Aviation Safety
Preliminary Information on Aircraft Icing and Winter Operations
Gao ID: GAO-10-441T February 24, 2010
Ice formation on aircraft can disrupt the smooth flow of air over the wings and prevent the aircraft from taking off or decrease the pilot's ability to maintain control of the aircraft. Taxi and landing operations can also be risky in winter weather. Despite a variety of technologies designed to prevent ice from forming on planes, as well as persistent efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other stakeholders to mitigate icing risks, icing remains a serious concern. As part of an ongoing review, this statement provides preliminary information on (1) the extent to which large commercial airplanes have experienced accidents and incidents related to icing and contaminated runways, (2) the efforts of FAA and aviation stakeholders to improve safety in icing and winter weather operating conditions, and (3) the challenges that continue to affect aviation safety in icing and winter weather operating conditions. GAO analyzed data obtained from FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and others. GAO conducted data reliability testing and determined that the data used in this report were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Further, GAO obtained information from senior FAA and NTSB officials, representatives of the Flight Safety Foundation, and representatives of some key aviation industry stakeholder organizations. GAO provided a draft of this statement to FAA, NTSB, and NASA and incorporated their comments where appropriate.
According to NTSB's aviation accident database, from 1998 to 2009 one large commercial airplane was involved in a nonfatal accident after encountering icing conditions during flight and five large commercial airplanes were involved in nonfatal accidents due to snow or ice on runways. However, FAA and others recognize that incidents are potential precursors to accidents and the many reported icing incidents suggest that these airplanes face ongoing risks from icing. For example, FAA and NASA databases contain information on over 600 icing-related incidents involving large commercial airplanes. FAA and other aviation stakeholders have undertaken many efforts to improve safety in icing conditions. For example, in 1997, FAA issued a multiyear plan for improving the safety of aircraft operating in icing conditions and has since made progress on the objectives specified in its plan by issuing regulations, airworthiness directives, and voluntary guidance, among other initiatives. Other government entities that have taken steps to increase aviation safety in icing conditions include NTSB, which has issued numerous recommendations as a result of its aviation accident investigations, and NASA, which has contributed to icing-related research. The private sector has deployed various technologies on aircraft, such as wing deicers, and operated ground deicing and runway clearing programs at airports. GAO identified challenges related to winter weather aviation operations that, if addressed by ongoing or planned efforts, could improve safety. These challenges include (1) improving the timeliness of FAA's winter weather rulemaking efforts; (2) ensuring the availability of adequate resources for icing-related research and development; (3) ensuring that pilot training is thorough and realistic; (4) ensuring the collection and distribution of accurate weather information; and (5) developing a more integrated approach to effectively manage winter operations.
GAO-10-441T, Aviation Safety: Preliminary Information on Aircraft Icing and Winter Operations
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST:
Wednesday, February 24, 2010:
Aviation Safety:
Preliminary Information on Aircraft Icing and Winter Operations:
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-10-441T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-441T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Ice formation on aircraft can disrupt the smooth flow of air over the
wings and prevent the aircraft from taking off or decrease the pilot‘s
ability to maintain control of the aircraft. Taxi and landing
operations can also be risky in winter weather. Despite a variety of
technologies designed to prevent ice from forming on planes, as well
as persistent efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
other stakeholders to mitigate icing risks, icing remains a serious
concern. As part of an ongoing review, this statement provides
preliminary information on (1) the extent to which large commercial
airplanes have experienced accidents and incidents related to icing
and contaminated runways, (2) the efforts of FAA and aviation
stakeholders to improve safety in icing and winter weather operating
conditions, and (3) the challenges that continue to affect aviation
safety in icing and winter weather operating conditions. GAO analyzed
data obtained from FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and
others. GAO conducted data reliability testing and determined that the
data used in this report were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
Further, GAO obtained information from senior FAA and NTSB officials,
representatives of the Flight Safety Foundation, and representatives
of some key aviation industry stakeholder organizations. GAO provided
a draft of this statement to FAA, NTSB, and NASA and incorporated
their comments where appropriate.
What GAO Found:
According to NTSB‘s aviation accident database, from 1998 to 2009 one
large commercial airplane was involved in a nonfatal accident after
encountering icing conditions during flight and five large commercial
airplanes were involved in nonfatal accidents due to snow or ice on
runways. However, FAA and others recognize that incidents are
potential precursors to accidents and the many reported icing
incidents suggest that these airplanes face ongoing risks from icing.
For example, FAA and NASA databases contain information on over 600
icing-related incidents involving large commercial airplanes.
FAA and other aviation stakeholders have undertaken many efforts to
improve safety in icing conditions. For example, in 1997, FAA issued a
multiyear plan for improving the safety of aircraft operating in icing
conditions and has since made progress on the objectives specified in
its plan by issuing regulations, airworthiness directives, and
voluntary guidance, among other initiatives. Other government entities
that have taken steps to increase aviation safety in icing conditions
include NTSB, which has issued numerous recommendations as a result of
its aviation accident investigations, and NASA, which has contributed
to icing-related research. The private sector has deployed various
technologies on aircraft, such as wing deicers, and operated ground
deicing and runway clearing programs at airports.
GAO identified challenges related to winter weather aviation
operations that, if addressed by ongoing or planned efforts, could
improve safety. These challenges include (1) improving the timeliness
of FAA‘s winter weather rulemaking efforts; (2) ensuring the
availability of adequate resources for icing-related research and
development; (3) ensuring that pilot training is thorough and
realistic; (4) ensuring the collection and distribution of accurate
weather information; and (5) developing a more integrated approach to
effectively manage winter operations.
Figure: Example of Ground Deicing to Help Ensure Clean Aircraft:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Gerald R. Ford International Airport.
[End of figure]
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-441T] or key
components. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham at
(202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on issues related to
aircraft icing and conducting aviation operations on contaminated
runways.[Footnote 1] Icing can be a significant hazard for aviation
operations of all types, including commercial flights, no matter the
season of the year. As shown in figure 1, when there is ice on an
aircraft's wings, it can disrupt the smooth flow of air over the wings
and prevent the aircraft from safely taking off or decrease the
pilot's ability to control the aircraft in flight. Depending on the
location of the ice, the shape of the wing, and the phase of flight,
even small, almost imperceptible amounts of ice can have a significant
detrimental effect. Despite a variety of technologies designed to
prevent ice from forming on planes or to remove ice that has formed,
as well as persistent efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and other stakeholders to mitigate icing risks, icing remains a
concern. Furthermore, runways that have not been cleared of snow or
ice can be hazardously slick for planes during takeoff and landing.
Figure 1: Effect of Ice Build-up on Aircraft Wings:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The illustration depicts the following:
Normal conditions:
In normal conditions, air flows smoothly over the wings, creating lift.
When icing occurs:
Ice disrupts smooth airflow on a wing, increasing drag and decreasing
lift.
Sources: GAO and FAA.
[End of figure]
Based on an ongoing review for this Subcommittee, as well as for the
Senate Aviation Subcommittee and Senator Charles Schumer, my testimony
today discusses preliminary information on (1) the extent to which
large commercial airplanes have experienced accidents and incidents
related to icing and contaminated runways, (2) the efforts of FAA and
other aviation stakeholders to improve safety in icing and winter
weather operating conditions, and (3) the challenges that continue to
affect aviation safety in icing and winter weather operating
conditions. My statement is based on our analyses of data related to
icing obtained from FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and
others. It also includes updates from FAA of information published in
our related reports. It reflects our discussions with senior FAA,
NTSB, NASA, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
officials and representatives from the Flight Safety Foundation and
several aviation industry organizations.[Footnote 2] As part of our
ongoing review, we performed this work from August 2009 to February
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our review objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further,
we conducted data reliability testing and determined that the data
used in this report were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We
provided a draft of this testimony to FAA, NTSB, and NASA officials to
obtain their comments. In response, FAA, NTSB, and NASA provided
additional information that we incorporated where appropriate.
Although Large Commercial Airplanes Have Experienced Few Icing-Related
Accidents since 1998, the Many Reported Icing Incidents Suggest that
Icing Is an Ongoing Risk to Aviation Safety:
According to NTSB's aviation accident database, from 1998 to 2009 one
large commercial airplane was involved in a nonfatal accident after
encountering icing conditions during flight and five large commercial
airplanes were involved in nonfatal accidents related to snow or ice
on runways.[Footnote 3] Although there have been few accidents, FAA
and others recognize that incidents are potential precursors to
accidents.[Footnote 4] Data on hundreds of incidents that occurred
during this period reveal that icing and contaminated runways pose
substantial risk to aviation safety. FAA's database of incidents
includes 200 icing-related incidents involving large commercial
airplanes that occurred from 1998 through 2007.[Footnote 5] These data
covered a broad set of events, such as the collision of two airplanes
at an ice-covered gate, and an airplane that hit the right main gear
against the runway and scraped the left wing down the runway for about
63 feet while attempting to land with ice accumulation on the
aircraft. During this same time period, NASA's Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) received over 600 icing and winter weather-
related incident involving large commercial airplanes.[Footnote 6]
These incidents reveal a variety of safety issues such as runways
contaminated by snow or ice, ground deicing problems, and in-flight
icing encounters. This suggests that risks from icing and other winter
weather operating conditions may be greater than indicated by NTSB's
accident database and by FAA's incident database. FAA officials point
out that there is no defined reporting threshold for ASRS reports and
because they are developed from personal narrative, they can be
subjective. However, these officials agree that the ASRS events must
be thoroughly reviewed and evaluated for content to determine the
relevancy to icing and the extent and severity of the safety issue.
The contents of the ASRS data system also demonstrate the importance
of aggregating data from all available sources to understand a safety
concern.[Footnote 7] See table 1 for the number of icing and winter
weather-related incident reports from ASRS for large commercial
airplanes.
Table 1: Icing and Winter Weather-Related Incident Reports for Large
Commercial Airplanes by Category of Incident, 1998 to 2007:
Category: Anti-ice or deicing incident/procedure;
Number of Reports: 179.
Category: Controllability issue--ground;
Number of Reports: 72.
Category: In-flight encounter--aircraft equipment problems;
Number of Reports: 72.
Category: In-flight encounter--airframe and/or flight control icing;
Number of Reports: 69.
Category: Other winter weather incident;
Number of Reports: 42.
Category: Surface marking and signage obstruction;
Number of Reports: 41.
Category: Runway, ramp, or taxiway excursion;
Number of Reports: 36.
Category: Runway, ramp, or taxiway incursion;
Number of Reports: 34.
Category: Controllability issue--air;
Number of Reports: 32.
Category: Maintenance incident;
Number of Reports: 19.
Category: Ramp safety--personnel risk or injury;
Number of Reports: 17.
Category: In-flight encounter--sensor type incident;
Number of Reports: 15.
Category: Total;
Number of Reports: 628.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA ASRS data.
Note: An excursion occurs when an aircraft unintentionally exits a
runway, ramp, or taxiway. An incursion occurs when an aircraft enters
a runway, ramp, or taxiway without authorization.
[End of table]
While this testimony focuses on large commercial airplanes, I would
like to note that from 1998 to 2007, small commercial airplanes and
noncommercial airplanes experienced more icing-related accidents and
fatalities than did large commercial airplanes, as shown in table 2.
[Footnote 8] This is largely because, compared to large commercial
airplanes, small commercial airplanes and noncommercial airplanes (1)
operate at lower altitudes that have more frequent icing conditions,
(2) have a higher icing collection efficiency due to their smaller
scale, (3) are more greatly impacted by ice as a result of their
smaller scale, (4) tend to have deicing equipment rather than fully
evaporative anti-icing equipment, (5) may not have ice protection
systems that are certified, nor are they required to be, because the
airplane is not approved for flight in known icing conditions, and (6)
may not have ice protections systems installed.
Table 2: Icing and Winter Weather-Related Accidents and Fatalities for
1998 to 2009, Incidents for 1998 to 2007:
Icing-related accidents, including in-flight and runway:
Large commercial airplanes: 6;
Small commercial: airplanes: 49;
Noncommercial: airplanes: 510.
Fatalities in icing-related accidents:
Large commercial airplanes: 0;
Small commercial: airplanes: 27;
Noncommercial: airplanes: 202.
Icing-related incidents in FAA's database:
Large commercial airplanes: 200;
Small commercial: airplanes: 119;
Noncommercial: airplanes: 567.
Icing-related incidents in NASA's ASRS database:
Large commercial airplanes: 628;
Small commercial: airplanes: 102;
Noncommercial: airplanes: 422.
Source: NTSB for accidents and fatalities; FAA and NASA for incidents.
Notes: For all three types of airplanes, accident data for 2008 and
2009 are incomplete because NTSB has not completed all of its accident
investigations that occurred during those years. For small commercial
and noncommercial airplanes, the number of accidents and incidents
also includes carburetor icing.
[End of table]
FAA and Other Aviation Stakeholders Have Undertaken a Variety of
Efforts Aimed at Improving Safety in Icing/Winter Weather Conditions:
FAA Adopted a Plan to Increase Safety in Icing Conditions and Has
Taken Other Actions to Improve Safety in Winter Weather:
Following the 1994 fatal crash of American Eagle Flight 4184 in
Roselawn, Indiana, FAA issued a multiyear plan in 1997for improving
the safety of aircraft operating in icing conditions and created a
steering committee to monitor the progress of the planned activities.
[Footnote 9] Over the last decade, FAA made progress on the
implementation of the objectives specified in its multiyear plan by
issuing or amending regulations, airworthiness directives (ADs), and
voluntary guidance to provide icing-related safety oversight.[Footnote
10] For example, FAA issued three final rules on icing:
* in August 2007, a rule introduced new airworthiness standards to
establish comprehensive requirements for the performance and handling
characteristics of transport category airplanes in icing conditions;
[Footnote 11]
* in August 2009, a rule required a means to ensure timely activation
of the ice protection system on transport category airplanes; and:
* in December 2009, a rule required pilots to ensure that the wings of
their aircraft are free of polished frost.[Footnote 12]
FAA has also proposed an icing-related rule in November 2009, on which
the public comment period closed February 22, 2010; this rule would
require the timely activation of ice protection equipment on
commercial aircraft during icing conditions and weather conditions
conducive to ice formation on the aircraft.[Footnote 13] In addition,
FAA is developing a proposed rule to amend its standards for transport
category airplanes to address supercooled large drop icing, which is
outside the range of icing conditions covered by the current
standards.[Footnote 14] Since 1997, FAA has issued over 100 ADs to
address icing safety issues involving more than 50 specific types of
aircraft, including ADs that required the installation of new software
on certain aircraft and another that required operators and
manufactures to install placards displaying procedures for use of an
anti-icing switch on certain aircraft. Additionally, FAA has issued
bulletins and alerts to operators emphasizing icing safety issues. As
part of our ongoing review, we will conduct a more comprehensive
evaluation of FAA's progress on the implementation of the objectives
specified in its multiyear in-flight icing plan. Among other things,
we will also analyze the results of FAA's surveillance activities
related to monitoring air carriers' compliance with existing
regulations and ADs.
FAA also provided funding for a variety of icing-related purposes. For
example, FAA has supported NASA research related to severe icing
conditions and the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR)
research related to weather and aircraft icing. Furthermore, FAA has
provided almost $200 million to airports through the Airport
Improvement Program (AIP) to construct deicing facilities and to
acquire aircraft deicing equipment from 1999 to 2009. See appendix I
for a detailed listing of AIP icing-related funding by state, city,
and year.
Runway safety is a key concern for aviation safety and especially
critical during winter weather operations. For example, in December
2005, a passenger jet landed on a snowy runway at Chicago's Midway
Airport, rolled through an airport perimeter fence onto an adjacent
roadway, and struck an automobile, killing a child and injuring 4
other occupants of the automobile and 18 airline passengers[Footnote
15]. According to the Flight Safety Foundation, from 1995 through
2008, 30 percent of global aviation accidents were runway-related and
"ineffective braking/runway contamination" is the fourth largest
causal factor in runway excursions that occur during landing. In
fiscal year 2000, FAA's Office of Airport Safety and Standards
initiated a program, which includes making funds available to airports
through AIP, to accelerate improvements in runway safety areas at
commercial service airports that did not meet FAA design standards.
Since 2000, FAA has provided about $200 million per year in AIP
funding for the creation of runway safety areas. According to FAA
officials, of the 619 runways that FAA determined needed improvement,
465 (74 percent) have been completed and 154 (26 percent) remain to be
completed by 2015. The estimated cost to complete the remaining
project is about $835 million.[Footnote 16] In some cases where (1)
land is not available, (2) it would be very expensive for the airport
sponsors to buy land off the end of the runway, or (3) it is otherwise
not possible to have the 1,000 foot safety area, FAA has approved the
use of an Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS).[Footnote 17]
FAA supports EMAS installations through AIP funding, and currently,
EMAS installations have been completed for 44 runways at 30 airports
in the United States, with 4 more installations scheduled for 2010.
[Footnote 18] To date there have been five successful EMAS captures of
overrunning aircraft.
Other Stakeholders Support and Augment FAA Efforts to Increase Safety
in Winter Weather/Icing Conditions:
Government and industry stakeholders, external to FAA, also contribute
to the effort to increase aviation safety in winter weather/icing
conditions. For example, NTSB investigates and reports on civil
aviation accidents and issues safety recommendations to FAA and
others, some of which it deems most critical and places on a list of
"Most Wanted" recommendations.[Footnote 19] Since 1996, NTSB has
issued 82 recommendations to FAA aimed at reducing risks from in-
flight structural icing, engine and aircraft component icing, runway
condition and contamination, ground icing, and winter weather
operations. NTSB's icing-related recommendations to FAA have called
for FAA to, among other things, strengthen its requirements for
certifying aircraft for flying in icing conditions, sponsor the
development of weather forecasts that define locations with icing
conditions, and enhance its training requirements for pilots.[Footnote
20] NTSB has closed 39 of these recommendations (48 percent) as having
been implemented by FAA, and has classified another 25 (30 percent) as
FAA having made acceptable progress.[Footnote 21] This combined 78
percent acceptance rate is similar to the rate for all of NTSB's
aviation recommendations.
For more than 30 years, NASA has conducted and sponsored fundamental
and applied research related to icing. The research addresses icing
causes, effects, and mitigations. For instance, NASA has conducted
extensive research to characterize and simulate supercooled large drop
icing conditions to inform a pending FAA rule related to the topic.
NASA participated in research activities, partially funded by FAA,
that developed additional knowledge and strategies which allowed
forecasters to more precisely locate supercooled large drop icing
conditions. Furthermore, NASA has an icing program, focused generally
on research related to the effects of in-flight icing on airframes and
engines for many types of flight vehicles. NASA has developed icing
simulation capabilities that allow researchers, manufacturers, and
certification authorities to better understand the growth and effects
of ice on aircraft surfaces. NASA also produced a set of training
materials for pilots operating in winter weather conditions. In recent
years, NASA's funding decreased significantly, limiting the capability
of its icing research program.
NOAA, the National Weather Service (NWS), and NCAR have efforts
directed and funded by FAA related to predicting the location and
severity of icing occurrences. NWS operates icing prediction systems
and NCAR conducts research to determine more efficient methods to
complete this task. For example, in 2006, NCAR introduced a new Web-
based icing forecast tool that allows meteorologists and airline
dispatchers to warn pilots about icing hazards up to 12 hours in
advance. NCAR developed this tool using FAA funding and NWS
facilitates the operation of the new icing forecasting tool. NWS also
posts on the agency's Web site maps of current icing conditions, pilot
reports, forecasts, and freezing level graphics.
The private sector has also contributed to efforts to prevent
accidents and incidents related to icing and winter weather
conditions. For example, as shown in figure 2, aircraft manufacturers
have deployed various technologies such as wing deicers, anti-icing
systems, and heated wings.
Figure 2: Aircraft Ice Protection Systems:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The following items are depicted on the illustration:
* Windshield wipers;
* Electronically heated windshield;
* Electronically heated pitot/static tubes;
* TAT sensor;
* Electronically heated propellor blade deicers;
* Pneumatic engine inlet lip deicer;
* Bypass duct deicer;
* Pneumatic leading edge deicers.
Source: GAO, based on information from NTSB.
Notes: Pneumatic leading edge deicers are inflatable rubber "boots" on
the leading edges of airfoil surfaces (including wings, horizontal
stabilizers, and vertical stabilizers) that can be rapidly inflated
and deflated with air pressure to break up ice accumulation. Similar
technology is used for the pneumatic engine inlet lip and bypass duct
deicer. The TAT (Total Air Temperature) sensor helps the pilot
determine critical flight parameters such as true airspeed computation
and static air temperature. Electronically heated propeller blade
deicers, windshield, and pitot/static tubes operate in-flight to rid
the aircraft of ice buildup and to prevent ice accumulation.
[End of figure]
In addition, airports operate ground deicing and runway clearing
programs that help ensure clean wings (see fig. 3) and runways. While
critical to safe, efficient winter operations, these programs involve
treating aircraft and airport pavement with millions of pounds of
deicing and anti-icing compounds annually. According to the
Environmental Protection Agency, these compounds contain chemicals
that can harm the environment. Some airports can control deicing
pollution by capturing the fluids used to deice aircraft using
technologies such as AIP-funded deicing pads, where aircraft are
sprayed with deicing fluids before takeoff and the fluids are captured
and treated; drainage collection systems; or vacuum-equipped vehicles.
Third-party contractors, rather than individual air carriers, are
increasingly performing deicing operations at commercial airports. FAA
does not currently have a process to directly oversee these third-
party contractors but indicates that it has one under development.
Figure 3: Example of Ground Deicing to Help Ensure Clean Aircraft:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Gerald R. Ford International Airport.
[End of figure]
Continued Attention to Regulation, Training, and Coordination Issues
Could Further Mitigate the Risks of Winter Weather Operations:
While FAA and others are undertaking efforts to mitigate the risks of
aircraft icing and winter weather operations, through our interviews
and discussions with government and industry stakeholders, we have
identified challenges related to these risks that, if addressed by
ongoing or planned efforts, could improve aviation safety. These
challenges include (1) improving the timeliness of FAA's winter
weather rulemaking efforts, (2) ensuring the availability of adequate
resources for icing-related research and development (R&D), (3)
ensuring that pilot training is thorough, relevant, and realistic, (4)
ensuring the collection and distribution of timely and accurate
weather information, and (5) developing a more integrated approach to
effectively manage winter operations.
Improving the timeliness of FAA's winter weather rulemaking efforts.
FAA's rulemaking, like that of other federal agencies, is a
complicated, multistep process that can take many years. Nonetheless,
NTSB, FAA, and we have previously expressed concerns about the
efficiency and timeliness of FAA's rulemaking efforts. In 2001, we
reported that a major reform effort begun by FAA in 1998 did not solve
long-standing problems with its rulemaking process, as indicated both
by the lack of improvement in the time required to complete the
rulemaking process and by the agency's inability to consistently meet
the time frames imposed by statute or its own guidance.[Footnote 22]
External pressures--such as highly-publicized accidents,
recommendations by NTSB, and congressional mandates--as well as
internal pressures, such as changes in management's emphasis continued
to add to and shift the agency's priorities. For some rules, difficult
policy issues continued to remain unresolved late in the process. The
2001 report contained 10 recommendations designed to improve the
efficiency of FAA's rulemaking through, among other things, (1) more
timely and effective participation in decision-making and
prioritization; (2) more effective use of information management
systems to monitor and improve the process; and (3) the implementation
of human capital strategies to measure, evaluate, and provide
performance incentives for participants in the process. FAA
implemented 8 of the 10 recommendations.[Footnote 23]
NTSB's February 2010 update on the status of its Most Wanted
recommendations related to icing characterized FAA's related
rulemaking efforts as "unacceptably slow." In December 2009, at FAA's
International Runway Safety Summit, NTSB's Chairman commented, "How do
safety improvements end up taking 10 years to deliver? They get
delayed one day at a time...and every one of those days may be the day
when a preventable accident occurs as the result of something we were
'just about ready to fix.'" In particular, NTSB has expressed concern
about the pace of FAA's rulemaking project to amend its standards for
transport category airplanes to address supercooled large drop icing,
which is outside the range of icing conditions covered by the current
standards. FAA began this rulemaking effort in 1997 in response to a
recommendation made by NTSB the prior year, and the agency currently
expects to issue its proposed rule in July 2010 and the final rule in
January 2012. However, until the notice of proposed rulemaking is
published and the close of the comment period is known, it will be
unclear as to when the final rule will be issued.[Footnote 24] Much of
the time on this rulemaking effort has been devoted to research and
analysis aimed at understanding the atmospheric conditions that lead
to supercooled large drop icing.
In 2009, FAA completed an internal review of its rulemaking process
that concluded that several of the concerns from 1998 that led to the
agency's major reform effort remain issues, including:
* inadequate early involvement of key stakeholders;
* inadequate early resolution of issues;
* inefficient review process;
* inadequate selection and training of personnel involved in
rulemaking; and:
* inefficient quality guidance.
According to FAA's manager for aircraft and airport rules, the agency
is taking steps to implement recommendations made by the internal
review, such as revising the rulemaking project record form and
enhancing training for staff involved in rulemaking. In addition, in
October 2009, FAA tasked its Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
(ARAC) with reviewing its processes and making recommendations for
improvement within a year. We believe these efforts have the potential
to improve the efficiency of FAA's rulemaking process. Recently,
moreover, FAA has demonstrated a commitment to making progress on some
high-priority rules that have languished for a long time. For example,
FAA officials have said that they intend to expedite FAA's rulemaking
on pilot fatigue, which has been in process since 1992. The issue of
insufficient rest emerged as a concern from NTSB's investigation of
the February 12, 2009, crash of Continental Connection/Colgan Air
Flight 3407 near Buffalo, New York.[Footnote 25] Moreover, a capacity
for progress in rulemaking will be critical because, as we have
reported to this Subcommittee in our recent reviews of the transition
to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), many of
the procedures that are proposed to safely enhance the efficiency and
capacity of the national airspace system to address current delays and
congestion in the system and to accommodate forecasted increases in
air traffic will be dependent on the timely development of rules and
standards.
Ensuring the availability of adequate resources for icing-related R&D.
NASA is a key source of R&D related to icing. The agency performs
fundamental research related to icing in house and sponsors such
research at universities and other organizations. According to NASA
officials, possible areas for increased support for R&D that could be
helpful include pilot training, supercooled large drop simulation
(both experimental and computational), engine icing, and the effects
of icing on future aircraft wing designs. However, the amount of NASA
resources (including combined amounts of NASA's budget and funding
from FAA for aircraft icing R&D at NASA facilities) and staffing for
icing research have declined significantly since fiscal year 2005, as
shown in figure 4. According to NASA officials, there were several
contributing factors to the decline in available resources including
the fiscal constraints on the overall federal budget, a shift in the
Administration's priorities for NASA, as well as a restructuring
within the NASA's aeronautical programs to reflect the available
resources and priorities. Because the outcomes of R&D are often
required for the development of rules and standards, as well as for
technological innovation, a decline in R&D resources can delay actions
that would promote safe operation in icing conditions.
Figure 4: NASA Funding and Staffing for Icing-Related R&D, Fiscal
Years 2005-2013:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Fiscal year: 2005;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA (dollars in thousands): $6,383;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 42.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA (dollars in thousands): $6,086;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 36.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA (dollars in thousands): $1,532;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 28.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA (dollars in thousands): $1,959;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 21.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA (dollars in thousands): $2,183;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 22.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA (dollars in thousands): $1,043;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 21.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA (dollars in thousands): $1,966;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 21.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA (dollars in thousands): $930;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 21.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA (dollars in thousands): $930;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 21.
Sources: GAO presentation of NASA data.
Notes: Funding data represents three sources of funding for icing
research at NASA. According to NASA, complete data are available for
one source, while data for another source are only available for
fiscal years 2005-2010, and data for the third source are only
available for fiscal years 2005-2009. Amounts do not reflect icing-
related funds received or could be received through other government
programs or external partnership (i.e. Boeing) agreements. The funding
costs do not include amounts for staffing.
[End of figure]
According to FAA's chief scientist for icing, NASA's research to
understand how icing affects various makes and models of aircraft in
real time, which would ultimately help pilots determine how to respond
to specific icing encounters, has been adversely affected by cuts to
NASA's icing research budget. He further said that without NASA's
research efforts, it would be uncertain who would conduct potentially
important icing research.
Ensuring that pilot training is thorough, relevant, and realistic.
Another icing-related challenge to aviation safety is pilot training.
Aviation experts told us that pilots are likely to encounter icing
conditions beyond their aircraft's capabilities at least once in their
career. It is therefore important that pilots be trained to handle
such conditions. Currently, icing must be covered in a commercial
pilot's initial training and, while recurrent training may not always
emphasize icing, it is covered on a rotational basis. Different
weather conditions affect aircraft performance in a variety of ways,
making it critical that pilots receive training relevant to the
conditions they are likely to encounter. For example, it is important
that regional airline operators provide region-specific training to
their pilots as regional airline consolidations may cause pilots to
fly a geographically wider variety of routes with more variation in
weather conditions. Regarding pilot training, in January 2010, the FAA
Administrator said, "The flying public needs to have confidence that
no matter what size airplane they board, the pilots have the right
qualifications, are trained for the mission, are fit for duty....We
know we need to reexamine pilot qualifications to make sure commercial
pilots who carry passengers have the appropriate operational
experience--they need to be trained for the mission they are flying."
As part of our ongoing work, we will examine FAA pilot training
requirements and the extent to which FAA ensures pilots are adhering
to FAA training requirements in our final report.
Simulators are used to train pilots of large commercial airplanes for
in-flight icing because it is not feasible to train in actual icing
conditions, as they are difficult to predict and hazardous. However,
reliance on simulators for training means that pilots may not be
sufficiently prepared for a variety of real-world icing conditions.
According to representatives of the Aerospace Industries Association,
some characteristics of icing cannot currently be replicated and to
improve simulators, researchers need to develop engineering tools to
characterize ice shapes such as those resulting from supercooled large
drops.
Ensuring the collection and distribution of timely and accurate
weather information. Improving the quality of weather information
could reduce the safety risks associated with winter weather
operations. Pilots and operators use weather forecasts to decide
whether it is safe to start a flight or, once aloft, whether it is
preferable to continue on to the destination or divert to an alternate
airport. Weather experts explained that weather forecasters are still
far from being able to precisely predict icing conditions in the
atmosphere and the impact of such conditions on individual aircraft.
For this reason, FAA said icing forecasters generally provide overly
cautious forecasts that cover a broad area. While this serves to warn
pilots that icing could occur, representatives of the Air Line Pilots
Association said that too many false alarms result in pilots ignoring
subsequent forecasts of icing. These representatives also said that
pilots do not know when they are entering severe conditions, as they
are only given generalized statements about icing conditions.
Providing pilots with accurate weather information has been a long-
standing concern: FAA's 1997 Inflight Aircraft Icing Plan recommended
improving the quality and dissemination of icing weather information
to dispatchers and flight crews. Since 1997, FAA, in conjunction with
NOAA and NCAR, has developed improved icing forecasting products to
improve icing weather information. Icing-related research is an
important component of planning for the NextGen initiative. Currently,
NextGen weather researchers are focused on creating technology and
procedures that enable forecasters to provide pilots with more precise
predictions of icing conditions, which they believe will address the
problem of pilots ignoring traditionally unreliable icing forecasts.
According to NWS and NCAR, real-time information about weather
conditions could help forecasters create more precise forecasts and
communicate the existence of dangerous weather conditions to pilots.
Developing a more integrated approach to effectively manage winter
operations. FAA indicated that developing an integrated approach to
effectively manage winter operations is among its top challenges
related to aviation icing. It is important for FAA and the aviation
industry to focus on how components of the aviation system interact
and affect one another during winter operations. Airport surface
conditions, aircraft ground deicing, aircraft in-flight icing and
icing certification, the dissemination of airport condition
information, air traffic handling of aircraft in icing conditions, and
air traffic arrival and departure sequencing should be considered
together as vital to safe operations in icing conditions and should
not be viewed in isolation.
Mr. Chairman, we are continuing to collect and analyze information
related to the issues that we have presented here today and expect to
provide this Subcommittee and the co-requesters of this study a final
report as soon as possible. This concludes my prepared statement. I
would be happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the
Subcommittee may have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Gerald
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to
this testimony included Laurel Ball, Shareea Butler, Colin Fallon,
David Goldstein, Brandon Haller, David Hooper, Joshua Ormond, and
Sally Moino.
[End of section]
Appendix I: FAA's Funding to the Airport Improvement Program for Icing-
Related Projects, 1999--2009, by State and City:
State/City: Fairbanks, Alaska;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $2,069,333.
State/City: Denver, Colorado;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $299,974.
State/City: Denver, Colorado;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $6,200,000.
State/City: Denver, Colorado;
Year: 2004;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $7,700,000.
State/City: Denver, Colorado;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $9,909,845.
State/City: Denver, Colorado;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $3,211,130.
State/City: Denver, Colorado;
Year: 2006;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $2,634,739.
State/City: New Haven, Connecticut;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility: P;
Total amount: $67,092.
State/City: Dubuque, Iowa;
Year: 2006;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $221,417.
State/City: Belleville, Illinois;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $202,572.
State/City: Belleville, Illinois;
Year: 2009;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $507,900.
State/City: Indianapolis, Indiana;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $5,654,999.
State/City: Wichita, Kansas;
Year: 1999;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $128,350.
State/City: Manhattan, Kansas;
Year: 2001;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $37,438.
State/City: Manhattan, Kansas;
Year: 2002;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $123,971.
State/City: Covington, Kentucky;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $1,210,000.
State/City: Covington, Kentucky;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $269,057.
State/City: Lexington, Kentucky;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $198,000.
State/City: Lexington, Kentucky;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $2,399,244.
State/City: Paducah, Kentucky;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $91,037.
State/City: Baltimore, Maryland;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $3,403,519.
State/City: Bangor, Maine;
Year: 2004;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: 399,599.
State/City: Bangor, Maine;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: 1,384,222.
State/City: Detroit, Michigan;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $2,950,000.
State/City: Detroit, Michigan;
Year: 2008;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $3,800,000.
State/City: Detroit, Michigan;
Year: 2009;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $1,889,237.
State/City: Kalamazoo, Michigan;
Year: 2004;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $203,468.
State/City: Bemidji, Minnesota;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $12,065.
State/City: Bemidji, Minnesota;
Year: 2005;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $161,478.
State/City: Brainerd, Minnesota;
Year: 2008;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $204,250.
State/City: Hibbing, Minnesota;
Year: 2005;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $280,690.
State/City: International Falls, Minnesota;
Year: 2007;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $205,899.
State/City: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $7,660,984.
State/City: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $10,204,941.
State/City: St. Cloud, Minnesota;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $58,500.
State/City: St. Cloud, Minnesota;
Year: 2007;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $204,250.
State/City: Kansas City, Missouri;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $150,000.
State/City: Kansas City, Missouri;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $5,589,005.
State/City: Kansas City, Missouri;
Year: 2006;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $4,463,462.
State/City: Bozeman, Montana;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $91,328.
State/City: Missoula, Montana;
Year: 2008;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $4,363,460.
State/City: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $145,051.
State/City: Kinston, North Carolina;
Year: 2001;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $167,943.
State/City: Morristown, New Jersey;
Year: 2004;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $1,579,259.
State/City: Roswell, New Mexico;
Year: 2008;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $116,051.
State/City: Buffalo, New York;
Year: 2006;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $816,891.
State/City: Buffalo, New York;
Year: 2008;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $500,000.
State/City: Islip, New York;
Year: 2009;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $288,591.
State/City: Islip, New York;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $46,550.
State/City: Ithaca, New York;
Year: 2009;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $113,735.
State/City: New York, New York;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $6,856,488.
State/City: Newburgh, New York;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $1,400,000.
State/City: Rochester, New York;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $1,858,022.
State/City: Rochester, New York;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $973,860.
State/City: White Plains, New York;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $369,855.
State/City: White Plains, New York;
Year: 2003;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $262,678.
State/City: White Plains, New York;
Year: 2007;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $581,613.
State/City: White Plains, New York;
Year: 2008;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $296,283.
State/City: White Plains, New York;
Year: 2009;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $473,991.
State/City: Akron, Ohio;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $4,993,313.
State/City: Akron, Ohio;
Year: 2006;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $5,000,000.
State/City: Columbus, Ohio;
Year: 2002;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $5,173,023.
State/City: Toledo, Ohio;
Year: 2006;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $861,735.
State/City: Toledo, Ohio;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $77,524.
State/City: Toledo, Ohio;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $746,756.
State/City: Youngstown/Warren, Ohio;
Year: 2008;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $246,687.
State/City: Youngstown/Warren, Ohio;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: 22,609.
State/City: Tulsa, Oklahoma;
Year: 2004;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $381,239.
State/City: Portland, Oregon;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $6,173,126.
State/City: Portland, Oregon;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $9,645,738.
State/City: Portland, Oregon;
Year: 2002;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $488,743.
State/City: Bradford, Pennsylvania;
Year: 2003;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $144,425.
State/City: Harrisburg, Pennsylvania;
Year: 2000;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $86,920.
State/City: Latrobe, Pennsylvania;
Year: 2006;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $118,883.
State/City: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
Year: 2000;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $17,915,168.
State/City: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $1,000,000.
State/City: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
Year: 2002;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $2,430,965.
State/City: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $6,115,219.
State/City: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
Year: 2008;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $6,775,000.
State/City: State College, Pennsylvania;
Year: 2002;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $89,092.
State/City: State College, Pennsylvania;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $221,883.
State/City: State College, Pennsylvania;
Year: 2004;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $3,919,476.
State/City: Memphis, Tennessee;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $1,440,412.
State/City: Memphis, Tennessee;
Year: 2008;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $286,591.
State/City: Nashville, Tennessee;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $1,356,970.
State/City: Nashville, Tennessee;
Year: 1999;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $214,294.
State/City: Nashville, Tennessee;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $832,306.
State/City: Nashville, Tennessee;
Year: 2000;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $131,416.
State/City: Nashville, Tennessee;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $44,491.
State/City: Beaumont/Port Arthur, Texas;
Year: 2006;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $88,825.
State/City: Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $7,878,022.
State/City: Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $1,223,254.
State/City: Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $750,000.
State/City: Fort Worth, Texas;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $13,075.
State/City: Roanoke, Virginia;
Year: 2002;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $387,827.
State/City: Bellingham, Washington;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility,
Total amount: $75,000.
State/City: Eau Claire, Wisconsin;
Year: 2005;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $220,000.
State/City: Green Bay, Wisconsin;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $605,700.
State/City: Clarksburg, West Virginia;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: 66,825.
State/City: Clarksburg, West Virginia;
Year: 2002;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: 230,683.
State/City: Clarksburg, West Virginia;
Year: 2004;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment;
Total amount: $220,139.
State/City: Huntington, West Virginia;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $577,789.
State/City: Sheridan, Wyoming;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility;
Total amount: $58,850.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In this statement we use the term icing to refer to icing of
airplane surfaces. We use the term contaminated runway to refer to
ice, snow, slush, frost, or standing water on the runway. The presence
of standing water, snow, slush, or ice on the runway at low
temperatures may be defined as icing conditions for the airplane,
which may require certain ground icing procedures (e.g., checks or
deicing of wings). Runways that are contaminated with snow, slush, or
ice are generally associated with operations in winter conditions.
[2] The Flight Safety Foundation is an independent, nonprofit,
international organization engaged in research, auditing, education,
advocacy, and publishing to improve aviation safety.
[3] By large commercial airplanes, we mean those airplanes operating
under part 121 of title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
Among other things, part 121 applies to air carrier operations
involving turbojet airplanes or any airplane with a seating capacity
of more than 9 passengers or a maximum payload capacity of more than
7,500 pounds.
[4] An incident is defined by NTSB as an occurrence other than an
accident associated with the operation of an aircraft that affects or
could affect the safety of operations.
[5] FAA's database contains data generated by FAA investigations of
aviation incidents. These data are generated by officials charged with
investigating incidents.
[6] This voluntary system is administered by NASA. It contains
voluntary reports, which are later de-identified, from pilots,
controllers, maintenance technicians, and other operating personnel
about human behavior that resulted in unsafe occurrences or hazardous
situations. NASA seeks to avoid double counting of incidents by
ensuring that multiple reports for a single incident are grouped
together under that incident. Because ASRS reporting is voluntary, it
is unlikely to cover the universe of safety events. It is also
possible that ASRS incident data may overlap with FAA incident data,
because a single incident may be entered into FAA's incident database
by an FAA inspector and reported to ASRS by a pilot or bystander.
However, the extent to which overlap occurs is unknown.
[7] We plan to report in the spring of 2010 on FAA's use of data to be
proactive in its oversight of key safety areas.
[8] By small commercial airplanes, we mean those airplanes operating
under part 135 of title 14 CFR. Among other things, part 135 covers
commuter operations on airplanes, other than turbojet powered
airplanes, with 9 passenger seats or less, and a payload capacity of
7,500 pounds or less. Most commuter, air tour, and air taxi operators
and medical services (when a patient is on board) fall under the
purview of part 135. By noncommercial airplanes, we mean airplanes
that are privately operated under 14 CFR part 91. These types of
operations are often referred to as "general aviation" and include
flights for recreation and training. Although noncommercial flights
usually involve small aircraft, the definition depends on the nature
of the operation not the size of the aircraft.
[9] FAA's 1997 Inflight Aircraft Icing Plan describes various
activities planned to improve safety for aircraft operating in icing
conditions. Recent FAA documentation indicates that the agency aims to
provide better icing forecast technology and to develop ice-resistant
pavement surfaces, improved deice/anti-ice technology, and more
efficient ground icing detection.
[10] An airworthiness directive is a legally enforceable rule that may
apply to aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances. FAA
issues an airworthiness directive when it determines that (1) an
unsafe condition exists in the product and (2) the condition is likely
to exist or develop in other products of the same type or design.
[11] In general, a transport category airplane is an airplane with
maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) greater than 12,500 pounds or with 10 or
more passengers, except for propeller-driven, multi-engine airplanes,
in which case the transport category airplanes are those with MTOW
greater than 19,000 pounds or with 20 or more passengers. Transport
category airplanes operate under 14 CFR part 25.
[12] 14 CFR Part 135, §135.227 and 14 CFR Part 91, §91.527. Frost-
polishing is accomplished by scraping or buffing frost accumulations
so as to obtain a smooth surface. The polished frost requirement does
not apply to large commercial aircraft (part 121) because part 121 did
not permit operations with polished frost prior to the implementation
of this new rule.
[13] This proposed rule only applies to airplanes with an MTOW of
60,000 pounds being operated under 14 CFR part 121.
[14] Supercooled large drops have a diameter greater than 50 microns
and include freezing drizzle and freezing rain. These droplets can
form into ice beyond the normally protected areas of aircraft.
[15] NTSB concluded that the probable cause of the accident was the
pilot's failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to
safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted in a
runway overrun. NTSB's accident investigation report indicated that
contributing to the severity of the accident was the absence of an
Engineering Materials Arresting System, which was needed because of
the limited runway safety area beyond the end of the runway.
[16] Public Law 109-115 adopted FAA's 2015 goal. FAA considers runway
safety areas that meet 90 percent of the standards to be substantially
compliant.
[17] EMAS uses materials of closely controlled strength and density
placed at the end of the runway to stop or greatly slow an aircraft
that overruns the runway. According to FAA, the best material found to
date is a lightweight crushable concrete.
[18] Airports that are scheduled for 2010 installation of EMAS beds
are Areta, California; Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Wilmington,
Delaware; and Key West, Florida.
[19] This list, which NTSB has maintained since 1990 and revises
annually, includes important safety recommendations identified for
special attention and intensive follow-up.
[20] According to FAA, in response to NTSB's recommendation related to
weather forecasts the agency sponsored the development of the Current
Icing Product (CIP) and Forecast Icing Potential (FIP), which are
computer-generated three-dimensional graphics containing information
on the likelihood of an aircraft encountering icing conditions.
[21] In addition, NTSB has closed 8 of these recommendations as
"unacceptable response" by FAA; has classified 6 of the open
recommendations as "unacceptable response" by FAA; has closed 3 of
these recommendations after concurring with FAA's rationales for
disagreeing with the recommendations; and is awaiting FAA's response
on 1 of these recommendations.
[22] GAO, Aviation Rulemaking: Further Reform Is Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-821] (Washington, D.C.: July 9,
2001).
[23] Additional information about the status of these recommendations
is available at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-821].
[24] FAA is required by statute to issue a final regulation within 16
months of the last day of the comment period.
[25] In 1992, in response to NTSB recommendations, FAA established the
flight crewmember flight/duty rest requirements working group of ARAC.
However, by mid-1994 the working group had concluded its work, having
failed to reach a consensus. Nevertheless, FAA issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking in December 1995 to update the flight and duty
regulations for airline pilots; however, in the intervening 14 years,
the regulations have not been revised. In recent years, FAA has stated
that it is developing a fatigue risk management system (FRMS) to
provide an alternative to prescriptive limitations. Additionally, FAA
has supported the adoption of FRMS programs among certain air carriers
for their ultra-long-range operations.
In June 2008, the FAA sponsored a symposium on fatigue management that
provided an opportunity for subject matter experts to come together
and discuss fatigue's effects on flight crews, maintenance personnel,
and air traffic controllers. NTSB believes that fatigue management
plans may hold promise as an approach to dealing with fatigue in the
aviation environment. However, NTSB considers fatigue management plans
to be a complement to, not a substitute for, regulations to prevent
fatigue.
[End of section]
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