Technology Assessment
Explosives Detection Technologies to Protect Passenger Rail
Gao ID: GAO-10-898 July 28, 2010
Passenger rail systems are vital to the nation's transportation infrastructure, providing approximately 14 million passenger trips each weekday. Recent terrorist attacks on these systems around the world--such as in Moscow, Russia in 2010--highlight the vulnerability of these systems. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal entity responsible for securing passenger rail systems. In response to the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2008, GAO conducted a technology assessment that reviews 1) the availability of explosives detection technologies and their ability to help secure the passenger rail environment, and 2) key operational and policy factors that impact the role of explosives detection technologies in the passenger rail environment. GAO analyzed test reports on various explosives detection technologies and convened a panel of experts comprised of a broad mix of federal, technology, and passenger rail industry officials. GAO also interviewed officials from DHS and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Transportation, and Justice to discuss the effectiveness of these technologies and their applicability to passenger rail. GAO provided a draft of this report these departments for comment. Four departments provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
A variety of explosives detection technologies are available or in development that could help secure passenger rail systems. While these technologies show promise in certain environments, their potential limitations in the rail environment need to be considered and their use tailored to individual rail systems. The established technologies, such as handheld, desktop, and kitbased trace detection systems, and x-ray imaging systems, as well as canines, have demonstrated good detection capability with many conventional explosive threats and some are in use in passenger rail today. Newer technologies, such as explosive trace portals, advanced imaging technology, and standoff detection systems, while available, are in various stages of maturity and more operational experience would be required to determine their likely performance if deployed in passenger rail. When deploying any of these technologies to secure passenger rail, it is important to take into account the inherent limitations of the underlying technologies as well as other considerations such as screening throughput, mobility, and durability, and physical space limitations in stations. GAO is not making recommendations, but is raising various policy considerations. For example, in addition to how well technologies detect explosives, GAO's work, in consultation with rail and technology experts, identified several key operational and policy considerations impacting the role that these technologies can play in securing the passenger rail environment. Specifically, while there is a shared responsibility for securing the passenger rail environment, the federal government, including TSA, and passenger rail operators have differing roles, which could complicate decisions to fund and implement explosives detection technologies. For example, TSA provides guidance and some funding for passenger rail security, but rail operators themselves provide day-to-day-security of their systems. In addition, risk management principles could be used to guide decision-making related to technology and other security measures and target limited resources to those areas at greatest risk. Moreover, securing passenger rail involves multiple security measures, with explosives detection technologies just one of several components that policymakers can consider as part of the overall security environment. Furthermore, developing a concept of operations for using these technologies and responding to threats that they may identify would help balance security with the need to maintain the efficient and free flowing movement of people. A concept of operations could include a response plan for how rail employees should react to an alarm when a particular technology detects an explosive. Lastly, in determining whether and how to implement these technologies, federal agencies and rail operators will likely be confronted with challenges related to the costs and potential privacy and legal implications of using explosives detection technologies.
GAO-10-898, Technology Assessment: Explosives Detection Technologies to Protect Passenger Rail
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2010:
Technology Assessment:
Explosives Detection Technologies to Protect Passenger Rail:
GAO-10-898:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-898, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Passenger rail systems are vital to the nation‘s transportation
infrastructure, providing approximately 14 million passenger trips
each weekday. Recent terrorist attacks on these systems around the
world”such as in Moscow, Russia in 2010”highlight the vulnerability of
these systems. The Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal
entity responsible for securing passenger rail systems.
In response to the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act for fiscal
year 2008, GAO conducted a technology assessment that reviews 1) the
availability of explosives detection technologies and their ability to
help secure the passenger rail environment, and 2) key operational and
policy factors that impact the role of explosives detection
technologies in the passenger rail environment. GAO analyzed test
reports on various explosives detection technologies and convened a
panel of experts comprised of a broad mix of federal, technology, and
passenger rail industry officials. GAO also interviewed officials from
DHS and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Transportation, and
Justice to discuss the effectiveness of these technologies and their
applicability to passenger rail. GAO provided a draft of this report
these departments for comment. Four departments provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found:
A variety of explosives detection technologies are available or in
development that could help secure passenger rail systems. While these
technologies show promise in certain environments, their potential
limitations in the rail environment need to be considered and their
use tailored to individual rail systems. The established technologies,
such as handheld, desktop, and kit-based trace detection systems, and
x-ray imaging systems, as well as canines, have demonstrated good
detection capability with many conventional explosive threats and some
are in use in passenger rail today. Newer technologies, such as
explosive trace portals, advanced imaging technology, and standoff
detection systems, while available, are in various stages of maturity
and more operational experience would be required to determine their
likely performance if deployed in passenger rail. When deploying any
of these technologies to secure passenger rail, it is important to
take into account the inherent limitations of the underlying
technologies as well as other considerations such as screening
throughput, mobility, and durability, and physical space limitations
in stations.
GAO is not making recommendations, but is raising various policy
considerations. For example, in addition to how well technologies
detect explosives, GAO‘s work, in consultation with rail and
technology experts, identified several key operational and policy
considerations impacting the role that these technologies can play in
securing the passenger rail environment. Specifically, while there is
a shared responsibility for securing the passenger rail environment,
the federal government, including TSA, and passenger rail operators
have differing roles, which could complicate decisions to fund and
implement explosives detection technologies. For example, TSA provides
guidance and some funding for passenger rail security, but rail
operators themselves provide day-to-day-security of their systems. In
addition, risk management principles could be used to guide decision-
making related to technology and other security measures and target
limited resources to those areas at greatest risk. Moreover, securing
passenger rail involves multiple security measures, with explosives
detection technologies just one of several components that
policymakers can consider as part of the overall security environment.
Furthermore, developing a concept of operations for using these
technologies and responding to threats that they may identify would
help balance security with the need to maintain the efficient and free
flowing movement of people. A concept of operations could include a
response plan for how rail employees should react to an alarm when a
particular technology detects an explosive. Lastly, in determining
whether and how to implement these technologies, federal agencies and
rail operators will likely be confronted with challenges related to
the costs and potential privacy and legal implications of using
explosives detection technologies.
View GAO-10-898 or key components. For more information, contact
Nabajyoti Barkakati at (202) 512-4499 or BarkakatiN@gao.gov or David
Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
A Variety of Explosives Detection Technologies Are Available or in
Development That Could Help Secure Passenger Rail Systems--If Tailored
to the Needs of Individual Rail Systems--but Limitations Exist:
Several Overarching Operational and Policy Factors Could Impact the
Role of Explosives Detection Technologies in the Passenger Rail
Environment:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Some Trace Explosives Detection Methods:
Table 2: Description of Advanced Techniques for Carry-on Baggage
Explosive Systems:
Table 3: Passenger Rail Operators Interviewed During This Engagement:
Figures:
Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Passenger Rail Systems and Amtrak
in the United States:
Figure 2: Example of Typical Metropolitan Heavy Rail Station:
Figure 3: Typical Large Intermodal Passenger Rail Station:
Figure 4: Example of a Typical Outdoor Commuter or Light Rail Station:
Figure 5: Selected Security Practices in the Passenger Rail
Environment:
Figure 6: Explosives Detection Technologies Used to Screen People and
Their Carry-On Baggage:
Figure 7: Examples of AIT portal images:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 28, 2010:
The Honorable Ben Nelson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Lisa Murkowski:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Legislative Branch:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Debbie Wasserman Schultz:
Chairman:
The Honorable Robert B. Aderholt:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Legislative Branch:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Passenger rail systems are vital components of the nation's
transportation infrastructure, encompassing rail transit (heavy rail,
commuter rail, and light rail), and intercity rail.[Footnote 1] In the
United States, passenger rail systems provide approximately 14 million
passenger trips each weekday, and commuters rely on these systems to
provide efficient, reliable, and safe transportation.[Footnote 2]
Terrorist attacks on passenger rail systems around the world--such as
the March 2010 Moscow, Russia subway bombings, and the July 2006
passenger train bombing in Mumbai, India that resulted in 209
fatalities--highlight the vulnerability of these systems.
Additionally, the administration's Transborder Security Interagency
Policy Committee, Surface Transportation Subcommittee's recently
issued Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment stated that
the nation's transportation network was at an elevated risk of attack
and that recent plots against passenger rail highlight the lengths
terrorists will go to defeat security measures put in place after
September 11, 2001.[Footnote 3] Another threat facing passenger rail
systems are chemical and biological weapons. While there have been no
terrorist attacks against U.S. passenger rail systems to date, the
systems are vulnerable to attack in part because they rely on an open
architecture that is difficult to monitor and secure due to its
multiple access points, hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in some
cases, no barriers to access. Further, an attack on these systems
could potentially lead to casualties due to the high number of daily
passengers, especially during peak commuting hours, and result in
serious economic disruption and psychological impact.
Day-to-day responsibility for securing passenger rail systems falls on
passenger rail operators, local law enforcement, and state and local
governments that own portions of the infrastructure. While several
entities play a role in helping to fund and secure U.S. passenger rail
systems, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal agency
responsible for overseeing security for these systems and for
developing a national strategy and implementing programs to enhance
their security. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
also provide support to rail operators by providing technical
assistance in conducting threat and vulnerability assessments and
developing and providing training courses for rail operators.
Additionally, several other DHS components conduct threat and
vulnerability assessments of passenger rail systems, research and
develop security technologies for these systems, and develop security
training programs for passenger rail employees. We have previously
reported, most recently in June 2009, on federal and industry efforts
to secure passenger rail systems and have made recommendations for
strengthening these efforts.[Footnote 4] DHS generally agreed with
these recommendations and is taking action to implement them.
A variety of security measures, including technological measures, have
been and are being considered by federal policymakers and rail
operators as part of a layered approach to strengthening the security
of passenger rail systems, particularly in the area of protecting
against the threat of explosives. Explosives detection technologies
have been tested and implemented for screening passengers and baggage
in aviation and building security. Further, the U.S. military uses
some of these technologies to, among other things, detect the presence
of improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[Footnote 5] However, these technologies have been tested and
implemented less frequently in passenger rail systems. This is due in
part to the open nature of passenger rail systems, which does not lend
itself to people and baggage screening. Also, there is relatively less
funding available to support the purchase and maintenance of such
equipment compared to the funding available for commercial aviation
security in which the federal government plays a larger role. Because
of the potential impact of implementation of explosives detection
technology on the open nature of passenger rail systems, weighing rail
operator needs and technological effectiveness of explosives detection
technology against the relative costs and impact on rail operations is
important. Additionally, because these explosives detection
technologies tend to be expensive, rail operators may look to other
funding sources, such as the federal government, to assist in
implementing these technologies.
In the Senate report accompanying the proposed bill for the
legislative branch fiscal year 2008 appropriation, the Senate
Committee on Appropriations recommended the establishment of a
permanent technology assessment function within GAO.[Footnote 6] In
the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress authorized GAO to
use up to $2.5 million of amounts appropriated for salaries and
expenses for technology assessment studies.[Footnote 7] After
consultation with congressional committees, GAO agreed to conduct a
technology assessment on the use of explosives detection technologies
to secure passenger rail systems. Specifically, this report addresses
the following questions:
1. What is the availability of explosives detection technologies and
what is their ability to help secure the passenger rail environment?
2. What key operational and policy factors could have an impact on the
role of explosives detection technologies in the passenger rail
environment?
This report is a public version of the restricted report (GAO-10-
590SU) that we provided to you on May 28, 2010. DHS deemed some of the
information in the restricted report as sensitive security
information, which must be protected from public disclosure.
Therefore, this report omits this information. Although the
information provided in this report is more limited in scope, it
addresses the same questions as the restricted report. Also, the
overall methodology used for both reports is the same.
To determine what explosives detection technologies are available and
their ability to help secure the passenger rail environment, we met
with experts and officials on explosives detection research,
development, and testing, and reviewed test, evaluation, and pilot
reports and other documentation from DHS's Science and Technology
Directorate, including the Transportation Security Laboratory; TSA;
several Department of Defense (DOD) components, including the Naval
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (NAVEODTECHDIV), the
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), and the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO); several Department of
Energy (DOE) National Laboratories involved in explosives detection
testing, research, and development including Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL); and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
because of its expertise in explosives detection. We also observed a
TSA pilot test of a standoff explosives detection system at a rail
station within the Port Authority Trans-Hudson passenger rail system.
In addition, we interviewed several manufacturers of explosives
detection technologies and attended government-sponsored
demonstrations, a conference, and an academic workshop on explosives
detection technologies. We also interviewed government officials
involved with securing passenger rail in the United Kingdom. We
visited six domestic passenger rail locations, two of which were
involved in testing various types of explosives detection technologies
to either observe the testing or discuss the results of these tests
with operators. The specific locations we visited are listed in
appendix I.
In determining which explosives detection technologies were available
and able to secure the passenger rail environment, we considered those
technologies available today or deployable within 5 years,
technologies which could be used to screen either passengers or their
carry-on items, and technologies which were safe to use when deployed
in public areas. In determining the capabilities and limitations of
explosives detection technologies we evaluated their detection and
screening throughput performance, reliability, availability, cost,
operational specifications, and possible use in passenger rail. We
also restricted our evaluation to those technologies which have been
demonstrated to detect explosives when tested against performance
parameters as established by government and military users of the
technologies.
We also obtained the views of various experts and stakeholders during
a panel discussion we convened with the assistance of the National
Research Council (NRC) in August 2009 (hereafter referred to as the
expert panel). Panel attendees included 23 experts and officials from
academia, the federal government, domestic and foreign passenger rail
industry organizations, technology manufacturers, national
laboratories, and passenger rail industry stakeholders such as local
law enforcement officials and domestic and foreign passenger rail
operators. During this meeting, we discussed the availability and
applicability of explosives detection technologies for the passenger
rail environment and the operational and policy impacts associated
with implementing these technologies in the rail environment. While
the views expressed during this panel are not generalizable across all
fields represented by officials in attendance, they did provide an
overall summary of the current availability and effectiveness of
explosives detection technologies and industry views on their
applicability to passenger rail.
To determine what key operational and policy factors could have an
impact in determining the role of explosives detection technologies in
the passenger rail environment, we reviewed documentation related to
the federal strategy for securing passenger rail, including TSA's Mass
Transit Modal Annex to the Transportation Systems Sector Specific
Plan, and other documentation, including DHS reports summarizing
explosives detection technology tests conducted in passenger rail to
better understand the role and impact that these technologies have in
the passenger rail environment.[Footnote 8] We reviewed relevant laws
and regulations governing the security of the transportation sector as
a whole and passenger rail specifically, including the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.[Footnote 9] We also
reviewed our prior reports on passenger rail security and studies and
reports conducted by outside organizations related to passenger rail
or the use of technology to secure passenger rail, such as the
National Academies, Congressional Research Service, and others to
better understand the existing security measures used in passenger
rail and operational and policy issues. During our interviews and
expert panel mentioned above, we also discussed and identified
officials' views related to the key operational and policy issues of
using explosives detection technologies to secure passenger rail.
While these views are not generalizeable to all industries represented
by these officials, they provided a snapshot of the key operational
and policy views.
During our visits to 6 rail operator locations involved in explosives
detection testing, we interviewed officials regarding operational and
policy issues related to technology and observed passenger rail
operations. We selected these locations because they had completed or
were currently conducting testing of the use of explosives detection
technology in the rail environment and to provide the views of a cross-
section of heavy rail, commuter rail, and light rail operators. While
these locations and officials' views are not generalizeable to the
entire passenger rail industry, they provided us with a general
understanding of the operational and policy issues associated with
using such technologies in the rail environment. In addition, we
utilized information obtained and presented in our June 2009 report on
passenger rail security.[Footnote 10] For that work, we conducted site
visits, or interviewed security and management officials from 30
passenger rail agencies across the United States and met with
officials from two regional transit authorities and Amtrak. The
passenger rail operators we visited or interviewed for our June 2009
report represented 75 percent of the nation's total passenger rail
ridership based on the information we obtained from the FTA's National
Transit Database and the American Public Transportation Association.
For additional information on our scope and methodology please see
appendix I.
We conducted our work from August 2008 through July 2010 in accordance
with all sections of GAO's Quality Assurance Framework that are
relevant to Technology Assessments. The framework requires that we
plan and perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate
evidence to meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations
to our work. We believe that the information and data obtained, and
the analysis conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings
and conclusions in this product.
Background:
Overview of the U.S. Passenger Rail System:
Passenger rail systems provided 10.7 billion passenger trips in the
United States in 2008.[Footnote 11] The nation's passenger rail
systems include all services designed to transport customers on local
and regional routes, such as heavy rail, commuter rail, and light rail
services. Heavy rail systems--subway systems like New York City's
transit system and Washington, D.C.'s Metro--typically operate on
fixed rail lines within a metropolitan area and have the capacity for
a heavy volume of traffic. Commuter rail systems typically operate on
railroad tracks and provide regional service (e.g., between a central
city and adjacent suburbs). Light rail systems are typically
characterized by lightweight passenger rail cars that operate on track
that is not separated from vehicular traffic for much of the way. All
types of passenger rail systems in the United States are typically
owned and operated by public sector entities, such as state and
regional transportation authorities.
Amtrak, which provided more than 27 million passenger trips in fiscal
year 2009, operates the nation's primary intercity passenger rail and
serves more than 500 stations in 46 states and the District of
Columbia.[Footnote 12] Amtrak operates a more than 22,000 mile
network, primarily over leased freight railroad tracks. In addition to
leased tracks, Amtrak owns about 650 miles of track, primarily on the
"Northeast Corridor" between Boston and Washington D.C., which carries
about two-thirds of Amtrak's total ridership. Stations are owned by
Amtrak, freight carriers, municipalities, and private entities. Amtrak
also operates commuter rail services in certain jurisdictions on
behalf of state and regional transportation authorities. Figure 1
identifies the geographic location of passenger rail systems and
Amtrak within the United States as of January 1, 2010.
Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Passenger Rail Systems and Amtrak
in the United States:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map]
Amtrak rail network:
Amtrak train station: Anchorage, Alaska;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Seattle, Washington;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 2.
Amtrak train station: Tacoma, Washington;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 2.
Amtrak train station: Portland, Oregon;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 2.
Amtrak train station: Sacramento, California;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: San Francisco, California;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 1;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: San Jose, California;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Los Angeles, California;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 1;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 2.
Amtrak train station: San Diego, California;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Phoenix, Arizona;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Albuquerque, New Mexico;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Denver, Colorado;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Dallas, Texas;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 2.
Amtrak train station: Houston, Texas;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Gavleston, Texas;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Little Rock, Arkansas;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Tampa, Florida;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Miami, Florida;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 1;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: San Juan, Puerto Rico;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Atlanta, Georgia;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 1,
Amtrak train station: Memphis, Tennessee;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Nashville, Tennessee;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: St. Louis, Missouri;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Chicago, Illinois;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 1;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 2.
Amtrak train station: Kenosha, Wisconsin;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Detroit, Michigan;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Cleveland, Ohio;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Harrisburg, Pennsylvania;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Washington, DC;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 1;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 2.
Amtrak train station: Baltimore, Maryland;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: New Jersey cities;
Number of light rail systems in city: 3.
Amtrak train station: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 2;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: New York, New York;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 3;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 3.
Amtrak train station: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Buffalo, New York;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: New Haven, Connecticut;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Boston, Massachusetts;
Number of heavy rail systems in city: 1;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1;
Number of light rail systems in city: 1.
Amtrak train station: Portland, Maine;
Number of commuter rail systems in city: 1.
Source: Amtrak, National Transit Database, and APTA; Map Resources
(map).
[End of figure]
Passenger rail operators that we spoke to and that attended our expert
panel indicated that rail stations in the United States generally fall
into one of three categories:
* Heavy rail station. These stations are generally heavily traveled--
serving thousands of passengers during rush hours--and are located in
major metropolitan areas. They are usually space constrained and
located either underground or on an elevated platform and serviced by
heavy rail. Entry to the stations is usually controlled by turnstiles
and other chokepoints. Many of the subway stations in New York City
and elevated stations in Chicago are examples of these types of
stations. See figure 2 for an example of a typical heavy rail station.
Figure 2: Example of Typical Metropolitan Heavy Rail Station:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Source: GAO.
* Large intermodal station. These stations are also heavily traveled
and service multiple types of rail including heavy rail, commuter
rail, and intercity passenger rail (such as Amtrak). These stations
are usually not as space constrained and access is usually restricted
either by turnstiles or naturally occurring chokepoints, such as
escalators or doorways leading to rail platforms. Examples of these
types of stations include Union Station in Washington, D.C. See figure
3 for an example of a typical large intermodal station.
Figure 3: Typical Large Intermodal Passenger Rail Station:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Source: GAO.
* Commuter or light rail station. These stations are open and access
is generally not constrained by turnstiles and other chokepoints.
These stations are usually served by commuter rail systems in suburban
or rural areas outside of a metropolitan area or in the case of light
rail may be located physically on the city's streets with no access
barriers between the city and the station stop. The stations are
easily accessible, not usually space constrained, and are often
located outdoors. Examples of this type of station include Virginia
Railway Express commuter stations in suburban Virginia and the
Maryland Area Regional Commuter (MARC) stations in Maryland. See
figure 4 for an example of a commuter or light rail station.
Figure 4: Example of a Typical Outdoor Commuter or Light Rail Station:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Source: GAO.
Passenger Rail Systems Are Inherently Difficult to Secure and
Vulnerable to Terrorist Attacks, Particularly Against the Threat From
Explosives:
To date, U.S. passenger rail systems have not been attacked by
terrorists. However, according to DHS, terrorists' effective use of
IEDs in rail attacks elsewhere in the world suggests that IEDs pose
the greatest threat to U.S. rail systems. Rail systems in the United
States have also received heightened attention as several alleged
terrorists' plots have been uncovered, including multiple plots
against systems in the New York City area. Worldwide, passenger rail
systems have been the frequent target of terrorist attacks. According
to the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System maintained by the National
Counter Terrorism Center, from January 2004 through July 2008 there
were 530 terrorist attacks worldwide against passenger rail targets,
resulting in more than 2,000 deaths and more than 9,000 injuries.
Terrorist attacks include a 2007 attack on a passenger train in India
(68 fatalities and more than 13 injuries); 2005 attack on London's
underground rail and bus systems (52 fatalities and more than 700
injuries); and 2004 attack on commuter rail trains in Madrid, Spain
(191 fatalities and more than 1,800 injuries). More recently, in
January 2008, Spanish authorities arrested 14 suspected terrorists who
were allegedly connected to a plot to conduct terrorist attacks in
Spain, Portugal, Germany, and the United Kingdom, including an attack
on the Barcelona metro. The most common means of attack against
passenger rail targets has been through the use of IEDs, including
attacks delivered by suicide bombers.
According to passenger rail operators, the openness of passenger rail
systems can leave them vulnerable to terrorist attack. Further, other
characteristics of passenger rail systems--high ridership, expensive
infrastructure, economic importance, and location in large
metropolitan areas or tourist destinations--make them attractive
targets for terrorists because of the potential for mass casualties,
economic damage, and disruption. Moreover, these characteristics make
passenger rail systems difficult to secure. In addition, the multiple
access points along extended routes make the costs of securing each
location prohibitive. Balancing the potential economic impacts of
security enhancements with the benefits of such measures is a
difficult challenge.
Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Securing Passenger Rail
Systems:
Securing the nation's passenger rail systems is a shared
responsibility requiring coordinated action on the part of federal,
state, and local governments; the private sector; and passengers who
ride these systems. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
the role of the federal government in securing the nation's
transportation systems has evolved. In response to attacks, Congress
passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which
created TSA within DOT and conferred to the agency broad
responsibility for overseeing the security of all modes of
transportation, including passenger rail.[Footnote 13] Congress passed
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established DHS, transferred
TSA from DOT to DHS, and assigned DHS responsibility for protecting
the nation from terrorism, including securing the nation's
transportation systems.[Footnote 14] TSA is supported in its efforts
to secure passenger rail by other DHS entities such as the National
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) and Federal Emergency
Management Administration's (FEMA) Grant Programs Directorate and
Planning and Assistance Branch. NPPD is responsible for coordinating
efforts to protect the nation's most critical assets across all 18
industry sectors, including transportation.[Footnote 15] FEMA's Grant
Programs Directorate is responsible for managing DHS grants for mass
transit. FEMA's Planning and Assistance Branch is responsible for
assisting transit agencies with conducting risk assessments.
While TSA is the lead federal agency for overseeing the security of
all transportation modes, DOT continues to play a supporting role in
securing passenger rail systems. In a 2004 Memorandum of Understanding
and a 2005 annex to the Memorandum, TSA, and FTA agreed that the two
agencies would coordinate their programs and services, with FTA
providing technical assistance and assisting DHS with implementation
of its security policies, including collaborating in developing
regulations affecting transportation security. In addition to FTA,
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) also has regulatory authority
over commuter rail operators and Amtrak and employs over 400
inspectors who periodically monitor the implementation of safety and
security plans at these systems. FRA regulations require railroads
that operate intercity or commuter passenger train service or that
host the operation of that service adopt and comply with a written
emergency preparedness plan approved by FRA.[Footnote 16]
In August 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act was signed into law, which included provisions that
require TSA to take certain actions to secure passenger rail systems.
[Footnote 17] Among other items, these provisions include mandates for
developing and issuing reports on TSA's strategy for securing public
transportation, conducting and updating security assessments of mass
transit systems, and establishing a program for conducting security
exercises for rail operators. The 9/11 Commission Act includes
requirements for TSA to increase the number of explosives detection
canine teams and required DHS to carry out a research and development
program to secure passenger rail systems.
State and local governments, passenger rail operators, and private
industry are also stakeholders in the nation's passenger rail security
efforts. State and local governments might own or operate portions of
passenger rail systems. Consequently, the responsibility for
responding to emergencies involving systems that run through their
jurisdictions often falls to state and local governments. Although all
levels of government are involved in passenger rail security, the
primary responsibility for securing the systems rests with the
passenger rail operators. These operators, which can be public or
private entities, are responsible for administering and managing
system activities and services, including security. Operators can
directly operate the security service provided or contract for all or
part of the total service. For example, the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority operates its own police force.
Federal and Industry Stakeholders Have Taken Actions to Secure
Passenger Rail Systems:
Federal stakeholders have taken actions to help secure passenger rail.
For example, in November 2008, TSA published a final rule that
requires passenger rail systems to appoint a security coordinator and
report potential threats and significant security concerns to TSA.
[Footnote 18] In addition, TSA developed the Transportation Systems-
Sector Specific Plan (TS-SSP) in 2007 to document the process to be
used in carrying out the national strategic priorities outlined in the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the National
Strategy for Transportation Security (NSTS).[Footnote 19] The TS-SSP
contains supporting modal implementation plans for each transportation
mode, including mass transit and passenger rail. The Mass Transit
Modal Annex provides TSA's overall strategy and goals for securing
passenger rail and mass transit, and identifies specific efforts TSA
is taking to strengthen security in this area.[Footnote 20]
DHS also provides funding to passenger rail operators for security,
including purchasing and installing security technologies, through the
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP). We reported in June 2009 that
from fiscal years 2006 through 2008, DHS provided about $755 million
dollars to mass transit and passenger rail operators through the TSGP
to protect these systems and the public from terrorist
attacks.[Footnote 21] Passenger rail operators with whom we spoke and
that attended our expert panel said that they used these funds to
acquire security assets including explosives detection canines,
handheld explosives detectors, closed circuit television (CCTV)
systems, and other security measures.
Passenger rail operators have also taken actions to secure their
systems. In September 2005, we reported that all 32 U.S. rail
operators that we interviewed or visited had taken actions to improve
the security and safety of their rail systems by, among other things,
conducting customer awareness campaigns; increasing the number and
visibility of security personnel; increasing the use of canine teams,
employee training, passenger and baggage screening practices, and CCTV
and video analytics; and strengthening rail system design and
configuration. Passenger rail operators stated that security-related
spending by rail operators was based in part on budgetary
considerations, as well as other practices used by other rail
operators that were identified through direct contact or during
industry association meetings. According to the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA), in 2005, 54 percent of passenger
rail operators faced increasing deficits, and no operator covered
expenses with fare revenue; thus, balancing operational and capital
improvements with security-related investments has been an ongoing
challenge for these operators. Figure 5 provides a composite of
selected security practices used in the passenger rail environment.
Figure 5: Selected Security Practices in the Passenger Rail
Environment:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Depicted on the illustration are the following security resources
currently used:
CCTVs: Pantilt zoom, digital, and monitored;
Track monitoring;
Elevator monitoring;
Camera;
Bomb-resistant trash cans;
Law enforcement personnel;
K-9 patrol units;
Station officials;
Alert signs;
Station design: ticket machines, benches, etc., designed to prevent
items from being hidden;
Subway train operator;
Public awareness announcements: Report unattended items or suspicious
activities immediately.
Source: GAO and NOVA Development Corporation.
[End of figure]
Types and Characteristics of Explosives and IEDs:
Countering the explosives threat to passenger rail is a difficult
challenge as there are many types of explosives and different forms of
bombs. The many different types of explosives are loosely categorized
as military, commercial, and a third category called homemade
explosives (HME) because they can be constructed with unsophisticated
techniques from everyday materials. The military explosives include,
among others, the high explosives PETN and RDX, and the plastic
explosives C-4 and Semtex.[Footnote 22] The military uses these
materials for a variety of purposes, such as the explosive component
of land mines, shells, or warheads. They also have commercial uses
such as for demolition, oil well perforation, and as the explosive
filler of detonation cords. Military explosives can only be purchased
domestically by legitimate buyers[Footnote 23] through explosives
distributors and typically terrorists have to resort to stealing or
smuggling to acquire them. RDX was used in the Mumbai passenger rail
bombings of July 2006. PETN was used by Richard Reid, the "shoe
bomber" in his 2001 attempt to blow up an aircraft over the Atlantic
Ocean, and was also a component involved in the attempted bombing
incident on board Northwest Airline Flight 253 over Detroit on
Christmas Day 2009.
Commercial explosives, with the exception of black and smokeless
powders, also can only be purchased domestically by legitimate buyers
through explosives distributors. These are often used in construction
or mining activities and include, among others, trinitrotoluene (TNT),
ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder, ammonium nitrate and fuel oil
(ANFO), black powder,[Footnote 24] dynamite, nitroglycerin, smokeless
powder,[Footnote 25] and urea nitrate. Dynamite was likely used in the
2004 Madrid train station bombings, as well as the Sandy Springs,
Georgia abortion clinic bombing in January, 1997. ANFO was the
explosive used in the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma bombings in 1995.
The common commercial and military explosives contain various forms of
nitrogen. The presence of nitrogen is often exploited by detection
technologies some of which look specifically for nitrogen (nitro or
nitrate groups) in determining if a threat object is an explosive.
HMEs, on the other hand, can be created using household equipment and
ingredients readily available at common stores and do not necessarily
contain the familiar components of conventional explosives. On
February 22, 2010, Najibullah Zazi pleaded guilty to, among other
things, planning to use TATP[Footnote 26] to attack the New York City
subway system. Also, HMEs using TATP and concentrated hydrogen
peroxide, for example, were used in the July 2005 London railway
bombing. TATP can be synthesized from hydrogen peroxide, a strong acid
such as sulfuric acid, and acetone, a chemical available in hardware
stores and found in nail polish remover, and HMTD[Footnote 27] can be
synthesized from hydrogen peroxide, a weak acid such as citric acid,
and hexamine solid fuel tablets such as those used to fuel some types
of camp stoves and that can be purchased in many outdoor recreational
stores. ANFO is sometimes misrepresented as a homemade explosive since
both of its constituent parts--ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer, and
fuel oil--are commonly available.
When used, for example, in terrorist bombings, explosives are only one
component of an IED. Explosive systems are typically composed of a
control system, a detonator, a booster, and a main charge. The control
system is usually more mechanical or electrical in nature. The
detonator usually contains a small quantity of a primary or extremely
sensitive explosive. The booster and main charges are usually
secondary explosives which will not detonate without a strong shock,
for example from a detonator. IEDs will also have some type of
packaging or, in the case of suicide bombers, some type of harness or
belt to attach the IED to the body. Often, an IED will also contain
packs of metal--such as nails, bolts, or screws--or nonmetallic
material which are intended to act as shrapnel or fragmentation,
increasing the IED's lethality. The various components of an IED--and
not just the explosive itself--can also be the object of detection.
The initiation hardware, which may be composed of wires, switches, and
batteries, sets off the primary charge in the detonator which, in
turn, provides the shock necessary to detonate the main charge. The
primary charge and the main charge are often different types and
categories of explosives. For example, in the attempted shoe bombing
incident in 2001, the detonator was a common fuse and paper-wrapped
TATP, while PETN was the main charge. While in the past the initiation
hardware of many IEDs contained power supplies, switches, and
detonators, certain of the newer HMEs do not require an electrical
detonator but can be initiated by an open flame.
A Variety of Explosives Detection Technologies Are Available or in
Development That Could Help Secure Passenger Rail Systems--If Tailored
to the Needs of Individual Rail Systems--but Limitations Exist:
Several different types of explosives detection technologies could be
applied to help secure passenger rail, although operational
constraints of rail exist that would be important considerations. For
example, handheld, desktop, and kit explosives detection systems are
portable and already in use in the passenger rail environment. Carry-
on item explosives detection technologies are mature and can be
effective in detecting some explosive devices. Explosive Trace Portals
generally use the same underlying technology as handheld and desktop
systems, and have been deployed in aviation with limited success.
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) portals are becoming available but,
as with trace portals, will likely have only limited applicability in
passenger rail. Standoff detection technologies promise a detection
capability without impeding the flow of passengers, but have several
limitations. Canines are currently used in passenger rail systems,
generally accepted by the public, and effective at detecting many
types of explosives. Limitations in these technologies restrict their
more widespread or more effective use in passenger rail and include
limited screening throughput and mobility, potential issues with
environmental conditions, and the openness and physical space
restrictions of many rail stations.[Footnote 28]
Various Explosives Detection Technologies Could be Applied to Help
Secure Passenger Rail Systems If Operational Constraints of Rail are
Effectively Considered:
In the passenger rail environment detection of explosives involves the
screening of people and their carry-on baggage. The different types of
explosives detection technology available to address these screening
needs can be divided into two basic categories. There are those based
on imaging methods, sometimes called bulk detection, and those that
are based on trace detection methods. The goal in bulk detection is to
identify any suspicious indication--an anomaly--in a bag or on a
person that might potentially be a bomb. These systems, while they may
be used to detect explosive material, are also often used to detect
other parts of a bomb. Although some automated detection assistance is
usually included, imaging based detection systems currently depend
heavily on trained operators in identifying the anomalies indicative
of a bomb.
Trace detection technologies, on the other hand, involve taking a
physical sample from a likely source and then analyzing it with any
one of several different techniques for the presence of trace
particles of explosive material.[Footnote 29] Importantly, a positive
detection does not necessarily indicate the presence of a bomb because
the trace particles may just be contamination from someone having
handled or having been near explosives material. Explosives trace
detection systems can often identify the individual type of explosives
trace particles present.
Bulk and trace detection technology generally serve different
functions and can sometimes be paired to provide a more complete
screening of a person and their belongings. Typically that screening
occurs in two stages. First, an initial screening is done to separate
suspicious persons or carry-on baggage from the rest of the passenger
flow quickly. In almost all cases, any anomalies detected in initial
screening will trigger the need for a person or baggage to undergo a
secondary inspection, via different methods, and typically aside from
the main screening flow to confirm or dismiss the anomaly as a threat.
[Footnote 30] Technology need not be used in either inspection stage.
For example, behavioral assessment is sometimes used to provide an
initial screening. In addition, secondary inspection can be a physical
pat-down of a person or hand inspection of carry-on baggage although
explosives detection technology can also be used. Screening can be
done on 100 percent of passengers or on a subset of passengers chosen
at random or by some selection method.
Different types of bulk and trace explosives detection technology have
been developed over the years to handle both the screening of people
and the screening of carry-on baggage. Generally, equipment falls into
certain typical configurations--handheld, desktop, kit-based systems,
carry-on baggage inspection systems, explosive trace portals, AIT
portals, standoff detection systems, and explosives detection
canines.[Footnote 31] Certain equipment has been designed for the
screening of people, some for the screening of carry-on baggage, and
some equipment can be used for both. (See figure 6.)
Figure 6: Explosives Detection Technologies Used to Screen People and
Their Carry-On Baggage:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Configuration: Handheld explosives detectors [Photograph Source: Naval
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division];
Can be used to check for explosives on people: [Check];
Can be used to check for explosives in carry-on baggage: [Check];
Description: Portable devices for detecting traces of explosives.
Configuration: Desktop explosives detectors [Photograph Source: Naval
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division];
Can be used to check for explosives on people: [Check];
Can be used to check for explosives in carry-on baggage: [Check];
Description: Desktop devices for detecting traces of explosives.
Configuration: Kit based explosives detectors [Photograph Source:
American Innovations, Inc., XD-2i Explosives Detector];
Can be used to check for explosives on people: [Check];
Can be used to check for explosives in carry-on baggage: [Check];
Description: Portable devices for detecting traces of explosives.
Configuration: Carry-on baggage detection systems [Photograph Source:
Department of Transportation];
Can be used to check for explosives on people: [Empty];
Can be used to check for explosives in carry-on baggage: [Check];
Description: X-ray based devices that look inside carry-on items to help
the operator identify the presence of suspect items, such as
explosives.
Configuration: Explosive trace portals [Photograph Source: GAO];
Can be used to check for explosives on people: [Check];
Can be used to check for explosives in carry-on baggage: [Empty];
Description: Walk-through devices for detecting traces of explosives
on people.
Configuration: Advanced imaging technology portals [Photograph Source:
DHS Science and Technology Directorate];
Can be used to check for explosives on people: [Check];
Can be used to check for explosives in carry-on baggage: [Empty];
Description: Walk-through devices that are used to look for hidden
objects on people.
Configuration: Standoff detection systems [Photograph Source: GAO];
Can be used to check for explosives on people: [Check];
Can be used to check for explosives in carry-on baggage: [Empty];
Description: Detection systems that can be used to look for hidden
objects on people.
Configuration: Explosives detection canines [Photograph Source: DHS
Science and Technology Directorate];
Can be used to check for explosives on people: [Check];
Can be used to check for explosives in carry-on baggage: [Check];
Description: Dogs which have been trained to detect certain explosives.
[End of figure]
To be effective, equipment in each of these configurations is
generally evaluated across several different technical
characteristics. The first important technical characteristic of an
explosives detection system is how good it is at detecting a threat.
Several different parameters are considered to fully express a
system's ability to detect a threat. They are used to express how
often the system gets the detection right, and how often--and in which
ways--it gets the detection wrong. The system can get the detection
right when it alarms in the presence of a threat and the percentage of
times it does under a given set of conditions is called the
probability of detection.
However, other important parameters measure the percentage of times
the system gets the detection wrong. This can occur in two ways.
First, the system can alarm even though a threat is not present. This
is called a false positive and the percentage of times it occurs in a
given number of trials is called the false positive rate. It is also
called the false alarm rate or probability of false alarm. Second, the
system can fail to alarm even though a threat is present. This is
called a false negative and the percentage of times it occurs in a
given number of trials is called the false negative rate.
A second key technical characteristic for explosives detection systems
is screening throughput, which is a measure of how fast a person or
item can be processed through the system before the system is ready to
accept another person or item. Screening throughput is an important
characteristic to know because it directly impacts passenger delay, an
important consideration when using technology in passenger rail. The
higher the throughput, the less delay is imposed on passenger flow.
Other important technical characteristics to consider when assessing
applicability of explosives detection systems for use in passenger
rail are the system's size and weight, which will impact its mobility,
the physical space needed to operate the system, and the system's
susceptibility to harsh environmental conditions. Understanding the
system's cost is also important.
Handheld, Desktop, and Kit Explosives Detection Systems:
Handheld, desktop, and kit explosives detection systems are portable
systems that are designed to detect traces of explosive particles.
They have been shown to detect many explosive substances and are
already used in passenger rail environments today, generally in
support of secondary screening or in a confirmatory role when the
presence of explosives or their trace particles are suspected.
In a typical usage with handheld and desktop systems, a sample of
trace particles is collected by wiping a surface with a swab or other
collection device designed for use with the system.[Footnote 32] The
sample is transferred into the system and typically heated to vaporize
the trace particles, which are then drawn into the detector where they
are analyzed for the presence of substances indicative of explosives.
The results of sample analysis are typically displayed on a readout
screen.
Handheld and desktop systems encompass a variety of detection
techniques to analyze the sample and determine if it contains
particles of explosive compounds. The various underlying techniques
include ion mobility spectrometry (IMS), amplifying fluorescent
polymer (AFP), chemiluminescence, and colorimetric. Many handheld and
desktop systems are generally based on IMS technology, a mature and
well-understood method of chemical analysis. This technique consists
of ionizing the sample vapors and then measuring the mobility of the
ions as they drift in an electric field. Each sample ion possesses a
unique mobility--based on its mass, size, and shape--which allows for
its identification.[Footnote 33]
The AFP technique utilizes compounds that fluoresce when exposed to
ultraviolet light. However, the fluorescence intensity decreases in
the presence of vapors of certain nitrogen-containing explosives, such
as TNT. Detection methods based on this principle look for a decrease
in intensity that is indicative of specific explosives. AFP has been
shown to have a high level of sensitivity to TNT. The
chemiluminiscence principle is based on the detection of light
emissions coming from nitro[Footnote 34] groups that are found in many
conventional military and commercial explosives such as TNT, RDX,
PETN, black powder, and smokeless powder. However, chemiluminiscence
by itself cannot identify any specific explosives because these nitro
compounds are present not only in a number of commercial and military
explosives, but also in many nonexplosive substances such as
fertilizers and some perfumes. Therefore, this technique is often used
in conjunction with other techniques, such as gas chromatography,
[Footnote 35] to positively identify specific explosives.
Kit-based explosives detection systems generally use colorimetric
techniques. In this method, the detection is based on the fact that a
specific compound, when treated by an appropriate color reagent,
[Footnote 36] produces a color that is characteristic of this
compound. The sample is taken by swiping the target object, typically
with a paper, and then the colorimetric reagents are applied by
spraying or dropping them on the paper. The operator deposits chemical
reagents in a series and observes color changes with each reagent
added. This process of adding reagents is stopped when a visible color
change is observed by the operator. The operator decides whether there
are any trace explosives present by visually matching the color change
observed to a standardized sheet of colors.
Table 1 describes some of the trace explosives detection methods
described above.
Table 1: Some Trace Explosives Detection Methods:
Trace explosives detection method: Ion mobility spectrometry;
Operating principles: Based on ionizing the sample and measuring its
mobility. In general heavier ions move slowly and lighter ones move
relatively fast.
Trace explosives detection method: Amplifying fluorescent polymer;
Operating principles: Detection is based on a reduction in fluorescent
intensity of AFP in the presence of certain explosives.
Trace explosives detection method: Chemiluminescence;
Operating principles: Based on detection of light emissions coming
from nitro groups that are found in many conventional explosives.
Trace explosives detection method: Colorimetric Techniques;
Operating principles: Various colorimetric reagents are applied to a
sample in a predetermined sequence. The operator observes color
changes with each reagent added that is indicative of an explosive.
Source: GAO analysis of Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology
Division and other data.
[End of table]
In comparative studies over the last 8 years, the Naval Explosive
Ordinance Disposal Technology Division showed that IMS-based handheld
and desktop systems are capable of detecting many conventional
military and commercial explosives that are nitrogen-based, such as
TNT, PETN, and RDX. Non-IMS based techniques such as amplifying
fluorescent polymer and chemiluminescence based techniques are able to
additionally detect ANFO, smokeless powder, and urea nitrate. However,
a report sponsored by DOD's Technical Support Working Group shows that
most of these systems had difficulty in detecting certain other types
of explosives.[Footnote 37]
Preliminary results from an ongoing comparative study of kit-based
detection systems sponsored by the Transportation Security Laboratory
have shown that these systems can detect the presence of nitrogen when
there is sufficient quantity of explosive sample (in small-bulk
[Footnote 38] or visible amounts) available for analysis. For example,
kit-based systems were able to correctly identify the presence of
nitrogen in a variety of different threat materials.[Footnote 39]
Additionally, kit-based systems have been shown to be susceptible to
false alarms when challenged with substances such as soaps and
perfumes, among others.
The open and often dirty air environment of passenger rail presents
certain operational issues for trace detection. However, durable
versions of handheld and desktop detectors are starting to appear for
use in the open and rugged field environment. This is meant to improve
the instruments' reliability, availability, and performance in an
environment that has varying degrees of temperature, pressure, and
humidity. In 2008 and 2009, both the Technical Support Working Group
and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
[Footnote 40] sponsored evaluations of commercial 'hardened mobile'
trace detectors, during which these systems demonstrated the
capability to detect certain types of explosives in an open
environment over a range of external temperature, pressure, and
humidity conditions.[Footnote 41]
A survey by the Transportation Security Laboratory in 2009 showed a
large number of manufacturers of handheld, desktop, and portable kit-
based devices available on the commercial market. [Footnote 42]
Although costs are a consideration--for example, in addition to
initial costs, there are routine maintenance costs and the cost of
consumables such as the swabs used for sampling--for determining
whether to make future deployments of handheld, desktop, and kit
explosives detection systems, these technologies are already being
used in the passenger rail environment and are expected to continue to
play a role there.
Carry-on Baggage Explosive Detection Systems:
Carry-on baggage explosive detection systems are based on x-ray
imaging, a technology that has been in use for more than a century.
Screening systems incorporating the technology have been used in
commercial aviation for more than 30 years, in part, because they
serve a dual purpose; images are analyzed for guns and other weapons
at the same time they are analyzed for the presence of materials that
may be explosives. Because these images do not uniquely identify
explosive materials, secondary screening is required to positively
identify the materials as explosives.
Single-energy x-ray systems are useful for detecting some bomb
components. They are, however, not as useful for the detection of
explosive material itself. Advanced techniques add multiple views,
dual x-ray energies, backscatter, and computed tomography (CT)
features (see Table 2) to provide the screener with additional
information to help identify IEDs. Systems with one or more advanced
techniques, multiple views; dual energies, and backscatter, but not
CT, are called advanced technology (AT) systems to distinguish them
from CT. AT systems enable more accurate identification of explosives
without the additional expense of CT. Further, the additional
information can be used to automatically detect explosive materials.
Carry-on baggage explosive detection technology used in commercial
aviation is a mature technology.[Footnote 43] The Transportation
Security Laboratory has qualified[Footnote 44] several different
models of carry-on baggage explosive detection systems manufactured by
several vendors for use in commercial aviation. Many of these systems
are in use every day at airports in the United States.
Table 2: Description of Advanced Techniques for Carry-on Baggage
Explosive Systems:
Technology: Multiple view;
Key feature: Records images from different directions;
Characteristics: Aids in thickness reconstruction.
Technology: Dual energy;
Key feature: Two x-ray energies or x-ray detectors sensitive to
different x-ray energies;
Characteristics: Material discrimination based on shape.
Technology: Backscatter;
Key feature: Records images from backscattered x-rays as well as
transmitted x-rays;
Characteristics: Distinguishes atomic characteristics of materials
such as explosives from other materials.
Technology: Computed tomography;
Key feature: 3-dimensional images;
Characteristics: Allows the most accurate estimate of material
properties. Hidden objects are identified.
Source: GAO and Sandia National Laboratories.
[End of table]
Carry-on baggage explosive detection systems are effective in
detecting IEDs that use conventional explosives when screeners
interpret the images as was demonstrated in a Transportation Security
Laboratory air cargo screening experiment where five different models
of currently fielded AT baggage explosives detection systems were used
to screen all eight categories of TSA-defined cargo.
In addition, DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate provided
another comparison of screener performance to automatic detection
performance in a 2006 pilot program at the Exchange Place Station in
the Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH)[Footnote 45] heavy rail system.
Phase I of this pilot evaluated the effectiveness of off-the-shelf
explosives detection capabilities that were adapted from current
airport checkpoint screening technologies and procedures. The carry-on
baggage explosive detection equipment was operated in the automated
threat detection mode to minimize passenger delay. System
effectiveness was tested by the use of a red team, an adversary team
that attempted to circumvent the security measures. While the results
were highly sensitive and not discussed in the pilot program report,
the false alarm rate was found to be low.
Carry-on baggage explosive detection technologies have operational
issues that limit their usefulness in passenger rail security. These
systems are used in checkpoints and their acceptability will depend
upon the tolerance for passenger delay. At checkpoints, 100 percent
screening is possible up to the throughput capacity of the screening
equipment; beyond that rate, additional screening equipment and
personnel or selective (less than 100 percent) screening is required.
During S&T's screening in the PATH system passenger rail pilot, a
maximum single system throughput of 400 bags per hour was measured
with carry-on baggage explosive detection systems operating in
automatic explosive detection mode at threat levels appropriate to
passenger rail, as described above. The 400 bags per hour single
system throughput had a corresponding passenger throughput of 2336
passengers per hour. With this throughput, the pilot was able to
perform 100 percent screening of large bags and computer bags (see
below) during the peak rush hour using two carry-on baggage explosive
detection systems.
Another closely related challenge associated with checkpoint screening
is passenger delay. The S&T pilot in the PATH system measured median
passenger delays of 17 seconds and 47.5 seconds respectively depending
on whether or not a passenger's bags set off automated explosive
detection alarms. These delays can be compared to the 13 second median
time for an unscreened passenger to walk through the screening area.
The longer delay, when bags set off alarms, was caused by secondary
screening required to confirm or deny the presence of explosives.
Maximum passenger throughput was achieved when screening only bags
large enough and heavy enough to contain sufficient explosives to
damage passenger rail infrastructure. When 100 percent screening
exceeded the capacity of the system, the pilot used queue-based
selection to maximize throughput. In queue-based selection, a traffic
director selects passengers for screening as long as there is room in
the queue for the screening process. Using this procedure, the pilot
was able to accommodate PATH's desire to keep queue lengths below five
passengers.
Acquisition costs range from $25,000 to $50,000 for AT systems to more
than $500,000 for CT systems. The primary operating cost is manpower.
Operating manpower typically includes a traffic director (someone to
select passengers for screening [if required], direct passengers to
the carry-on baggage explosive detection system, and provide
instructions as required), a secondary screener, and a maintenance
person.
Structures would be needed to protect existing carry-on baggage
explosive detection systems from the challenging passenger rail
environments, which include outdoor stations that are exposed to dust
and precipitation. This is because typical carry-on baggage explosive
detection systems have hazardous parts that are not protected from
foreign objects up to 1 inch in diameter and have no protection from
water intrusion.
Explosive Trace Portals:
Explosive trace portals (ETP) are used in screening for access to
buildings and, to a limited extent, airport checkpoint screening. The
operation of these systems generally involves a screener directing an
individual to the ETP and the ETP sensing his presence and, when
ready, instructing the individual to enter. The portal then blows
short puffs of air onto the individual being screened to help displace
particles and attempts to collect these particles with a vacuum
system. The particle sample is then preconcentrated and fed into the
detector for analysis. The results are displayed to the operator as
either positive or negative for the detection of explosives. Positive
results can display the detected explosives and trigger an audible
alarm.
Currently tested and deployed ETPs use IMS analytical techniques for
chemical analysis to detect traces of explosives, similar to those
used for handheld and desktop detectors. These techniques are
relatively mature but the operation of IMS-based ETPs in an open air
environment, such as that of passenger rail, is subject to
interference from ambient agents, such as moisture and contaminants,
that can impact a detector's performance by interfering with its
internal analysis process resulting in false readings.[Footnote 46]
Regardless of the detection technique used, sampling is a major issue
for trace detection. Generally, factors such as the explosives' vapor
pressure and packaging, as well as how much contamination is present
on an individual from handling the explosive, affect the amount of
material available for sampling. Particular to trace portals, factors
such as the systems' puffer jets and timing, clothing, the location of
explosive contamination on the body, and human variability impact the
effectiveness of sampling. For example, if the puffer jets produce too
little pressure, they have little impact in improving the trace
explosive signal, while too much pressure results in trace explosive
particles becoming lost in a large volume of air that is difficult to
sample effectively. In addition, clothing material and layering can
reduce the available trace explosive signal. The location of the
explosive trace on the body also impacts the amount of trace
explosives that the system will collect.
In laboratory testing of ETPs in 2004, the Naval Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Technology Division tested three ETP systems' basic ability
to detect trace amounts of certain explosives within the required
detection threshold when deposited on the systems' collection sites.
[Footnote 47] While the systems consistently detected some of these
explosives, they were unable to detect others. [Footnote 48]
In addition, during laboratory testing on systems from three
manufacturers performed by the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Technology Division in 2004 and the Transportation Security Laboratory
from 2004 through 2007, the systems did not meet current Naval
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division or TSA requirements.
In 10 laboratory and airport pilot tests of ETPs from three
manufacturers from 2004 through 2005, the Naval Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Technology Division and TSA also measured the systems'
throughput. In laboratory testing, the average throughput without
alarms ranged from 2.56 to 5 people per minute. During pilot testing
in airports, the operational mean throughput, which included alarms,
ranged from 0.3 to 1.4 people per minute and the operational mean
screening time ranged from 15.4 seconds to 22.2 seconds. Although,
they may have some applicability for checkpoint screening in lower
volume rail environments that require passengers to queue up, the
throughput and screening time of ETPs make them impractical to use for
100 percent screening in high volume rail stations.
An ETP system using a different analytical technique, mass
spectrometry (MS), for chemical analysis has the potential of
significantly improving the ability to distinguish explosives from
environmental contaminants, although its use in a portal configuration
has not been tested in the rail environment.[Footnote 49] DHS has,
however, performed laboratory testing of two versions of an MS-based
ETP.[Footnote 50]
Other operational issues may limit their applicability in the rail
environment. GAO found that during the pilot testing in airports, for
example, the systems did not meet TSA's reliability requirements due
to environmental conditions.[Footnote 51] This resulted in higher than
expected maintenance costs and lower than expected operational
readiness time. ETPs may have some applicability for checkpoint
screening in lower volume rail environments that require passengers to
queue up such as Amtrak, but the low throughput and long screening
time of ETPs make them impractical to use for 100 percent screening in
high volume rail stations. In addition, the large size and weight of
ETPs make them difficult to transport and deploy in stations with
limited space and also impractical for use in any random way.
Advanced Imaging Technology Portals:
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) portals are used for screening
people for building access and, to an increasing extent, airport
access. The operation of these systems generally involves the
individual undergoing screening entering the AIT portal and raise his
hands above his head. The AIT portal then takes images of the
individual, which are displayed to another officer who inspects the
images. The inspecting officer views the image to determine if there
are threats present. If a threat is detected, the individual must go
through further inspection to determine if the he or she is carrying
explosives.
Currently deployed AIT portals in the aviation environment use either
millimeter wave[Footnote 52] or backscatter x-ray techniques to
generate an image of a person through their clothing. While both
systems generate images of similar quality, millimeter wave has the
advantage that it does not produce ionizing radiation. Although,
according to one manufacturer, its backscatter x-ray system meets all
applicable federal regulations and standards for public exposure to
ionizing radiation, systems that don't use ionizing radiation will
likely raise fewer concerns.
An issue of particular concern to the public with AIT portals is
privacy, due to the ability of the systems to image underneath
clothing (see figure 7). In order to protect passengers' privacy, TSA
policy for these systems specifies that the officer directing
passengers into the system never sees the images. In addition, some
systems offer privacy algorithms that can be configured to blur out
the face and other areas of the body or present the image as a chalk
outline. Efforts are currently underway to develop algorithms to
automate the detection of threat objects, which has the potential to
increase privacy if it eliminates the need for a human to inspect the
images.
Figure 3: Examples of AIT portal images:
[Refer to PDF for image: portal images]
4 Millimeter wave images;
4 Backscatter x-ray images.
Source: Transportation Security Administration.
[End of figure]
In testing done prior to October 2009, TSA tested AIT portals from two
vendors--one using millimeter wave and the other backscatter x-ray--
against detection, safety, throughput, and availability requirements
for airport checkpoint screening. Both systems met these requirements.
[Footnote 53] In addition, in 2006, TSA pilot tested an AIT portal in
the rail environment to determine the usefulness and maturity of these
systems.
In 2007 and 2008, the Transportation Security Laboratory tested the
performance of AIT systems in a laboratory environment for DHS S&T.
TSA also began an operational evaluation of AIT systems in airports in
2007, which, due to privacy concerns, includes the use of privacy
algorithms. Laboratory testing included a comparison of the
performance of AIT systems against enhanced metal detectors and pat-
downs; determining the detection effectiveness of the systems for
different body concealment locations and threat types, including
liquids, metallic and nonmetallic weapons, and explosives; and
measuring the systems' throughput. The detailed results of this
testing are classified so will not be outlined in this technology
assessment.
However, generally, the testing showed that there are a number of
factors that affect the performance of AIT systems, including the
individual inspecting the images for potential threats, the use and
settings of privacy algorithms, and other factors. For example, the
detection performance varied by screener. In addition, the use of
privacy algorithms generally impacts the decision time for screeners,
and has other operational considerations. The throughput of one of the
AIT systems was measured to be 40 people per hour, which was
significantly lower than the S&T requirement of 60 people per hour.
As with ETPs, AIT portals may have some applicability for checkpoint
screening in lower volume rail environments, but the low throughput,
long screening time, and other factors make them impractical to use
for 100 percent screening in high volume rail stations. Another
operational issue that may limit their applicability in the rail
environment is their large size and weight that makes them difficult
to transport and deploy in stations with limited space.
Standoff Explosives Detection Systems:
Standoff explosives detection systems are primarily differentiated
from other types of explosives detection devices by the significant
physical separation of detection equipment from the person or target
being scanned.[Footnote 54] Several different technologies have been
incorporated into standoff explosives detection systems, but those
suitable for use today in a public setting such as passenger rail are
passive or active imaging systems using typically either the
millimeter wave or terahertz (THz)[Footnote 55] portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum. Radiation in these portions of the spectrum
are naturally emitted or reflected from everyday objects, including
the human body, and have the added feature that clothing is often
transparent to them. Therefore, they can be used to safely screen
people for hidden threat objects. Systems available on the market
today claim to detect person-borne objects across a range of distances.
In several laboratory and field studies since 2006 looking at passive
standoff imaging systems, organizations including Naval Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, Transportation Security
Laboratory, S&T, and TSA have demonstrated the technology's basic
ability, under the right conditions, to detect hidden person-borne
threat objects. Because the detection technique relies on a
temperature differential between the warmer human body and the colder
threat object next to it and not on the metallic content of the
object, it also has the potential to detect non-metallic threats. This
capability gives these standoff imaging systems a distinct advantage
over walk-through metal detectors--the conventional person screening
tool--which can only detect objects with sufficient metallic content.
DHS has also evaluated several standoff detection systems in
operational rail environments. For example, as part of Phase II of the
2006 Rail Security Pilot looking at advanced imaging technologies, S&T
found that such systems, in general, had some ability to detect threat
objects indicative of suicide bombs on passengers and, overall, were
developing into potentially useful technologies for passenger rail.
Follow-on tests in 2007 and 2009 conducted by TSA at operational
passenger rail or other mass transit locations provided further
support for the technologies potential in addressing the screening
needs of these systems.[Footnote 56] In the July 2009 pilot, for
instance, screening throughput for a passive millimeter wave system
was tested by TSA during rush hour at the PATH Exchange Place subway
station in New Jersey, a key entry point for commuters entering lower
Manhattan. Two systems were used with each positioned 8 to 10 meters
from a group of passenger turnstiles which provided a chokepoint for
commuters entering the station. At several periods during rush hour,
the systems demonstrated the ability to scan at or near 100 percent
screening--in one case, more than 900 people per hour--without
disrupting the flow of passengers.
Those pilots also demonstrated another attractive feature of these
systems important for their use in passenger rail; they can be built
to be relatively portable. For the PATH pilot, TSA broke down, moved
and re-configured multiple standoff devices four times a day. The
ability for screening systems to be deployed and easily re-deployed to
another location encourages their use for random deployment, a
recommended protective measure for mass transit systems.[Footnote 57]
In addition, this allows rail operators a way to provide screening to
a much wider percentage of their system with fewer units than it would
if they had to use fixed systems, which might prove cost prohibitive
for the larger rail systems.[Footnote 58]
While promising, several factors limit the more widespread use of
current standoff detection technologies to just detection of objects
carried on a person's body. They cannot provide a complete screening
of a passenger and their belongings. They could, however, be used in
tandem with other technologies or methods to handle accompanying
articles.
Another limiting factor of current standoff technologies is the
inability to discriminate between a potential threat object and a real
one. Because the current state of the technology is based on imaging
alone, explosives material identification is generally not possible.
Use of radiation in the weaker, nonionizing millimeter wave and THz
bands is attractive because it presents no danger to humans, but it
also means that there is not enough information in the energy received
by the sensor to more positively identify the threat as explosives
material, as is routinely done, for example, by the higher energy CT
systems used to screen checked baggage in aviation. Therefore,
secondary screening will often be needed to completely resolve an
alarm. In a standoff configuration, this raises logistical and
manpower issues. At a minimum, for example, since the system is
operating at a distance and passengers are not queuing up, it is not
obvious how a person showing up as a potential threat could be easily
intercepted and directed out from the normal flow of passengers.
In addition, although recent TSA testing in 2009 on an advanced
standoff system showed good performance detecting hidden threat
objects--including nonmetallic objects--on moving people in controlled
situations, consistent detection under actual operating conditions in
heavy passenger volume scenarios will be challenging. The TSA tests
showed good probability of detection rates and low false alarm rates
for indoors and outdoors screening.[Footnote 59] Unlike the use of
similar technology in a portal configuration (such as AIT) where a
passenger can be asked to pause, turn around, or, for example, lift
their arms to provide the sensor a better view, in a standoff
configuration passenger, movement is uncontrolled. Although some
systems allow tracking, the length of time a person can be maintained
within the required line of sight is minimal in a fast-moving, large
density crowd.
Finally, at up to several hundred thousand dollars per unit, a
deployment of standoff technology in passenger rail could be costly
and manpower intensive. Based on their operational pilots over the
last several years, TSA told us that a likely implementation for a
standoff detection system at a rail site would consist of multiple
detectors, and a 3 to 4 person team including one operator per system,
an assistant, and probably two Behavioral Detection Officers[Footnote
60] to focus special attention on persons of interest. A good
implementation would also have a canine team ready to inspect the
passenger or accompanying articles, if the system detected an anomaly.
Also, since some of the systems produce images susceptible to the same
privacy concerns as the recent deployment of AIT in airports, a remote
imaging station might also need to be configured and staffed.
Explosives Detection Canines:
Explosives detection canines (EDC) are currently used in passenger
rail systems for both random screening of passengers and their
belongings and as a deterrent to criminal and terrorist activity. EDCs
are considered a mature technology and are being used by all of the
passenger rail operators with whom we spoke or that attended our
expert panel. These operators also viewed canines as the most
effective method currently available for detecting explosives in the
rail environment because of their detection capability as well as the
deterrent effect that they provide. More specifically, operators noted
EDCs' ability to rapidly move to various locations throughout a rail
system, their minimum impact on passenger flow and rail operations,
and their ability to detect explosives they are trained to detect.
Operators and experts on our panel also noted that canines are
generally accepted by members of the public that use these systems. In
addition to passenger rail operators, canines have been deployed by
federal agencies such as the U.S. Secret Service; Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. While the use of canines is mature, both the government,
through DHS S&T, as well as academia, are conducting ongoing research
on the limits of canine detection.
While the mechanism of how canines detect explosives through their
sense of smell is not well understood, there are several certification
programs to validate the canines' ability to detect explosives, which
include specifying standards for explosives detection. These standards
vary based on which entity is certifying the canine. A guiding
document on the training of canines is the Scientific Working Group on
Dog and Orthogonal Detectors Guidelines that specifies recommended
best practices for canine explosives detection. These standards call
for an EDC to detect explosives a certain percent of the time and a
probability of false alarms less than a certain rate. Certifying
entities, however, may have more stringent standards. For example, ATF
requires that its canines detect all explosives that are presented to
them, and have limited false alarms in its tests. TSA requires that
their certified canines find a specified percent of explosives in a
variety of scenarios, such as onboard an aircraft, mass transit rail,
and mass transit buses. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-19
tasks the Attorney General, in coordination with DHS and other
agencies, with assessing the effectiveness of, and, as necessary,
making recommendations for improving federal government training and
education initiatives related to explosive attack detection, including
canine training and performance standards. According to ATF officials,
TSA, in coordination with ATF, is developing standards for EDCs, which
are nearly complete and are similar to the standards that ATF uses.
EDCs have a limited period of endurance at which they can maintain
effective detection capabilities. According to ATF officials and other
experts that attended our panel, canines can typically operate between
20 and 45 minutes before requiring a break with a total of 3 to 4
hours of time spent detecting per day. Additionally, members of our
expert panel told us that aspects of the rail environment such as
dirt, cleaning chemicals, and metal fragments from trains, may reduce
canines' optimum operating time in this environment. As a result, one
rail operator told us that their EDCs are stored in the back of police
cars throughout the day unless they are needed and are not available
for use as a deterrent. TSA advocates using explosive detection
canines on patrols as visible deterrents in an effort to reduce crime
and prevent the introduction of explosives into the rail environment.
Canines have a history of being trained to detect items and in recent
years have been trained to detect, among other things, explosives,
fire accelerants used in arson investigations, and drugs. While
training methods differ among canine training schools, these methods
typically train canines by rewarding them for locating certain items.
Rewards include toys, a food treat, or the canine's food itself. In
turn, these canines are trained to alert their handlers if they detect
an item of interest, usually by sitting down next to the item. EDCs
used in rail are generally deployed to screen passenger baggage,
either on a primary basis by inspecting baggage as passengers enter a
system or on a secondary basis to screen an item of interest, such as
an unattended package. Additionally, EDCs are to receive training on a
regular basis to ensure that they are capable of detecting explosives.
Recurrent training requirements vary based on the training method used
with the canine. For instance, one training regime we reviewed calls
for 4 hours per week of recurrent training for EDCs, while other
training regimes, such as those used by ATF, require daily training.
The amount of recurrent training necessary for EDCs has not been
determined according to the experts we spoke with, but they agree that
the training is necessary to ensure the canine accurately detects
explosives. As such, passenger rail operators who employ EDCs are to
incorporate the training regime specified by the training method used
to produce the EDC to ensure the canine operates effectively.
Additionally, TSA and ATF both require their trained EDCs to be
recertified on an annual basis whereby the canine and handler must
demonstrate that they can detect explosives and meet required
performance standards.
The quality of an EDC's search for explosives is dependent on the
handler correctly interpreting behavioral changes of the canine. As
the canine is capable of giving a positive or negative response as to
the presence of an explosive odor emanating from an item, the handler
must interpret the canine's response and respond appropriately in
keeping with a pre-determined concept of operations because the canine
cannot indicate the type of explosive it has detected. Moreover,
according to ATF officials, a canine is only capable of detecting the
explosives it has been trained to detect and there are tens of
thousands of explosive compounds. To address this issue, ATF separates
explosives into six categories with similar characteristics that the
canines are trained and required to identify.
According to TSA, the total initial cost to acquire and train an EDC
and handler is about $31,000. In addition, there are also ongoing
maintenance costs including food, veterinary services, and other
maintenance expenses, as well as the ongoing expense of the handler's
salary. TSGP grant funding can often be used to offset the initial
acquisition cost of the canine, but cannot typically be used to pay
for ongoing maintenance throughout the canines' duty life.[Footnote
61] According to ATF officials, an EDC typically has an operational
life of about 7 years, having completed training around age 2 and
entering retirement at age 9.
Vapor Wake Canines are an emerging use of EDCs that may be applicable
to the passenger rail environment. Vapor Wake Canines differ from more
traditional EDCs in that the canine does not directly sniff individual
passengers and their belongings and instead the canine may remain in a
stationary location sniffing multiple passengers as they pass by the
canine, thus allowing more passengers and their belongings to be
screened. These canines are trained to alert if they detect any
explosives in the air and follow the explosive to its source. Vapor
Wake Canines were piloted by DHS S&T in 2006 in the Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority with generally positive results.
Specifically, these canines were able to detect explosives under the
concept of operations developed by DHS S&T.[Footnote 62] DHS S&T
officials told us that they will soon begin additional research on
Vapor Wake Canines to determine their probability of detection and to
better understand factors behind their performance.
Limitations in Available Explosives Detection Technologies Restrict
Their More Widespread or More Effective Use in Passenger Rail:
The ability of explosives detection technologies to help protect the
passenger rail environment depends both upon their detection
performance and how effectively the technologies can be deployed in
that environment. Detection performance varies across the different
technologies with more established technologies such as handheld,
desktop, kit-based trace detection systems, x-ray imaging systems, and
canines having demonstrated good performance against many conventional
explosives threats while newer technologies such as ETPs, AIT, and
standoff detection systems are in various stages of maturity. However,
all of the technologies face key challenges, and most will struggle in
passenger rail stations to screen passengers without undue delays.
Important characteristics of the technologies such as screening
throughput, mobility, and durability, as well as physical space
constraints in rail stations may limit deployment options for
explosives detection technologies in passenger rail.
Detection Performance Varies Across the Different Explosives Detection
Technologies and Challenges Exist in Detection of HMEs:
Certain explosives detection technologies have demonstrated good
detection performance against conventional explosives. Explosives
detection canines, for example, are certified by several organizations
as being able to detect a wide variety of conventional explosives for
which they have been trained. In addition, some of the analytical
trace detection methods are mature laboratory techniques that--within
their individual design constraints--have been shown to be capable of
consistent detection of many conventional explosives and their
components when used in handheld, desktop, and kit-based systems. In
many cases, this is because they have been designed specifically to
focus on specific characteristics of nitro-based conventional
explosives. Similarly, the more mature bulk detection techniques--
carry-on baggage x-ray systems, for example--have been widely used for
many years and, when used by trained operators, have shown good
detection performance.
However, some of the newer detection technologies--ETPs, AIT, and
standoff detection systems, for example--are in varying stages of
maturity and more extensive testing would be required to determine
their likely performance if deployed in passenger rail. For example,
ETPs performed poorly in laboratory testing even though those devices
incorporated mature analytical detection techniques. In this case, the
variation in performance might be the result of how those techniques
are integrated by specific manufacturers into a portal configuration.
AIT is currently being deployed in airports nationwide, and laboratory
testing has shown it has some ability to detect explosives.[Footnote
63] While standoff detection systems have demonstrated good
performance detecting hidden threat objects on people in controlled
testing, consistent detection under actual operating conditions in
heavy passenger volume scenarios will be challenging.
With all the technologies, certain factors underlie their ability to
achieve adequate performance and often these depend on the human
operator. For example, in a trace detection system the human operator
plays a key part in preparing the sample and delivering it to the
trace detection machine. In addition, trace detection is an indirect
method of detection, relying on the presence of trace signatures that
may, in fact, not exist or exist in insufficient quantities to be
detected even though the threat object is present, or are present in
the absence of a threat object.
Similarly, image based detection schemes are all dependent on
successful image interpretation. Human operator image interpretation
is a difficult task and performance is largely a function of adequate
and persistent training. To help address this issue, DHS has initiated
efforts looking at enhancing automated image processing algorithms to
provide for better detection and lower false alarm rates. As part of
this, DHS is creating a database of raw image data from commercially
available systems--for example, x-ray and millimeter wave image data--
which can be made available to researchers to help them develop better
automated detection algorithms to improve processing across a range of
imaging technologies including carry-on baggage x-ray technologies
such as AT-based systems, AIT, and some of the standoff detection
technologies. With the goal of increasing the probability of detection
and reducing the number of false alarms these systems generate when
operating in automated mode, such enhancements could help with the
challenge of screening large volumes of people by increasing system
throughput. While an outgrowth of research and development to support
aviation security, this could benefit the use of imaging technologies
in passenger rail settings as well.
Finally, adequate detection performance of explosives detection
technologies can depend on other factors, such as maintenance, system
calibration, and proper setup. For example, performance can be
affected by the operator's preferences regarding sensitivity of the
equipment. With many of the technologies there are tradeoffs that can
be made between the sensitivity of the device and the operator's
tolerance for false alarms. In cases where a trace detector is highly
sensitive to contaminants in the air, for instance, decreasing the
sensitivity may reduce the number of false alarms but will also
increase the possibility for missed detections.
One of the issues in implementing explosives detection technologies
effectively in passenger rail is in identifying the explosive
materials and amounts that constitute the threat to that environment.
While requirements and standards for explosives threat amounts and
detection levels, for example, have been defined for the aviation
environment and for DOD's counter IED mission, threat amounts have not
been determined for rail for either the conventional explosives threat
or the threat from HMEs. As a result, in general, detection
performance has been measured against threats levels defined for other
environments.
Screening Throughput, Mobility, and Other Characteristics of
Explosives Detection Technologies Could Limit Deployment Options in
Passenger Rail:
Because passenger volumes and timeliness expectations vary across the
different rail systems including heavy rail and commuter or light
rail, different methods of selecting and screening passengers are
possible. Although passenger volumes in the heavier trafficked rail
stations may preclude 100 percent screening of passengers in an overly
intrusive way, lighter volume stations may allow for such intrusive
screening if an adequate screening throughput speed can be maintained.
Decisions regarding screening modes will vary by systems, stations,
and the tolerance for passenger delay.
Two important system characteristics when considering the use of
explosives detection technologies in passenger rail are screening
throughput and system mobility. The higher the throughput, the less
delay is imposed on passenger flow. The more portable a detection
system is, the more it lends itself for use in random deployment, a
known deterrent and cost effective option for rail operators.
Screening throughput and system mobility varied across the different
explosives detection technologies we examined, but many had screening
times that would be difficult to accommodate in situations with heavy
passenger volume. In airport security checkpoints, for example, using
similar equipment and working toward a goal of 10 minute or less wait
times, the TSA staffing allocation model for screening operations
requires individual screening lanes to be able to process 200
passengers per hour. [Footnote 64] However, during the 2006 S&T pilot
testing in PATH, passenger flow rates on the order of 4,000 passengers
per hour was measured during the afternoon rush at just the main
entrance turnstiles at one station. Even under TSA's aviation wait
time goal this would require the purchase, staffing, and physical
space for 20 screening lanes.
These technologies, however, might be considered for use in lower
volume rail stations, for example, or in other areas of passenger rail
where passenger queues could be supported without unduly impacting
passenger flow. However, they are generally large, bulky and not
easily moved from place to place and therefore impractical for use in
any highly mobile way.
In general, most passenger rail operators that have deployed
explosives detection technologies have done so on a less intrusive
basis, using, for example, mobile explosives detection canine teams as
a deterrent in stations or, alternatively, setting up temporary,
portable stations for the screening of selected passengers who are
pulled out of the normal passenger flow randomly, via some selection
method, or as a result of behavioral cues. In this mode, for example,
they have used handheld detectors for primary screening.
Standoff detection systems, which minimize the impact of screening on
passenger flow, are the only explosives detection technology that
currently could be considered for helping to address the 100 percent
screening scenario at heavy volume stations, generally, for passenger
rail. As noted, some of these systems demonstrated the ability to scan
at or near 100 percent of passengers even in heavy rail stations for
periods of time. In addition, many are portable and are designed so
that system installations could be shifted from site to site. However,
while attractive from a throughput point of view, standoff systems are
developing in terms of their detection performance and general concept
of operations.
In addition to limitations imposed by the technologies, rail stations
themselves have constraints that will influence the applicability of
certain technology for certain purposes. These include environmental
issues, such as the relatively high level of contaminants found in
passenger rail environments like steel dust and soot that can disrupt
the operation of sensitive equipment, and raise the potential for
false alarms, and the lack of controlled temperature and humidity
levels in many stations and the potential for extremes of those levels
in outdoor stations. Some DOD research and development efforts are
looking at hardened versions of some explosives detection
technologies.[Footnote 65]
The general openness of many rail stations is another important
consideration in deciding on the use of explosives detection
technologies in rail. In commuter or light rail systems, for example,
many stations may be unmanned, outdoor platforms without barriers
between pubic areas and the train and with few natural locations to
place technologies to be able to screen passengers. With limited
existing chokepoints, implementation of certain technologies may
require station infrastructure modifications to aid in funneling
passengers for screening.
Finally, physical space constraints in many stations are an important
consideration. For example, many rail stations have limited space in
which to install large equipment, accommodate any passenger queues
that might build up, or add multiple screening lanes as a way of
dealing with long lines. Further, while standoff detection
technologies are more able to deal with heavy passenger volumes and do
not necessarily have a large physical footprint, they do require
several to tens of meters of open, line of sight spacing between
sensor and passengers for effective operation.
Several Overarching Operational and Policy Factors Could Impact the
Role of Explosives Detection Technologies in the Passenger Rail
Environment:
In addition to how well technologies work in detecting explosives and
their applicability in the passenger rail environment, there are
several overarching operational and policy considerations impacting
the role that these technologies can play in securing the passenger
rail environment, such as who is paying for them and what to do when
they apparently detect explosives. Even if a technology works in the
passenger rail environment, our work, in consultation with rail
experts, identified several critical operational and policy factors
that arise when these technologies are being considered for
deployment. Specifically, 1) the roles and responsibilities of
multiple federal and local stakeholders could impact how explosives
detection technologies are funded and implemented in passenger rail;
2) implementation of technology or any security investment could be
undertaken in accordance with risk management principles, to ensure
limited security funding is allocated to those areas at greatest risk;
3) explosives detection technologies are one component of a layered
approach to security, where multiple security measures combine to form
the overall security environment; 4) a well-defined and designed
concept of operations for the use of these technologies is important
to ensure that they work effectively in the rail environment; and 5)
cost and potential legal implications are important policy
considerations when determining whether and how to use these
technologies.
The Roles and Responsibilities of Multiple Federal and Local
Stakeholders Could Impact How Explosives Detection Technologies are
Funded and Implemented in Passenger Rail:
Although there is a shared responsibility for securing the passenger
rail environment, the federal government and rail operators have
differing roles, which could complicate decisions to fund and
implement technologies. More specifically, while passenger rail
operators are responsible for the day to day security measures in
their stations, including funding them, they utilize federal grant
funding to supplement their security budgets. While federal grant
funding for security has increased in recent years, decision making
for funding these measures, including technology, is likely to
continue to be shared between the rail operators and the federal
government moving forward. In addition, as federal agencies implement
their own rail security measures and operations, which could include
the use of explosives detection technology, decisions of how to
implement and coordinate these measures will likely be shared with
operators.
Regarding the federal role, TSA defines and implements federal
policies and actions for securing passenger rail systems in their role
as the lead federal agency responsible for transportation security.
TSA's strategy for securing passenger rail is identified in the Mass
Transit Modal Annex to the Transportation Systems-Sector Specific
Plan, including its role in developing and procuring technologies for
securing rail systems. To date, TSA's primary approach to securing
passenger rail, defined in the Modal Annex, has been to assess the
risk facing rail systems, develop security guidance for rail
operators, and to provide funding to operators to make security
improvements to their systems, including the purchase of security
technologies. Specifically, TSA's stated objectives for using
technology in passenger rail is to bolster the use of technologies to
screen passengers and their bags on a random basis in partnership with
rail operators. According to the Modal Annex, these objectives are to
be achieved through the use of explosives detection technology to
screen passengers during TSA Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) operations and screening programs introduced by
passenger rail operators themselves.[Footnote 66] In addition, through
its National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP), TSA
procures, trains, and certifies explosives detection canine teams and
provides training and the canines to passenger rail operators.
[Footnote 67]
TSA also supports the use of technology by providing funding to rail
operators to purchase screening technologies and train their employees
through TSGP.[Footnote 68] To date, TSGP has provided funding for
various security-related technologies; including handheld explosive
trace detection equipment, closed-circuit television, intrusion
detection devices, and others. In June 2009, we reported that the TSGP
faces a number of challenges, such as lack of clear roles and
responsibilities in the program and delays in approving projects and
making funds available to operators, and as of February 2009, of the
$755 million that had been awarded by TSGP for fiscal years 2006
through 2008, approximately $334 million had been made available to
transit agencies, and transit agencies had spent about $21 million.
[Footnote 69] We further reported that these delays were caused
largely by TSA's lengthy cooperative agreement process with transit
agencies, a backlog in required environmental reviews, and delays in
receiving disbursement approvals from FEMA. As such, rail operators
have spent a small percentage of the resources available to fund
security investments. We recommended that DHS establish and
communicate to rail operators time frames for releasing funds after
the projects receive approval from TSA. DHS agreed with this
recommendation and indicated that it would establish and communicate
timeframes for releasing funds to TSGP grantees and try to release
funds shortly after they have received all required documentation from
grant recipients.[Footnote 70]
Additionally, in a March 2010 report, the administration's Surface
Transportation Security Priority Assessment recommended that TSA adopt
a multi-year, multi-phase approach for grant funding based on a long-
term strategy for transportation security. This approach calls for
segmenting larger projects into smaller components to both complete
the projects quicker and also to provide strategic planning for future
grant funding needs and provide closer alignment of federal and
stakeholder long-term priorities. Moreover, during our expert panel,
rail operators stated that they would prefer the federal government to
procure and provide security technologies to them, instead of
providing cash awards to directly procure the technologies by the
operators. These operators indicated that their local procurement
regulations can often make the process of procuring security
technologies slow and cumbersome.
In addition to providing funding for technology, the Modal Annex also
identifies TSA's role in providing resources for research,
development, testing, and evaluation of technology. TSA, like other
DHS components, is responsible for articulating the technology needs
of all transportation sector stakeholders--including passenger rail
operators--to DHS S&T for development.[Footnote 71] Although TSA and
DHS have worked to develop some security technologies specific to
passenger rail systems, technologies that it has pursued could work
across different transportation modes, including aviation, maritime,
mass transit, and passenger rail. TSA officials told us that they look
for opportunities to take advantage of technologies in transportation
modes other than those for which they were originally developed.
However, the TSA officials indicated that certain characteristics of
passenger rail may not allow the deployment of technologies developed
for other modes such as aviation.
In addition to its work with S&T, TSA has commissioned its own
research efforts, including pilot programs designed to test existing
explosives detection equipment in the rail environment and the use of
standoff technologies in the passenger rail environment. Additionally,
the administration recommended in its March 2010 report that TSA, DHS
S&T, and other agencies directly involve rail operators in setting
surface transportation research and development priorities.[Footnote
72]
TSA also provides technological information to rail operators through
the Public Transit Portal of the Homeland Security Information Network
(HSIN) and maintains a Qualified Products List (QPL)[Footnote 73] of
technologies that have been qualified for use in aviation.[Footnote
74] As we reported in June 2009[Footnote 75], the information on HSIN
is in an early state of development and contains limited information
that would be useful to rail operators. For example, for a given
security technology, TSA's list of technologies provides a categorical
definition (such as video motion analysis), a subcategory (such as day
or night camera), and the names of products within those categories.
We also reported that the list on HSIN neither provides nor indicates
how rail operators can obtain information beyond the product's name
and function and does not provide information on the product's
capabilities, maintenance, ease of use, and suitability in a rail
environment. We recommended that TSA explore the feasibility of
expanding the security technology information in HSIN, including
adding information on cost, maintenance, and other information to
support passenger rail agencies' purchases and deployment of these
technologies. TSA concurred with this recommendation and stated that
it would provide information on HSIN about specifications, performance
criteria, and evaluations of security technologies used in or
adaptable to the passenger rail environment. In January 2010, TSA
officials told us that they were still planning to provide this
information on the HSIN some time in 2010, but had not done so yet.
TSA officials told us that in addition to the QPL for aviation there
is another list that is administered by FEMA called the Authorized
Equipment List, which provides a list of technologies for which TSGP
grant recipients can use grant funding. According to TSA officials,
the Authorized Equipment List is available on HSIN and there is one
explosives detection technology on the list--a handheld explosive
trace detector. Passenger rail operators that attended our expert
panel stated that they would like TSA to pursue research more directly
related to rail and provide additional information on which
technologies are best for use in rail, including a list of "approved"
or recommended technologies.[Footnote 76] TSA officials told us that
they are currently developing minimum standards for technologies for
modes of transportation other than aviation, but did not provide a
time frame for completing this effort. Once these standards are
developed they envision adding categories for other modes of
transportation---such as rail---to the QPL. Additionally, the
administration's Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment
report from this year recommended that TSA along with DHS S&T
establish a fee-based, centrally managed "clearing house" to validate
new privately developed security technologies that meet federal
standards.
In contrast to the federal role, passenger rail operators and local
government stakeholders are responsible for the day-to-day security of
rail systems, including the purchase, installation, and operation of
any explosives detection technologies. As such, operators consider
their own unique security and operational needs when deciding whether
and to what extent to use these technologies. While the operators have
responsibility for securing their systems, the operators that attended
our panel expressed to us that their limited resources often limit
their ability to directly invest in security, including technology,
and instead they look to the federal government to provide financial
assistance. For example, rail operators that we spoke to and that
attended our expert panel noted that they often do not collect
sufficient revenue from their fares to cover operational expenses.
In June 2009, we reported that while the majority of rail operator
actions to secure passenger rail have been taken on a voluntary basis,
the pending 9/11 Commission Act regulations outline a new approach
that sets forth mandatory requirements, such as, among others,
requirements for employee training, vulnerability assessments, and
security plans, the implementation of which may create challenges for
TSA and industry stakeholders.[Footnote 77] In general, TSA has a
collaborative approach in encouraging passenger rail systems to
voluntarily participate and address security gaps. We also reported
that with TSA's pending issuance of regulations required by the 9/11
Commission Act, TSA will fundamentally shift this approach, and
establish new regulatory requirements for passenger rail security. TSA
officials stated that they do not see the 9/11 Commission Act
requirements impacting TSA's current role as it relates to
technologies in the passenger rail environments. Because of the unique
characteristics of the rail environment and the fact that the 9/11
Commission Act does not impose specific requirements related to
technologies, TSA officials stated that the agency's role will
continue to be to assist rail operators in conducting random
deployments of explosives detection technologies and inspections, as
stated in the Modal Annex.
Risk Management Could be Used to Effectively Guide the Decision to
Fund or Implement Explosives Detection Technologies:
As passenger rail operators consider the use of explosives detection
technologies, it is not only important to select technologies capable
of detecting explosives and that can be used in the passenger rail
environment, but it is also important to select technologies that will
address identified risks. We have recommended that a risk management
approach be used to guide the investment of security funding,
particularly for passenger rail systems, where security funding and
rail operator budgets are limited.[Footnote 78] As such, the decision
as to whether or not to deploy explosives detection technologies
should be made consistent with a risk management framework to ensure
that limited security budgets are expended to address the greatest
risks. We reported in June 2009 that officials from 26 of 30 transit
and passenger rail systems we visited stated that they had conducted
their own assessments of their systems, including risk assessments.
Additionally, Amtrak officials stated that they conducted a risk
assessment of all of their systems. As part of the assessment, Amtrak
contracted with a private consulting firm to provide a scientific
basis for identifying critical points at stations that might be
vulnerable to IED attacks or that are structurally weak.[Footnote 79]
We also reported that other transit agencies indicated that they have
received assistance in the form of either guidance or risk assessments
from federal and industry stakeholders. For example, FTA provided on-
site technical assistance to the nation's 50 largest transit agencies
(i.e., those transit agencies with the highest ridership) on how to
conduct threat and vulnerability assessments, among other technical
assistance needs, through its Security and Emergency Management
Technical Assistance Program (SEMTAP). According to FTA officials,
although FTA continues providing technical assistance to transit
agencies, the on-site SEMTAP program concluded in July 2006.
Furthermore, FTA officials stated that on-site technical assistance
was transferred to TSA when TSA became the lead agency on security
matters for passenger rail.
In addition, multiple federal agencies recommend the use of risk based
principles in assessing risk and making investment decisions. DHS's
National Infrastructure Protection Plan states that implementing
protective programs based on risk assessment and prioritization
enables DHS, sector-specific agencies, and other security partners to
enhance current critical infrastructure and key resources protection
programs and develop new programs where they will offer the greatest
benefit. Further, TSA's Modal Annex advocates using risk-based
principles to secure passenger rail systems and we have previously
reported that TSA has used various threat, vulnerability, and
consequence assessments to inform its security strategy for passenger
rail. In June 2009, we reported that TSA had not completed a risk
assessment of the entire passenger rail system and recommended that,
by doing so, TSA would be able to better prioritize risks as well as
more confidently assure that its programs are directed toward the
highest priority risks.[Footnote 80] TSA concurred with this
recommendation and stated that it is developing a Transportation
Systems Security Risk Assessment that aims to provide TSA with a
comprehensive risk assessment for use in passenger rail. To this end,
TSA told us that it has developed a Transportation Systems Sector Risk
Assessment report, which is to evaluate threat, vulnerability, and
consequence in more than 200 terrorist attack scenarios on passenger
rail. Moreover, TSA also indicated that they are developing and
fielding a risk assessment capability focused on individual passenger
rail agencies. This effort includes, among other things, a Baseline
Assessment for Security Enhancement for rail operators, a Mass Transit
Risk Assessment, and an Under Water Tunnel Assessment. Rail operators
with whom we spoke or who attended our expert panel noted the
importance of using risk management practices to allocate limited
resources.
Explosives Detection Technologies are One Component of a Layered
Approach to Security:
TSA's Modal Annex calls for a flexible, layered, and unpredictable
approach to securing passenger rail, while maintaining an efficient
flow of passengers and encouraging the expanded use of the nations'
rail systems. Expanding the use of explosives detection technology is
one of the layers of security identified by the Modal Annex. When
considering whether to fund or implement explosives detection
technologies, it will be important for policymakers to consider how
explosives detection technology would complement other layers of
security, the impacts on other layers of security, and the security
benefits that would be achieved. For example, one rail operator who
attended our expert panel told us that they used deployments of
explosives detection technologies along with customer awareness
campaigns and CCTV as layers of security in their security posture. In
addition to explosives detection technology, other layers of security
that rail operators have used or are considering using to secure
passenger rail include:
* Customer awareness campaigns. Rail operators use signage and
announcements to encourage riders to alert train staff if they observe
suspicious packages, persons, or behavior. We have previously reported
that of the 32 rail operators we interviewed, 30 had implemented a
customer awareness program or made enhancements to an existing
program.[Footnote 81]
* Increased number and visibility of security personnel. Of the 32
rail operators we previously interviewed, 23 had increased the number
of security personnel they utilized since September 11, 2001, to
provide security throughout their system or had taken steps to
increase the visibility of their security personnel. Further, these
operators stated that increasing the visibility of security is as
important as increasing the number of personnel. For example, several
U.S. rail operators we spoke with had instituted policies such as
requiring their security staff, wearing brightly colored vests, to
patrol trains or stations more frequently, so they are more visible to
customers and potential terrorists or criminals. These policies make
it easier for customers to contact security personnel in an emergency
or potential emergency.
* Employee training. All 32 of the rail operators we previously
interviewed had provided security training to their staff, which
largely consisted of ways to identify suspicious items and persons and
how to respond to events.
* CCTV and video analytics. As we previously reported, 29 of 32 U.S.
rail operators had implemented some form of CCTV to monitor their
stations, yards, or trains. Some rail operators have installed "smart"
cameras which make use of video analytics to alert security personnel
when suspicious activity occurs, such as if a passenger left a bag in
a certain location or if a person entered a restricted area. According
to one passenger rail operator we spoke with, this technology was
relatively inexpensive and not difficult to implement. Several other
operators stated they were interested in exploring this technology.
* Rail system design and configuration. In an effort to reduce
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and increase overall security,
passenger rail operators are incorporating security features into the
design of new and existing rail infrastructure, primarily rail
stations. For example, of the 32 rail operators we previously
interviewed, 22 of them had removed their conventional trash bins
entirely, or replaced them with transparent or bomb-resistant trash
bins. Of 32 rail operators we previously interviewed, 22 had stated
they were incorporating security into the design of new or existing
rail infrastructure.
A Concept of Operations For Explosives Detection Technologies Could
Enable Passenger Rail Operators to Better Balance Security with the
Movement of Passengers:
In deploying explosives detection technologies, it is important to
develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) for both using these
technologies to screen passengers and their belongings and for
responding to identified threats. This CONOPS for passenger rail would
include specific plans to respond to threats without unacceptable
impacts on the flow of passengers through the system. There are
multiple components of a CONOPS. First, operators identify likely
threats to rail systems and choose layers of security to mitigate
these threats. Since each rail system in the United States faces
different risks, rail systems perform their own risk assessment in
consultation with federal partners to identify their risks. Using the
results of the risk assessment, each system crafts a strategy to
respond to the threat and to mitigate the risks by acquiring different
layers of security. Rail systems typically make use of multiple
security layers--which may or may not include the use of an explosives
detection technology component--based on the risks each system faces.
The CONOPS is a plan to respond to threats identified by one of the
layers of security. Developing a CONOPS for responding to explosives
detection technology is challenging because of the potential for false
alarms. For example, two rail operators with whom we spoke and that
were using explosives detection technologies to screen passengers and
their belongings stated that a CONOPS was critical for ensuring that
actions taken in response to an alarm are appropriate and are followed
correctly. For example, should the person be questioned or searched
further or should the person be moved to another location on the
chance that the threat is real. These are questions that would be
answered in developing a CONOPS and before implementing explosives
detection technology in the passenger rail environment. Two of the
rail operators and one of the experts that attended our panel also
expressed concern about the potential for false alarms when using
explosives detection technologies and the potential impacts on rail
operations. For example, operators were concerned about a false alarm
stopping service. As a result, it is important to carefully consider
the CONOPS of using a particular technology, such as how to respond to
false alarms, in addition to the security benefits before
implementation. For instance, one major rail operator's CONOPS
involves using handheld explosives detection technology to screen
passengers' baggage randomly by a law enforcement officer. The
frequency in which bags are selected is determined in advance by
someone other than the law enforcement officer--such as a supervisor--
based on a number of factors such as the number of passengers entering
a station and resources available for screening. The baggage is then
screened by the officer with the explosives detection equipment; if
there is no alarm, the passenger is free to continue. Should the bag
alarm, the officer then questions the passenger to determine the
source of the alarm and, if necessary, takes action to respond to a
threat.
Costs, Potential Legal Implications, and Policy Concerns, such as
Privacy and Health, Are Important Considerations When Making Decisions
about Explosives Detection Technologies in the Passenger Rail
Environment:
Cost is an important consideration for rail system security
investments, as all operators have limited resources to devote to
security. For example, all of the rail operators that we spoke with
and that attended our expert panel expressed the view that obtaining
funds for security priorities is challenging. Nearly all domestic rail
systems operate at a deficit in which their revenues from operations
do not cover their total cost of operations. An official from the
industry association representing passenger rail and mass transit
systems that attended our expert panel stated that when it comes to
security investments, security often becomes less of a priority than
operational investments as they often operate with budgets deficits.
In addition, another rail operator that attended our expert panel
raised concern that TSGP often will not provide funding for ongoing
maintenance of capital purchases, additional staff needed to deploy
these technologies, and disposable items required to operate the
technology, such as swabs for explosive trace detection devices. For
example, while rail operators can use TSGP grant funds to purchase
explosives detection equipment, funding for the operation and
maintenance of this technology is only provided for a 36 month period.
One major rail operator that attended our expert panel stated that the
cost of deploying a random baggage check with a handheld explosive
trace detector costs between $700 and $1,000 per hour, including the
costs of staffs' salaries and disposable items. Given the cost of
operating and maintaining these security technologies, it would be
important for policymakers to consider all associated costs of these
technologies before implementing new security measures or encouraging
their use.
Legal implications with regard to constitutional and tort law would
also be important for passenger rail operators to consider when
determining whether and how explosives detection technologies are
applied in the passenger rail environment.[Footnote 82] The Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects individuals against
unreasonable governmental searches, and state constitutional law may
provide additional protections against searches. In recent years,
federal courts have heard several challenges to new passenger
inspection programs implemented in passenger rail environments.
[Footnote 83] In these cases, in order to assess the constitutionality
of the programs, the courts considered factors such as the
intrusiveness of the searches, the government interest in the program,
and the effectiveness of the program. In addition to constitutional
concerns, taking actions to mitigate potential tort liability is
another important consideration for rail operators. For example, state
law may allow individuals to bring tort claims against transit
agencies, such as claims related to invasion of privacy and health
hazards posed by scanning equipment. Also, operators using explosives
detection canines should be conscious of potential claims related to
dog bites.
There are also privacy considerations associated with subjecting
passengers to certain types of screening technologies. Because
explosives detection technologies generally do not collect personally
identifiable information, they pose fewer privacy concerns than other
screening techniques may. However, a number of advocacy groups have
raised concerns about the use of AITs which produce an image of a
person without clothing. To protect passengers' privacy, however, ways
have been introduced to blur the passengers' images with privacy
settings.
Concerns also exist about the impact that certain technologies could
have on the health of passengers. For example, certain types of
explosives detection screening equipment may expose individuals to
mild radiation. Specifically, technologies such as backscatter x-ray
AIT expose the passenger to minute amounts of radiation. While this
radiation exposure is smaller than the radiation a person receives by
a normal medical x-ray, the public may have concerns about being
exposed to any radiation or may misjudge the amount of radiation they
receive. For example, according to TSA, a person would require more
than 1,000 backscatter scans in a year to reach the effective dose
equal to one standard chest x-ray. Additionally, some forms of IMS
technology make use of radiation in their operation and some people
may be concerned with having any radiation source in a rail network.
Finally, some passenger rail systems operate across multiple city,
county, and other jurisdictions and must coordinate with local
governments and law enforcement across these areas. For example, the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority was established by an
interstate compact between Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia. The authority has its own police force and must coordinate
with not only the police force of the District of Columbia, but also
the surrounding communities through which its trains pass. This
pattern is common across the country where public transportation
systems cross state and local boundaries. As such, the use of
explosives detection equipment throughout these networks involves
coordination across many levels of government and may potentially
invoke the laws of multiple jurisdictions and come under the scrutiny
of different governments.
Concluding Observations:
Securing passenger rail systems is a daunting challenge for several
reasons, including the open nature of these systems and the relative
ease and the number of locations in which these systems can be
accessed by those wishing to cause harm. While there are some
explosives detection technologies available or currently in
development that could be used to help secure passenger rail, there
are several technical, operational, and policy factors that are
important to consider when determining the role that these
technologies can play in passenger rail security. There are various
stakeholders responsible for securing passenger rail systems and all
may need to be involved when making decisions to fund, implement, and
operate explosives detection technologies. It is also important that
the need for explosives detection technologies be based on a
consideration of the risks posed by the threat of an explosives attack
on passenger rail systems. Such a risk assessment would help define
the detection needs, including what explosives materials need to be
detected and in what quantities.
Explosives detection technologies are just one of many layers of
security and cannot, by themselves, secure passenger rail systems.
While explosives detection technologies can play a role in securing
passenger rail systems, certain aspects of these technologies will
likely limit their immediate use. All of the technologies face key
challenges, including the ability to screen passengers without undue
delays. In some cases, the ability to detect more conventional
explosives is also limited. The ability of these technologies to
effectively detect explosives on people and their belongings, as well
as the expectations of the public for openness and speed when using
rail, will likely be key drivers in decisions about which technologies
should be applied, and in what capacity. Other important
characteristics of the technologies, including the mobility,
durability, and the size of the equipment, may limit deployment
options for explosives detection technologies in passenger rail. The
ability of these technologies to effectively detect explosives often
depends on a human operator and the development of a strong concept of
operations that defines the processes used to screen passengers and
their belongings and the roles that people and technology play in that
process will be critical.
When considering the options for securing passenger rail, it is
important that policymakers also take into account the cost and legal
implications of securing systems that are so open and widely used by
the public. The lack of funding from passenger rail operator budgets
means that the purchase and maintenance of explosives detection
technologies would likely originate from or be highly subsidized by
the federal government. Moreover, the wide scale use and reliance on
these systems by the public means that individuals and advocacy groups
may raise concerns about any technology that screens passengers or
their belongings. An effective risk management process that
continuously examines the risks posed by explosives to the passenger
rail environment and considers the various technical, operational, and
policy considerations when determining alternative solutions to
address the explosives risk should result in an effective
identification of the role that explosives detection technologies can
play in securing passenger rail.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided draft copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland
Security, Defense, Transportation, Justice, and Energy for review and
comment. DHS's TSA and the Department of Transportation provided
technical comments which we have incorporated as appropriate. The
National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy
agreed with our report and also provided technical comments which we
incorporated, as appropriate. The Department of Defense provided
technical comments which we have incorporated as appropriate. The
Department of Justice stated they had no comments on the draft report.
We will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland
Security, Defense, Transportation, Justice, and Energy, and
appropriate congressional committees. The report will also be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please
contact Nabajyoti Barkakati at (202) 512-4499 or barkakatin@gao.gov or
David Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Dr. Nabajyoti Barkakati:
Chief Technologist:
Director, Center for Science, Technology, and Engineering:
Signed by:
David C. Maurer:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine what explosives detection technologies are available and
their ability to help secure the passenger rail environment, we met
with experts and officials on explosives detection research,
development, and testing, and reviewed test, evaluation, and pilot
reports and other documentation from several components within the
Department of Homeland Security including the Science and Technology
Directorate, the Transportation Security Laboratory; the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA); the Office of Bombing
Prevention; and the United States Secret Service; several Department
of Defense (DOD) components including the Naval Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Technology Division (NAVEODTECHDIV), the Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG), and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO); several Department of Energy (DOE) National
Laboratories involved in explosives detection testing, research and
development including Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia
National Laboratories (SNL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and
Idaho National Laboratory (INL); and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF), because of its expertise in explosives detection. We also
observed explosives detection canine testing at the ATF's National
Canine Training and Operations Center in Front Royal, Virginia. We
also observed a TSA pilot test of a standoff explosives detection
system at a rail station within the Port Authority Trans-Hudson
passenger rail system (PATH). In addition, we made site visits to LANL
and SNL to observe the research and development work being done and to
interview experts on explosives detection technologies. We also
interviewed several manufacturers of explosives detection technologies
and attended an industry-wide exhibition and demonstration of
explosives detection equipment products. In addition, we attended a
symposium and workshop on explosives detection organized by DOD's
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, the 2009 DOD Explosive
Detection Equipment Program Review at NAVEODTECHDIV, and an academic
workshop on explosive detection at DHS's Center of Excellence for
Explosives Detection, Mitigation, and Response at the University of
Rhode Island. We also interviewed government officials involved with
securing passenger rail in the United Kingdom. Finally, we visited six
domestic passenger rail locations that were involved in testing
various types of explosives detection technologies to either observe
the testing or discuss the results of these tests with operators.
Table 3 is a listing of the passenger rail locations we visited.
Table 3: Passenger Rail Operators Interviewed During This Engagement:
Passenger rail system: Chicago Transit Authority (CTA);
Urban area served: Chicago, Illinois.
Passenger rail system: Maryland Transit Administration (MTA);
Urban area served: Greater Washington, D.C., and Maryland.
Passenger rail system: METRA Commuter Rail;
Urban area served: Chicago, Illinois.
Passenger rail system: Port Authority Trans Hudson (PATH);
Urban area served: New York, New York and New Jersey.
Passenger rail system: Virginia Railway Express (VRE);
Urban area served: Northern Virginia, greater Washington, D.C.
Passenger rail system: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit;
Authority (WMATA);
Urban area served: Washington, D.C.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
In determining which explosives detection technologies were available
and able to secure the passenger rail environment, we considered those
technologies available today or deployable within 5 years,
technologies which could be used to screen either passengers or their
carry-on items, and technologies which were safe to use when deployed
in public areas. In determining the capabilities and limitations of
explosives detection technologies we evaluated their detection and
screening throughput performance, reliability, availability, cost,
operational specifications, and possible use in passenger rail. We
also restricted our evaluation to those technologies which have been
demonstrated through tests, evaluations, and operational pilots, to
detect explosives when tested against performance parameters as
established by government and military users of the technologies.
[Footnote 84]
We also obtained the views of various experts and stakeholders during
a panel discussion we convened with the assistance of the National
Research Council on August 11-12, 2009.[Footnote 85] Panel attendees
included 23 experts and officials from academia, the federal
government, domestic and foreign passenger rail industry
organizations, technology manufacturers, national laboratories, and
passenger rail industry stakeholders such as local law enforcement
officials and domestic and foreign passenger rail operators. During
this meeting, we discussed the availability and applicability of
explosives detection technologies for the passenger rail environment
and the operational and policy impacts associated with implementing
these technologies in the rail environment. While the views expressed
during this panel are not generalizable across all fields represented
by officials in attendance, they did provide an overall summary of the
current availability and effectiveness of explosives detection and
industry views on their applicability to passenger rail.
To determine what key operational and policy factors could have an
impact in determining the role of explosives detection technologies in
the passenger rail environment, we reviewed documentation related to
the federal strategy for securing passenger rail, including TSA's Mass
Transit Modal Annex to the Transportation Systems Sector Specific
Plan, and other documentation including DHS reports summarizing
explosives detection technology tests conducted in passenger rail to
better understand the role and impact that these technologies have in
the passenger rail environment. We reviewed relevant laws and
regulations governing the security of the transportation sector as a
whole and passenger rail specifically, including the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. We also reviewed our prior
reports on passenger rail security and studies and reports conducted
by outside organizations related to passenger rail or the use of
technology to secure passenger rail, such as the National Academies,
Congressional Research Service, and others to better understand the
existing security measures used in passenger rail and operational and
policy issues. During our interviews and expert panel mentioned above,
we also discussed and identified officials' views related to the key
operational and policy issues of using explosives detection
technologies to secure passenger rail. While these views are not
generalizeable to all industries represented by these officials, they
provided a snapshot of the key operational and policy views.
During our visits to six rail operator locations involved in
explosives detection testing, we interviewed officials regarding
operational and policy issues related to technology and observed
passenger rail operations. We selected these locations because they
had completed or were currently conducting testing of the use of
explosives detection technology in the rail environment and to provide
the views of a cross-section of heavy rail, commuter rail, and light
rail operators. While these locations and officials' views are not
generalizeable to the entire passenger rail industry, they provided us
with a general understanding of the operational and policy issues
associated with using such technologies in the rail environment. In
addition, we utilized information obtained and presented in our June
2009 report on passenger rail security.[Footnote 86] For that work, we
conducted site visits, or interviewed security and management
officials from 30 passenger rail agencies across the United States and
met with officials from two regional transit authorities and Amtrak.
The passenger rail operators we visited or interviewed for our June
2009 report represented 75 percent of the nation's total passenger
rail ridership based on the information we obtained from the Federal
Transit Administration's National Transit Database and the American
Public Transportation Association.
We conducted our work from August 2008 through July 2010 in accordance
with all sections of GAO's Quality Assurance Framework that are
relevant to Technology Assessments. The framework requires that we
plan and perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate
evidence to meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations
to our work. We believe that the information and data obtained, and
the analysis conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings
and conclusions in this product.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Dr. Nabajyoti Barkakati, (202) 512-4499 or barkakatin@gao.gov:
David Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contacts named above, contributors to this report
include Amy Bowser, William Carrigg, Nirmal Chaudhary, Frederick K.
Childers, Christopher Currie, Andrew Curry, Richard Hung, Lara Kaskie,
Leyla Kazaz, Tracey King, Robert Lowthian, and Maria Stattel.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Passenger rail systems consist of various passenger rail transit
systems. Transit rail is comprised of heavy, commuter, and light rail
systems. Heavy rail is an electric railway that can carry a heavy
volume of traffic, and is characterized by high speed and rapid
acceleration, passenger rail cars operating singly or in multi-car
trains on fixed rails, separate rights of way from which all other
vehicular and foot traffic is excluded, sophisticated signaling, and
high-platform loading. Most subway systems are considered heavy rail.
Commuter rail is characterized by passenger trains operating on
railroad tracks and providing regional service, such as between a
central city and its adjacent suburbs. Light rail systems typically
operate passenger rail cars singly (or in short, usually two-car
trains) and are driven electrically with power being drawn from an
overhead electric line.
[2] The American Public Transportation Association compiled this
ridership data from the Federal Transit Administration's National
Transit Database. Ridership on rail transit systems in the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico are included in these statistics. A passenger
trip is defined as the number of passengers who board public
transportation vehicles. Passengers are counted each time they board
vehicles no matter how many vehicles they use to travel from their
origin to their destination.
[3] The White House Transborder Security Interagency Policy Committee
Surface Transportation Subcommittee, Surface Transportation Security
Priority Assessment (March 2010). In making its recommendations, the
subcommittee gathered input from surface-transportation owners and
operators, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Transportation, as well as state and local government representatives.
[4] GAO, Transportation Security: Key Actions Have Been Taken to
Enhance Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security, But Opportunities
Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-678] (Washington, D.C: June 2009)
and Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-851] (Washington, D.C.: September
2005).
[5] An IED is a device fabricated in an improvised manner that
incorporates in its design explosives or destructive, lethal, noxious,
pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals. It can be carried by an
individual or deposited in an unnoticed location for detonation by a
timer or remote control.
[6] S. Rep. No. 110-89, at 42-43 (2007).
[7] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div.
H, tit. I, 121 Stat. 1844, 2249 (Dec. 26, 2007).
[8] The Transportation Systems Sector Specific Plan documents the
processes to be used in carrying out the national strategic priorities
related to securing the U.S. transportation system.
[9] Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (Aug. 3, 2007).
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-678].
[11] Ridership data reported by the American Public Transportation
Association for 2008.
[12] The Alaska Railroad Corporation also operates intercity passenger
rail service. Amtrak's ridership data comes from the 2007 Amtrak
Environmental Health and Safety Report.
[13] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001).
[14] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002).
[15] The 18 industry sectors include agriculture and food, banking and
finance, chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical
manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services,
energy, government facilities, information technology, national
monuments and icons, nuclear, postal and shipping, public health and
healthcare, transportation, and water.
[16] FRA regulations define emergency to include a security-related
incident, such as a bomb threat, among other things. Each plan must
address, for example, employee training and qualification and
coordination with emergency responders. Also, each covered railroad
must conduct full-scale passenger train emergency simulations in order
to determine its capability to execute the emergency preparedness plan.
[17] Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (Aug. 3, 2007).
[18] 73 Fed. Reg. 72,130 (Nov. 26, 2008).
[19] The NSTS, mandated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, outlines the federal government approach--in
partnership with state, local, and tribal governments and private
industry--to secure the U.S. transportation system from terrorist
threats and attacks.
[20] DHS updated the NIPP in 2009.
[21] GAO, Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based
on Risk, but Its Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant
Oversight Can Be Strengthened, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-491] (Washington, D.C.: June 8,
2009).
[22] PETN is pentaerythritol tetranitrate. RDX is the explosive
cyclotrimethylene trinitramine, also known as cyclonite. These can be
used separately or combined with binders and other agents to form, for
example, the hand-moldable plastic explosives, C-4 and Semtex. RDX is
the main ingredient of C-4. Semtex contains both PETN and RDX.
[23] Legitimate buyers are licensed or permitted possessors of
explosives.
[24] Black powder, also called gunpowder, is a mixture of sulfur,
charcoal, and potassium nitrate. It is the main ingredient found in
fireworks. In the past it was used as a propellant powder in
ammunition.
[25] Smokeless powder is not an explosive but rather a flammable solid
that burns very rapidly and is mainly used as a propellant in modern
ammunitions.
[26] TATP is triacetone triperoxide and its usual form is a white
powder.
[27] HMTD is hexamethylene tripreoxide diamine and its usual form is a
white powder.
[28] Certain details regarding the ability of particular technologies
to detect explosives and any limitations in their ability to detect
certain types of explosives were deleted because DHS considered them
to be Sensitive Security Information.
[29] Trace particles are microscopic particles not visible to the
naked eye. Existing explosives trace detectors can detect on the order
of 10 nanograms of explosive trace material, which is 1,000 times
smaller than what is typically considered to be the least visible
amount.
[30] A familiar implementation of this two stage process is the
primary and secondary inspection layers used in airport security
checkpoints.
[31] While canines are not a technology per se, they have been
included in this assessment because of their widespread use for
explosives detection.
[32] In addition to trace particles, there may also be minute amounts
of explosive substances naturally vaporized and aloft in the
atmosphere near the compound. However, most conventional explosives
have very low vapor pressures and, hence, do not produce much
vaporized particles at their surface and therefore, the primary
sampling source is trace particles. For sample collection, some
handheld detectors also have a vacuum collection system.
[33] Details regarding the ability of IMS technologies to detect
explosives were deleted because DHS considered them to be Sensitive
Security Information.
[34] Many conventional explosive compounds contain either nitro (NO2)
or nitrate (NO3) groups.
[35] Gas chromatography (GC) is a technique used to separate various
molecular species in a gaseous mixture. It consists of a hollow tube
or column that is usually packed with beads. The gaseous mixture is
made to pass through this column where various molecules interact
differently with the beads causing them to exit the GC column at
various times thereby resulting in the separation of individual
gaseous species. A GC is used at the front end of an IMS or mass
spectrometry trace detector to improve its detection effectiveness.
[36] A reagent is a chemical agent or a substance or compound that is
added to a system in order to bring about a chemical reaction or is
added to see if a reaction occurs. Such a reaction is used to confirm
the presence of another substance.
[37] Details regarding the difficulty these systems face in detecting
certain types of explosives were deleted because DHS considered them
to be Sensitive Security Information.
[38] Small-bulk amount is defined by the Naval Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Technology Division as the minimum amount that is visible to
the eye.
[39] Certain details regarding the ability of kit-based detection
systems to detect explosives and any limitations regarding these
technologies were deleted because DHS considered them to be Sensitive
Security Information.
[40] The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization is a
jointly manned activity of DOD, established to reduce or eliminate the
effects of all forms of IEDs used against U.S. and Coalition Forces.
Its leadership teams include representatives from the office of the
secretary of all five branches of the U.S. military, plus legal,
advisory and expert representatives from throughout the DOD and the
intelligence community.
[41] The specific types of explosives that these technologies were
able to detect were deleted because DHS considered them to be
Sensitive Security Information.
[42] The Transportation Security Laboratory survey showed there were
11 manufacturers of handheld, 10 of desktops, and 9 of portable kits.
[43] The Transportation Security Laboratory gives carry-on baggage a
technology readiness level of 9 for use in commercial aviation.
Technology at this level has been proven through successful mission
operations.
[44] Qualified carry-on baggage explosive detection systems have been
tested to verify that they meet requirements as specified in a TSA-
initiated Technical Requirements Document.
[45] PATH is a subsidiary of the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, and is the eighth largest heavy rail transit authority in the
United States.
[46] Certain details regarding the limitations of IMS screening
technology in portals were deleted because DHS considered them to be
Sensitive Security Information.
[47] The Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division
performance requirements are established by military security
personnel, various government agencies with similar requirements, and
commercial industry.
[48] Certain details regarding the ability of ETPs to detect
explosives were deleted because DHS considered them to be Sensitive
Security Information.
[49] MS-based systems can provide about 10,000 times greater
specificity than an IMS-based system; that is they have a much greater
ability to distinguish explosive molecules from interfering molecules
in a sample, resulting in a significantly lower alarm rate. The
greater specificity also makes MS-based systems capable of better
distinguishing a broader range of explosives from other similar
chemical compounds.
[50] Details concerning the ability of MS-based ETPS to detect
explosives in DHS laboratory tests were deleted because DHS considered
them to be Sensitive Security Information.
[51] GAO, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed,
and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but
Continue to Face Challenges, GAO-09-21SU (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17,
2009).
[52] The millimeter wave region of the electromagnetic spectrum
encompasses frequencies generally between 30 GHz and 300 GHz.
[53] Details from the TSA's October 2009 test regarding the
probability of detection and probability of false alarm for AIT
systems were deleted because DHS considered them to be Sensitive
Security Information.
[54] There is no standard definition of standoff detection and
separation distances can be less than a meter to tens of meters and
beyond depending on concept of operations and goals. When applied to
passenger rail, their distinguishing feature is they attempt to screen
passengers with minimal to no impact on normal passenger flow.
[55] The THz region of the electromagnetic spectrum encompasses
frequencies generally between 1000 GHz and 10,000 GHz.
[56] Tests were run, for example, in New Jersey's PATH system,
Washington D.C.'s Amtrak station at Union Station, and at the Staten
Island Ferry Line in New York.
[57] DHS and DOJ/FBI Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Terrorist
Tactics Against Mass Transit and Passenger Rail,,September 18, 2009.
[58] TSA has told us that they are encouraged enough by the technology
that at least one commercial standoff system is on the path to be
qualified.
[59] Certain details regarding the limitations of stand-off
technologies were deleted because DHS considered them to be Sensitive
Security Information.
[60] A Behavior Detection Officer is a TSA Transportation Security
Officer specially trained to detect suspicious behavior in individuals.
[61] Generally, TSGP funding for each EDC lasts 36 months.
[62] Details regarding the limitations of vapor wake canines were
deleted because DHS considered them to be sensitive security
information.
[63] Certain details regarding the limitations of AIT systems were
deleted because DHS considered them to be Sensitive Security
Information.
[64] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful
for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be
Systematically Reassessed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-299] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2007). The model is used to guide Transportation Security Officer
(TSO) staffing requirements for screening operations at the nation's
airports using assumptions on a representative week during each
airports' busiest month.
[65] Both DOD's Technical Support Working Group and the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization have sponsored
research and development efforts to test emerging hardened handheld
trace detectors, and the Technical Support Working Group is developing
a hardened portal.
[66] Since late 2005, TSA has reported deploying VIPR teams consisting
of various TSA personnel to augment the security of passenger rail
systems and promote the visibility of TSA. Working alongside local
security and law enforcement officials, VIPR teams conduct a variety
of security tactics to introduce unpredictability and deter potential
terrorist actions, including random high visibility patrols at
passenger rail stations and conducting passenger and baggage screening
operations using specially trained behavior detection officers and a
varying combination of explosives detection canine teams and
explosives detection technology.
[67] In 2005, TSA expanded the NEDCTP from aviation into mass transit.
TSA has worked in partnership with mass transit systems to procure,
train, certify, and deploy canine teams to mass transit systems
nationwide to provide mobile and flexible deterrence and explosives
detection capabilities. TSA provides the canine training for the
handler and the dogs and also allocates funds to cover costs
associated with continued training and maintenance of the team, while
the transit system commits a handler to attend the TSA training and
receive program certification.
[68] Since fiscal year 2008, TSA has approved transit agency projects
and then forwarded them to FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) for
review. GPD is responsible for ensuring that all grant projects adhere
to federal grant requirements, including all environmental and
historical preservation (EHP) requirements. FEMA's Office of
Environmental and Historical Preservation (OEHP) assists with the EHP
reviews. GPD reviews projects identified as having limited EHP
impacts, while OEHP reviews projects needing a more extensive
environmental and historical review. Until FEMA is satisfied that all
requirements have been met, no grant funding can be released to
transit agencies to begin projects. However, once funds are awarded,
transit agencies must complete the grant project within the designated
performance period for the grant year.
[69] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-491].
[70] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-491].
[71] To carry out this process, DHS S&T brings together agency
representatives into Integrated Product Teams (IPT) to collaboratively
set research and spending priorities to the individual project level.
IPTs do not include technology end-users--such as transit bus and rail
system security operators--because DHS has assumed that its component
agencies would represent end-user interests.
[72] The White House Transborder Security Interagency Policy Committee
Surface Transportation Subcommittee, Surface Transportation Security
Priority Assessment (March 2010). In making its recommendations, the
subcommittee gathered input from surface-transportation owners and
operators, DHS and DOT, as well as state and local government
representatives.
[73] See FAR § 9.203.
[74] Technologies that successfully pass independent and operational
evaluation are added to a list of qualified products.
[75] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-678].
[76] In our June 2009 report, we recommended that to help ensure that
DHS security technology research and development efforts reflect the
security technology needs of the nation's mass transit and passenger
rail systems, TSA should expand its outreach to the mass transit and
passenger rail industry in the planning and selection of related
security technology research and development projects. See GAO-09-678.
[77] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-678].
[78] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-678].
[79] Another rail operator with whom we spoke, indicated that they had
performed a risk assessment in which they identified their most
critical assets and had identified likely threats to their system,
including terrorism attacks by IEDs.
[80] A risk assessment, as required by the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, involves assessing each of the three elements of
risk--threat, vulnerability, and consequence--and then combining them
together into a single analysis.
[81] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-851].
[82] For a detailed discussion of legal implications of performing
passenger security inspections, see Jenks, Christopher W.
Transportation Research Board of the National Academies TCRP Report
86: Public Transportation Security--Volume 13: Public Transportation
Passenger Security Inspections: A Guide for Policy Decision Makers
(Washington, D.C.: 2007).
[83] Three passenger inspection programs have been challenged in
different judicial districts. Based on the specific facts and
circumstances of each case, each of the challenges was denied. See,
e.g., Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F. 3d 67 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
random inspections of ferry passengers' automobiles and baggage did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because the intrusions on privacy
interests are minimal and the measures are reasonably effective in
serving an important governmental special need to protect ferry
passengers and crew from terrorist acts); McWade v. Kelly, 2005 WL
3338573 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that New York City's random passenger
inspection program did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the
governmental interest in preventing a terrorist act on the subway is
vitally important, that the inspection program is effective in
deterring such an act, and the minimal intrusion entailed by subway
searches is justified); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee et
al. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 2004 WL 1682859 (D.
Mass. 2004) (holding that a policy permitting security searches of
handbags, briefcases, and other items carried onto trains and buses
was likely constitutional because there is a substantial governmental
need or public interest served by the regime and the privacy intrusion
is reasonable in its scope and effect, given the nature and dimension
of the public interest to be served).
[84] Specific performance parameters included, for example, the
ability to successfully determine the presence of a variety of
explosives and not falsely indicate the presence of nor falsely
confirm the absence of explosives.
[85] We have a standing contract with the National Research Council
(NRC) under which the NRC provides assistance in convening groups of
experts to provide information and expertise in our engagements. The
NRC uses its scientific network to identify participants and uses its
facilities and processes to arrange the meetings. Recording and using
the information in a report is our responsibility.
[86] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-678].
[End of section]
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