Waste Management
Observations on the Congressionally Approved New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Compact Gao ID: GAO-03-276R December 13, 2002This report provides information on (1) the structure and operations of the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Project; (2) how the project's structure and operations compare to those of other interstate waste management projects; and (3) issues that need to be addressed in the future, as the expiration of the incineration contract approaches and the districts consider their options. In addressing the second question, we were unable to identify any other congressionally approved interstate solid waste compacts. However, we identified 10 interstate compacts for the management of low-level radioactive waste and one solid waste agreement that was not congressionally approved and used them as a basis for comparison.
To implement the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Compact, the two member districts adopted a cooperative agreement that established a two-tiered management structure: a Joint Meeting with representatives from each community in the two districts and a smaller Executive Committee composed of representatives from the Joint Meeting. The Joint Meeting authorizes actions needed to carry out the purposes of the cooperative agreement, such as the acquisition or disposition of property, and adopts the annual budget under which the project operates. The Executive Committee implements the policies and actions authorized by the Joint Meeting, proposes an annual budget, oversees the project's day-to-day operations, and approves all project contracts. Executive Committee members develop a budget sufficient to cover the estimated costs of waste incineration and ash disposal; real estate taxes; bond repayments; and running the project office. Once the budget has been approved, the communities in the member districts are responsible for generating sufficient revenues to pay for their share of the budget, an allocation determined by the waste management districts and based on the percentage of the total waste tonnage that each community generates. The communities are also responsible for organizing a collection site for their waste and its transport to the incinerator. The structure and operations of the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Project differ from those of other interstate waste management projects in several ways. For example, the two-tiered structure used in the New Hampshire-Vermont project differs from that of the other projects, each of which has a single governing body. From an operational standpoint, major differences between the New Hampshire-Vermont project and the others include the degree of authority granted to the projects' governing bodies and how clearly the implementing agreements define roles and responsibilities. The New Hampshire-Vermont compact and the other waste management agreements are similar in several respects, however, including the extent to which they address how accounts and records will be maintained, audit services will be engaged, and the agreements will be modified. By the time the contract for incineration services expires in July 2007, project officials must address a variety of issues in three broad categories: alternative waste disposal options, the long-term liability of communities in the member districts, and the disposition of project-related land. Much depends on whether the districts decide to dissolve their cooperative agreement and, as a result, are faced with making new arrangements for the disposal of their solid waste.
GAO-03-276R, Waste Management: Observations on the Congressionally Approved New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Compact
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December 13, 2002:
The Honorable Bob Smith
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Environment
and Public Works
United States Senate:
Subject: Waste Management: Observations on the Congressionally Approved
New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Compact:
Dear Senator Smith:
Managing garbage and other solid waste poses a significant challenge
for many communities, particularly small ones.[Footnote 1] Over the
past 4 decades, the amount of waste destined for landfills--the
traditional method of solid waste disposal--increased dramatically,
from 88 million tons in 1960 to 232 million tons in 2000, or by about
6.6 percent annually. During the same period, significant numbers of
landfills closed as federal and state regulatory requirements were
strengthened. From 1988 to 2000 alone, about 75 percent of the nation‘s
landfills ceased operation, according to data from the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). To meet these challenges, some communities
have banded together under regional agreements or interstate
agreements--sometimes referred to as compacts--that help them jointly
manage their waste. Such agreements help participating communities
avoid duplication of costs and take advantage of economies of scale.
In 1982, Congress approved an interstate compact between a solid waste
management district in New Hampshire and a solid waste management
district in Vermont to establish the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste
Project. The purpose of the project was to develop joint solid waste
disposal and resource recovery facilities, including a waste-to-energy
incinerator and a landfill for disposal of the incinerator
ash.[Footnote 2] After the member districts adopted a cooperative
agreement to implement the compact, project officials contracted with a
waste management company to build the incinerator and to operate and
maintain it until 2007. Project officials issued separate contracts for
the design and construction of the ash landfill. After disputes arose
regarding expansion of the landfill‘s capacity, the ash landfill was
closed in 2001 and project officials entered into a contract to have
the incinerator ash hauled to a landfill in Massachusetts. Other
disputed issues over the years have included the financing of major
capital projects, the cost of the incineration services, the cost of
the electricity generated by the incinerator, the potential
environmental impact of the incinerator and landfill, and other
matters.
The federal government plays a role in the implementation of the New
Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Compact. The project‘s waste disposal
operations must comply with applicable federal environmental laws.
Moreover, because the compact required initial congressional approval,
the Congress must approve any changes to it. The compact has now been
in place for over 20 years, and questions have arisen about the future
of waste disposal in the affected region. This report provides
information on (1) the structure and operations of the New Hampshire-
Vermont Solid Waste Project; (2) how the project‘s structure and
operations compare to those of other interstate waste management
projects; and (3) issues that need to be addressed in the future, as
the expiration of the incineration contract approaches and the
districts consider their options. In addressing the second question, we
were unable to identify any other congressionally approved interstate
solid waste compacts. However, we identified 10 interstate compacts for
the management of low-level radioactive waste and one solid waste
agreement that was not congressionally approved[Footnote 3] and used
them as a basis for comparison.
In summary, we found that:
To implement the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Compact, the two
member districts adopted a cooperative agreement that established a
two-tiered management structure: a Joint Meeting with representatives
from each community in the two districts and a smaller Executive
Committee composed of representatives from the Joint Meeting. The Joint
Meeting authorizes actions needed to carry out the purposes of the
cooperative agreement, such as the acquisition or disposition of
property, and adopts the annual budget under which the project
operates. The Executive Committee implements the policies and actions
authorized by the Joint Meeting, proposes an annual budget, oversees
the project‘s day-to-day operations, and approves all project
contracts. Executive Committee members develop a budget sufficient to
cover the estimated costs of waste incineration and ash disposal; real
estate taxes; bond repayments; and running the project office. Once the
budget has been approved, the communities in the member districts are
responsible for generating sufficient revenues to pay for their share
of the budget, an allocation determined by the waste management
districts and based on the percentage of the total waste tonnage that
each community generates. The communities are also responsible for
organizing a collection site for their waste and its transport to the
incinerator.
The structure and operations of the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste
Project differ from those of other interstate waste management projects
in several ways. For example, the two-tiered structure used in the New
Hampshire-Vermont project differs from that of the other projects, each
of which has a single governing body. From an operational standpoint,
major differences between the New Hampshire-Vermont project and the
others include the degree of authority granted to the projects‘
governing bodies and how clearly the implementing agreements define
roles and responsibilities. For example, under the low-level
radioactive waste compacts, the projects‘ governing bodies are
specifically defined as independent legal entities, separate and
distinct from the participating members. However, the cooperative
agreement that implements the New Hampshire-Vermont project is not as
explicit, and the question of whether the ’project“ exists as a
separate legal entity has been the subject of litigation. Similarly,
the cooperative agreement either does not address important functions
that have been retained by the member districts, such as the authority
to issue bonds to finance major capital investments, or is unclear
about how certain responsibilities are divided between the project and
the districts. The New Hampshire-Vermont compact and the other waste
management agreements are similar in several respects, however,
including the extent to which they address how accounts and records
will be maintained, audit services will be engaged, and the agreements
will be modified.
By the time the contract for incineration services expires in July
2007, project officials must address a variety of issues in three broad
categories: alternative waste disposal options, the long-term liability
of communities in the member districts, and the disposition of project-
related land. Much depends on whether the districts decide to dissolve
their cooperative agreement and, as a result, are faced with making new
arrangements for the disposal of their solid waste. If the agreement is
dissolved, project officials must ensure that existing obligations are
met. For example, although the ash landfill was officially closed in
2001, project officials are responsible both for ensuring that post-
closure maintenance and monitoring requirements will be met over a 30-
year period and for establishing a trust fund to meet related financial
obligations. Consequently, communities in the member districts may
retain certain financial liabilities long after the cooperative
agreement is dissolved. Dissolving the agreement would also raise
issues regarding the disposition of project-related land. For example,
although the member districts jointly own the land on which the
incinerator is sited, the company that currently holds the incineration
contract has two 10-year options to renew its lease of the incinerator
property and could do so whether or not the districts decide to
dissolve the cooperative agreement.
Background:
The management of the nation‘s solid waste is regulated under Subtitle
D of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended.
The statute and EPA‘s implementing regulations prohibit the ’open
dumping“ of solid waste and the establishment of new open dumps, and
required that existing open dumps be upgraded or closed within specific
time frames.[Footnote 4] Communities are allowed to manage their waste
through other means, such as incineration or disposal in sanitary
landfills, as long as the alternatives meet certain criteria
established to protect public health and the environment. Partly in
response to these restrictions, smaller communities throughout the
country began to look for cost-effective alternatives to address their
solid waste management problems.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, some neighboring communities along
the New Hampshire-Vermont border recognized that they needed to address
the limited capacity and environmental problems at their existing
landfills and began to explore waste disposal alternatives. In 1979,
EPA funded a study that examined the feasibility of developing a joint
resource recovery project for Sullivan County in New Hampshire and the
Southern Windsor Regional Planning Commission in Vermont. As the study
progressed, the member communities in each state formed solid waste
management districts and moved toward entering into an interstate
agreement or ’compact,“ as authorized under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act.[Footnote 5] After the New Hampshire and Vermont
legislatures approved the interstate agreement in 1981, EPA and the
Congress formally approved the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste
Compact in April and October 1982, respectively. Following these
approvals, the two solid waste management districts entered into a
cooperative agreement to implement the compact and establish a
framework for the joint management and disposal of their solid waste.
A Two-Tiered Management Structure Controls Project Operations:
In approving the New Hampshire-Vermont compact, the Congress authorized
the adoption of cooperative agreements ’for the construction,
maintenance, and operation of a resource recovery facility or sanitary
landfill or both“ and established requirements for the contents of such
agreements, including ’provision for a joint board and/or
administrator, responsible for administering the cooperative
undertaking and the powers to be exercised thereby.“ Accordingly, the
cooperative agreement that implements the compact provides for a
management structure consisting of (1) a governing body called the
Joint Meeting, which has representatives from each participating
community, and (2) a smaller Executive Committee that oversees the
project‘s day-to-day operations.
The Joint Meeting consists of representatives from the member solid
waste districts, who are appointed by the boards of selectmen or city
councils in the district communities. In accordance with the rules of
their respective solid waste management districts, representatives from
New Hampshire communities serve 3-year terms and Vermont‘s
representatives serve 1-year terms. In total, the Joint Meeting has 34
members representing 29 communities in accordance with the terms of the
district agreements. Although most of the participating communities
have one representative to the Joint Meeting, six of them qualify for
additional votes based on the amount of waste they generate.[Footnote
6]
The Joint Meeting is responsible for authorizing the actions needed to
carry out the purposes of the cooperative agreement, namely, to meet
the solid waste disposal needs of the communities in the member
districts. For example, the Joint Meeting was responsible for
authorizing the acquisition of land on which the incinerator and
landfill were sited and, later, voted to close the landfill. In
addition, the Joint Meeting adopts the annual budget under which the
project operates and allocates the budget between the two districts
based on the total tonnage of waste their communities generated during
the prior year.
An 11-member Executive Committee implements the policies and actions
authorized by the Joint Meeting, proposes an annual budget, oversees
the project‘s day-to-day operations, and approves all project
contracts. In addition, the committee is responsible for appointing a
project manager and other project staff as needed. The committee
includes individuals in key leadership positions--the chair of the
Joint Meeting and the chair and vice-chair of each district--as well as
three additional representatives from each solid waste district, whom
the respective district‘s appointed representatives select annually.
Members of the Executive Committee serve 1-year terms and may be re-
elected.
Executive Committee members develop a budget sufficient to cover (1)
waste disposal costs, including incineration services and disposal of
the ash; (2) the interest and principal repayment associated with the
bonds issued to construct the landfill; and (3) other operating costs,
such as real estate taxes, salaries for project staff, and amounts
needed to run the project‘s office. Project officials compute an
estimated cost per ton of waste, called a ’tipping fee,“ by dividing
the total budgeted costs by the projected waste tonnage. For 2002, the
project‘s budget was about $4.4 million, including $2.2 million for the
incineration of 49,000 tons of solid waste.
When the Joint Meeting approves the budget, the members allocate it
between the two districts based on the total waste tonnage generated by
their respective communities during the prior year. The districts, in
turn, determine each community‘s share based on the volume or tonnage
of waste generated in the prior year. Historically, New Hampshire is
responsible for about 57 percent of the budget allocation and Vermont‘s
share is about 43 percent. Communities in each member district are
responsible for generating sufficient revenue to pay their share of the
district‘s budget and, with few exceptions, obtain this revenue through
property tax assessments. The project collects the funds when the
project manager bills the communities--or independent waste haulers, in
some instances--for each ton of waste delivered to the incinerator
based on the tipping fee in the adopted budget.
In addition to contributing a share of the project budget, each
community in the member districts is responsible for providing a
collection site for its waste and transporting it from the collection
site to the incinerator. In some instances, communities make
arrangements for joint collection sites or shared waste transport.
Key Aspects of the New Hampshire-Vermont Project Differ from Other
Waste Management Projects:
The structure of the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Project differs
from those of other waste management projects we examined. For example,
the New Hampshire-Vermont project has a two-tiered structure that
allows each of the 29 communities in the member districts to be
represented in a governing body and also provides for a smaller, more
manageable Executive Committee to oversee day-to-day operations. In
contrast, the low-level radioactive waste projects have fewer
participants--about four states, on average--and have a single
governing body. In the I-95 Complex project, the participating entities
signed a memorandum of understanding that gave Fairfax County full
authority to manage all financial and operational aspects of the
project, including the contract for incineration services and landfill
operations. The structural differences in the waste management
agreements may be a reflection of the differences in the number of
entities participating in each project.
We also found differences between the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste
Project and the other waste management projects we examined from an
operational standpoint, based on their implementing
agreements.[Footnote 7] Among the major differences are the extent of
the authority granted to the projects‘ governing bodies compared to the
projects‘ members and how clearly their respective roles and
responsibilities are defined in the implementing agreements. For
example, under the low-level radioactive waste compacts, the projects‘
governing bodies are explicitly defined as independent legal entities,
separate and distinct from the participating members. In these
projects, the relationship between the governing body and member states
is clearly defined. For example, some agreements authorize the
governing bodies to designate host states for the disposal facilities
and to enter into contracts to accomplish project objectives.[Footnote
8] However, while the cooperative agreement that implements the New
Hampshire-Vermont project describes the roles and responsibilities of
the Joint Meeting and Executive Committee, it is not explicit about the
legal status of these entities. The question of whether the project
exists as a separate legal entity has been an issue in litigation
involving the project, for example, in a case in which a district
representative sought copies of the project‘s legal bills.[Footnote 9]
Clarifying this issue from the beginning might have allowed the project
to avoid some legal problems.
Similarly, problems might have been avoided if the cooperative
agreement for the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Project had
addressed the projects‘ responsibility for certain important functions.
For example, the cooperative agreement does not address how major
capital projects will be financed; authority to issue long-term debt is
addressed only in the agreements for the solid waste
districts.[Footnote 10] This omission may have been a factor in an
internal dispute over project financing. Specifically, the Joint
Meeting recommended the issuance of long-term debt to finance certain
costs related to the ash landfill, and one of the member districts
issued the bonds. However, a problem arose when the other district did
not want to pay its portion of the allocated budget related to bond
repayment, arguing that it was not responsible for repayment of bonds
issued by the first district. While the problem was eventually resolved
through arbitration, it might have been avoided altogether had the
cooperative agreement been explicit about who had authority to issue
long-term debt for the benefit of the project--and under what
circumstances--and who was responsible for repaying it. In contrast to
the New Hampshire-Vermont project, the memorandum of understanding used
for the I-95 Complex agreement clearly gives the county responsible for
managing the project authority to finance the design and construction
of waste disposal facilities and to charge the participating entities
for their share of the capital costs.[Footnote 11]
Other operational differences between the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid
Waste Project and the other projects we examined, based on their
implementing agreements, were in the areas of annual accountability
reporting and public access to meetings and records. Under the low-
level radioactive waste compacts, the governing bodies must publish
annual reports to the governors and legislative bodies of their member
states on the projects‘ operations and finances, including copies of
annual budgets and independent audits. In addition, 8 of the 10 low-
level radioactive waste compacts included in our comparison require,
with certain exceptions, that project meetings and records be open to
the public. While the memorandum of understanding for the I-95 Complex
does not address either accountability reporting or public access,
Fairfax County, which manages the I-95 project, has a process in which
the public can gain access to project records. The cooperative
agreement for the New Hampshire-Vermont project does not address either
area.[Footnote 12]
We also found some similarities in the operations of the New Hampshire-
Vermont project and the other waste management projects based on their
implementing agreements. For example, most of the agreements contain
provisions requiring the maintenance of accurate accounts and
independent audits of the projects‘ finances. The agreements also
contain provisions on amendments by project members and the entry and
withdrawal of members from the project.
Waste Disposal Options, Long-term Liability of Participating
Communities, and Other Matters Will Need to Be Addressed in the Near
Future:
Officials with the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Project will have
to address a number of important issues relating to waste disposal,
long-term liability, and other matters by July 2007, when the project‘s
contract for incineration services expires. Recognizing this need,
project officials formed a transition committee to identify more
specifically the kinds of questions that will have to be answered and
the decisions that will have to be made. The committee is not expected
to report its findings until December 2002. However, based on our
discussions with project officials and our review of applicable
contracts and other project documents, we noted some of the key issues
that will need to be resolved.
Extension of incineration contract. Regarding waste disposal, the most
critical decision facing project officials is whether to negotiate an
extension of the incineration contract. Furthermore, according to
project officials, the need to make a decision on the incineration
contract is prompting representatives from the member districts to
reconsider their participation in the cooperative agreement. If the
representatives vote to dissolve the cooperative agreement, then the
districts and their participating communities will have to examine
waste disposal alternatives, the costs associated with each option, and
whether certain communities or districts will make new arrangements to
jointly manage their waste or decide to go it alone.
Long-term liability of participating communities. Another set of issues
for project officials to consider involves the long-term liability
associated with the project‘s landfill, which was closed in 2001.
According to federal and state requirements for the management of solid
waste, the New Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste project, as the permit
holder for the ash landfill, is responsible both for meeting post-
closure maintenance and monitoring requirements, generally for 30
years, and for maintaining a trust fund or other mechanism to meet
related financial obligations. As a result, communities in the member
districts may retain certain financial liabilities even after the
cooperative agreement is dissolved. Selling or transferring the
landfill property is a possibility, but the project--and by definition,
the communities in the member districts--would continue to be liable
for meeting the technical and financial obligations associated with the
permit unless the new owner agreed to assume responsibility.
Disposition of project-related land. If the members of the Joint
Meeting vote to dissolve the cooperative agreement, project officials
must ensure that existing obligations are met and that land and other
assets are disposed of in an orderly manner. Disposition of project-
related land, in particular, raises significant issues. For example,
although the member districts jointly own the land on which the
incinerator is sited, the company that currently holds the incineration
contract has two 10-year options to renew its lease of the property and
could do so whether or not the cooperative agreement is dissolved. In
addition, under the terms of its agreement with the project, the
incineration company pays just $100 per year for the lease, a provision
that would likely remain in effect in the event that the property was
transferred or sold to a new owner. These restrictions could affect the
ability of project officials to dispose of the incinerator property by
limiting the potential buyers.[Footnote 13] Similarly, a restriction on
the use of the landfill property could hinder the project‘s ability to
dispose of it. An April 2000 amendment to the cooperative agreement
provided that the property could not be used as a municipal sanitary
landfill without approval by the town of Newport, New Hampshire, where
the property is located.
With only a few years remaining on the contract for incineration
services, project officials have already taken some preliminary steps
to prepare for the future and ensure that various aspects of the
project will be concluded in 2007. For example, when project officials
contracted with a company to haul the incinerator ash to a
Massachusetts landfill after the project‘s own landfill was closed,
they made sure that the ash hauling contract expires on the same date
as the project‘s contract for incineration services. Project officials
also refinanced the bonds that had been issued to pay for expenses
related to the design and construction of the ash landfill so that the
bond repayments end in 2007 rather than in 2009, as originally
scheduled. Finally, after borrowing from the trust fund established for
the landfill to pay for its permanent closure, project officials
established a repayment schedule that would ensure that the trust fund
is fully funded by 2007.
Comments from Project Officials:
We provided a summary of our findings to the New Hampshire-Vermont
Solid Waste Project to obtain technical comments on the factual
accuracy of the contents. Project officials generally agreed with the
facts presented and suggested some clarifications and technical
corrections, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Scope and Methodology:
To gain an understanding of the structure and operations of the New
Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Project, we interviewed key officials
from the Executive Committee, Joint Meeting, and solid waste management
districts and reviewed the compact, cooperative agreement, major
contracts, and other pertinent documents. To determine how the
structure and operations of the New Hampshire-Vermont project compare
with those of other interstate waste management projects, we identified
other projects and reviewed their implementing agreements.
Specifically, we compared the structure and operations of the New
Hampshire-Vermont project with 10 low-level radioactive waste compacts
and a memorandum of understanding between jurisdictions in Virginia and
the District of Columbia. To identify issues that will need to be
addressed in the near future, we interviewed key project officials to
obtain their views and officials from the New Hampshire Department of
Environmental Services to obtain information on the requirements
associated with the ash landfill. We also reviewed pertinent documents
relating to the environmental, financial, and legal obligations of the
project and the member districts. We conducted our review from February
through November 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 7 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on GAO‘s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff
have questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512-3841. Key
contributors to this assignment were Ellen Crocker, Les Mahagan,
Richard Johnson, and Cynthia Norris.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by John B. Stephenson:
John B. Stephenson, Director
Natural Resources and Environment:
FOOTNOTES
[1] For the purposes of this report, solid waste means the nonhazardous
garbage or trash typically generated by industries, businesses,
institutions, and households.
[2] Under state law in New Hampshire and Vermont, communities may join
together to form waste management districts to manage the disposal of
their solid waste.
[3] In 1971, Fairfax County, Virginia; the District of Columbia; and a
regional waste management agency, which encompassed these and other
jurisdictions (including some in Maryland), entered into a memorandum
of understanding to jointly develop an interim landfill. By 1986, the
solid waste management project had evolved to include a waste-to-energy
incinerator and a landfill; project participants included jurisdictions
in Virginia and the District of Columbia. The project is called the I-
95 Resource Recovery, Land Reclamation, and Recreation Complex or, more
commonly, the ’I-95 Complex.“
[4] An open dump is any landfill that poses a reasonable probability of
adverse effects on health or the environment, as provided for under EPA
regulations.
[5] The act authorizes two or more states to enter into agreements or
’compacts“ for the management of solid waste, hazardous waste, or both;
the enforcement of applicable laws; and the establishment of agencies
to implement the compacts. For such compacts to be binding, they must
be approved by the EPA Administrator and the Congress.
[6] One community has three votes (the maximum allowed) and five
communities have two votes.
[7] We compared the cooperative agreement used to implement the New
Hampshire-Vermont Solid Waste Compact with the 10 low-level radioactive
waste compacts and a memorandum of understanding that was used for the
I-95 Complex agreement.
[8] As indicated earlier, instead of having a governing body, the
participants in the I-95 Complex project agreed that one county would
be responsible for managing the project.
[9] Franklin v. Callum, 804 A.2d 444 (N.H. 2002). As part of its
ruling, the court determined that the project is not a separate entity
but rather a creation of the two waste management districts.
[10] For example, the agreement for the New Hampshire district states
that the district has authority to incur debt for the purpose of
acquiring land and for planning, constructing, and equipping a refuse
disposal facility.
[11] The governing bodies established under the low-level radioactive
waste compacts do not issue long-term debt to finance major capital
projects.
[12] The lack of a clear, consistent policy on access to records became
an issue in litigation, after the executive committee denied a district
representative‘s request to review certain invoices from the project‘s
attorney, citing attorney-client privilege. New Hampshire‘s Supreme
Court ultimately ruled in favor of the district representative, holding
that the representative was a client of the attorney who provided
services to the project, and therefore was entitled to see the
project‘s legal bills. Franklin v. Callum, 804 A.2d 444 (N.H. 2002).
[13] According to project officials, the member districts jointly own
more than 50 acres of land, including 6 acres on which the incinerator
is sited, and there is no restriction on the districts‘ ability to
dispose of the unencumbered portion of the property.
