Aviation Safety
Improved Planning Could Help FAA Address Challenges Related to Winter Weather Operations Gao ID: GAO-10-678 July 29, 2010Ice formation on aircraft can disrupt the smooth flow of air over the wings and prevent the aircraft from taking off or decrease the pilot's ability to maintain control of the aircraft. Takeoff and landing operations can also be risky in winter weather. Despite persistent efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and others to mitigate icing risks, icing remains a serious concern. GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which commercial airplanes have experienced accidents and incidents related to icing, (2) FAA's inspection and enforcement activities related to icing, (3) the efforts of FAA and others to improve safety in winter weather, and (4) the challenges that continue to affect aviation safety in winter weather. GAO analyzed data obtained from FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and others. Further, GAO obtained information from FAA and NTSB officials and representatives of key aviation industry stakeholders.
According to NTSB's aviation accident database, from 1998 to 2009 large commercial airplanes were involved in six nonfatal accidents related to icing (including in-flight and runway). However, FAA and others recognize that incidents are potential precursors to accidents. Although large commercial airplanes have experienced few icing-related accidents in the last decade, the several hundred icing-related incidents involving these airplanes contained in FAA and NASA databases suggest that they face ongoing risks from icing. Based on multiple inspections, FAA assesses each large carrier's ground deicing program to ensure that it meets relevant safety regulations. For fiscal years 2005 to 2009, FAA largely met its own requirements for inspecting carriers' ground deicing programs. When a carrier violates a safety regulation, FAA can take enforcement action against the carrier. For fiscal years 2005 to 2009, FAA initiated enforcement actions against large commercial carriers in 274 cases for violations of icing-related regulations. FAA and other aviation stakeholders have undertaken many efforts to improve safety in icing conditions. For example, in 1997, FAA issued a multiyear plan for improving the safety of aircraft operating in icing conditions and has since made progress on the objectives specified in its plan by issuing regulations, airworthiness directives, and voluntary guidance. However, FAA has not formally updated its 1997 in-flight icing plan, meaning the stakeholders do not have a consolidated and readily accessible source of information on the key in-flight icing actions FAA has under way or planned. NTSB has issued numerous recommendations as a result of its aviation accident investigations, and NASA has contributed to research related to icing. In addition, the private sector has deployed various FAA-required technologies on aircraft, such as wing deicers, and operated ground deicing and runway clearing programs at airports. GAO's interviews with government and industry stakeholders identified challenges related to winter weather operations that, if addressed, could improve safety. Among others, these challenges include improving the timeliness of FAA's winter weather rulemaking efforts, ensuring the availability of resources for icing-related research, and developing a more integrated approach to effectively manage winter operations. With respect to an integrated approach, FAA said it needs to begin focusing on winter operations holistically because there are many vital elements to safe operations in winter weather, such as airport surface conditions, aircraft ground deicing, aircraft in-flight icing and icing certification, and air traffic handling of aircraft in icing conditions. A plan that addresses both in-flight and ground icing issues, as well as the challenges stakeholders identified for this report, would help FAA measure its ongoing and planned efforts against its goals for improving safety. Furthermore, a comprehensive plan could help identify gaps or other areas for improvement and assist FAA in developing an integrated approach to winter operations. To help facilitate FAA's efforts to address challenges to improving safety in winter weather conditions, GAO recommends that FAA develop a plan focused on winter operations holistically that includes detailed goals and milestones. In response, the Department of Transportation agreed to consider GAO's recommendation and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Gerald L. Dillingham Team: Government Accountability Office: Physical Infrastructure Phone: (202) 512-4803GAO-10-678, Aviation Safety: Improved Planning Could Help FAA Address Challenges Related to Winter Weather Operations
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2010:
Aviation Safety:
Improved Planning Could Help FAA Address Challenges Related to Winter
Weather Operations:
GAO-10-678:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-678, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Ice formation on aircraft can disrupt the smooth flow of air over the
wings and prevent the aircraft from taking off or decrease the pilot‘s
ability to maintain control of the aircraft. Takeoff and landing
operations can also be risky in winter weather. Despite persistent
efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and others to
mitigate icing risks, icing remains a serious concern. GAO reviewed
(1) the extent to which commercial airplanes have experienced
accidents and incidents related to icing, (2) FAA‘s inspection and
enforcement activities related to icing, (3) the efforts of FAA and
others to improve safety in winter weather, and (4) the challenges
that continue to affect aviation safety in winter weather. GAO
analyzed data obtained from FAA, the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), and others. Further, GAO obtained information from FAA and
NTSB officials and representatives of key aviation industry
stakeholders.
What GAO Found:
According to NTSB‘s aviation accident database, from 1998 to 2009
large commercial airplanes were involved in six nonfatal accidents
related to icing (including in-flight and runway). However, FAA and
others recognize that incidents are potential precursors to accidents.
Although large commercial airplanes have experienced few icing-related
accidents in the last decade, the several hundred icing-related
incidents involving these airplanes contained in FAA and NASA
databases suggest that they face ongoing risks from icing.
Based on multiple inspections, FAA assesses each large carrier‘s
ground deicing program to ensure that it meets relevant safety
regulations. For fiscal years 2005 to 2009, FAA largely met its own
requirements for inspecting carriers‘ ground deicing programs. When a
carrier violates a safety regulation, FAA can take enforcement action
against the carrier. For fiscal years 2005 to 2009, FAA initiated
enforcement actions against large commercial carriers in 274 cases for
violations of icing-related regulations.
FAA and other aviation stakeholders have undertaken many efforts to
improve safety in icing conditions. For example, in 1997, FAA issued a
multiyear plan for improving the safety of aircraft operating in icing
conditions and has since made progress on the objectives specified in
its plan by issuing regulations, airworthiness directives, and
voluntary guidance. However, FAA has not formally updated its 1997 in-
flight icing plan, meaning the stakeholders do not have a consolidated
and readily accessible source of information on the key in-flight
icing actions FAA has under way or planned. NTSB has issued numerous
recommendations as a result of its aviation accident investigations,
and NASA has contributed to research related to icing. In addition,
the private sector has deployed various FAA-required technologies on
aircraft, such as wing deicers, and operated ground deicing and runway
clearing programs at airports.
GAO‘s interviews with government and industry stakeholders identified
challenges related to winter weather operations that, if addressed,
could improve safety. Among others, these challenges include improving
the timeliness of FAA‘s winter weather rulemaking efforts, ensuring
the availability of resources for icing-related research, and
developing a more integrated approach to effectively manage winter
operations. With respect to an integrated approach, FAA said it needs
to begin focusing on winter operations holistically because there are
many vital elements to safe operations in winter weather, such as
airport surface conditions, aircraft ground deicing, aircraft in-
flight icing and icing certification, and air traffic handling of
aircraft in icing conditions. A plan that addresses both in-flight and
ground icing issues, as well as the challenges stakeholders identified
for this report, would help FAA measure its ongoing and planned
efforts against its goals for improving safety. Furthermore, a
comprehensive plan could help identify gaps or other areas for
improvement and assist FAA in developing an integrated approach to
winter operations.
What GAO Recommends:
To help facilitate FAA‘s efforts to address challenges to improving
safety in winter weather conditions, GAO recommends that FAA develop a
plan focused on winter operations holistically that includes detailed
goals and milestones. In response, the Department of Transportation
agreed to consider GAO‘s recommendation and provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-678] or key
components. To view the e-supplement online, click on [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-679SP]. For more information,
contact Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. at (202) 512-2834 or
dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Although Large Commercial Airplanes Have Experienced Few Icing-Related
Accidents Since 1998, the Many Reported Icing Incidents Suggest That
Icing Is an Ongoing Risk to Aviation Safety:
FAA Largely Met Its Own Inspection Requirements Related to Icing:
FAA and Other Aviation Stakeholders Have Undertaken a Variety of
Efforts Aimed at Improving Safety in Icing and Winter Weather
Conditions:
Continued Attention to Regulation, Training, and Coordination Issues
Could Further Mitigate the Risks of Winter Weather Operations:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: FAA's Funding to the Airport Improvement Program for 1999
to 2009, by State and City:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Description of Tools and Processes Used for Ground Deicing
and Anti-Icing:
Table 2: Description of Aircraft Systems for In-flight Ice Protection:
Table 3: Icing and Winter Weather-Related Incident Reports for Large
Commercial Airplanes by Category of Incident, 1998 to 2007:
Table 4: Icing and Winter Weather-Related Accidents and Fatalities for
1998 to 2009, Incidents from 1998 to 2007:
Table 5: Assessment Results of FAA's Inspections of Large Commercial
Carriers' Ground Deicing Programs (December 2007 through End of Fiscal
Year 2009):
Table 6: Industry Groups We Contacted:
Figures:
Figure 1: Effect of Ice Build-up on Aircraft Wings:
Figure 2: Assessment Results of FAA's Inspections of Large Commercial
Carriers' Ground Deicing Programs by Type of Inspection (December 2007
through End of Fiscal Year 2009):
Figure 3: Aircraft Ice Protection Systems:
Figure 4: Example of Ground Deicing to Help Ensure Clean Aircraft:
Figure 5: FAA's Rulemaking Process for Significant Rules:
Figure 6: NASA Funding and Staffing for Icing-Related R&D, Fiscal
Years 2005-2013, as of February 2010:
Abbreviations:
AIP: Airport Improvement Program:
AIRA: Aircraft Icing Research Alliance:
APA: Administrative Procedure Act:
ARAC: Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee:
ASRS: Aviation Safety Reporting System:
ATOS: Air Transportation Oversight System:
CIP: Current Icing Product:
EMAS: Engineered Materials Arresting System:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FIP: Forecast Icing Potential:
IG: Inspector General:
MTOW: Maximum Takeoff Weight:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NCAR: National Center for Atmospheric Research:
NextGen: Next Generation Air Transportation System:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
NSF: National Science Foundation:
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board:
PTRS: Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystems:
R&D: research and development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 29, 2010:
Congressional Requesters:
Icing can be a significant hazard for aviation operations of all
types, including commercial flights.[Footnote 1] As shown in figure 1,
when there is ice on an aircraft's wings, it can disrupt the smooth
flow of air over the wings and prevent the aircraft from safely taking
off or decrease the pilot's ability to control the aircraft in flight.
Depending on the location of the ice, the shape of the wing, and the
phase of flight, even small, almost imperceptible amounts of ice can
have a significant detrimental effect. Despite a variety of
technologies designed to prevent ice from forming on wings or other
critical surfaces or to remove ice that has formed, as well as
persistent efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
other stakeholders to mitigate icing risks, icing remains a concern.
Furthermore, runways that have not been cleared of snow or ice
(referred to as contaminated runways) can be hazardously slick for
planes during takeoff and landing.
Figure 1: Effect of Ice Build-up on Aircraft Wings:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Normal conditions:
In normal conditions, air flows smoothly over the wings, creating lift.
When icing occurs:
Ice disrupts smooth airflow on a wing, increasing drag and decreasing
lift.
Sources: GAO and FAA.
[End of figure]
This report describes the risks to aviation safety posed by icing and
winter weather conditions and the steps taken and challenges faced by
aviation stakeholders in their efforts to mitigate those risks. As
such, we reviewed (1) the extent to which large commercial airplanes
have experienced accidents and incidents related to icing and
contaminated runways, (2) FAA's inspection and enforcement activities
related to icing, (3) the efforts of FAA and other aviation
stakeholders to improve safety in icing and winter weather operating
conditions, and (4) the challenges that continue to affect aviation
safety in icing and winter weather operating conditions.
To review the extent to which large commercial airplanes have
experienced accidents and incidents related to icing and contaminated
runways, we analyzed data obtained from FAA, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). To review FAA's inspection and
enforcement activities related to icing we obtained FAA's inspection
and enforcement policies and analyzed data from FAA's inspection and
enforcement databases. For example, we obtained data from FAA's Air
Transportation Oversight System to assess the timeliness of FAA's
inspections of large commercial carriers' ground deicing programs. To
review FAA's efforts to improve safety in icing and winter weather
operating conditions and the challenges that remain, we obtained
information from FAA, NTSB, NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and the National Center for Atmospheric
Research (NCAR). In addition, we interviewed representatives from the
Flight Safety Foundation, an academic expert, and a diverse group of
aviation industry stakeholders and associations.[Footnote 2] We
provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation
(which contains FAA), the Department of Commerce (which contains
NOAA), NTSB, NASA, and the National Science Foundation (which contains
NCAR) for their review and incorporated their comments as appropriate.
We performed this work from August 2009 to July 2010 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further, we assessed the
reliability of the data used in this report and determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To assess the
reliability of the inspection and enforcement data that we received
from FAA, we performed electronic testing of the data elements that we
used, obtained and reviewed documentation about the data and the
systems that produced them, and interviewed knowledgeable FAA
officials. To assess the reliability of the accident data we received
from NTSB and the incident data we received from FAA and NASA, we
obtained and reviewed documentation about the data and the systems
that produced them. Appendix I contains a more detailed discussion of
our objectives, scope, and methodology, including a complete list of
industry stakeholders we interviewed.
Background:
Deicing operations include removing ice from aircraft, applying
chemicals to prevent initial icing or further icing (anti-icing), and
removing (and preventing) ice from airfield pavement (runways,
taxiways, aprons, and ramps). Prior to departure, the removal of ice,
snow, slush, or frost from an aircraft's critical surfaces can be
accomplished by mechanical means, using heat, using a heated fluid,
using forced air, or a combination thereof. When frost, snow, or ice
adheres to an aircraft surface, the surface must be heated or sprayed
with pressurized fluid to remove the contaminant. Anti-icing on the
ground is accomplished by applying a freezing point depressant to a
surface either following deicing or in anticipation of subsequent
winter precipitation; it is intended to protect the critical surfaces
from ice adherence for a limited period of time. The fluid is capable
of absorbing freezing or frozen precipitation until the fluid freezing
point coincides with the ambient temperature. Once this fluid freezing
point has been reached, the fluid can no longer protect the aircraft
from ground icing conditions. During in-flight operations, an anti-
icing system is expected to keep ice from forming in all but severe
icing conditions and is accomplished with the use of engine bleed air,
electro-thermal heaters, or fluid freezing point depressants. Table 1
describes the tools and processes used for ground deicing and anti-
icing procedures on aircraft; table 2 describes systems found on
aircraft for in-flight ice protection.
Table 1: Description of Tools and Processes Used for Ground Deicing
and Anti-Icing:
Anti-ice and deicing fluid application:
Prior to takeoff, deicing and anti-icing fluids are used to remove ice
from the aircraft and to prevent future ice formation. Once anti-icing
fluids are applied to an aircraft, the aircraft has a finite amount of
time--known as a holdover time--that the fluid will remain effective.
These holdover times are established as a guide for the amount of time
anti-icing fluid will provide protection. Deicing facilities can be
located at the terminal area or at "centralized deicing pads" which
restrict aircraft deicing to a specific area, minimizing the volume of
deicing waste water and allowing for the capture of deicing waste.
Infrared heat deicing:
A method of deicing using infrared thermal energy. Aircraft using this
method enter a drive-through structure designed to rapidly melt the
accumulated ice, frost and snow off all critical surfaces of the
aircraft. As a result, the aircraft come out of the system clean and
dry. Currently, such systems are in place at two airports:
Rhinelander, Wisconsin, and John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. The
infrared system is powered by natural gas and thought to be less
harmful to the environment than the use of deicing fluid. These
systems can handle any size aircraft and are fully automated. After
the aircraft goes through the infrared deicing process, a small amount
of anti-icing fluid is applied to the plane so that new ice does not
develop prior to takeoff.
Forced air deicing:
A method of deicing using forced air to blow frozen contaminants off
an aircraft surface. Some forced air deicing systems use high-pressure
air or a mix of air and deicing fluid, while others are based on
delivering large air volumes at low pressure.
Critical surface inspection:
A critical surface inspection is a preflight external inspection of
critical surfaces conducted by a qualified person, to determine if
they are contaminated by frost, ice, snow or slush. This inspection is
mandatory whenever ground icing conditions exist and, if the aircraft
is deiced with fluid, must take place immediately after the final
application of fluid, or when an approved alternative method of
deicing is used, upon completion of this process. After the
inspection, a report completed by a qualified individual must be
submitted to the pilot-in-command.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA and industry information.
[End of table]
Table 2: Description of Aircraft Systems for In-flight Ice Protection:
Pneumatic deicers:
A common deicing system uses pneumatically inflated rubber boots on
the leading edges of airfoil surfaces, typically including the leading
edges of the wings and tail surfaces. The system uses relatively low
pressure air to rapidly inflate and deflate the boot. This is usually
done in a sequence of segments--for example, the outer wings followed
by the inner wings followed by the horizontal stabilizer. Depending on
the manufacturer's specifications, the system may be operated either
automatically, through a timing circuit, or manually, using a cockpit
control to initiate the boot cycle sequence.
Weeping wing:
An anti-icing system that pumps fluid from a reservoir through a
porous panel embedded in the leading edges of the wings and tail.
Activated by a switch in the cockpit, the liquid flows all over the
wing and tail surfaces, anti-icing as it flows. It can also be applied
to the prop and the windshield.
Thermal systems:
Some aircraft use electronically heated surfaces on critical
components of the aircraft (e.g., windshield, pitot/static tubes, and
propeller blades). These systems operate in-flight to rid the aircraft
of ice buildup and to prevent ice accumulation. Large aircraft may use
a hot "bleed air system" from the compressor stages of a turbine
engine to periodically break the bond between accreted ice and the
surface of the airframe.[A]
Source: GAO analysis of NASA, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association, and industry information.
[A] Ice accretion is the process by which a layer of ice builds up on
solid objects that are exposed to weather conditions such as freezing
precipitation.
[End of table]
FAA issues regulations, airworthiness directives, and other guidance
and monitors industry compliance as part of its mission to ensure
safe, orderly, and efficient air travel in the national airspace
system. FAA regulations contain a number of parts, and different parts
apply to aircraft based on their size and type and the activities they
are used for. In this report we use the term "large commercial
airplanes" to refer to those airplanes operating under part 121 of
title 14 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations. Among other
things, part 121 applies to air carrier operations involving turbojet
airplanes or any airplane with a seating capacity of more than nine
passenger seats or a maximum payload capacity of more than 7,500
pounds. We use the term "small commercial airplanes" to refer to those
airplanes operating under part 135 of title 14. Among other things,
part 135 covers certain commuter and on-demand operations on
airplanes, other than turbojet powered airplanes, with nine passenger
seats or less, and a payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or less. Some
commuter and most air tour operators and medical services (when a
patient is on board) fall under the purview of part 135. By
"noncommercial airplanes," we mean airplanes that are privately
operated under part 91 of title 14. These types of operations are
often referred to as "general aviation" and include, among other
things, flights for recreation and training and certain business
flights. Although noncommercial flights usually involve small
aircraft, the definition we are using depends on the nature of the
operation, not the size of the aircraft.
In developing regulations, FAA follows the rulemaking process used by
all federal agencies, which is established in the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).[Footnote 3] This act establishes procedures and
broadly applicable federal requirements for informal rulemaking, also
known as notice and comment rulemaking. This process is designed to
provide the opportunity for public participation in rulemakings by
submission of written comments and to ensure that all aspects of any
regulatory change are fully analyzed before the change goes into
effect. Starting early in a rulemaking, FAA may seek input from its
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), and during the course
of a rulemaking it may conduct research related to the rulemaking. In
addition, the APA generally requires agencies to publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register. During the public comment
period that follows the publication of the proposed rule, interested
parties may submit written comments, which FAA examines and may
consider when making any changes before publishing the final rule. The
final rule is then incorporated into the United States Code of Federal
Regulations, but it may not take effect immediately. For example, FAA
may phase in requirements over time or it may give industry time--
sometimes several years--to implement changes.
FAA can also issue airworthiness directives.[Footnote 4] An
airworthiness directive is a legally enforceable rule that may apply
to an aircraft or its parts, such as engines and propellers. FAA
issues an airworthiness directive when it determines that (1) an
unsafe condition exists in the product and (2) the condition is likely
to exist or develop in other products of the same type design.
NTSB investigates and reports on civil aviation accidents, which it
defines as occurrences whereby a person suffers death or serious
injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. FAA and
NTSB also investigate aviation incidents, which NTSB defines as
occurrences other than an accident associated with the operation of an
aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of operations. FAA
maintains an incident database generated by its investigations. NASA
also administers a voluntary reporting system on aviation incidents,
called the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). It contains
voluntary reports, which are later de-identified, from pilots,
controllers, maintenance technicians, and other operating personnel
about human behavior that resulted in unsafe occurrences or hazardous
situations. NASA seeks to avoid double counting of incidents by
ensuring that multiple reports for a single incident are grouped
together under that incident. Because ASRS reporting is voluntary, it
is unlikely to cover the universe of safety events. It is also
possible that ASRS incident data may overlap with FAA incident data
because a single incident may be entered into FAA's incident database
by an FAA inspector and reported to ASRS by a pilot or bystander.
However, the extent to which overlap occurs is unknown.
When airlines and airports conduct deicing operations on aircraft and
airfield pavement, the large amounts of chemicals used for deicing
operations may drain off airport facilities to nearby rivers, lakes,
streams, and bays and can have major impacts on water quality. In
August 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a
proposed rule on the use of deicing fluids at airports.[Footnote 5]
According to EPA, the proposed rule would require 218 airports to
collect spent deicing fluid and treat the associated wastewater, and 6
major airports would likely need to install centralized deicing pads
to comply with the rule. Additionally, some airports would be required
to reduce the amount of ammonia discharged from urea-based airfield
pavement deicers or use more environmentally friendly airfield deicers
that do not contain urea.[Footnote 6] EPA plans to issue a final rule
in December 2010.
Although Large Commercial Airplanes Have Experienced Few Icing-Related
Accidents Since 1998, the Many Reported Icing Incidents Suggest That
Icing Is an Ongoing Risk to Aviation Safety:
According to NTSB's aviation accident database, from 1998 to 2009 one
large commercial airplane was involved in a nonfatal accident after
encountering icing conditions during flight and five large commercial
airplanes were involved in nonfatal accidents related to snow or ice
on runways. Although there have been few accidents, FAA and others
recognize that incidents are potential precursors to accidents. Data
on hundreds of incidents that occurred during this period reveal that
icing, contaminated runways, and other winter weather conditions pose
substantial risk to aviation safety. FAA's database of incidents
includes 120 incidents related to icing, contaminated runways,
taxiways, or ramps, or other winter weather conditions involving large
commercial airplanes that occurred from 1998 through 2007.[Footnote 7]
These data covered a broad set of events, such as the collision of two
airplanes at an ice-covered gate, and an airplane that hit the right
main gear against the runway and scraped the left wing down the runway
for about 63 feet while attempting to land with ice accumulation on
the airplane. During this same time period, NASA's ASRS received over
600 icing and winter weather-related incident reports involving large
commercial airplanes. These incidents reveal a variety of safety
issues such as runways contaminated by snow or ice, ground deicing
problems, and in-flight icing encounters. These incidents thus also
suggest that risks from icing and other winter weather operating
conditions may be greater than indicated by NTSB's accident database
and by FAA's incident database. FAA officials point out that there is
no defined reporting threshold for ASRS reports and because they are
developed from personal narrative, they can be subjective. However,
these officials agree that the ASRS events must be thoroughly reviewed
and evaluated for content to determine the relevancy to icing and the
extent and severity of the safety issue. The contents of the ASRS data
system also demonstrate the importance of aggregating data from all
available sources to understand a safety concern. See table 3 for the
number of icing and winter weather-related incident reports from ASRS
for large commercial airplanes.
Table 3: Icing and Winter Weather-Related Incident Reports for Large
Commercial Airplanes by Category of Incident, 1998 to 2007:
Category: Anti-icing or deicing incident/procedure[A];
Number of reports: 179.
Category: Controllability issue--ground;
Number of reports: 72.
Category: In-flight encounter--aircraft equipment problems;
Number of reports: 72.
Category: In-flight encounter--airframe and/or flight control icing;
Number of reports: 69.
Category: Other winter weather incident;
Number of reports: 42.
Category: Surface marking and signage obstruction;
Number of reports: 41.
Category: Runway, ramp, or taxiway excursion[B];
Number of reports: 36.
Category: Runway, ramp, or taxiway incursion[C];
Number of reports: 34.
Category: Controllability issue--air;
Number of reports: 32.
Category: Maintenance incident;
Number of reports: 19.
Category: Ramp safety--personnel risk or injury;
Number of reports: 17.
Category: In-flight encounter--sensor type incident;
Number of reports: 15.
Category: Total;
Number of reports: 628.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA ASRS data on incidents due to winter
weather conditions.
[A] An anti-icing or deicing incident/procedure is an event involving
the process of preventing or removing accumulations of ice, snow,
frost, etc., on aircraft critical surfaces by means of aircraft
equipment deployment or application of specified fluids. Anti-icing
means that ice, snow, or frost formation was prevented, either by on-
ground means or by aircraft equipment in flight. Deicing means that
ice, snow, or frost was removed, either by on-ground means or by
aircraft equipment in flight.
[B] An excursion occurs when an aircraft unintentionally exits a
runway, ramp, or taxiway.
[C] An incursion occurs when an aircraft enters a runway, ramp, or
taxiway without authorization.
[End of table]
While our review focused on large commercial airplanes, small
commercial airplanes and noncommercial airplanes experienced more
icing-related accidents and fatalities than did large commercial
airplanes from 1998 to 2007, as shown in table 4. They did so largely
because, compared to large commercial airplanes, small commercial
airplanes and noncommercial airplanes (1) may be performance-limited
and therefore operate for longer periods at lower altitudes that more
frequently have icing conditions, (2) have a higher icing collection
efficiency due to their smaller scale, (3) are more greatly impacted
by ice as a result of their smaller scale, (4) tend to have deicing
equipment (e.g., pneumatic deicing boots) rather than fully
evaporative anti-icing equipment, and (5) may not be approved for
flight in known icing conditions. If an airplane is not approved for
flight in icing conditions, it may either not have an ice protection
system installed, or it may have an ice protection system that is not
certified.
Table 4: Icing and Winter Weather-Related Accidents and Fatalities for
1998 to 2009, Incidents from 1998 to 2007:
Icing-related accidents, including in-flight and runway:
Large commercial airplanes: 6;
Small commercial airplanes: 49;
Noncommercial airplanes: 510.
Fatalities in icing-related accidents:
Large commercial airplanes: 0;
Small commercial airplanes: 27;
Noncommercial airplanes: 202.
Icing-related incidents in FAA's database:
Large commercial airplanes: 120;
Small commercial airplanes: 86;
Noncommercial airplanes: 319.
Icing-related incidents in NASA's ASRS database:
Large commercial airplanes: 628;
Small commercial airplanes: 102;
Noncommercial airplanes: 422.
Sources: GAO analysis of NTSB data for accidents and fatalities; GAO
analysis of FAA and NASA data for incidents.
Notes: For all three types of airplanes, accident data for 2008 and
2009 are incomplete because NTSB has not completed all of its accident
investigations that occurred during those years. For small commercial
and noncommercial airplanes, the number of accidents and incidents
also includes carburetor icing.
In December 2005, a passenger jet landed on a snowy runway at
Chicago's Midway Airport, rolled through an airport perimeter fence
onto an adjacent roadway, and struck an automobile, killing a child
and injuring 4 other occupants of the automobile and 18 airline
passengers. NTSB concluded that the probable cause of the accident was
not related to icing or winter weather, but rather to the pilot's
failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to safely
slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted in a runway
overrun.
[End of table]
FAA Largely Met Its Own Inspection Requirements Related to Icing:
As part of its Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), FAA
assesses large carriers' ground deicing programs to ensure that they
meet relevant safety regulations.[Footnote 8] FAA requires itself to
assess the design of each carrier's program twice every 5 years, with
one of the assessments focused on ground crews and the other on flight
crews. FAA also requires itself to assess the performance of each
carrier's program twice each year, again with one assessment focused
on ground crews and the other on flight crews. Design assessments
ensure that an air carrier's operating systems comply with regulations
and safety standards. Performance assessments confirm that an air
carrier's operating systems produce intended results, including
mitigation or control of hazards and associated risks. FAA bases each
assessment of a carrier's performance on multiple inspections, which
are typically conducted at several of the various locations where the
carrier operates.[Footnote 9] FAA considers assessments to be on-time
if they are completed within 30 days of the end of the quarter in
which they are scheduled for completion. From December 2007, when it
first completed these assessments, through fiscal year 2009, FAA
completed 103 of 108 design assessments on time (95 percent) and 303
of 315 required performance assessments on time (96 percent).
While this review focused on FAA's inspections related to ground
deicing, the Department of Transportation Inspector General (IG) in
March 2010 issued an initial report based on its broader ongoing
review of FAA's inspections under ATOS.[Footnote 10] The IG reported
that FAA does not have an effective process for ensuring the timely
completion of inspections. In particular, the IG found that FAA does
not assign inspectors to all scheduled inspections, does not
nationally track these unassigned inspections, and that these
inspections could therefore "remain uncompleted for months or even
years, and any associated risks within air carrier programs would
remain unknown." The IG plans to issue a subsequent report with
recommendations to FAA later this year.
For each design or performance inspection, an FAA inspector answers a
series of questions about whether the carrier is in compliance with
FAA's safety requirements. For inspections of large commercial
carriers' ground deicing programs focused on ground crews in fiscal
years 2005 through 2009, FAA inspectors indicated that carriers were
meeting the requirement in 16,867 out of 20,513 cases (82 percent),
were not meeting the requirement in 3,569 cases (17 percent), and that
the question was not applicable in 77 cases (0.4 percent). For
inspections of large commercial carriers' ground deicing programs
focused on flight crews in fiscal years 2005 through 2009, FAA
inspectors indicated that carriers were meeting the requirement in
13,734 out of 16,266 cases (84 percent), were not meeting the
requirement in 2,122 cases (13 percent), and that the question was not
applicable in 410 cases (3 percent).
For each design and performance assessment, FAA scores the carrier on
a six-part scale ranging from "no issues observed--no action required"
to "persistent, systemic safety and/or regulatory issues observed--
system reconfiguration by air carrier required." Of the 423
assessments following inspections of ground deicing programs that FAA
completed from December 2007 through the end of fiscal year 2009, 290
(69 percent) did not require any corrective action by the carrier,
while 133 (31 percent) required some form of corrective action. Table
5 presents additional information on the results of these assessments.
Table 5: Assessment Results of FAA's Inspections of Large Commercial
Carriers' Ground Deicing Programs (December 2007 through End of Fiscal
Year 2009):
Assessment result: No issues observed--no action required;
Number of assessments: 221;
Percent: 52.
Assessment result: Minor issues observed--no action required;
Number of assessments: 69;
Percent: 16.
Assessment result: Minor issues observed--action required;
Number of assessments: 65;
Percent: 15.
Assessment result: Issues of concern observed--action required;
Number of assessments: 40;
Percent: 9.
Assessment result: Safety and/or regulatory issues observed--action
required;
Number of assessments: 26;
Percent: 6.
Assessment result: Persistent, systemic safety and/or regulatory
issues observed--system reconfiguration by air carrier or applicant is
required;
Number of assessments: 2;
Percent: Less than 1.
Assessment result: Total;
Number of assessments: 423;
Percent: 100.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
Note: Percents do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.
[End of table]
Carriers generally did better on the performance assessments than the
design assessments. Carriers also generally did better on the
assessments related to flight crews than on those related to ground
crews. Figure 2 presents additional details on the assessment results
of FAA's ground deicing inspections.
Figure 2: Assessment Results of FAA's Inspections of Large Commercial
Carriers' Ground Deicing Programs by Type of Inspection (December 2007
through End of Fiscal Year 2009):
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
FAA assessment result: No issues observed - no action required;
Design inspections - ground crews: 23.1%;
Design inspections - flight crews: 37.5%;
Performance inspections - ground crews: 50.6%;
Performance inspections - flight crews: 69.3%.
FAA assessment result: Minor issues observed - no action required;
Design inspections - ground crews: 23.1%;
Design inspections - flight crews: 10.7%;
Performance inspections - ground crews: 19.1%;
Performance inspections - flight crews: 13.1%.
FAA assessment result: Minor issues observed - action required;
Design inspections - ground crews: 30.8%;
Design inspections - flight crews: 35.7%;
Performance inspections - ground crews: 12.3%;
Performance inspections - flight crews: 5.9%.
FAA assessment result: Issues of concern observed - action required;
Design inspections - ground crews: 13.5%;
Design inspections - flight crews: 5.4%;
Performance inspections - ground crews: 10.5%;
Performance inspections - flight crews: 8.5%.
FAA assessment result: Safety and/or regulatory issues observed -
action required;
Design inspections - ground crews: 9.6%;
Design inspections - flight crews: 10.7%;
Performance inspections - ground crews: 7.4%;
Performance inspections - flight crews: 2%.
FAA assessment result: Persistent, systemic safety and/or regulatory
issues observed - system reconfiguration by air carrier or applicant
required;
Design inspections - ground crews: 0;
Design inspections - flight crews: 0;
Performance inspections - ground crews: 0;
Performance inspections - flight crews: 1.3%.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
[End of figure]
Because not all large commercial carriers were covered by ATOS until
April 2008, FAA also inspected some large commercial carriers' ground
deicing programs under the agency's National Work Program Guidelines
(NPG). FAA's policy was to conduct these inspections of each carrier
once a year. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, FAA completed 327 out of
345 required inspections (95 percent) of large commercial carriers'
ground deicing programs under NPG. An FAA official told us that
resource constraints prevented the agency from being able to complete
all the required inspections, and that some were not completed under
NPG because the carriers were transitioned to ATOS. In fiscal years
2007 and 2008, FAA conducted far fewer of these inspections as the
agency completed its transitioning of large commercial carriers from
NPG to ATOS. Under NPG, FAA also plans additional inspections of some
carriers on an "as resources allow" basis, and conducts other
additional inspections that were not planned. In fiscal years 2005
through 2009, FAA completed 3,757 out of 3,946 planned inspections (95
percent) of large commercial carriers' ground deicing programs under
NPG, and it completed an additional 1,704 inspections that were not
planned.
When FAA determines that a carrier has violated a safety regulation
(through inspections or other means such as accident investigations or
public complaints), the agency can take enforcement action against the
carrier, which may include imposing monetary fines or temporarily or
permanently shutting down the carrier's operations.[Footnote 11] In
fiscal years 2005 through 2009, FAA initiated enforcement actions
against large commercial carriers in 274 cases following one or more
violations of icing-related regulations. FAA had closed 254 of these
actions by March 2010; of these, 226 were administrative actions, such
as letters to carriers specifying required corrective actions; 22 were
monetary fines, with a median amount of $20,000 and ranging from $675
to $175,000; 3 were closed with no action taken; 2 were suspensions of
operating certificates, 1 for 60 days and the other for 90 days; and 1
was a revocation of an operating certificate.
FAA also inspects commercial carriers that operate small airplanes
(small commercial carriers) to check whether they are complying with
FAA's safety regulations. For inspections that cover areas that FAA
deems critical to safety, including ground deicing programs, FAA
requires that each carrier be inspected once every 12 months. For less
critical areas, FAA establishes inspection annual plans for each
carrier that includes what the agency believes are the most important
areas for that carrier. In fiscal years 2005 through 2009, FAA
completed 942 of 1,026 required inspections (92 percent) of small
commercial carriers' ground deicing programs. In addition, over the
same time period, FAA completed 2,029 out of 2,099 planned inspections
(97 percent) of small commercial carriers' ground deicing programs
under NPG, and it completed an additional 431 inspections that were
not planned.
In fiscal years 2005 through 2009, FAA initiated enforcement actions
against small commercial carriers in 274 cases following one or more
violations of icing-related regulations. FAA had closed 209 of these
actions by March 2010; of these, 112 were administrative actions, such
as letters to carriers specifying required corrective actions; 29 were
monetary fines, with a median amount of $5,800 and ranging from $1,000
to $186,150; 28 were closed with no action taken; 28 were suspensions
of operating certificates, with a median duration of 60 days and
ranging from 7 to 270 days; and 12 were revocations of operating
certificates.
In fiscal years 2005 through 2009, FAA completed 256 inspections
covering icing-related requirements of private operators, 2 of which
were required, 125 of which were planned, and 129 of which were not
planned. During this time period, FAA did not take any enforcement
actions against private operators related to violations of icing-
related regulations.
FAA and Other Aviation Stakeholders Have Undertaken a Variety of
Efforts Aimed at Improving Safety in Icing and Winter Weather
Conditions:
FAA and others have undertaken many efforts to improve safety in icing
and winter weather conditions. In addition to conducting inspection
and enforcement activities as we previously described, FAA's efforts
include issuing a multiyear plan in 1997 related to in-flight icing
and providing funding for icing-related purposes. Other government
entities that have taken steps to increase aviation safety in icing
conditions include NTSB, which has issued numerous recommendations as
a result of its aviation accident investigations, and NASA, which has
contributed to research related to icing. In addition, the private
sector has deployed various FAA-required technologies on aircraft,
such as wing deicers and ice detectors, and operated ground deicing
and runway clearing programs at airports.
FAA Has Taken Actions to Implement Objectives of a Safety Plan Issued
in 1997, but Information about Recent Initiatives to Promote Safety in
Icing Conditions Has Not Been Readily Accessible:
Following the 1994 fatal crash of American Eagle Flight 4184 in
Roselawn, Indiana, FAA issued a multiyear plan in 1997 for improving
the safety of aircraft flying in icing conditions.[Footnote 12] FAA
distributed the plan to a broad range of aviation stakeholders,
including airlines, airports, and pilot organizations, asking for
their support in implementing the plan. It also posted the plan on its
public Web site, and it created an icing steering committee to monitor
the progress of the planned activities. The steering committee is
composed of FAA icing specialists who work together to resolve
aircraft icing issues.
Over the last decade, FAA made progress on the implementation of the
objectives specified in its multiyear plan by issuing or amending
regulations, airworthiness directives, and voluntary guidance to
provide icing-related safety oversight. For example:
* In August 2007, FAA issued a final rule for new airworthiness
standards to establish comprehensive requirements for the performance
and handling characteristics of transport category airplanes in icing
conditions.[Footnote 13]
* In January 2009, FAA also issued a proposed rule that would amend
the regulations for crewmember and dispatcher training programs,
requiring many new training elements and procedures for air carriers
including some relevant to icing training.[Footnote 14]
* In August 2009, FAA issued a final rule requiring a means to ensure
timely activation of the ice protection system on transport category
airplanes.[Footnote 15]
* In November 2009, FAA issued a proposed rule that would require the
timely activation of ice protection equipment on commercial aircraft
during icing conditions and weather conditions conducive to airframe
icing.[Footnote 16]
* In June 2010, FAA issued a proposed rule to amend its standards for
certain transport category airplanes and certain aircraft engines to
address supercooled large droplet icing, ice crystal, and mixed phase
icing conditions, which are outside the range of icing conditions
covered by the current standards; FAA plans to issue the final rule by
January 2012.[Footnote 17]
* Since 1997, FAA has issued over 100 airworthiness directives to
address icing safety issues involving more than 50 specific types of
aircraft, including directives that require revising the FAA-Approved
Airplane Flight Manual limitations to provide the flight crew with
recognition cues and procedures for exiting severe icing conditions or
inserting a copy of the airworthiness directive in the manual.
* FAA has sponsored research and provided subsequent guidance material
incorporating information on critical ice accretions that it believes
has resulted in a significant increase in the level of safety of new
airplanes.
While FAA points to its actions to implement its 1997 plan as having
contributed to a decline in icing-related accidents, the agency also
acknowledges that additional steps were and still are needed to
further reduce the risks that icing continues to pose to aviation
safety. Since it issued the plan, FAA's icing steering committee has
identified many additional actions to reduce risks from icing, such as
researching and developing approaches to mitigate the risk of
turboengine power loss from ice crystal ingestion. At our request, FAA
provided us with a lengthy compilation of the tasks it is undertaking
with respect to icing; however, its Inflight Aircraft Icing Plan has
not been publicly updated since the initial release in 1997. FAA told
us it has reported the status of key tasks in the icing plan to
aviation stakeholders via different methods, such as during FAA Icing
Conferences in 1999 and 2003; yet because FAA has not formally updated
the plan, stakeholders do not have a consolidated and readily
accessible source of information on the key in-flight icing actions
FAA has under way or planned. Furthermore, because the plan only
addresses initiatives related to in-flight icing, FAA is missing an
opportunity to take a more holistic and coordinated approach to the
broader range of issues related to winter weather, including ground
icing and deicing and contaminated runways.
While FAA's Inflight Aircraft Icing Plan does not cover ground icing,
FAA officials said the agency has maintained a ground icing program
whereby FAA provides guidance on ground winter operations on a yearly
basis and conducts research on endurance times for deicing and anti-
icing fluids. FAA said it also investigates new issues that may arise
as a result of special industry concerns or changes in FAA policy.
Regulations and guidance developed as a result of the ground icing
program include a rule that no longer permits frost to be polished
smooth on critical surfaces prior to takeoff and requires pilots to
ensure that the wings of their aircraft are free of all frost prior to
takeoff.[Footnote 18]
FAA has also provided funding for a variety of icing-related purposes.
For example, FAA has supported NASA research related to severe icing
conditions and NCAR research related to weather and aircraft icing.
Furthermore, FAA has provided almost $200 million to airports through
the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) to construct deicing facilities
and to acquire aircraft deicing equipment from 1999 to 2009. (See
appendix II for a detailed listing of AIP icing-related funding by
state, city, and year for 1999 to 2009.) Since runway safety is a key
concern for aviation safety and especially critical during winter
weather operations, FAA has also provided about $200 million per year
in AIP funding for the creation of runway safety areas since
2000.[Footnote 19] According to the Flight Safety Foundation, from
1995 through 2008, 30 percent of global aviation accidents were runway-
related and "ineffective braking/runway contamination" is the fourth
largest causal factor in runway excursions that occur during landing.
In fiscal year 2000, FAA's Office of Airport Safety and Standards
initiated a program to accelerate improvements in runway safety areas
at commercial service airports that did not meet FAA design standards.
According to FAA officials, of the 619 runways that FAA determined
needed improvement, 465 (74 percent) have been completed and 154 (26
percent) remain to be completed by 2015. The estimated cost to
complete the remaining projects is about $835 million.[Footnote 20] In
some cases where (1) land is not available, (2) it would be very
expensive for the airport sponsors to buy land off the end of the
runway, or (3) it is otherwise not possible to have the 1,000 foot
safety area, FAA has approved the use of an Engineered Materials
Arresting System (EMAS).[Footnote 21] FAA supports EMAS installations
through AIP funding, and currently, EMAS installations have been
completed for 44 runways at 30 airports in the United States, with
seven more installations scheduled for 2010.[Footnote 22] To date
there have been six successful EMAS captures of overrunning aircraft.
Other Stakeholders Support and Augment FAA Efforts to Increase Safety
in Icing and Winter Weather Conditions:
Government and industry stakeholders, external to FAA, also contribute
to the effort to increase aviation safety in icing and winter weather
conditions. For example, as a result of its civil aviation accident
investigations, NTSB issues safety recommendations to FAA and others,
some of which it deems most critical and places on a list of "Most
Wanted" recommendations.[Footnote 23] Since 1996, NTSB has issued 82
recommendations to FAA aimed at reducing risks from in-flight
structural icing, engine and aircraft component icing, runway
condition and contamination, ground icing, and winter weather
operations. NTSB's icing-related recommendations to FAA have called
for FAA to, among other things, strengthen its requirements for
certifying aircraft for flying in icing conditions, sponsor the
development of weather forecasts that define locations with icing
conditions, and enhance its training requirements for pilots. NTSB has
closed 41 of these recommendations (50 percent) as having been
implemented by FAA, and has classified another 22 (27 percent) as FAA
having made acceptable progress.[Footnote 24] This combined 77 percent
acceptance rate is similar to the rate for all of NTSB's aviation
recommendations. A complete listing of and additional information on
NTSB's icing-related recommendations made since 1996 can be viewed at
GAO-10-679SP.
For more than 30 years, NASA has conducted and sponsored fundamental
and applied research related to icing. The research addresses icing
causes, effects, and mitigations. For instance, NASA has conducted
extensive research to characterize and simulate supercooled large
droplet icing conditions to inform a pending FAA rule related to the
topic. NASA participated in research activities, partially funded by
FAA, that developed additional knowledge and strategies which allowed
forecasters to more precisely locate supercooled large droplet icing
conditions. Furthermore, NASA has an icing program, focused generally
on research related to the effects of in-flight icing on airframes and
engines for many types of flight vehicles. NASA has developed icing
simulation capabilities that allow researchers, manufacturers, and
certification authorities to better understand the growth and effects
of ice on aircraft surfaces. NASA also produced a set of training
materials for pilots operating in winter weather conditions.
NOAA, the National Weather Service, and NCAR have efforts directed and
funded by FAA related to predicting the location and severity of icing
occurrences. The National Weather Service operates icing prediction
systems and NCAR conducts research to determine more efficient methods
to complete this task. In response to FAA's 1997 Inflight Aircraft
Icing Plan, FAA sponsored NCAR's development of two in-flight icing
weather products to improve icing diagnoses and forecasting. They are
the (1) Current Icing Product (CIP), which combines satellite, radar,
surface, lighting, and pilot report observations with model output to
create a detailed three-dimensional diagnosis of the potential for the
existence of icing, and (2) Forecast Icing Potential (FIP), which
calculates the likelihood of icing and supercooled large droplet
conditions. FIP allows meteorologists and airline dispatchers to
advise pilots about icing hazards up to 12 hours in advance. The CIP
and FIP are now fully operational and are available at NOAA's aviation
weather Web site, as are maps showing advisories of severe and
moderate icing conditions, pilot reports, and freezing-level graphics.
FAA has also supported the development and use of operationally
available sensors. Observational datasets from those sensors are used
in the CIP algorithm.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the National Science
Foundation said that members from the Aircraft Icing Research Alliance
(AIRA) conduct a significant amount of icing-related research in a
collaborative manner. According to the AIRA Web site, its members
include NASA; Environment Canada; Transport Canada; National Research
Council, Canada; FAA; NOAA; National Defence, Canada; and Defence
Science and Technology Laboratory, United Kingdom. AIRA's mission is
to coordinate among the parties the conduct of collaborative aircraft
icing research activities that improve the safety of aircraft
operations in icing conditions.
The private sector has also contributed to efforts to prevent
accidents and incidents related to icing and winter weather
conditions, as required by FAA. For example, as shown in figure 3,
aircraft manufacturers have deployed various technologies such as wing
deicers, anti-icing systems, and heated wings. In addition, airports
operate ground deicing and runway clearing programs that help ensure
clean wings (see figure 4) and runways.
Figure 3: Aircraft Ice Protection Systems:
[Refer to PDF for image: aircraft illustration]
Depicted on the illustration are the following:
Windshield wipers;
Bypass duct deicer;
Pneumatic leading edge deicers;
Electronically heated propellor blade deicers; Electronically heated
windshield;
Pneumatic engine inlet lip deicer;
Electronically heated pitot/static tubes;
TAT sensor.
Source: GAO, based on information from NTSB.
Notes: Pneumatic leading edge deicers are inflatable rubber "boots" on
the leading edges of airfoil surfaces (including wings, horizontal
stabilizers, and vertical stabilizers) that can be rapidly inflated
and deflated with air pressure to break up ice accumulation. Similar
technology is used for the pneumatic engine inlet lip deicer (the
engine inlet lip is the edge of the opening through which air enters
the engine), and the bypass duct deicer (in turbofan engines, the
bypass duct channels the outer airflow past the core engine,
minimizing large inertia objects such as snow, ice, and water drops
from entering the engine). The TAT (Total Air Temperature) sensor
helps the pilot determine critical flight parameters such as true
airspeed computation and static air temperature. Electronically heated
propeller blade deicers, windshield, and pitot/static tubes operate in-
flight to rid the aircraft of ice buildup and to prevent ice
accumulation.
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Example of Ground Deicing to Help Ensure Clean Aircraft:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Gerald R. Ford International Airport.
[End of figure]
Continued Attention to Regulation, Training, and Coordination Issues
Could Further Mitigate the Risks of Winter Weather Operations:
While FAA and others are undertaking efforts to mitigate the risks of
aircraft icing and winter weather operations, through our interviews
and discussions with government and industry stakeholders, we have
identified challenges related to these risks that, if addressed by
ongoing or planned efforts, could improve aviation safety. These
challenges include (1) improving the timeliness of FAA's winter
weather rulemaking efforts; (2) ensuring the availability of adequate
resources for icing-related research and development (R&D); (3)
ensuring that pilot training is thorough, relevant, and realistic; (4)
ensuring the collection and distribution of timely and accurate
weather information; (5) addressing the environmental impacts of
deicing fluids; and (6) developing a more integrated approach to
effectively manage winter operations.
Improving the timeliness of FAA's winter weather rulemaking efforts.
FAA's rulemaking, like that of other federal agencies, is a
complicated, multistep process that can take many years. One purpose
of the rulemaking process is to ensure that all aspects of any
regulatory change are fully analyzed before the change goes into
effect. To begin a rulemaking, FAA may seek input from ARAC,[Footnote
25] and it may conduct research and development to enhance existing
technologies or to introduce new technologies. NTSB, the Air Transport
Association, and other stakeholders have recognized that such research
and development can be time-consuming. In addition, FAA generally is
required to develop and publish each rule in the Federal Register--
first as a proposed rule and then as a final rule.[Footnote 26] During
the public comment period that follows the publication of the proposed
rule, interested parties may submit written comments, which FAA
examines and may consider when making any changes before publishing
the final rule. The final rule is then incorporated into the United
States Code of Federal Regulations, but it may not take effect
immediately. For example, FAA may phase in requirements over time or
it may give industry time--sometimes several years--to implement
changes. Figure 5 provides an overview of the federal rulemaking
process as it applies to FAA.
Figure 5: FAA's Rulemaking Process for Significant Rules:
[Refer to PDF for image: Process illustration]
Identify need for rulemaking:
Internal sources of rulemaking efforts: FAA Administrator, program
offices, Office of General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of
Transportation (OST).
External sources of rulemaking efforts: The Congress, President,
National Transportation Safety Board, the public, industry.
Develop proposed rule:
* Initiate rulemaking, draft proposal, obtain management approval;
* Draft, review, approve proposed rule;
* OST review;
* Office of Management and Budget review;
* Publish proposed rule in the Federal Register;
* Start of public comment period.
Public comment period.
Develop final rule:
* End of public comment period;
* Analyze and address comments; draft, review, approve final rule;
* OST review;
* Office of Management and Budget review;
* Publish final rule in the Federal Register.
Source: Based on FAA‘s Rulemaking Manual, Dec. 1998.
Notes: Executive Order 12866 (58 Fed. Reg. 51735, September 30, 1993)
defines "regulatory action" as any substantive action by an agency
that promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation of a final
rule or regulation, including notices of inquiry, advance notices of
proposed rulemaking, and notices of proposed rulemaking. The executive
order defines a "significant" rulemaking as, among other things, one
that is likely to result in a rule that may have an annual effect on
the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material
way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition,
jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or state, local, or
tribal governments or communities. The order states that agencies
should submit detailed cost-benefit analyses to the Office of
Management and Budget for all economically significant rulemakings.
[End of figure]
NTSB, FAA, and we have previously expressed concerns about the
efficiency and timeliness of FAA's rulemaking efforts. In 2001, we
reported that a major reform effort begun by FAA in 1998 did not solve
long-standing problems with its rulemaking process, as indicated both
by the lack of improvement in the time required to complete the
rulemaking process and by the agency's inability to consistently meet
the time frames imposed by statute or its own guidance.[Footnote 27]
External pressures--such as highly-publicized accidents,
recommendations by NTSB, and congressional mandates--as well as
internal pressures, such as changes in management's emphasis,
continued to add to and shift the agency's priorities. For some rules,
difficult policy issues continued to remain unresolved late in the
process. Our 2001 report contained 10 recommendations designed to
improve the efficiency of FAA's rulemaking through, among other
things, (1) more timely and effective participation in decision making
and prioritization; (2) more effective use of information management
systems to monitor and improve the process; and (3) the implementation
of human capital strategies to measure, evaluate, and provide
performance incentives for participants in the process. FAA has
implemented 8 of our 10 recommendations.[Footnote 28]
NTSB's February 2010 update on the status of its Most Wanted
recommendations related to icing characterized FAA's related
rulemaking efforts as "unacceptably slow." In December 2009, at FAA's
International Runway Safety Summit, NTSB's Chairman commented, "How do
safety improvements end up taking 10 years to deliver? They get
delayed one day at a time ...and every one of those days may be the
day when a preventable accident occurs as the result of something we
were 'just about ready to fix.'" In particular, NTSB has expressed
concern about the pace of FAA's rulemaking project to amend its
standards for transport category airplanes to address supercooled
large droplets, which is outside the range of icing conditions covered
by the current standards. FAA began this rulemaking effort in 1997 in
response to a recommendation made by NTSB the prior year, and the
agency currently expects to issue its proposed rule in July 2010 and
the final rule by January 2012. However, until the notice of proposed
rulemaking is published and the close of the comment period is known,
it will be unclear as to when the final rule will be issued.[Footnote
29] The Department of Transportation, in its monthly report on the
department's significant rulemakings, has classified this rulemaking
effort as "behind schedule" since March 2010. Much of the time on this
rulemaking effort has been devoted to research and analysis aimed at
quantifying the atmospheric conditions that lead to supercooled large
droplet icing, as well as developing tools that would allow industry
to comply with the forthcoming rule.
In 2009, FAA completed an internal review of its rulemaking process
and concluded that several of the concerns from 1998 that led to the
agency's major reform effort remain, including:
* inadequate early involvement of key stakeholders;
* inadequate early resolution of issues;
* inefficient review process;
* inadequate selection and training of personnel involved in
rulemaking; and:
* inefficient quality guidance.
According to FAA's manager for aircraft and airport rules, the agency
is taking steps to implement recommendations made by the internal
review, such as revising the rulemaking project record form and
enhancing training for staff involved in rulemaking. In addition, in
October 2009, FAA tasked ARAC with reviewing its processes and making
recommendations for improvement within a year. According to an FAA
rulemaking manager, ARAC is finalizing its recommendations and writing
its report, which FAA expects to receive in December 2010. We believe
these efforts have the potential to improve the efficiency of FAA's
rulemaking process. Progress in rulemaking will be critical for FAA
because, as we have reported in our recent reviews of the transition
to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), many of
the proposals for safely enhancing the efficiency and capacity of the
national airspace system will depend on timely development of rules
and procedures.[Footnote 30]
Ensuring the availability of adequate resources for icing-related R&D.
NASA is a key source of R&D related to icing. The agency performs
fundamental research related to icing in-house and sponsors such
research at universities and other organizations. According to NASA
officials, possible areas for increased support for R&D that could be
helpful include pilot training, supercooled large droplet simulation
(both experimental and computational), engine icing, and the effects
of icing on future aircraft wing designs. However, the amount of NASA
resources (including combined amounts from NASA's budget and from FAA
for aircraft icing R&D at NASA facilities) and staffing for icing
research have declined significantly since fiscal year 2005, as shown
in figure 6. According to NASA officials, there were several
contributing factors to the decline in available resources, including
the fiscal constraints on the overall federal budget, a shift in the
administration's priorities for NASA, as well as a restructuring
within NASA's aeronautical programs to reflect the available resources
and priorities. Because the outcomes of R&D are often a required
precursor to the development of rules and standards, as well as
technological innovation, a decline in R&D resources can delay actions
that would promote safe operation in icing conditions. For example,
FAA's chief scientist for icing told us the decline in NASA's icing
research budget has adversely affected NASA's research to understand
how icing affects various makes and models of aircraft in real time--
research that would ultimately help pilots determine how to respond to
specific icing encounters. He said that without NASA's research
efforts, it would be uncertain who would conduct this and other
potentially important icing research. In commenting on a draft of this
report, the National Science Foundation agreed that this is a major
concern and noted that icing-related research conducted by NASA has
been extremely valuable.
Figure 6: NASA Funding and Staffing for Icing-Related R&D, Fiscal
Years 2005 to 2013, as of February 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Fiscal year: 2005;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA: $6,383,000;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 42.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA: $6,086,000;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 36.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA: $1,532,000;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 28.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA: $1,959,000;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 21.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA: $2,183,000;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 22.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA: $1,043,000;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 21.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA: $1,966,000;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 21.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA: $930,000;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 21.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Funding for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, provided by NASA and
FAA: $930,000;
Staffing for icing-related R&D at NASA facilities, in full time
equivalents (FTEs): 21.
Sources: GAO presentation of NASA data.
Notes: Amounts for fiscal years 2005 through 2009 represent actual
allocations, while amounts for fiscal years 2010 through 2013
represent projected allocations. Funding data represent three sources
of funding for icing research at NASA. According to NASA, complete
data are available for one source, while data for another source are
only available for fiscal years 2005 to 2010, and data for the third
source are only available for fiscal years 2005 to 2009. Amounts do
not reflect icing-related funds received or could be received through
other government programs or external partnership (e.g., Boeing)
agreements. The funding costs do not include amounts for staffing.
[End of figure]
Ensuring that pilot training is thorough, relevant, and realistic.
Another icing-related challenge to aviation safety is pilot training.
Aviation experts told us that pilots are likely to encounter icing
conditions beyond their aircraft's capabilities at least once in their
career. Currently, icing must be covered in a commercial pilot's
initial training and, while recurrent training may not always
emphasize icing, it is covered on a rotational basis. Different
weather conditions affect aircraft performance in a variety of ways,
making it critical that pilots receive training relevant to the
conditions they are likely to encounter. For example, it is important
that regional airline operators provide region-specific training to
their pilots as regional airline consolidations may cause pilots to
fly a geographically wider variety of routes with more variation in
weather conditions. Further, in February 2010, the Executive Air
Safety Chairman of the Airline Pilots Association International
testified on the importance of pilots knowing the effects icing has on
the controllability of the specific airplane they are flying. He
stressed that, currently, the pilot community has inconsistent
information and guidance when having to decide how to react after
encountering in-flight icing conditions or whether to take off or
proceed into reported freezing rain or drizzle. Furthermore, in
commenting on a draft of this report, NASA said the current FAA
written tests for pilot certification have little relevance to the
competence required in icing and winter weather operations. For
example, NASA said one issue is that the pilot-applicant can pass the
test without answering weather-related questions correctly, but that
even correct answers provide very little operational information
compared with what a pilot needs to know when faced with icing. NASA
said it has participated in developing materials to help fill this
information gap and while the materials have been adopted by a number
of users, they have not been endorsed by FAA. NASA believes that these
or other expanded materials should be utilized and included as part of
the formal pilot training requirement.
Regarding pilot training, in January 2010, the FAA Administrator said,
"The flying public needs to have confidence that no matter what size
airplane they board, the pilots have the right qualifications, are
trained for the mission, are fit for duty. . . . We know we need to
reexamine pilot qualifications to make sure commercial pilots who
carry passengers have the appropriate operational experience--they
need to be trained for the mission they are flying."[Footnote 31] FAA
has begun to take steps to address shortcomings in pilot training. For
example, in January 2009, FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
to establish new training requirements, such as requiring the use of
flight simulators for training flight crewmembers and requiring
training on special hazards such as loss of control and controlled
flight into terrain.[Footnote 32] However, as of June 2010, FAA did
not have a target date for issuing a final rule. In June 2009, FAA
took the additional step of issuing an action plan to improve airline
safety and pilot training. The plan called for specially focused
inspections of carriers' flight crew training and qualifications
programs. In February 2010, the IG reported that these inspections
were generally completed on time, but inspectors lacked guidance from
FAA headquarters and surveillance questions were inadequate.[Footnote
33] As a result, the IG reported that the consistency and quality of
the inspections may not have been comprehensive enough to detect flaws
in the carriers' training and qualifications programs.
Ensuring the collection and distribution of timely and accurate
weather information. Improving the quality of weather information
could reduce the safety risks associated with winter weather
operations. Pilots and operators use weather forecasts to decide
whether it is safe to start a flight or, once aloft, whether it is
preferable to continue on to the destination or divert to an alternate
airport. Weather experts explained that weather forecasters are still
far from being able to precisely predict icing conditions in the
atmosphere and the impact of such conditions on individual aircraft.
For this reason, FAA said icing forecasters generally provide overly
cautious forecasts that cover a broad area. While this serves to warn
pilots that icing could occur, representatives of the Air Line Pilots
Association said that too many false alarms result in pilots ignoring
subsequent forecasts of icing. These representatives also said that
pilots do not know when they are entering severe conditions, as they
are only given generalized statements about icing conditions.
Providing pilots with accurate weather information has been a long-
standing concern: FAA's 1997 Inflight Aircraft Icing Plan recommended
improving the quality and dissemination of icing weather information
to dispatchers and flight crews. Since 1997, FAA, in conjunction with
NOAA and NCAR, has developed improved icing forecasting products. As
previously mentioned, these icing forecasting products are now fully
operational, yet FAA and others told us that further improvements to
weather forecasts are still needed. Currently, NextGen weather
researchers are focused on creating technology and procedures that
enable forecasters to provide pilots with more precise and accurate
predictions of icing conditions, which they believe will address the
problem of pilots ignoring traditionally unreliable icing forecasts
and better communicate the existence of dangerous weather conditions
to pilots.
Addressing the environmental impacts of deicing fluids. While critical
to safe, efficient winter operations, continuing to keep aircraft and
airport pavement free of ice and snow while complying with EPA's
proposed rule on the use of deicing fluids could be challenging for
affected airports.[Footnote 34] These programs involve treating
aircraft and airport pavement with millions of pounds of deicing and
anti-icing compounds annually. These compounds contain chemicals that
can harm the environment. Some airports can control deicing pollution
by capturing the fluids used to deice aircraft using technologies such
as AIP-funded deicing pads, where aircraft are sprayed with deicing
fluids before takeoff and the fluids are captured and treated;
drainage collection systems; or vacuum-equipped vehicles. Third-party
contractors, rather than individual air carriers, are increasingly
performing deicing operations at commercial airports. FAA does not
currently have a process to directly oversee these third-party
contractors but indicates that it has one under development.
In its official comments on EPA's proposed rule, an association of
airports expressed several concerns, including that (1) complying with
the proposed rule would require additional vehicles around terminals,
taxiways, and runways to recover deicing fluid, potentially slowing or
halting operations and posing a safety hazard; (2) the proposed rule
offers no alternative means of compliance to airports which do not
have enough space to construct deicing pads; and (3) EPA's estimate of
the costs of complying with the proposed rule did not include several
necessary expenditures, including certain infrastructure and
maintenance costs and the cost of consultants or other staff needed to
help comply with the rule. According to EPA, the agency worked closely
with FAA in developing the proposed rule, which FAA determined would
have no impact on the safety of operations. Several state
environmental agencies supported the need for this type of rule, but
some of the agencies believed that the proposal could be improved by,
for example, including stricter requirements for the treatment of
deicing fluid or by giving airports more time to comply with new
requirements.
Developing a more integrated approach to effectively manage winter
operations. FAA indicated that developing an integrated approach to
effectively manage winter operations is among its top challenges
related to aviation icing. FAA said that, in conjunction with the
aviation industry, it needs to begin focusing on winter operations
holistically because there are many vital elements to safe operations
in winter weather conditions, including airport surface conditions,
aircraft ground deicing, aircraft in-flight icing and icing
certification, dissemination of airport condition information, air
traffic handling of aircraft in icing conditions, and air traffic
arrival and departure sequencing. An academic expert on icing agreed
with this view when he told us an integrated approach is critical
because there are so many different players involved. Other industry
stakeholders we contacted cited specific examples that demonstrated a
lack of an integrated approach to winter operations. For example,
representatives from a pilots' association told us air traffic control
procedures at large airports cause aircraft to spend more time than
necessary in icing conditions, which is a safety hazard for small
aircraft. Representatives from the National Air Transportation
Association told us consistent language does not exist across all
stakeholders, with subjective terminology used to report runway
conditions and in-flight icing encounters that could be interpreted in
various ways by pilots. FAA stressed that it is important for FAA and
the aviation industry to focus on how components of the aviation
system interact and affect one another during winter operations and
not view the components in isolation.
Conclusions:
FAA and other aviation stakeholders have taken many steps to improve
aviation safety in icing and winter weather conditions. These steps
have likely contributed to the fact that large commercial airplanes
have experienced few icing-related accidents since 1998. Nevertheless,
the many reported icing incidents suggest that icing is an ongoing
risk to aviation safety, including the safety of large commercial
airplanes. Further, aviation stakeholders have identified challenges
that if addressed, could improve safety. Among others, these
challenges include improving the timeliness of FAA's winter weather
rulemaking efforts, ensuring the availability of adequate resources
for icing-related R&D, and developing a more integrated approach to
effectively manage winter operations. Although FAA and other
stakeholders are continuing their efforts to reduce safety risks
associated with icing and winter weather operating conditions, these
efforts could benefit from more formal and holistic planning. FAA has
not formally updated its 1997 Inflight Aircraft Icing Plan, meaning
the stakeholders do not have a consolidated and readily accessible
source of information on the key in-flight icing actions FAA has under
way or planned. Furthermore, the scope of the 1997 plan did not
include icing issues occurring on the ground, yet contaminated runways
resulting from icing and winter weather pose hazards to planes during
takeoff and landing, and removing ice or preventing ice from forming
on aircraft occurs not only during flight, but also on the ground
prior to takeoff. A plan that addresses both in-flight and ground
icing issues, as well as the challenges stakeholders identified for
this report, would help FAA measure its ongoing and planned efforts
against its goals for improving safety. Furthermore, a comprehensive
plan could help identify gaps or other areas for improvement and
assist FAA in developing an integrated approach to winter operations.
Although stakeholders identified multiple challenges for this report,
we believe several of them could be addressed in the plan.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To help facilitate FAA's and other stakeholders' efforts to address
challenges to improving safety in icing and winter weather conditions,
we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the
Administrator, FAA, to develop a comprehensive plan, in consultation
with public and private stakeholders, to guide these efforts. The plan
should focus on winter operations holistically, be clearly
communicated to all affected parties, and include detailed goals,
milestones, and time frames that can be used to gauge performance and
progress, identify gaps, and determine areas for improvement. FAA
should also periodically report to affected parties on its progress in
implementing the plan, as well as any updates to the plan.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation
(which contains FAA), the Department of Commerce (which contains
NOAA), NTSB, NASA, and the National Science Foundation (which contains
NCAR) for their review and comment. In response, the Department of
Transportation agreed to consider our recommendation and provided
technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. The
Department of Commerce and NTSB also provided technical comments which
we incorporated as appropriate.
In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA emphasized the
importance of updated and timely aircraft certification requirements
and the need for research to develop computer models and simulations
to provide the understanding needed to support new certification
requirements. With respect to our recommendation, NASA said that while
FAA's development of a comprehensive plan for winter operations is a
good first step, NASA suggested that greater emphasis be placed on
FAA's implementation activities once the plan is in place. NASA also
provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate.
In its comments, the National Science Foundation (NSF) said our report
adequately addresses the state of aircraft operations during winter.
Of the challenges we identified, NSF said developing a more integrated
approach to effectively manage winter operations is the most critical
and will result in the most improvements to aviation safety and icing.
NSF said that a number of universities, under funding from NSF,
conduct research into the physics of icing and also had provided in
situ measurements (using a storm penetration aircraft) of icing and
other conditions associated with large convective storms. NSF
indicated that our discussion of CIP and FIP as fully operational
products illustrates that advances are being made, but that constant
updates are needed as a result of additional research.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Chairman of NTSB, the Administrator of NASA, and the
Acting Director of the NSF. In addition, the report will be available
at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Chairman:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jim DeMint:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Jerry F. Costello:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thomas E. Petri:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Aviation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Charles E. Schumer:
United States Senate:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
We reviewed (1) the extent to which large commercial airplanes have
experienced accidents and incidents related to icing and contaminated
runways, (2) the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) inspection
and enforcement activities related to icing, (3) the efforts of FAA
and other aviation stakeholders to improve safety in icing and winter
weather operating conditions, and (4) the challenges that continue to
affect aviation safety in icing and winter weather operating
conditions.
To review the extent to which large commercial airplanes have
experienced accidents and incidents related to icing and contaminated
runways, we analyzed data obtained from FAA, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). More specifically, NTSB provided us both
raw and summary data from its aviation accident database on accidents
involving large commercial carriers, small commercial carriers, or
private operators in which any of the following were cited as a cause
of the accident, a contributing factor, or a finding: icing of the
airframe and associated equipment and structures, engines and engine
intakes, fuel lines, or carburetors; contamination of airport surfaces
by snow or ice; and snow removal.[Footnote 35] We analyzed this data
to identify and remove several duplicate accident records. FAA and
NASA provided us data from their aviation incident databases on
incidents related to the same types of factors as the accidents we
analyzed. We tabulated the incident data to determine the numbers of
incidents by type of factor and by type of operator.
To review FAA's inspection and enforcement activities related to icing
we obtained FAA's inspection and enforcement policies and analyzed
data from FAA's inspection and enforcement databases. More
specifically, to assess the timeliness of FAA's inspection-based
assessments of large commercial carriers ground deicing programs under
the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), we obtained and
analyzed data from the system to determine how many assessments were
completed within FAA's required time frames. To determine the extent
to which FAA's inspections found that large commercial carriers were
in compliance with FAA's safety requirements, we analyzed inspection
data from ATOS on inspectors' responses to compliance-related
questions. We also analyzed data from ATOS on the results of
inspectors' overall assessments of each large commercial carrier's
compliance with ground deicing regulations. To determine the extent to
which FAA had completed all required and planned inspections of large
and small commercial carriers' ground deicing programs that were
covered by the National Work Program Guidelines (NPG), we obtained and
analyzed data from FAA's Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem
(PTRS) on the numbers of required and planned inspections that FAA
completed, as well as those that it terminated or canceled. To
determine the enforcement actions that FAA initiated against carriers
that violated icing-related regulations, we obtained and analyzed data
on these actions from FAA's Enforcement Information System, including
whether the actions were administrative, fines, or suspensions or
revocations of carriers' operating certificates. For the cases that
are closed, we analyzed data to determine the minimum, median, and
maximum dollar amounts of fines and durations of suspensions.
To determine the efforts FAA and other stakeholders have undertaken to
improve safety in icing and winter weather operating conditions and
the challenges that remain, we interviewed government officials from
FAA, NTSB, NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), and the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), as
well as the Flight Safety Foundation and an academic expert from the
University of Illinois. We also contacted a variety of industry
representatives, as shown in table 6.
Table 6: Industry Groups We Contacted:
Industry group name: Aerospace Industries Association;
Representation: Represents manufacturers and suppliers of civil,
military, and business aircraft.
Industry group name: Air Line Pilots Association, International;
Representation: Represents the collective interests of pilots in
commercial aviation in the United States and Canada.
Industry group name: Air Transport Association;
Representation: Represents the nation's leading airlines.
Industry group name: Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association;
Representation: Represents general aviation.
Industry group name: Airports Council International of North America;
Representation: Represents local, regional, and state governing bodies
that own and operate commercial airports in the United States and
Canada.
Industry group name: General Aviation Manufacturers Association;
Representation: Represents manufacturers of fixed-wing general
aviation airplanes, engines, avionics, and components.
Industry group name: National Air Traffic Controllers Association;
Representation: Represents air traffic controllers, engineers, and
other safety-related professionals.
Industry group name: National Air Transportation Association;
Representation: Represents the legislative, regulatory, and business
interests of general aviation service companies.
Industry group name: National Business Aviation Association;
Representation: Represents companies that rely on general aviation
aircraft for business purposes.
Industry group name: Regional Airline Association;
Representation: Represents North American regional airlines and the
manufacturers of products and services supporting the regional airline
industry.
Source: GAO, based on industry information.
[End of table]
We also reviewed key documents on the efforts undertaken by these
entities, including FAA's 1997 Inflight Aircraft Icing Plan and a
status update on the plan and FAA's other winter-weather initiatives
that FAA developed at our request; FAA's 2009 report on its review of
its rulemaking process; FAA's Answering the Call to Action on Airline
Safety and Pilot Training; and the Environmental Protection Agency's
proposed rule on the use of deicing fluids and related effluents, as
well as public comments on the proposed rule submitted to the docket
by Airports Council International of North America and several state
environmental agencies. We also obtained and reviewed data related to
several key stakeholder efforts, such as data on Airport Improvement
Program (AIP) funding FAA has provided to airports to construct
deicing facilities and to acquire aircraft deicing equipment; data
from NTSB's recommendation database on the status of its
recommendations related to aviation icing and winter weather; and data
on NASA funding and staffing for icing research.
We conducted this review from August 2009 to July 2010 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient and
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. To assess the reliability
of the inspection and enforcement data that we received from FAA, we
performed electronic testing of the data elements that we used,
obtained and reviewed documentation about the data and the systems
that produced them, and interviewed knowledgeable FAA officials. To
assess the reliability of the accident data we received from NTSB and
the incident data we received from FAA and NASA, we obtained and
reviewed documentation about the data and the systems that produced
them.
[End of section]
Appendix II: FAA's Funding to the Airport Improvement Program for 1999
to 2009, by State and City:
State/City: Alaska; Fairbanks;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $2,069,333.
State/City: Colorado; Denver;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $299,974.
State/City: Colorado; Denver;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $6,200,000.
State/City: Colorado; Denver;
Year: 2004;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $7,700,000.
State/City: Colorado; Denver;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $13,120,975.
State/City: Colorado; Denver;
Year: 2006;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $2,634,739.
State/City: Connecticut; New Haven;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $67,092.
State/City: Iowa; Dubuque;
Year: 2006;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $221,417.
State/City: Illinois; Belleville;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $202,572.
State/City: Illinois; Belleville;
Year: 2009;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $507,900.
State/City: Indiana; Indianapolis;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $5,654,999.
State/City: Kansas; Wichita;
Year: 1999;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $128,350.
State/City: Kansas; Manhattan;
Year: 2001;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $37,438.
State/City: Kansas; Manhattan;
Year: 2002;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $123,971.
State/City: Kentucky; Covington;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $1,210,000.
State/City: Kentucky; Covington;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $269,057.
State/City: Kentucky; Lexington;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $198,000.
State/City: Kentucky; Lexington;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $2,399,244.
State/City: Kentucky; Paducah;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $91,037.
State/City: Maryland; Baltimore;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $3,403,519.
State/City: Maine; Bangor;
Year: 2004;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $399,599.
State/City: Maine; Bangor;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $1,384,222.
State/City: Michigan; Detroit;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $2,950,000.
State/City: Michigan; Detroit;
Year: 2008;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $3,800,000.
State/City: Michigan; Detroit;
Year: 2009;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $1,889,237.
State/City: Michigan; Kalamazoo;
Year: 2004;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $203,468.
State/City: Minnesota; Bemidji;
Year: 2005;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $12,065.
State/City: Minnesota; Bemidji;
Year: 2005;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $161,478.
State/City: Minnesota; Brainerd;
Year: 2008;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $204,250.
State/City: Minnesota; Hibbing;
Year: 2005;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $280,690.
State/City: Minnesota; International Falls;
Year: 2007;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $205,899.
State/City: Minnesota; Minneapolis;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $7,660,984.
State/City: Minnesota; Minneapolis;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $10,204,941.
State/City: Minnesota; St. Cloud;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $58,500.
State/City: Minnesota; St. Cloud;
Year: 2007;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $204,250.
State/City: Missouri; Kansas City;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $150,000.
State/City: Missouri; Kansas City;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $5,589,005.
State/City: Missouri; Kansas City;
Year: 2006;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $4,463,462.
State/City: Montana; Bozeman;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $91,328.
State/City: Montana; Missoula;
Year: 2008;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $4,363,460.
State/City: North Carolina; Charlotte;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $145,051.
State/City: North Carolina; Kinston;
Year: 2001;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $167,943.
State/City: New Jersey; Morristown;
Year: 2004;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $1,579,259.
State/City: New Mexico; Roswell;
Year: 2008;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $116,051.
State/City: New York; Buffalo;
Year: 2006;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $816,891.
State/City: New York; Buffalo;
Year: 2008;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $500,000.
State/City: New York; Islip;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $46,550.
State/City: New York; Islip;
Year: 2009;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $288,591.
State/City: New York; Ithaca;
Year: 2009;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $113,735.
State/City: New York; New York;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $6,856,488.
State/City: New York; Newburgh;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $1,400,000.
State/City: New York; Rochester;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $1,858,022.
State/City: New York; Rochester;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $973,860.
State/City: New York; White Plains;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $369,855.
State/City: New York; White Plains;
Year: 2003;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $262,678.
State/City: New York; White Plains;
Year: 2007;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $581,613.
State/City: New York; White Plains;
Year: 2008;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $296,283.
State/City: New York; White Plains;
Year: 2009;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $473,991.
State/City: Ohio; Akron;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $4,993,313.
State/City: Ohio; Akron;
Year: 2006;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $5,000,000.
State/City: Ohio; Columbus;
Year: 2002;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $5,173,023.
State/City: Ohio; Toledo;
Year: 2005;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $746,756.
State/City: Ohio; Toledo;
Year: 2006;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $861,735.
State/City: Ohio; Toledo;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $77,524.
State/City: Ohio; Youngstown/Warren;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $22,609.
State/City: Ohio; Youngstown/Warren;
Year: 2008;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $246,687.
State/City: Oklahoma; Tulsa;
Year: 2004;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $381,239.
State/City: Oregon; Portland;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $6,173,126.
State/City: Oregon; Portland;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $9,645,738.
State/City: Oregon; Portland;
Year: 2002;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $488,743.
State/City: Pennsylvania; Bradford;
Year: 2003;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $144,425.
State/City: Pennsylvania; Harrisburg;
Year: 2000;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $86,920.
State/City: Pennsylvania; Latrobe;
Year: 2006;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $118,883.
State/City: Pennsylvania; Philadelphia;
Year: 2000;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $17,915,168.
State/City: Pennsylvania; Pittsburgh;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $1,000,000.
State/City: Pennsylvania; Pittsburgh;
Year: 2002;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $2,430,965.
State/City: Pennsylvania; Pittsburgh;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $6,115,219.
State/City: Pennsylvania; Pittsburgh;
Year: 2008;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $6,775,000.
State/City: Pennsylvania; State College;
Year: 2002;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $89,092.
State/City: Pennsylvania; State College;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $221,883.
State/City: Pennsylvania; State College;
Year: 2004;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $3,919,476.
State/City: Tennessee; Memphis;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $1,440,412.
State/City: Tennessee; Memphis;
Year: 2008;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $286,591.
State/City: Tennessee; Nashville;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $1,356,970.
State/City: Tennessee; Nashville;
Year: 1999;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $214,294.
State/City: Tennessee; Nashville;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $832,306.
State/City: Tennessee; Nashville;
Year: 2000;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $131,416.
State/City: Tennessee; Nashville;
Year: 2007;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $44,491.
State/City: Texas; Beaumont/Port Arthur;
Year: 2006;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $88,825.
State/City: Texas; Dallas-Fort Worth;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $7,878,022.
State/City: Texas; Dallas-Fort Worth;
Year: 2000;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $1,223,254.
State/City: Texas; Dallas-Fort Worth;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $750,000.
State/City: Texas; Fort Worth;
Year: 2003;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $13,075.
State/City: Virginia; Roanoke;
Year: 2002;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $387,827.
State/City: Washington; Bellingham;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $75,000.
State/City: Wisconsin; Eau Claire;
Year: 2005;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $220,000.
State/City: Wisconsin; Green Bay;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $605,700.
State/City: West Virginia; Clarksburg;
Year: 2001;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $66,825.
State/City: West Virginia; Clarksburg;
Year: 2002;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $230,683.
State/City: West Virginia; Clarksburg;
Year: 2004;
Acquire aircraft deicing equipment:
Total amount: $220,139.
State/City: West Virginia; Huntington;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $577,789.
State/City: Wyoming; Sheridan;
Year: 1999;
Construct deicing containment facility:
Total amount: $58,850.
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO contact:
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, other key contributors to this
report were Sally Moino, Assistant Director; Laurel Ball; Richard
Brown; Shareea Butler; Colin Fallon; David Goldstein; Brandon Haller;
David Hooper; and Joshua Ormond.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In this report we use the term "icing" to refer to icing of
airplane surfaces. We use the term "contaminated runway" to refer to
ice, snow, slush, frost, or standing water on the runway.
Precipitation or the presence of fog at low temperatures may be
defined as icing conditions for the airplane, which may require
certain ground deicing procedures (e.g., checks or deicing of the
critical surfaces). Runways that are contaminated with snow, slush, or
ice are generally associated with operations in winter conditions.
[2] The Flight Safety Foundation is an independent, nonprofit,
international organization engaged in research, auditing, education,
advocacy, and publishing to improve aviation safety.
[3] APA describes two types of rulemaking, formal and informal. Formal
rulemaking includes a trial-type on-the record proceeding. Most
federal agencies use the informal rulemaking procedures outlined in 5
U.S.C. §553.
[4] 14 C.F.R. part 39.
[5] 74 Fed. Reg. 44676, Aug. 28, 2009.
[6] Urea is a chemical compound commonly used to deice runways and
other airfield surfaces at commercial airports in the United States.
[7] We did not analyze trends because, according to incident data
experts, not all incidents are reported and therefore trends are not
meaningful.
[8] FAA implemented ATOS in 1998, and currently uses the system to
oversee all 98 large commercial carriers. ATOS emphasizes a system
safety approach that extends beyond periodically checking airlines for
compliance with regulations to using technical and managerial skills
to identify, analyze, and control hazards and risks. For example,
under ATOS, inspectors develop surveillance plans for each airline,
based on data analysis and risk assessment, and adjust the plans
periodically based on inspection results. FAA also conducts
inspections that partially address icing related requirements, such as
inspections of carriers' flight crew training. We did not look at
these inspections because of resource constraints.
[9] FAA bases assessments of design on a single inspection because,
unlike performance assessments, assessing the design of a program does
not involve inspecting activities at multiple locations.
[10] U.S. Department of Transportation Inspector General, FAA's
Process for Reviewing Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS)
Inspection Data (Washington, D.C., Mar. 2010).
[11] 49 U.S.C. §46301 (civil penalties) and 49 U.S.C. §44709 (license
revocation).
[12] FAA's 1997 Inflight Aircraft Icing Plan describes various
activities planned to improve safety for aircraft flying in icing
conditions.
[13] 72 Fed. Reg. 44656, Aug. 8, 2007. In general, a transport
category airplane is an airplane with maximum takeoff weight (MTOW)
greater than 12,500 pounds or with 10 or more passenger seats, except
for propeller-driven, multiengine airplanes and recently certified
commuter category aircraft with an exemption to 14 C.F.R. § 23.3(d),
in which case the transport category airplanes are those with MTOW
greater than 19,000 pounds or with 20 or more passenger seats. FAA
certifies the design of transport category airplanes under 14 C.F.R.
part 25.
[14] 74 Fed. Reg. 1280, Jan. 12, 2009.
[15] 74 Fed. Reg. 38328, Aug. 3, 2009.
[16] 74 Fed. Reg. 61055, Nov. 23, 2009. This proposed rule only
applies to airplanes with an MTOW of less than 60,000 pounds being
operated under 14 C.F.R. part 121.
[17] 75 Fed. Reg. 37311, June 29, 2010. Supercooled large droplets
have a diameter greater than 50 microns and include freezing drizzle
and freezing rain. These droplets can result in ice accretion beyond
the normally protected areas of the aircraft. Mixed-phase icing
conditions are a mixture of supercooled water droplets and ice
crystals. Exposing engines and externally mounted probes to ice
crystal or mixed-phase conditions, especially high ice water content
conditions, could result in hazardous ice accumulations within the
engine that may cause engine damage, power loss, and loss of or
misleading airspeed indications.
[18] 74 Fed. Reg. 62691, Dec. 1, 2009. 14 C.F.R. §135.227 and 14
C.F.R. §91.527. Frost-polishing is accomplished by scraping or buffing
frost accumulations so as to obtain a smooth surface. Previous FAA
guidance recommended removal of all wing frost prior to takeoff, but
allowed frost to be polished smooth if the operator followed the
manufacturer's procedures. The polished frost requirement does not
apply to large commercial aircraft (part 121) because part 121 already
did not permit operations with polished frost.
[19] A runway safety area is a 1,000-foot safety zone at the end of a
runway.
[20] The Transportation [and other] Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006.
Pub.L.No. 109-115, Div. A, Title I, 119 Stat. 2396, 2401 adopted FAA's
2015 goal for owners or operators of airports to improve the airport's
runway safety areas to comply with FAA's design standards required by
14 C.F.R. part 39. FAA considers runway safety areas that meet 90
percent of the standards to be substantially compliant.
[21] EMAS uses materials of closely controlled strength and density
placed at the end of the runway to stop or greatly slow an aircraft
that overruns the runway. According to FAA, the best material found to
date is a lightweight crushable concrete.
[22] Airports that are scheduled for 2010 installation of EMAS beds
are Arcata, California; Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Wilmington,
Delaware; Key West, Florida; Teterboro, New Jersey; Telluride,
Colorado; and Stuart, Florida.
[23] This list, which NTSB has maintained since 1990 and revises
annually, includes important safety recommendations identified for
special attention and intensive follow-up.
[24] In addition, NTSB has closed eight of these recommendations as
"unacceptable response" by FAA; has classified seven of the open
recommendations as "unacceptable response" by FAA; has closed three of
these recommendations after concurring with FAA's rationales for
disagreeing with the recommendations; and is awaiting FAA's response
on one of these recommendations.
[25] ARAC is an advisory committee consisting of representatives from
the aviation community. Established by the FAA Administrator in 1991,
ARAC provides industry information, advice, and recommendations to be
considered during FAA's rulemaking activities. ARAC affords FAA
additional opportunities to obtain firsthand information and insight
from those parties that are most affected by existing and proposed
regulations.
[26] The APA includes exceptions to notice and comment procedures for
categories of rules such as those dealing with military or foreign
affairs and agency management or personnel. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a). APA
requirements to publish a proposed rule generally do not apply when an
agency finds, for "good cause," that those procedures are
"impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." 5
U.S.C. § 553(b).
[27] GAO, Aviation Rulemaking: Further Reform Is Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-821](Washington, D.C.: July 9,
2001).
[28] Additional information about the status of these recommendations
is available at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-821]
[29] FAA is required by statute to issue a final regulation, or take
other final action, within 16 months of the last day of the comment
period; or if an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is issued, FAA
has not more than 24 months after the date of publication in the
Federal Register of the proposed rule to issue a final regulation. 49
U.S.C. § 106(f)(3)(A).
[30] GAO, Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on the Future
of Air Traffic Control Modernization, GAO-07-928R (Washington, D.C.:
May 30, 2007) and Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of
Transformation and Issues Associated with Midterm Implementation of
Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-479T](Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18,
2009).
[31] J. Randolph Babbitt, Focus and Vision: Moving Forward, remarks as
prepared for a speech before the Aero Club (Washington, D.C., January
26, 2010).
[32] 74 Fed. Reg. 1280, Jan. 12, 2009. Currently, simulators are used
to train pilots of large commercial airplanes for in-flight icing
because it is not feasible to train in actual icing conditions, as
they are difficult to predict and hazardous. However, reliance on
simulators for training means that pilots may not be sufficiently
prepared for a variety of real-world icing conditions. According to
representatives of the Aerospace Industries Association, some
characteristics of icing cannot currently be replicated, and to
improve simulators, researchers need to develop engineering tools to
characterize ice shapes such as those resulting from supercooled large
droplets.
[33] Department of Transportation Inspector General, Progress and
Challenges With FAA's Call to Action for Airline Safety (Washington,
D.C., Feb. 4, 2010).
[34] 74 Fed. Reg. 44676, Aug. 28, 2009.
[35] In determining the probable causes of an accident, NTSB seeks to
consider all facts, conditions, and circumstances. Any information
that contributes to the explanation of an accident is identified as a
"finding" and may be further designated as either a "cause" or
"factor." The term "factor" is used to describe situations or
circumstances that contributed to the accident cause. Just as
accidents often include a series of occurrences, the reasons why these
occurrences lead to an accident may be the combination of multiple
causes and factors. For this reason, a single accident record may
include multiple causes and factors.
[End of section]
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