
- more clearly defining federal and industry roles and
responsibilities;
- ensuring that performance measures have defined targets and are
linked to fulfilling goals and objectives;
- more systematically addressing specific milestones for completing
activities and measuring progress toward meeting identified goals;
- more thoroughly identifying the resources and investments required to
implement the strategy, including priorities for allocating future
grants; and:
- more comprehensively identifying linkages with other developed
strategies, such as those that guide DHS IP, whose responsibilities
overlap with TSA for protecting freight rail critical infrastructure.
* To ensure that TSA is consistently and accurately measuring agency
and industry performance in reducing the risk associated with TIH rail
shipments in major cities, take steps to revise the baseline year
associated with its TIH risk reduction performance measure to enable
the agency to more accurately report results for this measure.
* To ensure that TSA is able to more effectively assess the progress
being made in securing freight rail, balance future activities against
the various security risks to freight rail, and use its and industry's
resources in the most cost-effective manner, take steps to more fully
track and assess the implementation and effectiveness of security
actions being taken to secure freight rail.
* To better ensure that federal agencies are coordinating as
effectively as possible, work with federal partners, such as DHS IP and
FRA, to ensure that all relevant assessments and information are shared
and TSA and FRA field inspector resources are fully leveraged.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOT, and DOD on February 23,
2009, for review and comment. DOD did not provide comments, and DOT
provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. DHS
provided written comments on April 7, 2009, which are reprinted in
appendix VII. In commenting on the report, DHS reported that it
concurred with all five recommendations and discussed actions it has
taken or planned to take to implement them. However, the actions DHS
reported taking or planned to take, while relevant, do not fully
address the intent of two of the five recommendations. DHS also
provided summary information on freight rail security actions that it
has taken in recent months or intends to take in the future.
With regard to our first recommendation that TSA develop a plan for
addressing identified security threats to freight rail other than TIH
and further evaluate methods for estimating the likelihood of various
threats occurring, DHS stated that it concurred with the
recommendation. DHS also reported that it is currently developing an
initiative to address the security of critical railroad infrastructure
and to assist in this effort has developed a draft tool designed to
measure the criticality and vulnerability of freight rail
infrastructure. DHS added that it is coordinating this effort with and
collecting input from freight rail industry stakeholders, which will be
further developed through future updates to TSA's freight rail security
strategy. We support TSA's efforts to expand its strategy beyond TIH by
beginning to address the security of critical railroad infrastructure;
however, these actions alone will not fully address the intent of our
recommendation. We believe it is also important for TSA to address
additional identified security threats in future updates to its
strategy, such as cyberattacks to the rail system, and to further
evaluate methods for estimating the likelihood of various identified
security threats occurring. Without taking steps to more fully address
other identified security threats, TSA cannot ensure a comprehensive
freight rail security strategy moving forward, and finding ways to
better estimate the actual likelihood of various freight rail security
threats occurring, as directed by the NIPP, could help TSA better
assess overall risks to freight assets and to the system.
With regard to our second recommendation that TSA ensure that future
updates to its Freight Rail Modal Annex more comprehensively address
factors contained in Executive Order 13416 and those identified as key
characteristics of a successful national strategy, DHS stated that it
concurred with the recommendation. DHS also stated that it endorses the
elements detailed in the recommendation and will incorporate them into
future updates of its Freight Rail Modal Annex, which will be designed
to more specifically address elements such as stakeholder roles and
linkages, goal-oriented milestones, performance measures, and future
resource requirements. We believe that incorporating these elements
into DHS's updates of its Freight Rail Modal Annex will enhance its
usefulness in resource and policy decisions and better ensure
accountability by making decision making more transparent and
comprehensive.
With regard to our third recommendation that TSA take steps to revise
the baseline year associated with its TIH risk reduction performance
measure to ensure that the agency is consistently and accurately
measuring its and industry performance in reducing the risk associated
with TIH rail shipments in major cities, DHS stated that it concurred
with the recommendation. DHS also reported that TSA recognizes the
importance of establishing outcome-based performance measures and will
establish a new 12-month baseline with empirical and quantified data,
and that current year performance will be compared to the new baseline
period and scored to determine variance from year to year.
Additionally, in an effort to maintain consistency, and to discern the
effectiveness of the voluntary security action items, DHS stated that
TSA will also continue to measure and score current performance and
compare it to the original baseline year (the 12-month period preceding
the adoption of the security action items from June 2005 through May
2006), but in doing so will provide sufficient information regarding
possible data limitations. We recognize TSA's interest in capturing
early efforts by agency and industry officials to secure TIH within the
freight rail system and agree that given the potential limitations in
these data and the resulting differences in how results are calculated
from this initial baseline year compared to subsequent year
calculations, that discussions of data limitations would be helpful.
This type of disclosure would help to avoid potential confusion that
could result from TSA using this additional measure, if TSA reports
this measure externally. Such action would also be consistent with best
practices in performance reporting.
With regard to our fourth recommendation that TSA take steps to more
fully track and assess the implementation and effectiveness of actions
being taken to secure freight rail, DHS stated that it concurred with
the recommendation. Specifically, DHS stated that TSA will continue to
track industry adoption and implementation of the security action items
and plans to gain additional perspective by measuring annual TIH risk
reduction performance against the previous year to determine the
efficacy of freight rail initiatives and actions as they are being
implemented. In addition, DHS said that TSA's Corporate Security
Reviews will also provide insights into improvements that freight
railroads have implemented. While we support TSA's ongoing efforts to
assess progress in reducing TIH risks in high-threat urban areas, these
actions will not fully address the intent of our recommendation. We
believe it is important for TSA to also assess the implementation and
effectiveness of security actions resulting from its individual
programs, such as the Corridor Reviews, which will allow the agency to
better weigh the benefits and costs of the various programs that have
been implemented to secure freight rail. Specifically, TSA should, for
example, ensure that its and industry's efforts to develop and
implement specific security actions through the Corridor Reviews be
fully documented in TSA Corridor Review reports, which the agency has
begun to do recently. Furthermore, while TSA's Corporate Security
Reviews provide valuable insights into security improvements being
implemented by freight railroad carriers, these reviews currently do
not provide the type of detailed information necessary to ensure that
specific freight rail assets, particularly those on DHS IP's
prioritized critical infrastructure list, are effectively protected. As
such, we believe that tracking the specific security measures being
implemented for these high-priority freight rail assets is an important
factor in determining the overall level of security preparedness within
the system and should be addressed in future Corporate Security Reviews
or other related efforts.
With regard to our fifth recommendation that TSA more closely work with
federal partners, such as DHS-IP and FRA, to ensure that all relevant
assessments and information are shared and that TSA and FRA field
inspector resources are fully leveraged, DHS concurred with the
recommendation and said that the government coordination process
continues to mature and develop and that it recognizes the importance
of having and maintaining strong working relationships with other
government agencies. DHS also stated that it recognizes the need to
specifically define roles and responsibilities with all freight rail
security stakeholders, including industry and federal, state, local,
and tribal governments, and will use the Freight Rail Modal Annex to
define specific stakeholder roles and responsibilities. In addition,
FRA told us in its technical comments that it plans to conduct joint
inspections with TSA in the future when FRA and TSA inspectors are
fully trained on the new regulatory requirements recently issued by
both PHMSA and TSA. We support TSA, DHS IP, and FRA efforts to better
coordinate relevant information and inspector resources and better
define stakeholder roles and responsibilities and believe that these
efforts will help to ensure that relevant assessments and information
are shared among key federal freight rail security stakeholders, TSA
and FRA field inspector resources are fully leveraged, and specific
stakeholder roles and responsibilities are better defined.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Transportation, the
Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of the Transportation
Security Administration, and appropriate congressional committees. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix VIII.
Signed by:
Cathleen A. Berrick:
Managing Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Objectives:
To assess the status of federal and industry efforts to secure the
freight rail system, we addressed the following questions: (1) To what
extent have federal and industry freight rail stakeholders assessed the
risks to the nation's freight rail network, and has the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) developed a risk-based strategy--
consistent with applicable federal guidance and characteristics of a
successful national strategy--for securing the system? (2) What actions
have federal and industry stakeholders taken to secure freight rail
systems since September 11, 2001; to what extent has TSA monitored
their status and effectiveness; and what, if any, challenges hinder the
implementation of future actions? (3) To what extent have federal and
industry stakeholders coordinated their efforts to secure the freight
rail system?
Scope and Methodology:
To collectively address all three questions, we reviewed freight rail
security-related laws, regulations, and executive directives. We also
reviewed reports on topics related to freight rail security that were
previously issued by us, the Congressional Research Service, and
federal and freight rail industry stakeholders. In addition, we
reviewed reports we previously issued on government management
requirements, best practices, and internal controls. We interviewed
freight rail security stakeholders from federal, state, and local
governments, as well as representatives from the freight rail industry.
A complete list of the agencies and organizations visited and contacted
are in table 10. Below the table, we outline the specific steps taken
to answer each objective.
Table 10: Names and Locations of Organizations Contacted:
Federal agencies:
Department of Homeland Security;
* Transportation Security Administration, including the Office of
Intelligence; Freight Rail Transportation Sector Network Management
office; Surface Transportation Security Inspector Program officials in
Washington, D.C.; and surface transportation security inspectors in New
Orleans, Chicago, New Jersey, and Houston;
* Office of Infrastructure Protection, Washington, D.C.;
* Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, Washington,
D.C.;
* Federal Emergency Management Agency Grants Programs Directorate,
Washington, D.C.
Department of Transportation;
* Federal Railroad Administration in Washington, D.C. (including the
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Hazardous Materials
Division, Office of Chief Counsel, and Federal Railroad Administration
field inspectors in Newark, New Jersey, and Chicago);
* Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of
Hazardous Materials Standards, Washington, D.C.;
* Surface Transportation Board, Washington, D.C.
State and local government:
* National Association of Counties, Washington, D.C.;
* National Conference of State Legislators, Washington, D.C.;
* New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, Hamilton,
New Jersey.
Private sector:
Railroad industry groups;
* Association of American Railroads, Washington, D.C.;
* American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, Washington,
D.C.;
* Railroad Research Foundation, Washington, D.C.
Railroads;
* Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Company, Houston, Texas;
* Canadian National Railroad, Baton Rouge, Louisiana;
* Canadian Pacific Railroad, Chicago, Illinois;
* Conrail Shared Assets, Newark, New Jersey;
* CSX Railroad, Baltimore, Maryland;
* East Jersey Railroad Company, Bayonne, New Jersey;
* Kansas City Southern Railway Company, Baton Rouge, Louisiana;
* Morristown & Erie Railway, Morristown, New Jersey;
* New Orleans and Gulf Coast Railway, Westwego, Louisiana;
* New Orleans Public Belt Railroad, New Orleans, Louisiana;
* New York New Jersey Railroad, West Seneca, New York;
* Norfolk Southern Corporation, Atlanta, Georgia;
* Port Terminal Railroad Association, Houston, Texas;
* Union Pacific Railroad, Spring, Texas.
Chemical company industry groups;
* American Chemistry Council, Arlington, Virginia;
* The Chlorine Institute, Arlington, Virginia;
* The Fertilizer Institute, Washington, D.C.
Chemical companies;
* BASF Corporation, Florham Park, New Jersey;
* Dow Chemical Company, Freeport, Texas;
* Lyondell Chemical Company, Houston, Texas;
* Monsanto Chemical Company, Luling, Louisiana;
* Occidental Chemical Corporation, LaPorte, Texas;
* PPG Industries, Inc., Lake Charles, Louisiana.
Other stakeholders;
* Aon Risk Services, insurance broker, Baltimore, Maryland;
* Union Tank Car Company, tank car manufacturer.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Objective I - Freight Rail Assessments of Risk and TSA's Security
Strategy:
To determine the extent to which the federal government and industry
freight rail stakeholders assessed risks to the freight rail network,
we analyzed federal and industry assessments to determine the nature
and severity of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences of
potential attacks to the freight rail system. Specifically, we analyzed
federal security assessments that addressed components of risk (threat,
vulnerability, and consequence) from the Department of Transportation
(DOT), TSA, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of
Infrastructure Protection (IP). Although DHS, DOT, and industry
characterized these assessments as threat, vulnerability, and
consequence assessments, we did not evaluate the quality of the
assessments nor did we determine the extent to which the assessments
were conducted consistent with requirements outlined in the DHS
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) as this analysis was
outside the scope of our work. However, we did discuss the assessments'
reported results with the respective agencies and private entities that
conducted them to ascertain the efforts that were made to identify
potential threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with an
attack on the freight rail system. Since TSA identified the rail
transportation of Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials as the
highest risk to the freight rail system, we focused our effort on
understanding the vulnerabilities and consequences associated with this
threat. We participated in TSA's rail Corridor Review risk assessment
in Chicago to better understand the corridor review assessment process,
which TSA officials told us was their key action to strengthen rail
security. We also reviewed the 2001 industrywide risk assessment
developed by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and other
freight rail industry stakeholders. Further, we discussed the findings
of federal and industry assessments with the respective agencies and
private entities responsible for them.
To determine the extent to which TSA's strategy to secure freight rail
was risk based, we identified TSA's strategic planning document--the
Freight Rail Modal Annex to the Transportation Sector-Specific Plan
(TSSP) issued in May 2007--and evaluated the extent to which this
document was consistent with federal guidelines for a risk-based
security strategy. Specifically, to determine the extent to which TSA's
strategy conformed to requirements and best practices, we reviewed
relevant statutory requirements of the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) that included general requirements to
establish government strategies and programs, and the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission
Act), which included more specific requirements for establishing a
security strategy. We reviewed executive directives, including Homeland
Security Presidential Directives 1, 7, and 8 and Executive Order 13416,
Strengthening Surface Transportation Security. We also reviewed
documents to determine the best practices for effectively implementing
a risk management framework and, in particular, risk assessment best
practices. Specifically, we reviewed documents, such as the NIPP and
TSSP. We also compared the Freight Rail Modal Annex to our guidance on
six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy.
[Footnote 83] We reviewed other security strategy-related documents,
such as a railroad security memorandum of understanding annex signed by
both DHS and DOT that agreed to implement a work plan developed by the
Homeland Security Council (HSC) in 2004.
We also reviewed TSA's four metrics as presented in the annex and
gathered detailed information from TSA on its methodology and data used
to calculate its metric to reduce the risk associated with the
transportation of TIH in major cities by 50 percent by the end of 2008.
TSA provided us aggregated baseline data from June 1, 2005, to December
31, 2005, prior to the implementation of the TIH Rail Risk Reduction
Program and a second set of results for April 1, 2008, to June 30,
2008, after its implementation for 46 TIH high-risk cities.[Footnote
84] We met with TSA officials to understand their process and
methodology for developing this measure and the data they collected. We
also collected copies of completed inspection report sheets that TSA
used to determine the relative security of TIH cars that were sampled
to develop a risk score for each city. Also, we interviewed the private
company that tracks the flow of railcars through cities about the
reliability of its tracking devices. We discussed our concern with
TSA's methodology earlier in this report.
To obtain views of the federal government's current and future state of
freight rail security strategic planning, we interviewed officials from
relevant federal agencies to discuss the scope and methodologies of
their risk assessments and their views of the identified risks.
Specifically, we determined that TSA's Transportation Security Network
Management (TSNM) office was responsible for implementing the freight
rail security strategy. We then discussed the office's current and
future efforts with respect to strategic planning and freight rail
security assessments with TSNM officials. We also discussed other
federal components' efforts to assess security risks to freight rail,
including the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's
(PHMSA) vulnerability assessment with PHMSA officials to understand the
scope, methodology, and results of their report. We discussed the Tier
2 list and the policies and procedures for administering and conducting
the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP) and Site Assistance Visit
(SAV) assessments with DHS IP officials responsible for developing
these programs. We discussed freight rail threats with TSA's Office of
Intelligence. We asked officials from the TSNM office for freight rail
security how, if at all, they used completed assessments to develop
their freight rail security strategy. We also interviewed a former
executive official from the HSC who was familiar with HSC events during
2004 that affected freight rail security. We discussed with him the
actions leading up to the HSC's request that DHS and DOT identify and
mitigate the security risks associated with the transportation of TIH.
In addition, we interviewed numerous industry representatives to
discuss their opinions of the threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences associated with freight rail and the assessments conducted
to identify and mitigate those risks. Specifically, we spoke with
officials from all 7 Class I railroads, which represent about 93
percent of railroad freight revenue and 67 percent of the total U.S.
rail mileage. According to DHS, DOT, and AAR officials we spoke with,
these railroads collectively operate in most major cities in the United
States where rail service is provided and have robust security plans in
place. We also interviewed officials from 7 short line and regional
railroads that operated in the same cities in which we conducted site
visits, with a particular focus on those railroads that had
participated in a prior TSA Corridor Review and carried TIH materials.
Because we selected a nonprobability sample of short line and regional
railroads, the results from our visits cannot be generalized to the
entire population of over 500 railroads; however, we believe that
obtaining information from these 7 railroads allowed us to better
understand the views and unique operational challenges that short line
and regional railroads face in the context of freight rail security. We
also met with officials from the American Short Line and Regional
Railroad Association (ASLRRA) to better understand short line and
regional railroad operations. Further, we interviewed officials from
six chemical companies that use rail services to ship TIH and other
hazardous materials. We selected these companies based on their
geographic proximity to the cities we conducted site visits in, and
recommendations from chemical industry officials at the American
Chemistry Council (ACC). Furthermore, two of the chemical companies we
spoke with, Dow Chemical and BASF, are two of the largest in the world,
according to several chemical industry officials we spoke with. We
developed a data collection instrument to collect uniform information
from the railroads and the chemical companies whose officials we
interviewed and to characterize summarily these entities' views on the
current and future state of freight rail security. While the results
from these visits cannot be generalized to the entire population, we
believe the results from these visits provided us with a broad
perspective of the types of actions taken to secure freight rail and
the challenges operators face in doing so.
Objective II - Key Actions Taken and Challenges:
To identify the key actions federal and industry stakeholders have
taken or planned to mitigate identified risks, we reviewed TSA's
Freight Rail Modal Annex and discussed the rail security actions
outlined in the annex with several officials from DHS components,
including TSA's TSNM office for freight rail; TSA's Office of Security
Operations, the Surface Transportation Security Inspectors Program
Office; the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)'s DHS
IP; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Grants
Programs Directorate. We also met with officials from DOT's Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) and PHMSA. During these reviews, we
gathered information on several freight rail security initiatives,
including TSA's Corridor Reviews, 27 joint TSA and DOT voluntary
security action items, DHS IP's BZPP and SAVs, and DHS FEMA grant
funding for freight rail security. We also reviewed PHMSA's and TSA's
rulemakings on freight rail security (Notices of Proposed Rulemaking
issued in December 2006, PHMSA's interim final rule issued in April
2008, and final rules issued by both agencies in November 2008) and
PHMSA's rulemakings on enhanced performance standards for rail
hazardous materials tank cars (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued in
April 2008, and final rule for TIH tank cars issued in January 2009).
We also interviewed freight rail industry stakeholders, including
representatives of major freight rail industry associations and select
rail and chemical companies, to determine the actions they have taken
to secure their facilities, operations, and shipments. We also reviewed
AAR's rail security management plan, which was identified as the
prominent action taken by the freight rail industry since September 11,
2001, to secure freight rail and is a template for most railroad
security plans in the United States.
To observe actions taken to secure the freight rail system and to
obtain the views of railroad and chemical company representatives, as
well as federal field inspector officials, we conducted site visits to
seven major cities. We chose these cities based on several factors,
including that the cities have been the subject of or are expected to
be the subject of a TSA Corridor Review and have rail networks that
typically transport significant amounts of TIH materials. To determine
the U.S. cities transporting the highest amounts of TIH materials by
rail, we obtained a 3-month sample of rail industry information from
TSA regarding the number TIH shipments traversing major cities for the
year 2007. We compared the ranking of cities based on this information
with aggregate data of the quantities of TIH being transported for the
year 2000. We found the relative rankings of the major cities to be
similar and selected cities that appeared high on these lists. We also
solicited input from AAR on the appropriateness of the cities we
selected to visit. During our site visits, we met with officials from
all seven Class I railroads, seven short line and regional railroads,
and six chemical companies in these cities because they carry, ship, or
handle TIH materials over the rail system. We used a data collection
instrument to collect uniform information from these entities on the
actions taken to secure freight rail. We also met with federal
government officials who work in the field, including TSA surface
transportation security inspectors (STSI) at four locations and FRA
officials at two locations we visited. As discussed earlier in this
report, while the results from our visits cannot be generalized to the
entire population of railroads, chemical facilities, and industry
stakeholders, we believe that the observations obtained from these
visits provided us with a greater understanding of the industry's
operations and perspectives.
To determine the extent to which TSA monitored the status and
effectiveness of its programs, including how well the industry was
complying with voluntary action items, we interviewed TSA officials
responsible for these programs and reviewed available agency
documentation on both federal and industry action taken to secure
freight rail. Further, we reviewed GPRA program performance standards
and GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government to
further assist us in evaluating TSA's efforts to monitor and evaluate
the effectiveness of actions taken.[Footnote 85]
To identify freight rail security challenges, we solicited information
from federal, state, and local freight rail security stakeholders as
well as industry stakeholders on pending and new freight rail security
requirements. For instance, we reviewed the rail security requirements
promulgated in the 9/11 Commission Act, and discussed any
implementation and resource challenges associated with the act as well
as TSA's and PHMSA's security rulemakings issued in 2008. In addition,
we reviewed and analyzed over 100 public stakeholder comments to TSA's
and PHMSA's notices of proposed rulemakings published in December 2006.
These comments were from a wide range of organizations, including
federal entities, several state and city organizations, industry
associations, and individual rail and chemical companies. After
reviewing the comments, we interviewed stakeholders that noted
important challenges to implementing these new rules. We also solicited
the opinion of other stakeholder parties about the challenges in
securing freight rail transportation, including state and local
government representatives and representatives from advocacy groups we
identified through interviews or literature searches. We attended a
session of the National Conference of State Legislatures'
transportation committee to discuss the risk posed by transporting TIH
by rail and other types of freight rail transportation and its effect
on state governments. In addition, we interviewed representatives of
the National Association of Counties to obtain similar views of TIH
transportation risk and its effect on local governments.
Objective III - The Extent to Which Federal and Industry Actions Are
Coordinated and Challenges to Be Addressed:
To determine the extent to which federal and industry stakeholders have
coordinated their actions, we reviewed relevant requirements in laws
and regulations and best practices. We analyzed federal and industry
cooperative agreements, including DHS and DOT memorandums of
understanding and freight rail industry and government memorandums of
cooperation. In addition, we analyzed the public comments to TSA and
PHMSA proposed rulemakings to determine the efforts that agencies made
to coordinate their respective proposed rules. For PHMSA's interim
final freight rail security rule, we reviewed the government's
responses to stakeholders' comments to the rule. We also assessed
federal coordination efforts using criteria we developed for effective
collaboration between federal agencies as well as guidance established
in the NIPP for effective collaboration with industry stakeholders.
[Footnote 86] To determine the mechanisms that freight rail
stakeholders use to coordinate and share information, we reviewed
information provided by federal agencies, such as TSA's Freight Rail
Modal Annex to the TSSP, information prepared by FRA, and documentation
provided to us from industry stakeholders such as AAR and ACC. To
obtain information about federal actions taken to coordinate through
the Freight Rail Government Coordinating Council, we talked with four
of its members, including officials from the TSA TSNM office for
freight rail, which heads the council. To obtain information about the
nature, scope, and effectiveness of the Freight Rail Sector
Coordinating Council, we talked with officials representing the council
chair--AAR--and discussed the extent to which the council had been used
to coordinate with the federal government. To further obtain
stakeholders' opinions on federal and industry cooperation, we met with
DHS, TSA, and DOT officials responsible for various freight rail
security-related programs and met with relevant representatives from
the freight rail and chemical industry associations. During our site
visits, we also met with federal inspectors and railroad industry
representatives to discuss their specific efforts to coordinate.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2007 through April
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Federal and Industry Freight Rail Security Vulnerability
and Consequence Assessment Activities Conducted since 2001:
The federal government and freight rail industry stakeholders have
conducted a number of threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments since 2001. Although DHS, DOT, and industry characterized
these assessments as threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments, we did not evaluate the quality of the assessments nor did
we determine the extent to which the assessments were conducted
consistent with requirements outlined in the NIPP as this analysis was
outside the scope of our work. However, we did discuss the assessments'
reported results with the agencies and private entities that conducted
them to ascertain the efforts that were made to identify potential
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with an attack on
the freight rail system. While these assessments were wide-ranging,
special attention was given to determining the security risks
associated with the transportation of TIH materials. Below is a summary
of these assessments, categorized by those activities that focused
exclusively on TIH risks and those that included or focused on other
risks.
Assessments That Focused Exclusively on TIH Risks:
PHMSA TIH Summary Report:
PHMSA conducted the first federal security assessment of TIH in 2003,
called the TIH Summary Report, at the request of the HSC. The study
analyzed the transportation of 13 TIH materials to determine their
vulnerabilities and potential consequences in the rail transportation
system along with other modes of transportation, such as maritime and
highway modes. PHMSA chose to focus on these 13 materials because of
their high toxicity and the large volumes transported. Specifically,
the report identified 3 TIH materials--chlorine, anhydrous ammonia, and
ethylene oxide--that accounted for 90 percent of the total volume
shipped via rail.
TSA Rail Corridor Reviews:
In 2004, TSA began conducting Corridor Reviews, which are detailed
freight rail security assessments that focus on TIH rail shipments in
individual cities. They are conducted by teams of TSA subject matter
experts and are designed to evaluate the vulnerabilities and potential
consequences posed by TIH freight rail shipments within each city. To
conduct these reviews, TSA uses a systematic and quantitative
assessment methodology, called the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point (HACCP), which enables the agency to identify specific locations
within a city's rail system that pose a high risk for someone
weaponizing a TIH railcar.[Footnote 87] As part of the assessment, TSA
gathers information on the volume and traffic patterns of TIH railcars
traveling in and through the city and analyzes these data to identify
locations in the city where TIH railcars tend to sit unattended.
[Footnote 88] These locations are often in freight rail yards or at
interchange locations where railroads exchange railcars or break apart
and build trains. Once the TSA subject matter experts identify these
key locations for each city, they assess them against three risk
factors:[Footnote 89]
* the potential severity of an attack, such as how many people might be
injured or killed by an attack on a TIH car at a location;
* the number of TIH railcars at a specific location; and:
* detection capability, such as the ability of police officers or
railroad workers to detect an attack before it could be carried out.
Using the HACCP tool and data gathered based on the three risk factors
above, TSA calculates a numerical risk score for each location to
identify areas on which to focus future security efforts and actions.
[Footnote 90] However, TSA allows each rail carrier to provide input
and clarification on each risk score at a tabletop session the agency
holds with the rail carriers at the end of the each review. As of March
2009, TSA completed Corridor Reviews in 12 cities, including the 9
cities originally selected for review in 2004. TSA officials told us
that they have assessments under way in 5 cities and plan to continue
conducting these reviews in 43 additional U.S. cities that have TIH
rail shipments transported through them.
TIH Rail Risk Reduction Program:
In 2007, TSA began further assessing the potential vulnerabilities and
consequences posed by TIH railcars in major cities by gathering,
monitoring, and quantifying risk information associated with TIH rail
shipments traveling through 46 U.S. cities.[Footnote 91] TSA officials
stated that the agency developed this assessment program to measure the
progress federal and industry efforts are having in achieving the
agency's key performance metric for the freight rail security program,
which is to reduce the risk associated with the transportation of TIH
in major cities--identified as high-threat urban areas--by 50 percent
by the end of 2008. To do so, TSA collected both historical and current
information on the number of TIH rail shipments in each city, security
at rail yards holding TIH shipments in each city, and city populations.
TSA then developed a formula to quantify a risk score for each city.
This score is a relative measure, or indicator, of the TIH security
risks within a city for a given time period. TSA used the historical
information to develop a baseline risk score for each city and then
collected later information to measure progress in reducing
risk.[Footnote 92] Specifically, the agency compiled information for
four factors:
* Total hours TIH cars were present inside a city. TSA collected data
from the rail industry's automated systems that record the movement and
location of all railcars within the U.S. rail system by means of
electronic identification tags. TSA used these data to quantify the
amount of time TIH railcars are located within a city.
* Security status of TIH cars. TSA collected this information through
in-person visits conducted by TSA STSIs at over 200 rail yards located
in major cities.
* Population proximity to unsecured TIH cars. TSA used U.S. Census
Bureau data to determine the population within a 1-mile radius of each
TIH car that was sitting unattended and to rank each city's possible
exposure based on this information.
* City ranking. TSA prioritized the cities' importance on a scale of 1
to 5 (5 being the highest) based on the population of each city.
In 2007, TSA collected historical information on these risks factors
from the time period June 1, 2005, to May 31, 2006, to establish a
baseline risk score for each of the 46 U.S. cities, and then compared
each baseline to information for the current year.[Footnote 93],
[Footnote 94] Thus far, TSA has determined that nationally there was
over a 60 percent reduction in risk from the baseline period to the end
of December 2008. However, we have concerns about this performance
measure's reported results, as discussed earlier in our report. To show
results for this measure, TSA developed a national risk scorecard that
ranks each city by risk score. Each Class I rail carrier also receives
a unique scorecard, providing insight into its individual TIH risk
scores. These scorecards then become the focus of discussions between
TSA and individual carriers on how to further reduce risk. TSA
officials also said that they may use the scorecards for, among other
things, monitoring which cities or railroads have high-risk scores and
focusing further assessment and security efforts on these cities or
railroads.
Assessments That Included Risks Other Than TIH:
TSA Corporate Security Reviews:
In 2007, TSA began conducting assessments, called Corporate Security
Reviews (CSR), which evaluate potential vulnerabilities associated with
a freight rail carrier's corporate security plan and procedures. The
purpose of these reviews is to both increase the agency's domain
awareness and identify possible vulnerabilities that individual
railroad carriers may have because of unique operating procedures or
other company-specific concerns. In 2007, TSA conducted CSRs of all
seven Class I railroads and assessed their security plans and
procedures against the following TSA guidelines: threat assessment and
processing; vulnerability assessments; personnel security, auditing/
testing of plan; drills/exercises; infrastructure security; hazardous
materials security; cybersecurity; and infrastructure security.
[Footnote 95] The reviews essentially consist of an on-site visit to
the carrier's corporate headquarters to interview rail officials on the
procedures and processes included in the company's security management
plan.[Footnote 96] After completing its data gathering and analysis,
TSA develops a final report for each railroad and sends it to the
carrier informing the company of the results. TSA officials told us
that overall the Class I carriers have good security plans and
procedures in place to respond to raised alert levels. In a few cases,
TSA made recommendations for improvement, for example, for better
documenting of security processes or protocols and better defining of
departmental roles and responsibilities. In 2008, TSA performed CSRs on
the three largest short line railroad holding companies that
collectively control 89 short line railroads. In the immediate future,
TSA intends to focus CSRs on terminal-switching railroads operating
within high-threat urban areas. However, TSA has not yet developed a
schedule for conducting these reviews.
DHS List of Prioritized Critical Infrastructure:
In 2006, DHS IP created a program to annually assess and identify the
nation's most critical infrastructure and key resources. This effort
results in a prioritized critical infrastructure list. DHS stated that
assets on this list--which includes freight rail assets--if destroyed
or disrupted could cause national or regional catastrophic effects.
This list is used to inform incident management, vulnerability
assessments, grants, and other risk management activities. To ensure
that assessment resources are invested correctly, DHS IP officials said
that DHS works closely with TSA to develop criteria used to determine
which freight rail assets should appear on the list. They also use
information provided from sector industry stakeholders and state
homeland security offices.[Footnote 97]
DHS IP Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments:
In 2004, DHS IP began two assessment programs to identify
vulnerabilities associated with assets and infrastructure in the United
States across all sectors of the economy, including freight rail
assets. The two programs are BZPP and the SAV program.
BZPP:
BZPP is an assessment of an asset's perimeter "outside the fence" to
identify potential vulnerabilities associated with these areas where a
terrorists may launch an attack.[Footnote 98] Annually, DHS IP
determines which assets and infrastructure are to be subjected to a
BZPP assessment by using the DHS prioritized critical infrastructure
list. These assets and infrastructure are prioritized by such factors
as whether a BZPP assessment was recently conducted and if the asset
belongs to a high-risk sector, such as dams or nuclear facilities. DHS
IP officials stated that the agency coordinates roughly 200 BZPP
assessments a year, and the agency has conducted 53 freight rail-
related security assessments since the program's inception. DHS
officials called protective security advisors (PSA) are responsible for
coordinating BZPP assessments with state and industry stakeholders.
These assessments are conducted on a voluntary basis, and the results
can be used to obtain grant funding from FEMA for security
enhancements.
SAV:
These are voluntary visits conducted at the request of an asset owner/
operator or the state government. However, PSAs are to solicit state
homeland security advisors and major industry officials for SAVs where
DHS believes an asset would benefit from the program. DHS officials
stated that the agency targets SAVs on (1) a facility or sector that is
under threat, (2) a facility that is highly consequential, (3) a
facility that supports or is close to a national special security
event, (4) a facility that is so complex that it would benefit from
subsequent or concurrent BZPP activities, or (5) a facility whose
owner/operator requests an SAV and the facility appears on the DHS
prioritized critical infrastructure list. The main distinction between
an SAV and a BZPP assessment are that BZPP assessments focus on the
outside of the perimeter of an asset and are conducted largely by local
law enforcement, while SAVs are conducted by PSAs and focus on
vulnerabilities inside the perimeter. The results of the SAV are
verbally briefed to the appropriate key staff members of the site upon
completion, including any security measures to consider for
implementation. However, SAVs are not used to award grants, and the
asset owner/operator is not required to adopt any security measures DHS
recommends.
Industry Assessments:
In 2001, AAR conducted the first nationwide security risk assessment of
the freight rail system, which incorporated vulnerability and
consequence criteria to evaluate multiple security risks to the freight
rail industry.[Footnote 99] Overall, the assessment reviewed five
critical areas to determine the railroad's security vulnerabilities and
consequences: infrastructure, military operations, information
technology and communications, train operations, and hazardous
materials. For example, the assessment evaluated vulnerabilities and
consequences associated with the destruction or degradation of freight
rail infrastructure, such as key bridges, tunnels, tracks, and
operation centers that electronically direct and monitor train
movements.[Footnote 100] Key participants in the risk assessment
included the Class I railroads; ASLRRA; and as appropriate, major
chemical industry groups, whose member companies use the rail system to
ship TIH commodities.
Individual rail and chemical companies have also conducted assessments
of their properties and operations. One impetus for these efforts is
the 2003 PHMSA regulations, which require railroads that carry certain
hazardous materials--including TIH--and chemical companies that ship
these materials to develop security plans that include assessments of
the risks of shipments of the covered hazardous materials and measures
to mitigate those risks. Officials we interviewed at all 13 of the
railroads stated that they had conducted these PHMSA-regulated security
assessments. In addition to these required assessments, representatives
we interviewed from the 7 Class I railroads stated that they conduct
other assessments as well, including reviews of TIH operations and
physical infrastructure assessments, which have helped them make
decisions about business operations and determine where to make
physical security upgrades in some cases.
[End of section]
Appendix III: TSA Did Not Consistently Measure Results for Its Key
Performance Measure:
TSA has made limited progress thus far in measuring the extent to which
federal and industry efforts are achieving the agency's only
performance metric with a target--to reduce the risk associated with
TIH rail shipments in major cities by 50 percent by the end of 2008--
because the agency was unable to obtain key data needed to consistently
measure results. According to TSA officials, this is the key
performance metric for the agency's freight rail security program.
Specifically, to measure progress in meeting this metric, TSA has
collected limited vulnerability and consequence information from 2007
and compared it with historical vulnerability and consequence
information for 2005 and 2006. However, the agency was unable to obtain
key information needed to accurately measure vulnerability in 2005 and
2006. As a result, the agency developed a general estimate of this
vulnerability using its and industry's expert judgment and inserted it
into its calculation of risk for most cities in place of actual
historical information that it could not obtain retrospectively.
Therefore, the accuracy of this estimated vulnerability--and the
associated 60 percent overall reduction in risk that TSA reports as
being achieved through November 2008--is uncertain because it depends
on the accuracy of the general estimate.[Footnote 101] More
specifically, the key vulnerability risk factor that TSA measures as
part of this performance metric is the amount of time that railcars
containing TIH are unattended in major U.S. cities. However, TSA was
unable to obtain information for this risk factor in 2005 and 2006
because the agency did not begin conducting inspections at rail
facilities to gather this information until 2007, yet it was using 2005
and 2006 as its baseline period. Since the 2005 and 2006 vulnerability
data were unavailable, agency officials made a broad estimate--
hypothesizing that TIH railcars sat unattended during the baseline
year, June 2005 through May 2006, approximately 80 percent of the time.
TSA officials reported that to develop this estimate, they relied
primarily on the memory of railroad employees and their responses to
standard questions when they were interviewed by TSA officials during
the agency's 2007 inspections at rail facilities. TSA officials also
reported that they relied on their expert judgment to develop this
estimate. However, because this estimate was based on memories and
certain assumptions about past activity rather than actual measurements
of unattended cars, which is the type of data that TSA gathered in
subsequent years, the improvements that TSA reports have been made in
reducing risk depend on the validity of these assumptions and recall.
In addition, we found empirical evidence suggesting that the 2005 and
2006 baseline year data estimate of unattended cars may be inaccurate
based on actual data that TSA collected in 2007. Specifically, in
reviewing the 2007 data, we learned that the amount of time that TSA
inspectors found TIH railcars to be unattended in 2007 varied greatly
by city. For example, of the 45 cities that TSA inspected to measure
TIH railcar attendance, data for 6 cities inspected in 2007 show cars
as unattended 0 percent of the time, and data for 5 other cities show
cars as unattended less than 20 percent of the time. Moreover, 18 other
cities showed railcars as unattended over 80 percent of the time,
including 9 cities showing railcars as unattended 100 percent of the
time.[Footnote 102] However, the agency was unable to account for any
specific actions taken that would explain why the unattended status of
TIH railcars seemed to dramatically improve in some cities and slightly
worsen in others compared to the agency's estimates. As a result,
because TSA cannot resolve the uncertainties associated with its 2005
and 2006 estimate, the accuracy of TSA's risk reduction calculations in
subsequent years against the 2005 June through December baseline will
likewise remain uncertain. Without being able to show demonstrable
reduction in risk related to its only targeted performance measure, TSA
does not know the degree to which its programs are effective and does
not know which actions are most effective for future rail security
efforts. Therefore, we are recommending in this report that TSA take
steps to change the baseline measure associated with its TIH risk
reduction performance metric to a measure that is more consistent with
what has been used in subsequent years, or revise this performance
metric to more consistently and accurately assess TIH risk reduction
efforts in major cities over time.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Summary of Key Actions Taken to Secure Freight Rail:
The federal government and freight rail industry have taken a range of
actions since September 11, 2001, to mitigate freight rail security
risks. While many of these actions have focused on securing TIH rail
shipments, some actions have addressed other security threats as well.
In addition, new TSA and DOT rail security regulations for better
securing TIH rail shipments will make some freight rail security
actions mandatory. However, federal and industry stakeholders also face
some technology challenges to further enhancing the security of TIH
rail shipments. These challenges include designing stronger tank cars,
developing more real-time railcar tracking and monitoring systems, and
substituting highly hazardous materials with less dangerous chemicals.
Below is a summary of these various actions, categorized as federal and
industry.
Key Federal Actions Taken:
TSA Rail Corridor Review Actions:
Since 2004, TSA has been assisting freight rail carriers in mitigating
security vulnerabilities the agency identified during its Corridor
Reviews. Specifically, during these reviews TSA works with individual
rail carriers to identify site-specific risk mitigation strategies for
areas that pose the greatest risk for weaponizing a loaded TIH railcar.
Then, typically at the end of each review, TSA officials propose
specific actions that railroads can then either implement at their
facilities or as part of their operations to reduce risk. Examples of
specific rail carrier actions taken as a result of TSA's reviews
follow.
* Following TSA's assessment in New Jersey, rail carriers implemented
operational changes that permanently removed railcars containing TIH
from three rail yards.
* Also following TSA's assessment in New Jersey, rail carriers
installed camera systems to monitor TIH railcars and perimeter fencing.
One carrier also installed gates at certain road access points and high-
intensity lighting. Some carriers also increased security personnel and
the frequency of security patrols at facilities.[Footnote 103]
* Prior to TSA's review in Chicago, two rail carriers would interchange
TIH cars at an unmanned location in the city. The lag time between one
carrier's drop-off and the other's pickup resulted in loaded TIH cars
sitting idle and unattended for significant periods of time in a
populated area. As a result of TSA's concern, the two carriers decided
to reroute the TIH cars to a different interchange point located
outside the city. The rail carriers stated that after they analyzed
several options for addressing this vulnerability, they chose to
reroute the trains because it adequately addressed TSA's concerns and
ended up being more cost effective for them operationally.
TSA and DOT Voluntary Security Action Items:
In June 2006, TSA and DOT issued 24 recommended security action items
for the rail transportation of TIH materials that addressed system
security, access controls, and en route security.[Footnote 104]
Specific actions included the following:
* designating an individual with overall responsibility for security
planning,
* identifying company critical infrastructure,
* collaborating with other railroad security offices,
* restricting access to information the railroad deems to be sensitive,
and:
* establishing procedures for background checks and safety and security
training for contractor employees with unmonitored access to company-
designated critical infrastructure.
Then, in November 2006, TSA and DOT issued 3 supplemental security
action items for the rail transportation of TIH materials designed to
build upon the original 24 and recommended the following:
* Rail carriers operating in high-threat urban areas should develop
site-specific security plans that address the security of the
transporting of TIH materials.[Footnote 105]
* Rail carriers should not operate trains carrying TIH within a
specified distance of public venues with national special security
events in progress and as requested by the appropriate agency
responsible for overall event security coordination.
* In the security planning process, rail carriers should identify and
select areas within their systems where cars containing TIH can be
moved and held when threat conditions warrant.
TSA Surface Transportation Inspection Activities:
In addition to assisting TSA in measuring industry progress in
achieving its 50 percent TIH risk reduction goal, STSIs have also
assessed industry's implementation of some of the security action items
that TSA and DOT issued in June 2006. Specifically, STSIs visited
approximately 151 rail facilities from October through December 2006
and interviewed 2,619 rail employees to assess rail carrier
implementation for 7 seven security action items on a scale of high,
medium, and low.[Footnote 106] When averaged across all carriers, TSA's
results showed the level of implementation averaged in the low/medium
to medium range. STSIs also conducted an additional set of visits to
approximately 147 rail facilities from March through June 2007 to
assess the degree to which rail carriers had implemented 10 other
security action items.[Footnote 107] TSA officials told us that they
selected these 10 items for review because they focused more on rail
carrier security management practices than on field-level practices.
[Footnote 108] TSA's results for these 10 items showed that railroads
scored high in the areas of internal communication on threat conditions
and establishing liaisons with federal, state, and local law
enforcement, but lower in the areas of photo identification, background
checks for employees, and intrusion deterrence and detection. While TSA
has not conducted any additional surveys of rail carrier implementation
of the security action items since 2007, TSA officials stated that item
surveys will be an integral part of the 2009 inspection plan. In
addition, TSA officials told us that they have conducted approximately
4,000 surveys that provide some information on rail carrier
implementation of Supplemental Security Action Item No. 1, which was
issued in November 2006; these surveys were components of the TIH Rail
Risk Reduction Program and will continue until 2013.
DHS FEMA Grant Funding:
Using the states' buffer zone plans and Vulnerability Reduction
Purchasing Plan (VRPP) submissions under DHS IP's BZPP, DHS provides
grant money, through the states, to local law enforcement agencies that
purchase security-related equipment for reducing the risk of the asset
assessed to a terrorist attack.[Footnote 109] The results of the BZPP
assessments are used to develop VRPP, which identifies the spending
plan, including the equipment to be purchased under BZPP. VRPP
submissions are completed by the local jurisdiction responsible for
securing the asset assessed. Once VRPP submissions are completed and
submitted to the state administrative agency, DHS verifies that what is
planned to be purchased is on the DHS authorized equipment list. As
part of the review process, FEMA and DHS IP review the documentation to
make sure it is completed appropriately; however, FEMA, as the final
approver, ultimately determines whether the funding will be provided
and when. Through the end of 2008, DHS told us that it provided $4.6
million through the program to purchase security-related equipment to
protect freight rail assets from terrorist attack. Examples of items
purchased include chemical protective clothing, bulletproof vests,
video surveillance equipment, and portable radios.
National Capital Region Rail Pilot Project:
DHS also developed a project to secure rail infrastructure within
highly populated or otherwise critical locations. The National Capital
Region was chosen for the initial pilot because of the proximity of
D.C. rail lines to Congress, the Supreme Court, and other significant
entities, monuments, and icons. The National Capital Region Rail Pilot
Project (NCRRPP) was designed to address security concerns while
maintaining efficient rail operations. NCRRPP is a remote intelligent
video security system-based and sensor-based program that creates a
virtual fence of video surveillance cameras along an 8.1 mile rail
corridor through Washington, D.C. NCRRPP has two central features: a
virtual fence surrounding the entire 8.1-mile D.C. corridor and virtual
gates installed at each entry point. The virtual fence is made up of a
network of video surveillance cameras covering the entire length of the
D.C. corridor rail line. The virtual gate design uses nonintrusive
remote detection technologies to provide advance notification of
approaching train traffic and detect the presence of leaking hazardous
and TIH materials. The system architecture allows for easy installation
of this system at other critical rail infrastructures throughout the
country and provides constant real-time video monitoring and hazardous
material detection capabilities. The system also disseminates alarm
information to first responders in the NCRRPP area, including the U.S.
Capitol Police, Washington Metropolitan Police, U.S. Secret Service,
White House Situation Room, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and others
as determined necessary.
Rail Routing Risk Assessment Tool:
In 2005, DHS's Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness (SLGCP), Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), provided
a $5 million grant to the Railroad Research Foundation (RRF) to oversee
the development and implementation of three risk assessment tools
intended to assist the rail industry and federal government in
performing risk assessments, selecting safe and secure rail routes, and
implementing a "safe haven" for carriers to use during transport and
storage of TIH railcars so that security risks may be minimized.
[Footnote 110] However, shortly after RRF began developing the tools,
it, in coordination with DHS, elected to condense the three tools into
a single Web-based tool that would analyze the safety and security
risks along rail routes posed by TIH rail shipments. DHS and RRF
officials we spoke with stated that the major factor contributing to
this decision was PHMSA's 2006 proposed rail safety and security
rulemaking, now a final rule, that requires rail carriers to analyze
safety and security risks along the rail routes used to transport
certain hazardous materials. RRF, DHS, and other involved stakeholders
stated that the tool will provide rail carriers a common framework for
conducting this analysis.[Footnote 111] RRF and its contractor
completed initial development of the tool and held two demonstration
briefings on it in November and December 2007. While officials from RRF
and DHS and other federal officials we spoke with stated that the
briefings effectively demonstrated the tool's ability to host the
necessary data, additional funding and work was required to finalize it
and make it deployable nationwide. As a result, DHS awarded an
additional $2.5 million grant to RRF in 2008 to finish development of
the tool.[Footnote 112] However, DHS officials also told us that they
do not intend to fund any out-year maintenance or updates to the tool,
and that it will be up to the rail industry to fund any remaining work.
Although RRF and DHS expect the Rail Routing Risk Assessment Tool to be
made available to the railroads in time for them to complete the
routing analysis required under PHMSA's final rule, it is uncertain
what the impact of this tool will be in making routing decisions
because decisions made using the tool can be subjective--depending on
the users and how they apply the results of the tool. For example, the
contractors assisting RRF in developing the tool said that it is not a
"decision-making" tool and it does not make decisions for users on
which rail route to use, but rather provides them with a comprehensive
set of data on each rail route being analyzed based on the 27 risk
criteria outlined in PHMSA's rule. The data are then used to compute a
risk score for each route in three categories: security, natural
hazards, and accidents. Rail officials can then use the three
categorical scores for each route to assist them in determining which
routes present the lowest overall risk based on the three scores.
However, it is ultimately the user's discretion that determines how the
three scores are weighted and interpreted to make a routing decision.
As a result, it is uncertain how consistently users of the tool will
apply it in their decision making, and rail carriers may view the
overall risk posed by commonly used routes differently. The potential
differences in decision making--derived from the same tool--could also
make it more difficult for FRA to consistently enforce compliance with
the rule. Furthermore, the extent to which the tool will be used by the
railroads is also uncertain because use of the tool is voluntary, and
railroad user groups participating in its development have given mixed
feedback on its utility for the analysis.
PHMSA Final Rule:
On November 26, 2008, PHMSA issued its final rule requiring rail
carriers to compile annual data on certain shipments of explosive, TIH,
and radioactive materials; use those data to analyze safety and
security risks along rail routes where those materials are transported;
assess alternative routing options; and make routing decisions based on
those assessments.[Footnote 113] Included in the rule are 27 specific
risk criteria rail carriers are required to consider and use when
conducting this analysis; however, not all the criteria will be present
on each route, and each route will have its own combination of factors
to be considered. These criteria cover areas such as rail traffic
density of the route, trip length, iconic targets, and population
density along the route. Using the results of their analyses, rail
carriers must select and use the practicable routes posing the lowest
overall safety and security risks.[Footnote 114] In addition, the rule
adopts a new requirement for rail carriers to inspect placarded
hazardous materials railcars for signs of tampering or suspicious
items, including improvised explosive devices (IED). The rule also
clarifies rail carriers' responsibility to address in their security
plans' issues related to en route storage and delays in transit.
Specifically, the PHMSA rule requires covered entities to include,
among other things,
* measures to mitigate risk to population centers associated with in-
transit storage;
* procedures for notifying consignees of any significant unplanned
delays affecting the delivery of the covered hazardous materials; and:
* procedures under which rail carriers will consult with shippers and
consignees to minimize the time a railcar containing one of the
specified hazardous materials is placed on track awaiting pickup,
delivery, or transfer.
FRA plans to review the rail carriers' route analyses on behalf of DOT.
FRA intends to have an FRA headquarters team of experts in the various
safety disciplines conduct these reviews of the carriers' route
analyses; this team is to consult with TSA on security aspects of these
analyses. FRA officials indicated that regardless of the risk
assessment methodology selected by a rail carrier, FRA is to look at
the carrier's analysis for the following information:
* The analysis must demonstrate that the railroad has included the
required information, complied with the consultation and other
requirements of the PHMSA rule, considered the criteria set out in
Appendix D of the rule, and developed a rational explanation for
criteria that it is relying on.
* The characterizations of risks and of changes in the nature or
magnitude of risks is qualitative and, to the extent possible given
available data, quantitative.
* The characterization of risk is broad enough to deduce a range of
activities to reduce risks on the lines being analyzed.
* All assumptions, their rationales, and their impact on the risk
analysis are clearly set out.
* The analysis considers the full population at risk, as well as
subpopulations particularly susceptible to such risks, the populations
more highly exposed, or both.
* The analysis adopts consistent approaches to evaluating the risks
posed by hazardous agents or events.
* The analysis includes measures to minimize the safety and security
vulnerabilities identified through the route analyses.
FRA's enforcement rule sets out the process FRA is to follow if it
identifies deficiencies in a railroad's risk analysis; this process
includes full consultation with the railroads, PHMSA, TSA, and the
Surface Transportation Board before any rerouting would be directed.
PHMSA and FRA officials stated that since rail carriers have every
incentive to choose routes posing the least overall safety and security
risks for moving security-sensitive materials, officials anticipate
that FRA will rarely have to overturn a rail carrier's routing
decision; more likely, the discussion may center on mitigation measures
a carrier can take to reduce the risks that are identified.
PHMSA's Tank Car Safety Proposed Rule:
On April 1, 2008, PHMSA and FRA issued a proposed rail safety rule to
enhance the performance standards for tank cars used to transport
highly hazardous materials, implement operational restrictions to
improve accident survivability, and enhance the cars' resistance to
rupture or puncture during a derailment.[Footnote 115] While this
proposed rulemaking focused on safety, DOT officials we spoke with said
that these enhancements would also have security benefits. Essentially,
the revised standards are designed to improve the accident
survivability of railroad tank cars and were developed in response to
several rail tank car accidents occurring in recent years in which the
tank car was breached and the hazardous product leaked into the
atmosphere. Specifically, this rule proposes:
* enhanced tank car performance standards for head and shell impacts,
including expedited replacement of tank cars used for the
transportation of TIH materials manufactured before 1989 with non-
normalized steel head or shell construction;
* operational restrictions for trains hauling tank cars containing TIH
materials, such as a maximum speed limit of 50 miles per hour for all
railroad tank cars used to transport TIH materials;
* interim operational restrictions for trains hauling tank cars not
meeting the enhanced performance standards, for example, a maximum
speed limit of 30 miles per hour in nonsignaled (i.e., dark) territory
for all railroad tank cars transporting TIH materials or the approval
of a complete risk assessment and risk mitigation strategy establishing
that operating conditions provide at least an equivalent level of
safety as that provided by signaled track; and:
* an allowance to increase the gross weight of tank cars that meet the
enhanced tank-head and shell puncture-resistance systems.
PHMSA's Tank Car Safety Final Rule:
On January 13, 2009, PHMSA and FRA issued a final rule to prescribe
enhanced safety measures for the transportation of TIH materials.
[Footnote 116] Pending the issuance of the final rule proposed in April
2008, the rule imposes interim design standards for newly manufactured
tank cars. Specifically, this rule requires:
* commodity-specific improvements in safety features and design
standards, for shell and jacket thickness, for newly manufactured tank
cars;
* enhancements in top fittings protection systems and nozzle
arrangements for newly manufactured tank cars; and:
* a 50 mile per hour speed limit for all loaded rail tank cars used to
transport TIH materials.
TSA's Rail Transportation Security Rule:
On November 26, 2008, TSA issued a rule establishing security
requirements for freight railroad carriers; intercity, commuter, and
short-haul passenger train service providers; rail transit systems; and
rail operations at certain, fixed-site facilities that ship or receive
specified hazardous materials by rail.[Footnote 117] The rule also
codifies the scope of TSA's existing inspection program and requires
regulated parties to allow TSA and DHS officials to enter, inspect, and
test property, facilities, conveyances, and records relevant to rail
security. The rule also requires that regulated parties designate rail
security coordinators and report significant security concerns to DHS.
This rule further requires that freight rail carriers and certain
facilities handling specified hazardous materials be able to report
location and shipping information to TSA upon request and to implement
chain-of-custody requirements to ensure a positive and secure exchange
of specified hazardous materials. TSA also clarifies and amends the
sensitive security information (SSI) protections to cover certain
information associated with rail transportation.[Footnote 118]
Specifically, TSA's rule requires all rail carriers to:
* designate a rail security coordinator and at least one alternate to
be available to TSA on a 24-hour, 7-day per week basis to serve as the
primary contact for receipt of intelligence information and other
security-related activities;
* immediately report incidents, potential threats, and significant
security concerns to TSA's Freedom Center; and:
* allow TSA officials and other DHS officials to enter and conduct
inspections, copy records, perform tests, and conduct other activities
necessary to carry out TSA's statutory and regulatory
responsibilities.[Footnote 119]
Specific requirements for freight rail carriers and facilities that
ship or receive certain hazardous materials include the following:
[Footnote 120]
* Freight rail carriers and certain facilities that ship or receive
certain hazardous materials by rail must provide to TSA, upon request,
the location and shipping information of railcars within their physical
custody or control that contain a specified category and quantity of
hazardous materials. Class I freight railroad carriers must provide the
information to TSA no later than 5 minutes (for one car) or 30 minutes
(for two or more cars) after receiving the request. Other railroad
operators and rail hazardous materials shipper and receiver facilities
must provide the information for one or more cars within 30 minutes
after receiving the request.
* As discussed earlier in this report, the rule also requires certain
rail carriers, shippers, and receivers to establish and provide for a
"secure chain of custody and control" for railcars in their possession
containing the selected hazardous materials, such as TIH. Rail
carriers, shippers, and receivers are required to establish a secure
chain of custody and control through several steps and processes.
Specifically, shippers of these hazardous materials are required to
perform a physical security inspection of railcars for signs of
tampering or suspicious items, including IEDs.[Footnote 121] During pre-
transportation functions, the shipper is also required to store the
cars in an area with physical security measures in place until the
carrier arrives to pick up the car and assume physical custody of it.
The shipper is also required to document the transfer of custody with
the rail carrier either in writing or electronically. The rail carrier
must also perform an inspection of the cars before leaving the
shipper's facility, as required by DOT. When a carrier transfers a car
transporting the hazardous materials to another carrier and the
transfer occurs in a high-threat urban area or when the railcar may
subsequently enter a high-threat urban area, the transferring carrier
must ensure that the railcar is not left unattended at any time during
the physical transfer of custody, perform a security inspection, and
document the transfer of custody. When a railroad carrier transfers
custody to a rail receiver in a high-threat urban area, the carrier
must not leave the car unattended in a nonsecure area until the
receiver accepts custody and must document the transfer of custody. In
such a transfer, the receiver must ensure that either it or the carrier
maintains positive control of the car during the transfer, document the
transfer, and keep the car in a secure area until it is unloaded. As
used in the regulations, a railcar is "attended" if an employee or
authorized representative of the freight railroad carrier (1) is
physically located on-site in reasonable proximity to the railcar; (2)
is capable of promptly responding to unauthorized access or activity at
or near the railcar, including immediately contacting law enforcement
or other authorities; and (3) immediately responds to any unauthorized
access or activity at or near the railcar either personally or by
contacting law enforcement or other authorities. The rule also permits
electronic monitoring so long as the responsible party is located on-
site and can accomplish an equivalent level of surveillance, response,
and notification.[Footnote 122]
Key Industry Actions Taken:
AAR Industrywide Security Management Plan:
AAR's security plan, developed from the results of the industrywide
risk assessment, comprises of four alert levels with specific security
actions to be taken by the railroads at each alert level. As the alert
level rises, as dictated by the AAR board of directors, the security
actions and countermeasures progressively become more rigorous. These
actions cover areas such as operations, communications and information
technology, hazardous materials shipments, and critical infrastructure.
AAR officials said that the primary benefit of the plan is that it
allows the industry to tailor and regionalize security measures to the
current threat environment, such as a specific geographic area,
specific commodities, and so forth. AAR reported that having the
ability to tailor security measures to the threat environment is
critical because AAR estimates it would cost the rail industry $500,000
a day to operate nationwide at Alert Level 4. In 2007, AAR began
working with its member railroads to update the industrywide plan.
[Footnote 123] According to AAR, these efforts generally involved
restructuring some of the alert level actions and significantly
increasing the total number of Alert Level 1 actions. Specifically, AAR
reported that because the industry has historically operated at Alert
Level 2, many of these actions have become institutionalized by the
railroads into their normal day-to-day operations. As a result, the
industry feels that moving many of the current Alert Level 2 actions to
Alert Level 1 will better reflect the industry's current day-to-day
operations. Table 11 contains a brief description of each alert level.
Table 11: AAR Industrywide Security Management Plan's Four Alert
Levels:
Alert level: Level 1;
Description: New normal day-to-day operations: Exists when a general
threat of terrorist activity exists, but warrants routine security
posture. Actions in effect at this level include conducting security
training and awareness activities, restricting certain information to a
need-to-know basis, restricting the ability of unauthenticated persons
to trace sensitive materials, and periodically testing that security
systems are operating as intended.
Alert level: Level 2;
Description: Heightened security awareness: Applies when there is a
general nonspecific threat of terrorist activity. Actions in effect at
this level include providing security and awareness briefings as part
of daily job briefings, conducting content inspections of cars and
containers, and increasing security at designated facilities.
Alert level: Level 3;
Description: A credible threat of an attack on the United States or
railroad industry (continuously reevaluated): Exists in light of the
specificity of the threat against railroad personnel and facilities.
Examples of Level 3 actions include further restricting physical access
and increasing security vigilance at control centers, communication
hubs, and other designated facilities and requesting national guard
security for certain critical assets.
Alert level: Level 4;
Description: A confirmed threat of attack against the railroad industry
or actual attack in the United States (implemented up to 72 hours and
reevaluated): Action taken at this level include stopping the services
of non-mission-essential contractors with access to critical facilities
and systems, increasing vigilance and scrutiny of railcars and
equipment during mechanical inspections to look for unusual items, and
providing a continuous guard presence at designated facilities and
structures.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Actions Taken by Individual Freight Rail Carriers:
Rail carriers have also taken a variety of steps to enhance security at
some of their facilities by, among other things, installing perimeter
fencing, lighting, security cameras, and other monitoring equipment;
restricting access through the use of key cards; increasing security
awareness; providing security training; and increasing the frequency of
security patrols at key yards and facilities. Several rail carriers we
visited installed various types of security cameras and monitoring
equipment at some of their key rail yards and facilities to better
monitor the activities in and around these areas. In addition, some
rail carriers had also installed cameras and other surveillance
equipment at key bridges. One Class I railroad we met with installed
cameras, electronic motion detectors, and sensors to detect a hazardous
material release at each end of one of its key tunnels located in a
major metropolitan area. Several rail carriers had also installed
perimeter fencing and high-intensity lighting around key rail yards and
facilities. Figure 4 shows the camera at the tunnel, figure 5 shows
lighting that another rail carrier had installed at one of its key rail
yards in Houston, and figure 6 shows perimeter fencing at a rail yard
in Houston.
Figure 4: Camera System Located in the Upper-Right-Hand Corner of the
Tunnel:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 5: Light Towers at a Rail Yard in Houston:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Perimeter Fencing at a Rail Yard in Houston:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Several individual rail carriers we met with also indicated that they
implemented other types of measures to better secure their facilities
and operations, including creating backup and dual command centers to
ensure little or no degradation of service in the event of an attack,
requiring employees and contract employees to wear ID badges,
installing firewalls and password protecting critical information,
increasing the frequency of security patrols at facilities, installing
security signage, restricting access to key buildings through the use
of key cards, providing security training, and conducting security
drills.
Some rail carriers told us that specifically for TIH cars they have
increased their temporary storage fees, which are the fees customers
pay railroads to temporarily store their railcars at local rail yards
if customers cannot accept the cars when the rail carriers offer them
for delivery.[Footnote 124] For instance, one Class I carrier we met
with sent a letter to its customers indicating that it was raising its
temporary storage fees in 2007 for railcars containing certain
hazardous materials, including TIH, to $500 for the first 24 hours of
storage and increasing them to $1,000 per day for each day of storage
thereafter. Another Class I rail carrier we met with is taking steps to
require that its TIH customers located in DHS-designated high-threat
urban areas accept TIH cars upon arrival. This carrier told us that
this change will reduce the time TIH cars sit in its rail yards waiting
to be delivered to the customer. However, the carrier also told us that
it is providing daily service, including weekends, for some of its TIH
customers located in high-threat urban areas to minimize any negative
impacts this may have on customer operations. Another rail carrier told
us that it is not renewing its fixed-lease track agreements with
companies for temporary storage of certain hazardous materials,
including TIH.[Footnote 125] Moreover, several rail carriers we met
with said that they are encouraging their rail yard masters to reduce
the amount of time TIH cars sit in yards. One carrier stated that its
goal is to get all TIH cars processed and out of the high-threat urban
areas in less than 24 hours and that any TIH cars that remain in its
yards located in a high-threat urban area for more than 24 hours get
flagged and get first priority for shipment. Some rail carriers we met
with also stated that they have also taken steps to reroute or stop
their trains carrying TIH during certain major events. For example,
rail carriers we met with indicated that they stopped trains during
World Series games, the Final Four basketball tournament, and NFL
playoff games.
Actions Taken by Individual Chemical Companies:
Representatives we interviewed from all six chemical companies stated
that they monitor TIH shipments to their destinations using the
railroad Automatic Equipment Identification system (AEI) to ensure that
cars are continually moving through the rail system.[Footnote 126]
Additionally, see the following:
* Two companies said that they are independently installing Global
Positioning Systems (GPS) and other detection devices to their tank
cars to constantly monitor the shipments and be notified if there is a
potential breach in the car.
* Some chemical companies have increased their facilities' security
around rail yards, including increasing security guards and installing
fencing, cameras, guards, and thermal detection devices around the
entire perimeter and points of entry for their railroad infrastructure.
[Footnote 127]
* One large chemical company we visited in Houston that produces,
ships, and receives large amounts of chlorine has completely fenced all
of its rail facilities, installed cameras and motion detection sensors
at yard entrances, and increased the amount of security lighting and
frequency of security patrols. This company also told us that it has
seals for its chlorine tank car shipments that require special cutters
for removal.[Footnote 128]
* During a site visit to a chemical company that routinely receives
large quantities of chlorine, we observed several physical security
measures that had been installed at the rail receiving facility, such
as a crash resistant gate, two barbed wire fences, and several
surveillance cameras.[Footnote 129] Figure 7 illustrates some of the
fencing installed by this chemical customer.
Figure 7: TIH Rail Customer Facility with Barbed Wire Fencing around
the Perimeter:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Federal and Industry Stakeholders Also Report Facing
Technology Challenges to Enhancing the Security of TIH:
Federal and industry stakeholders identified three main technology
challenges to better securing TIH shipments, which--if overcome--could
improve the security of future TIH shipments. These challenges include
designing stronger tank cars, developing more real-time railcar
tracking and monitoring systems, and substituting highly hazardous
materials with less dangerous chemicals. While federal and industry
stakeholders are currently working to meet these challenges, it is too
soon to know if these efforts will mitigate the outstanding security
risks, as many of these efforts are still under way.
While some federal and industry stakeholder officials we spoke with
reported that designing stronger tank cars and better railcar tracking
systems and substituting TIH chemicals with less dangerous ones are
ways to reduce the security risks these materials pose in transit, they
also described technology challenges associated with these efforts.
However, stakeholders viewed some of these challenges as more difficult
or costly to overcome than others. For example, some stakeholders we
spoke with told us that it can be difficult to find substitutes for
some chemicals, for example, chlorine, because it is a base product
used to make other products. In addition, officials from all six of the
chemical companies we met with told us that it can be expensive to
switch to alternative chemicals because switching would require them to
retrofit facilities to be able to make or use the alternate products
and processes. However, while some industry stakeholders identified the
challenge of tracking the real-time location or status of railcars
while in transit, some stakeholders are finding more real-time ways to
track hazardous railcar movements through the use of GPS.
Furthermore, government and industry stakeholders reported that they
have been engaged in research aimed at developing safer tank cars that
could better withstand an accident or derailment and will be less
likely to breach and release dangerous chemicals. However, some rail
and chemical industry officials--as well as government officials--
reported that it is difficult to develop a tank car that would be
resistant to all potential security threats, such as certain types of
IEDs, yet would also be safe and have the capacity to carry sufficient
amounts of product. Specifically, these stakeholder officials stated
that it was difficult to design tank cars such that security
improvements to the car--such as reinforcing its hull--do not
simultaneously compromise the car's safety. According to these
officials, adding layers to the hull of a tank car increases its
weight, which can result in the car being too heavy for the tracks and
thus increase the likelihood of its derailment and the resultant
potential release of toxic materials. They also reported that they
could mitigate the weight concern by decreasing the capacity of the
car, but this would result in more tank cars being put on the rail
system to carry the same amount of hazardous materials, thereby
increasing the potential risk of an incident as well as congestion in
the system. FRA and TSA are also investigating ways to overcome
technological challenges, such as researching lightweight coatings that
could potentially add ballistics penetration resistance to a tank car
without substantially increasing the car's weight. FRA has also tested
various products with self-sealant capabilities to protect against a
large-caliber weapon creating a gaping hole in a tank car if it was
penetrated by a bullet. These officials believe that they may be able
to apply these materials to future tank cars, if their weight and costs
are not too high, but this research is still under way.
Another technology challenge that stakeholders face relates to
developing more sophisticated railcar tracking systems. Currently, the
technology most widely used in the rail industry to track railcar
movements, AEI, does not provide the real-time location or status of
railcars while in transit. Instead, AEI is a passive tracking system
that tracks railcars by unique radio-frequency identification tags.
When a railcar or train passes a reader, its location is recorded and
sent to the railroad. However, the system cannot transmit the precise
location of the car, only that it has passed a reader, and in some
areas AEI readers could be 30 to 40 miles apart. As a result, some
industry stakeholders, including certain chemical companies we
contacted, are installing GPS on tank cars as an alternative method of
tracking their tank cars from origin to destination.[Footnote 130]
However, these chemical company officials noted that although GPS
technology has clear benefits, it can have limitations, such as a
limited battery life and problems with signal interference, for
example, when a car travels through a tunnel. TSA is conducting a study
comparing GPS to the current system, AEI. Results of these studies are
expected in 2009.
Lastly, industry stakeholders face technology challenges in attempting
to substitute less toxic materials for the highly hazardous materials
that currently traverse the freight rail system. While federal and
industry officials we interviewed said that substituting highly toxic
chemicals with less hazardous materials is one way to reduce risk,
chemical industry officials told us that doing so can be expensive, and
finding substitutes for some highly hazardous chemicals is especially
difficult because these chemicals serve as the bases for other
products--and thus do not currently have substitutes. For instance,
chlorine is used to develop a wide array of products, including
medicines, semiconductors, and paints, in addition to being used for
water treatment. Anhydrous ammonia is most commonly used to develop
fertilizers to enhance crop growth. While some water treatment
facilities have started using chemicals other than chlorine to purify
water, some chemical company officials we spoke with said that a
substitute for some TIH chemicals has not been identified for all
processes. In addition, chemical company officials we spoke with told
us that product substitution can be expensive because switching to
alternative chemicals would require them to retrofit facilities to be
able to make or use the alternate products and processes.
According to some industry stakeholders we spoke with, one alternative
to developing substitute chemicals would be to move these materials by
pipeline rather than rail or to colocate production and consumption
facilities, thereby eliminating the need to transport them by rail.
Some chemical industry officials reported that these options could also
be potentially costly and would require some retrofitting of chemical
facilities. Another alternative shipping option is to move these
materials by truck. However, according to officials we spoke with from
one large chemical company, the risk of shipping TIH materials by truck
is significantly higher than the risk with rail shipments, and as a
result, they have elected to not ship by truck. In contrast, some
members of the rail industry we spoke with supported these
alternatives, recognizing that these measures would reduce the volume
of highly hazardous materials on the rail system and concurrently
reduce their security risks and liability concerns.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Summary of 9/11 Commission Act Requirements Pertaining to
Freight Rail Security:
The 9/11 Commission Act, signed into law on August 3, 2007, requires
federal stakeholders to take several additional steps to further secure
the freight rail system, including TIH shipments. Table 12 provides a
listing of the key provisions in the act that are relevant to freight
rail security.
Table 12: Key Provisions from the 9/11 Commission Act That Are Relevant
to Freight Rail Security:
Provision: Sec. 1202: Transportation Security Strategic Planning;
Description:
* Specifies that the transportation modal security plan required under
49 U.S.C. § 114(t) must include threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences;
* Requires that the National Strategy for Transportation Security
(NSTS) include a 3-year and a 10-year budget for federal transportation
security programs that will achieve the priorities of the NSTS, methods
for linking the individual transportation modal security plans and a
plan for addressing intermodal transportation, and transportation modal
security plans;
* Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in addition to
submitting an assessment of the progress made on implementing the NSTS,
to submit an assessment of the progress made on implementing the
transportation modal security plans;
* Requires that the progress reports include an accounting of all
grants for transportation security; funds requested in the President's
budget for transportation security, by mode; personnel working on
transportation security, by mode; and information on the turnover in
the previous year among senior staff working on transportation security
issues;
* Requires that the NSTS include the TSSP required by Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7.
Provision: Sec.1304: Surface Transportation Security Inspectors;
Description:
* Authorizes the Secretary to train, employ, and utilize STSIs;
* Requires the Secretary to employ up to a total of:
- 100 STSIs in fiscal year 2007;
- 150 STSIs in fiscal year 2008;
- 175 STSIs in fiscal year 2009, and;
- 200 STSIs in fiscal years 2010 and 2011;
* Requires the DHS Inspector General, not later than September 30,
2008, to submit a report to the appropriate committees on the
performance and effectiveness of STSIs, whether there is a need for
additional inspectors, and other recommendations.
Provision: Sec. 1511: Railroad Transportation Security Risk Assessment
and National Strategy;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary to establish a federal task force to complete,
within 6 months after enactment (Feb. 3, 2008), a nationwide risk
assessment of a terrorist attack on railroad carriers;
* Requires the Secretary to develop and implement, not later than 9
months after enactment (May 3, 2008), the modal plan for railroad
transportation, as required by 49 U.S.C. § 114(t);
* Requires the Secretary to transmit to the appropriate congressional
committees, not later than 1 year after enactment (Aug. 3, 2008), the
assessment and national railroad strategy and an estimate of the cost
to implement the strategy;
* Consistent with the requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 114(t), requires the
Secretary to update the assessment and strategy each year and submit a
report containing the assessment and report;
* Requires that $5 million out of the funds authorized by this act be
made available to the Secretary for fiscal year 2008 to carry out this
section.
Provision: Sec. 1512: Railroad Carrier Assessments and Plans;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary to assign each railroad carrier to a risk-
based tier;
* Authorizes the Secretary to establish a security program for railroad
carriers not assigned to the high-risk tier;
* Requires the Secretary, not later than 12 months after enactment
(Aug. 3, 2008), to establish standards and guidelines for developing
and implementing the vulnerability assessments and security plans for
railroad carriers assigned to high-risk tiers;
* Requires the Secretary, not later than 12 months after enactment
(Aug. 3, 2008), to issue regulations that require each railroad carrier
assigned to a high-risk tier to conduct a vulnerability assessment and
prepare, submit to the Secretary for approval, and implement a security
plan;
* Requires railroad carriers assigned to a high-risk tier to submit
vulnerability assessments and security plans to the Secretary for
approval not later than 9 months after the date of issuance of the
regulations;
* Requires the Secretary to provide technical assistance and guidance
to railroad carriers in conducting vulnerability assessments and to
require that each vulnerability assessment include certain factors;
* Requires the Secretary to provide technical assistance and guidance
to railroad carriers in preparing and implementing security plans and
to require that each security plan include certain factors;
* Requires the Secretary to provide threat information that is relevant
to the carrier to appropriate employees of a railroad carrier;
* Requires the Secretary, within 6 months of receiving the assessments
and security plans, to review each assessment and security plan,
require amendments to any security plan that does not meet the
applicable requirements, and approve any vulnerability assessment or
security plan that meets the applicable requirements;
* Authorizes the Secretary to require railroad carriers, during the
period before the deadline for submitting the assessments and security
plans, to submit a security plan to implement any necessary interim
security measures essential to providing adequate security;
* Authorizes the Secretary to determine that existing procedures,
protocols, and standards meet all or part of the requirements of this
section and authorizes the railroad carriers to comply with existing
procedures, protocols, and standards that meet the requirements of this
section;
* Requires each railroad carrier that submitted a vulnerability
assessment and security plan and is still assigned to the high-risk
tier to submit to the Secretary an evaluation of the adequacy of the
vulnerability assessment and security plan not later that 3 years after
the vulnerability assessment and security plan are approved by the
Secretary, and at least once every 5 years thereafter, and requires the
Secretary to review the evaluation within 180 days of submission.
Provision: Sec. 1513: Railroad Security Assistance;
Description:
* Authorizes the Secretary to make grants to railroad carriers, the
Alaska Railroad, security-sensitive materials shippers that ship by
railroad, owners of railroad cars used in the transportation of
security-sensitive materials, state and local governments for railroad
passenger facilities and infrastructure not owned by Amtrak, and Amtrak
for specified intercity passenger railroad and freight railroad
security improvements;
* Establishes that any railroad carrier that has an approved
vulnerability assessment and security plan and any carrier that uses
the grant funds solely to develop an assessment or security plan is
eligible for grant funds, and authorizes the Secretary, prior to the
earlier of 1 year after the date of issuance of final regulations
requiring vulnerability assessments and security plans or 3 years after
the date of enactment (Aug. 3, 2010), to award grants to carriers based
on vulnerability assessments and security plans that the Secretary
deems are sufficient for the purposes of this section but that have not
been approved by the Secretary;
* Requires the Secretary to determine the requirements for recipients
of grants, establish priorities for uses of funds for grant recipients,
award the funds based on risk, take into account whether stations or
facilities are used by commuter railroad passengers as well as
intercity railroad passengers, encourage nonfederal financial
participation in projects funded by grants, and not later than 5
business days after awarding a grant to Amtrak, transfer grant funds to
the Secretary of Transportation to be disbursed to Amtrak.
Provision: Sec. 1516: Railroad Carrier Exercises;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary to establish a program for conducting security
exercises for railroad carriers.
Provision: Sec. 1517: Railroad Carrier Training Program;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary, not later than 6 months after enactment (Feb.
3, 2008), to develop and issue regulations for a training program to
prepare railroad frontline employees for potential security threats and
conditions;
* Requires each railroad carrier, not later than 90 days after the
Secretary issues the regulations, to develop a security training
program in accordance with the regulations and submit the program to
the Secretary for approval;
* Requires the Secretary, not later than 60 days after receiving a
security training program, to approve the program or require the
operator to make revisions;
* Requires the carrier to respond to the Secretary's comments not later
than 30 days after receiving them;
* Requires the carrier, not later than 1 year after the Secretary
approves a security training program, to complete the training of all
railroad frontline employees who were hired more than 30 days preceding
such date, and requires the carrier to complete training for employees
employed less than 30 days preceding such date within their first 60
days of employment;
* Requires the Secretary to periodically review and update, as
appropriate, the training regulations to reflect new or changing
security threats;
* Requires the Secretary, not later than 2 years after the issuance of
the regulations, to review implementation of the training program of a
representative sample of railroad carriers and frontline employees and
submit a report to the appropriate committees.
Provision: Sec. 1518: Railroad Security Research and Development;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for
Science and Technology and the Administrator of TSA, to carry out a
research and development program to improve the security of railroad
transportation systems.
Provision: Sec. 1519: Railroad Tank Car Security Testing;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary to conduct a vulnerability assessment of
railroad tank cars used to transport TIH materials;
* Requires the Secretary, acting through the National Infrastructure
Simulation and Analysis Center, to conduct an air dispersion modeling
analysis of release scenarios of TIH materials resulting from a
terrorist attack on a loaded railroad tank car.
Provision: Sec. 1520: Railroad Employee Security Threat Assessments;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary, not later than 1 year after enactment (Aug.
3, 2008), to complete a name-based security background check against
the consolidated terrorist watchlist and an immigration status check
for all railroad frontline employees.
Provision: Sec. 1522: Procedural Requirements for Railroad Employee
Security Threat Assessments;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary, if the Secretary issues any guidance,
recommendations, suggested action items, or any other widely
disseminated voluntary action items related to security background
checks of railroad employees, to include recommendations on the
appropriate scope and application of a security background check and a
redress process for adversely affected individuals;
* Requires the Secretary, if the Secretary issues any rule, regulation,
or directive requiring a railroad carrier to perform a security
background check of employees, to prohibit the carrier from making an
adverse employment decision unless the carrier determines that the
employee has been convicted, has been found not guilty by reason of
insanity, or is under want, warrant, or indictment for a permanent
disqualifying criminal offense, as defined for the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program in 49 C.F.R. pt. 1572;
was convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity of an interim
disqualifying offense, as defined for the TWIC program in 49 C.F.R. pt.
1572, within 7 years of the date of the background check; or was
incarcerated for an interim disqualifying offense and released from
incarceration within 5 years of the date of the background check;
* Requires the Secretary, if the Secretary issues any rule, regulation,
or directive requiring a railroad carrier to perform a security
background check of employees, to provide an adequate redress process
for an employee subjected to an adverse employment decision that is
consistent with the appeals and waiver process established for the TWIC
program in 46 U.S.C. § 70105(c), and to have the authority to order an
appropriate remedy if the Secretary determines that a carrier
wrongfully made an adverse employment decision;
* Prohibits a carrier from knowingly misrepresenting to an employee or
other relevant person the scope, application, or meaning of any rules,
regulations, directives, or guidance issued by the Secretary related to
security background checks.
Provision: Sec. 1524: International Railroad Security Program;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary to develop a system to detect both undeclared
passengers and contraband, with a primary focus on the detection of
nuclear and radiological materials entering the United States by
railroad;
* Requires the Secretary to identify and seek the submission of
additional data elements for improving high-risk targeting of cargo
prior to importation into the United States, utilize data collected and
maintained by the Secretary of Transportation in the targeting of high-
risk cargo, and analyze the data to identify high-risk cargo for
inspection;
* Requires the Secretary to transmit to the appropriate committees a
report that describes the progress of the system being developed.
Provision: Sec. 1551: Railroad Routing of Security-Sensitive Materials;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary of Transportation, not later than 9 months
after enactment (May 3, 2008), to publish a final rule based on PHMSA's
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published on December 21, 2006;
* Requires the Secretary of Transportation to ensure that the final
rule requires each railroad carrier transporting security-sensitive
materials in commerce, not later than 90 days after the end of each
calendar year, to compile security-sensitive materials commodity data;
* Requires the Secretary of Transportation to ensure that the final
rule requires each railroad carrier transporting security-sensitive
materials in commerce to provide, for each calendar year, a written
analysis of the safety and security risks for the transportation routes
identified in the security-sensitive materials commodity data;
* Requires the Secretary of Transportation to ensure that the final
rule requires each railroad carrier transporting security-sensitive
materials in commerce, for each calendar year, to identify practicable
alternative routes over which the railroad carrier has authority to
operate and perform a safety and security risk assessment of each
alternative route;
* Requires the Secretary of Transportation to ensure that the final
rule requires each railroad carrier transporting security-sensitive
materials in commerce to use the required analysis to select the safest
and most secure route to be used in transporting security-sensitive
materials;
* Requires the Secretary of Transportation to ensure that the final
rule requires each railroad carrier transporting security-sensitive
materials in commerce, not less than once every 3 years, to analyze the
route selection determinations required under this section to review
all operational changes, infrastructure modifications, traffic
adjustments, changes in the nature of high-consequence targets located
along or in proximity to the route, or other changes affecting the
safety and security of the movements of security-sensitive materials
that were implemented since the previous analysis was completed.
Provision: Sec. 1552: Railroad Security-Sensitive Material Tracking;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary to develop a program that will encourage the
equipping of railroad cars transporting security-sensitive materials
with technology that provides car position location and tracking
capabilities and notification of railroad car depressurization, breach,
unsafe temperature, or release of hazardous materials, as appropriate.
Provision: Sec. 1555: Hazardous Materials Security Inspections and
Study;
Description:
* Requires the Secretary of Transportation to consult with the
Secretary of Homeland Security to limit, to the extent practicable,
duplicative reviews of hazardous materials security plans;
* Requires the Secretary of Transportation, in conjunction with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, within 1 year after enactment (Aug. 3,
2008), to study the extent to which insurance, security, and safety
costs borne by railroad carriers, motor carriers, pipeline carriers,
air carriers, and maritime carriers associated with the transportation
of hazardous materials are reflected in the rates paid by offerors of
such commodities as compared to the costs and rates for the
transportation of nonhazardous materials.
Source: GAO analysis of Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266. (2007).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
April 7, 2009:
Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO):
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Berrick:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would like to thank you for
the opportunity to comment on the GAO-09-243 SU draft report titled,
"Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy
Can Be Strengthened and Security Efforts Better Monitored". The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) values the investigative
team's comprehensive review of this Agency's progress in addressing
freight rail security needs and intends to immediately implement its
recommendations. TSA also wishes to express our appreciation for the
professionalism demonstrated by GAO's team members in conducting this
difficult and broad-ranging review.
This letter responds to the recommendations made by the GAO and
provides current information on the status of programs referred to in
the draft report. The following activities have occurred within TSA
since our last conversation with the GAO review team on December 10,
2008.
Corridor Assessments:
In early 2004, the Homeland Security Council (HSC) requested that DHS
and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) conduct risk
assessments specifically examining the movement of tank cars used for
the bulk shipment of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials in nine
urban areas: Washington, DC, Northern New Jersey, Cleveland, New
Orleans, Buffalo, Houston, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles.
These nine areas were part of a larger list of 46 High Threat Urban
Areas (HTUAs) defined by DHS. These risk assessments are known as
Freight Rail Comprehensive Reviews or Freight Rail Corridor Assessments
(Comprehensive Review). TSA has conducted seven Comprehensive Reviews
involving over a dozen railroad companies.
A Comprehensive Review is comprised of three distinct phases. The first
is the fact gathering phase. During this phase, TSA determines the
distinct geographic area that comprises the Corridor under assessment.
Once the Corridor area has been determined, the TSA team conducts
research to determine the locations of shippers, receivers, and rail
facilities that handle tank cars with TIH materials. A request for
information is sent to the railroads operating within the Corridor to
provide TSA staff with an overview of railroad operations in the area.
Potential locations of interest, known as security control points
(SCPs), are identified for inclusion in on-site evaluations that are
conducted in phase two.
The second phase is the analysis phase. During this phase, TSA, along
with representatives of the participating railroads and other
Government partners, conducts on-site security evaluations of locations
identified in the fact gathering phase. Analysis of the information
gathered during the on-site evaluations is used to identify gaps in
preparedness and countermeasures. Locations initially identified as
areas of concern may be removed as a result of information gathered
during the on-site visits. Preliminary options for consideration are
identified and noted during this phase.
The third phase is the options for consideration phase. During this
phase, a tabletop exercise is conducted with representatives from TSA,
participating railroads, and other Government partners to review all
SCPs visited during phase two. Options for consideration that are
developed at the tabletop exercise are presented in a report and
include countermeasures, security enhancements, and mitigation
strategies based on team member observations and analysis of factual
information. The railroads use this experience and information to
develop and implement methods to continue this cooperative process in
reducing vulnerabilities associated with TIH shipments moving through
HTUAs.
In addition to completing the risk assessments directed by the HSC in
the nine metropolitan areas listed above, TSA has also completed
assessments in Sacramento, Oklahoma City, and Baltimore. Additional
assessments are currently underway in Denver, Milwaukee, Charlotte,
Little Rock, and Atlanta.
Between 2006 and 2008, the DHS Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)
list[Footnote 131] has grown from 46 to 60 locations. TSA has leveraged
the resources of the Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI)
and plans to conduct assessments in the remainder of the 60 HTUAs as
itemized in the 2009 DHS UASI list.[Footnote 132]
STSI Program:
The STSI program deploys 175 inspectors in 54 field offices to conduct
surveys and inspections of freight rail and other surface
transportation operations throughout the Nation. The efforts of the
inspectors are focused on the HTUAs of highest risk in the freight rail
industry. The inspection program is responsible for verifying
implementation of voluntary security measures, conducting vulnerability
assessments, and conducting regulatory compliance inspections. In
addition to participating in Corridor Assessments, which feed
recommendations to TSA leadership, the inspectors also act as local
liaisons to railroad carriers and other Government agencies for
emergency planning and response. This important component of layered
security will expand in fiscal year (FY) 2009 to 225 inspectors
nationwide.
Corporate Security Reviews (CSR):
CSRs evaluate and collect physical and operational preparedness
information including critical asset and key point-of-contact lists;
review emergency procedures and domain awareness training; and provide
an opportunity to share industry best practices. Since the inception of
the TSA Freight Rail Division in 2002, TSA has worked closely with
railroad carriers to determine the level of security throughout the
industry and to improve it. In coordination with freight rail
stakeholders, TSA has issued guidelines and recommended protective
measures to enhance freight rail security, particularly as it applies
to the risk associated with the transportation by rail of TIH
materials. Among other things, TSA's guidelines recommended that
railroad carriers develop and implement security plans. Measures
railroad carriers have taken through this voluntary program have
resulted in an overall risk reduction of more than 60 percent, well
above the target reduction of 50 percent. The CSR program not only
assesses how a freight railroad carrier's security plan addresses the
transportation of hazardous materials, but also reviews and assesses
the effectiveness of those plans in the following areas:
* Communication of Security Plan;
* Audit of Security Plan;
* Cyber Security;
* Protection of Critical Assets;
* Security Awareness Training;
* Personnel Security;
* Threat Assessment.
In addition, the CSRs also provide carriers an opportunity to update
TSA on system-wide improvements as they relate to the implementation of
the security plan.
In 2008, TSA updated the methodology and format of the CSRs to
facilitate comparative scoring metrics that will enable TSA and
industry stakeholders to identify best practices. In addition, TSA has
conducted CSRs on railroad entities that exercise operating control
over 98 short line, regional, and terminal railroads. During FY 2009,
TSA plans to revisit Class I railroads utilizing the new methodology to
assess the improvements and security enhancements that have taken place
since the original CSRs were conducted in FY 2007.
TSA Rail Security Rule:
On November 26, 2008, TSA issued a final rule on rail transportation
security aimed at strengthening the security of the Nation's freight
and passenger rail systems, including reducing the risk associated with
the transportation of security-sensitive materials, including TIH
materials, 73 FR 72130. While TIH materials represent less than one
percent of all hazardous materials rail shipments, these materials are
potentially lethal and include essential chemicals such as chlorine and
anhydrous ammonia. The final rule requires that freight railroad
carriers, rail hazardous materials shippers, rail hazardous materials
receivers, and passenger rail carriers (including passenger railroad
carriers and rail transit systems) allow TSA and DHS officials to
enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, conveyances, and records
relevant to rail security. The regulated parties must also designate
rail security coordinators and report significant security concerns to
TSA.
In the case of freight rail, the final rule requires freight railroad
carriers and certain facilities handling specified hazardous materials
to be able to report location and shipping information to TSA upon
request, and implement chain of custody requirements to ensure a
positive and secure exchange of rail security-sensitive materials.
Information Sharing:
In response to the statements on pages 64-65 of the report concerning
information sharing by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) with
the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), we are confident that
the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program and
the protections embodied in the Sensitive Security Information (SSI)
law and regulations can meet the needs of AAR to protect the critical
infrastructure information it shares with DHS. The PCII Program is a
voluntary program that the private sector may use to protect its most
sensitive information when shared with the Government. IP is currently
in discussions with AAR on sharing their critical infrastructure list
through PCII, but ultimately it is the association's decision whether
the information will be submitted to DHS. Sensitive Security
Information (SSI) is a specific category of information related to
transportation security that requires protection against public
disclosure. Although it is not classified national security
information, SSI is a category of sensitive but unclassified
information that, along with PCII, is specifically exempted by statute
from release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and is to be
disclosed only to covered persons on a need to know basis. While SSI
may be shared with regulated entities, the public disclosure of
information obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities
is generally prohibited.
Infrastructure Assessment:
The TSA Freight Rail Division is developing an initiative to address
the security of critical railroad infrastructure. As of March 2009, we
have created a draft risk tool to identify critical freight rail
infrastructure and measure the relative risk associated with it. The
tool will first focus on railroad bridges, and then another version
will be developed to measure relative risk to tunnels and other
railroad infrastructure. The tool will be similar in design to HACCP
(Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) which was developed to
measure the relative risk of bulk TIH in densely populated areas. The
TSA infrastructure tool will measure criticality and vulnerability.
We have scheduled meetings with several Class I freight railroad
carriers to seek their input and comment on the infrastructure tool.
The first meeting of this type took place March 10, 2009. We plan to
roll out our assessment tool at an Intermodal Security Training and
Exercise Program (ISTEP) workshop with industry security partners in
summer 2009. When the tool is finalized, we will begin assessing the
railroad crossings over the Mississippi, Ohio, and Missouri rivers.
Additionally, TSA STSIs will use the tool to assess critical railroad
infrastructure in HTUAs in which they conduct Corridor Reviews.
DHS Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP):
The FRSGP was created as a new component of the Transit Security Grant
Program (TSGP) in FY 2008. The TSGP is one of five DHS programs that
focus on infrastructure protection activities with a primary focus on
strengthening the Nation's critical infrastructure against terrorism.
In FY 2008, the FRSGP provided $7.4M to railroad operators that
transport security-sensitive materials through HTUAs. Class I freight
railroad carriers whose annual operating revenues exceed $319.2 million
may request funds to support security awareness and emergency response
training for frontline employees provided they have completed an
acceptable vulnerability assessment and security plan. Class II freight
railroad carriers whose annual operating revenues are between $25.5M
and $319.2M, and Class III freight railroad carriers whose annual
operating revenues are less than $25.5M may request funds to conduct a
vulnerability assessment and develop a security plan. The Class II and
Class III freight railroad carriers may also request funds to support
security awareness and emergency response training for frontline
employees if they have completed an acceptable vulnerability assessment
and security plan.
The FY 2009 FRSGP applications are expected to be awarded the spring of
2009. This year's $15M grant program builds on the FY 2008 programs
regarding Security Plan, Vulnerability Assessments, and Frontline
Railroad Employee Training. In addition to these important programs,
TSA included a new program to encourage the railroad industry to start
utilizing GPS-based tracking solutions to monitor their high risk
assets as they move through HTUAs. The GPS program will provide the
tank car owners and operators the resources to install GPS tracking
devices on bulk-TIH tank car shipments, which will enhance the
protection and visibility of these dangerous commodities.
The following represents the Department of Homeland Security's response
to the recommendations made by the GAO:
Recommendation 1: To ensure that the Federal strategy to secure the
freight rail system is comprehensive and considers a wider range of
risk information, develop a plan for addressing identified security
threats to freight rail other than toxic inhalation hazard (TIH such as
the destruction of or sabotage to freight rail bridges and tunnels and
cyber attacks to the rail system, and incorporate this information and
other related strategic updates into its Freight Rail Modal Annex. As
part of this effort, further evaluate methods for estimating the
likelihood of various threats occurring and ensure that this
information is also considered when developing future risk assessments
and strategic updates.
TSA Concurs: In accordance with Section 1511 of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, TSA is collecting
comments from railroad management, labor organizations representing
railroad employees, owners or lessors of railroad cars used in the
transport of hazardous material, emergency responders, offerors of
security-sensitive materials and public safety officials regarding the
National Strategy for Railroad Security. This stakeholder input was
considered during the development of the national strategy and will
provide additional guidance during its implementation. In addition, the
TSA Freight Rail Division is developing an initiative to address the
security of critical railroad infrastructure. TSA has created a draft
risk tool designed to identify critical freight rail infrastructure and
measure the relative risk associated with it. The tool will measure
criticality and vulnerability and will initially focus on railroad
bridges. Ensuing versions of the tool will be developed by TSA to
measure relative risk to tunnels and other infrastructure. TSA has
scheduled meetings with several Class I freight railroad carriers to
seek their input and comment on the infrastructure tool. The first
meeting of this type occurred on March 10, 2009. We plan to roll out
our assessment tool at an ISTEP (Intermodal Security Training and
Exercise Program) workshop with industry security partners in summer
2009. When the tool is finalized, we will begin assessing the railroad
crossings over the Mississippi, Ohio, and Missouri rivers.
Additionally, TSA Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs)
will use the tool to assess critical railroad infrastructure in High
Threat Urban Areas as they conduct Corridor Reviews.
Recommendation 2: To better ensure that relevant Federal and industry
partners effectively leverage their resources to achieve the strategic
vision of TSA's Freight Rail Modal Annex, TSA should ensure that future
updates to its Annex more comprehensively address factors contained in
Executive Order 13416 and identified key characteristics of a
successful national strategy including:
* describing the methodology used to develop the strategy and which
organizations and entities contributed to its development;
* more clearly defining Federal and industry roles and
responsibilities;
* ensuring that performance measures have defined targets and are
linked to fulfilling goals and objectives;
* more systematically addressing specific milestones for completing
activities and measure progress toward meeting identified goals;
* more thoroughly identifying the resources and investments required to
implement the strategy, including priorities for allocating future
grants; and;
* more comprehensively identifying linkages with other developed
strategies such as those that guide DHS IP, whose responsibilities
overlap with TSA for protecting freight rail critical infrastructure.
TSA Concurs: TSA endorses the elements detailed in recommendation 2.
TSA incorporates many of those elements into the Freight Rail Modal
Annex. Future updates of TSA's Freight Rail Modal Annex will be
designed to more specifically address issues such as stakeholder roles
and linkages, goal oriented milestones, performance measures, and
future resource requirements.
Recommendation 3: To ensure that TSA is consistently and accurately
measuring agency and industry performance in reducing the risk
associated with TIH rail shipments in major cities, take steps to
revise the baseline year associated with its TIH risk reduction
performance measure to enable the agency to more accurately report
results for this measure.
TSA Concurs: TSA recognizes the importance of establishing outcome-
based performance measures for any and all programs developed and
implemented to strengthen security. TSA will establish a new 12-month
baseline in which the data is empirical and qualified by TIH Risk
Reduction Surveys. Current year performance will be compared to the new
baseline period and scored to determine variance. In addition, in an
effort to maintain consistency, provide historical perspective, and to
discern the effectiveness of the voluntary Security Action Items (SAI),
TSA will continue to measure and score current performance and compare
it to the original baseline that is comprised of the 12-month period
preceding the adoption of the SAIs, but in doing so, will provide
sufficient information with regard to possible data limitations.
Recommendation 4: To ensure that TSA is able to more effectively assess
the progress being made in securing freight rail, balance future
activities against the various security risks to freight rail, and use
its and industry's resources in the most cost effective manner, take
steps to more fully track and assess the implementation and
effectiveness of security actions being taken to secure freight rail.
TSA Concurs: TSA will continue to track the level of industry SAI
adoption and implementation as well as compliance with 49 CFR part 1580
through STSI inspections of railroad carrier locations and operations.
The additional perspective gained by measuring TIH risk reduction
performance against the previous year will enable TSA to determine the
efficacy of freight rail initiatives and security actions as they are
being implemented. TSA will continue to track TIH dwell time and assess
the level of attendance for loaded TIH rail cars by High Threat Urban
Area and by freight railroad carrier. In addition, Corporate Security
Reviews will provide insights into system-wide improvements effected by
freight railroad carriers as they occur and, when compared to the
current assessments, shed light on the effectiveness of those
improvements.
Recommendation 5: To better ensure that Federal agencies are
coordinating as effectively as possible, work with Federal partners,
such as DHS-IP and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), to ensure
that all relevant assessments and information are shared and TSA and
FRA field inspector resources are fully leveraged.
TSA Concurs: Recognizing the importance of having and maintaining
strong working relationships with other Government agencies, as well as
working through the Government Coordinating Council security
partnership framework established in the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, TSA has established a Government coordination process
that continues to mature and develop. TSA recognizes the need to
specifically define roles and responsibilities with all freight rail
security stakeholders, including industry and Federal, State, local,
and tribal Governments. The appropriate document TSA is using to define
roles and responsibilities, as well as describe communication methods
and measurement efforts, is the Transportation Systems Sector Specific
Plan modal annex.
The DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) agrees that
sharing assessments and information is a vital practice. NPPD will
continue its efforts to appropriately coordinate with TSA.
DHS appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on draft report
GAO-09-243SU and we look forward to working with you on future homeland
security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine Director:
Departmental DHS GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director,
and Chris Ferencik, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Carissa
Bryant, Jeremy Manion, and Gabriel Tonsil and made significant
contributions to the work. William (Rudy) Chatlos assisted with design,
methodology, and data analysis. Linda Miller provided assistance in
report preparation, Tracey King provided legal support, and Greg Hanna
provided expertise on freight rail issues.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Transportation Security Administration, Transportation Systems
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan-Freight
Rail Modal Annex, May 2007.
[2] AAR is a trade association whose membership includes freight
railroads that operate 67 percent of the industry's mileage, employ 93
percent of the workers, and account for 95 percent of the freight
revenue of all railroads in the United States, and passenger railroads
that operate intercity passenger trains and provide commuter rail
service.
[3] Federal hazardous materials transportation law defines a hazardous
material as a substance or material that the Secretary of
Transportation has determined is capable of posing an unreasonable risk
to health, safety, and property when transported in commerce. For
emergency response purposes, railcars and containers containing of
hazardous materials bear external markings and placards to identify
which hazardous materials are being transported. Placards identify the
type of hazard the material being shipped poses.
[4] TIH materials are gases or liquids that are known or presumed on
the basis of tests to be so toxic to humans that they pose a hazard to
health in the event of a release during transportation. See 49 C.F.R.
§§ 171.8, 173.115, and 173.132.
[5] For example, chlorine is typically carried in tank cars that can
hold up to 90 tons of material, which if released into the atmosphere,
may have a lethal dispersal range of over 2 miles.
[6] The NIPP, issued by DHS in June 2006 as a requirement of Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7, provides the unifying structure for
the integration of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR)
protection efforts into a single national partnership model. Critical
infrastructure includes systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacity or
destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security,
national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters. Key resources are publicly or privately
controlled resources essential to minimal operations of the economy or
government, including individual targets whose destruction would not
endanger vital systems but could create a local disaster or profoundly
damage the nation's morale or confidence. For purposes of this report,
we will use the term critical infrastructure to also include key
resources. Furthermore, the NIPP also outlines a comprehensive risk
management framework that defines critical protection roles and
responsibilities for DHS; federal SSAs; and other federal, state,
local, tribal, and private sector partners to secure all sectors of the
United States.
[7] The HSC was established by the President to ensure the coordination
of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments
and agencies.
[8] The NIPP obligates each sector to develop a sector-specific plan
that describes strategies to protect the nation's CIKR under its
purview, outline a coordinated approach to strengthen its security
efforts, and determine the appropriate programmatic funding levels. The
TSSP and its supporting modal implementation plans, or annexes,
establish the Transportation Systems Sector's strategic approach based
on the tenets outlined in the NIPP and the principles of Executive
Order 13416, Strengthening Surface Transportation Security.
Furthermore, each modal implementation plan, or modal annex, details
how each distinct mode intends to achieve the sector's goals and
objectives.
[9] Exec. Order No. 13,416, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,033 (Dec. 5, 2006).
Executive Order 13416 mandates that an annex shall be completed for
each surface transportation mode in support of the TSSP. The Freight
Rail Annex was developed to meet this mandate and is intended to meet
the minimum content requirements set forth in this order.
[10] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[11] Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
[12] 73 Fed. Reg. 72,182 (Nov. 26, 2008); 73 Fed. Reg. 72,130 (Nov. 26,
2008); 73 Fed. Reg. 20,752 (Apr. 16, 2008); 73 Fed. Reg. 17,818 (Apr.
1, 2008); 71 Fed. Reg. 76,852 (Dec. 21, 2006); and 71 Fed. Reg. 76,834
(Dec. 21, 2006).
[13] TSA's Corridor Reviews are vulnerability assessments that focus on
the security risks posed by TIH rail shipments in major cities. We
discuss these assessments in detail later in our report.
[14] These railroads are known as Class I railroads. A Class I railroad
is defined by the U.S. Surface Transportation Board as a railroad
company that earns adjusted annual revenue of $319.3 million or more.
Class I freight railroads represent about 93 percent of railroad
freight revenue and 69 percent of the total U.S. rail mileage.
Currently, seven railroads in North America are classified as Class I
railroads. They are CSX, BNSF, Canadian National, Canadian Pacific,
Norfolk Southern, Union Pacific Railroad, and Kansas City Southern
Railway.
[15] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[16] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[17] In addition, many commuter and light rail systems operate
primarily or exclusively over tracks owned by freight railroads.
[18] Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(a), 115 Stat. 597, 597 (2001).
[19] The TSNM office was established in November 2005 following
internal restructuring of the modal offices. Prior to 2005, freight
rail security was addressed through the Freight Rail Division of the
Intermodal Program Office.
[20] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[21] Implementing Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No.110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
[22] The 18 industry sectors are agriculture and food, banking and
finance, chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical
manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services,
energy, government facilities, information technology, national
monuments and icons, nuclear, postal and shipping, public health and
healthcare, transportation, and water.
[23] The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was
enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007, and transferred many functions of the former
Preparedness Directorate, including managing certain grant programs, to
FEMA. Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1394, 2006. We discuss BZPP
and the freight rail security grant program later in the report.
[24] The State Homeland Security Grant Program consists of three
underlying programs that have been used, in part, to finance freight
rail security enhancements--the State Homeland Security Program, the
Urban Area Security Initiative, and the Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Program. The State Homeland Security Program provides funds
to build capabilities at the state and local levels through planning,
equipment, training, and exercise activities. The Urban Area Security
Initiative focuses on the unique planning, equipment, training, and
exercise needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas. The Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program provides resources to law
enforcement and public safety communities to support critical terrorism
prevention activities, including establishing and enhancing fusion
centers and collaborating with non-law enforcement partners, other
government agencies, and the private sector. Under the Infrastructure
Protection Program, freight rail security efforts have been funded
through BZPP. BZPP is a targeted grant program that provides funding to
states to purchase equipment that will enhance security measures around
critical infrastructure facilities for all modes of transportation,
which we discuss later in the report.
[25] 49 U.S.C. § 5103.
[26] Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1711, 116 Stat. 2135, 2319-20 (2002)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5103).
[27] FRA conducts freight rail-related inspections. FRA acts under the
delegation of the Secretary of Transportation. 49 C.F.R. § 1.49(s).
[28] 49 C.F.R. § 172.700-172.804.
[29] Specifically, the subset of hazardous materials requiring security
plans includes (1) a highway route-controlled quantity of a Class 7
(radioactive) material; (2) more than 25 kilograms (55 pounds) of
Division 1.1 (explosive with a mass explosion hazard), 1.2 (explosive
with a projection hazard), or 1.3 (explosive with predominately a fire
hazard) material; (3) more than 1 liters (1.06 quarts) per package of a
TIH material of a specified concentration level; (4) a shipment of
hazardous materials in bulk packaging having a capacity of 13,248
liters (3,500 gallons) or more for liquids or gases or more than 13.24
cubic meters (468 cubic feet) for solids; (5) a shipment in other than
bulk packaging of 2,268 kilograms (5,000 pounds) gross weight or more
of one class of hazardous materials for which placarding is required;
(6) a select agent or toxin regulated by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention; and (7) a quantity of hazardous materials that
requires placarding. 49 C.F.R. § 172.800 (2007). PHMSA proposed a rule
in September 2008 that would narrow the list of hazardous materials
subject to the security plan regulations. 73 Fed. Reg. 52,558 (Sept. 9,
2008).
[30] At a minimum, a plan must include measures to (1) confirm
information provided by job applicants hired for positions that involve
access to and handling of hazardous materials covered by the security
plan, (2) respond to the assessed risk that unauthorized persons may
gain access to hazardous materials covered by the security plan, and
(3) address the assessed risk associated with the shipment of hazardous
materials covered by the security plan from origin to destination.
[31] 73 Fed. Reg. 72,182 (Nov. 26, 2008). Specifically, carriers
subject to the new regulations include those that ship (1) more than
2,268 kilograms (5,000 lbs.) in a single carload of a Division 1.1,
1.2, or 1.3 explosive; (2) a quantity of a material poisonous by
inhalation in a single bulk packaging; and (3) a highway route-
controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive) material. 49 C.F.R. §
172.820(a).
[32] Class II and III railroads include a number of short line
railroads that provide freight rail transportation. A short line is an
independent railroad company that operates over a relatively short
distance. Class II railroads earn annual revenue from $25.5 million to
$319.3 million, and Class III railroads are those earning less than
$25.5 million. Regional and short line railroads generally exist for
one of three reasons: to link two industries requiring rail freight
together; to interchange revenue traffic with other, usually larger,
railroads; or to operate a tourist passenger train service.
[33] Pursuant to law regarding common carrier obligations, rail
carriers must provide transportation or service upon reasonable
request. 49 U.S.C. § 11101. This obligation stems from, among other
things, the concept that an entity that represents to the public that
it provides transportation of certain goods and that such
transportation is available to the general public has a duty to
shippers and to the general public to receive and transport such goods.
[34] The DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program
requires certain chemical facilities that are determined to be high
risk to complete site security plans that include measures that satisfy
DHS's risk-based performance standards.
[35] DHS serves as the SSA for 11 sectors: information technology;
communications; transportation systems; chemical; emergency services;
nuclear reactors, material, and waste; postal and shipping; dams;
government facilities; commercial facilities; and critical
manufacturing. Other SSAs are the Departments of Agriculture, Defense,
Energy, Health and Human Services, the Interior, and the Treasury and
the Environmental Protection Agency. See GAO, Critical Infrastructure
Protection: Sector Plans and Sector Councils Continue to Evolve,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-706R] (Washington, D.C.:
July 10, 2007).
[36] HSPD-7 requires DHS and DOT to collaborate on all matters related
to transportation security and transportation infrastructure
protection.
[37] The NSTS, mandated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), outlines the federal government
approach--in partnership with state, local, and tribal governments and
private industry--to securing the U.S. transportation system from
terrorist threats and attacks.
[38] Although federal and industry stakeholders categorized these
efforts as threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments, we did
not evaluate them to determine whether they met the NIPP criteria for
threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. As a result, we
discuss them in this report using the terminology that federal and
industry stakeholders used to identify them.
[39] A threat scenario is a potential terrorist event that delineates
the tactics and locations a terrorist may use, for example, to cause
casualties or disrupt the economy, using expert judgment based on
available risk information, including past attacks.
[40] In addition to modal-specific threat assessments, TSA OI develops
other threat-related products for groups inside and outside of TSA. For
instance, the office leads daily Administrator's briefings to discuss
current and ongoing threats to the transportation sector, including
freight rail. Also, TSA OI collects and disseminates suspicious
incidence reports to make stakeholders aware of recent suspicious
activity that may be terrorism related.
[41] In calculations for risk analysis, the term threat is an estimated
value that approximates the likelihood that a specific asset, system,
network, sector, or region will suffer an attack or an incident. This
differs from "threat scenarios" or "threat analysis," which are
generalized descriptions of potential methods of attack that are used
to help inform consequence and vulnerability assessments. The NIPP also
states that assessments should provide numerical values for estimated
consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats whenever possible.
[42] TSA uses the term high-threat urban area to describe geographic
areas that warrant special consideration with respect to transportation
security. TSA derived its list of high-threat urban areas from the
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program. Under the UASI,
program, DHS designates metropolitan areas as high-threat urban areas
based on a consideration of the relative threat, vulnerability, and
consequences from acts of terrorism faced by each metropolitan area.
Specifically, DHS identified UASI areas as high-threat urban areas if
they had populations greater than 100,000 and had reported threat data
during the past fiscal year.
[43] While TSA has determined the specific results of this assessment
to be "For Official Use Only," the assessment generally concluded that
transporting TIH materials by rail poses a risk in highly populated
areas.
[44] TSA officials told us that the initial 9 cities were chosen
because they were large population centers with both large rail
networks and significant quantities of TIH traveling through them by
rail. TSA used aggregate data on city population and the quantities of
TIH being transported in each city for the year 2000 to assist in
selecting the cities. The 9 cities originally selected in 2004 for TSA
Corridor Reviews were Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Houston, Los
Angeles, New Orleans, Newark, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. TSA
officials said that they intend to conduct Corridor Reviews in all
major cities that have TIH rail shipments and qualify for DHS's UASI
grant program. Several agencies have participated in these security
assessments, including DHS IP and DOT's FRA and PHMSA.
[45] As of November 2008, TSA has reported measuring an overall
reduction in risk of over 60 percent across all high-threat urban
areas. However, we discuss concerns about the accuracy of this
measurement later in this report.
[46] Although this list informs the allocation of the BZPP grants, and
the determination to conduct SAVs, informing those programs is not the
primary reason DHS conducts the process. The department develops the
list to fulfill legislative and NIPP requirements to do so, as well as
to ensure the nation's leadership have standing lists of the country's
most critical infrastructure for risk and incident management purposes.
[47] These reviews assessed the security plans and procedures against
the following TSA guidelines: threat assessment and processing;
vulnerability assessments; personnel security, auditing/testing of
plan; drills/exercises; infrastructure security; hazardous materials
security; cybersecurity; and infrastructure security. TSA believes that
at minimum, these elements must be in a security plan for industry to
effectively respond to a security incident or event.
[48] To prioritize railroad assets, the rail industry developed a
formula to score the asset value, which is determined by quantifying
the security vulnerabilities and consequences for each asset. Assets
considered at most risk generally were those that were (1) difficult to
repair or replace, (2) likely to affect a railroad's ability to
operate, and (3) lacking effective countermeasures to reduce the
likelihood of causing this damage.
[49] Most officials that we interviewed questioned how realistic the
results of this study would be in the event of a chlorine tank car
breach because it used a worst-case scenario model.
[50] According to TSA, the office has since expanded to 15 staff
members in 2008. TSA's permanent staff assigned to freight rail
security was 7 in 2004, 10 in 2005, 12 in 2006, and 15 in 2007. Prior
to 2003, TSA organized its freight rail security division differently,
but had 3 personnel assigned to freight rail security-related work.
[51] One Class I railroad representative that we interviewed told us
that securing critical freight rail infrastructure should have been
TSA's initial focus.
[52] A waybill is a shipping document that travels with a shipment;
identifies the shipper, receiver, origin, and destination; describes
the goods; and shows their weight and freight.
[53] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1202(a), 121 Stat. 266, 381 (2007).
[54] The NIPP requires sector-specific plans (which include the TSSP
and the Freight Rail Modal Annex) to be reissued every 3 years
concurrently with the NIPP, which was to be updated by March 2009.
[55] For example, the law requires that DHS, among other things,
identify high-risk railroads and issue regulations requiring high-risk
railroads to develop vulnerability assessments and security plans;
establish a program for conducting security exercises for railroad
carriers; and issue regulations for a security training program for
frontline rail employees.
[56] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T].
[57] The sixth characteristic is problem definition and risk
assessment, which addresses the particular national problems and
threats the strategy is directed toward mitigating. However, because we
provided details earlier in our report on the steps federal and
industry stakeholders have taken to assess risks to the freight rail
system, we do not address this characteristic in this section of our
report.
[58] These sector goals are (1) prevent and deter acts of terrorism
using or against the transportation system, (2) enhance the resiliency
of the U.S. transportation system, and (3) improve the cost-effective
use of resources for transportation security.
[59] These incidents include, but are not limited to, the September 11,
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; attacks on
transportation targets in the 2005 London bombings; and coordinated
attacks on four commuter trains in Madrid in 2004.
[60] Outcome measures describe the intended result of carrying out a
program or activity. They define an event or condition that is external
to the program or activity and that is of direct importance to the
intended beneficiaries, the public, or both. An output measure
describes the level of activity to be provided over a period of time,
including a description of the characteristics (e.g., timeliness)
established as standards for the activity.
[61] TSA established annual goals in its submission to the Office of
Management and Budget Performance and Rating Tool for TSA's program to
strengthen surface transportation security. TSA's goals by year are 55
percent by 2009, 61 percent by 2010, 67 percent by 2011, 74 percent by
2012, and 81 percent by 2013.
[62] While TSA identified 46 high-threat urban areas in its Rail
Security Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Final Rail Security Rule,
the agency only reported on 45 cities related to meeting its goal of
reducing TIH risks in 2007. Additionally, 5 cities do not have TIH
materials traveling through them by rail. As a result, TSA does not
measure TIH risks in those cities. In addition, TSA's 80 percent
estimate represents the estimated amount of time TIH railcars were
unattended by rail employees during the baseline time period.
[63] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107. Stat 285 (1993). GPRA was intended to
address several broad purposes, including strengthening the confidence
of the American people in their government; improving federal program
effectiveness, accountability, and service delivery; and enhancing
congressional decision making by providing more objective information
on program performance.
[64] GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax
Filing Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22,
2002). In this report, GAO reported on nine key attributes of
successful performance measures. Among these attributes are objectivity
and reliability of measures.
[65] TSA's remaining performance measures are (1) percentage of carrier-
adopted security action items and (2) percentage of employees who have
received security awareness training.
[66] GAO, Agencies' Annual Performance Plans Under the Results Act: An
Assessment Guide to Facilitate Congressional Decisionmaking,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD/AIMD-10.1.18]
(Washington, D.C.: February 1998).
[67] DHS IP's mission is to lead the coordinated national effort to
reduce the risk to critical infrastructures and key resources posed by
acts of terrorism and strengthen national preparedness, timely
response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, natural
disaster, or other emergency.
[68] The NSTS, required by section 4001 of IRTPA, is a national
strategy for transportation security outlining the federal government's
approach--in partnership with state, local, and tribal governments and
private industry--to securing the U.S. transportation system from
terrorist threats and attacks.
[69] In addition to securing their TIH rail shipments, chemical
companies have also taken various other security-related actions to
secure their facilities. Certain chemical facilities are also subject
to the DHS's Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program, which
requires facilities that are determined to be high risk to complete
site security plans that include measures that satisfy DHS risk-based
performance standards.
[70] For additional information on some of the specific technology
challenges federal and industry stakeholders face in better securing
TIH shipments, see appendix V. These challenges include designing
stronger tank cars, developing more real-time railcar tracking and
monitoring systems, and substituting highly hazardous materials with
less dangerous chemicals.
[71] An intermodal freight rail yard is a yard that handles the
transportation of freight in containers that can be transported by
multiple modes of transportation (rail, ship, and truck), without any
handling of the freight itself when changing modes. Railroads told us
that these yards often handle higher value goods that may be subject
greater instances of theft. As a result, railroads told us that these
yards are more frequently fenced.
[72] Most large rail yards, often called classification and switching
yards, are comprised of a complex series of rail tracks for storing,
sorting, or loading/unloading railroad cars, locomotives, or both.
Railcars in a yard may be sorted by numerous categories, including
railroad company, whether they are loaded or unloaded, destination, car
type, or whether they need repairs. The purpose of railroad yards is to
store cars while they are not being loaded or unloaded or are waiting
to be assembled into trains. Local serving yards are often smaller
yards near local customers served by the railroad.
[73] While TSA did not follow up with all rail carriers in cities it
previously reviewed, it did focus its follow-up on cities that had
large rail networks and large quantities of TIH rail shipments
routinely traversing them.
[74] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[75] TSA estimated that the 10-year cost of the regulation would range
from $152.8 million to $173.9 million. It also stated that the
regulation would have a yet-to-be-determined impact on small
businesses.
[76] In one instance TSA observed unattended, fully loaded TIH railcars
left at rail track siding for 72 hours over the weekend.
[77] For example, PHMSA stated that one or more criteria may need to be
weighted more strongly than they would be for other areas or
localities. Alternatively, some criteria may not apply to a given area
or locality. See appendix IV for additional information on FRA's plans
to enforce compliance with the rule.
[78] In early 2006, TSA began deploying its STSIs to support VIPR
deployment teams, which conduct single-or multi-day security operations
at various mass transit and passenger rail systems to deter and protect
against potential terrorist actions. The VIPR operations represent an
ongoing effort to develop surge capacity to enhance security in the
transportation sectors.
[79] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[80] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[81] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[82] FRSCC and the chemical sector coordinating council have not held a
joint meeting since September 2007.
[83] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[84] TSA's TIH Rail Risk Reduction Program, which began in 2007, is a
transportation security assessment in 46 major urban areas that uses
industry data about TIH railcar movements inside the urban area. TSA
also audits the security status of the cars while at rail yards, and
assesses potential consequences associated with the surrounding
population. As part of this program, TSA surface transportation
security inspectors conduct site visits to rail yards in high-threat
urban areas to assess whether TIH railcars are under surveillance.
[85] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[86] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[87] HACCP is a risk management tool used to guide the identification,
evaluation, and control of hazards. A hazard is any condition that
results in an adverse consequence detrimental to people, property, or
the environment. In TSA's case, the hazard is the primary threat
scenario.
[88] For this program, TSA defines unattended railcars as those
railcars that are in a train or on railroad-controlled leads or tracks
with no crew on board and no personnel active in the area. "Personnel"
includes railroad employees or agents, law enforcement officers,
private security guards, and rail customer employees.
[89] According to TSA, these risk factors are comparable to two of the
three elements of risk identified in the NIPP. Specifically, TSA's
potential severity variable corresponds to consequence, and together,
the occurrence and detection variables correspond to vulnerability. TSA
officials stated that they considered the threat of an attack to be
relatively similar at all locations.
[90] According to a TSA official responsible for the program, initial
assessments were less focused on developing and storing data. Thus, TSA
lacked summary documentation to ascertain specific information about
identified vulnerabilities and consequences or recommendations for
improvement. As a result, little information could be gleaned from the
earliest assessments in five cities from 2004 to 2006. According to
TSA, these limitations were a result of the lack of personnel to
conduct these reviews early on.
[91] TSA initially chose these 46 cities to correspond its rail
security programs with DHS's Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)
grant program, and refers to these cities as high-threat urban areas.
Since TSA's initial list in 2006, the number of high-threat urban areas
for the UASI program has increased to 62 cities.
[92] TSA collects rail commodity information on a continual basis,
while the agency collects the rest of its information annually,
including population proximities and the attended status of TIH
railcars.
[93] Because much of the information TSA uses to assess risk is
automated, TSA was able to obtain much of the historical information
required for each risk factor. For example, a TSA official responsible
for the program told us that TSA determined information on population
by obtaining U.S. Census Bureau data. Furthermore, hours of exposure,
which is the amount of time the TIH cars are in a city's proximity, was
gathered using industry computer commodity tracking data from the
freight rail industry.
[94] TSA chose to make its baseline year June 2005 through May 2006
(prior to issuance of the first 24 freight rail security action items).
TSA chose to make its baseline year the year before issuance of the
action items because it wanted its baseline year to be established
prior to implementation of any TSA freight rail security actions.
[95] TSA first conducted CSRs in 2004; however, officials said that
they do not use the results from these reviews because they changed the
criteria used to evaluate the security plans. As such, they decided to
reassess the Class I carriers previously evaluated in 2004.
[96] During this step, TSA officials may also conduct site visits of
various locations, including critical bridges, tunnels, operations
centers, and yards.
[97] DHS determined that the criteria and all numbers related to this
list are "For Official Use Only." As a result, these data are not
contained in this report.
[98] According to DHS IP officials, there are three main objectives of
BZPP: (1) create open communication and coordination among facilities,
state and local agencies, and local responders for the protection of
the asset; (2) use site-specific buffer zone plans to conduct a gap
analysis of state and local capabilities and equipment staffing and
training needs; and (3) identify the existing procedures to prevent a
terrorist incident to the asset, enhance these procedures, or both.
[99] AAR, established in 1935, is an organization that represents the
Class I freight railroads, some smaller railroads, Amtrak, and some
commuter railroads in the United States. AAR also sets the standards
for rail operations through the association's committee structure.
[100] In a 2008 update to this assessment, the rail industry also
identified and prioritized around 1,000 assets, of which about 10
percent were considered highly critical to railroad actions.
[101] TSA measures risk associated with this metric by gathering and
measuring vulnerability and consequence information for various U.S.
cities, as discussed earlier in our report. The threat that the agency
is measuring vulnerability and consequence against is the threat of
someone weaponizing TIH railcars inside the city.
[102] TSA provided TIH railcar unattended status information for 45
cities in 2007. In addition to the cities discussed above, our analysis
shows that 4 cities show cars as unattended from 20 to 50 percent of
the time, and 7 cities show cars as unattended from 50 to 80 percent of
the time. TSA reported that the remaining 5 cities did not have TIH
travel in or through them.
[103] Some physical security enhancements installed at rail facilities
in New Jersey were implemented as a result of DHS IP's BZPP
assessments.
[104] System security and access control refer to practices affecting
the security of the railroad and its property. En route security refers
to the actual movement and handling of railcars containing TIH
materials.
[105] TSA recommended that each plan (1) reduce the number of hours TIH
cars are held in yards, in terminals, and on railroad-controlled leased
track in high-threat urban areas; (2) minimize the occurrence of
unattended TIH cars in high-threat urban areas; (3) reduce potential
exposure to surrounding people, property, and environment in high-
threat urban areas with special emphasis on reducing potential exposure
to hospitals, high-occupancy buildings, schools, and public venues; (4)
reduce the occurrence of standing TIH trains in high-threat urban
areas; (5) provide a procedure for the protection or surveillance of
unattended TIH trains in high-threat urban areas; (6) ensure compliance
with C.F.R. 49 Part 174.14 (48-hour rule); and (7) develop site-
specific procedures for the positive and secure handoff of TIH cars at
points of origin, destination, and interchange in high-threat urban
areas.
[106] Of the rail facilities TSA inspectors visited, about 80 percent
were Class I facilities, and of the rail employees the inspectors
interviewed, about 75 percent were actual frontline workers. The
remaining employees interviewed were considered rail management.
[107] The 10 items TSA selected for review were also part of the
original 24 issued in June 2006.
[108] The 10 items TSA selected for review were (1) communication of
current threat information; (2) liaison activities with federal, state,
and local law enforcement; (3) liaison activities with other railroad
security offices; (4) contingency planning; (5) emergency response
planning; (6) community safety and security outreach; (7) photo
identification and background checks; (8) access control; (9) intrusion
deterrence and detection; and (10) secure bridge operation procedures.
[109] Because many rail carriers have their own police forces, BZPP
funding was awarded directly to the railroads to purchase security-
related equipment.
[110] Since 2005, the DHS SLGCP, formerly the DHS Office of Grants and
Training (OGT), has moved into FEMA's Grant Program Directorate, Grant
Development and Administration Division. The DHS OGT originated within
the Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs in 1998 as the
Office for Domestic Preparedness. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, this office was transferred to DHS in March 2003. See Pub. L.
No. 107-296, § 403(5), 116 Stat. 2135, 2178 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §
203(5)). In March 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security consolidated
ODP with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination to form
SLGCP. SLGCP was created to provide a "one-stop shop" for the numerous
federal preparedness initiatives applicable to state and local
governments. Recently, SLGCP was incorporated under the Preparedness
Directorate as OGT. Pursuant to the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2007, OGT was transferred, along with certain
other components of the Preparedness Directorate, into FEMA effective
March 31, 2007. Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 611(13), 120 Stat. 1355, 1400
(2006).
[111] Other reasons DHS and RRF provided were that TSA and other
federal stakeholders that were thought to be possible future users of
the tools had indicated that they would not be using the tools because
they already had developed their own tools for assessing freight rail
risk. In addition, during initial development of the tools, RRF and its
contractor determined that the tools were essentially using the same
types of data inputs to conduct their analysis and could be easily
combined.
[112] DHS officials told us that the grant moneys will formally be
awarded to CSX Railroad, which has submitted a written letter of intent
to DHS stating that it intends to give the entire $2.5 million award to
RRF. DHS said the 9/11 Commission Act required that the department only
provide grant funds from the Freight Rail Security Grant Program
directly to transportation agencies. As a result, DHS could not provide
funding directly to RRF to complete the tool. However, because it was
appropriate to have RRF complete the tool, CSX Railroad agreed to
accept the grant, as required by law, and provide it to RRF.
[113] Hazardous Materials: Enhancing Rail Transportation Safety and
Security for Hazardous Materials Rail Shipments, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,182
(Nov. 26, 2008).
[114] Beginning January 1, 2009, rail carriers must compile information
on the commodities they transport and the routes they use for the 6-
month period from July 1, 2008, through December 31, 2008. Rail
carriers must complete their data collection by March 1, 2009. Rail
carriers may either complete the safety and security analyses of routes
currently utilized and available alternatives and select the safest,
most secure routes for transporting the specified explosive, TIH, and
radioactive materials for the period from July 1, 2008, through
December 31, 2008, by September 1, 2009, or may notify FRA in writing
and complete the process by March 31, 2010, using data for all of 2008.
Beginning January 1, 2010, and for subsequent years, rail carriers must
compile information on the commodities they transport and the routes
used for the previous calendar year and complete route assessments and
selections by the end of the calendar year.
[115] 73 Fed. Reg. 17,818 (Apr. 1, 2008).
[116] 74 Fed. Reg. 1770 (Jan. 13, 2009).
[117] 73 Fed. Reg. 72,130 (Nov. 26, 2008).
[118] Section 114(r) of title 49 of the United States Code requires TSA
to promulgate regulations governing the protection of SSI. SSI includes
information that would be detrimental to transportation security if
publicly disclosed. TSA's SSI regulation, 49 C.F.R. pt. 1520,
establishes requirements for the recognition, identification, handling,
and dissemination of SSI, including restrictions on disclosure and
civil penalties for violations of those restrictions. Although 49
C.F.R. pt. 1520 primarily covers aviation-and maritime security-related
information, vulnerability assessments and threat information related
to all modes of transportation are considered SSI under 49 C.F.R. §§
1520.5(b)(5) and 1520.5(b)(7) and must be protected and handled in
accordance with 49 C.F.R. pt. 1520. However, because certain other
information created in connection with TSA's rule would be detrimental
to transportation security if publicly disclosed, TSA's rule amends 49
C.F.R. pt. 1520 to more directly protect information related to the
rail sector. Thus TSA's rule adds railroad carriers, rail hazardous
materials shippers, rail hazardous materials receivers, and rail
transit systems as covered parties under part 1520.
[119] This will only be permitted providing that TSA inspectors, and
DHS officials working with TSA, will present their credentials for
examination at the request of the entity being inspected, with the
understanding that the credentials may not be reproduced.
[120] Transportation of these materials includes (1) a railcar
containing more than 2,268 kilograms (5,000 pounds) of a Division 1.1,
1.2, or 1.3 (explosive) material, as defined in 49 C.F.R. § 173.50; (2)
a tank car containing a material poisonous by inhalation as defined in
49 C.F.R. § 171.8, including anhydrous ammonia, Division 2.3 gases
poisonous by inhalation as set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 173.115 (c), and
Division 6.1 liquids meeting the defining criteria in 49 C.F.R. §
173.132(a)(1)(iii) and assigned to hazard zone A or hazard zone B in
accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 173.133(a), excluding residue quantities of
these materials; and (3) a railcar containing a highway route-
controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive) material, as defined in
49 C.F.R. § 173.403.
[121] TSA also developed a training video to assist rail carriers in
training their employees on how to identify improvised explosive
devices and other possible security threats.
[122] TSA's rule does not specify any particular category of individual
needed to perform this job function and does not specify that a freight
carrier would have to use a hazmat employee (as the term is used in 49
C.F.R. § 171.8) to perform this job function. Moreover, to allow
freight railroad carriers a maximum degree of flexibility in adopting
and implementing procedures to meet the car attendance performance
standard, TSA does not specify a maximum number of railcars permitted
per attending employee (or authorized representative) or define how
close that individual must be to the railcar while attending it.
[123] AAR reported that many of the updates in its revised plan were
identified from prior AAR tabletop exercises conducted in coordination
with member railroads. According to AAR, in addition to identifying
actions to implement at lower alert levels, the tabletops identified a
need to implement and routinely test a better system of implementing
the embargo process required at Alert Level 4; enable timely
notification to all railroads, customer trade associations, law
enforcement agencies, and federal government agencies of an Alert Level
4 embargo action; and monitor passenger carriers' security plans for
potential conflicts with freight rail security plans.
[124] Once a car has been constructively placed at a local serving
yard, which is a yard from which the railroad serves local customers,
the rail carrier notifies the customer that the car is available for
placement at the customer's facility. However, if the customer cannot
take the car into its facility upon notification from the railroad, the
customer is charged a "demurrage fee" by the railroad. This is a fee
the customer pays the railroad for storing the car at the railroad
serving yard until the customer can accept the car for final placement
at its facility. The amount of money the customer pays in demurrage
charges will typically depend on the length of time the car sits in the
serving yard before it is accepted for final placement at the
customer's facility. Some rail carriers we met with told us that this
typically occurs when a customer does not have sufficient space in its
facility to accept all the cars it ordered. As a result, it pays the
railroad to temporarily store the cars until it has room to receive
them in the facility.
[125] Leased tracks are railroad tracks in rail yards or railroad
sidings that manufacturers, such as chemical companies, lease from a
railroad to temporarily store their commodities until needed.
[126] The technology most widely used in the rail industry to track
railcar movements is AEI, which is a passive tracking system that
tracks each railcar in transit with a unique radio-frequency
identification (RFID) tag. The rail industry has placed AEI readers in
strategic locations throughout the rail system to detect each RFID tag
as it passes the detector. When a railcar, or train, passes a reader,
its location is recorded and sent to the railroad; however, the system
only indicates that a car is located at a reader, and in some areas AEI
readers could be 30 or 40 miles apart. The system provides key
information on the trains, including milepost location; locomotives
assigned; and consist and car information, such as lading, load status,
car specification, origin, and destination.
[127] Certain chemical facilities are also subject to the DHS Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program, which requires facilities
that are determined to be high risk to complete site security plans
that include measures that satisfy DHS risk-based performance
standards.
[128] The company told us that each seal has a unique serial number,
which the company provides to the receiver when shipping either a full
or empty car to a customer. The company places two seals on the car,
one on the outside and one on the inside for the receiver, when
shipping the full or empty car back. As such, both the companies can
tell if someone has tampered with a seal. Company officials stated that
this is a standard in the chlorine industry.
[129] According to railroad officials we spoke with, they have also
worked with this company to establish better procedures for delivery
and acceptance of TIH railcars. For example, rail officials told us
that when they drop off a shipment of TIH, both railroad and chemical
company employees are present, a visual inspection is conducted of the
cars, and once that is completed, the gates are opened, the cars are
moved inside, and then the gates are closed.
[130] A GPS is a satellite-based system that can pinpoint any position
on earth--any time and in any weather--and then use receivers to
process the satellite signals to determine a location.
[131] The UASI list includes areas eligible for DHS homeland security
grants.
[132] TSA has trained three STSI teams on Corridor Assessment
methodology. TSA's Office of Transportation Sector Network Management
plans to coordinate with the Office of Security Operations to train
additional teams and will optimize the use of those teams during the
conduct of the future assessments planned for the remainder of the 60
HTUAs.
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