Public Transportation
Better Data Needed to Assess Length of New Starts Process, and Options Exist to Expedite Project Development Gao ID: GAO-09-784 August 6, 2009The New Starts program is an important source of new capital investment in mass transportation. To be eligible for federal funding, a project must advance through the different project development phases of the New Starts program, including alternatives analysis, preliminary engineering, and final design. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) evaluates projects as a condition for advancement into each project development phase of the program. FTA has acted recently to streamline the process. This report discusses the (1) time it has generally taken for projects to move through the New Starts process and what Congress and FTA have done to expedite the process and (2) options that exist to expedite the process. In response to a legislative mandate, GAO reviewed statutes, FTA guidance and regulations, and project data. GAO also interviewed Department of Transportation (DOT) officials, projects sponsors, and industry stakeholders.
Insufficient data are available to describe the time it has taken for all projects to move through the New Starts process. Nevertheless, 9 of 40 projects that have received full funding grant agreements since 1997, and had complete data available, had milestone dates that ranged from about 4 to 14 years to complete the project development phases. However, the data from these 9 projects are not generalizeable to the 40 New Starts projects. FTA has not historically retained all milestone data for every project, such as the dates that project sponsors apply to enter preliminary engineering and FTA's subsequent approval. Although not required by its records retention policy, FTA has retained milestone data from some projects longer than 2 years. However, GAO was unable to obtain complete and reliable project milestone data from FTA. FTA officials acknowledged that, while not historically perfect, the agency has retained sufficient milestone data to help manage the New Starts program. Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of having complete milestone data, FTA has taken several steps in recent years to more consistently collect and retain such data. In addition, GAO found that project sponsors do not consistently retain milestone data for projects that have completed the New Starts process. Congress and FTA have taken action to expedite projects through the New Starts process. For example, legislative action created the Public-Private Partnership Pilot Program (Penta-P) to study the benefits of using public-private partnerships for certain new fixed-guideway capital projects, such as accelerating project delivery. In addition, FTA has implemented administrative changes to expedite the New Starts process. For example, FTA has developed and offered training workshops for project sponsors and has introduced project delivery tools. These tools include checklists for project sponsors to improve their understanding of the requirements of each phase of the New Starts process. Project sponsors and industry stakeholders GAO interviewed identified options to help expedite project development within the New Starts program. These options include tailoring the New Starts evaluation process to risks posed by the projects, using letters of intent more frequently, and applying policy and guidance changes only to future projects. Each option has advantages and disadvantages to consider. In addition, FTA must also strike the appropriate balance between expediting project delivery and maintaining the accountability of the program. For example, by signaling early federal support of projects, letters of intent could help project sponsors use potentially less costly and time-consuming alternative project delivery methods, such as design-build. However, such early support poses some risk. It is possible that with more frequent use of letters of intent, FTA's commitment authority could be depleted earlier than expected, which could affect the anticipated funding stream for future projects. Furthermore, some options, like combining one or more statutorily required project development phases, would require legislative action.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-784, Public Transportation: Better Data Needed to Assess Length of New Starts Process, and Options Exist to Expedite Project Development
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-784
entitled 'Public Transportation: Better Data Needed to Assess Length of
New Starts Process, and Options Exist to Expedite Project Development'
which was released on August 6, 2009.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2009:
Public Transportation:
Better Data Needed to Assess Length of New Starts Process, and Options
Exist to Expedite Project Development:
GAO-09-784:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-784, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The New Starts program is an important source of new capital investment
in mass transportation. To be eligible for federal funding, a project
must advance through the different project development phases of the
New Starts program, including alternatives analysis, preliminary
engineering, and final design. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
evaluates projects as a condition for advancement into each project
development phase of the program. FTA has acted recently to streamline
the process. This report discusses the (1) time it has generally taken
for projects to move through the New Starts process and what Congress
and FTA have done to expedite the process and (2) options that exist to
expedite the process. In response to a legislative mandate, GAO
reviewed statutes, FTA guidance and regulations, and project data. GAO
also interviewed Department of Transportation (DOT) officials, projects
sponsors, and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found:
Insufficient data are available to describe the time it has taken for
all projects to move through the New Starts process. Nevertheless, 9 of
40 projects that have received full funding grant agreements since
1997, and had complete data available, had milestone dates that ranged
from about 4 to 14 years to complete the project development phases.
However, the data from these 9 projects are not generalizeable to the
40 New Starts projects. FTA has not historically retained all milestone
data for every project, such as the dates that project sponsors apply
to enter preliminary engineering and FTA‘s subsequent approval.
Although not required by its records retention policy, FTA has retained
milestone data from some projects longer than 2 years. However, GAO was
unable to obtain complete and reliable project milestone data from FTA.
FTA officials acknowledged that, while not historically perfect, the
agency has retained sufficient milestone data to help manage the New
Starts program. Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of having
complete milestone data, FTA has taken several steps in recent years to
more consistently collect and retain such data. In addition, GAO found
that project sponsors do not consistently retain milestone data for
projects that have completed the New Starts process.
Congress and FTA have taken action to expedite projects through the New
Starts process. For example, legislative action created the Public-
Private Partnership Pilot Program (Penta-P) to study the benefits of
using public-private partnerships for certain new fixed-guideway
capital projects, such as accelerating project delivery. In addition,
FTA has implemented administrative changes to expedite the New Starts
process. For example, FTA has developed and offered training workshops
for project sponsors and has introduced project delivery tools. These
tools include checklists for project sponsors to improve their
understanding of the requirements of each phase of the New Starts
process.
Project sponsors and industry stakeholders GAO interviewed identified
options to help expedite project development within the New Starts
program. These options include tailoring the New Starts evaluation
process to risks posed by the projects, using letters of intent more
frequently, and applying policy and guidance changes only to future
projects. Each option has advantages and disadvantages to consider. In
addition, FTA must also strike the appropriate balance between
expediting project delivery and maintaining the accountability of the
program. For example, by signaling early federal support of projects,
letters of intent could help project sponsors use potentially less
costly and time-consuming alternative project delivery methods, such as
design-build. However, such early support poses some risk. It is
possible that with more frequent use of letters of intent, FTA‘s
commitment authority could be depleted earlier than expected, which
could affect the anticipated funding stream for future projects.
Furthermore, some options, like combining one or more statutorily
required project development phases, would require legislative action.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOT consider options to expedite project
development and continue to improve its data collection efforts. DOT
agreed with the first recommendation but not the second, which GAO
revised to better reflect FTA‘s efforts to date and the ongoing need
for complete and reliable data to help strengthen the program.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-784] or key
components. For more information, contact Susan Fleming at (202) 512-
2834 or flemings@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Insufficient Data Prevent Complete Assessment of the Time It Takes
Projects to Move through the Process, but Congress and FTA Have Taken
Action to Expedite the Process:
Options Exist That Could Expedite the New Starts Project Development
Process:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Administration Requests $1.83 Billion in Fiscal Year 2010
Funding for New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts Projects:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Timeline Data on New Starts Projects That We Collected
from Project Sponsors, by Mode:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: New Starts Projects Evaluated and Rated for Fiscal Year 2010
by Phase of New Starts Process:
Table 2: Small Starts and Very Small Starts Projects Evaluated and
Rated for Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 3: New Starts and Small Starts Project Sponsors Interviewed:
Figures:
Figure 1: New Starts Project Planning and Development Process:
Figure 2: FTA's Current New Starts Evaluation Process:
Figure 3: New Starts Planning and Project Development Durations for the
Nine Projects with Complete Data:
Figure 4: Allocation of FTA's Recommended Fiscal Year 2010 Budget for
New Starts:
Abbreviations:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
ESWA: early systems work agreement:
FFGA: full funding grant agreement:
FTA: Federal Transit Administration:
LPA: locally preferred alternative:
NARA: National Archives and Records Administration:
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act:
PCGA: project construction grant agreement:
PDA: project development agreement:
Penta-P: Public-Private Partnership Pilot Program:
PMOC: project management oversight contractor:
Recovery Act: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act:
SAFETEA-LU: Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 6, 2009:
The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Chairman:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
Since the early 1970s, much of the federal government's share of new
capital investment in mass transportation has come through the Federal
Transit Administration's (FTA) New Starts program. Through this
program, FTA identifies and recommends new fixed-guideway transit
projects for grants, typically through full funding grant agreements
(FFGA).[Footnote 1] Over the last decade, the New Starts program has
provided state and local agencies with over $10 billion to help design
and construct transit projects nationwide.
The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), which authorized the New Starts program
through fiscal year 2009, identifies criteria for how FTA evaluates and
rates projects.[Footnote 2] FTA must prioritize projects for funding by
evaluating, rating, and recommending potential projects on the basis of
specific financial commitment and project justification criteria--
including mobility improvements, cost-effectiveness, economic
development effects, land use, environmental benefits, and operating
efficiencies. Using these statutorily identified criteria, FTA
evaluates potential projects annually and as a condition for
advancement into each phase of the New Starts process, including
preliminary engineering, final design, and construction. FTA refers to
projects in the preliminary engineering or final design phases as being
in the "pipeline" through which successful projects advance to receive
funding.
We have previously identified FTA's use of a rigorous and systematic
evaluation process to distinguish among proposed New Starts investments
as a model for other transportation programs.[Footnote 3] However, we
and other stakeholders and policymakers have also identified challenges
facing the New Starts program. For example, our past reviews found that
many program stakeholders thought that FTA's process for evaluating New
Starts projects was too time consuming, costly, and complex. These
issues and the upcoming reauthorization of all surface transportation
programs, including the New Starts program, have led stakeholders and
policymakers to examine the existing evaluation and rating process and
consider potential modifications and other options to reduce the
complexity, cost, and time it takes for a New Starts project to go
through the pipeline.
We are required by SAFETEA-LU to report each year on FTA's processes
and procedures for evaluating, rating, and recommending New Starts
projects for federal funding and on FTA's implementation of these
processes and procedures.[Footnote 4] This report discusses the (1)
time it has generally taken for proposed projects to move through the
New Starts process, and what Congress and FTA have done to expedite the
process, and (2) options that exist to expedite the process. In
addition, appendix I contains an overview of FTA's fiscal year 2010 New
Starts Annual Report and budget request. To address these objectives,
we reviewed SAFETEA-LU and other New Starts statutory requirements, FTA
guidance and regulations governing the New Starts program and other FTA
documents, including the annual New Starts report, and interviewed
transportation experts, transit consultants, transit industry
associations, and Department of Transportation (DOT) officials about
the time it takes for a New Starts project to move through the New
Starts process, as well as the options that exist to expedite the
process. We also interviewed 9 project sponsors about 10 projects. We
selected these projects based on a range of characteristics, including:
(1) timing (i.e., when projects received a FFGA); (2) mode (i.e., heavy
rail, light rail, or bus); (3) scope (i.e., the total cost of the
project); and (4) geographic area. In addition, we gathered, and took
steps to verify, FTA data on project milestone approval dates to
determine how long the 40 projects that received a FFGA after June 1997
took to complete the New Starts process. We also attempted to gather
data directly from project sponsors on project milestone approval and
application dates for these 40 projects to determine how long it took
projects to complete the New Starts process. Appendix II contains
additional information about our scope and methodology. For this
report, we did not consider how projects are rated or examine the
efficacy of FTA's evaluation measures.[Footnote 5] We conducted this
performance audit from January 2009 to August 2009, in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
Background:
FTA generally funds New Starts projects through FFGAs, which are
required by statute to establish the terms and conditions for federal
participation in a New Starts project.[Footnote 6] FFGAs also define a
project's scope, including the length of the system and the number of
stations; its schedule, including the date when the system is expected
to open for service; and its cost. For projects to obtain FFGAs, they
must emerge from a regional, multimodal transportation planning
process.
The early stages of the New Starts project development process--
alternatives analysis and much of preliminary engineering--are carried
out in concert with the metropolitan planning process specified by
SAFETEA-LU and the environmental review processes required by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).[Footnote 7]
Alternatives analysis studies are a corridor-level analysis of a range
of alternatives designed to address locally-identified mobility and
other problems in a specific transportation corridor. The alternatives
analysis phase culminates in the selection of a locally preferred
alternative (LPA), which is the New Starts project that FTA evaluates
for funding.
After a locally preferred alternative is selected, the project sponsor
submits an application to FTA for the project to enter the preliminary
engineering phase.[Footnote 8] During the preliminary engineering
phase, project sponsors refine the design of the locally preferred
alternative, taking into consideration all reasonable design
alternatives and estimating each alternative's costs, benefits, and
impacts (e.g., financial or environmental). Further, project sponsors
are required to complete the NEPA environmental review process in order
to receive federal funding. Specifically, FTA interprets NEPA to
require, as part of the NEPA process for evaluation of the
alternatives,[Footnote 9] an environmental review document with
information on each alternative's benefits and costs relating to the
New Starts evaluation. When the preliminary engineering phase is
completed and federal environmental requirements are satisfied, FTA may
approve the project's advancement into final design, after which FTA
may recommend the project for a FFGA and proceed to
construction.[Footnote 10] FTA oversees grantees' management of
projects from the preliminary engineering phase through the
construction phase (see figure 1). This project management oversight is
conducted by FTA staff, working closely with its project management
oversight contractors (PMOC), to provide continual monitoring and
assessment of projects' scope, schedule, and budget, and of its
sponsor's technical capacity.
Figure 1: New Starts Project Planning and Development Process:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Planning:
* Systems planning (major development stage);
* Alternatives analysis (major development stage);
* Select LPA (decision point);
* FTA decision on entry into preliminary engineering (decision point);
- Project management oversight interaction occurs here.
Preliminary engineering:
* Preliminary engineering (major development stage);
- Project management oversight interaction occurs here.
* FTA decision on entry into final design (decision point);
- Project management oversight interaction occurs here.
Final design:
* Final design (major development stage);
- Project management oversight interaction occurs here.
* FFGA (decision point);
- Project management oversight interaction occurs here.
Construction:
* Construction (major development stage);
- Project management oversight interaction occurs here.
Source: FTA.
Note: Projects are rated at several points during project development,
including as part of the evaluation for entry into the preliminary
engineering and final design phases, and yearly for inclusion in the
New Starts Annual Report. Additionally, the administration uses the FTA
evaluation and rating process, along with the phase of development of
New Starts projects, to decide which projects to recommend to Congress
for funding.
[End of figure]
To help inform administration and congressional decisions about which
projects should receive federal funds, FTA currently distinguishes
among proposed projects by evaluating and assigning ratings to various
statutory evaluation criteria--including both project justification and
local financial commitment criteria--and then assigning an overall
project rating.[Footnote 11] (See figure 2.) These evaluation criteria
reflect a broad range of benefits and effects of the proposed project,
such as cost-effectiveness, as well as the ability of the project
sponsor to fund the project and finance the continued operation of its
transit system. FTA has developed specific measures for each of the
criteria outlined in statute. However, FTA currently assigns a 50
percent weight to both the cost-effectiveness and the land use criteria
when developing the project justification summary rating. The other
project justification criteria are not weighted, although the mobility
improvements criterion is used as a "tiebreaker."[Footnote 12] On the
basis of their evaluation measures, FTA assigns proposed projects a
rating for each criterion and then assigns a summary rating for local
financial commitment and project justification. These two ratings are
averaged together, and FTA assigns each project a "high," "medium-
high," "medium," "medium-low," or "low" overall rating, which is used
to rank projects and determine which projects to recommend for funding.
Figure 2: FTA's Current New Starts Evaluation Process:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Overall project rating: comprised of:
(1) Local financial commitment summary rating:
* Capital finance plan (50% weight);
* Operating finance plan (30% weight);
* Non-New Starts share (20% weight).
and:
(2) Project justification summary rating:
* Cost-effectiveness (50% weight);
* Land use (50% weight);
* Mobility improvements (0% weight)[A];
* Operating efficiencies (0% weight)[A];
* Environmental benefits (0% weight)[A];
* Other factors (0% weight)[A].
Source: GAO analysis of FTA data.
[A] These criteria are not assigned a weight in the evaluation
framework.
[End of figure]
Projects are rated at several points during the New Starts process,
including as part of the evaluation for entry into the preliminary
engineering and final design phases, and they are rated yearly for
inclusion in the New Starts Annual Report. The administration uses the
FTA evaluation and rating process, along with the phase of development
of New Starts projects, to decide which projects to recommend to
Congress for funding.[Footnote 13] Although many projects receive a
summary rating that would make them eligible for a FFGA, generally only
a few are proposed for a FFGA in a given fiscal year. FTA proposes
FFGAs for those projects that are projected to meet the following
conditions during the fiscal year for which funding is proposed:
* All nonfederal project funding must be committed and available for
the project.
* The project must be in or near the final design phase and have
progressed far enough for uncertainties about costs, benefits, and
impacts (e.g., financial or environmental) to be minimized.
* The project must meet FTA's tests for readiness and technical
capacity, which confirm that there are no remaining cost, project
scope, or local financial commitment issues.
SAFETEA-LU introduced a number of changes to the New Starts program,
including some that affect the evaluation and rating process.[Footnote
14] For example, given past concerns that the evaluation process did
not account for a project's impact on economic development and FTA's
lack of communication to sponsors about upcoming changes, the statute
added economic development to the list of project justification
criteria that FTA must use to evaluate and rate New Starts projects,
and requires FTA to issue notice and guidance each time significant
changes are made to the process and criteria.[Footnote 15] SAFETEA-LU
also established the Small Starts program, a new capital investment
grant program, simplifying the requirements imposed for those seeking
funding for lower cost projects such as bus rapid transit, streetcar,
and commuter rail projects.[Footnote 16] This program is intended to
advance smaller-scale projects through an expedited and streamlined
evaluation and rating process. FTA also subsequently introduced a
separate eligibility category within the Small Starts program called
Very Small Starts, which is for projects with a capital cost of less
than $50 million.[Footnote 17] Very Small Starts projects qualify for
an even simpler and more expedited evaluation and rating process than
other Small Starts projects.
FTA, like most federal agencies, must document its activities,
including work related to the New Starts program, in accordance with
the Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended. Each federal agency must
maintain a records management program and must preserve records that
(1) document the organization, functions, policies, decisions,
procedures, and essential transactions of the agency and (2) provide
the information necessary to protect the legal and financial rights of
the government and of persons directly affected by the agency's
activities.[Footnote 18] The National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) is given general oversight responsibilities for
records management programs and practices. The activities of an agency
records management program include, among other things, the development
of a records schedule--that is, for all records created and received by
the agency, where and how long records need to be retained and their
final disposition (destruction or preservation) based on time, or
event, or a combination of time and event--subject to the approval of
NARA. No record may be destroyed unless it has been scheduled and, for
temporary records, the schedule is of critical importance because it
provides the authority to dispose of the record after a specified time
period.
Insufficient Data Prevent Complete Assessment of the Time It Takes
Projects to Move through the Process, but Congress and FTA Have Taken
Action to Expedite the Process:
There is insufficient data available to determine the time it takes for
a project to move through the New Starts process. Nevertheless, 9 of
the 40 projects that have received a FFGA since 1997, and with complete
data available, had milestone dates that ranged from about 4.5 to 14
years to complete the project development phases. However, the data
from these 9 projects are not generalizeable to the 40 New Starts
projects. FTA has not historically retained all milestone data for the
40 projects, such as the dates project sponsors apply to enter a
project development phase, in a consistent manner. However, FTA has
retained some milestone data from some projects and is taking steps to
improve its New Starts data retention and collection. In addition, we
found that project sponsors do not systematically retain milestone data
for projects that have completed the New Starts process. Congress and
FTA have taken action to expedite projects through the New Starts
process through Penta-P and training workshops for project sponsors.
Limited Milestone Data on Projects Available through FTA or Project
Sponsors:
FTA has not historically retained all milestone data, such as the dates
that project sponsors apply to enter a project development phase, and
FTA's subsequent approval, in a consistent or comprehensive manner.
According to FTA, its record schedule requires that FTA retain
documents related to milestone approvals for 2 years after the close of
the project and FTA meets this requirement. For example, FTA retains
documents that notify project sponsors of their approval to enter
preliminary engineering and final design. Although not required, FTA
has also retained milestone data from some, but not all, projects
longer than 2 years.
We were unable to obtain complete and reliable project milestone data
from FTA. FTA has historically retained milestone data from some
projects using a variety of techniques, such as maintaining hard copies
of milestone approval letters or internal memos in binders and saving
electronic copies of some documents in a computer filing system. Using
these sources, FTA provided us with milestone approval dates--
preliminary engineering, final design, and FFGA--for the 40 projects
that received a FFGA since 1997. However, when we attempted to verify
the milestone approval dates from a random sample of 10 projects, we
found that the data were unreliable and, in some cases, inaccurate. For
example, the approval dates for some projects did not match the dates
contained in the source documents (e.g., letters from FTA approving a
project's advancement into preliminary engineering); in other cases the
source documents for some projects were missing from the project files.
In addition to milestone approval dates, we asked FTA to provide the
dates that these 40 projects began alternatives analysis and submitted
applications for preliminary engineering, final design, and FFGA.
Because FTA is not required by its record schedule to retain these
dates, FTA was unable to provide these dates. In addition, FTA
officials cited several challenges to collecting this information.
First, FTA told us that it does not have records on when a project
begins alternatives analysis because this phase is conducted at the
local level, generally without FTA involvement. Second, FTA told us
that it does not record when a project sponsor submits an application
for preliminary engineering, final design, and FFGA because project
sponsors almost never submit complete applications. According to FTA
officials, they begin to review applications while simultaneously
working with project sponsors to submit additional documentation to
complete the application. However, according to FTA officials, because
the application process is iterative, they have not historically
assigned a date when the application was fully submitted.
We have previously reported that federal agencies can use performance
information to make various types of management decisions to improve
programs and results.[Footnote 19] In particular, managers can use
performance information to identify problems in existing programs, to
try to identify the causes of problems, or to develop corrective
actions. Further, GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government states that internal control activities include, among other
activities, appropriate documentation of records.[Footnote 20] More
specifically, internal control and all transactions and other
significant events need to be clearly documented, and the documentation
should be readily available for examination. The documentation should
appear in management directives, administrative policies, or operating
manuals and may be in paper or electronic form. All documentation and
records should be properly managed and maintained.
FTA officials acknowledged that while not historically perfect; the
agency has retained sufficient milestone data to help manage the New
Starts program. For example, FTA officials noted that they have used
the data to help identify "pain points" in the process and options to
streamline the process. Furthermore, FTA officials stated that even
with the most comprehensive information on the time it takes for New
Starts projects to complete the project development process, each
project represents a unique set of challenges from local decision
making, funding availability, and local legal structure that will
impact the time it takes to pass through the FTA decision phases.
Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of having complete milestone
data to better understand and improve the project development process,
FTA has taken several steps in recent years to more consistently
collect and retain such data. For example, FTA officials told us that,
since late 2006, they now retain all letters that contain preliminary
engineering and final design approval dates and electronically document
the date a project sponsor's application to enter preliminary
engineering is received in internal memos. Also, according to FTA, the
agency has begun to document the date when it considers project
sponsors' preliminary engineering applications complete. In addition,
in 2008, FTA officials said that they began requiring project sponsors
to submit a copy of their alternatives analysis initiations packages
for FTA review and comment. Finally, FTA officials said they were in
the process of developing a spreadsheet to record various project
approval dates--including statutorily required approval dates and
internal FTA review dates--and just completed a year long pilot project
of an electronic case management system.
Project sponsors also do not consistently retain milestone data for
projects that have completed the New Starts process. Because of the
limitations of FTA's data, we attempted to collect data from project
sponsors that have received a FFGA since 1997, on the time it takes for
a project to move through the New Starts evaluation and rating process.
We queried the project sponsors for several New Starts milestone dates.
However, we found that some of the project sponsors do not consistently
maintain records on completed projects. In addition, some projects had
multiple project sponsors during the New Starts evaluation and rating
process, which complicated record keeping. Nonetheless, we were able to
gather some milestone dates for 30 of the 40 projects, but these data
were not complete due to missing milestone dates and therefore we were
not able to calculate valid timelines for all projects. (See appendix
III for more information on these data.)
However, of the 30 project sponsors that provided information to us,
only 9 had complete sets of New Starts milestone dates. Figure 3 shows
the time it took for each of these projects with complete data to move
from the beginning of alternatives analysis to the approval for a FFGA,
ranging from about 4.5 years for 3 projects to over 14 years for 2
projects.[Footnote 21] Due to the number of projects with complete
data, the data from these 9 projects are not generalizeable to the 40
New Starts projects. The small sample size also makes it difficult to
determine whether mode (i.e., heavy rail, light rail, or bus), cost, or
the year that the completed projects entered the New Starts evaluation
and rating process impacts the time each project spends in each phase.
Furthermore, FTA officials told us that each New Start project's
experience in the evaluation and rating process is unique, making it
difficult to identify trends or patterns.
Figure 3: New Starts Planning and Project Development Durations for the
Nine Projects with Complete Data:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated horizontal bar graph]
Project[A]: Southeast Corridor Light Rail (T-Rex), Denver, Colorado;
Begin alternatives analysis to approval into preliminary engineering:
2.8 years;
Approval into preliminary engineering to approval into final design:
2.2 years;
Approval into final design to approved for full funding grant
agreement: .5 years;
Total: 5 years, 7 months.
Project[A]: Metra South West Service Improvements and Extension,
Chicago, Illinois;
Begin alternatives analysis to approval into preliminary engineering:
1.8 years;
Approval into preliminary engineering to approval into final design: 2
years;
Approval into final design to approved for full funding grant
agreement: .8 years;
Total: 4 years, 7 months.
Project[A]: Metra Union Pacific West Line Extension/Central Kane,
Chicago, Illinois;
Begin alternatives analysis to approval into preliminary engineering:
1.8 years;
Approval into preliminary engineering to approval into final design: 2
years;
Approval into final design to approved for full funding grant
agreement: .8 years;
Total: 4 years, 7 months.
Project[A]: Metra North Central Service (NCS) Improvements, Chicago,
Illinois;
Begin alternatives analysis to approval into preliminary engineering:
1.8 years;
Approval into preliminary engineering to approval into final design: 2
years;
Approval into final design to approved for full funding grant
agreement: .8 years;
Total: 4 years, 7 months.
Project[A]: Eastside Corridor LRT Project, Los Angeles, California;
Begin alternatives analysis to approval into preliminary engineering:
1.4 years;
Approval into preliminary engineering to approval into final design: 2
years;
Approval into final design to approved for full funding grant
agreement: 1.6 years;
Total: 5 years.
Project[A]: West Corridor Light Rail, Denver, Colorado;
Begin alternatives analysis to approval into preliminary engineering: 6
years;
Approval into preliminary engineering to approval into final design:
7.5 years;
Approval into final design to approved for full funding grant
agreement: .4 years
Total: 13 years, 9 months.
Project[A]: Norfolk Light Rail Transit Project, Norfolk, Virginia;
Begin alternatives analysis to approval into preliminary engineering:
10 years;
Approval into preliminary engineering to approval into final design:
3.1 years;
Approval into final design to approved for full funding grant
agreement: 1 year;
Total: 14 years, 1 month.
Project[A]: South Corridor I-205/Portland Mall Light Rail Project,
Portland, Oregon;
Begin alternatives analysis to approval into preliminary engineering:
12 years;
Approval into preliminary engineering to approval into final design:
1.5 years;
Approval into final design to approved for full funding grant
agreement: 1.7 years;
Total: 14 years, 2 months.
Project[A]: University Link LRT, Seattle, Washington;
Begin alternatives analysis to approval into preliminary engineering: 5
years;
Approval into preliminary engineering to approval into final design: 1
year;
Approval into final design to approved for full funding grant
agreement: 1.7 years;
Total: 7 years, 9 months.
[A] Projects arrayed in chronological order by the date FTA approved
them to enter preliminary engineering.
Note: This figure includes the time each of the nine projects spent in
the alternatives analysis phase. This phase is conducted at the local
level, with limited FTA involvement. According to FTA officials, the
time spent in alternatives analysis reflects local decision making and
activities, not the New Starts process.
[End of figure]
Some project sponsors, transit consultants, and a transportation
industry association official told us that, over the years, the New
Starts process has become too time consuming. Specifically, several
project sponsors told us that the amount of time it takes for FTA to
determine whether a project can advance into the next phase can be
significant and causes additional costs. In addition, a 2007 Deloitte
study on the New Starts program found that the New Starts process is
perceived by project sponsors as intensive, lengthy, and burdensome.
[Footnote 22] For example, one project sponsor believes that FTA
reviews prolonged its project development by approximately 1 year,
which they estimate cost an additional $24 million.
FTA officials have acknowledged that the requirements of the New Starts
process could add time to project development and have acted to
streamline the process. For example, FTA has allowed projects to
conduct additional engineering while FTA reviews applications for final
design. FTA has also maintained that thorough reviews of project
information can identify issues and challenges with proposed
investments that may later prolong project development. However, FTA
officials also noted that not all project delays can be attributed to
FTA or the New Starts process. FTA officials cited a number of reasons
that a project could be delayed during preliminary engineering or final
design that are outside FTA's control such as changes to a project's
scope, changes in local political leadership, or the loss of local
financial commitment. For example, according to FTA officials, the
Northern Virginia (Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project--Extension to
Wiehle Avenue) project was about to receive FTA approval to enter the
final design phase when the Governor of Virginia requested a period of
6 months to evaluate a potential change in the project's scope--digging
a large-bore 4-mile tunnel for a portion of the project--that the
project sponsor eventually discarded in favor of the original design.
The lack of reliable comprehensive data makes it difficult to develop a
complete understanding of the time it takes projects to move through
the New Starts process. The limited information available and anecdotal
examples suggest that the process can be lengthy. But, without complete
and accurate data, it is difficult to know whether and to what extent
the process has become more time consuming over the years or the
addition of new requirements add to the length of the process. Without
such information, Congress and FTA cannot reliably identify the
location, causes, or extent of the pain points and which options would
be an appropriate response to expedite this process. Moreover, as we
have previously reported, having such information can help agencies
identify weaknesses in programs, assess factors causing the problems,
and modify processes.[Footnote 23]
Legislative and FTA Actions Have Been Taken to Expedite the Process:
SAFETEA-LU created what is commonly called the Small Starts program, a
new capital investment grant program, simplifying the requirements
imposed for those seeking funding for lower cost projects, such as bus
rapid transit, streetcar, and commuter rail projects. This program is
intended to advance smaller scale projects through an expedited and
streamlined evaluation and rating process. In July 2007, FTA
established the eligibility parameters for the Small Starts program.
FTA created a separate eligibility category within the Small Starts
program called Very Small Starts, which is for projects with a total
capital cost of less than $50 million. According to FTA, as of June
2009, one Small Starts project has been awarded a project construction
grant agreement (PCGA), and another is currently being processed.
[Footnote 24] In addition, two projects have received construction
funding through standard grants rather than PCGAs.
SAFETEA-LU also established the Public-Private Partnership Pilot
Program (Penta-P) to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of
public-private partnerships for certain new fixed guideway capital
projects funded by FTA. In January 2007, FTA published the terms of
Penta-P in the Federal Register.[Footnote 25] Penta-P projects may be
eligible for a simplified and accelerated New Starts review process
that is intended to reduce the time and cost to project sponsors. For
example, under Penta-P, the projects are eligible for consideration, on
a case-by-case basis, for accelerated design approvals. Specifically,
FTA could issue concurrent approvals for preliminary engineering and
final design to commence, thus allowing the project to proceed with
final design immediately upon completion of preliminary engineering
without requiring additional approval. To date, FTA has not issued such
concurrent approvals. In 2007, FTA executed memorandums of
understanding for three pilot Penta-P projects that are candidates for
New Starts funding: Houston, Texas; Denver, Colorado; and Oakland,
California. According to FTA officials, as of July 2009, FTA has not
issued concurrent approvals of the type described above as the Penta-P
projects have not yet demonstrated the distribution of risk among the
private and public sectors that would enable FTA to relax its normal
due diligence for approvals into preliminary engineering or final
design.
FTA has also implemented administrative changes designed to expedite
the New Starts process. Examples of these changes include the
following:
* Regular training workshops: FTA has developed and offered regular
training workshops for project sponsors and offered information to
project sponsors to end misconceptions about the New Starts process.
For example, in March 2009, FTA offered two New Starts workshops in
Phoenix, Arizona, and Tampa, Florida, on travel forecasting and
provided the materials from these workshops on its Web site. In
addition, in June 2009, FTA offered a course on alternatives analysis
in Los Angeles. FTA also offers New Start roundtables that are usually
2-day meetings between FTA staff and project sponsors of projects in
preliminary engineering and final design seeking New Starts funding.
They consist of presentations by FTA staff and local project sponsors
on topics related to New Starts planning, project development, and the
evaluation and rating process.
* Project delivery tools: In addition to training, FTA has introduced
project delivery tools to assist project sponsors with the New Starts
evaluation and rating process. FTA now requires the submittal of an
alternatives analysis initiation package summarizing corridor problems,
conceptual alternatives, and preliminary evaluation measures to be
used, which, according to FTA, can help to foster coordination among
local participating agencies and FTA. FTA has also developed checklists
for project sponsors to improve their understanding of the requirements
of each phase of the New Starts process. Lastly, FTA has begun to use
road maps with some project sponsors that include schedules and roles
for both FTA and the sponsor.
Options Exist That Could Expedite the New Starts Project Development
Process:
Project sponsors, transit consultants, transit industry associations,
and academics we contacted identified several options for streamlining
the New Starts project development process, including combining project
development phases, using nonbinding or binding agreements, adopting a
more risk-based approach, and promoting project development tools.
[Footnote 26] Although each of these options could streamline the New
Starts evaluation and rating process, each option has advantages and
disadvantages to consider.[Footnote 27]
Combining Project Development Phases:
Project sponsors and transit consultants cited combining project
development phases, such as preliminary engineering and final design,
as an option for expediting the New Starts project development process.
Project sponsors and transit consultants told us that waiting for FTA's
approval to enter preliminary engineering, final design, and
construction can prolong project development. According to project
sponsors, while FTA determines whether a project can advance to the
next project development phase, work on the project essentially stops.
Project sponsors can advance the project at their own risk, meaning
they could have to redo the work if FTA does not subsequently approve
an aspect of the project. The amount of time it takes for FTA to
determine whether a project can advance can be significant. For
example, one project sponsor told us that FTA's review of its
application to advance from alternatives analysis to preliminary
engineering took 8 months, about the same amount of time it took the
project sponsor to complete alternatives analysis. FTA officials told
us the length of time for reviews depends on a number of factors, most
importantly the completeness and accuracy of the project sponsor's
submissions.
To reduce the "start/stop" phenomena project sponsors described, a
legislative change would be necessary to eliminate the requirement that
FTA approve advancement of a project into final design, which would
effectively combine the preliminary engineering and final design phases
into one "project development" phase, as was done in SAFETEA-LU when
creating a more streamlined version of the process under the Small
Starts program. Furthermore, another option for legislative change
would be to replace the requirement that FTA approve the advancement of
a project into the preliminary engineering phase with a requirement
that FTA approve a project into the overall New Starts program, which
would streamline and simplify the process. In addition, the Deloitte
study recommended combining preliminary engineering and final design,
while simultaneously adjusting the FFGA review date to occur in the
middle of this expanded phase, rather than after final design, where it
traditionally happened. In this regard, the Deloitte study reflected
the sentiments of project sponsors and consultants we interviewed, who
said that combining phases and/or creating a programmatic approval
[Footnote 28] would allow FTA to signal its intent to recommend a
project for funding at an earlier point than the current project
development process allows. This would give sponsors more opportunity
to pursue private financing arrangements and alternative project
delivery methods, such as those being carried out under Penta-P, as
this federal funding provides the certainty needed to encourage private
sector participation. In addition to combining phases, the Deloitte
study also recommended that FTA redefine or more clearly define the
project phases to more accurately reflect FTA's current requirements
and to better accommodate alternative delivery methods.
There are limitations to combining phases of the New Starts project
development process. One limitation to combining phases and clarifying
them is that a legislative change would be necessary. Another
limitation is that, depending on how it is accomplished, combining
phases could impact how FTA integrates NEPA requirements into the
project development process. Finally, combining phases would reduce the
opportunities for FTA to monitor and evaluate high-value projects at
important interim phases; therefore, increasing the potential for
issues or problems to go undetected.
Consider Greater Use of Letters of Intent and Early Systems Work
Agreements:
The linear, phased evaluation process of the New Starts program has
historically hampered project sponsors' ability to utilize alternative
project delivery methods, such as design-build, according to project
sponsors.[Footnote 29] These alternative project delivery methods have
the potential to develop a project cheaper and quicker than traditional
project delivery methods can. However, project sponsors told us it is
difficult to attract private sector interest early enough in the
project development process to use alternative project delivery methods
because there is no guarantee that the project will ultimately receive
federal funding through the New Starts program. The Deloitte study also
noted that New Starts project sponsors miss the opportunity to use
alternative project delivery methods because of the lack of early
commitment of federal funding for the projects. To encourage the
private sector involvement needed, project sponsors, consultants, and
experts we interviewed suggested that FTA use letters of intent, which
are nonbinding agreements, or early system work agreements, which are
binding agreements. Through a letter of intent, FTA announces its
intention to obligate an amount from future available budget authority
to a project. According to private sector entities we interviewed, such
an intended obligation sends a signal of federal support for a project
and, therefore, attaches more certainty to the project. A challenge of
using letters of intent is that they can be misinterpreted as an
obligation of federal funds, when in fact they only signal FTA's
intention to obligate future funds should the project meet all New
Starts criteria and requirements, and budget authority is available. In
addition, because FTA reserves, or sets aside, commitment authority, or
contract authority,[Footnote 30] when it issues letters of intent,
issuing more such letters would reduce the availability of this
authority at a faster pace than issuing more early systems work
agreements. Letters of intent cover the project's full federal share
and, while early systems work agreements actually obligate federal
funds, they obligate only a portion of a project's federal share. As
such, it is possible that, with more frequent use of letters of intent,
FTA's commitment authority could be depleted earlier than expected,
which could affect the anticipated funding stream for future projects.
Finally, another challenge of using an early systems work agreement is
that the law specifies that FTA can only enter into this type of
agreement with a project if a Record of Decision under NEPA has been
issued, and the Secretary finds that a FFGA for the project will be
made and the terms of the agreement will promote ultimate completion of
the project more rapidly and at less cost, thus limiting FTA's ability
to use these agreements.
Tailor the New Starts Evaluation Process to Risks Posed by the
Projects:
Project sponsors, consultants, and experts we interviewed suggested
that FTA adopt a more risk-based evaluation process for New Starts
projects based on a project's cost or complexity, the federal share of
the project's cost, or the project sponsor's New Starts experience. For
example, FTA could align the level of oversight with the proposed
federal share of the project--that is, the greater the financial
exposure for the federal government, the greater the level of
oversight. This was employed with the creation of the Small Starts
program, which is intended to provide a more streamlined process for
smaller and less costly projects. Similarly, FTA could reduce or
eliminate certain reviews for project sponsors who have successfully
developed New Starts projects in the past, while applying greater
oversight to project sponsors who have no experience with the New
Starts project development process. We have noted the value in using
risk-based approaches to oversight. For example, we have previously
reported that assessing risks can help agencies allocate finite
resources and help policymakers make informed decisions.[Footnote 31]
By adopting a more risk-based approach, based on, for example, project
sponsor experience, project scope, total project cost, or federal share
of the cost, FTA could allow select projects to move more quickly
through the New Starts project development process and more efficiently
use its scarce resources. However, a trade-off of not applying all
evaluation measures to every project is that FTA could miss the
opportunity to detect problems early in the project's development.
Further, this practice may move FTA away from their stated management
objective of treating "all projects equitably across the U.S."
Consistently Use Project Development Tools:
Project sponsors said that FTA should more consistently use road maps
or similar tools to define the project sponsor's and FTA's expectations
and responsibilities for moving the project forward. Without
establishing these expectations, project sponsors have historically had
little information about how long it will take FTA to review, for
example, their request to move from alternatives analysis to
preliminary engineering. This lack of information makes it difficult
for the project sponsor to effectively manage the project.
Additionally, FTA previously identified an "adequate schedule" as a key
factor of successful project implementation. Given the benefits of
clearly setting these expectations, Deloitte recommended that FTA use
road maps for all projects. The Deloitte study also observed that
project sponsors would like to see FTA use more project development
agreements, or similar vehicles, early in the development process
because they help clarify expectations on both sides.[Footnote 32]
The following project development tools could increase the transparency
of and help project sponsors navigate the New Starts project
development process:
* Road maps or similar project schedules: FTA has used road maps for
select projects, but the agency does not consistently use them for all
projects. According to FTA, the agency is currently working with
project sponsors to establish road maps for all projects. However,
according to some project sponsors, a limitation of using road maps is
that expected time frames are subject to change--that is, project
schedules often change as a project evolves throughout the development
process. Furthermore, every project is unique, making it difficult to
set a realistic time frame for each phase of development. Consequently,
the road maps can provide only rough estimates of expected time frames.
* Project development agreements (PDA): FTA has used project
development agreements, on a limited basis, to help streamline the New
Starts project development process. PDAs require project sponsors and
FTA to agree on three components: a delivery schedule, a review of key
project development deliverables, and clear expectations from both
sides for demonstrating project development progress, so that each
would be held accountable for the advancement of a project. However, an
FTA official stated that there are differences of opinion inside FTA as
to the relative efficacy of road maps versus project development
agreements. In addition, FTA told us that, as legal documents, PDAs
take so long to negotiate with project sponsors that they may not offer
a streamlining advantage. Because of that, some FTA staff members have
stated a preference for road maps over PDAs and, as an alternative to
PDAs, are currently using the informal road maps described above to
establish milestones and timelines.
Apply Policy and Guidance Changes Only to Future Projects:
Project sponsors told us that the frequent policy and guidance changes
to the New Starts program can result in additional costs and delays as
project sponsors are required to redo analyses to reflect the changes.
In May 2006, FTA modified its policy so that a project that has been
approved for entry into final design would no longer be subject to
changes in New Starts policy and guidance.[Footnote 33] However, this
policy change does not apply to projects approved for entry into
preliminary engineering, which is the New Starts project development
phase that has the most requirements for project sponsors and the phase
where project sponsors told us that frequent changes result in
additional costs and delays. For example, sponsor officials for one
project told us that shortly after they submitted their preliminary
engineering approval materials to FTA, FTA established a new, internal
rule that required a risk assessment to take place prior to FTA's
approval to enter preliminary engineering, instead of during
preliminary engineering. To protect the development schedule, the
officials asked for, but were denied, approval for the project to
proceed under the existing guidance that placed risk assessment
activities during preliminary engineering, or at least to perform the
risk assessment concurrently with preliminary engineering approval to
maintain the schedule. The sponsor said the overall effect of the
change was a delay of the preliminary engineering approval by about 4
months. According to FTA officials, FTA typically allows "grace
periods" when implementing major policy changes to provide sponsors
stability and time to adapt to those changes. Furthermore, another
project sponsor noted that new requirements can prolong project
development because each element of a proposed project is interrelated,
so changing one requirement can stop momentum on a project. To avoid
this rework, some project sponsors, consultants, and experts we
interviewed suggested that FTA apply changes only to future projects,
not projects currently in preliminary engineering. However, by not
applying changes to projects in preliminary engineering, FTA could miss
the opportunity to enhance its oversight of these projects. Also,
applying changes to some projects but not to others would require FTA
staff to create and apply multiple sets of rules to the project
management process, which could create an administrative burden and
move away from a consistent evaluation process.
Revise the Internal Review Process and the Use of Project Management
Oversight Contractors:
Project sponsors told us that FTA could minimize delays due to the
stop/start nature of the development process by an adjustment to FTA
staffing or contractor support levels to allow for multiple,
simultaneous reviews of sponsors' projects, and could reduce
uncertainty by changing the way the agency selects and trains oversight
contractors. Consultants and sponsors told us that FTA's "first-in,
first-out" approach to the review process, while not agency policy,
sometimes can result in FTA reviewing only one project at a time, in
the order they arrive. FTA told us this happens occasionally because of
overlapping demands placed on oversight contractors, who are not able
to perform simultaneous reviews. As a result, the development of low-
risk projects is often prolonged if they happen to sit in the queue
behind more complex projects that were submitted earlier. The Deloitte
study recommended, and consultants and a sponsor we interviewed agreed,
that FTA could adjust its process or staffing, as needed, to enable
multiple reviews to be conducted in parallel. In addition, sponsors and
consultants we interviewed told us some of FTA's PMOCs have little
experience with New Starts or Small Starts projects, leaving them
uncertain about FTA requirements. As a consequence, inexperienced PMOCs
sometimes provide inconsistent guidance, resulting in sponsors having
to re-do work, adding time to the development process. To reduce the
PMOC's uncertainties about FTA's requirements, FTA could provide them
with additional training, especially when regulatory and administrative
requirements change. FTA could also streamline the process by using
staff, instead of contractors, to oversee project sponsors. Since staff
possesses more institutional knowledge, they would provide sponsors
more certain guidance. However, shifting more oversight work inside FTA
would add to the scope and complexity of FTA's work and could,
therefore, create staffing challenges.
Conclusions:
FTA's New Starts program is often cited as a model for other federal
transportation programs. FTA's recommendations for funding are based on
a rigorous examination of proposed projects, and Congress has generally
followed FTA's funding recommendations. However, there is concern among
some Members of Congress and the transit industry about the project
development process, namely that it has become too time consuming,
costly, and complex.
Despite congressional and FTA actions to streamline the New Starts
project development process, it continues to be viewed as time
consuming and lengthy. However, the specific areas of concern that lead
to delays, are difficult to determine because of a paucity of
information about the time it has taken projects to move through the
New Starts process. Moreover, this lack of adequate data makes it
difficult for Congress and FTA to assess the extent to which federal
efforts designed to expedite the New Starts process are succeeding.
Although each project is unique, providing this information could also
help set general expectations about the length of the process for
potential project sponsors. While FTA has taken some steps to improve
its data collection and retention, additional work is needed. As
stewards of the New Starts program, which provides millions of dollars
to local communities for transit projects each year, it is FTA's
responsibility to ensure that program changes are based on accurate and
reliable information.
Through our interviews with project sponsors, transit industry
consultants, and transportation experts, as well as our review of
existing research, we identified a number of potential options to
expedite project development within the New Starts program. However,
FTA must also strike the appropriate balance between expediting project
development and maintaining the rigor and accountability of the New
Starts program. As FTA works to develop its proposal for the New Starts
program for the upcoming surface transportation reauthorization,
considering the advantages and disadvantages of these options,
including any potential trade-offs, could help FTA select any options
that expedite the process while maintaining the rigorous oversight of
the process. It is important that the length of project development
within New Starts program does not serve as a deterrent as more
communities turn to transit to solve their transportation challenges.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the New Starts program, we recommend that the Secretary of
Transportation direct the FTA Administrator to take the following two
actions:
* continue to improve data collection and retention for statutorily
defined milestones and determine if additional data would help to
better describe the time it takes for a project to move through the New
Starts process. In doing so, FTA should establish mechanisms to ensure
the accuracy of the data and routinely analyze the data in order to
identify the length of time it takes projects to move through each
phase, potential causes for perceived delays, and potential solutions.
FTA should make its analysis available to Congress and other interested
parties.
* analyze the streamlining options identified in this report, along
with any additional options, to determine which options, if any, to
implement--seeking legislative change if necessary--to expedite the
project development within the New Starts program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided the DOT, including FTA, with a draft copy of this report
for review and comment. In e-mail comments, DOT agreed with our
recommendation to consider options to expedite project development,
noting that the options we identified to help expedite project
development within the New Starts program are consistent with the
options that FTA has been discussing with transit stakeholders and
congressional staff. However, DOT disagreed with our recommendation on
data, as originally drafted, because it did not recognize FTA's ongoing
efforts to improve its data collection. In addition, in its comments,
FTA acknowledged that there are always opportunities to improve various
aspects of the program, including some of the data collection efforts
discussed in this report, but noted that the agency has maintained, and
has access to, the information necessary to effectively track active
projects and review progress through milestones for past projects.
Furthermore, FTA expressed concern that the report uses a standard for
data management that is neither intended nor necessary for effective
project management. FTA officials also stated that, even with the most
comprehensive milestone data, each project represents a unique set of
challenges that will impact the time it takes for a project to pass
through the New Starts process. More broadly, FTA officials stated that
they use milestone data to manage the program and make changes to
improve the program.
To address these comments, we incorporated additional information about
FTA's ongoing efforts to strengthen its data management process in the
report. We also revised in the report the recommendation on data
collection to reflect FTA's ongoing work while still emphasizing the
need to improve the agency's milestone data collection and retention,
including the reliability and accuracy of the data. In addition, we
agree that each New Starts project represents a unique set of
circumstances that will affect the time it takes to pass through FTA
decision phases and further recognized this fact in the report.
However, we disagree with the assertion that we hold this information
to a standard neither intended nor necessary for effective program
management. An effective system of internal controls requires that
managers have relevant and reliable information to better achieve
agencies' missions and program results. As we note in the report, FTA
project milestone data are unreliable and, in some cases, inaccurate,
which can jeopardize effective program management. We and others have
recognized FTA's New Starts process as providing a sound, rigorous and
systematic process for identifying projects worthy of federal
discretionary funding for major transit investments, and analysis based
on reliable data will only help strengthen FTA's management of the
program. We, therefore, believe that this recommendation, as revised,
is valid.
DOT also provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees and DOT. The report also is available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at flemings@gao.gov or (202) 512-2834. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Susan A. Fleming:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Administration Requests $1.83 Billion in Fiscal Year 2010
Funding for New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts Projects:
FTA Evaluated and Rated 14 New Starts Projects and Recommended 5 New
Projects for Funding in Fiscal Year 2010:
The Federal Transit Administration evaluated and rated 14 New Starts
projects in preliminary engineering and final design during the fiscal
year 2010 cycle. FTA also reviewed the progress but did not rate 5
projects that are statutorily exempt from being rated.[Footnote 34]
(See table 4 for a full list of these projects.)
Table 1: New Starts Projects Evaluated and Rated for Fiscal Year 2010
by Phase of New Starts Process (Dollars in millions):
Final design:
Project name: New Britain--Hartford Busway;
Location: Hartford, Conn.;
Total capital cost: $569.3;
Federal share of capital cost: 48%;
Overall project rating: Medium.
Project name: Urban Transitway Phase II;
Location: Stamford, Conn.;
Total capital cost: $48.3;
Federal share of capital cost: 51%;
Overall project rating: Exempt.
Project name: Wilmington to Newark Commuter Rail Improvements;
Location: Wilmington, Del.;
Total capital cost: $78.4;
Federal share of capital cost: 32%;
Overall project rating: Exempt.
Project name: Central Florida Commuter Rail Transit--Initial Operating
Segment[A];
Location: Orlando, Fla.;
Total capital cost: $357.2;
Federal share of capital cost: 50%;
Overall project rating: Medium.
Project name: Access to the Region's Core[B];
Location: Northern New Jersey;
Total capital cost: $8,700.0;
Federal share of capital cost: 34%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high.
Project name: South County Commuter Rail;
Location: Providence, R.I.;
Total capital cost: $49.2;
Federal share of capital cost: 51%;
Overall project rating: Exempt.
Preliminary engineering:
Project name: Modern Streetcar[C];
Location: Tucson, Ariz.;
Total capital cost: $150.1;
Federal share of capital cost: 17%;
Overall project rating: Exempt.
Project name: South Corridor Phase 2[A];
Location: Sacramento, Calif.;
Total capital cost: $270.0;
Federal share of capital cost: 50%;
Overall project rating: Medium.
Project name: Central Subway LRT;
Location: San Francisco, Calif.;
Total capital cost: $1,298.0;
Federal share of capital cost: 59%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high.
Project name: East Corridor[C];
Location: Denver, Colo.;
Total capital cost: $2,043.8;
Federal share of capital cost: 39%;
Overall project rating: Medium.
Project name: Gold Line[C];
Location: Denver, Colo.;
Total capital cost: $859.5;
Federal share of capital cost: 28%;
Overall project rating: Medium.
Project name: Orange Line Phase 2: North Corridor Metrorail Extension;
Location: Miami, Fla.;
Total capital cost: $1,504.7;
Federal share of capital cost: 47%;
Overall project rating: Medium-low.
Project name: Assembly Square Station[C];
Location: Boston, Mass.;
Total capital cost: $47.7;
Federal share of capital cost: 52%;
Overall project rating: Exempt.
Project name: Silver Line Phase III;
Location: Boston, Mass.;
Total capital cost: $2,106.5;
Federal share of capital cost: 60%;
Overall project rating: Medium-low.
Project name: Central Corridor LRT;
Location: St. Paul-Minneapolis, Minn.;
Total capital cost: $914.9;
Federal share of capital cost: 50%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high.
Project name: Northeast Corridor Light Rail Project;
Location: Charlotte, N.C.;
Total capital cost: $749;
Federal share of capital cost: 50%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high.
Project name: Milwaukee LRT[C];
Location: Portland, Ore.;
Total capital cost: $1,471.7;
Federal share of capital cost: 50%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high.
Project name: North Corridor LRT[A, C];
Location: Houston, Tex.;
Total capital cost: $677.0;
Federal share of capital cost: 49%;
Overall project rating: Medium.
Project name: Southeast Corridor LRT[A, C];
Location: Houston, Tex.;
Total capital cost: $680.6;
Federal share of capital cost: 49%;
Overall project rating: Medium.
Source: GAO summary of New Starts Annual Report on Funding
Recommendations for Fiscal Year 2010.
Note: Projects in this table are listed in alphabetic order by state.
[A] These projects have been recommended for full funding grant
agreements and are in final design or expected to be approved into
final design before the end of summer 2009, the environmental process
has been completed, and any needed railroad agreements have been
negotiated and are at or near completion.
[B] This project has been recommended for an early system work
agreement.
[C] These projects have been approved into New Starts preliminary
engineering since the publication of the fiscal year 2009 annual
report.
[End of table]
Of the 14 New Starts projects evaluated and rated during the fiscal
year 2010 cycle, FTA recommended five new projects for funding through
full funding grant agreements (FFGA) or early system work agreements
(ESWA) this year. In its annual report, FTA states that these projects
recommended for funding are in final design or expected to be approved
into final design before the end of summer 2009, the environmental
process has been completed, and any needed railroad agreements have
been negotiated and are at or near completion. For these projects, FTA
recommends a total of $430 million in New Starts funding in fiscal year
2010. The total capital cost of these projects is estimated to be
approximately $11.14 billion.
FTA also recommended, as part of the President's budget request,
reserving $81.79 million in New Starts funding for projects that may
attain the FFGA milestone in the budget year but have not sufficiently
progressed in project development for FTA to recommend them in the
budget request. FTA has not specified which projects will be eligible
for this funding or allocated a particular amount for any given
project. According to the annual report and officials we spoke with at
FTA, this approach will allow the agency to make "real time" funding
recommendations as project uncertainties are mitigated, and Congress
makes final appropriations decisions. FTA does not expect that all of
the projects in preliminary engineering will advance to final design in
fiscal year 2010.
FTA Evaluated and Rated 21 Small Starts and Very Small Starts Projects
and Recommended Funding for 16 Projects:
FTA evaluated and rated 21 eligible Small Starts and Very Small Starts
projects for the fiscal year 2010 cycle. These include 1 project with a
pending project construction grant agreement,[Footnote 35] 16 projects
that have demonstrated sufficient readiness to be considered for
funding in the fiscal year 2010 President's budget request, and 4
projects that have not yet demonstrated readiness to be considered for
funding.[Footnote 36] (See table 5 for a full list of these projects.)
FTA recommends a total of $174.27 million in funding for Small Starts,
including Very Small Starts, projects. The total capital cost of the 16
projects that FTA recommended for funding is estimated to be $895.11
million. Most of these projects are proposed to be funded under a
multiyear PCGA. However, if a project requests less than $25 million in
Small Starts funding or has received its full appropriations, FTA will
award funds in a single-year capital grant rather than a PCGA.
Table 2: Small Starts and Very Small Starts Projects Evaluated and
Rated for Fiscal Year 2010 (Dollars in millions):
Project name: Mountain Links BRT[A];
Location: Flagstaff, Ariz.;
Total capital cost: $10.4;
Federal share of capital cost: 60%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: Livermore-Amador Route 10 BRT[A];
Location: Livermore, Calif.;
Total capital cost: $21.7;
Federal share of capital cost: 50%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: Metro Rapid Bus System Gap Closure[A];
Location: Los Angeles, Calif.;
Total capital cost: $34.5;
Federal share of capital cost: 48%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: Wilshire Boulevard Bus-Only Lane[A];
Location: Los Angeles, Calif.;
Total capital cost: $31.5;
Federal share of capital cost: 74%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: Monterey Bay Rapid Transit[A, B];
Location: Monterey, Calif.;
Total capital cost: $3.5;
Federal share of capital cost: 80%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: East Bay BRT[B];
Location: Oakland, Calif.;
Total capital cost: $234.6;
Federal share of capital cost: 32%;
Overall project rating: High;
Type of project: Small Starts.
Project name: Perris Valley Line[A];
Location: Riverside, Calif.;
Total capital cost: $168.9;
Federal share of capital cost: 44%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high;
Type of project: Small Starts.
Project name: E Street Corridor sbX BRT[A]; Location: San Bernardino,
Calif.;
Total capital cost: $163.4;
Federal share of capital cost: 46%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Small Starts.
Project name: Mid-City Rapid[A];
Location: San Diego, Calif.;
Total capital cost: $43.3;
Federal share of capital cost: 50%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: Van Ness Avenue BRT;
Location: San Francisco, Calif.;
Total capital cost: $118.2;
Federal share of capital cost: 63%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high;
Type of project: Small Starts.
Project name: Metro Express--Airport Way Corridor BRT[A, B];
Location: San Joaquin, Calif.;
Total capital cost: $9.7;
Federal share of capital cost: 29%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: Mason Corridor BRT[A];
Location: Fort Collins, Colo.;
Total capital cost: $82.0;
Federal share of capital cost: 80%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Small Starts.
Project name: BRT Projectab;
Location: Roaring Fork Valley, Colo.;
Total capital cost: $46.4;
Federal share of capital cost: 56%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: Commuter Rail Improvements[A];
Location: Fitchburg, Mass.;
Total capital cost: $150.0;
Federal share of capital cost: 50%;
Overall project rating: Medium-high;
Type of project: Small Starts.
Project name: Division Avenue BRT;
Location: Grand Rapids, Mich.;
Total capital cost: $36.7;
Federal share of capital cost: 80%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: Troost Corridor BRT[A];
Location: Kansas City, Mo.;
Total capital cost: $30.7;
Federal share of capital cost: 80%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: Nostrand Avenue BRT[B];
Location: New York City, N.Y.;
Total capital cost: $88.3;
Federal share of capital cost: 21%;
Overall project rating: High;
Type of project: Small Starts.
Project name: Streetcar Loop[C];
Location: Portland, Ore.;
Total capital cost: $126.9;
Federal share of capital cost: 59%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Small Starts.
Project name: MetroRapid BRT[A, B];
Location: Austin, Tex.;
Total capital cost: $47.0;
Federal share of capital cost: 80%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: Bellevue-Redmond BRT[A];
Location: King County, Wash.;
Total capital cost: $27.0;
Federal share of capital cost: 75%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Project name: Pacific Highway South BRT[A];
Location: King County, Wash.;
Total capital cost: $25.1;
Federal share of capital cost: 56%;
Overall project rating: Medium;
Type of project: Very Small Starts.
Source: GAO summary of New Starts Annual Report on Funding
Recommendations for Fiscal Year 2010.
Note: Projects in this table are listed in alphabetic order by state.
[A] These projects have been recommended for funding in fiscal year
2010.
[B] These projects have been approved into Small Starts Project
Development since the publication of the fiscal year 2009 report.
[C] This project has a pending PCGA. The fiscal year 2009 annual report
recommended the Portland Streetcar Loop project for funding but noted
that while it did receive an overall rating of medium it did not
achieve a Medium rating for cost effectiveness. As the project meets
all the statutory criteria, FTA is advancing the project for funding.
[End of table]
FTA's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal Recommends $1.83 Billion for the
New Starts Program:
The administration's fiscal year 2010 budget proposal recommends that
$1.83 billion be made available for the New Starts program. This amount
is $81.093 million more than the program's fiscal year 2009
appropriation. Figure 4 illustrates the planned uses of the
administration's proposed request for the New Starts fiscal year 2010
budget, including the following:
* $1,123.03 million would be allocated among the 19 projects with
existing FFGAs,
* $430.0 million would be allocated among the 5 projects newly
recommended for funding through FFGAs or ESWAs,
* $81.79 million would be allocated to projects that may attain the
FFGA milestone in the budget year but have not sufficiently progressed
for FTA to recommend them in the budget request,
* $174.25 million would be allocated among the 16 Small Starts projects
newly recommended for funding, and:
* $18.27 million for management and oversight activities.
Figure 4: Allocation of FTA's Recommended Fiscal Year 2010 Budget for
New Starts:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Existing FFGAs, $1,123.03 million: 61%;
New FFGA and ESWA, $430.0 million: 23%;
Small Starts projects, $174.25 million: 10%;
Possible FFGAs, $81.79 million: 5%;
Management and oversight activities, $18.27 million: 1%.
Source: GAO analysis of FTA data.
Note: FTA is authorized to use up to 1 percent of amounts made
available for the New Starts program for project management and
oversight activities.
[End of figure]
Recovery Act Funding Allowed FTA to Accelerate Payments to Projects
with FFGAs:
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) provided FTA
with over $740 million in funding for the New Starts program. This
funding for surface transportation projects allowed FTA to accelerate
payments to transit projects with existing FFGAs and PCGAs. FTA
distributed Recovery Act funding to 11 projects in construction with
fiscal year 2010 commitments. More specifically, FTA distributed at
least 40 percent of each project's scheduled fiscal year 2010 payment
in Recovery Act funding. According to FTA, 5 projects with demonstrated
cash flow needs that exceeded this distribution received additional
funding. This funding will not require amendments or significant
changes to any FFGAs because the overall federal share of the total
project costs did not change.
FTA Has About $879 Million Remaining in SAFETEA-LU Contingent
Commitment Authority:
The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users Act (SAFETEA-LU), like the Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century, allowed FTA to make contingent commitments for
funding to projects beyond what is authorized in law, subject to future
authorizations and appropriations.[Footnote 37] According to FTA,
SAFETEA-LU and the Recovery Act gave FTA a total contingent commitment
authority of $14.37 billion, of which $12.684 billion has been
committed through FFGAs and preliminary engineering and final design
activities for projects through fiscal year 2009.
FTA officials said that the agency has approximately $879 million
remaining in contingent commitment authority after consideration of
fiscal year 2010 funding recommendations. FTA officials also told us
that they need additional authority for commitment beyond fiscal year
2010 because FTA is not permitted to spend money beyond its authorized
level. FTA officials noted that the available level of contingent
commitment authority did not influence their fiscal year 2010
recommendations. Further, they stated that they were able to recommend
all of the projects deemed ready for funding because of the additional
Recovery Act funding.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To evaluate the time it has generally taken for projects to move
through the New Starts process we collected and attempted to verify FTA
data on New Starts projects that have advanced through the New Starts
process and received FFGAs after June 1997 to determine the length of
time each project spent in each stage of the process. However, we found
this data to be unreliable based on our reviews of FTA files on a
random sample of 10 projects' milestone dates. We also attempted to
collect data from project sponsors to establish how long it has taken
projects to move through the New Starts process. We contacted each
project sponsor and requested seven milestone dates from alternatives
analysis through FFGA. We received verifiable data for 30 of the 40
projects approved into a FFGA since June 1997. However, of the 30
projects, we received complete sets of milestone data for 9 projects.
Due to the number of projects with complete data, the data from these 9
projects are not generalizeable to the 40 New Starts projects. The
verifiable data included the dated letters the project sponsors sent to
or received from FTA. The data for the beginning of alternatives
analysis are based on several documents, including local government
board meeting minutes that record a decision for the locality to begin
alternatives analysis. We also examined the 2007 Deloitte Development,
LLC, report on FTA's New Starts process and interviewed the project
leader for this study to obtain information on the time it takes for
New Starts projects to move through the process.
To determine the steps Congress and FTA have taken to expedite the New
Starts process, we reviewed documents including our reports on the New
Starts program, federal legislation such as SAFETEA-LU, as well as
other applicable New Starts requirements, and FTA New Starts policy
guidance. In addition, we interviewed FTA officials and attended the
American Public Transportation Association's March 11, 2009,
legislative conference, at which FTA gave a presentation on the New
Starts and Small Starts programs, to obtain information on steps taken
by Congress and FTA to expedite the New Starts process.
To assess the options that exist to expedite the process, we collected
and analyzed information from relevant reports. In particular, we
examined the recommendations from the 2007 Deloitte Development, LLC,
report on FTA's New Starts process and the American Pubic
Transportation Association's October 2008 report on transportation
authorizing law. We interviewed FTA officials, transportation experts
and consultants, industry groups, and project sponsors that chose not
to enter the New Starts pipeline to identify factors contributing to
New Starts project timeline challenges, as well as actions FTA and
Congress have taken to expedite the New Starts process. We also
interviewed these officials to identify additional changes that could
streamline the project development process, as well as the advantages
and disadvantages.
Additionally, we interviewed 9 project sponsors about 10 projects,
including those currently in the New Starts pipeline and those under a
FFGA, about their experiences with and perceptions of the New Starts
process. For each of these projects we interviewed the relevant project
sponsor or contractor, as well as FTA officials with experience
evaluating and overseeing the project. We selected these projects based
on the following criteria: (1) timing (i.e., when projects received a
FFGA); (2) mode (e.g., rail, light rail, or bus); (3) scope (i.e., the
total cost of the project); and (4) projects from different geographic
areas. Because the projects were selected as a nonprobability sample,
the results cannot be generalized to all projects.[Footnote 38] Table 3
lists the New Starts and Small Starts project sponsors we interviewed
for our review.
Table 3: New Starts and Small Starts Project Sponsors Interviewed:
Name of project sponsor: AC Transit;
Location: Oakland, California;
Project type: Small Starts.
Name of project sponsor: Charlotte Area Transit System;
Location: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Project type: New Starts.
Name of project sponsor: City of Fort Collins;
Location: Fort Collins, Colorado;
Project type: Small Starts.
Name of project sponsor: Connecticut Department of Transportation;
Location: Hartford, Connecticut;
Project type: New Starts.
Name of project sponsor: Metropolitan Council;
Location: St. Paul, Minnesota;
Project type: New Starts.
Name of project sponsor: Metropolitan Transportation Authority;
Location: New York City, New York;
Project type: New Starts.
Name of project sponsor: Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority;
Location: Northern Virginia;
Project type: New Starts.
Name of project sponsor: Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation
District of Oregon;
Location: Portland, Oregon;
Project type: New Starts.
Name of project sponsor: Utah Transit Authority;
Location: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Project type: New Starts.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To describe the New Starts and Small Starts projects evaluated, rated,
and recommended for funding in fiscal year 2010 by FTA, we reviewed
FTA's Annual Report on New Starts for Fiscal Year 2010 and interviewed
FTA officials. We spoke to the FTA officials about the number of
projects evaluated, rated, and recommended for funding, the amount of
funding requested for these projects, the total costs of proposed
projects, as well as how FTA allocated its Recovery Act funding.
[Footnote 39]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Timeline Data on New Starts Projects That We Collected
from Project Sponsors, by Mode:
Central Light rail Double Track Project (Md.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: Jan. 1999;
Request entry final design: [Empty];
Approval into final design: Aug. 2000;
Request full funding grant agreement: [Empty];
Approval funding grant agreement: July 2001;
Mode: Light rail.
CTA Ravenswood Line Extension (Ill.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Request entry final design: Apr. 2002;
Approval into final design: Aug. 2002;
Request full funding grant agreement: Jan. 2003;
Approval funding grant agreement: Jan. 2004;
Mode: Heavy rail.
Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project--Extension to Wiehle Ave. (Va.)[A];
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: Aug. 2003;
Approval into preliminary engineering: June 2004;
Request entry final design: Sept. 2007;
Approval into final design: May 2008;
Request full funding grant agreement: Oct. 2008;
Approval funding grant agreement: Mar. 2009;
Mode: Heavy rail.
Eastside Corridor LRT Project (Calif.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: June 1999;
Request entry preliminary engineering: July 2000;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Oct. 2000;
Request entry final design: May 2002;
Approval into final design: Oct. 2002;
Request full funding grant agreement: May 2003;
Approval funding grant agreement: June 2004;
Mode: Light rail.
Euclid Corridor Transportation Project (Ohio);
Beginning alternatives analysis: Mar. 1993;
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: Sept. 1996;
Request entry final design: Dec. 2001;
Approval into final design: July 2002;
Request full funding grant agreement: Sept. 2002;
Approval funding grant agreement: Oct. 2004;
Mode: Bus.
Hiawatha Avenue Corridor (Minn.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Request entry final design: Sept. 1999;
Approval into final design: Apr. 2000;
Request full funding grant agreement: June 2000;
Approval funding grant agreement: Nov. 2000;
Mode: Light rail.
Hudson Bergen Light rail Transit System (N.J.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Request entry final design: [Empty];
Approval into final design: [Empty];
Request full funding grant agreement: [Empty];
Approval funding grant agreement: Oct. 2000;
Mode: Light rail.
Interstate Max Project: North/South Corridor (Ore.)[A];
Beginning alternatives analysis: Apr. 1993;
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Request entry final design: Oct. 1999;
Approval into final design: Feb. 2000;
Request full funding grant agreement: [Empty];
Approval funding grant agreement: Sept. 2000;
Mode: Light rail.
Largo Town Center Metrorail Extension (D.C.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: July 1997;
Request entry final design: [Empty];
Approval into final design: July 2000;
Request full funding grant agreement: May 2000;
Approval funding grant agreement: Dec. 2000;
Mode: Heavy rail.
Medical Center Rail Extension (Tenn.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: Oct. 1997;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Apr. 1998;
Request entry final design: Dec. 1999;
Approval into final design: May 2000;
Request full funding grant agreement: [Empty];
Approval funding grant agreement: Dec. 2000;
Mode: Light rail.
Metra North Central Service Improvements (Ill.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: Apr. 1997;
Request entry preliminary engineering: Dec. 1997;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Jan. 1999;
Request entry final design: May 2000;
Approval into final design: Oct. 2000;
Request full funding grant agreement: Mar. 2001;
Approval funding grant agreement: Nov. 2001;
Mode: Commuter rail.
Metra South West Service Improvements and Extension (Ill.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: Apr. 1997;
Request entry preliminary engineering: Dec. 1997;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Jan. 1999;
Request entry final design: Oct. 2000;
Approval into final design: Jan. 2001;
Request full funding grant agreement: Mar. 2001;
Approval funding grant agreement: Nov. 2001;
Mode: Commuter rail.
Metra Union Pacific West Line Extension/Central Kane (Ill.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: Apr. 1997;
Request entry preliminary engineering: Dec. 1997;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Jan. 1999;
Request entry final design: Aug. 2000;
Approval into final design: Jan. 2001;
Request full funding grant agreement: Mar. 2001;
Approval funding grant agreement: Nov. 2001;
Mode: Commuter rail.
MTA Long Island rail Road East Side Access (N.Y.)[A];
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Request entry final design: [Empty];
Approval into final design: Feb. 2002;
Request full funding grant agreement: June 2006;
Approval funding grant agreement: [Empty];
Mode: Commuter rail.
Newark Elizabeth rail Link (N.J.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Request entry final design: [Empty];
Approval into final design: [Empty];
Request full funding grant agreement: [Empty];
Approval funding grant agreement: Aug. 2000;
Mode: Light rail.
North Shore Light rail Transit Connector (Pa.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: Jan. 1999;
Request entry preliminary engineering: Sept. 2000;
Approval into preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Request entry final design: Sept. 2002;
Approval into final design: Apr. 2003;
Request full funding grant agreement: Jan. 2006;
Approval funding grant agreement: Sept. 2006;
Mode: Light rail.
Norfolk Light rail Transit Project (Va.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: Sept. 1993;
Request entry preliminary engineering: Aug. 2002;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Nov. 2002;
Request entry final design: Nov. 2005;
Approval into final design: Sept. 2006;
Request full funding grant agreement: Feb. 2007;
Approval funding grant agreement: Oct. 2007;
Mode: Light rail.
Northstar Corridor rail Project (Minn.)[A];
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: Mar. 2000;
Approval into preliminary engineering: June 2000;
Request entry final design: June 2001;
Approval into final design: Sept. 2006;
Request full funding grant agreement: June 2007;
Approval funding grant agreement: Dec. 2007;
Mode: Commuter rail.
Oceanside Escondido rail Project (Calif.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: June 1997;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Jan. 1998;
Request entry final design: Nov. 1999;
Approval into final design: Mar. 2000;
Request full funding grant agreement: Apr. 2002;
Approval funding grant agreement: Feb. 2003;
Mode: Light rail.
Rehabilitate CTA Douglas Branch (Ill.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Request entry final design: Feb. 2000;
Approval into final design: June 2000;
Request full funding grant agreement: Dec. 2000;
Approval funding grant agreement: Jan. 2001;
Mode: Heavy rail.
San Francisco Airport Extension (Calif.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: June 1990;
Request entry preliminary engineering: Aug. 1992;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Oct. 1992;
Request entry final design: [Empty];
Approval into final design: [Empty];
Request full funding grant agreement: Mar. 1996;
Approval funding grant agreement: June 1997;
Mode: Heavy rail.
Second Avenue Subway (N.Y.)[A];
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: Dec. 2001;
Request entry final design: Mar. 2006;
Approval into final design: Apr. 2006;
Request full funding grant agreement: [Empty];
Approval funding grant agreement: Nov. 2007;
Mode: Heavy rail.
South Corridor I-205/Portland Mall Light rail Project (Ore.)[A];
Beginning alternatives analysis: Apr. 1993;
Request entry preliminary engineering: Aug. 2003;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Mar. 2004;
Request entry final design: Apr. 2005;
Approval into final design: Oct. 2005;
Request full funding grant agreement: Mar. 2006;
Approval funding grant agreement: June 2007;
Mode: Light rail.
South Corridor LRT, (N.C.)[A];
Beginning alternatives analysis: Dec. 1997;
Request entry preliminary engineering: June 2000;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Sept. 2000;
Request entry final design: May 2003;
Approval into final design: [Empty];
Request full funding grant agreement: [Empty];
Approval funding grant agreement: [Empty];
Mode: Light rail.
Southeast Corridor Light rail (T-Rex) (Colo.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: Apr. 1995;
Request entry preliminary engineering: Nov. 1997;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Feb. 1998;
Request entry final design: Apr. 2000;
Approval into final design: May 2000;
Request full funding grant agreement: Oct. 2000;
Approval funding grant agreement: Nov. 2000;
Mode: Light rail.
South Florida Double Track Corridor Improvement Program (Fla.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Request entry final design: [Empty];
Approval into final design: [Empty];
Request full funding grant agreement: Nov. 1999;
Approval funding grant agreement: Apr. 2004;
Mode: Commuter rail.
Stage II LRT (Pa.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: Dec. 1995;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Feb. 1996;
Request entry final design: [Empty];
Approval into final design: [Empty];
Request full funding grant agreement: Apr. 2000;
Approval funding grant agreement: Jan. 2001;
Mode: Light rail.
University Link LRT (Wash.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: Apr. 2001;
Request entry preliminary engineering: Aug. 2005;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Dec. 2005;
Request entry final design: May 2006;
Approval into final design: Dec. 2006;
Request full funding grant agreement: Jan. 2008;
Approval funding grant agreement: Jan. 2009;
Mode: Light rail.
Wilsonville to Beaverton Commuter rail Project (Ore.)[A];
Beginning alternatives analysis: [Empty];
Request entry preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Approval into preliminary engineering: [Empty];
Request entry final design: May 2002;
Approval into final design: May 2004;
Request full funding grant agreement: [Empty];
Approval funding grant agreement: Oct. 2006;
Mode: Commuter rail.
West Corridor Light rail (Colo.);
Beginning alternatives analysis: Apr. 1995;
Request entry preliminary engineering: Dec. 2000;
Approval into preliminary engineering: Mar. 2001;
Request entry final design: June 2005;
Approval into final design: Aug. 2005;
Request full funding grant agreement: June 2008;
Approval funding grant agreement: Jan. 2009;
Mode: Light rail.
Source: GAO analysis of project sponsor documents.
[A] Designates projects whose sponsors we interviewed, and from whom we
collected data.
Note: The data in this table are based on dated letters the project
sponsors sent to or received from FTA. The data for the beginning of
alternatives analysis is based on several different kinds of documents,
including Environmental Impact Statements and local government board
meeting minutes that record a decision for the locality to begin
alternatives analysis or major investment study.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Susan Fleming, (202) 512-2834, or flemings@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, A. Nicole Clowers, Acting
Director; Kyle Browning; Lauren Calhoun; Gary Guggolz; Brandon Haller;
and Carrie Wilks made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Fixed guideway systems use and occupy a separate right-of-way for
the exclusive use of public transportation services. These fixed
guideway systems include fixed rail, exclusive lanes for buses and
other high-occupancy vehicles, and other systems. A FFGA establishes
the terms and conditions for federal funds available for the project,
including the maximum amount of government financial assistance.
[2] Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 5309(j), 119 Stat. 1144, 1584 (2005).
[3] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-917], Public
Transportation: Future Demand Is Likely for New Starts and Small Starts
Programs, but Improvements Needed to the Small Starts Application
Process (Washington, D.C.; July 27, 2007).
[4] 49 U.S.C. § 5309(k)(2).
[5] For information on issues related to the New Starts evaluation
measures, see [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-844],
Public Transportation: Improvements Are Needed to More Fully Assess
Predicted Impacts of New Starts Projects (Washington, D.C.: July 25,
2008).
[6] 49 U.S.C. § 5309(g)(2).
[7] 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. FTA requires projects to have progressed
beyond the NEPA scoping phase before it will approve entry into New
Starts preliminary engineering. The scoping phase of a project is a
requirement of the NEPA process focused on identifying significant
issues related to a proposed action. Additionally, the scoping phase
may include a determination of the range of alternatives to be
addressed in NEPA documents.
[8] To gain approval for entry into preliminary engineering, a project
must (1) be identified through the alternatives analysis process, (2)
be included in the region's long-term transportation plan, (3) meet the
statutorily defined project justification and financial criteria, and
(4) demonstrate that the sponsors have the technical capability to
manage the project during the preliminary engineering phase. Some
federal New Starts funding is available to projects for preliminary
engineering activities, if so appropriated by Congress.
[9] 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(iii) and implementing regulation 40 C.F.R. §
1501.2(c) requires the study and development of alternatives to a
proposed action.
[10] Final design is the last phase of project development before
construction and may include right-of-way acquisition, utility
relocation, and the preparation of final construction plans and cost
estimates.
[11] The exceptions to the evaluation process are statutorily exempt
projects, which are those with requests for less than $25 million in
New Starts funding. Sponsors of these projects are not required to
submit project justification information (although FTA encourages the
sponsors to do so). These projects are exempt until such time as a
final regulation implementing certain provisions of SAFETEA-LU is
complete. FTA does not rate these projects. As a result, the number of
projects in the preliminary engineering or final design phases may be
greater than the number of projects evaluated and rated by FTA.
[12] In May 2009, FTA took steps to address concerns about the
exclusion of some project justification criteria from the evaluation
process. In a "Notice of Availability of Proposed Guidance for New
Starts/Small Starts Policies and Procedures" and "Request for Comments"
in the Federal Register, FTA proposed changing the weights assigned for
the project justification criteria for New Starts projects.
Specifically, FTA proposes to set the weights at 20 percent each for
the mobility, cost-effectiveness, land use, and economic development
criteria, and 10 percent each for operating efficiencies and
environmental benefits. 74 Fed. Reg. 23776 (May 20, 2009).
[13] The administration's funding recommendations are made in the
President's budget request and are included in FTA's annual New Starts
report to Congress, which is released each February in conjunction with
the President's budget request. See appendix I for a summary of the
annual report for fiscal year 2010.
[14] For more information on the changes SAFETEA-LU made to the New
Starts program and the status of their implementation, see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-819], Public Transportation: New
Starts Program in a Period of Transition (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30,
2006) and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-917].
[15] The legislation also requires that projects be funded only if they
are justified based on a "comprehensive review" of its (1) mobility
improvements, (2) environmental benefits, (3) cost-effectiveness, (4)
operating efficiencies, (5) economic development effects, and (6)
public transportation supportive land use policies and future patterns.
The legislation also lists a number of factors to be analyzed,
evaluated, and considered, including congestion relief, improved
mobility, air and noise pollution, and energy consumption.
[16] Small Starts projects are defined as those that are requesting
less than $75 million in federal funding and have a total estimated net
capital cost of less than $250 million. Transit projects that qualify
for the Small Starts program are referred to as "Small Starts projects"
in this report as well as in FTA's guidance and reports. Transit
projects that do not qualify for the Small Starts program because they
request more federal funding, or are larger in scope, than is permitted
by 49 U.S.C. § 5309(e) are referred to as "New Starts projects." Thus,
in this report, we use the term "New Starts" in two contexts: (1) to
identify projects that are larger in scope than is permitted by 49
U.S.C. § 5309(e) and (2) as a reference to the entire capital
investment grants program that is subject to 49 U.S.C. § 5309(d) or
(e).
[17] Very Small Starts projects must meet the same eligibility
requirements as Small Starts projects and be located in corridors with
more than 3,000 existing riders per average weekday who will benefit
from the proposed project. In addition, the projects must have a total
capital cost of less than $50 million (for all project elements) and a
per-mile cost of less than $3 million, excluding rolling stock (e.g.,
train cars).
[18] As relevant here, 44 U.S.C. chapters 21, 29, 31, and 33, and 36
C.F.R. Part 1222.
[19] GAO, Managing For Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-927] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2005).
[20] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). An internal control is an integral
component of an organization's management that provides reasonable
assurance that the following objectives are being achieved: (1)
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of
financial reporting, and (3) compliance with applicable laws and
regulations.
[21] Alternatives analysis is conducted at the local level, with
limited FTA involvement. Thus, according to FTA officials, FTA has
limited influence on the amount of time projects spend in the
alternatives analysis phase.
[22] In June 2006, FTA commissioned Deloitte Development LLC to review
the New Starts project development process and identify opportunities
for streamlining or simplifying the process. See Deloitte Development
LLC, New Starts Program Assessment (Feb. 12, 2007).
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-927].
[24] A project construction grant agreement, like a FFGA, is a
multiyear binding agreement that formally establishes the maximum level
of federal financial assistance and outlines the terms and conditions
of federal financial participation. A project construction grant
agreement is used for projects requiring less than $75 million in New
Starts funding with a total project cost of less than $250 million.
[25] 72 Fed. Reg. 2583 (January 2007).
[26] The options that we identify in this section of the report are
based on information we obtained from our interviews with New Starts
project sponsors, transit industry associations, transit consultants,
and academics. Not all of these officials identified each of these as
options for streamlining the New Starts evaluation and rating process.
Therefore, our intent is not to focus on the frequency with which the
officials identified each option, but to inform the reader about the
various options that could streamline the New Starts process in the
future.
[27] As of the issuance date of this report, DOT officials were in the
process of formulating its reauthorization proposal for the New Starts
process. Therefore, DOT officials did not comment on the options
project sponsors and industry stakeholders told us would expedite
project development within the New Starts program.
[28] Approval to enter the New Starts program would convey FTA's intent
to recommend a project for funding so long as the project continued to
meet certain broad criteria and satisfy NEPA and other project
development conditions.
[29] Design-build is a project delivery approach where, in contrast to
the design-bid-build approach that FTA's project evaluation process is
aligned with, the design and construction are contracted out to a
single entity. This approach is used to minimize the project risk for
an owner and to reduce the delivery schedule by overlapping the design
phase and construction phase of a project. Design-bid-build is a
project delivery approach in which the agency or owner (e.g., transit
operator) contracts with separate entities for the design and
construction of a project.
[30] Contract authority is budget authority that permits an agency to
incur obligations in advance of appropriations, including collections
sufficient to liquidate the obligation or receipts. Contract authority
is unfunded, and a subsequent appropriation or offsetting collection is
needed to liquidate the obligations. GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in
the Federal Budget Process, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-734SP] (Washington, D.C.: September
2005).
[31] GAO, Highlights of a Forum Convened by the Comptroller General of
the United States: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles
in Homeland Security, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-627SP] (Washington, D.C.: April
2008).
[32] FTA included a provision for project development agreements in its
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued in August, 2007, which proposed
mandatory execution of project development agreements before projects
could be accepted into preliminary engineering. However, the notice was
withdrawn in February, 2009 after FTA determined withdrawal was
"warranted due to an intervening statutory change." That change was the
June 2008 SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act, which required FTA to
"give comparable, but not necessarily equal, numerical weight to each
project justification criteria in calculating the overall project
rating" for both New Starts and Small Starts projects. In withdrawing
the notice, FTA wrote that those revisions would require such a
fundamental change to how FTA weighs the criteria that a new approach
to rulemaking for the New Starts and Small Starts programs was
required.
[33] This policy would not exempt a project from new statutory or
regulatory guidelines, as it is outside FTA's authority to do so.
[34] Projects requesting less than $25 million in New Starts funding
were not evaluated and rated during the fiscal year 2010 cycle because
under 49 U.S.C. §5309(e)(1)(B) they are exempt from the New Starts
evaluation and rating process until such time as a final regulation
implementing certain provisions of SAFETEA-LU is completed.
[35] Financial assistance for construction of Small Starts projected is
provided through a PCGA, which are similar to FFGAs and are negotiated
during project development.
[36] In the fiscal year 2010 New Starts annual report, FTA recommends a
Small Starts project, Portland Streetcar Loop, for a PCGA even though
it received a low cost-effectiveness rating. According to an FTA
official we spoke with, FTA is advancing the project for funding
because it meets all the statutory criteria. The official also noted
that the policy instituted in 2005 that all projects receive a medium
cost-effectiveness rating before they are recommended for funding was
an "administrative requirement" of the previous administration, and the
new administration believes that the Portland project is worth funding
given its other predicted benefits.
[37] See Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 3011(g)(2)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 1144, 1580
(2005), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5309(g)(2)(B)(ii). This contingent
commitment authority is designed to allow FTA to execute grant
agreements that extend beyond SAFETEA-LU's 5-year period.
[38] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population because in a nonprobability sample some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[39] American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
title XII, 123 Stat. 115, 209-211.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
