Environmental Protection
Issues Raised by the Reorganization of EPA's Ombudsman Function Gao ID: GAO-03-92 October 31, 2002Federal ombudsmen help their agencies be more responsive to the public through the impartial investigation of citizens' complaints. Professional standards for ombudsmen incorporate certain core principles, such as independence and impartiality. In July 2001, GAO reported that key aspects of EPA's hazardous waste ombudsman were not consistent with professional standards, particularly with regard to independence. (See GAO-01-813.) Partly in response to GAO's recommendations, EPA reorganized its ombudsman function and removed the national ombudsman from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. GAO made preliminary observations on these changes in testimony in June and July 2002. (See GAO-02-859T and GAO-02-947T). This report provides information on (1) the current status of EPA's reorganization of the ombudsman function and (2) issues identified in our prior report and testimonies that have not yet been addressed.
EPA's national ombudsman now reports to a newly created Assistant Inspector General for Congressional and Public Liaison within the Office of Inspector General (OIG), unlike other federal agencies whose ombudsmen report to the highest levels of the agency. Control over the budget and staff resources for EPA's ombudsman is held by the Assistant Inspector General and not the ombudsman. Similarly, overall responsibility for the work performed by the OIG rests with the Inspector General; the ombudsman no longer has the authority to decide which complaints warrant further review, as was the case prior to the reorganization. Regarding the recordkeeping and accountability aspects of the ombudsman function, OIG officials say that they will likely adopt many of the office's existing procedures for tracking, documenting, and reporting the results of investigations. While EPA's reorganization addresses some of the concerns raised in GAO's July 2001 report and subsequent testimonies, other issues remain. For example, EPA removed the national ombudsman from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, whose decisions the ombudsman was responsible for investigating. However, the ombudsman still will not be able to exercise independent control over budget and staff resources as called for by relevant professional standards. Relocating the ombudsman to the OIG also raises some new issues regarding (1) the extent to which the position will function as a "true" ombudsman in interactions with the public and (2) the potential impact of the reorganization on the OIG's role. Although the role of an ombudsman typically includes program operating responsibilities, such as helping to informally resolve disagreements between the agency and the public, for legal reasons such responsibilities have been omitted from the ombudsman's role within the OIG. In addition, with the ombudsman function a part of the OIG, the Inspector General can no longer independently audit and investigate that function, as is the case at other federal agencies where the ombudsman and the OIG are separate entities.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-92, Environmental Protection: Issues Raised by the Reorganization of EPA's Ombudsman Function
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Report to the Honorable
Diana DeGette,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
October 2002:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
Issued Raised by the Reorganization of EPA‘s Ombudsman Function:
Reorganization of EPA‘s Ombudsman:
GAO-03-92:
GAO Highlights:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AADMINISTRATION
Issues Raised by the Reorganization of EPA‘s Ombudsman Function:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Federal ombudsmen help their agencies be more responsive to the public
through the impartial investigation of citizens‘ complaints.
Professional
standards for ombudsmen incorporate certain core principles, such as
independence and impartiality. In July 2001, GAO reported that key
aspects of EPA‘s hazardous waste ombudsman were not consistent with
professional standards, particularly with regard to independence.
(See GAO-01-813.) Partly in response to GAO‘s recommendations, EPA
reorganized its ombudsman function and removed the national ombudsman
from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. GAO made
preliminary observations on these changes in testimony in June and
July 2002. (See GAO-02-859T and GAO-02-947T). This report provides
information
on (1) the current status of EPA‘s reorganization of the ombudsman
function
and (2) issues identified in our prior report and testimonies that
have not
yet been addressed.
What GAO Found:
EPA‘s national ombudsman now reports to a newly created Assistant
Inspector General for
Congressional and Public Liaison within the Office of Inspector
General (OIG), unlike
other federal agencies whose ombudsmen report to the highest levels
of the agency.
Control over the budget and staff resources for EPA‘s ombudsman is
held by the Assistant
Inspector General and not the ombudsman. Similarly, overall
responsibility for the work
performed by the OIG rests with the Inspector General; the ombudsman
no longer has the
authority to decide which complaints warrant further review, as
was
the case prior to the
reorganization. Regarding the recordkeeping and accountability
aspects of the ombudsman
function, OIG officials say that they will likely adopt many of
the office‘s existing
procedures for tracking, documenting, and reporting the results
of investigations.
While EPA‘s reorganization addresses some of the concerns raised
in GAO‘s July 2001 report
and subsequent testimonies, other issues remain. For example,
EPA removed the national
ombudsman from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
whose decisions the ombudsman
was responsible for investigating. However, the ombudsman still
will not be able to exercise
independent control over budget and staff resources as called for
by relevant professional
standards. Relocating the ombudsman to the OIG also raises some
new issues regarding (1) the
extent to which the position will function as a ’true“ ombudsman
in interactions with the public
and (2) the potential impact of the reorganization on the OIG‘s
role. Although the role of an
ombudsman typically includes program operating responsibilities,
such as helping to informally
resolve disagreements between the agency and the public, for
legal reasons such responsibilities
have been omitted from the ombudsman‘s role within the OIG. In
addition, with the ombudsman
function a part of the OIG, the Inspector General can no longer
independently audit and investigate
that function, as is the case at other federal agencies where the
ombudsman and the OIG are
separate entities.
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that EPA reconsider placement of the national
ombudsman in the OIG.
EPA and the OIG disagreed with GAO‘s conclusion that the ombudsman
function still is not
consistent with the position‘s typical definition, which includes
informally resolving
disagreements. GAO continues to believe that the ombudsman and
OIG functions are fundamentally
different and should not be housed together.
The full report, including GAO‘s objectives, scope, methodology,
and analysis is available at
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-92. For additional information
about the report, contact
John B. Stephenson (202) 512-3841.
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Status of EPA‘s Reorganization of Its Ombudsman Function:
Issues Raised by EPA‘s Reorganization of the Ombudsman Function:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Comments from the Environmental Protection
Agency:
Appendix II: Comments from the Environmental Protection
Agency:
Abbreviations:
ABA American Bar Association:
EPA Environmental Protection Agency:
GAO General Accounting Office:
OIG Office of Inspector General:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 31, 2002:
The Honorable Diana DeGette
House of Representatives:
Dear Ms. DeGette:
The Congress is currently considering legislation to reauthorize the
Environmental Protection Agency‘s (EPA‘s) hazardous waste ombudsman and
strengthen the ombudsman‘s authority. EPA‘s ombudsman was first
established in 1984 to assist the public and the regulated community by
providing information, responding to concerns, and investigating the
merits of complaints relating to the implementation of waste management
programs under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.[Footnote 1]
Over time, EPA expanded the ombudsman‘s jurisdiction to include
Superfund[Footnote 2] and other hazardous waste programs managed by the
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. Although legislative
authorization for the ombudsman function expired in 1988, EPA
recognizes that the ombudsman provides a valuable service to the public
and has retained the function as a matter of policy. In addition to
having a national hazardous waste ombudsman, as of 1996, EPA had
installed ombudsmen in each of its 10 regional offices, where the
function is generally seen as a collateral duty.
Through the impartial and independent investigation of citizens‘
complaints, federal ombudsmen help agencies be more responsive to the
public and, in particular, people who believe that their concerns have
not been dealt with fully or fairly through normal channels. As the
ombudsman function is typically defined within the ombudsman community,
ombudsmen recommend ways to resolve individual complaints or more
systemic problems and help to informally resolve disagreements between
agencies and the public. In 1990, the Administrative Conference of the
United States recommended that the President and the Congress support
initiatives to create and fund ’external“ ombudsmen[Footnote 3]--
ombudsmen who handle concerns and inquiries from the public--in federal
agencies with significant public interaction.[Footnote 4] In addition
to EPA, a number of other federal agencies have established an
ombudsman function, including the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry of the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Food and Drug
Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service.
In a July 2001 report,[Footnote 5] we compared the hazardous waste
ombudsman function at EPA with relevant professional standards for
ombudsmen, including those developed by the American Bar Association,
and found that it was not consistent with the standards in several
areas, particularly with regard to independence. For example, we found
that EPA‘s national ombudsman was located within the Office of Solid
Waste and Emergency Response, the organizational unit whose decisions
the ombudsman was responsible for investigating, and that his budget
and staff resources were controlled by unit managers. We also raised
concerns about the extent to which other aspects of the ombudsman‘s
operations, such as procedures for documenting and reporting on the
results of investigations, were consistent with standards for
impartiality and accountability. Finally, we found that the part-time
status and other duties assigned to EPA‘s regional ombudsmen
compromised their independence. We made a number of recommendations to
strengthen the independence, impartiality, and accountability of the
national ombudsman and to address impairments to the independence of
the regional ombudsmen.
Partly in response to our recommendations, EPA, in November 2001,
reorganized its ombudsman function and relocated the national ombudsman
to the Office of Inspector General (OIG). As you know, we provided some
preliminary observations on EPA‘s reorganization in testimony before
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and
Hazardous Materials and Subcommittee on Health, in June 2002 and July
2002, respectively.[Footnote 6] While EPA is still finalizing the
detailed operating policies and procedures to implement its
reorganization, the agency has made some decisions about the overall
operating framework for the ombudsman function. This report provides
information on (1) the current status of EPA‘s reorganization of its
ombudsman function and (2) issues identified in our prior report and
testimonies that have not yet been addressed.
Results in Brief:
EPA has moved its national ombudsman from the Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response to the OIG under a newly created Assistant Inspector
General for Congressional and Public Liaison. As the reorganization
takes effect, detailed policies and operating procedures for the
ombudsman function have been drafted, but have not yet been finalized.
However, control over the budget and staff resources for the ombudsman
function is exercised by the Assistant Inspector General for
Congressional and Public Liaison and not the ombudsman. Similarly, the
ombudsman no longer has the authority to decide which complaints
warrant further investigation, as was the case prior to the
reorganization. Overall responsibility for the work performed by the
OIG rests with the Inspector General, and no single staff member--
including the national ombudsman--has the authority to select and
prioritize his or her own caseload independent of all other needs.
Regarding recordkeeping and accountability, the OIG‘s draft operating
procedures for the ombudsman indicate that the office‘s existing
procedures for tracking, documenting, and reporting on individual
investigations and overall caseload will be used by the ombudsman. EPA
did not include the 10 regional ombudsmen in the transfer of the
function to the OIG, but retained them in the positions they held prior
to the reorganization. EPA and OIG officials are still working out how
the regional ombudsmen will be utilized and how they will interact with
the national ombudsman. For now, the regional ombudsmen will continue
to have a dual role in fulfilling some ombudsman responsibilities while
also serving in line management positions, primarily within the
Superfund program.
While EPA‘s decision to remove the national ombudsman from the Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response is consistent with our earlier
recommendations, placement of the ombudsman in the OIG does not fully
address the concerns we identified in July 2001 and, as noted in our
subsequent testimonies, raises issues that have not yet been addressed.
EPA‘s reorganization does not provide the degree of structural or
functional independence that is (1) typical of ombudsmen in other
federal agencies or (2) consistent with the relevant professional
standards for ombudsmen, as shown in the following examples:
* Ombudsmen at other federal agencies report to the highest levels of
the agency, such as the Office of the Commissioner in case of the Food
and Drug Administration and the Internal Revenue Service, and can
decide how their funds will be spent.
* EPA‘s national ombudsman, as the position is currently envisioned,
still will not be able to exercise independent control over the budget
and staff resources needed to implement the function and can no longer
independently determine which cases to pursue, as he was able to do
prior to the reorganization.
* In addition, EPA‘s reorganization does not address concerns we raised
in our 2001 report about the independence of the regional ombudsmen,
whose position is generally seen as a collateral duty within EPA. In
other agencies, the staff assigned to the regional ombudsman function
devote 100 percent of their time to that responsibility and report
directly to the national ombudsman.
Further, the ombudsman function as typically defined within the
ombudsman community includes program operating responsibilities, such
as informally resolving disagreements between the agency and the
public, but EPA has chosen to omit these responsibilities from the
national ombudsman‘s role. Including them would have conflicted with
the Inspector General Act, as amended, which prohibits the transfer of
program operating responsibilities to the Inspector General. As a
result, however, the agency has established an ’ombudsman“ that is not
fully consistent with the typical definition. In addition, placing the
ombudsman in the OIG could affect the activities of the Inspector
General. For example, the OIG could no longer independently audit or
investigate the ombudsman, as the OIG can at other federal agencies
where the ombudsman function and the OIG are separate entities.
This report includes a recommendation that EPA reconsider placement of
the national ombudsman in the OIG. In commenting on a draft of this
report, EPA and OIG officials disagreed with our conclusions that,
under EPA‘s reorganization, the ombudsman function is not consistent
with the position as typically defined within the ombudsman community
and lacks sufficient independence. We continue to believe that
ombudsman and OIG functions are fundamentally different and should not
be housed together.
Background:
While there are no federal requirements or standards specific to the
operation of federal ombudsman offices, several professional
organizations have published relevant standards of practice for
ombudsmen, such as those published by the American Bar Association
(ABA), The Ombudsman Association, and the U.S. Ombudsman Association.
For example, the ABA‘s standards[Footnote 7] define the core
characteristics as follows:
* Independence--An ombudsman must be and appear to be free from
interference in the legitimate performance of duties and independent
from control, limitation, or penalty by an officer of the appointing
entity or a person who may be the subject of a complaint or inquiry.
* Impartiality--An ombudsman must conduct inquiries and investigations
in an impartial manner, free from initial bias and conflicts of
interest.
* Confidentiality--An ombudsman must not disclose and must not be
required to disclose any information provided in confidence, except to
address an imminent risk of serious harm. Records pertaining to a
complaint, inquiry, or investigation must be confidential and not
subject to disclosure outside the ombudsman‘s office.
In addition to the core principles, some associations also stress the
need for accountability and a credible review process. Accountability
is generally defined in terms of the publication of periodic reports
that summarize the ombudsman‘s findings and activities. Having a
credible review process generally entails having the authority and the
means, such as access to agency officials and records, to conduct an
effective investigation. The ABA recommends that an ombudsman issue and
publish periodic reports summarizing the findings and activities of the
office to ensure its accountability to the public.
Our July 2001 report made a number of recommendations to strengthen the
independence, impartiality, and accountability of the national
hazardous waste ombudsman and to address impairments to the
independence of the regional ombudsmen. Specifically, we recommended
that EPA (1) modify its organizational structure so that the ombudsman
is located outside of the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
and (2) provide the ombudsman with a separate budget and, subject to
applicable civil service requirements, the authority to hire, fire, and
supervise his own staff. To ensure the adequacy of the ombudsman‘s
resources and provide greater accountability, we recommended that EPA
require the ombudsman to (1) develop written criteria for selecting and
prioritizing cases for investigation; (2) maintain records on his
investigations and other activities sufficient to serve as a basis for
a reasonable estimate of resource needs; (3) establish a consistent
policy for preparing written reports on investigations, consulting with
agency officials and other affected parties to obtain their comments
before findings are made public, and including written agency comments
when reports are published; and (4) file an annual report summarizing
his activities and make it available to the public. With regard to the
regional ombudsmen, we recommended that EPA (1) assess the demand for
ombudsman services nationwide to determine where these resources are
needed and, (2) in those locations where regional ombudsmen are
warranted, ensure that their operations are consistent with the
relevant professional standards for independence.
The Status of EPA‘s Reorganization of Its Ombudsman Function:
In general, EPA is implementing its reorganization of the ombudsman
function by adapting the OIG‘s organizational framework to include the
national ombudsman and applying the OIG‘s existing policies and
procedures to the ombudsman‘s operations. EPA is still considering how
the national ombudsman will interact with the ombudsmen located in the
agency‘s 10 regional offices. While EPA‘s reorganization is still in
its early stages, discussions with OIG officials, their recent
testimony, and other documents provided the following insights on key
aspects of the ombudsman function:
* Organizational location. Within the OIG, the national ombudsman will
report to a newly created Assistant Inspector General for Congressional
and Public Liaison. In addition to the ombudsman function, the new
Assistant Inspector General has responsibility for the OIG hotline and
congressional and media relations. According to EPA, the national
ombudsman was moved from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response to the OIG to strengthen the ombudsman‘s independence. EPA
officials believe that certain characteristics of the OIG--
independence, credibility, experience, and freedom from political
influence--are also important elements of an effective ombudsman
function. While EPA officials acknowledge that the ombudsman is not an
independent entity within the OIG, they maintain that the position is
independent by virtue of the OIG‘s independence. EPA did not include
the regional ombudsmen in the transfer of the ombudsman function to the
OIG, but retained them in the positions they were in prior to the
reorganization.
* Scope of responsibilities. Prior to the reorganization, the national
ombudsman‘s jurisdiction was limited to the hazardous waste programs
managed by EPA‘s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. When the
ombudsman was relocated to the OIG, EPA decided to expand the scope of
the ombudsman‘s responsibilities across the spectrum of EPA-
administered programs, including those related to air pollution, water
pollution, safe drinking water, and others. EPA and the OIG have not
explicitly clarified the programmatic jurisdiction of regional
ombudsmen, but their position is referred to as ’regional Superfund
ombudsman“ and most of them are located within units responsible for
Superfund and other waste management programs.
* Authority over budget resources. According to OIG officials, the
national ombudsman will not have a separate budget allocation. Rather,
the Office of Congressional and Public Liaison will have a specific
allocation within the OIG budget, consistent with budget operations for
similar OIG offices. The ombudsman‘s resource needs will be determined
in conjunction with the needs of the new Office of Congressional and
Public Liaison--and the OIG as a whole--in the context of the
priorities identified in the OIG‘s annual work planning process. EPA
officials noted that in a broader sense, relocating the ombudsman to
the OIG increases the function‘s financial independence; in effect, the
ombudsman‘s budget is outside EPA‘s control because the OIG‘s budget
appropriation is separate from EPA‘s.
* Authority over staff resources. Within the OIG, each Assistant
Inspector General is responsible for assigning staff resources,
including hiring.[Footnote 8] According to OIG officials, decisions on
staff resources are largely based on the advice and recommendations of
senior staff or project leads, such as the national ombudsman.
Initially, the OIG assigned eight full-time staff to inventory and
organize the case files transferred from the former ombudsman‘s office-
-more than double the staff that had been assigned to the ombudsman
function when it was located within the Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response. In part, this exercise will help determine the
ombudsman‘s caseload and an appropriate allocation of resources. OIG
officials noted that the ombudsman now has access to other OIG
resources as needed, including scientists, auditors, attorneys,
engineers, and investigators as well as staff with expertise in
specific subject matters, such as hazardous waste and water pollution.
At the time of our review, OIG officials were still finalizing
operating policies and procedures for the ombudsman function in a
number of areas, including the assignment of other OIG resources to
ombudsman cases. However, in testimony before the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, the Inspector General stated that the OIG
is a matrix organization in which staff and other resources are
assigned to projects on a priority basis, drawing from the pool of OIG
resources.[Footnote 9] In addition, according to draft operating
procedures for the ombudsman, staff will be temporarily assigned from
OIG Resource Centers (field offices) to perform detailed field work on
ombudsman assignments under the technical direction of the ombudsman or
a designee.
* Case selection and prioritization. In general, OIG officials told us
that the Inspector General has the overall responsibility for the work
performed by the OIG, and no single staff member--including the
national ombudsman--has the authority to select and prioritize his or
her own caseload independent of all other needs. Prior to the
reorganization, the ombudsman had authority to determine which cases
warrant further investigation. According to the OIG‘s draft operating
procedures for the ombudsman, all complaints, allegations, concerns,
and inquiries submitted to the ombudsman will be logged into a tracking
system, subject to initial screening, and, ultimately, assessed against
the OIG‘s priorities, as established in its annual work planning
process. Informational inquiries will be referred to the appropriate
EPA office or to other federal or state agencies if the inquiries are
not related to EPA programs or operations. Decisions on which matters
warrant a more detailed review will be made by the Assistant Inspector
General for Congressional and Public Liaison in consultation with the
national ombudsman and other OIG staff. Complaints, allegations, and
concerns deemed to warrant further investigation will be assessed to
determine if they can be incorporated into ongoing or planned OIG
assignments. Otherwise, the cases will be proposed as new work,
evaluated, and prioritized for staffing according to the OIG‘s work
planning evaluation criteria to ensure that staff are assigned to the
highest priority work. The criteria include potential environmental
risk; fraud, waste, or abuse risk; the potential for increasing EPA‘s
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and the extent of interest by
external stakeholders, among other things.
* Recordkeeping and accountability. In testimony before the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, the Inspector General agreed
that public reporting on the ombudsman‘s caseload, activities, and
accomplishments is a vital and important responsibility.[Footnote 10]
She also endorsed public accountability as a means of strengthening the
credibility of a reviewer‘s findings and stated that the OIG would
publish, at least annually, a report summarizing the ombudsman‘s work,
including a status report on cases opened and recommendations or
findings made to the agency. The OIG‘s draft operating procedures for
the ombudsman indicate that they incorporate existing OIG operating
policy and procedures, including those for tracking, documenting, and
reporting the results of investigations. For example, the current
tracking system will be used to separately track the status of
ombudsman cases and provide annual or semiannual activity reports on
the ombudsman‘s activities. With regard to reporting on individual
cases, OIG officials indicated that rather than issue reports to
complainants, the national ombudsman‘s reports will be addressed to the
EPA Administrator, consistent with the reporting procedures for other
OIG offices.
* Status of the regional ombudsman. EPA has also not yet fully defined
the role of its regional ombudsmen or the nature of their relationship
with the national ombudsman in the OIG. According to officials from the
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response and the OIG and draft
operating procedures for the ombudsman, the investigative aspects of
the ombudsman function will be assigned to the OIG and the regional
ombudsmen will respond to inquiries and have a role in informally
resolving issues between the agency and the public before they escalate
into complaints about how EPA operates. For the time being, EPA
officials expect the regional ombudsmen to retain their line management
positions.[Footnote 11] EPA officials told us that the relationship
between the national ombudsman and regional ombudsmen is a ’work in
progress“ and that EPA and the OIG will be developing procedures for
when and how interactions will occur.
Issues Raised by EPA‘s Reorganization of the Ombudsman Function:
EPA‘s reorganization of the ombudsman function does not fully address
the issues we raised in our July 2001 report and, as noted in our
subsequent testimonies, raises some new concerns as well. First,
several aspects of EPA‘s reorganized ombudsman function are not
consistent with existing professional standards for ombudsmen. For
example, among the key indicators of independence identified in the ABA
standards are a budget funded at a level sufficient to carry out the
ombudsman‘s responsibilities; the ability to spend funds independent of
any approving authority; and the power to appoint, supervise, and
remove staff. However, under EPA‘s reorganization, the national
ombudsman will not be able to exercise independent control over budget
and staff resources, even within the general constraints that are faced
by federal agencies. While the national ombudsman will be consulted
about the hiring, assignment, and supervision of staff, overall
authority for staff resources and the budget allocation rests with the
Assistant Inspector General for Congressional and Public Liaison, to
whom the ombudsman reports.
OIG officials pointed out that the concern our July 2001 report raised
about control over budget and staff resources was closely linked to the
ombudsman‘s placement within the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response. The officials believe that once the national ombudsman
function was relocated to the OIG, the ombudsman‘s inability to control
resources became much less significant as an obstacle to operational
independence. They maintain that although the ombudsman is not an
independent entity within the OIG, the position is independent by
virtue of the OIG‘s independence. Nonetheless, we note that the
national ombudsman will also lack authority to independently select and
prioritize cases that warrant investigation. If both the ombudsman‘s
budget and workload are outside his or her control, then the ombudsman
will be unable to ensure that the resources for implementing the
function are adequate.
As we noted in our July 2001 report, the ombudsmen in the other federal
agencies we looked at--including the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Food
and Drug Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service--report to
the highest levels of the agency.[Footnote 12] In addition, although
ombudsmen at other federal agencies must live within a budget and are
subject to the same spending constraints as other offices within their
agencies, they can set their own priorities and decide how their funds
will be spent.
Depending on how EPA ultimately defines the role of its regional
ombudsmen, concerns about their independence could remain. In our July
2001 report, we concluded that the other duties assigned to the
regional ombudsmen--primarily line management positions within the
Superfund program--hamper their independence. Among other things, we
cited guidance from The Ombudsman Association, which states that an
ombudsman should serve ’no additional role within an organization“
because holding another position would compromise the ombudsman‘s
neutrality. Although it appears that EPA‘s regional ombudsmen will not
participate in investigations, perceptions about their lack of
independence could affect their ability to play a role in informally
mediating disagreements between the agency and the public.
When we looked at how other federal agencies dealt with regional
ombudsmen as part of our July 2001 report, we found that the ombudsmen
in two of the other four federal agencies we examined, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Internal Revenue Service, had
staff located in regional offices. In both instances, the regional
staffs devote 100 percent of their time to the ombudsman function; they
are considered part of the national ombudsman‘s office for budget
purposes and report directly to the national ombudsman.
From a broader perspective, EPA‘s reorganization of the ombudsman
function also raises issues about consistency with the way the role is
typically defined within the ombudsman community. Specifically, the
role of an ombudsman typically includes program operating
responsibilities, such as helping to informally resolve program-related
issues and mediating disagreements between the agency and the public.
However, EPA has chosen to omit such responsibilities from the national
ombudsman‘s role within the OIG. Including them would have conflicted
with the Inspector General Act, as amended, which prohibits an agency
from transferring any function, power, or duty involving program
responsibilities to its OIG.[Footnote 13] According to OIG officials,
the national ombudsman‘s role will be limited to reviewing complaints
about EPA‘s programs and operations; the ombudsman will not be
disseminating basic information about the agency‘s programs and
operations or become an advocate for individuals or groups. OIG
officials acknowledge that the reorganized ombudsman function differs
from the accepted definition in some respects, but say that they do not
intend to have a ’traditional“ ombudsman function. Under similar
circumstances, having an ombudsman function that is not consistent with
the way the position is typically defined has raised concerns within
ombudsman community. In an April 2001 report on the role of ombudsmen
in dispute resolution,[Footnote 14] we noted that some federal experts
in the field were concerned that among the growing number of federal
’ombuds“ or ’ombuds offices,“ there are some individuals or activities
that do not generally conform to the standards of practice for
ombudsmen.
A related issue is that ombudsmen generally serve as a key focal point
for interaction between the government, or a particular government
agency, and the general public. By placing the national ombudsman
function within its OIG, EPA appears to be altering the relationship
between the function and the persons who make inquiries or complaints.
Ombudsmen typically see their role as being responsive to the public
without being an advocate. However, EPA‘s reorganization signals a
subtle change in emphasis: OIG officials see the ombudsman function as
a source of information regarding the types of issues that the OIG
should be investigating. In addition, where possible, the OIG plans to
incorporate complaints made to the ombudsman into ongoing or planned
OIG investigations. Finally, as noted earlier, OIG officials expect
that the national ombudsman‘s reports will be addressed to the EPA
Administrator rather than to complainants, consistent with the
reporting procedures for the OIG. However, the officials told us that
their procedures for the national ombudsman function, which are still
being developed, could provide for sending a copy of the final report
or a summary of the investigation to the original complainant along
with a separate cover letter when the report is issued to the
Administrator.
Finally, EPA‘s reorganization of the ombudsman function raises issues
about consistency with the role of the OIG. In reorganizing the
ombudsman function, EPA had to consider statutory restrictions on the
Inspector General‘s activities. However, although it appears that EPA
has successfully defined the ombudsman‘s role in a way that avoids
conflict with the Inspector General Act, the reorganization raises
concerns about the effect on the OIG. With the ombudsman function a
part of the OIG, the Inspector General can no longer independently
audit and investigate that function, as is the case at other federal
agencies where the ombudsman function and the OIG are separate
entities. As we noted in a June 2001 report on certain activities of
the OIG at the Department of Housing and Urban Development, under
applicable government auditing standards the OIG cannot independently
and impartially audit and investigate activities in which it is
directly involved.[Footnote 15] Also of potential concern are
situations in which the national ombudsman receives an inquiry or
complaint about a matter that has already been investigated by the OIG.
For example, OIG reports are typically transmitted to the EPA
Administrator after a review by the Inspector General. A process that
requires the Inspector General to review an ombudsman-prepared report
that is critical of, or could be construed as reflecting negatively on,
previous OIG work could pose a conflict for the Inspector General.
Conclusions:
EPA‘s reorganization of its ombudsman function has addressed some of
the recommendations contained in our July 2001 report. For example, the
agency modified its organizational structure so that the national
ombudsman is located outside of the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response. In addition, as we recommended, EPA‘s ombudsman function now
has written criteria for selecting and prioritizing cases for
investigation and, by virtue of its relocation to the OIG, will be
adopting many of that office‘s existing procedures for tracking,
documenting, and reporting the results of investigations and
summarizing annual activities in a public report.
Notwithstanding the positive aspects of EPA‘s reorganization, other
concerns remain. While the move to the OIG provides a measure of
budgetary independence, the national ombudsman will continue to lack
independent control over budget and staff resources. In addition, EPA
has not yet resolved concerns about the independence of its regional
ombudsmen. Moreover, in relocating the national ombudsman to the OIG,
EPA has created a position that will not function as a ’true“ ombudsman
in interactions with the public and may adversely affect the
independence of the OIG.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that EPA‘s national ombudsman (1) is consistent with what the
ombudsman community and the public have come to expect from that
position and (2) does not adversely affect the independence of the
agency‘s OIG, we recommend that the Administrator, EPA, reconsider
placement of the national ombudsman in the OIG.
Agency Comments:
EPA and the OIG commented on a draft of this report. Specifically, we
received comments from the Assistant Administrator of the Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response and the Inspector General. These
comments are contained in appendix I and appendix II, respectively. In
addition, we incorporated technical comments from the OIG as
appropriate throughout the report.
EPA commented that its reorganization of the ombudsman function
achieves the ’spirit“ of the ABA standards for ombudsmen and cited the
OIG‘s independence, objectivity, and quality of work as reasons why the
relocation of the national ombudsman to the OIG was a sound and correct
decision. More specifically, EPA said that locating the ombudsman in
the OIG ensures that the function operates within ABA‘s standards of
practice for ombudsmen: independence, impartiality, and
confidentiality. Similarly, the comments from the OIG raised a number
of points relating to the appropriateness of housing the ombudsman in
the OIG. Among other things, the OIG said that it intends to perform
the ombudsman function in the same manner in which the office performs
its audit, program evaluation, and investigative functions. The OIG
also maintained that its independence--in terms of controlling budget
and staff resources, selecting and prioritizing cases, and reporting--
are characteristics that also surround the ombudsman function by virtue
of the function‘s location within the OIG. In response to our concerns
about the reorganization‘s impact on the role of the OIG, the office
commented that its framework of internal and external checks and
balances is adequate to ensure that OIG officials can objectively
monitor the quality of internal work processes, including those of the
ombudsman, and address problems if necessary. These checks and balances
would also ensure objectivity in the OIG‘s review of any ombudsman
reports critical of OIG work, according to the Inspector General.
We disagree with the premise underlying the comments by EPA and the
OIG--that there is little or no distinction between the functions
performed by ombudsmen and the OIG. We believe that these functions are
fundamentally different and, as such, should not be housed together.
[Footnote 16] The OIG intends to perform its ombudsman function in the
same manner in which the office performs its audit, program evaluation,
and investigative functions, but doing so means that EPA will have an
ombudsman in name only. ABA‘s standards clearly define the ombudsman‘s
role as including certain responsibilities that have been omitted from
the OIG‘s conception of the ombudsman function. Specifically, according
to ABA, ombudsmen ’work for the resolution of particular issues“ and,
among other things, are engaged in ’developing, evaluating, and
discussing options available to affected individuals“ and
’facilitating, negotiating, and mediating.“ If EPA and the OIG are
intent on maintaining their reorganization, we concur with ABA‘s
position that ’those who are now called ombudsmen but do not meet these
Standards may provide important or valuable services. But, it would be
far better if entities that established these positions were to call
them a term more fitting of the function they provide and to reserve
the term …ombudsman‘ for those who do in fact meet certain basic
authorities and essential characteristics.“:
EPA also commented that based on its preliminary research, some of the
ombudsmen in other federal agencies we contacted may not have as much
independence as our report suggests. Specifically, EPA stated that the
ombudsmen at the Food and Drug Administration and the Internal Revenue
Service (1) do not have independence from agency decision-making
processes and (2) do not have independent budgets because their budgets
are allocated according to decisions by their respective commissioners
and subject to competing demands from other priorities. We disagree.
Both the Food and Drug Administration and the Internal Revenue Service,
whose ombudsmen report to their respective commissioners, have adopted
measures to help ensure that the ombudsmen are isolated from agency
decision-making processes likely to be the subject of investigations.
Consistent with the ABA standards, these ombudsmen have both
’sufficient stature in the organization to be taken seriously by senior
officials“ and ’placement in an organization at the highest possible
level and at least above the heads of units likely to generate the most
complaints.“ Regarding budgetary independence, our report acknowledges
that ombudsmen at other federal agencies must live within a budget and
are subject to the same spending constraints as other offices within
their agencies. In contrast to EPA‘s national ombudsman, however, the
other federal ombudsmen have a specifically allocated budget, can set
their own priorities, and can decide how their funds will be spent.
Finally, EPA commented that its Community Involvement and Outreach
Center provides ’an avenue for active community involvement and
participation in Superfund issues“ and is specifically charged with
responding to community concerns. However, we believe that the center
serves a different purpose than an ombudsman. While the center may help
alleviate community concerns, its focus is limited to Superfund issues
and providing greater community access and participation, not
fulfilling an ombudsman role, particularly with respect to the
independent investigation and resolution of individual complaints.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine how EPA is implementing its reorganization of the
ombudsman function, we met with key officials from EPA‘s Office of
Inspector General and Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. We
also reviewed relevant testimony by EPA and OIG officials and other
pertinent documents, such as the OIG‘s new case selection criteria for
the ombudsman and EPA‘s response to congressional inquiries about the
reorganization.
To identify issues raised by the reorganization, we followed up on
preliminary observations provided in our testimony of June 2002 and
July 2002.[Footnote 17] As part of this effort, we used information
developed for our July 2001 report, including information on relevant
professional standards for ombudsmen, such as those published by ABA,
The Ombudsman Association, and the U.S. Ombudsman Association. We also
reviewed legislation applicable to Inspector General offices and other
relevant GAO reports.
We conducted our review from June 2002 through September 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Administrator, EPA, and other interested parties. We will also
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on GAO‘s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please call me
at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this assignment were Ellen
Crocker, Les Mahagan, Richard Johnson, and Cynthia Norris.
Sincerely yours,
John B. Stephenson
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
Signed by John B. Stephenson:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency:
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460:
Mr. John B. Stephenson Director:
Natural Resources and Environment U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548:
OCT 28 2002:
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
Dear Mr. Stephenson:
I am responding to your request that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA or Agency) review the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft
report on the organizational placement of the ombudsman. EPA
appreciates the opportunity to respond to the draft report.
We continue to believe that the transfer of the National Solid and
Hazardous Waste Ombudsman function to the Office of Inspector General
(OIG) was a correct and sound decision, and that it addresses those
concerns that were raised in GAO‘s July 2001 report. When Administrator
Whitman authorized the transfer in her November 27, 2001 memorandum,
she believed then - and continues to believe now - that the OIG is the
logical home for the function, with its newly expanded role to
investigate complaints about all Agency environmental programs. Within
the EPA organization, locating the ombudsman in the OIG ensures
that.the function operates with independence, impartiality, and
confidentiality, which are standards of practice for ombudsmen,
according to the American Bar Association (ABA). The OIG has an
excellent track record of objectively evaluating interests and has
extensively trained technical staff that will support the ombudsman‘s
expanded scope of work. There is no other office within the Agency
which, by statute, provides for this level of independence.
The independence of the OIG is ensured through its separate budget
authority, hiring and contracting authority, and distinct reporting
responsibilities to Congress that is independent from the Agency. In
addition, internal and external controls monitor the OIG‘s quality of
work, identify areas for improvements, and ensure that the ombudsman
operates with the highest level of integrity and efficiency.
While the draft report provides analysis of ombudsmen in other Federal
organizations, our preliminary research suggests that some of the
Federal ombudsmen may not have the degree of independence the draft
report suggests. For example, neither the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) nor the Internal Revenue Service (TRS) ombudsman functions have
independence from:
*Printed Whh Vegetable ON Based inks on 100% Recycled:
Agency decision making processes, which is suggested in the ABA
standards. In contrast, the EPA ombudsman is independent from the
Agency decision making processes, since the OIG is an independent
organization within EPA,
Our preliminary research also finds that the ombudsmen at FDA and IRS
do not have independent budgets, as inferred in the draft report.
According to our colleagues at FDA and IRS, the ombudsmens‘ budgets are
reviewed along with others in their respective Commissioner‘s office,
and resources are allocated according to their decisions. In addition,
FDA and IRS ombudsmens‘ budgets are subject to the resource demands of
other priorities when additional funds are required to supplement
programs. Therefore, we believe that the funding processes for the OIG
ombudsman function at EPA compare favorably to those at FDA and IRS,
both of which require management review and approval.
As the GAO draft report indicates, the ombudsman in OIG does not retain
program operating responsibilities, such as resolving disagreements
between the Agency and the public. However, EPA continues to maintain a
Community Involvement and Outreach Center to provide an avenue for
active community involvement and participation in Superfund issues. The
Center is specifically charged with responding to community concerns.
Many of the issues that are identified in the draft report have been
and continue to be addressed during a transition period. One issue
concerns the independence of regional ombudsmen and their relationships
with the national ombudsman function. The OIG is reviewing this and
other issues, as stated in the Inspector General‘s letter to you dated
October 11, 2002.
We believe that the placement of the ombudsman function in the OIG
achieves the spirit of the ABA standards and that of the ombudsman
community in the Federal context. …We expect that the OIG will continue
to provide the Agency and the American public with quality and
objective evaluations:
Thank you for this opportunity to review the draft report. I appreciate
GAO‘s consideration of these comments and their incorporation in the
final report. I am available to discuss them with you, and your staff
may contact Steve Tiber at 202/564-5184 for additional clarifications.
Sincerely,
Marianne Lamont Horinko:
Assistant Administrator:
Signed by MArianne Lamont Horinko:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency:
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460:
OCT 11 2002:
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:
Mr. John B. Stephenson:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Stephenson:
Thank you for the opportunity to review your recently issued draft
report, ’Issues Raised by the Reorganization of EPA‘s Ombudsman
Function.“ We offer the following comments.
The draft report questions whether the Office of Inspector General‘s
(OIG‘s) Ombudsman function is inconsistent ’with the way the position
is typically defined . . . ’ We believe there is no question that the
OIG Ombudsman function is fully consistent with a typical Ombudsman
definition. On July 2, 2002, the American Bar Association (ABA)
submitted comments to the Honorable James M. Jeffords, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, regarding S. 606, the
’Ombudsman Reauthorization Act of 2002.“ In suggesting that S. 606
’clearly set forth the role and jurisdiction of the ombudsman,“ the
ABA‘ recommended that the bill:
. . . state whether the EPA Ombudsman is a …classical‘ or …advocate‘
ombuds. A classical ombuds operates in the public sector addressing
issues raised by the general public or internally, usually concerning
the actions or policies of government entities or individuals. An
advocate ombuds, like a classical, evaluates claims objectively but
is authorized or required to advocate on behalf of individuals or
groups found to be aggrieved.. . . (Emphasis added):
We have clearly stated in congressional testimony that we intend to
operate in the ’classical,“ versus the ’advocate“ Ombudsman role. It is
no less of an Ombudsman role. Furthermore, we have stated often that we
intend to perform this function in the same manner which we perform our
audit, program evaluation, and investigative functions. That is, the
OIG will not become an ’advocate“ for the specialized interests of
individuals or groups. We review and analyze problems in the EPA
programs
and operations and recommend solutions. That is what Inspectors General
do.
We believe other Federal agency Ombudsman, such as the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, also operate in that manner.
The report challenges the degree of Ombudsman independence and the
application of Ombudsman professional standards subsequent to the
placement of the Ombudsman in the OIG. We disagree with these
characterizations. As we have publicly stated in congressional:
testimony, we believe the IG Act provides complete independence for the
OIG as an organization as well as for all of its employees. We select,
prioritize and carry out all of our work assignments independent of EPA
oversight. We have separate budget authority, separate hiring and
contracting authority, and independent reporting responsibilities to
Congress. These are some of the key characteristics that enable us to
effectively review Agency programs and assure our structural
independence. These characteristics surround the Ombudsman and, thus,
provide the requisite ’independence“ from the government entity being
reviewed - the EPA. It is difficult to conceive how any further
positional independence can or needs to be achieved. We do not believe
that an individual must be free from basic managerial oversight to have
the structural independence to carry out the work of an Ombudsman, or
any other activity.
Regarding Ombudsman professional standards, the OIG has not
specifically adopted such standards. We note, however, that the
American Bar Association standards mirror professional standards found
in GAO‘s Government Auditing Standards and are already fully
incorporated in OIG operations. These include standards such as
independence, impartiality, and confidentiality. Again, it is difficult
to conceive how the application of these standards can be further
enhanced.
The draft report states that OIG Ombudsman detailed policies and
operating procedures are still under development. Since the time of
your fieldwork, we drafted Ombudsman operating procedures to guide our
work. These procedures address many of the recommendations made in your
July 2001 report, ’EPA‘s National and Regional Ombudsmen Do Not Have
Sufficient Independence,“ such as developing case selection and
prioritization criteria, maintaining case file records, establishing a
case reporting policy that include an agency comment process, and
preparing an annual report of activities. These operating procedures
appear at Enclosure I for your consideration as you prepare your final
report.
The draft report also states EPA is still considering how the OIG
Ombudsman will interact with EPA regional Ombudsmen. There have been
several developments since the time of your fieldwork. First, in June
2002, we issued a memorandum jointly signed by the OIG and the Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER) that defines general
roles and responsibilities for each office as well as coordination
expectations. This memorandum appears at Enclosure 2 for your
consideration. Second, our operating procedures provide further
guidance on coordination and communication to include regular meetings
and case referral procedures. Third, the OIG recently initiated a
review to assess OSWER‘s Regional Ombudsman Program. A copy of our
engagement letter appears at Enclosure 3.
The draft report discusses whether OIG‘s assumption of the Ombudsman
function raises concerns because ’the Inspector General can no longer
independently audit and investigate that function.“ We believe these
concerns are misplaced.
OIGs have ’checks and balances“ (both internal and external), enabling
them to monitor the quality of their work processes and, if need be,
address problems or make improvements. These mechanisms apply to all of
our activities, including our Ombudsman activities. First, we have
Quality Assurance Reviews (QAR), Annual Self-Assessments (ASA), and
Administrative Program Reviews (APR) of our program activities. A copy
of the IG Policy describing these mechanisms appears as Enclosure 4.
Second, each OIG employee is required to annually sign an impairments
Statement, a sample of which appears at Enclosure 5. Third, we have
peer reviews conducted every 3 years by another OIG organization.
Fourth, if we determined that a matter arose which we could not
adequately address ourselves (e.g., due to the seriousness of an .
allegation of wrongdoing by an OIG employee or the senior position of
an OIG employee), we would refer the matter to the President‘s Council
on Integrity and Efficiency, to another Federal agency with
jurisdiction over the matter, or to another law enforcement authority
(including another O1G).
Finally, the draft report states, ’[a]lso of potential concern are
situations in which the national ornbudsman receives an inquiry or
complaint about a matter that has already been investigated by the OIG.
. . . A process that requires the Inspector General to review an
Ombudsman-prepared report that is critical of, or could be construed as
reflecting negatively on, previous OIG work could pose a conflict for
the Inspector General.“ If I review an Ombudsman-prepared report
critical of earlier OIG work, it would be incumbent on me to correct
any deficiencies. This is the case whether I receive such a report from
the Ombudsman, a QAR, an ASA, an APR, the peer review process, or the
results from an outside referral. If need be, I will recuse myself from
any matter in which I had prior personal involvement that might impact
my objectivity. Again, that is standard practice in the IG community.
If you have any questions, or need additional information, do not
hesitate to contact me at . (202) 566-0847.
Sincerely,
Nikki L.Tinsley:
Signed By Nikki L. Tinsley:
Enclosures:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
See comment 1.
The following are GAO‘s comment on the Office of Inspector General‘s
letter dated October 11, 2002.
GAO Comment:
1. The enclosures provided by the OIG indicate that EPA and the OIG are
still developing policies and procedures for the regional ombudsmen and
how they will interact with the national ombudsman within the OIG. For
example, the enclosure concerning the OIG‘s review of the regional
ombudsman program states that the review, which was scheduled to begin
in September 2002, includes questions on the roles and responsibilities
of the regional ombudsmen and actions taken by EPA to address GAO‘s
recommendations regarding the regional ombudsmen:
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FOOTNOTES
[1] The Congress established the ombudsman function in 1984 amendments
to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which governs the
management of solid and hazardous waste.
[2] The Superfund program was established under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 to
clean up highly contaminated hazardous waste sites.
[3] In contrast, internal or ’workplace“ ombudsmen provide an
alternative to more formal processes to deal with conflicts and other
issues that arise in the workplace. See U.S. General Accounting Office,
Human Capital: The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution, GAO-01-466
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2001) for information on the role of
ombudsmen in resolving workplace issues.
[4] The Administrative Conference of the United States was an
independent advisory agency in the executive branch that issued
recommendations and statements on the improvement of the federal
administrative process. The agency was terminated in fiscal year 1996.
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Hazardous Waste: EPA‘s National and
Regional Ombudsmen Do Not Have Sufficient Independence, GAO-01-813
(Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2001).
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Environmental Protection: Issues
for Consideration in the Reorganization of EPA‘s Ombudsman Function,
GAO-02-859T and GAO-02-947T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002, and July
16, 2002, respectively).
[7] American Bar Association, Standards for the Establishment and
Operation of Ombudsman Offices, (Aug. 2001) http://www.abanet.org/
adminlaw/ombuds/ostdsfinal.doc (downloaded October 21, 2002). To help
develop the standards, ABA‘s Sections of Administrative Law and
Regulatory Practice and Dispute Resolution appointed a steering
committee, which included representatives from several ombudsman
associations: the Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen, The Ombudsman
Association, the U.S. Ombudsman Association, and the University and
College Ombuds Association.
[8] In April 2002, the OIG appointed an acting ombudsman; OIG officials
said that once an official position description has been prepared, they
will issue a vacancy announcement to fill the position permanently.
[9] Testimony of Nikki L. Tinsley, Inspector General, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, before the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, June 25, 2002.
[10] Testimony of Nikki L. Tinsley, June 25, 2002.
[11] EPA officials told us that they are piloting a new approach in
three regional offices in which the ombudsmen will be increasing their
level of involvement in the ombudsman role, although the individuals
will continue to have other responsibilities.
[12] For example, the ombudsmen from the Food and Drug Administration
and the Internal Revenue Service each report to the Office of the
Commissioner in their respective agencies.
[13] See 5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 9(a)(2).
[14] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: The Role of
Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution, GAO-01-466 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13,
2001).
[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, HUD Inspector General: Actions
Needed to Strengthen Management and Oversight of Operation Safe Home,
GAO-01-794 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2001).
[16] Similarly, in comments on S. 606, the Ombudsman Reauthorization
Act of 2001, The Ombudsman Association cited concerns about the
placement of the ombudsman function within the OIG, saying that the
tenets of the inspector general and ombudsman professions are not
compatible. For example, the association pointed out that inspectors
general serve a compliance function while the ombudsman function is
specifically designated as an alternative to formal compliance
channels.
[17] GAO-02-859T and GAO-02-947T.
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