Global Positioning System
Significant Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-09-670T May 7, 2009The Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides position, navigation, and timing data to users worldwide, has become essential to U.S. national security and a key tool in an expanding array of public service and commercial applications at home and abroad. The United States provides GPS data free of charge. The Air Force, which is responsible for GPS acquisition, is in the process of modernizing GPS. In light of the importance of GPS, the modernization effort, and international efforts to develop new systems, GAO was asked to undertake a broad review of GPS. Specifically, GAO assessed progress in (1) acquiring GPS satellites, (2) acquiring the ground control and user equipment necessary to leverage GPS satellite capabilities, and evaluated (3) coordination among federal agencies and other organizations to ensure GPS missions can be accomplished. To carry out this assessment, GAO's efforts included reviewing and analyzing program documentation, conducting its own analysis of Air Force satellite data, and interviewing key officials.
It is uncertain whether the Air Force will be able to acquire new satellites in time to maintain current GPS service without interruption. If not, some military operations and some civilian users could be adversely affected. (1) In recent years, the Air Force has struggled to successfully build GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals; it encountered significant technical problems that still threaten its delivery schedule; and it struggled with a different contractor. As a result, the current IIF satellite program has overrun its original cost estimate by about $870 million and the launch of its first satellite has been delayed to November 2009--almost 3 years late. (2) Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA program to prevent mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air Force is aiming to deploy the next generation of GPS satellites 3 years faster than the IIF satellites. GAO's analysis found that this schedule is optimistic, given the program's late start, past trends in space acquisitions, and challenges facing the new contractor. Of particular concern is leadership for GPS acquisition, as GAO and other studies have found the lack of a single point of authority for space programs and frequent turnover in program managers have hampered requirements setting, funding stability, and resource allocation. (3) If the Air Force does not meet its schedule goals for development of GPS IIIA satellites, there will be an increased likelihood that in 2010, as old satellites begin to fail, the overall GPS constellation will fall below the number of satellites required to provide the level of GPS service that the U.S. government commits to. Such a gap in capability could have wide-ranging impacts on all GPS users, though there are measures the Air Force and others can take to plan for and minimize these impacts. In addition to risks facing the acquisition of new GPS satellites, the Air Force has not been fully successful in synchronizing the acquisition and development of the next generation of GPS satellites with the ground control and user equipment, thereby delaying the ability of military users to fully utilize new GPS satellite capabilities. Diffuse leadership has been a contributing factor, given that there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all procurements and fielding related to GPS, and funding has been diverted from ground programs to pay for problems in the space segment. DOD and others involved in ensuring GPS can serve communities beyond the military have taken prudent steps to manage requirements and coordinate among the many organizations involved with GPS. However, GAO identified challenges in the areas of ensuring civilian requirements can be met and ensuring GPS compatibility with other new, potentially competing global space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems.
GAO-09-670T, Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, May 7, 2009:
Global Positioning System:
Significant Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used
Capabilities:
Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-09-670T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-670T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides position,
navigation, and timing data to users worldwide, has become essential to
U.S. national security and a key tool in an expanding array of public
service and commercial applications at home and abroad. The United
States provides GPS data free of charge. The Air Force, which is
responsible for GPS acquisition, is in the process of modernizing GPS.
In light of the importance of GPS, the modernization effort, and
international efforts to develop new systems, GAO was asked to
undertake a broad review of GPS. Specifically, GAO assessed progress in
(1) acquiring GPS satellites, (2) acquiring the ground control and user
equipment necessary to leverage GPS satellite capabilities, and
evaluated (3) coordination among federal agencies and other
organizations to ensure GPS missions can be accomplished. To carry out
this assessment, GAO‘s efforts included reviewing and analyzing program
documentation, conducting its own analysis of Air Force satellite data,
and interviewing key officials.
What GAO Found:
It is uncertain whether the Air Force will be able to acquire new
satellites in time to maintain current GPS service without
interruption. If not, some military operations and some civilian users
could be adversely affected.
* In recent years, the Air Force has struggled to successfully build
GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals; it encountered
significant technical problems that still threaten its delivery
schedule; and it struggled with a different contractor. As a result,
the current IIF satellite program has overrun its original cost
estimate by about $870 million and the launch of its first satellite
has been delayed to November 2009”almost 3 years late.
* Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA program
to prevent mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air Force is aiming to
deploy the next generation of GPS satellites 3 years faster than the
IIF satellites. GAO‘s analysis found that this schedule is optimistic,
given the program‘s late start, past trends in space acquisitions, and
challenges facing the new contractor. Of particular concern is
leadership for GPS acquisition, as GAO and other studies have found the
lack of a single point of authority for space programs and frequent
turnover in program managers have hampered requirements setting,
funding stability, and resource allocation.
* If the Air Force does not meet its schedule goals for development of
GPS IIIA satellites, there will be an increased likelihood that in
2010, as old satellites begin to fail, the overall GPS constellation
will fall below the number of satellites required to provide the level
of GPS service that the U.S. government commits to. Such a gap in
capability could have wide-ranging impacts on all GPS users, though
there are measures the Air Force and others can take to plan for and
minimize these impacts.
In addition to risks facing the acquisition of new GPS satellites, the
Air Force has not been fully successful in synchronizing the
acquisition and development of the next generation of GPS satellites
with the ground control and user equipment, thereby delaying the
ability of military users to fully utilize new GPS satellite
capabilities. Diffuse leadership has been a contributing factor, given
that there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all
procurements and fielding related to GPS, and funding has been diverted
from ground programs to pay for problems in the space segment.
DOD and others involved in ensuring GPS can serve communities beyond
the military have taken prudent steps to manage requirements and
coordinate among the many organizations involved with GPS. However, GAO
identified challenges in the areas of ensuring civilian requirements
can be met and ensuring GPS compatibility with other new, potentially
competing global space-based positioning, navigation, and timing
systems.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense appoint a single
authority to oversee the development of GPS, including space, ground
control, and user equipment assets, to ensure these assets are
synchronized and well executed, and potential disruptions are
minimized. DOD concurred with our recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-670T] or key
components. For more information, contact Cristina T. Chaplain at (202)
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Global Positioning System
(GPS)--a space-based satellite system that provides positioning,
navigation, and timing data to users worldwide--that has become
essential to U.S. national security and a key component in economic
growth, transportation safety, homeland security, and critical national
infrastructure in the United States and abroad. In view of the
importance of GPS to the military, the economy and other critical
sectors, and problems being experienced in the acquisition of GPS, you
requested that we perform a comprehensive review of the program. Our
report, which was issued on April 30, presents our findings in
considerable detail. My statement today will focus on the essence of
what we found.
In summary, it is uncertain whether the Air Force will be able to
acquire new satellites in time to maintain current GPS service without
interruption. If not, some military operations and some civilian users
could be adversely affected. In addition, military users will
experience a delay in utilizing new GPS capabilities, including
improved resistance to jamming of GPS signals, because of poor
synchronization of the acquisition and development of the satellites
with the ground control and user equipment. Finally, there are
challenges in ensuring civilian requirements for GPS can be met and
that GPS is compatible with other new, potentially competing global
space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems.
Background:
The U.S. government provides GPS service free of charge and plans to
invest more than $5.8 billion over the next 5 years in the GPS
satellites and ground control segments. The Department of Defense (DOD)
develops and operates GPS, and an interdepartmental committee--
co-chaired by DOD and the Department of Transportation--manages the
U.S. space-based positioning, navigation, and timing infrastructure,
which includes GPS. DOD also provides most of the funding for GPS. The
Air Force is responsible for GPS acquisition and is in the process of
modernizing GPS to enhance its performance, accuracy, and integrity.
The modernization effort includes GPS IIF and IIIA, two satellite
acquisition programs that are to provide new space-based capabilities
and replenish the satellite constellation; the ground control segment
hardware and software; and user equipment for processing modernized GPS
capabilities. Other countries are also developing their own independent
global navigation satellite systems that could offer capabilities that
are comparable, if not superior, to GPS.
Air Force Faces Significant Challenges in Acquiring GPS Satellites:
In recent years under the IIF program, the Air Force has struggled to
successfully build GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals. It
encountered significant technical problems that still threaten its
delivery schedule and it struggled with a different contractor for the
IIF program. These problems were compounded by an acquisition strategy
that relaxed oversight and quality inspections as well as multiple
contractor mergers and moves, and the addition of new requirements late
in the development cycle.
GPS was not the only space program started in the 1990s to face such
challenges. In fact, DOD continues to face cost overruns in the
billions of dollars, schedule delays adding up to years, and
performance shortfalls stemming from programs that began in the 1990s
and after that were poorly structured, managed and overseen. What sets
GPS apart from those programs is that GPS had already been "done"
before. The GPS IIF program was far less ambitious than efforts to
advance missile warning and weather monitoring capabilities, for
example.
Our report documents the history of the IIF program and the decisions
made early on that weakened the foundation for program execution. What
is important to highlight today is that the program is still
experiencing technical problems that still threaten its delivery
schedule. For example, last year, during the first phase of thermal
vacuum testing (a critical test to determine space-worthiness that
subjects the satellite to space-like operating conditions), one
transmitter used to send the navigation message to the users failed.
The program suspended testing in August 2008 to allow time for the
contractor to identify the causes of the problems and take corrective
actions. The program also had difficulty maintaining the proper
propellant fuel-line temperature; this, in addition to power failures
on the satellite, delayed final integration testing. In addition, the
satellite's reaction wheels, used for pointing accuracy, were
redesigned because on-orbit failures on similar reaction wheels were
occurring on other satellite programs--this added about $10 million to
the program's cost. As a result of these problems, the cost to complete
GPS IIF will be about $1.6 billion--about $870 million over the
original cost estimate of $729 million. The launch of the first IIF
satellite has been delayed until November 2009--almost 3 years late.
The Air Force is taking measures to prevent the problems experienced on
the GPS IIF program from recurring on the GPS IIIA program. Some of the
measures the Air Force is taking include:
* using incremental or block development, where the program would
follow an evolutionary path toward meeting needs rather than attempting
to satisfy all needs in a single step;
* using military standards for satellite quality;
* conducting multiple design reviews, with the contractor being held to
military standards and deliverables during each review;
* exercising more government oversight and interaction with the
contractor and spending more time at the contractor's site;
* using an improved risk management process, where the government is an
integral part of the process;
* not allowing the program manager to adjust the GPS IIIA program scope
to meet increased or accelerated technical specifications, system
requirements, or system performance; and:
* conducting an independent technology readiness assessment of the
contractor design once the preliminary design review is complete.
These efforts are not trivial. The primary causes of space acquisition
problems in our view include (1) the tendency to start space programs
too early, that is, before there has been assurance that the
capabilities being pursuing can be achieved within resources and time
constraints and (2) the tendency to attempt to achieve all requirements
in one step rather than gradually. The GPS IIIA program was structured
to avoid these problems and ensure the program has the right knowledge
for moving forward into the acquisition process. Moreover, our work has
cited prior acquisition strategies in which the lack of contractor
oversight was a problem. Again, the actions being taken on GPS IIIA put
controls in place to strengthen oversight and government involvement.
We also recognize that the GPS IIIA program took steps to produce
realistic cost estimates, which has generally not been done in the
past.
Nevertheless, there is still a high risk that the Air Force will not
meet its schedule for GPS. First, it is aiming to deploy the GPS IIIA
satellites 3 years faster than the IIF satellites. Second, the time
period between the contract award and first launch for GPS IIIA is
shorter than most other major space programs we have reviewed. Third,
GPS IIIA is not simply a matter of replicating the IIF program. Though
the contractor has had previous experience with GPS, it is likely that
the knowledge base will need to be revitalized. The contractor is also
being asked to develop a larger satellite bus to accommodate the future
GPS increments and to increase the power of a new military signal by a
factor of ten. In view of these and other schedule issues, we believe
that there is little room in the schedule to accommodate difficulties
that the contractor or program may face.
Where does this leave the wide span of military, civil, and other user
of GPS? If the Air Force does not meet its schedule goals for
development of GPS IIIA satellites, there will be an increased
likelihood that in 2010, as old satellites begin to fail, the overall
GPS constellation will fall below the number of satellites required to
provide the level of GPS service that the U.S. government is committing
to providing. The performance standards for both (1) the standard
positioning service provided to civil and commercial GPS users and (2)
the precise positioning service provided to military GPS users commit
the U.S. government to at least a 95 percent probability of maintaining
a constellation of 24 operational GPS satellites. Because there are
currently 31 operational GPS satellites of various blocks, the near-
term probability of maintaining a constellation of at least 24
operational satellites remains well above 95 percent. However, DOD
predicts that over the next several years many of the older satellites
in the constellation will reach the end of their operational life
faster than they will be replenished, and that the constellation will,
in all likelihood, decrease in size. Based on the most recent satellite
reliability and launch schedule data approved in March 2009, the
estimated long-term probability of maintaining a constellation of at
least 24 operational satellites falls below 95 percent during fiscal
year 2010 and remains below 95 percent until the end of fiscal year
2014, at times falling to about 80 percent. See figure 1 for details.
Figure 1: Probability of Maintaining a Constellation of at Least 24 GPS
Satellites Based on Reliability Data and Launch Schedule as of March
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year, beginning October 2008:
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 100%.
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2009;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 99%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2010;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 98%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2011;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 92%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2012;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 87%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2013;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 87%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2014;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 86%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2015;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 77%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2016;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 87%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2017;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 86%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2018;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 91%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2019;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 89%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2020;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 97%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2021;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 99%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2022;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 99%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Fiscal year, beginning October 2023;
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 99%;
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Such a gap in capability could have wide-ranging impacts on GPS users,
though the exact impact is hard to precisely define, as it would depend
on which satellites stop operating. To illustrate, however, the
military could see a decrease in the accuracy of precision-guided
munitions that rely on GPS to strike their targets. Disruptions in
service could require military forces to either use larger munitions or
to use more munitions on the same target to achieve the same level of
success. Intercontinental commercial flights use predicted satellite
geometry over their planned navigation route, and may have to delay,
cancel, or reroute flights. Enhanced 911 services, which rely on GPS to
precisely locate callers, could lose accuracy particularly when
operating in urban canyons or mountainous terrain.
The Air Force is aware that, over the next several years, there is some
risk that the number of satellites in the GPS constellation could fall
below its required 24 satellites, and that this risk would grow
significantly if the development and launch of GPS IIIA satellites were
delayed by several years. Consequently, Air Force Space Command has
established an independent review team to examine the risks and
consequences of a smaller constellation on military and civil users.
There are measures the Air Force and others can take to plan for and
minimize these impacts, which are detailed in our report. However, at
this time Air Force representatives believe the best approach to
mitigating the risk is to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the
current schedule for GPS IIIA is maintained. Moreover, it is unclear
whether the user community knows enough about the potential problem to
do something about it.
New Satellite Capabilities Will Not Be Leveraged Because of Delayed
Delivery of Ground and User Equipment Capabilities:
To maximize the benefit of GPS, the delivery of its ground control and
user equipment capabilities must be synchronized with the delivery of
the satellites so that the full spectrum of military assets and
individual users can take advantage of new capabilities. This is a
challenging endeavor for GPS as it involves installing GPS equipment on
board a wide range of ships, aircraft, missiles, and other weapon
systems. Our review found that because of funding shifts and diffuse
leadership, the Air Force has not been successful in synchronizing
satellite, ground control, and user equipment segments. As a result of
the poor synchronization, new GPS capabilities may be delivered in
space for years before military users can take advantage of them.
The Air Force used funding set aside for the ground control and user
equipment segment to resolve GPS satellite development problems,
causing a delay in the delivery of new GPS capabilities. For example,
in 2005 the Air Force began launching its GPS IIR-M satellites, which
broadcast a second civil signal. Unfortunately, the ground control
segment will not be able to make the second civil signal operational
until late 2012 or 2013--7 years later. Likewise, a modernized military
signal designed to improve resistance to jamming of GPS will be
available for operations on GPS satellites over a decade before user
equipment will be fielded that is able to take strategic advantage of
it.
Because leadership for acquisitions across the space community is
fragmented, there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing
all segments related to GPS. The responsibility for developing and
acquiring GPS satellites and associated ground control segments and for
acquiring and producing user equipment for selected platforms for
space, air, ground, and maritime environments falls under the Air
Force's Space and Missile Systems Center. On the other hand,
responsibility for acquiring and producing user equipment for all other
platforms falls on the military services.
Challenges in Coordinating Requirements and Ensuring Compatibility:
GPS has produced dramatic improvements both for the United States and
globally. Ensuring that it can continue to do so is extremely
challenging given competing interests, the span of government and
commercial organizations involved with GPS, and the criticality of GPS
to national and homeland security and the economy. On the one hand, DOD
must ensure that military requirements receive top priority and the
program stays executable. In doing so, it must ensure that the program
is not encumbered by requirements that could disrupt development,
design, and production of satellites. On the other hand, there are
clearly other enhancements that could be made to GPS satellites that
could serve a variety of vital missions--particularly because of the
coverage GPS satellites provide--and there is an expressed desire for
GPS to serve as the world's preeminent positioning, navigation, and
timing system. In addition, while the United States is challenged to
deliver GPS on a tight schedule, other countries are designing and
developing systems that provide the same or enhanced capabilities.
Ensuring that these capabilities can be leveraged without compromising
national security or the preeminence of GPS is also a delicate
balancing act that requires close cooperation between DOD, the
Department of State, and other institutions.
Because of the scale and number of organizations involved in maximizing
GPS, we did not undertake a full-scale review of the requirements and
coordination processes. However, we reviewed documents supporting these
processes and interviewed a variety of officials to obtain views on
their effectiveness. While there is a consensus that DOD and other
federal organizations involved with GPS have taken prudent steps to
manage requirements and optimize GPS use, we also identified challenges
in the areas of ensuring civilian requirements can be met and ensuring
that GPS is compatible with other new, potentially competing global
space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems. According to
the civil agencies that have proposed GPS requirements, the formal
requirements approval process is confusing, time consuming, and
difficult to manage. Regarding the international community, while the
U.S. government has engaged a number of other countries and
international organizations in cooperative discussions, only one
legally binding agreement has been established.
Stronger Leadership Paramount to Addressing GPS Problems:
GPS has enabled transformations in military and other government
operations and has become part of the critical infrastructure serving
national and international communities. Clearly, the United States
cannot afford to see its GPS capabilities decrease below its
requirement, and optimally, it is one that should stay preeminent. Over
the past decade, however, the program has experienced cost increases
and schedule delays, and though the Air Force is making a concerted
effort to address acquisition problems, there is still considerable
risk that satellites will not be delivered on time and that there will
be gaps in capability.
As such, we concluded in our review that focused attention and
oversight is needed to ensure the program stays on track and is
adequately resourced, that unanticipated problems are quickly
discovered and resolved, and that all communities involved with GPS are
aware of and positioned to address potential gaps in service. But this
is difficult to achieve given diffuse responsibility for the GPS
acquisition program. Importantly, several recent congressional studies
have found that authority and responsibilities for military space and
intelligence programs are scattered across the staffs of various DOD
organizations and the Intelligence Community, and that this is
contributing to difficulties on all major space programs in meeting
their schedules.
The problem is more acute with GPS because of the range of
organizations involved in the program. As mentioned earlier, because
different military services are involved in developing and installing
equipment onto the weapon systems they operate, there are separate
budget, management, oversight, and leadership structures over the user
segments. And while there have been various recommendations to
accelerate the fielding of military user equipment, this has been
difficult to do partially because the program office is experiencing
technical issues.
We recommended that the Secretary of Defense appoint a single authority
to oversee the development of the GPS system, including space, ground
control, and user equipment assets, to ensure that the program is well
executed and resourced and that potential disruptions are minimized.
The appointee should have authority to ensure space, ground control,
and user equipment are synchronized to the maximum extent practicable;
and coordinate with the existing positioning, navigation, and timing
infrastructure to assess and minimize potential service disruptions in
the event that the satellite constellation were to decrease in size for
an extended period of time. Given the importance of GPS to the civil
community, we also recommended that the secretaries of Defense and
Transportation, as the co-chairs of the National Executive Committee
for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing, address, if
weaknesses are found, civil agency concerns for developing requirements
and determine mechanisms for improving collaboration and decision
making and strengthening civil agency participation.
In responding to our report, DOD concurred with our recommendations,
and stated that it recognized the importance of centralizing authority
to oversee the continuing synchronized evolution of the GPS and that it
will continue to seek ways to improve civil agency understanding of the
DOD requirements process and work to strengthen civil agency
participation. We continue to believe that DOD will consider an
approach that enables a single individual to make resource decisions
and maintain visibility over progress and establish a means by which
progress in developing the satellites and ground equipment receive
attention from the highest level of leadership, that is the Defense
Secretary and perhaps the National Security Council, given the
criticality of GPS to the warfighter and the nation, and the risks
associated with not meeting schedule goals. In addition, as DOD
undertakes efforts to inform and educate civil agencies on the
requirements process, we encourage it to take a more active role in
directly communicating with civil agencies to more precisely identify
concerns or weaknesses in the requirements process.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer
any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee have at
this time.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the acquisition of satellite, ground control, and user
equipment, we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
Department of Defense (DOD) officials from offices that manage and
oversee the Global Positioning System (GPS) program. We also reviewed
and analyzed program plans and documentation related to cost, schedule,
requirements, program direction, and satellite constellation
sustainment, and compared programmatic data to GAO's criteria compiled
over the last 12 years for best practices in system development. We
also conducted our own analysis, based on data provided by the Air
Force, to assess the implications of potential schedule delays we
identified in our assessment of the satellite acquisition. To assess
coordination among federal agencies and the broader GPS community, we
interviewed OSD and DOD officials from offices that manage and oversee
the GPS program, officials from the military services, officials from
civil departments and agencies, and officials at the U.S. Department of
State and at various European space organizations. We also analyzed how
civil departments and agencies coordinate with DOD on GPS civil
requirements, and how the U.S. government coordinates with foreign
countries. We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 to
April 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information, please contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-
4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Individuals making contributions to this
testimony include Art Gallegos, Greg Campbell, Maria Durant, Laura
Hook, Sigrid McGinty, Jay Tallon, and Alyssa Weir.
[End of section]
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