Federal Aviation Administration
Agency Is Taking Steps to Plan for and Train Its Technician Workforce, but a More Strategic Approach Is Warranted Gao ID: GAO-11-91 October 22, 2010Since 2006, air traffic control (ATC) equipment outages and failures at Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) facilities have caused hundreds of flight delays and raised questions about FAA's maintenance capabilities. About 6,100 technicians maintain FAA's current (legacy) facilities and equipment and will be responsible for the Next Generation (NextGen) technologies planned for the next 15 years. Safe and efficient air travel will therefore partly depend on FAA's having technicians with the right skills now and in the future. As requested, GAO reviewed how (1) FAA incorporates key practices of leading organizations in its workforce planning for technicians, (2) FAA's technician training compares with key practices of leading organizations, and (3) the costs of technician training, including travel costs, have changed in recent years. GAO analyzed FAA workforce and training data, compared FAA planning and training practices with criteria identified in prior GAO work, and conducted focus group interviews with FAA technicians and FAA Training Academy instructors.
FAA has followed some key practices of leading organizations in its strategic workforce planning for technicians but lacks a comprehensive, written strategy to guide its efforts. GAO assessed whether FAA followed those practices fully, mostly, or partially, or did not follow them. For example, FAA partially follows one practice--determining critical skills and competencies--because it assesses those skills and competencies its technicians now have to maintain legacy systems, but has just begun to identify those they will need to maintain NextGen systems. FAA also partially develops strategies to close the gap between the technician workforce it needs and the one that it has: It determines staffing needs annually, but lacks a longer-term strategy to address the hundreds of technician retirements projected through 2020. Without a comprehensive, written technician workforce planning strategy, FAA does not have a transparent road map to acquire and retain the right number of technicians with the right skills at the right time. FAA mostly follows other leading workforce planning practices, although it only partially involves key stakeholders--managers, but not technicians--in workforce planning and may thus be missing opportunities for improvement. FAA at least partially follows key practices of leading organizations in its strategic training and development for technicians, but it lacks a strategic training plan, and workload issues limit its ability to fully incorporate key leading practices. With the transition to NextGen, technicians will need to be trained both to maintain new systems and to remain proficient in maintaining the legacy systems that FAA plans to continue operating. FAA has partially implemented a strategic approach to planning for training in that it has established annual training goals and incorporated employees' developmental goals in its planning processes. As noted, however, it has just begun to identify the skills and competencies technicians will need to maintain NextGen systems. FAA mostly follows other key practices for design and development, such as developing a mix of in-house and vendor training. FAA is studying the feasibility of having vendors provide certain courses that are currently offered through the FAA Training Academy and are filled to capacity. FAA partially follows leading practices for implementing training and development, but workload demands often limit technicians' opportunities to attend training. FAA also partially follows leading practices for demonstrating how training and development efforts contribute to improved performance and results. For example, FAA identifies annual training goals, but does not link them to specific performance goals. As a result, it is limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its investments in training. Recent compensation costs for instructors at the FAA Training Academy have been roughly stable, while those for student travel to and from the academy and for training courses provided by vendors, exclusive of travel costs, have risen. The higher student travel costs reflect increases in air fares, and vendor training costs have grown as FAA has rolled out more courses for new equipment in preparation for the deployment of NextGen systems. Among other things, FAA should develop a written technician workforce planning strategy that identifies needed skills and staffing, and a strategic training plan showing how training efforts contribute to performance goals. The Department of Transportation provided technical corrections.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Gerald L. Dillingham Team: Government Accountability Office: Physical Infrastructure Phone: (202) 512-4803GAO-11-91, Federal Aviation Administration: Agency Is Taking Steps to Plan for and Train Its Technician Workforce, but a More Strategic Approach Is Warranted
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2010:
Federal Aviation Administration:
Agency Is Taking Steps to Plan for and Train Its Technician Workforce,
but a More Strategic Approach Is Warranted:
GAO-11-91:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-91, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2006, air traffic control (ATC) equipment outages and failures
at Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) facilities have caused
hundreds of flight delays and raised questions about FAA‘s maintenance
capabilities. About 6,100 technicians maintain FAA‘s current (legacy)
facilities and equipment and will be responsible for the Next
Generation (NextGen) technologies planned for the next 15 years. Safe
and efficient air travel will therefore partly depend on FAA‘s having
technicians with the right skills now and in the future. As requested,
GAO reviewed how (1) FAA incorporates key practices of leading
organizations in its workforce planning for technicians, (2) FAA‘s
technician training compares with key practices of leading
organizations, and (3) the costs of technician training, including
travel costs, have changed in recent years. GAO analyzed FAA workforce
and training data, compared FAA planning and training practices with
criteria identified in prior GAO work, and conducted focus group
interviews with FAA technicians and FAA Training Academy instructors.
What GAO Found:
FAA has followed some key practices of leading organizations in its
strategic workforce planning for technicians but lacks a
comprehensive, written strategy to guide its efforts. GAO assessed
whether FAA followed those practices fully, mostly, or partially, or
did not follow them. For example, FAA partially follows one practice”
determining critical skills and competencies”because it assesses those
skills and competencies its technicians now have to maintain legacy
systems, but has just begun to identify those they will need to
maintain NextGen systems. FAA also partially develops strategies to
close the gap between the technician workforce it needs and the one
that it has: It determines staffing needs annually, but lacks a longer-
term strategy to address the hundreds of technician retirements
projected through 2020. Without a comprehensive, written technician
workforce planning strategy, FAA does not have a transparent road map
to acquire and retain the right number of technicians with the right
skills at the right time. FAA mostly follows other leading workforce
planning practices, although it only partially involves key
stakeholders”-managers, but not technicians”-in workforce planning and
may thus be missing opportunities for improvement.
FAA at least partially follows key practices of leading organizations
in its strategic training and development for technicians, but it
lacks a strategic training plan, and workload issues limit its ability
to fully incorporate key leading practices. With the transition to
NextGen, technicians will need to be trained both to maintain new
systems and to remain proficient in maintaining the legacy systems
that FAA plans to continue operating. FAA has partially implemented a
strategic approach to planning for training in that it has established
annual training goals and incorporated employees‘ developmental goals
in its planning processes. As noted, however, it has just begun to
identify the skills and competencies technicians will need to maintain
NextGen systems. FAA mostly follows other key practices for design and
development, such as developing a mix of in-house and vendor training.
FAA is studying the feasibility of having vendors provide certain
courses that are currently offered through the FAA Training Academy
and are filled to capacity. FAA partially follows leading practices
for implementing training and development, but workload demands often
limit technicians‘ opportunities to attend training. FAA also
partially follows leading practices for demonstrating how training and
development efforts contribute to improved performance and results.
For example, FAA identifies annual training goals, but does not link
them to specific performance goals. As a result, it is limited in its
ability to assess the effectiveness of its investments in training.
Recent compensation costs for instructors at the FAA Training Academy
have been roughly stable, while those for student travel to and from
the academy and for training courses provided by vendors, exclusive of
travel costs, have risen. The higher student travel costs reflect
increases in air fares, and vendor training costs have grown as FAA
has rolled out more courses for new equipment in preparation for the
deployment of NextGen systems.
What GAO Recommends:
Among other things, FAA should develop a written technician workforce
planning strategy that identifies needed skills and staffing, and a
strategic training plan showing how training efforts contribute to
performance goals. The Department of Transportation provided technical
corrections.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-91] or key
components. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.,
at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
FAA Has Adopted Aspects of Some Leading Workforce Planning Practices
but Lacks a Strategic Approach to Planning for Its Technician
Workforce:
FAA's Ability to Plan for Technician Training Is Limited by Shortfalls
in Its Workforce Planning and Identification of Needed Skills and
Competencies:
Certain Academy Training Costs Have Been Roughly Stable, while Those
Vendor Training Costs That FAA Can Identify Have Risen with the
Rollout of Courses for New Equipment:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: ATO Organizational Chart:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: NextGen Systems That FAA Expects to Deploy in the Near Term
and Midterm:
Table 2: Technician Staffing, Equipment, and Facility Levels, Fiscal
Years 1999 through 2009:
Table 3: Comparison of Technician Separations and Hires, 2005 through
2009:
Table 4: Technician Separations, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2009:
Table 5: Number of Technicians Eligible to Retire Compared with Actual
Number of Retirements, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2009:
Table 6: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows
Key Leading Practices:
Table 7: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows a
Key Leading Practice in the Area of Critical Skills and Competencies:
Table 8: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows
Key Leading Practices in the Area of Gap-Closure Strategies:
Table 9: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows
Key Leading Practices in the Area of Supporting Capacity:
Table 10: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows
a Key Leading Practice in the Area of Evaluation:
Table 11: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows
Key Leading Practices in the Area of Stakeholder Involvement:
Table 12: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Training and Development
Efforts Follow Key Leading Practices:
Table 13: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Training and Development
Efforts Follow Key Leading Practices for Planning:
Table 14: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Training and Development
Efforts Follow Key Leading Practices for Design and Development:
Table 15: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Training and Development
Efforts Follow Key Leading Practices for Implementation:
Table 16: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Training and Development
Efforts Follow Key Leading Practices for Evaluation:
Table 17: Compensation-Related Academy Training Costs, Fiscal Years
2006 through 2009:
Table 18: Travel-Related Academy Training Costs, Fiscal Years 2006
through 2009:
Table 19: Cost of Vendor (Out of Agency) Technician Training, Fiscal
Years 2005 through 2010:
Table 20: Specialties Represented in Focus Groups:
Figures:
Figure 1: A Technician Conducting an Equipment Check:
Figure 2: Unscheduled Outages, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2009:
Figure 3: Average Duration of Outages, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2009:
Figure 4: Process for Planning and Funding Technician Training:
Figure 5: Projected Numbers of Technicians Eligible to Retire and
Estimated to Retire, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2020:
Figure 6: Generator Training Classroom at the FAA Academy:
Abbreviations:
ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast:
ARTCC: air route traffic control center:
ATC: air traffic control:
ATO: Air Traffic Organization:
CATMT: Collaborative Air Traffic Management Technologies:
CIP: Capital Investment Plan:
CPDF: Central Personnel Data File:
DALR: Digital Audio Legal Recorder:
DoP: demonstration of proficiency:
EHOT: enhanced hands-on training:
ELMS: Electronic Learning Management System:
ERAM: En Route Automation Modernization:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FIST: FAA Information Superhighway for Training:
GNAS: general national airspace system:
NASPAS: National Airspace System Performance Analysis System:
NVS: National Airspace Voice Switch:
OJT: on-the-job training:
PASS: Professional Airways Safety Specialists:
PC&B: personnel compensation and benefits:
SFFAS: Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards:
SWIM: System-Wide Information Management:
TRACON: terminal radar approach control:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 22, 2010:
The Honorable Jerry F. Costello:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Aviation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the key federal agency
responsible for maintaining the nearly 60,000 pieces of equipment that
help to ensure that the national airspace system operates safely and
efficiently. However, during the last few years, power outages and air
traffic control equipment failures--for example, in Southern
California in 2006, at the Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center in
2008, and at the Salt Lake City Air Route Traffic Control Center in
2009--have caused flight delays.[Footnote 1] FAA's equipment
maintenance staff--referred to in this report as technicians--are
responsible for minimizing the frequency, duration, and impact of such
outages. Trained as systems specialists, electronics technicians, and
computer specialists, they maintain, repair, and certify air traffic
control equipment--including radar, navigation, communication,
automation, and environmental systems deployed throughout the national
airspace system. In 2009, FAA had approximately 6,100 technicians.
This minimum technician staffing level was established under a 2000
contract between FAA and the Professional Airways Safety Specialists
(PASS)--the technicians' bargaining unit. The 5-year contract, which
expired in 2005, remains in effect until a new contract is
established.[Footnote 2]
Today's air traffic systems are primarily ground-based, and some date
back to at least the 1970s. To modernize these systems while improving
the safety, capacity, and efficiency of the national airspace system,
FAA plans to develop and deploy satellite-based air traffic management
technologies, collectively referred to as the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen). FAA has begun to deploy some NextGen
technologies and has set 2025 as a target date for full implementation
of NextGen capabilities. As it transitions to NextGen technologies,
FAA plans to continue operating existing air traffic control
technologies, referred to as legacy systems, while testing and
integrating NextGen technologies. Safe and efficient air travel will
therefore depend on, among other things, FAA's having a sufficient
number of skilled technicians to ensure that both the legacy and the
new systems are properly maintained and certified throughout the
transition. Incorporating key workforce planning and training
practices of leading organizations can help ensure that FAA has a
highly functioning workforce and appropriate training capabilities as
it manages the transition to NextGen.
In light of technicians' critical role in maintaining the nation's air
traffic control infrastructure, you asked us to assess the extent to
which FAA has the personnel with the right skills to maintain its
equipment and facilities now and in the near term and how much FAA is
spending on technician training. To achieve these objectives, we
addressed the following research questions: (1) To what extent does
FAA incorporate key practices of leading organizations in its
workforce planning for technicians? (2) How does FAA's technician
training compare with key practices of leading organizations? (3) How
have the costs of technician training, including travel costs, changed
in recent years?
To assess FAA's workforce planning for technicians, we analyzed FAA
data from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2009 to identify trends
in staffing, hiring, and attrition; reviewed FAA's workforce planning
documents; and compared the agency's workforce planning practices with
criteria from our past work.[Footnote 3] We selected key leading
practices, listed in tables throughout the report, and assessed the
extent to which FAA followed each practice by applying the following
scale: "Fully" indicated that, in our judgment, all or virtually all
aspects of the practice were followed; "mostly" indicated that more
than half but less than all or virtually all were followed;
"partially" indicated that less than half but more than a few were
followed; and "minimally" indicated that few or no aspects of the
practice were followed.
To assess training for technicians, we analyzed FAA training data from
fiscal year 2006 through May 2010 to identify trends in course
offerings and determine the number of classes, students, and
instructors; reviewed end-of-course surveys and technician training
documents; and compared FAA's development and delivery of technician
training with key leading practices identified through our past work,
as described above. In addition, to address both workforce planning
and training, we conducted 12 focus group meetings--11 with FAA
technicians and 1 with FAA Academy managers--at 11 locations and
conducted semistructured interviews with FAA managers and PASS union
officials. To identify the focus group locations, we considered the
number of technicians at the facilities, geographic location, notable
conditions (such as recent equipment outages), and agency and PASS
recommendations. The information collected from the focus groups is
not generalizable to all FAA technicians.
To determine how the costs of technician training have changed,
including travel costs, we compiled and compared cost data for
training provided at FAA's Training Academy in Oklahoma City and by
vendors from fiscal year 2005 through May 2010. To address all three
questions, we also reviewed documents from the Department of
Transportation's Office of the Inspector General, the National Academy
of Public Administration, and PASS. We assessed the reliability of
FAA's workforce and training data that are pertinent to this effort by
reviewing related documentation and internal controls and interviewing
agency officials and determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for our purposes. We could not assess the reliability of cost
data for vendor training, because FAA's cost accounting system does
not provide costs for vendor training and travel-related activities.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2009 through October 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
contains more detailed information on our scope and methodology.
Background:
FAA's roughly 6,100 technicians are part of the agency's Air Traffic
Organization (ATO) and are located organizationally within ATO's
Technical Operations Services. (See appendix II for ATO's
organization.) Physically, the technicians are located throughout the
country at approximately 600 air traffic control facilities, which
they are responsible for maintaining, repairing, and certifying,
together with the systems and equipment the facilities
contain.[Footnote 4] Currently, FAA operates nearly 60,000 pieces of
legacy equipment and has begun to deploy NextGen equipment.
Technicians maintain the equipment, certify that it is working
properly by conducting periodic performance checks, and repair
malfunctioning equipment and return it to service. They conduct
maintenance under various approaches depending on the equipment. Those
approaches include (1) periodic maintenance (which includes periodic
equipment inspections, performance checks, and routine maintenance),
(2) condition-based maintenance (which includes proactive maintenance
tasks to predict or prevent equipment failures), and (3) run-to-fault
maintenance (which means maintenance is performed after the equipment
stops functioning--an approach that, according to FAA, is normally
applied when other types of maintenance actions will not reduce the
probability of failure or extend the lifetime of the equipment). Since
2007, FAA has used reliability-centered maintenance to determine the
most appropriate approach and timing for conducting maintenance
activities for each type of equipment. Reliability-centered
maintenance requires that data on the function and performance of
specific equipment be collected and analyzed, including data on the
causes and consequences of failure, in order to determine the
maintenance approach needed to keep the equipment functioning
effectively and prevent future failures. For example, performance data
can be analyzed to determine whether a particular component wears out
with age or fails randomly; this information is then used to decide
the maintenance approach most appropriate for that item. (Figure 1
shows a technician upgrading lighting on an approach lighting system.)
Figure 1: A Technician Conducting an Equipment Check:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
As mentioned previously, FAA's technicians are responsible for
minimizing the frequency, duration, and impact of equipment outages.
Over the last 10 years, the frequency and duration of unscheduled
outages has generally increased.[Footnote 5] (See figs. 2 and 3.) Age
and the resulting deteriorating condition of equipment and facilities
are contributing to the increase in outages and repair time. According
to a senior FAA official, the number of outages decreased around 2008
because of changes in reporting practices.
Figure 2: Unscheduled Outages, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Unscheduled Outages: 24,176.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Unscheduled Outages: 26,154.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Unscheduled Outages: 29,694.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Unscheduled Outages: 34,699.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Unscheduled Outages: 34,853.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Unscheduled Outages: 36,814.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Unscheduled Outages: 36,743.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Unscheduled Outages: 37,815.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Unscheduled Outages: 33,825.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Unscheduled Outages: 32,228.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Average Duration of Outages, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Mean time to restore: 15.4 hours.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Mean time to restore: 17.2 hours.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Mean time to restore: 17.9 hours.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Mean time to restore: 20.4 hours.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Mean time to restore: 25.3 hours.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Mean time to restore: 25.1 hours.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Mean time to restore: 29.6 hours.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Mean time to restore: 29.9 hours.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Mean time to restore: 26.6 hours.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Mean time to restore: 30.2 hours.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
Note: Mean time to restore represents the average duration per outage.
[End of figure]
FAA is still determining technician responsibilities and maintenance
requirements under NextGen. A senior FAA official noted that the
agency plans to look at near-term system deployments and new system
requirements to see what maintenance requirements are planned for new
systems in the short term. The initial systems critical to
implementing NextGen--En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) and
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)--are currently
being deployed, and FAA expects that several other systems will come
online over the next several years. (See table 1 for FAA's schedule
for deploying NextGen systems.) Initially, FAA planned to decommission
legacy equipment as it deployed related NextGen equipment, but it has
since decided to retain much of the legacy equipment, according to a
senior ATO manager. As a result, the technicians' workload will
increase in the near term.
Table 1: NextGen Systems That FAA Expects to Deploy in the Near Term
and Midterm:
System: En Route Automation Modernization;
Next major milestone: Installed at 20 en route centers with software
testing under way at several key sites; initial operating capability
at all 20 sites scheduled for fiscal year 2011.
System: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast;
Next major milestone: Under deployment at several test sites;
full deployment of ground-based transceivers expected in fiscal year
2013.
System: System-Wide Information Management (SWIM);
Next major milestone: Deployment expected to start in fiscal year 2010.
System: Collaborative Air Traffic Management Technologies (CATMT);
Next major milestone: Integration of weather data in 2011.
System: NextGen Data Communications (DataComm);
Next major milestone: Deployment schedule not baselined until final
investment decision, expected in fiscal year 2016.
System: National Airspace Voice Switch (NVS);
Next major milestone: Market survey scheduled for 2010.[A]
Source: FAA.
Note: ERAM is foundational to NextGen.
[A] Market surveys involve collecting and analyzing information during
the early stages of procurement planning to understand vendors'
capabilities to satisfy FAA's requirements.
[End of table]
Trends in Size of Technician Workforce:
Over the last 11 years, staffing levels for technicians reached a high
of 6,721 in fiscal year 2001 and, with some fluctuation, dropped to a
low of 6,086 at the end of fiscal year 2008--a decline of about 9
percent. At the end of fiscal year 2009, the number of technicians
increased to 6,147, slightly more than the minimum staffing level
established in FAA's contract with PASS. (See table 2.) Over the same
period, the number of pieces of equipment increased from 40,360 in
1999 to 63,846 in 2009, while the number of air traffic control
facilities decreased from 651 in 1999 to 581 in 2009. The number of
technicians declined slightly during fiscal years 2006 through 2008
because separations exceeded hiring, as shown in table 3.
Table 2: Technician Staffing, Equipment, and Facility Levels, Fiscal
Years 1999 through 2009:
Number of technicians:
Fiscal year: 1999: 6,198;
Fiscal year: 2000: 6,416;
Fiscal year: 2001: 6,721;
Fiscal year: 2002: 6,692;
Fiscal year: 2003: 6,513;
Fiscal year: 2004: 6,345;
Fiscal year: 2005: 6,437;
Fiscal year: 2006: 6,215;
Fiscal year: 2007: 6,109;
Fiscal year: 2008: 6,086;
Fiscal year: 2009: 6,147.
Number of pieces of national airspace system equipment:
Fiscal year: 1999: 40,360;
Fiscal year: 2000: 40,921;
Fiscal year: 2001: 40,910;
Fiscal year: 2002: 40,746;
Fiscal year: 2003: 40,997;
Fiscal year: 2004: 41,082;
Fiscal year: 2005: 40,847;
Fiscal year: 2006: 40,639;
Fiscal year: 2007: 59,140;
Fiscal year: 2008: 60,851;
Fiscal year: 2009: 63,846.
Number of air traffic control facilities:
Fiscal year: 1999: 651;
Fiscal year: 2000: 653;
Fiscal year: 2001: 621;
Fiscal year: 2002: 622;
Fiscal year: 2003: 622;
Fiscal year: 2004: 690;
Fiscal year: 2005: 690;
Fiscal year: 2006: 689;
Fiscal year: 2007: 675;
Fiscal year: 2008: 593;
Fiscal year: 2009: 581.
Sources: Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) and FAA Administrator's
Fact Book (years 2001-2010).
[End of table]
Table 3: Comparison of Technician Separations and Hires, 2005 through
2009:
Number of separations:
2005: 330;
2006: 366;
2007: 309;
2008: 313;
2009: 211.
Number of hires:
2005: 360;
2006: 330;
2007: 235;
2008: 243;
2009: 213.
Net gain or loss:
2005: +30;
2006: -36;
2007: -73;
2008: -70;
2009: +2.
Source: GAO analysis of CPDF and FAA data.
Note: Number of separations is for the fiscal year, and number of
hires is for the calendar year.
[End of table]
During the past 11 years, the number of technician separations--
primarily because of retirements--has averaged about 280 per year. The
number peaked at 366 separations in fiscal year 2006 and then
decreased to 211 separations in fiscal year 2009--a decline of 42
percent. (See table 4.)
Table 4: Technician Separations, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2009:
Retirements (percentage of total separations):
Fiscal year: 1999: 216 (77);
Fiscal year: 2000: 178 (74);
Fiscal year: 2001: 186 (79);
Fiscal year: 2002: 185 (75);
Fiscal year: 2003: 213 (77);
Fiscal year: 2004: 238 (85);
Fiscal year: 2005: 279 (85);
Fiscal year: 2006: 279 (76);
Fiscal year: 2007: 225 (73);
Fiscal year: 2008: 238 (76);
Fiscal year: 2009: 160 (76).
Nonretirements[A]:
Fiscal year: 1999: 57;
Fiscal year: 2000: 59;
Fiscal year: 2001: 44;
Fiscal year: 2002: 53;
Fiscal year: 2003: 50;
Fiscal year: 2004: 38;
Fiscal year: 2005: 44;
Fiscal year: 2006: 74;
Fiscal year: 2007: 71;
Fiscal year: 2008: 63;
Fiscal year: 2009: 40.
Other[B]:
Fiscal year: 1999: 6;
Fiscal year: 2000: 5;
Fiscal year: 2001: 5;
Fiscal year: 2002: 6;
Fiscal year: 2003: 14;
Fiscal year: 2004: 3;
Fiscal year: 2005: 6;
Fiscal year: 2006: 13;
Fiscal year: 2007: 13;
Fiscal year: 2008: 12;
Fiscal year: 2009: 11.
Total separations:
Fiscal year: 1999: 279;
Fiscal year: 2000: 242;
Fiscal year: 2001: 235;
Fiscal year: 2002: 246;
Fiscal year: 2003: 277;
Fiscal year: 2004: 279;
Fiscal year: 2005: 330;
Fiscal year: 2006: 366;
Fiscal year: 2007: 309;
Fiscal year: 2008: 313;
Fiscal year: 2009: 211.
Source: CPDF.
[A] Includes resignations, firings, and deaths.
[B] Includes position changes, such as a technician's assumption of a
supervisory or staff position.
[End of table]
The number of technicians eligible to retire each year over this
period has ranged from about 800 to about 1,000. In 2005 and 2006, the
largest numbers of technicians retired--about one-third of those
eligible each year. (See table 5.) The relatively low number of
technicians retiring in 2009 may be due to the downturn in the economy.
Table 5: Number of Technicians Eligible to Retire Compared with Actual
Number of Retirements, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2009:
Number eligible to retire:
Fiscal year: 1999: 798;
Fiscal year: 2000: 905;
Fiscal year: 2001: 922;
Fiscal year: 2002: 975;
Fiscal year: 2003: 984;
Fiscal year: 2004: 997;
Fiscal year: 2005: 963;
Fiscal year: 2006: 842;
Fiscal year: 2007: 843;
Fiscal year: 2008: 799;
Fiscal year: 2009: 851.
Number of retirements:
Fiscal year: 1999: 216;
Fiscal year: 2000: 178;
Fiscal year: 2001: 186;
Fiscal year: 2002: 185;
Fiscal year: 2003: 213;
Fiscal year: 2004: 238;
Fiscal year: 2005: 279;
Fiscal year: 2006: 279;
Fiscal year: 2007: 225;
Fiscal year: 2008: 238;
Fiscal year: 2009: 160.
Percentage of eligible technicians who retired:
Fiscal year: 1999: 27;
Fiscal year: 2000: 20;
Fiscal year: 2001: 20;
Fiscal year: 2002: 19;
Fiscal year: 2003: 22;
Fiscal year: 2004: 24;
Fiscal year: 2005: 29;
Fiscal year: 2006: 33;
Fiscal year: 2007: 27;
Fiscal year: 2008: 30;
Fiscal year: 2009: 19.
Source: GAO analysis of CPDF data.
[End of table]
Technician Training:
ATO's Technical Operations Training and Development Group (Technical
Operations Training) is responsible for training technicians. (See
appendix II for ATO's organizational chart.) Through the Technical
Operations Training and Personnel Certification Program, FAA grants
certification to technicians who have obtained a professional level
and are responsible for the operation and performance of air traffic
control facilities and equipment. The certification program consists
of five types of training: (1) resident training taught in a classroom
environment by an instructor; (2) distance learning, such as
correspondence study or computer-based instruction; (3) refresher
training, which can be provided through resident or distance learning
courses, for technicians who hold a certification; (4) on-the-job
training (OJT), providing direct experience in the work environment
where the employee is required to perform his or her duties; and (5)
enhanced hands-on training (EHOT) and demonstration of proficiency
(DoP) training. To obtain certification, technicians must
satisfactorily complete their training--including theory-of-operations
training, OJT in the workplace, or EHOT and DoP[Footnote 6]--at the
training location or pass a performance examination in the workplace.
[Footnote 7] Technicians must also receive an endorsement, first by a
manager and then by a second-level manager, that the preceding actions
have been properly completed.
At the beginning of the year, Technical Operations Training works with
FAA's human resource personnel to obtain an estimate of new hires'
training needs. Technicians are earmarked for a piece of equipment at
a particular facility when they are hired; over the course of their
careers, they may be trained on many pieces of equipment. All new
hires must get one equipment course in their first year, and that
training is targeted to the needs of the facility to which they are
assigned. Technicians need to pass two types of equipment courses to
reach the full-performance level. New hires are at their facility for
30 days for familiarization and then go to the FAA Academy for theory-
of-operations training and one equipment course. Afterwards, the
technician's manager determines the additional equipment on which the
technician needs training. Training to work on legacy equipment is
provided at the academy, where technicians reside during the training.
When FAA acquires new air traffic control equipment, it follows an
established process for training technicians. Vendor courses are the
primary source of training for NextGen systems coming into the FAA
inventory. Figure 4 shows how FAA plans and funds technician training.
Figure 4: Process for Planning and Funding Technician Training:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Individual system program offices fund training:
FAA strategic planning includes training for new systems;
Program offices oversee vendor training as system comes online;
FAA contracts for and acquires new system;
Academy sends instructors to system vendor courses to train the
trainer.
ATO Technical Operations Training funds training:
Once system has moved from vendor to FAA ownership, FAA Academy
assumes training;
All academy in-residence training and other nonresidence training
(i.e., computer-based training and correspondence) also provided.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
[End of figure]
FAA Has Adopted Aspects of Some Leading Workforce Planning Practices
but Lacks a Strategic Approach to Planning for Its Technician
Workforce:
FAA's workforce planning for technicians partially or mostly
incorporates key practices of leading organizations, but no practices
are fully incorporated, and FAA has no comprehensive, written strategy
to guide its efforts. To the extent that the agency does not
incorporate leading practices, it may be limited in its ability to
plan effectively for the right number of technicians with the right
skill sets, both now and in the near term.[Footnote 8] Table 6
presents our analysis of the extent to which FAA has incorporated key
practices of leading organizations in its workforce planning.
Table 6: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows
Key Leading Practices:
Key leading practices in strategic workforce planning: Critical skills
and competencies: determine the critical skills and competencies that
will be needed to achieve current and future programmatic results;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Key leading practices in strategic workforce planning: Gap-closure
strategies: develop strategies that are tailored to address gaps in
number, deployment, and alignment of human capital approaches for
enabling and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and
competencies;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Key leading practices in strategic workforce planning: Support
capacity: build the capacity needed to address administrative,
educational, and other requirements important to support workforce
planning strategies;
Does FAA follow?: Mostly.
Key leading practices in strategic workforce planning: Evaluation:
monitor and evaluate the agency's progress toward its human capital
goals and the contribution that human capital efforts have made toward
achieving programmatic results;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Key leading practices in strategic workforce planning: Stakeholder
involvement: involve top management, employees, and other stakeholders
in developing, communicating, and implementing workforce planning
strategies;
Does FAA follow?: Minimally.
Sources: GAO-04-39 and GAO analysis of FAA practices.
[End of table]
FAA Has Established Current Technician Skills and Competencies and
Begun to Determine Those Critical for NextGen:
FAA is partially following a leading practice for workforce planning
in the area of determining current and future critical skills and
competencies. (See table 7.)
Table 7: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows a
Key Leading Practice in the Area of Critical Skills and Competencies:
Key leading practice in strategic workforce planning: Critical skills
and competencies: determine the critical skills and competencies that
will be needed to achieve current and future programmatic results;
* Establish and maintain an inventory of employee skills and
competencies (skills and supporting behaviors) and future needs;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Sources: GAO-04-39 and GAO analysis of FAA practices.
[End of table]
To establish and maintain an inventory of employee skills and
competencies, FAA assesses technicians' skills and competencies at
hiring and then biennially. Newly hired and on-board technicians
complete competency-based technical training on legacy systems and
equipment to establish a baseline level of technical proficiency on
these systems and equipment. Additionally, since August 2007, FAA has
assessed its technicians' proficiency every 2 years as part of an
Aviation Safety Oversight Credentialing Program to ensure that their
skills are current and they remain competent to perform work on the
equipment.
FAA's initial and biennial skills assessments evaluate technicians'
readiness to meet the agency's current maintenance needs, but FAA has
not determined whether its technician workforce has the skills and
competencies needed to achieve future programmatic results. Such a
determination will be critical as the transformation to NextGen
proceeds and the agency faces organizational as well as technological
changes. FAA's strategic plan for NextGen--the NextGen Implementation
Plan--describes the technology changes planned through 2018 but does
not mention workforce planning--including planning for critical skills
and competencies--for technicians.
FAA officials stated that the agency has started to determine its
maintenance requirements for NextGen equipment. This determination
will affect the skills and competencies that technicians will need
under NextGen. As part of this effort, FAA's NextGen Integration and
Implementation Office is establishing a workgroup with members
representing relevant FAA divisions and technician subject matter
experts. According to FAA officials, this workgroup will look at
changes in FAA's maintenance philosophy and NextGen equipment
acquisitions and needs, both leading up to and during implementation.
The officials said FAA will consider these factors as it develops
NextGen planning documents that outline, among other things, changes
needed in the technician workforce, including changes in skills,
competencies, and training. In addition, Technical Operations Training
officials have dedicated a staff member to compile technician job
descriptions, tasks, and training courses. According to the officials,
FAA will use this information to develop a skills and competency model
for training purposes (modeling efforts are discussed later in this
report).
FAA Has an Annual Process for Allocating Its Technician Workforce but
Lacks a Succession Planning Strategy for Addressing Impending
Retirements and a Staffing Model:
FAA's workforce planning efforts partially address leading practices
in developing strategies to close the gap between needed and actual
skills and competencies. Although FAA has reasonable strategies in
place to allocate staffing annually, it does not have a staffing model
and has not developed succession plans to prepare for impending
retirements. (See table 8.)
Table 8: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows
Key Leading Practices in the Area of Gap-Closure Strategies:
Key leading practices in strategic workforce planning: Gap-closure
strategies: develop strategies that are tailored to address gaps in
number, deployment, and alignment of human capital approaches for
enabling and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and
competencies;
* Develop human capital strategies and tools that can be implemented
with the resources that can be reasonably expected to be available;
Does FAA follow?: Mostly;
* Have succession plans for leadership and other critical positions;
Does FAA follow?: Partially;
* Approach workforce planning strategically, basing decisions on
mission needs, customer expectations, workload, and workforce;
Does FAA follow?: Partially;
* Establish a process to address gaps between current and future
skills and competencies needs;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Sources: GAO-04-39 and GAO analysis of FAA practices.
[End of table]
FAA has developed annual technician hiring and staff planning
strategies that are derived from the budget--a human capital strategy
that takes into consideration the resources that can be reasonably
expected to be available, following a key practice of leading
organizations. The staffing process, which is discussed in more detail
later in this report, begins with a budgetary dollar amount that is
used to determine how many new full-time technician positions can be
filled. Top management, with input from front-line managers in the
form of requests based on their facility needs, then distributes these
positions across locations. According to FAA officials, these
recommendations generally take into account FAA's equipment inventory
and restoration requirements and the varying levels of trained,
certified, and experienced technicians at FAA facilities, although top
management considers these factors in an ad hoc manner.
Foremost among the succession planning challenges ATO faces is the
impending retirement of portions of the technician workforce. We
updated FAA's 2008 projections with the most current federal personnel
data from the Office of Personnel Management's Central Personnel Data
File (CPDF) and found that 23 percent of the technicians on staff at
the end of fiscal year 2009 would be eligible for retirement in 2012.
Moreover, if the 2009 staffing level remained constant, 31 percent
would be eligible for retirement in 2015 and over 50 percent in 2020.
(See figure 5.) From 2005 through 2009, FAA averaged 236 actual
technician retirements annually, or 27 percent of those eligible. If
actual retirements, estimated for existing staff, continued at that
rate, FAA could face over 500 retirements in fiscal year 2015 and
about 900 retirements in fiscal year 2020. As discussed previously,
not all technicians that are eligible to retire will do so, and as
seen in figure 5, the gap between the number of technicians who are
eligible to retire and those projected to actually retire will
continue to expand at least through 2020.
Figure 5: Projected Numbers of Technicians Eligible to Retire and
Estimated to Retire, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2020:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2010;
Projected eligible retirements: 1,045;
Projected actual retirements: 287.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Projected eligible retirements: 1,219;
Projected actual retirements: 335.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Projected eligible retirements: 1,383;
Projected actual retirements: 380.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Projected eligible retirements: 1,548;
Projected actual retirements: 425.
Fiscal year: 2014;
Projected eligible retirements: 1,712;
Projected actual retirements: 470.
Fiscal year: 2015;
Projected eligible retirements: 1,894;
Projected actual retirements: 520.
Fiscal year: 2016;
Projected eligible retirements: 2,119;
Projected actual retirements: 582.
Fiscal year: 2017;
Projected eligible retirements: 2,359;
Projected actual retirements: 648.
Fiscal year: 2018;
Projected eligible retirements: 2,619;
Projected actual retirements: 720.
Fiscal year: 2019;
Projected eligible retirements: 2,899;
Projected actual retirements: 797.
Fiscal year: 2020;
Projected eligible retirements: 3,292;
Projected actual retirements: 905.
Source: GAO analysis of CPDF data.
Note: Analysis of eligibility for retirement based on data for
existing staff, as of the end of fiscal year 2009.
[End of figure]
FAA does not have succession plans for technicians--that is, FAA lacks
a pipeline to develop new technicians to respond to the impact on
operations of retirements, attrition, and the implementation of
midterm NextGen capabilities. Officials noted that new technicians are
brought in only as others retire or leave the agency; however, this
strategy does not factor in how long it takes new technicians to
become fully certified and acquire skills and abilities on a par with
those of the retiring technicians. A pipeline approach to workforce
planning, which would create a steady flow of trained technicians with
some on-the-job experience to replace experienced technicians as they
retire, would help to alleviate the pressures resulting from FAA's
current approach. In all of the focus groups we conducted,
participants raised concerns about this aspect of FAA's workforce
planning, noting that when an experienced technician trained to work
on multiple systems is replaced by a new technician trainee, the new
technician cannot fully replace the original employee for years,
placing a burden on other technicians at the facility as well as the
training program. FAA officials acknowledged that it can take 2 to 3
years for new technicians to attain the skills and abilities of more
experienced technicians. According to FAA's analysis, 686 full-
performance-level technicians with multiple certifications will be
eligible to retire by the end of fiscal year 2011. (These retirements
will also have an impact on training, as discussed later in this
report.)
The expected increase in retirements could also affect FAA's
implementation of midterm NextGen capabilities, scheduled for
completion by 2018. Currently FAA plans to implement ERAM by 2011 and
the initial segments of several other systems--including SWIM and
DataComm--by fiscal year 2016, as well as continue to operate its
legacy equipment. With both legacy and new systems to maintain,
technicians could have more varied, if not more, responsibilities and
therefore need a wider range of skills, further highlighting the
importance of succession planning. FAA needs to continue to plan for
these issues so that it can minimize the operational impact of
projected retirements.
FAA plans to rely on hiring and training to address gaps between the
skills and competencies that its technicians currently have and those
that they will need in the future. Senior FAA officials recognize
that, as NextGen technologies are introduced, technicians will need
very broad, and perhaps difficult-to-find, skill sets that will allow
them to maintain both old and new air traffic control technologies.
According to ATO's strategic human capital planning document,
technicians will continue to need the majority of their current skills
to maintain legacy systems, and they will need to enhance many of
these skills to maintain new computer networks and automated software
tools. ATO's planning document identifies timely new hire selections
and technical training as integral to maintaining and acquiring the
correct knowledge and skill base for FAA's technician workforce.
Moreover, the document states, technicians will need a full set of
technical, business, and leadership skills to be successful in a
rapidly changing environment. As the rate of technological change
increases, it will be an ongoing challenge for ATO to acquire and
maintain a technically current workforce able to integrate new
technologies and respond effectively to changes in technology, as well
as maintain legacy technologies. Additionally, to meet this challenge,
FAA will have to address new and expanded training requirements and
deliver that training in a cost-efficient and timely manner.
FAA does not have a staffing model for technicians, and senior
officials told us that FAA is currently not sure how many technicians
are and will be needed to maintain the national airspace system. This
uncertainty limits FAA's ability to plan strategically for the
technician workforce. Senior FAA officials confirmed that there is no
staffing standard for technicians. They noted that previous efforts to
develop a staffing model for technicians were not completed because of
too many variables and that FAA has not yet identified staffing
requirements for the technician workforce. Those officials pointed to
the technicians' union contract as the primary factor affecting FAA's
annual technician staff planning process. They explained that the
6,100 staffing minimum established by the PASS contract was negotiated
and is not based on equipment inventory or maintenance requirements.
They further noted that this contractual staffing minimum has deterred
FAA from implementing staffing requirements for the technician
workforce. The 2000 contract has not been renegotiated since it
expired in 2005; however, as of April 2010, the parties were
reportedly discussing a return to the negotiating table.
Although the negotiated minimum staffing level may preclude changes
below that level, it does not prevent FAA from examining the numbers
of staff and the skills required for its technician workforce now and
in the future. According to the Vice President of Technical Operations
Services, FAA may require more technicians in the future to adequately
maintain both legacy and NextGen systems. Conversely, FAA may require
fewer technicians because of the digital nature of the new equipment
and different maintenance approaches, such as reliability-centered
maintenance. FAA recently hired staff to begin collaboratively
developing an accurate, requirements-based predictive staffing model.
A senior FAA official suggested that FAA will look at various NextGen
planning documents to determine new maintenance requirements. FAA also
plans to look at near-term system deployments and new system
requirements to determine the short-term maintenance requirements for
NextGen systems. Senior FAA officials said that FAA will not be taking
as much equipment out of the national airspace system as previously
thought; systems that were originally planned to be decommissioned are
still in service and are expected to remain in service indefinitely.
These officials further noted that the maintenance process requires
administrative and business management personnel as well as
technicians, and the staffing model will therefore identify and
incorporate nontechnical as well as technical positions. The FAA
Reauthorization Bill of 2009 contains a provision that would require
the National Academy of Sciences to study the assumptions and methods
FAA uses to estimate staffing needs for its technicians to ensure
proper maintenance and certification of the national airspace system.
[Footnote 9] If enacted, this provision could help address FAA's
staffing approach.
FAA Has Taken Actions to Streamline the Technician Hiring Process, but
May Need to Do More to Develop the Capacity Needed for NextGen:
According to our analysis, FAA has mostly developed the capacity
needed to address requirements important to support its technician
workforce planning strategies. (See table 9.)
Table 9: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows
Key Leading Practices in the Area of Supporting Capacity:
Key leading practices in strategic workforce planning: Support
capacity: build the capacity needed to address administrative,
educational, and other requirements important to support workforce
planning strategies;
* Educate managers and employees on the availability and use of
flexibilities;
Does FAA follow?: Mostly;
* Build transparency and accountability into the system;
Does FAA follow?: Partially;
* Streamline and improve administrative processes;
Does FAA follow?: Mostly.
Sources: GAO-04-39 and GAO analysis of FAA practices.
[End of table]
FAA has taken steps to educate managers and employees on the
availability and use of hiring flexibilities. For example, FAA
provides managers with guidance on special appointing authorities,
such as "on-the-spot" hiring and recruitment and retention
incentives.[Footnote 10] Moreover, FAA's guidance for using specific
hiring flexibilities provides clear and transparent rules to help
ensure that managers and supervisors make fair and effective use of
the flexibilities, further addressing this leading practice.
FAA has streamlined its process for hiring technicians, further
building the capacity to support its workforce planning strategies.
For example, FAA uses a Web-based automated rating and ranking system
for screening applicants and making candidate selections for
technician vacancies. According to FAA, it has created efficiencies in
the hiring process for technicians by centralizing this function in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, much as it has done to streamline its hiring
of air traffic controllers. Additionally, according to FAA, it has the
ability to expand the use of temporary pre-employment clearance
processing centers to include technicians. These centers provide a
centralized interview site and "one-stop" service for potential new
hires, and their use can significantly shorten the hiring process,
which can take up to 6 months, thus allowing FAA to get qualified
applicants into academy training sooner. Managers at one location we
visited nevertheless stated that, although management tries to hire
and train new technicians as quickly as possible, the process takes
time and is still too slow.
For the transition to NextGen, FAA has acknowledged that a new
generation of personnel selection procedures may be needed. According
to FAA, the next generation of selection procedures should be
developed in parallel with the operational evolution of the national
airspace system. Identifying those future requirements will be part of
the agency's overall strategic workforce planning effort, requiring
the continued development and validation of a methodology for
identifying gaps between current and future knowledge, skills, and
abilities, and staffing profiles in safety-critical occupations.
FAA Has Some Initiatives to Monitor and Evaluate Progress in
Technician Workforce Planning Efforts:
FAA has partially implemented initiatives--such as developing
strategic human capital goals and analyzing attrition--to monitor and
evaluate its progress in workforce planning for technicians, but it
does not have measures to evaluate the contribution that its
technician human capital strategies have made toward achieving
programmatic results. (See table 10.)
Table 10: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows
a Key Leading Practice in the Area of Evaluation:
Key leading practice in strategic workforce planning: Evaluation:
monitor and evaluate the agency's progress toward its human capital
goals and the contribution that human capital efforts have made toward
achieving programmatic results;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Sources: GAO-04-39 and GAO analysis of FAA practices.
[End of table]
FAA has put monitoring and evaluation initiatives in place to assess
progress toward its human capital goals for technicians, such as its
hiring, training, and retention goals. These initiatives are
consistent with the practices of leading organizations and provide
information for oversight by identifying performance shortfalls and
options for corrective action. For example, FAA has a strategic
initiative with activity targets and milestones in its human resource
business plan to improve its external recruiting for several
occupations, including technicians, and it has met these targets and
milestones. FAA, as discussed earlier, also has completed an attrition
analysis of its technical operations workforce, which includes
technicians--an important step in identifying and addressing staffing
goals. FAA plans to use this analysis to understand the unique
characteristics of employee subgroups, including technicians, in an
effort to better forecast specific staffing turnover and anticipate
needs for new hires.
However, FAA needs to better link its human capital strategies and
programmatic results to evaluate the contribution that technician
human capital strategies have had on program results. As noted above,
the agency has just begun to identify--and has no strategy to help
ensure its technicians will have--the skills and competencies needed
to maintain NextGen systems; linking FAA's human capital strategies
for the technician workforce to that workforce's responsibilities in
the transition to NextGen will be critical as the transformation
proceeds. For example, a workforce plan can include measures that
indicate whether the agency executed its hiring, training, or
retention strategies as intended and achieved the goals for these
strategies, and how these initiatives changed the workforce's skills
and competencies. It can also include additional measures that address
whether the agency achieved its program goals and the link between
human capital and program results. Without periodic measurement of the
extent to which human capital activities contributed to achieving
programmatic goals, FAA lacks information for identifying performance
shortfalls and appropriate corrective actions for effective oversight.
FAA Has Involved Management, but not Technicians, in Workforce
Planning, Potentially Missing Opportunities to Improve Its Human
Capital Strategies:
FAA involves top management, but minimally involves technicians, in
developing, communicating, and implementing workforce planning
strategies. (See table 11.)
Table 11: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Workforce Planning Follows
Key Leading Practices in the Area of Stakeholder Involvement:
Key leading practices in strategic workforce planning: Stakeholder
involvement: involve top management, employees, and other stakeholders
in developing, communicating, and implementing workforce planning
strategies;
* Ensure that top management sets the overall direction and goals of
workforce planning;
Does FAA follow?: Mostly;
* Involve employees and other stakeholders in developing and
implementing future workforce strategies;
Does FAA follow?: Minimally;
* Establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations,
promote transparency, and report progress;
Does FAA follow?: Minimally.
Sources: GAO-04-39 and GAO analysis of FAA practices.
[End of table]
Consistent with a key leading practice, top management at FAA sets the
overall direction and goals of workforce planning. More specifically,
top FAA management, including resource management groups and service
area directors, conducts FAA's annual technician staff planning
process, as discussed previously in this report. The resource
management groups--ad hoc panels of district managers and
representatives from administrative services and business services--
make recommendations several times annually on the distribution of
personnel and funding. The director of each of three service areas
nationwide takes the recommendation made by that service area's
resource management group and, in conjunction with the area's first-
line managers, makes staffing allocation decisions.
While FAA has involved top management in developing and implementing
workforce strategies, it has not involved technicians, notwithstanding
a key leading practice calling for the involvement of employees and
other stakeholders. The Vice President of Technical Operations
Services, who is responsible for technician workforce planning, told
us that technicians have not been included in any technician workforce
planning efforts. The president of PASS and participants in all 12
focus groups we held also said that technicians had not been involved
in workforce planning activities. By not involving employees in
strategic workforce planning efforts, FAA may miss opportunities to
develop new synergies and ways to streamline processes and improve
human capital strategies.
FAA does not have a workforce planning communication strategy, a key
practice designed to create shared expectations, promote transparency,
and report progress. FAA has a strategic workforce plan for ATO, but
it does not have one specifically for the technician workforce,
although ATO has designated the technician workforce as mission-
critical. In contrast, FAA does have a strategic workforce plan for
nearly 16,000 air traffic controllers, another mission-critical
workforce within ATO, and the only group of FAA employees larger than
the technicians. Previous workforce planning documents for the
technicians--including the National Airspace System Maintenance
Workforce Plan, issued in July 2008--either primarily emphasized
training or were never implemented. According to FAA officials,
Technical Operations is in the process of collaboratively developing
an accurate predictive staffing model, a draft of which will be
completed in about another year. Without a final and public technician
workforce plan, FAA's approach to communicating about technician
workforce planning has limited potential to create shared
expectations, promote transparency, and report progress.
The technicians we spoke with described what they perceived as a lack
of management communication and support in the area of planning. They
raised concerns about how FAA plans for and communicates staffing and
planning decisions. Negative morale, stemming from such concerns over
management support and planning, could adversely affect FAA's hiring
and retention of technicians in the future. We have reported
previously that FAA's consistent ranking near the bottom in published
lists of best places to work in the federal government (viewed as an
indicator of employee morale) could pose challenges in recruiting,
motivating, and retaining employees to replace those retiring and to
meet current and future mission requirements.[Footnote 11]
The PASS union president also expressed concerns about FAA's
communication of information on policy changes and new technologies
throughout the agency. He stated that technical bulletins come from
other organizations but not from Technical Operations and that FAA
does not coordinate among the lines of business, resulting in a
"stovepipe effect." He suggested that FAA dedicate a person as a
conduit for communication to help ensure that information gets passed
along, which would help improve morale. In January 2010, PASS and
Technical Operations management developed the Joint Leadership Team as
a joint effort to rebuild their relationship and improve communication
and collaboration. As part of this effort, through a contractor, PASS
and Technical Operations management have conducted focus groups with
employees, including management, to identify areas of concern that
might affect employee morale. PASS and Technical Operations management
plan to survey field technicians in the next few months to help
identify opportunities to collaboratively address issues.
One way to address leading organizations' key practices in the area of
stakeholder involvement is to develop comprehensive workforce planning
strategy documents, such as a workforce plan or policy statement, that
reflect the human capital needs of an organization, any new
initiatives or refinements to existing human capital approaches, and
data on the organization's workforce profile. Without a written
workforce planning strategy, a staffing model, and a more strategic
approach, including succession planning issues related to developing
new technicians when experienced technicians leave, FAA lacks a fully
considered analysis of the appropriate number and composition of its
technician workforce, and it may not be able to meet future
maintenance demands. Moreover, as FAA transitions from legacy to
NextGen systems, it risks having too many technicians with legacy
skills and not enough with NextGen skills. As this transition occurs,
strategic plans for identifying and responding to changes in needed
competencies and potential gaps in knowledge and skills will be
critical to ensure that FAA acquires or develops the needed human
capital resources and makes full and efficient use of them.
FAA's Ability to Plan for Technician Training Is Limited by Shortfalls
in Its Workforce Planning and Identification of Needed Skills and
Competencies:
FAA at least partially follows key practices of leading organizations
in its training and development for technicians.[Footnote 12] Table 12
presents our analysis of the extent to which FAA has incorporated
these key practices.
Table 12: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Training and Development
Efforts Follow Key Leading Practices:
Key leading practices in strategic training and development: Planning:
develop a strategic approach that establishes priorities and leverages
investments in training and development to achieve agency results;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Key leading practices in strategic training and development: Design
and development: identify specific training and development
initiatives that, in conjunction with other strategies, improve
individual and agency performance;
Does FAA follow?: Mostly.
Key leading practices in strategic training and development:
Implementation: ensure effective and efficient delivery of training
and development opportunities in an environment that supports learning
and change;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Key leading practices in strategic training and development:
Evaluation: for all three above practices: Demonstrate how training
and development efforts contribute to improved performance and results;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Sources: GAO-04-546G and GAO analysis of FAA practices.
[End of table]
FAA Is Identifying Annual Training Goals but Needs to Identify
Strategic Training Goals and Those Skills and Competencies Needed to
Meet Such Goals:
FAA has partially implemented initiatives--such as establishing annual
training goals and incorporating employees' developmental goals--to
plan for strategic training and development of its technicians. (See
table 13.)
Table 13: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Training and Development
Efforts Follow Key Leading Practices for Planning:
Key leading practices in strategic training and development: Planning:
develop a strategic approach that establishes priorities and leverages
investments in training and development to achieve agency results;
* Establishes training goals and related performance measures that are
consistent with the agency's overall mission, goals, and culture;
Does FAA follow?: Partially;
* Determines the skills and competencies its workforce needs to
achieve current, emerging, and future agency goals and missions and
identify gaps, including those that training and development
strategies can help address;
Does FAA follow?: Partially;
* Identifies the appropriate level of investment to provide for
training and development efforts and prioritizes funding so that the
most important training needs are addressed first;
Does FAA follow?: Partially;
* Incorporates employees' developmental goals in its planning
processes;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Sources: GAO-04-54G and GAO analysis of FAA practices.
[End of table]
FAA is taking action to ensure that its training goals are consistent
with its overall mission, goals, and culture in that it plans to train
annually at least the minimum number of technicians that it believes
it needs to maintain air traffic management facilities; however, FAA
has not identified future training needs beyond the annual cycle and
has only just begun to determine the critical skills and competencies
that it will need to maintain NextGen systems. In previous work, we
have found that accountability mechanisms, such as an active training
oversight committee and effective performance management systems, can
help to ensure that sufficient attention is paid to planning for
training and development needs and that those planning efforts are
consistent with an agency's mission, goals, and culture.[Footnote 13]
Line managers and supervisors can ensure that employees' training
goals are consistent with the agency's overall mission and goals by
keeping this alignment in mind as they work with employees to set
training goals and approve employees' training requests. For
approximately the last 5 years, FAA has maintained a Technical
Training Advisory Council, which includes training program support
staff, a supervisory committee consisting of technician line managers,
and representatives of three ATO service centers.[Footnote 14] The
council meets in person four times a year and has a monthly
teleconference to provide training feedback to ATO Technical Training
and review the agency's training needs and goals. However, the
president of PASS told us the union had not been approached in recent
years to provide input into training planning and is not represented
on the council. FAA training officials told us, and the PASS president
confirmed, that the union provided a technician to work in Technical
Operations Training to assist with training coordination between the
two organizations through December 2009.
As discussed earlier in this report, FAA has begun to determine the
critical skills and competencies that it will need to maintain NextGen
systems; however, FAA officials stated that the agency has never
previously had a robust competency model for technician training. With
the transition to NextGen, technicians' training requirements--and
thus critical skills and competencies--will increase, since
technicians will have to learn how to maintain the new systems while
remaining proficient in maintaining the legacy systems that FAA plans
to continue operating indefinitely. The recent assignment of a staff
member dedicated to compile technician job descriptions, tasks, and
training courses for Technical Operations Training supports this
effort to develop a skills and competency model. Technical Operations
Training does not have a formal process to identify future needed
skills and competencies beyond those that will be required to maintain
new systems that are turned over in the near term from system program
offices, and it lacks a strategic training plan or other document that
presents a business case for proposed investments in training and
development. When assessing investment opportunities for its training
plan, an agency ought to consider the competing demands it faces, the
resources available to it, and how those demands can best be met with
available resources. Because FAA has not developed a longer-term
strategic plan to prepare for impending retirements and determine how
many technicians it will need to replace those who retire, the agency
cannot determine how many technicians it will need to train in the
future and what certifications will need to be replaced. For example,
as mentioned earlier in this report, 686 full-performance-level
technicians with multiple certifications will be eligible to retire by
the end of fiscal year 2011, and those that do retire will be replaced
by new technicians who might not acquire those skills and abilities
for 2 to 3 years.
While FAA has a well-established process to identify current training
and development needs annually and to prioritize training funds
annually, its ability to plan longer-term training and funding is
limited by Technical Operations Training's dependency on receiving
timely and accurate planning information on FAA systems from the
agency's individual program offices and NextGen office. Technical
Operations Training officials told us they identify future training
needs through coordination with the system program offices and
independently monitor the status of new systems coming into the FAA
inventory by reviewing the agency's Capital Investment Plan (CIP) to
see when Technical Operations Training should start planning for
training.[Footnote 15] However, opportunities for coordination with
the program offices have decreased with recent organizational changes,
according to FAA Academy officials. Formerly, the program offices
initially coordinated the contracts for new systems and equipment, and
the academy could work with the program offices to develop training
while the contracts were being negotiated. Now, however,
responsibilities for the contracts have been consolidated within FAA's
acquisition management offices, and there is less coordination between
the academy and the program offices. Academy officials recognize that
training development and funding for that training must await
equipment development, but they stated that coordination during the
contracting and development process would be extremely beneficial.
To incorporate employees' developmental goals into the planning
process, employees develop their course requests annually, in
conjunction with their managers. The agency uses individual
development plans to identify specific developmental needs and areas
for further enrichment for each employee. Technical Operations
Training officials stated that they do not solicit additional input
for training planning and development from technicians themselves
because the line managers are the best source of information on
training needs for their facilities.
Technicians in our focus groups told us they have had some difficulty
obtaining the training they need for several reasons. First, they
said, some courses on legacy systems needed for advancement have not
been available at the academy. Technical Operations Training officials
acknowledged that some academy courses on legacy systems were
prematurely canceled because their subject matter was incorporated in
course offerings for new systems, and then these new courses were
postponed because of delays in rolling out the new systems. For
example, plans for deploying ERAM led Technical Operations Training to
cancel the training on two legacy systems that ERAM incorporates--En
Route Communications Gateway and the Display System Replacement--but
then ERAM's deployment was delayed, and no courses were available on
the two legacy systems. Second, technicians said, the recent declines
in technician staffing and a reduction in periodic maintenance under
the reliability-centered maintenance approach have limited their
ability to become familiar with new systems and acquire timely on-the-
job training, as well as maintain proficiency in areas where they have
already received training or gained experience. Finally, technicians
told us, they often did not receive approval to attend the courses
they have requested as a priority to meet their developmental needs.
FAA officials stated that training requests are filled according to a
facility's priority, which is determined through a number of factors,
such as the minimum number of trained people it takes to maintain the
facility, the size of the airport where the equipment is maintained,
or the amount of equipment at a facility that is operationally
essential to maintain air traffic control. When a facility receives
approval for a technician to attend a course and the technician then
cannot attend, Technical Operations Training prioritizes the remaining
requests to determine which technician from which facility should go
instead. FAA officials estimate that, on average, 98 percent of
operationally essential training requests in recent years have been
met. For example, in fiscal year 2009, there were 5,100 requests for
training, and 5,100 slots were provided. However, academy officials
estimated that 50 to 70 percent of the courses are not filled to
capacity. As mentioned below, technicians are not able to attend all
training classes they receive approval to attend because of workforce
staffing issues at their facility.
FAA Is Still Developing a Mix of Centralized and Decentralized
Approaches for Technician Training:
According to our analysis, FAA has mostly developed the capacity to
identify design and development initiatives to improve individual and
agency performance. (See table 14.)
Table 14: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Training and Development
Efforts Follow Key Leading Practices for Design and Development:
Key leading practices in strategic training and development: Design
and development: identify specific training and development
initiatives that, in conjunction with other strategies, improve
individual and agency performance;
* Uses the most appropriate mix of centralized and decentralized
approaches for its training and development programs;
Does FAA follow?: Partially;
* Uses criteria to determine whether to design training and
development programs in-house or obtain these services from a
contractor or other external source;
Does FAA follow?: Mostly;
* Compares the merits of different delivery mechanisms (such as
classroom or computer-based training) and determines what mix of
mechanisms to use to ensure efficient and cost-effective delivery;
Does FAA follow?: Mostly.
Sources: GAO-04-54G and GAO analysis of FAA practices.
[End of table]
FAA offers a mix of in-residence, centralized training at the academy
and external, decentralized training at various locations provided by
vendors whose equipment FAA has purchased. Training at the academy
focuses on legacy equipment, while vendor courses are the primary
source of training for next-generation systems coming into the FAA
inventory.
FAA is limited in its choice of training delivery mechanisms because
of the unique and complex nature of air traffic control system
components. For example, the unique configurations of and
modifications to FAA generators make it difficult to replicate their
features and teach technicians how to maintain them at a field office
or vendor location rather than at the academy, according to academy
officials. (figure 6 illustrates the variety of generators available
in the training classroom at the FAA Academy.) Overall, technicians in
our focus groups maintained that, compared with the training offered
at the academy, vendor training was less informative and more
conceptual, offered less hands-on and problem-solving instruction, and
was limited by proprietary considerations that restricted students'
access to some information. Additionally, they said, vendors could not
teach FAA-specific safety issues or explain how their systems
interacted with other components of air traffic management systems.
Figure 6: Generator Training Classroom at the FAA Academy:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
No vendor courses have been approved to replace academy training for
legacy courses, although Technical Operations Training is studying the
feasibility of having vendors provide certain courses that are
currently offered through the academy and are filled to capacity. For
example, evaluations are under way to determine if the engine
generator courses can be taught by approved colleges and universities.
In deciding how to provide these courses, FAA is considering capacity,
quality, and cost criteria. Specifically, FAA is assessing whether (1)
the academy courses have a sufficient number of seats to fulfill the
training requests; (2) the replacement courses meet FAA's standards
for training in the applicable subject areas; and (3) how the costs of
academy training would compare with the costs of tuition, a per diem
allowance, and travel for training at a local junior college.
Technical Operations Training officials told us they will need to make
a business case to ATO management that there will be cost savings from
college training as well as demonstrate that the technicians' training
needs can be met with that approach.
FAA is also comparing the merits of different training delivery
mechanisms, such as computer-based simulation training, but had
adopted no such mechanisms as of April 2010. Some technicians told us
that emerging FAA maintenance policies limit hands-on interaction with
systems and that the combination of these policies and modifications
to equipment over time make the technicians feel they are no longer
qualified to work on certain systems. For example, some technicians
stated that because they have been away from training for so long,
they are unable to apply their now-dated knowledge and skill when
doing their work. Others stated that preventive maintenance checks
served as critical refresher training and familiarization tools, and
they raised concerns about the effects on their proficiency of less
frequent preventive maintenance checks resulting from the change in
maintenance philosophy. Technicians suggested that different methods,
such as the use of simulator training or the addition of detailed
visuals or photographs in training and system manuals, would greatly
aid their job knowledge in lieu of the reduced hands-on training.
Technical Operations Training officials said they were aware of this
issue and intend to evaluate additional methods for technicians to
maintain proficiency, including the use of online videos for specific
pieces of equipment.
Funding and Workload Issues Limit FAA's Ability to Implement Training
and Development Opportunities:
FAA has partially implemented practices--such as adjusting work
schedules so that employees can participate in developmental
activities and taking actions to foster an environment conducive to
effective training and development--when implementing training and
development for technicians. (See table 15.)
Table 15: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Training and Development
Efforts Follow Key Leading Practices for Implementation:
Key leading practices in strategic training and development:
Implementation: ensure effective and efficient delivery of training
and development opportunities in an environment that supports learning
and change;
* Communicates the importance of training and developing employees,
and their expectations for training and development programs to
achieve results;
Does FAA follow?: Partially;
* Provides consideration for options to pay for employee training and
development and adjusts employee work schedules so that employees can
participate in these developmental activities;
Does FAA follow?: Partially;
* Takes actions to foster an environment conducive to effective
training and development and encourages employees to buy into the
goals of training and development efforts, so that they participate
fully and apply new knowledge and skills when doing their work;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Sources: GAO-04-546G and GAO analysis of FAA practices.
[End of table]
FAA provides information on training opportunities to technicians but
does not communicate the importance of training and development and
its expectations for technicians in those areas. FAA publicizes
training information through its comprehensive Web site, known as the
FAA Information Superhighway for Training (FIST). FIST contains
training and certification program information from Technical
Operations Training, including policies and procedures, forms, course
descriptions, and examinations. However, FAA does not use established
mechanisms or written plans to communicate either the importance of
training and development for technicians or its expectations for
technician training and development programs to achieve results. As
previously noted, FAA does not have a strategic training plan for
technicians, and the agency has not included any expectations for, or
discussion of, technician training and development needs in its
planning document for NextGen, the March 2010 NextGen Implementation
Plan.
FAA is limited in the options it can consider for paying for employee
training and development to academy-provided training and vendor-
provided training, primarily because of the unique training
requirements of technicians. In addition, technicians' workloads limit
FAA's ability to adjust their schedules for training. Technicians told
us their high workload and a lack of staff to cover the work in their
absence impedes their ability to take time from their positions to
obtain training. Technical Operations Training officials confirmed
that three to four times a week, on average, technicians who have
requested and received approval to attend training have not been able
to do so because of staffing issues at their facilities. In an effort
to enhance training, increase technician proficiency, and avoid
burdening technicians in the field while other technicians are in
training, officials told us that they have been working to shorten the
training time for certain technician courses by adjusting training
methods and enhancing demonstrations of proficiency at the academy. In
the case of one course, these efforts reduced the average time for
certification from 240 days in fiscal year 2005 to 59 days in June
2007.
FAA does not consistently foster an environment conducive to Technical
Operations Training's efforts to train and develop employees so that
they can participate fully and apply new knowledge and skills when
doing their work. For example, training is not always timed to
coincide with the introduction of new systems. Technicians told us
that they received training on ERAM--a foundation system for NextGen
and one of the most recent additions to the technician curriculum--
over 2 years ago, but the system has yet to come on line. FAA training
officials confirmed that because of delays in the implementation of
ERAM, some technicians were trained months and even years ago and have
not touched the equipment since. As a result, Technical Operations
Training is concerned about technicians' proficiency and is evaluating
the need to retrain some staff on ERAM.
FAA Has a Formal Class Evaluation Process in Place but Needs to
Incorporate Performance Data and Technician Feedback in Assessing the
Impact of Training on Performance:
FAA has partially implemented practices--such as using some types of
performance data to assess the results achieved and incorporating
certain feedback perspectives--for evaluating its training and
development of technicians. (See table 16.)
Table 16: Extent to Which FAA's Technician Training and Development
Efforts Follow Key Leading Practices for Evaluation:
Key leading practices for strategic training and development:
Evaluation: demonstrate how training and development efforts
contribute to improved performance and results for planning,
designing, and implementing training;
* Systematically plans for and evaluates the effectiveness of its
training and development efforts;
Does FAA follow?: Mostly;
* Uses performance data (including qualitative and quantitative
measures) to assess the results achieved through training and
development efforts;
Does FAA follow?: Partially;
* Incorporates evaluation feedback into the planning, design, and
implementation of training and development efforts; and different
perspectives (including those of line managers and staff, customers,
and experts) in assessing the impact of training on performance;
Does FAA follow?: Partially.
Sources: GAO-04-546G and GAO analysis of FAA practices.
[End of table]
Technical Operations Training has a formal evaluation program in place
and amends the training or makes recommendations based on trends
observed in student evaluations. For example, student critiques of
ERAM training revealed that students had problems making the
connection between academy equipment used in ERAM training and the
actual equipment installed at their facilities. As a result, training
officials recently identified a need to have training systems
installed at the academy that would replicate the fielded systems
whenever possible. Technical Operations Training also completed an
audit on all technicians who had been trained in a course designated
as a prerequisite to the current ERAM course. Training officials
concluded that by the time ERAM was delivered and ready for
commissioning, up to 40 percent of the technicians who had completed
the prerequisite training could have left the technician workforce and
thus a new developmental course would be needed.
FAA partially uses quantitative or qualitative measures to assess
technician training results by using end-of-course evaluations and
follow-on evaluations, as discussed below. Successful organizations
typically develop and implement human capital approaches based on a
thorough assessment of their specific needs and capabilities. To
assess the results achieved through training and development, agencies
can rely on hard (quantitative) data, such as indicators of
productivity or output, quality, costs, and time, or soft
(qualitative) data, such as feedback on how well a training program
met employees' expectations. While technicians provide feedback after
completing a course, as discussed below, the additional use of
quantitative data could help strengthen the linkages between training
and development programs and improved performance.
FAA evaluates the effectiveness of its training efforts and
incorporates formal evaluation feedback into the implementation of its
training efforts, but it does not solicit or incorporate feedback from
personnel other than line managers into its planning and design of
technician training. Technicians are required to complete an
evaluation for any course they attend before they can graduate from
and become certified in that course. Additional evaluations go out 3
to 6 months after graduation to both the technicians and their
supervisors for additional feedback. Technical Operations Training
officials stated that the line managers who oversee the technicians,
not the technicians themselves, are the critical training customers
because the line managers are the best source of information on
training needs for their facilities. FAA officials meet with these
line managers to obtain training feedback through an FAA council that
meets four times a year. However, to the extent possible, agencies
need to ensure that they incorporate a wide variety of stakeholder
perspectives in assessing the impact of training on employee and
agency performance, including the receptiveness to and use of results
from employees' feedback on developmental needs. Senior FAA training
officials recognized they needed to develop additional measures to
address supervisory feedback and opinions on training and stated that
FAA will be developing additional measures to address these issues in
the future.
Certain Academy Training Costs Have Been Roughly Stable, while Those
Vendor Training Costs That FAA Can Identify Have Risen with the
Rollout of Courses for New Equipment:
Instructor Costs of Academy Training on Established Equipment Have
Remained Stable, but Student Travel Costs Have Increased:
In the past few years, the academy has provided hundreds of training
classes to thousands of FAA technicians. These courses are taught both
by academy staff and by contractors hired to assist with instruction.
The costs that FAA identified for academy training include those for
instructor services and those for student travel to and from the
academy in Oklahoma City.[Footnote 16] As shown in table 17, the
number of technicians who received training each year from fiscal year
2006 through fiscal year 2009 fluctuated, while the number of
instructors providing that training declined slightly. Despite the
small decline in the number of instructors, the cost for instructor
services rose slightly over the 4 years, likely because of increases
in the cost of salaries, benefits, and contractor fees. Overall, the
data indicate that the instructor-based cost for academy training has
remained fairly stable over the 4-year period, a result consistent
with the relatively stable need for instructors.
Table 17: Compensation-Related Academy Training Costs, Fiscal Years
2006 through 2009:
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number of classes: 593;
Number of students: 4,996;
Number of academy instructors: 157;
Number of contractor instructors: 29;
Cost for academy instructors[A]: $23.9 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of classes: 704;
Number of students: 4,981;
Number of academy instructors: 151;
Number of contractor instructors: 19;
Cost for academy instructors[A]: $23.9 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Number of classes: 739;
Number of students: 6,187;
Number of academy instructors: 146;
Number of contractor instructors: 31;
Cost for academy instructors[A]: $23.6 million.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Number of classes: 768;
Number of students: 5,644;
Number of academy instructors: 146;
Number of contractor instructors: 32;
Cost for academy instructors[A]: $24.7 million.
Source: FAA.
[A] Costs for academy instruction include both personnel compensation
and benefits (PC&B) for academy staff and payments for contract
instructors. These are current dollars and are not adjusted for
inflation.
[End of table]
Table 18 shows travel costs during the same 4 years for the students
who attended academy courses. The total annual travel costs went up 34
percent from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2009. During that
period, the number of students attending training also rose, resulting
in an 18 percent increase in the per student trip cost over the 4
years. In addition, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data,
airfares rose about 16 percent during that period, while hotel fees
slightly decreased. Thus, it appears that the increases in the number
of students and in airfares likely drove the increases in travel costs.
Table 18: Travel-Related Academy Training Costs, Fiscal Years 2006
through 2009:
Fiscal year: 2006;
Total number of students: 4,996;
Cost of student travel to and from academy[A]: $12.6 million;
Per student travel cost[A]: $2,515.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Total number of students: 4,981;
Cost of student travel to and from academy[A]: $13.6 million;
Per student travel cost[A]: 2,728.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Total number of students: 6,187;
Cost of student travel to and from academy[A]: $17.4 million;
Per student travel cost[A]: 2,806.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Total number of students: 5,644;
Cost of student travel to and from academy[A]: $16.8 million;
Per student travel cost[A]: $2,984.
Source: FAA.
[A] These are current dollars and are not adjusted for inflation.
[End of table]
Costs of Vendor Training on New Equipment Have Risen Quickly as FAA
Prepares to Roll Out NextGen Systems, but FAA Is Unable to Account for
Travel Costs Associated with Vendor Training:
According to data provided by FAA, costs for vendors to provide
training for technicians on new equipment have risen very quickly in
the past few years.[Footnote 17] This increase has been associated
with the rollout of new equipment related to the implementation of
NextGen, which has created new training needs for technicians. For
example, as shown in table 19, the vendor began to offer courses for
Digital Audio Legal Recorder (DALR) in 2007 and for ERAM in 2008.
During the period of our review, the total number of vendor courses
rose from fewer than 100 to over 200. Accordingly, training costs for
vendor training have also grown substantially in the past few years.
With other NextGen systems poised to go online in the near future,
these costs may continue to rise as technicians require further
training on other new equipment.
Table 19: Cost of Vendor (Out of Agency) Technician Training, Fiscal
Years 2005 through 2010:
Fiscal year: 2005;
Number of students: 247;
Number of vendor courses: 64;
Number of DALR courses: 0;
Number of ERAM courses: 0;
Cost of training[A]: $45,508.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number of students: 665;
Number of vendor courses: 172;
Number of DALR courses: 0;
Number of ERAM courses: 0;
Cost of training[A]: $1,121,255.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of students: 605;
Number of vendor courses: 130;
Number of DALR courses: 11;
Number of ERAM courses: 0;
Cost of training[A]: $1,195,728.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Number of students: 818;
Number of vendor courses: 215;
Number of DALR courses: 81;
Number of ERAM courses: 6;
Cost of training[A]: $2,880,911.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Number of students: 1,325;
Number of vendor courses: 308;
Number of DALR courses: 146;
Number of ERAM courses: 18;
Cost of training[A]: $5,285,025.
Fiscal year: 2010[B];
Number of students: 867;
Number of vendor courses: 210;
Number of DALR courses: 124;
Number of ERAM courses: 15;
Cost of training[A]: $4,361,698.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
Note: Though the cost data are unaudited, at this level of detail we
feel these data are adequately reliable for presenting a reasonable
estimate of costs for vendor training provided to technicians. See
appendix I for more detail.
[A] Cost of training is in addition to that which is included under
system support contracts. These are current dollars and are not
adjusted for inflation.
[B] Projected.
[End of table]
An FAA employee identified by the agency as a subject matter expert
told us the agency's cost accounting system is unable to accumulate
costs for travel to vendor training courses and report trends in those
costs because the funds for that travel are derived from multiple
sources--including the system program office, a centralized training
fund, and in some cases the local facility. FAA is subject to various
laws and standards that have an effect on its development and use of
cost information, including standards reported in the Statement of
Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS) No. 4, Managerial Cost
Accounting Standards and Concepts.[Footnote 18] While SFFAS No. 4 does
not specify the programs, services, or activities that federal
entities should determine costs for, such as travel for vendor-
provided training, the standards focus on developing information to
help management and Congress understand the costs of operations and
make informed decisions. The standards also provide that often a
combination of a cost accounting system and cost finding techniques
should be used to provide the cost information that is needed to
address specific issues that arise. The lack of cost data available
from FAA's cost accounting system or through cost analysis techniques
to summarize travel to vendor training courses limits FAA's ability to
manage the costs of such travel and evaluate all aspects of technician
training costs and benefits. FAA could help provide information that
addresses congressional concerns about the cost of in-house and vendor-
provided training and of the travel related to those training
activities by modifying its cost accounting system or cost finding
techniques.
Conclusions:
Technicians possess unique skills and are critical to the safety and
efficiency of the nation's air transportation system, as well as the
successful implementation of NextGen. FAA is not fully incorporating
key leading practices, such as determining the critical skills and
competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future
results, in its strategic workforce planning for technicians. FAA does
not have a comprehensive, written technician workforce strategy to
help it identify and focus on the long-term technician human capital
issues with the greatest potential to affect mission results. The lack
of a written strategy limits transparency, and thus the ability to
evaluate and measure performance, in FAA's workforce planning
approach. Such a strategy would include, among other things,
approaches to (1) identify the skills and competencies technicians
need to address both current and future needs and (2) anticipate
attrition and hire technicians with the requisite skills and abilities
in time to accomplish agency missions, down to the facility level.
FAA's practice of hiring replacements for technicians only after a
vacancy occurs leaves the agency vulnerable to skills imbalances, with
inexperienced, newly certified technicians replacing seasoned
veterans. While the contractual staffing minimum has deterred FAA from
developing staffing requirements for the technician workforce, it does
not prevent FAA from incorporating leading practices to provide a
strategic focus for technician workforce planning. Not having such
strategies raises the risk of adverse effects on the safety and
efficiency of the nation's air transportation system.
Furthermore, the training that technicians receive could lack
prioritization because FAA has not developed a strategic training
plan. Such a plan would need to be aligned with a written technician
workforce planning strategy and should incorporate key leading
practices in training and development. Without adequate planning,
agencies cannot establish priorities or determine the best ways to
leverage investments to improve performance. Additionally, including
input into planning for any future NextGen systems training from a
wide variety of employees--such as FAA's NextGen Integration and
Implementation Office, ATO's Technical Operations Training and
Development Group, technician supervisors, technical experts, and
technicians--could help FAA develop integrated ways to address
specific performance gaps or incorporate necessary enhancements in the
technician training curriculum. Such an inclusive approach could
create opportunities to develop solutions that FAA might otherwise
miss. Finally, the lack of cost data to summarize travel to vendor
training courses does not allow FAA to fully develop information about
the cost of in-house and vendor-provided training and of the travel
related to those training activities and therefore limits FAA's
ability to manage travel costs and evaluate all aspects of technician
training costs and benefits.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that FAA can hire and retain the technician staff it needs
to install, maintain, repair, and certify equipment and facilities in
the national airspace system, in the current and NextGen environments,
we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA
Administrator to take the following four actions:
1. develop and implement a comprehensive, written workforce strategy
or policy for the technician workforce that incorporates the key
leading practices in strategic workforce planning that FAA has not
fully incorporated, such as determining the critical skills and
competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future results;
2. develop and implement a strategic training plan that is aligned
with a written technician workforce strategy and incorporates key
leading practices in training and development that FAA has not fully
incorporated, such as determining how training and development efforts
are expected to contribute to improved performance and results;
3. improve planning for any future NextGen systems training by
including input from FAA's NextGen Integration and Implementation
Office, ATO's Technical Operations Training and Development Group,
technician supervisors, technical experts, and technicians to develop
an integrated way to address specific performance gaps or incorporate
necessary enhancements in the technician training curriculum; and:
4. consider modifying FAA's cost accounting system or cost analysis
techniques to develop information about the cost of in-house and
vendor-provided training and of the travel related to those training
activities to assist Congress in understanding the costs of operations
and making informed decisions.
Agency Comments:
We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this
report for its review and comment. The department provided technical
corrections, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions or would like to discuss this
work, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Individuals
making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report addresses the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
processes for carrying out workforce planning and training for the
agency's technician workforce. It describes the processes and
discusses the extent to which FAA's efforts incorporate key leading
practices in workforce planning and training and how the costs of
technician training, including travel costs, have changed in recent
years. Specifically, we addressed the following questions: (1) To what
extent does FAA incorporate key practices of leading organizations in
its workforce planning for technicians? (2) How does FAA's technician
training compare with key practices of leading organizations? (3) How
have the costs of technician training, including travel costs, changed
in recent years?
To describe the composition of FAA's technician workforce, we obtained
information on its nature and scope, including job descriptions and
job series information; the current, historical, and projected
population of technicians; hiring trends; the current and projected
numbers of technicians eligible to retire; the number of technicians
who retire when eligible; and data on the geographic locations of work
stations. We summarized FAA and federal personnel data from the Office
of Personnel Management's Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) on the
technician workforce and developed trends in staffing and attrition
for fiscal years 1999 through 2009, as well as retirement projections
through fiscal year 2020. We assessed the reliability of the CPDF data
by reviewing related documentation and determined that those data were
of sufficient quality to be used for the purposes of this report. We
focused on the technicians in the 2101 job series because (1)
according to FAA data about the technician workforce, the majority of
technicians are in the 2101 job series and (2) the FAA reauthorization
bill refers to systems specialists, the employees included in the 2101
job series.[Footnote 19]
To determine the extent to which FAA has incorporated key practices of
leading organizations in its workforce planning and training for
technicians, we sought to compare FAA's efforts with those of leading
organizations. We selected key leading practices in these areas by
reviewing, in conjunction with subject matter experts, our past work
to identify those most applicable.[Footnote 20] To determine how FAA's
technician-specific workforce planning and training components and
practices compare with those of leading organizations, we reviewed FAA
documents and regulations that detailed FAA policies and practices in
the functional areas of workforce planning and training. We discussed
the structure and processes of FAA's workforce planning and training
for technicians with FAA officials responsible for implementing those
human capital procedures within the Air Traffic Organization (ATO)
line of business, where the technicians are located. We interviewed
FAA officials at FAA headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at FAA's
Training Academy in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Additionally, we obtained
the perspectives of the bargaining unit that represents FAA
technicians on FAA's workforce planning and training for technicians
through semistructured interviews with representatives of the
Professional Airways Safety Specialists (PASS), the employee union
representing technicians. We assessed the extent to which FAA followed
each practice by applying the following scale: "Fully" indicated that,
in our judgment, all or virtually all aspects of the practice were
followed; "mostly" indicated that more than half but less than all or
virtually all were followed; "partially" indicated that less than half
but more than a few were followed; and "minimally" indicated that few
or no aspects of the practice were followed. We conducted our
comparison of FAA's practices with leading practices at a high level:
More detailed comparisons could disclose specific leading practices
that FAA is not following, beyond those discussed in this report. We
did not assess the effectiveness of FAA's workforce planning, because
factors other than FAA's human capital system may also affect FAA's
performance.
To balance the views of FAA management and obtain perspectives of the
technician workforce on FAA's workforce planning and training efforts,
we conducted 12 focus group meetings with 101 FAA technicians and 12
academy managers at 11 locations. These meetings involved structured
small-group discussions designed to gain more in-depth information
about specific issues that cannot easily be obtained from single or
serial interviews. Consistent with typical focus group methodologies,
our design included multiple groups with varying characteristics but
some similarity in experience and responsibility. Most groups involved
7 to 10 participants. Discussions were structured, guided by a
moderator who used a standardized list of questions to encourage
participants to share their thoughts and experiences. Our overall
objective in using a focus group approach was to obtain the views,
insights, and feelings of FAA technicians on issues related to their
workload, staffing, and training.
We conducted 12 separate focus group sessions--11 with FAA
technicians, including a range of (1) technical specialties
(Communications, Automation, Navigation, Environmental, and
Surveillance/Radar), (2) experience (less senior and more senior
staff), and (3) operating environments (e.g., air route traffic
control center [ARTCC], terminal radar approach control [TRACON], air
traffic control tower, or general national airspace system [GNAS]).
[Footnote 21] By including GNAS participants in the focus groups, we
ensured that the perspectives of technicians that perform their duties
at geographically distant, isolated, or smaller facilities were
included. One additional focus group was held with academy managers
from all areas of technician instruction. Table 20 identifies the
specialties included in the focus groups at each location. We traveled
to FAA facilities in Baltimore, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami,
and Oklahoma City to conduct the focus groups.
Table 20: Specialties Represented in Focus Groups:
Focus Group Location: Baltimore; Air Traffic Control Tower[A];
Communications: 5;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 0;
Navigation: 5;
Environmental: 1;
Surveillance/Radar: 4;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 0;
Other: 1.
Focus Group Location: Chicago; Air Route Traffic Control Center #1;
Communications: 2;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 2;
Navigation: 0;
Environmental: 1;
Surveillance/Radar: 0;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 0;
Other: 0.
Focus Group Location: Chicago; Air Route Traffic Control Center #2;
Communications: 0;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 6;
Navigation: 0;
Environmental: 0;
Surveillance/Radar: 0;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 0;
Other: 0.
Focus Group Location: Chicago; Air Traffic Control Tower;
Communications: 0;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 0;
Navigation: 4;
Environmental: 6;
Surveillance/Radar: 0;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 0;
Other: 1.
Focus Group Location: Chicago; Terminal Radar Approach Control Center;
Communications: 10;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 2;
Navigation: 0;
Environmental: 1;
Surveillance/Radar: 0;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 0;
Other: 2.
Focus Group Location: Dallas; Terminal Radar Approach Control Center;
Communications: 2;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 2;
Navigation: 0;
Environmental: 1;
Surveillance/Radar: 2;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 1;
Other: 2.
Focus Group Location: Dallas; Air Route Traffic Control Center;
Communications: 3;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 5;
Navigation: 0;
Environmental: 0;
Surveillance/Radar: 0;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 0;
Other: 1.
Focus Group Location: Los Angeles; Air Traffic Control Tower[A];
Communications: 4;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 0;
Navigation: 4;
Environmental: 5;
Surveillance/Radar: 0;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 0;
Other: 0.
Focus Group Location: Los Angeles; Air Route Traffic Control Center;
Communications: 1;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 3;
Navigation: 0;
Environmental: 1;
Surveillance/Radar: 0;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 0;
Other: 0.
Focus Group Location: Miami; Air Route Traffic Control Center;
Communications: 2;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 3;
Navigation: 0;
Environmental: 5;
Surveillance/Radar: 0;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 0;
Other: 1.
Focus Group Location: Miami; Air Traffic Control Tower[A];
Communications: 3;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 0;
Navigation: 3;
Environmental: 3;
Surveillance/Radar: 2;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 0;
Other: 0.
Focus Group Location: Oklahoma City; FAA Academy;
Communications: 2;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 2;
Navigation: 1;
Environmental: 1;
Surveillance/Radar: 3;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 0;
Other: 3.
Focus Group Location: Total;
Communications: 34;
Automation/Systems Operation Center: 25;
Navigation: 17;
Environmental: 25;
Surveillance/Radar: 11;
General National Airspace System (GNAS): 1;
Other: 11.
Source: GAO.
[A] Technicians here have a combination of Navigation and
Communication specialties.
[End of table]
We developed a guide to assist the moderator in leading the
discussions. The guide helped the moderator address several topics
related to workforce planning (staffing levels, workload issues, the
Next Generation Air Transportation System [NextGen], contract
personnel, reliability-centered maintenance) and training (quality and
quantity of training, FAA-provided and vendor-provided training). We
assured participants of the anonymity of their responses, promising
that their names would not be directly linked to their responses.
Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the
extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population,
(2) develop a consensus to arrive at an agreed-upon plan or make
decisions about what actions to take, or (3) provide statistically
representative samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead,
they are intended to generate in-depth information about the reasons
for the focus group participants' attitudes on specific topics and to
offer insights into their concerns about and support for an issue.
The projectability of the information produced by our focus groups is
limited for several reasons. First, the information includes only the
responses of FAA technicians from the 11 selected groups. Second,
while the composition of the groups was designed to ensure a range of
specialties, experience, and operational environments, the groups were
not randomly sampled. Third, participants were asked questions about
their specific experiences with workload, staffing, and training.
Other FAA technicians who did not participate in our focus groups may
have different experiences. Because of these limitations, we did not
rely entirely on focus groups, but rather used several different
methodologies to corroborate and support our conclusions.
To determine how training funds, including travel funds, have changed
in recent years, we obtained quantitative cost data (including travel
costs) from ATO and FAA Academy officials from fiscal year 2005
through May 2010 and compared these data for FAA-provided and vendor-
provided training. We also conducted semistructured interviews with
FAA management about technician training costs. We analyzed student
travel costs for academy training obtained from FAA's DELPHI system
and personnel compensation and benefits of academy instructors data
from the Federal Personnel and Payroll System. However, as FAA's cost
accounting system is not sufficient to provide costs for vendor
training and travel-related activities, the team had to analyze data
provided from FAA's Electronic Learning Management System (ELMS) to
summarize the cost of vendor technician training. We presented the
data provided by FAA despite the fact that the data are unaudited at
the level of detail needed for findings presented in table 19. As a
result, this report identified a recommendation for FAA to consider
modifying its cost accounting system or cost analysis techniques to
develop information about the cost of in-house and vendor-provided
training, and of the travel related to those training activities. We
assessed the reliability of the data we obtained electronically by
reviewing relevant documentation and internal controls, and
interviewing agency officials, and determined that those data were of
sufficient quality to be used for the purposes of this report.
To develop information on the occurrence and duration of scheduled and
unscheduled outages, we obtained operational performance data from FAA
for fiscal years 2000 through 2009. FAA outage data are collected in
accordance with the reporting guidance contained in FAA Order
6040.15E, National Airspace Performance Reporting System, and are
currently entered and stored in the Maintenance Management System.
These data are validated and fed into the National Airspace System
Performance Analysis System (NASPAS). NASPAS may be used for facility
or service performance trend analysis. NASPAS is capable of extracting
user-defined outage parameters, performing calculations, and
generating graphics for report writing. To understand how such outages
affect the national airspace system's efficiency, safety, and costs;
industry; and the flying public, we conducted structured interviews
with FAA and PASS officials. We assessed the reliability of the outage
data by reviewing relevant documentation and interviewing agency
officials, and determined that those data were of sufficient quality
to be used for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2009 to October 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: ATO Organizational Chart:
[Refer to PDF for image: chart]
Top level:
Office of the Chief Operating Officer.
Second level, reporting to Chief Operating Officer:
Senior Vice President (VP) for Operations;
Senior VP for Finance;
Senior VP for Strategy and Performance;
Senior VP for NextGen and Operations Planning;
Office of Safety;
Office of Acquisition and Business.
Third level, reporting to Senior VP for Operations:
VP System Operations;
VP Terminal;
VP En Route and Oceanic;
VP Technical Operations;
Office of the Service Center;
Office of Technical Training.
Fourth level, reporting to Office of Technical Training:
Director, Comptroller Business Operations and Planning;
Director, ATO Technical Training and Development:
* ATC Training and Development Group;
* Technical Operations Training and Development Group;
* Future Training and Development Group;
* ATC Facility Training Group;
* Infrastructure and Evaluation Group;
* Technical Workforce Management Group.
Source: FAA.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Teresa Spisak, Assistant
Director; Jessica A. Evans; Maren McAvoy; Taylor Reeves; Amy
Abramowitz; Emily Biskup; Melinda Cordero; Peter DelToro; Bess
Eisenstadt; Brandon Haller; Rich Hung; Bert Japikse; Steven Lozano;
Colleen Phillips; Andrew Stavisky; and John Warner made significant
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See, for example, FAA, Washington headquarters press release
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2009), [hyperlink,
http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=10966]
(accessed Aug. 20, 2010).
[2] The two parties had not begun to negotiate a new contract as of
June 2010.
[3] See GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic
Workforce Planning, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003), and Human Capital: A Guide for
Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal
Government, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G]
(Washington, D.C.: March 2004).
[4] These air traffic control facilities include 22 air route traffic
control centers, 163 terminal radar approach control facilities, and
466 air traffic control towers.
[5] Outages refer to the loss of a facility or service for 1 minute or
more. Outages can be scheduled (for maintenance or other purposes) or
unscheduled (such as when equipment fails).
[6] Theory-of-operations training covers the principles of equipment
operation, periodic and corrective maintenance, and troubleshooting.
EHOT includes the normal theory-of-operations instruction and covers
additional material designed to develop the skills and knowledge
needed to maintain and certify a system. DoP is an examination,
administered at the FAA Academy or vendor location following
successful completion of a theory-of-operations course that is
designed using EHOT.
[7] Technicians previously received OJT and performance examinations
in the field, whereas now a hands-on component is being built into
existing formal training courses provided at the academy or vendor
location to build proficiency without taking equipment out of service
for training purposes. EHOT and DoP satisfy the requirements of the
theory-of operations course, OJT, and the performance examination,
leading to the attainment of personnel certification authority.
[8] Strategic workforce planning focuses on developing long-term
strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining a workforce to
meet the needs of the future. Drawing on our previous work, we
selected key leading practices most related to FAA's technician
workforce. See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39].
[9] FAA Reauthorization Act of 2009, H.R. 915, 111th Cong., §
708(b)(1). See also FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety
Improvement Act, S. 1451, 111th Cong., § 708(b) (2010) as reported in
the Senate.
[10] According to FAA, recruitment incentives may be used when, for a
prolonged period, the agency has had extreme difficulty attracting an
adequate number of candidates, or when incentives are necessary to
attract candidates with unique competencies critical to an important
agency mission. Retention incentives may be paid to current employees
when they possess unique qualifications or their services meet a
special agency need, making it essential to retain them, and the
agency has determined they are likely to leave the federal service if
they do not receive a retention incentive.
[11] GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Human Capital System
Incorporates Many Leading Practices, but Improving Employee's
Satisfaction with Their Workplace Remains a Challenge, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-89] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28,
2009).
[12] Strategic training and development focuses on four key
components--planning, design and development, implementation, and
evaluation. Drawing on our previous work, we selected key leading
practices most related to FAA's technician workforce. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G].
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G].
[14] The service centers, located in Atlanta, Fort Worth, and Seattle,
provide shared services that promote standardization between Technical
Operations and ATO's three other service units, En Route, Terminal,
and System Operations. The service centers are also an ATO contact
point for other FAA organizations.
[15] The FAA Capital Investment Plan is a 5-year plan that describes
national airspace system modernization projects and lists the
activities FAA intends to accomplish during that period. The CIP
contains both projects that modernize existing systems and projects
that begin the transformation to NextGen. It also contains road maps
that show FAA's timetable for introducing new technologies to achieve
the planned NextGen capabilities and capacity increases. The CIP for
fiscal years 2011 through 2015 was released in February 2010.
[16] According to FAA, any costs over and above instructor and travel
costs for system technician-specific courses cannot be directly
attributed to the Technical Operations Training Division of the
academy, as this division shares the academy facilities with other FAA
training divisions, such as those for air traffic controllers and
inspectors.
[17] According to an individual identified as a subject matter expert
on the agency's cost accounting system, this system is not capable of
accumulating costs for vendor training and travel-related activities.
Accordingly, we cannot assess the reliability or completeness of the
data. FAA's Finance Office confirmed that the cost accounting system
does not have the data attributes needed to break out the training and
travel costs we requested or to validate the cost information provided
to us by training officials.
[18] Additionally, the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990. Pub. L.
101-576, 104 Stat. 2838, applies to the Department of Transportation,
of which FAA is a part. 31 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1)(M). The Federal
Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, Div. A,
Title I, § 806, [Title VIII], 110 Stat. 3009-389, requires, among
other things, that agencies covered by 31 U.S.C. § 901(b) have systems
that comply substantially with federal accounting standards. One such
standard is SFFAS No. 4, which states that essential uses of cost
information include controlling costs, measuring performance,
evaluating program costs and benefits, and making economic choice
decisions. The standard states that costs, regardless of funding
source, should be assigned to products or services that the entity
provides, and that costs not directly assignable to specific outputs
should be assigned on either a cause-and-effect basis or through
reasonable allocation. In plain language, the principal purpose of
cost accounting is to assess how much it costs to do whatever is being
measured, thus allowing agency management, Congress, and others to
analyze that cost information when making decisions.
[19] FAA Reauthorization Act of 2009, H.R. 915, 111th Cong., §
708(b)(1). See also FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety
Improvement Act, S. 1451, 111th Cong., § 708(b) (2010) as reported in
the Senate.
[20] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G].
[21] ARTCCs are air traffic control facilities that provide air
traffic control services to aircraft operating on instrument flight
rules flight plans within controlled airspace, principally during the
en route phase of flight. TRACONs are air traffic control terminals
that provide radar-control service to aircraft arriving or departing
the primary airport and adjacent airports, and to aircraft transiting
the terminal's airspace.
[End of section]
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