Capitol Hill Anthrax Incident
EPA's Cleanup Was Successful; Opportunities Exist to Enhance Contract Oversight Gao ID: GAO-03-686 June 4, 2003In September and October 2001, the first cases of anthrax bioterrorism occurred in the United States when letters containing anthrax were mailed to congressional leaders and members of the news media. As the cleanup of the Capitol Hill anthrax site progressed, EPA's estimates of the cleanup costs steadily rose. GAO was asked to describe (1) the costs EPA incurred to conduct the cleanup and how it was funded, (2) the extent to which EPA awarded the cleanup contracts competitively, (3) EPA's oversight of the contractors' work and any suggested changes to EPA's contracting practices, and (4) the extent to which EPA agreed to indemnify contractors against liability for potential damages related to the cleanup.
EPA spent about $27 million on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, using funds from its Superfund program. From the outset, many uncertainties were associated with the cleanup effort, including how to remove anthrax from buildings. EPA revised its November 2001 estimate of $5 million several times during the cleanup as the nature and extent of the contamination became fully known and the solutions to remove and properly dispose of the anthrax were agreed upon and carried out. To conduct the cleanup, EPA relied extensively on the existing competitively awarded Superfund contracts it routinely uses to address threats posed by the release of hazardous substances. Specifically, about 80 percent of the contract costs were incurred under 10 of EPA's existing Superfund contracts. EPA dedicated significant resources to overseeing the many contractors working on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup--including about 50 staff from nine regional offices experienced in leading and overseeing emergency environmental cleanups. Most often, these staff ensured that the contractors were on site and performing assigned tasks efficiently. EPA also assigned an administrative specialist to ensure that contract charges were accurate and reasonable. EPA's assessment of its emergency responses to the anthrax incidents, which focused on or included the Capitol Hill site, concluded that, overall, the agency had used its contracts effectively but that it could improve some areas of its contracting support. In addition, GAO's review of the Capitol Hill cleanup revealed inconsistencies in EPA's cost oversight practices among regions. For example, EPA uses a computerized system for tracking contractor costs for hazardous substance removal contracts, but regions use the system inconsistently for the technical assessment contracts also used during emergency responses. Consistent use of the system would likely improve the quality of EPA's nationwide contract data and enhance EPA's oversight capabilities. EPA agreed to indemnify two contractors with key roles in the fumigation of the Hart Senate Office Building with chlorine dioxide gas against liability that could have resulted if a third party had been injured by the contractors' release of a harmful substance, including anthrax.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-686, Capitol Hill Anthrax Incident: EPA's Cleanup Was Successful; Opportunities Exist to Enhance Contract Oversight
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
June 2003:
Capitol Hill Anthrax Incident:
EPA's Cleanup Was Successful; Opportunities Exist to Enhance Contract
Oversight:
GAO-03-686:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-686, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Finance, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
In September and October 2001, the first cases of anthrax bioterrorism
occurred in the United States when letters containing anthrax were
mailed to congressional leaders and members of the news media. As the
cleanup of the Capitol Hill anthrax site progressed, EPA‘s estimates
of the cleanup costs steadily rose. GAO was asked to describe (1) the
costs EPA incurred to conduct the cleanup and how it was funded, (2)
the extent to which EPA awarded the cleanup contracts competitively,
(3) EPA‘s oversight of the contractors‘ work and any suggested changes
to EPA‘s contracting practices, and (4) the extent to which EPA agreed
to indemnify contractors against liability for potential damages
related to the cleanup.
What GAO Found:
EPA spent about $27 million on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, using
funds from its Superfund program. From the outset, many uncertainties
were associated with the cleanup effort, including how to remove
anthrax from buildings. EPA revised its November 2001 estimate of $5
million several times during the cleanup as the nature and extent of
the contamination became fully known and the solutions to remove and
properly dispose of the anthrax were agreed upon and carried out. To
conduct the cleanup, EPA relied extensively on the existing
competitively awarded Superfund contracts it routinely uses to address
threats posed by the release of hazardous substances. Specifically,
about 80 percent of the contract costs were incurred under 10 of EPA‘s
existing Superfund contracts.
EPA dedicated significant resources to overseeing the many contractors
working on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup”including about 50 staff
from nine regional offices experienced in leading and overseeing
emergency environmental cleanups. Most often, these staff ensured that
the contractors were on site and performing assigned tasks
efficiently. EPA also assigned an administrative specialist to ensure
that contract charges were accurate and reasonable. EPA‘s assessment
of its emergency responses to the anthrax incidents, which focused on
or included the Capitol Hill site, concluded that, overall, the agency
had used its contracts effectively but that it could improve some
areas of its contracting support. In addition, GAO‘s review of the
Capitol Hill cleanup revealed inconsistencies in EPA‘s cost oversight
practices among regions. For example, EPA uses a computerized system
for tracking contractor costs for hazardous substance removal
contracts, but regions use the system inconsistently for the technical
assessment contracts also used during emergency responses. Consistent
use of the system would likely improve the quality of EPA‘s nationwide
contract data and enhance EPA‘s oversight capabilities.
EPA agreed to indemnify two contractors with key roles in the
fumigation of the Hart Senate Office Building with chlorine dioxide
gas against liability that could have resulted if a third party had
been injured by the contractors‘ release of a harmful substance,
including anthrax.
What GAO Recommends:
To enhance EPA‘s contract oversight, GAO recommends that the EPA
Administrator require all EPA regions to more consistently use two
contract oversight practices and to examine expanding the use of
another.
EPA officials agreed to implement or consider implementing GAO‘s
recommendations. Their comments and our response are discussed at the
end of this report.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
EPA Spent About $27 Million of its Superfund Money to Clean Up the
Capitol Hill Anthrax Site:
EPA Competitively Awarded Most Major Contracts Used in the Anthrax
Cleanup:
EPA Devoted Extensive Resources to Overseeing Contractors' Work, yet
Some Contracting Changes Would Better Support EPA Cleanups:
EPA Negotiated Indemnification Agreements with Two Contractors to
Address Their Liability Concerns:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Response:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Contract Tasks and Roles:
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: EPA Estimated Contract and Government Agreement Cost Increases
for the Capitol Hill Anthrax Cleanup:
Table 2: Competitively Awarded Superfund Contracts Used for the Capitol
Hill Anthrax Cleanup:
Table 3: Noncompetitively Awarded EPA Contracts Used for the Capitol
Hill Anthrax Cleanup:
Table 4: Agreements with Federal and State Agencies Used for the
Capitol Hill Anthrax Cleanup:
Figures:
Figure 1: A Sample Is Inserted into a Vial in the Hart Senate Office
Building:
Figure 2: Cleanup Personnel Use a HEPA Vacuum in a Congressional
Office:
Figure 3: Breakout of EPA Contract and Government Agreement Costs:
Abbreviations:
CDM: Federal Programs Corporation:
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
HEPA: high efficiency particulate arresting:
NCP: National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 4, 2003:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Chairman,
Committee on Finance
United States Senate:
Dear Chairman Grassley:
Anthrax is a naturally occurring bacterium that causes acute infectious
disease and is potentially fatal.[Footnote 1] As you know, in September
and October 2001, the first cases of anthrax bioterrorism occurred in
the United States when letters containing a powdered form of anthrax
were mailed to members of the news media and congressional leaders. On
October 15, 2001, one of these letters, addressed to the former
Majority Leader of the U. S. Senate, was opened in the Hart Senate
Office Building in Washington, D.C. The letter had contaminated several
congressional and other buildings along the mail delivery route and
elsewhere, and approximately 30 congressional employees tested positive
for anthrax exposure soon after. The Hart Senate Office Building is a
10-million-cubic-foot building that houses the offices and staffs of 50
senators. As a result of the anthrax contamination, the Hart Building
and several others on Capitol Hill were closed.
In consultation with the leadership of the Congress, the U.S. Capitol
Police Board--which oversees the security of the Capitol complex--
established a team led by an independent "incident commander" to
coordinate the response to the anthrax incident among several federal
and local agencies. The team determined that the congressional offices
should be decontaminated and reopened as expeditiously as possible so
that the operations of the legislative branch would not be impeded. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which removes hazardous
substances under its Superfund program, had a significant role in the
cleanup.
As the cleanup of the Capitol Hill anthrax site progressed, EPA's
estimates of its cost steadily increased. Consequently, you asked us to
examine several aspects of EPA's cleanup. This report describes (1) the
costs EPA incurred to conduct the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup and how
the costs were funded, (2) the extent to which EPA awarded the anthrax
cleanup contracts competitively, (3) EPA's oversight of the work
performed by contractors and any suggested changes to EPA's contracting
processes, and (4) the extent to which EPA agreed to indemnify
contractors against liability for potential damages related to the
cleanup.
To conduct our work, we sought contracting documentation relevant to
the anthrax cleanup from EPA. However, delays in receiving much of this
documentation considerably extended the time necessary to complete our
work. Factors contributing to the delay included the need to negotiate
and then to implement a process established by the Capitol Police Board
and EPA to address their respective concerns. The Capitol Police Board
was concerned that the EPA documents might contain sensitive security
information, and EPA thought that the documents might contain
confidential business information that it was not authorized to release
to the Capitol Police Board. As the first step in the process, EPA
established a reading room for GAO staff to preliminarily review the
documents. After this review, EPA screened the documents for
confidential business information and gave them, with certain
information redacted, to the Capitol Police Board so it could screen
for security issues and redact sensitive information. After the EPA and
Capitol Police Board reviews, which took more than 3 months, the
documents were given to us. In part because of delays in obtaining this
contracting information, we surveyed 63 EPA personnel the agency had
identified as having provided contractor oversight for the cleanup to
obtain information on their oversight roles. We received survey
responses from 56 people, a response rate of 89 percent. Our scope and
methodology for this review are presented at the end of this report.
Results in Brief:
EPA spent approximately $27 million to clean up anthrax contamination
on Capitol Hill, using funding from its Superfund program. To conduct
the anthrax contamination assessments and the actual decontamination,
EPA retained the services of many more contractors than it would
typically use for a single Superfund cleanup site. Specifically, EPA
paid 27 contractors and three federal and state agencies about $25
million for the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup; the remaining $2 million
covered EPA's personnel costs, including travel, primarily for the
staff who supervised the contractors. In fiscal year 2002, the Congress
appropriated about $23 million to replenish a substantial portion of
the Superfund monies EPA had spent. From the outset in October 2001,
many uncertainties were associated with the cleanup effort, including
how to remove anthrax from buildings and how much the cleanup would
cost. As the nature and extent of the contamination became fully known
and the solutions to remove and properly dispose of the anthrax were
agreed upon and carried out, EPA's November 2001 estimate of $5 million
proved to be a fraction of what was actually needed to conduct the
cleanup. With the dedication of substantial resources and funding to
the cleanup, the objective of reopening the decontaminated Capitol Hill
office buildings as soon as was safely possible was achieved in about 3
months. In contrast, some other buildings that were also contaminated
with anthrax in the fall of 2001, such as the Brentwood postal
facility, remain closed as of May 2003.
Because EPA relied extensively on the existing competitively awarded
Superfund contracts it routinely uses to address threats posed by the
release or threatened release of hazardous substances, about 80 percent
of the contract costs for the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup were
incurred under competitively awarded technical assessment or hazardous
substance removal contracts. Specifically, EPA used 10 of its existing
competitively awarded contracts and 2 new competitively awarded supply
and security contracts for additional support. Most of the 15 contracts
that were not competitively awarded were sole-source contracts for
under $200,000 to obtain supplies and technical, laboratory, and
security services or to support existing removal contracts. EPA's
Office of Acquisition Management authorized the use of sole-source
contracts for the cleanup on the basis that the emergency situation
created an urgent and compelling need to obtain services and supplies
without going through the generally more time-consuming competitive
bidding process. For additional assistance, EPA also entered into
agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of the Army, and
the State of Maryland Department of the Environment.
EPA dedicated significant staff resources to overseeing the many
contractors working on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup to ensure that
their assessment and cleanup work was appropriate and the charges were
accurate and reasonable. About 150 EPA staff participated in the
cleanup, including about 50 staff from nine regional offices--called
on-scene coordinators--who have experience in leading and overseeing
emergency environmental cleanup operations. The on-scene coordinators
oversaw, and sometimes assisted with the work of, the contractors
during shifts that ran 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for about 3
months. The tasks of the on-scene coordinators varied but most often
included ensuring that the contractors were on-site and performing
assigned tasks efficiently. In addition, EPA assigned an administrative
specialist to ensure that contract charges were accurate and
reasonable. This individual reviewed the daily charges for four removal
contracts, which represented about 41 percent of the total contract
costs. EPA has conducted four assessments of its emergency responses to
the anthrax incidents, focusing on or including the Capitol Hill site.
Overall, these assessments indicated that EPA used its contracting
capabilities effectively, but they also identified areas in which EPA
could improve contract support, and EPA has begun taking steps to do
so. Moreover, our work on the Capitol Hill cleanup revealed areas in
which oversight of contract costs was not consistent among the regions
and might be improved. For example, while EPA uses a computerized
system for tracking contractor costs for removal contracts, this system
is used on a limited basis for technical contracts that are also used
for cleanups. If the system--which provides up-to-date cost information
organized in consistent categories, such as equipment and travel--were
used consistently, the quality of EPA's nationwide contract data would
be improved and its oversight capabilities would likely be enhanced.
Toward this end, we are recommending that EPA require all the regions
to more consistently use certain of the practices now used in only some
regions.
EPA agreed to indemnify two contractors that had key roles in the
fumigation of the Hart Senate Office Building with chlorine dioxide gas
against liability that could have resulted if a third party had been
injured by the contractors' release of a harmful substance, including
anthrax and chlorine dioxide. Although one of the contractors worked at
the site while negotiating with EPA for indemnification against such
liability, the other contractor would not start removal procedures
without first receiving indemnification. Following 4 weeks of
negotiations, EPA reached agreement on indemnification with this
contractor in November 2001. Because the negotiation process occurred
at the same time that testing was being performed offsite to determine
the proper decontamination methods to use at the Hart Senate Office
Building, the month-long negotiation process did not delay the cleanup.
However, it potentially could have done so. As a result, two of EPA's
assessments of its responses to the 2001 terrorist attacks recommended
expanding contractor indemnification to address counter-terrorism
response activities.
Background:
The Capitol Hill anthrax incident occurred a month after the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, while EPA and other
federal agencies were continuing to respond to these attacks. The
Capitol Police Board, which governs the U.S. Capitol Police Force, led
the anthrax cleanup at the Capitol Hill site.[Footnote 2] Consisting at
the time of our review of the House and Senate Sergeants-at-Arms and
the Architect of the Capitol, the Board oversees the security of
members of the Congress and the Capitol buildings, such as the
congressional office buildings. The federal entities involved in the
cleanup--including EPA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the U.S. Coast Guard, and
the Department of the Army--reported to an incident commander who was
appointed by the Capitol Police Board to make decisions on the day-to-
day activities of the cleanup. The period from October 20, 2001, to
November 13, 2001, is characterized as the emergency phase, which
focused on identifying the extent of anthrax contamination; this was
followed by the remedial, or cleanup, phase.
Reporting to the Capitol Police Board's incident commander, EPA managed
the decontamination aspects of the cleanup. EPA's activities at the
Capitol Hill site included:
* working with other agencies and entities to evaluate the
effectiveness of potential disinfectants and cleanup technologies,
* isolating areas to prevent the spread of contamination,
* sampling to determine and confirm the extent of contamination (see
fig. 1),
* evaluating sampling results,
* removing critical items for special decontamination procedures, and:
* cleaning up the contaminated areas and disposing of decontaminated
items.
Figure 1: A Sample Is Inserted into a Vial in the Hart Senate Office
Building:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
At the Capitol Hill site, EPA sampled both surfaces and air in the
buildings for the presence of anthrax, using three types of surface
samples (wet swabs and wipes for nonporous surfaces and high efficiency
particulate arresting (HEPA) vacuuming for porous materials) and four
types of air samples. Four methods were used to remove anthrax found in
congressional buildings: fumigating with chlorine dioxide gas, an
antimicrobial pesticide; disinfecting with a liquid form of chlorine
dioxide; disinfecting with Sandia foam;[Footnote 3] and using HEPA
vacuuming (see fig. 2). During the cleanup, chlorine dioxide gas was
identified as the best available fumigant for decontaminating parts of
the Hart Senate Office Building, as well as for fumigating mail and
packages. EPA oversaw the use of chlorine dioxide gas during three
fumigation events in the Hart building.
Figure 2: Cleanup Personnel Use a HEPA Vacuum in a Congressional
Office:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition, contractors removed items from congressional offices that
were critical to congressional operations or personal effects of
significance. These items were bagged, tagged, and moved for off-site
decontamination. Approximately 3,250 bags of critical items were
transported to a company in Richmond, Virginia, for decontamination
treatment using ethylene oxide. Approximately 4,000 packages and other
mail were collected from the mail rooms in congressional office
buildings and also transported off site for decontamination using
chlorine dioxide gas. In addition, drums of mail were sent to a
facility in Lima, Ohio, for irradiation treatment.
The Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup site included 26 buildings, most of
them located in or near the Capitol Hill area of Washington, D.C. The
buildings that required testing for anthrax contamination included
congressional and judicial buildings; mail facilities; and other nearby
buildings, such as the Library of Congress. Initial sampling was
conducted along the route traveled by the letter opened in the Hart
Building by tracing the route back to the Dirksen Senate Office
Building (where the mail for the Senate is processed), to the P Street
Warehouse (a restricted mail inspection facility overseen by the
Capitol Police where congressional mail is inspected), and finally to
the Brentwood postal facility (the U.S. Postal Service mail processing
and distribution center for Washington, D.C.).[Footnote 4]
Samples from 7 of the 26 buildings were found to contain anthrax, which
required that these 7 undergo more thorough sampling, followed by
decontamination, and followed then by resampling to confirm that the
anthrax had been eradicated. In total, approximately 10,000 samples
were taken at the Capitol Hill site, about half of them from locations
in the Hart Senate Office Building. EPA advised the Capitol Police
Board's incident commander about the extent to which buildings needed
to be cleaned to make them safe. EPA, along with the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, and other relevant authorities, determined that the cleanup
standard that would be fully protective of public health and the
environment was "no detectable, viable anthrax spores." The seven
buildings that required decontamination were the Dirksen, Hart, and
Russell Senate Office Buildings; the Ford and Longworth House Office
Buildings; the U.S. Supreme Court Building; and the P Street Warehouse.
Six of the seven buildings were cleared for reentry by the end of
January 2002. The P Street Warehouse was cleared for reentry in March
2002. According to the lead EPA on-scene coordinator, no one became
sick as a result of exposure to anthrax or chemical agents used during
decontamination.
EPA performed its work on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup under its
Superfund program pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the National Oil and
Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). Provisions of
CERCLA, as amended, promote a coordinated federal, state, and local
response to mitigate situations at sites that may pose an imminent and
substantial threat to public health or the environment. The NCP is the
federal government's blueprint for responding to both oil spills and
hazardous substance releases. It requires that an on-scene coordinator
manage the federal response at the scene of a discharge of oil or a
release of a hazardous substance that poses a threat to public health
or the environment. The on-scene coordinator coordinates all federal
efforts with, and provides support and information to, local, state,
and regional response communities. Depending on where an incident
occurs, the on-scene coordinator may be either an EPA or U.S. Coast
Guard employee. EPA's Superfund work typically involves using agency
personnel and contractors from 1 of 10 EPA regions located throughout
the country that have experience with the hazardous substances involved
in the incident and the methods required to remove them.
Removal actions are generally short-term, relatively inexpensive
responses to releases or threats of releases of hazardous substances,
pollutants, or contaminants that pose a danger to human health,
welfare, or the environment. CERCLA generally limits the cost of a
removal action to $2 million and the duration to 1 year. However,
CERCLA exempts certain removal actions from these limitations, such as
when continued response is required immediately to prevent, limit, or
mitigate an emergency. EPA approved an emergency exemption to the $2-
million statutory limit for the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup on
November 5, 2001.
Typically, EPA provides one on-scene coordinator for a removal site to
perform an initial assessment of the cleanup work needed, monitor the
more detailed technical assessment and cleanup work being performed by
EPA personnel and one or two contractors, and evaluate the results.
However, the Capitol Hill site response was different from most
hazardous materials emergency responses in its size and complexity, the
nature of the contamination, and the requirement that the closed
congressional buildings be reopened as soon as possible. As a result,
EPA had to use a large number of on-scene coordinators, major
contracts, and other federal agencies for assistance. In this case,
EPA's Mid-Atlantic Regional Office (Region III) provided the lead on-
scene coordinator, who led the agency's cleanup efforts. Region III,
along with eight other regions, also provided about 50 other on-scene
coordinators. Further, unlike most EPA cleanups, the lead on-scene
coordinator was not in charge of the overall operations but instead
reported to the incident commander, who in turn reported to the Capitol
Police Board and House and Senate leaders.
A substantial portion of the cleanup work at the Capitol Hill site was
performed from October 2001 through January 2002, with most of the
remaining work finished by April 2002. However, some additional costs
have been incurred, and EPA personnel continued to work on activities
related to the cleanup after April 2002. For example, the final
disposal of items used at the cleanup continued after the buildings had
been reopened. In addition, EPA conducted several internal reviews to
identify lessons learned from this experience to help the agency
prepare for responses to other potential biological or chemical weapons
attacks.
EPA Spent About $27 Million of its Superfund Money to Clean Up the
Capitol Hill Anthrax Site:
According to EPA, the agency expended about $27 million on the Capitol
Hill anthrax cleanup, using Superfund program funding.[Footnote 5]
Through fiscal year 2002 supplemental appropriations acts, the Congress
provided EPA with additional funding for activities related to
terrorism, and EPA allocated about $23 million of these funds to
reimburse the Superfund program for expenditures associated with the
Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup. Overall, EPA dedicated what it describes
as unprecedented resources--contract staff and EPA personnel--to
accomplish the cleanup of the anthrax site safely and effectively.
Ninety-three percent of the $27 million in costs were incurred
primarily by EPA contractors who, among other things, conducted
technical assessments and performed the decontamination tasks at the
various Capitol Hill sites; the remaining 7 percent of costs were
incurred by EPA personnel, largely for planning and overseeing the work
of the contractors in accordance with the direction provided by the
Capitol Police Board.
Over the course of the cleanup, EPA revised its cost estimates several
times as the nature and extent of the contamination became fully known
and the solutions for removing and properly disposing of the anthrax
were agreed upon and carried out. EPA's various cost estimates covered
the contracts and government agreements and generally do not include
the payroll and travel costs associated with EPA personnel assigned to
the Capitol Hill site. In November 2001, EPA increased its initial
estimate for the cleanup to $5 million--more than doubling the initial
statutory limit of $2 million. EPA revised its estimate for the cleanup
five more times to continue work necessary to control and mitigate the
threat of release of anthrax to the environment and to properly dispose
of pollutants and contaminants from the site. The last revision--an
increase from $25 million to $28 million--occurred in June 2002. (See
table 1.):
Table 1: EPA Estimated Contract and Government Agreement Cost Increases
for the Capitol Hill Anthrax Cleanup:
Dollars in millions.
November 5, 2001; Amount of increase: a; New estimated contract cost:
$5.
December 5, 2001; Amount of increase: $4; New estimated contract cost:
9.
December 18, 2001; Amount of increase: 3; New estimated contract cost:
12.
January 16, 2002; Amount of increase: 8; New estimated contract cost:
20.
February 14, 2002; Amount of increase: 5; New estimated contract cost:
25.
June 6, 2002; Amount of increase: 3; New estimated contract cost: 28.
Source: EPA.
[A] EPA first authorized spending in excess of the $2 million statutory
limit in a November 5, 2001, action memorandum.
[End of table]
EPA adjusted its projections during the course of the cleanup as a
result of a number of factors generally related to the uniqueness of
the situation--the first use of anthrax as a terrorist weapon in this
country. EPA had not addressed anthrax contamination in buildings
previously and protocols for responding to contamination by anthrax or
other biological agents did not exist. In addition, some scientific and
technical information needed to properly plan and conduct the anthrax
cleanup was not readily available; and EPA did not, at that time, have
registered antimicrobial agents approved for use against anthrax. Also,
EPA had not compared the costs of candidate decontamination methods.
Further, much was--and still is--unknown about the properties of lab-
produced anthrax such as that used in this incident, which led to
uncertainties about the health risks posed by the contamination and how
it could spread. As a result, EPA and contractors had to develop plans
for decontaminating large areas within buildings with limited practical
knowledge; search for decontamination methods; assess their likely
efficacy; implement them; and, at times, repeat the process if the
methods did not work. Finally, EPA was one of a number of participants
in the decisions made about the work to be done, the timing of the
work, and the resources needed; it was not the primary decision maker
as it would be in a typical Superfund cleanup.
As EPA and contractor staff were beginning their work at the Capitol
Hill anthrax site, the limitations of existing knowledge about the
health risks associated with anthrax--such as what amount of exposure
could cause illness or death--were becoming more clear. That the
Capitol Hill site was potentially riskier than initially believed
became evident when workers in the postal facilities where anthrax-
laced letters were processed became ill; two of them subsequently died
of inhalation anthrax. The scientific and medical information initially
available to EPA and other agencies indicated that workers in postal
facilities were not at risk of infection. Further, an elderly
Connecticut woman--who may have been exposed to mail that had been
contaminated with anthrax--died from anthrax inhalation, and a New York
woman whose exposure to anthrax could not be linked to any mail or mail
facilities also died.[Footnote 6]
To accomplish the cleanup safely in the midst of significant scientific
and technical uncertainty and changing information about how anthrax
spreads, EPA called on about 150 of its staff in headquarters and the
regions, incurring agency payroll and travel costs of $1.9
million[Footnote 7]--payroll costs amounted to $1.3 million and travel
costs to about $600,000.[Footnote 8] According to our analysis of EPA's
Office of the Chief Financial Officer records, the majority of payroll
and travel costs were incurred by on-scene coordinators from EPA's
regions who were overseeing and assisting on the cleanup. Further, EPA
employed 27 contractors and obtained further support from three
government agencies at a total cost of about $25 million to provide
assessment and cleanup services. These costs are discussed in the next
section.
Because of the magnitude and urgency of the health threat and the high
priority placed on reopening the congressional buildings as soon as
possible to mitigate disruptions to the functioning of the federal
government, the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup conducted by EPA and other
federal agencies was accomplished fairly quickly, with the majority of
contaminated buildings opened for business in about 3 months. Without
the emphasis on reopening the buildings, for example, the cleanup site
likely would not have been operated around the clock, 24/7, for months.
In contrast, testing and decontamination of some buildings at other
sites have taken much longer. For example, fumigation of the Brentwood
postal facility was completed in March 2003, and this facility had not
reopened as of May 2003. In addition, a news media building in Boca
Raton, Florida, where the first letter containing anthrax was received
in September 2001, remained closed as of May 2003.
EPA Competitively Awarded Most Major Contracts Used in the Anthrax
Cleanup:
Almost all of the cleanup expenses-81 percent--paid to EPA's 27
contractors and 3 government agencies were incurred under competitively
awarded contracts. For example, $20.3 million of the approximately $25
million total expenditures under contracts and government agreements
were incurred under 10 existing, competitively awarded contracts that
EPA routinely uses under the Superfund program to respond to releases
or the threat of releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or
contaminants that may present imminent and substantial danger to the
public health or welfare. Most of the contracts that were not
competitively awarded cost less than $200,000 and provided supplies and
technical services. For additional assistance, EPA also entered into
agreements with two federal agencies and one state agency. (See fig.
3.):
Figure 3: Breakout of EPA Contract and Government Agreement Costs:
[See PDF for image]
[A] The competitively awarded contracts include $20.3 million expended
under 10 existing contracts and about $0.1 million under 2 contracts
awarded during the cleanup.
[End of figure]
Competitively Awarded Superfund Contracts:
When responding to a release of hazardous substances, EPA first relies
on its existing Superfund contracts. The Competition in Contracting Act
of 1984 generally requires contracting agencies to obtain full and open
competition through the use of competitive procedures, the dual
purposes of which are to ensure that procurements are open to all
responsible sources and to provide the government with the opportunity
to receive fair and reasonable prices. In order to respond to
emergencies involving releases of hazardous substances quickly, EPA
issues competitively awarded multiyear Superfund contracts so that
contractors with the necessary expertise are available on short notice
when needed. The 10 EPA regions each negotiate and manage these
Superfund contracts for work in their geographic area.
EPA generally uses two types of contracts in an emergency response:
* technical contracts provide technical assistance for EPA's site
assessment and removal activities, and:
* removal contracts provide emergency, time-critical removal services.
EPA used 10 existing, competitively awarded Superfund contracts for
most of the technical assessment and anthrax removal at the Capitol
Hill site: 4 technical contracts, 4 removal contracts, 2 other
contracts that provided specific technical services and support; and
issued 2 additional contracts for security services and supplies that
were competitively awarded. (See table 2.) The 10 existing contracts
had been in place for up to 4 years when the anthrax incident
occurred.[Footnote 9] While EPA's Region III issued the Superfund
contracts that incurred the most costs for the Capitol Hill anthrax
cleanup, contracts from other regions were also used to augment Region
III contracting resources. The 10 existing Superfund contracts
accounted for $20.3 million--or about 80 percent--of the total contract
and government agreement costs for the Capitol Hill cleanup.
Table 2: Competitively Awarded Superfund Contracts Used for the Capitol
Hill Anthrax Cleanup:
EPA Superfund contract: IT Corporation; Contract purpose: Removal;
Obligated amount: $4,800,000; Expended amount[A]: $3,924,566.
EPA Superfund contract: Tetra Tech EM, Inc.; Contract purpose:
Technical; Obligated amount: 4,497,205; Expended amount[A]: 4,397,083.
EPA Superfund contract: Earth Tech, Inc.; Contract purpose: Removal;
Obligated amount: 3,751,700; Expended amount[A]: 3,380,143.
EPA Superfund contract: Environmental Quality Management, Inc.;
Contract purpose: Removal; Obligated amount: 3,100,000; Expended
amount[A]: 2,848,095.
EPA Superfund contract: CDM Federal Programs Corporation; Contract
purpose: Support; Obligated amount: 2,500,000; Expended amount[A]:
2,075,436.
EPA Superfund contract: Roy F. Weston, Inc.; Contract purpose:
Technical; Obligated amount: 1,495,320; Expended amount[A]: 1,424,415.
EPA Superfund contract: Ecology & Environment, Inc.; Contract purpose:
Technical; Obligated amount: 1,055,261; Expended amount[A]: 1,039,601.
EPA Superfund contract: Lockheed Martin; Contract purpose: Support;
Obligated amount: 1,000,000; Expended amount[A]: 1,000,000.
EPA Superfund contract: Guardian Environmental Services, Inc.; Contract
purpose: Removal; Obligated amount: 200,000; Expended amount[A]:
116,184.
EPA Superfund contract: URS Operating Services, Inc.; Contract purpose:
Technical; Obligated amount: 91,423; Expended amount[A]: 91,423.
EPA Superfund contract: MVM Security & Staffing Services; Contract
purpose: Security services; Obligated amount: 87,562; Expended
amount[A]: 87,562.
EPA Superfund contract: TSI, Inc.; Contract purpose: Supplies;
Obligated amount: 7,520; Expended amount[A]: 7,520.
EPA Superfund contract: Total; Contract purpose: [Empty]; Obligated
amount: $22,585,991; Expended amount[A]: $20,392,028.
Source: EPA's Office of the Chief Financial Officer.
[A] Expenditures as of March 14, 2003.
[End of table]
The four EPA technical contracts for the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup,
among other things, provided decontamination plans and sampled for
anthrax in buildings. According to an EPA contracting official in
Region III, technical contracts typically account for about 10 percent
of total contract costs at a cleanup site. However, technical contracts
costs for the Capitol Hill site totaled about $7 million--or about 28
percent of the total contract costs.
The four EPA removal contracts for the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup
provided personnel, equipment, and materials to remove items from the
site for safekeeping, decontaminate areas where anthrax was found, and
dispose of contaminated items. These removal contracts also provided
equipment and personnel to conduct sampling because of the large amount
of samples that were required and the short time frames involved. The
four EPA removal contract costs totaled about $10 million.
The other existing EPA contracts provided either specific technical
services or support. One contract, which provides engineering and
analytical services to EPA, monitored the air to ensure that
potentially harmful decontamination chemicals were not released outside
the area in which they were being used. Another contract, typically
used for long-term Superfund cleanups known as remedial cleanups,
provided additional technical support, including sampling analysis and
data evaluation at the site. These two contracts totaled $3 million.
Noncompetitively Awarded Contracts:
Federal contracting laws that generally require EPA to use a
competitive bidding process permit some exceptions to this requirement,
including emergency situations where there is an unusual or compelling
urgency for obtaining the necessary supplies or services. On this
basis, in November 2001, EPA's Office of Acquisition Management gave
the EPA contracting officers the authority to enter into contracts for
the Capitol Hill anthrax site without using the normal competitive
bidding process. Overall, EPA used 15 noncompetitively awarded
contracts--that is, sole-source contracts--for supplies and for
technical, removal, and laboratory services to support the cleanup of
the Capitol Hill anthrax site. As shown in table 3, costs for three of
the sole-source contracts exceeded $200,000, and many of them were for
considerably less.
Table 3: Noncompetitively Awarded EPA Contracts Used for the Capitol
Hill Anthrax Cleanup:
Contract: Kemron Environmental Services, Inc.[B]; Contract purpose:
Removal; Obligated amount: $2,421,800; Expended amount[A]: $2,119,650.
Contract: HMHTTC Response Team, Inc.; Contract purpose: Removal;
Obligated amount: 900,000; Expended amount[A]: 900,000.
Contract: Southwest Research Institute; Contract purpose: Laboratory;
Obligated amount: 383,085; Expended amount[A]: 383,085.
Contract: University of California--Berkeley Sponsored Projects
Office; Contract purpose: Technical; Obligated amount: 182,075;
Expended amount[A]: 182,075.
Contract: Silva Consulting Services, LLC; Contract purpose: Technical;
Obligated amount: 165,000; Expended amount[A]: 158,100.
Contract: Science Applications International Corporation[B]; Contract
purpose: Technical; Obligated amount: 132,359; Expended amount[A]:
28,630.
Contract: Biomarine, Inc.; Contract purpose: Supplies; Obligated
amount: 81,147; Expended amount[A]: 65,647.
Contract: Envirofoam Technologies, Inc.; Contract purpose: Supplies;
Obligated amount: 52,405; Expended amount[A]: 52,405.
Contract: Safeware, Inc.; Contract purpose: Supplies; Obligated amount:
49,450; Expended amount[A]: 49,450.
Contract: Airgas Safety; Contract purpose: Supplies; Obligated amount:
31,756; Expended amount[A]: 30,992.
Contract: Sabre Oxidation Technologies, Inc.; Contract purpose:
Technical; Obligated amount: 21,950; Expended amount[A]: 19,850.
Contract: U.S. Art Company, Inc.; Contract purpose: Technical;
Obligated amount: 12,842; Expended amount[A]: 12,842.
Contract: Mine Safety Appliances[B]; Contract purpose: Supplies;
Obligated amount: 12,446; Expended amount[A]: 12,446.
Contract: Coastal Safety & Health Services, Inc.; Contract purpose:
Supplies; Obligated amount: 11,025; Expended amount[A]: 11,025.
Contract: New Horizons Diagnostics Corporation; Contract purpose:
Supplies; Obligated amount: 5,717; Expended amount[A]: 5,717.
Contract: Total; Contract purpose: [Empty]; Obligated amount:
$4,463,057; Expended amount[A]: $4,031,914.
Source: EPA's Office of the Chief Financial Officer.
[A] Expenditures as of March 14, 2003.
[B] GSA federal supply schedule contract.
[End of table]
The largest noncompetitive contract used for the cleanup was with
Kemron Environmental Services, Inc. Kemron provided EPA with HEPA
vacuuming services, one of the four methods used to remove anthrax at
the Capitol Hill site. EPA obtained the services of Kemron under the
GSA federal supply schedule, relying on GSA's determination that the
prices offered under the GSA contract were fair and
reasonable.[Footnote 10] The second largest noncompetitive contract was
with the removal contractor HMHTTC Response Team, which provided
additional workers in December 2001 to relieve the removal contractors
who had worked at the site since October. The other sole-source
contract over $200,000 was with Southwest Research Institute, a
laboratory that analyzed spore strips used to test for anthrax after
the decontamination efforts. This particular laboratory was selected
because it was familiar with the protocol developed by the technical
consultant who developed the spore strips. In addition, according to
EPA officials, the lab could handle the quantity of spore strips the
cleanup generated, it promised a quick turnaround time, and the fee was
reasonable.
The other noncompetitively awarded contracts used at the Capitol Hill
site were for supplies needed for the contractors working at the site,
such as respirators, air quality meters, and sampling kits, and for
technical and removal and laboratory services. For example, one
technical contractor, U.S. Art Company, Inc., provided advice regarding
the removal and decontamination of art objects in the Capitol Hill
buildings.
Appendix I provides details on the tasks performed under the
competitively and noncompetitively awarded contracts.
Agreements with Government Agencies:
EPA obtained further support through two federal interagency agreements
and one state agreement. EPA amended an existing interagency agreement
with the U.S. Coast Guard to respond quickly to the Capitol Hill
anthrax contamination. The U.S. Coast Guard National Strike Force
provided tactical entry teams, specialized equipment, management
support, and a deputy to the incident commander during the emergency
phase of the cleanup. EPA also entered into a new interagency agreement
with the U.S. Department of the Army for waste incineration services at
Fort Detrick, Maryland. In addition, EPA used the State of Maryland
Department of the Environment to review work plans and help coordinate
EPA's removal and disposal of anthrax. (See table 4.):
Table 4: Agreements with Federal and State Agencies Used for the
Capitol Hill Anthrax Cleanup:
Entity: U.S. Coast Guard; Obligated amount: $900,000; Expended
amount[A]: $635,254.
Entity: Department of the Army-U.S. Medical Command; Obligated amount:
274,141; Expended amount[A]: 241,141.
Entity: State of Maryland Department of the Environment; Obligated
amount: 1,500; Expended amount[A]: 1,500.
Entity: Total; Obligated amount: $1,175,641; Expended amount[A]:
$877,895.
Source: EPA's Office of the Chief Financial Officer.
[A] Expenditures as of March 14, 2003.
[End of table]
EPA Devoted Extensive Resources to Overseeing Contractors' Work, yet
Some Contracting Changes Would Better Support EPA Cleanups:
EPA dedicated significant staff resources to overseeing the many
contractors working on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup. Specifically,
about 50 EPA staff ensured the contractors were on site and performing
assigned tasks appropriately. In addition, EPA assigned an
administrative specialist to ensure contract charges were accurate and
reasonable. After the cleanup, EPA assessed its response to the Capitol
Hill anthrax incident and concluded that, overall, it had effectively
used its contracting resources. However, EPA also identified ways it
could improve contract support for potential future emergency
responses. Moreover, our review of the Capitol Hill anthrax incident
revealed inconsistencies in oversight practices that could affect the
quality of EPA's contract cost oversight, such as the extent to which
regions use the computerized cost-tracking system, the extent to which
they assign dedicated administrative specialists to cleanup sites to
oversee costs, and regions' varying approaches to reviewing cost
reports for technical contracts.
Staff Oversaw Contractors' Work to Ensure It Was Appropriate and
Charges Were Accurate and Reasonable:
EPA used emergency technical assessment and hazardous substance removal
contractors to conduct the cleanup and dedicated significant staff
resources to overseeing their work. Reporting to the Capitol Police
Board, EPA staff provided extensive technical expertise in anthrax
detection and removal to ensure that the Capitol Hill cleanup protected
public health and the environment. In all, according to EPA's Office of
the Chief Financial Officer's payroll list, about 150 EPA staff
participated in the anthrax cleanup, including about 50 staff from nine
regional offices who are experienced in leading and overseeing
emergency environmental cleanup operations--the on-scene coordinators-
-and several staff from EPA's Environmental Response Team who also have
experience in emergency cleanup operations.[Footnote 11]
The on-scene coordinators oversaw, and sometimes assisted with, the
work of the contractors during shifts that ran 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week, for about 3 months. Fifty-six EPA staff whose responsibilities at
the Capitol Hill site included overseeing contractors responded to our
survey about the oversight activities they performed. They reported
that their tasks varied but that the task they most frequently carried
out was overseeing contractors.[Footnote 12] Specifically, the EPA
respondents to our survey spent, on average,
* 53 percent of their time overseeing contractors;
* 18 percent researching and developing technical plans;
* 13 percent coordinating with other federal agencies on the
administration of the cleanup; and:
* 14 percent on "other activities," such as conducting pilot studies
for the decontamination effort, sampling for anthrax, and organizing
and administering cleanup activities.
The EPA staff who reported overseeing contractors spent, on average, 54
percent of their time observing contractors to ensure they were on site
and working on assigned tasks efficiently. These staff also spent, on
average, 17 percent of their time reviewing the results of contractors'
work, and 8 percent of their time preparing daily or weekly work plans.
Less frequently, staff who reported oversight activities also monitored
delivery and quality of supplies, reviewed cost documents, and approved
hours worked by contract personnel.
While EPA staff who reviewed cost documents spent, on average, 3
percent of their time reviewing cost documents, one person--a site
administrative officer--spent 100 percent of his time reviewing cost
documents. As discussed in the following section, Region III generally
uses site administrative officers to review both technical and removal
contract costs in detail and to document these reviews before the on-
scene coordinator reviews and approves them, thereby easing the cost-
review workload of on-scene coordinators and allowing them to focus
more on other cleanup management tasks and issues.
At the Capitol Hill anthrax site, the site administrative officer
reviewed the daily charges for four of the six removal contracts, which
represented about 41 percent of the total contract costs.[Footnote 13]
These reviews involved verifying the hours the contractor staff worked
by comparing the hours billed with the hours recorded in sign-in
sheets; reviewing travel costs to ensure they were within federal
guidelines and reviewing other expenditures of contractor staff, such
as telephone charges to ensure they were allowable. The review work
papers provide documentation of the cost reviews performed.
According to EPA officials, the technical contractors did not have
sufficient staff on site to provide daily cost reports, and the site
administrative officer, therefore, did not review the daily costs of
the technical contracts at the Capitol Hill site. EPA requires reviews
of the monthly cost reports from technical contractors before they are
approved for payment by project officers in the regions; the reviews
are generally performed by the on-scene coordinator at the site.
However, we could not determine the extent to which the costs of the
largest technical contract, which was managed by Region III, were
reviewed by on-scene coordinators at the Capitol Hill site because the
project officer responsible had retired, and EPA staff could not locate
any documentation of reviews that had been requested or performed. As
discussed further below, Region III implemented a new review process in
2002 that requires such documentation.
EPA's Assessments of Its Response to the Capitol Hill Anthrax Incident
Identified Contracting Issues, Which EPA Is Addressing:
EPA conducted four assessments that either focused on or included the
Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup; the reports resulting from each follow:
* Regional Lessons Learned from the Capitol Hill Anthrax Response,
March 2002;
* 60-Day Counter-Terrorism Contracting Assessment Final Report, May
2002;
* Federal On-Scene Coordinator's After Action Report for the Capitol
Hill Site, August 2002; and:
* Challenges Faced During the Environmental Protection Agency's
Response to Anthrax and Recommendations for Enhancing Response
Capabilities: A Lessons Learned Report, September 2002.[Footnote 14]
One of these reviews, the 60-day counter-terrorism contracting
assessment report, focused exclusively on the capability of EPA's
existing emergency response contracting network to respond to terrorist
incidents, while the other three addressed a range of issues, such as
operations and management, communications and coordination, health and
safety, and the resources available to EPA. The overarching purpose of
the four reviews was to derive lessons learned from EPA's responses to
the anthrax incidents in order to improve the agency's ability to
handle the kind of threats associated with large terrorist incidents.
In this regard, while EPA concluded the cleanup was a success because
the anthrax on Capitol Hill was removed efficiently and safely in the
face of numerous and unprecedented challenges, the reports include a
wide range of recommendations aimed at improving EPA's response
capabilities. Regarding contracting, the four reviews found that the
agency's emergency response contracting network met the response and
procurement needs at the Capitol Hill site, but they also identified
suggestions or recommendations for EPA to improve contract support for
potential future responses. The lessons learned and recommendations
included in the counter-terrorism contracting assessment report
generally address the contracting issues that were identified in the
broader reviews as well.
The counter-terrorism contracting assessment report developed 13
recommendations, 9 of which it identified as the most urgent. These
high-priority recommendations include the following:
* Facilitate counter-terrorism equipment acquisition and maintenance by
compiling a national vendor database of sources of counter-terrorism
equipment, supplies, and services.
* Create a strike team of headquarters and regional contracting
officers and project officers that will be available for deployment 24/
7 in the event of an emergency to assist with emergency procurement
needs.
* Increase the administrative support provided to on-scene coordinators
during a major terrorism-related response by, for example, providing
staff to review daily cost reports, review invoices, and process on-
site paperwork.
According to its April 21, 2003, status report of emergency response
contracting activities, EPA has completed or is currently taking steps
to address the contracting recommendations in the counter-terrorism
contracting report. Regarding the three recommendations discussed
above, EPA has done the following:
* EPA has developed counter-terrorism equipment warehouse contracts for
most of its regions.
* EPA developed a final draft document on establishing a national
contract support team and released it within EPA for review on April
18, 2003.
* The workgroup addressing the need for administrative support for on-
scene coordinators is working on a list of specific administrative
support tasks that are required.
The next section of this report discusses some other areas in which
EPA's contracting oversight might be improved that we identified during
our review of the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup.
Certain Oversight Practices That Could Enhance EPA's Oversight Are Used
in Some, but Not All, Regions:
As a result of the convergence of EPA staff from nine of its regions at
the Capitol Hill site, regional differences in contractor oversight
were highlighted. Three oversight differences concern contract cost
data and the review of these costs. First, regions vary in the way they
use a computerized contract cost-tracking system called the Removal
Cost Management System. All regions use the system for removal
contracts; however, some regions also use it for some technical
contracts also used at cleanup sites. Second, some regions require that
invoice reviews be documented before payments are made; other regions
have no such requirement. Third, regarding cost reviews, some regions
hire administrative specialists to conduct detailed daily on-site
reviews of contract costs in support of the on-scene coordinator, while
others only rely on the on-scene coordinator to both manage cleanups
and review and approve the contract costs.[Footnote 15]
Computerized Cost-Tracking System:
In 1988, to better support Superfund program management, EPA developed
a computerized cost-tracking system for cleanups so the agency could
obtain consistent documentation from contractors at all sites in a
timely and efficient manner. Specific anticipated benefits included
timely tracking of total costs to ensure that cleanup projects would
not exceed authorized amounts, more efficient invoice verification, and
the ability to develop more accurate cost estimates for cleanups. The
tracking system provides up-to-date cost information organized under
the main categories of "personnel," "equipment," and "other field
costs;" the system further breaks "other field costs" into such
subcategories as materials and supplies, travel, lodging, per diem, and
subcontracts. Thus, to the extent that regions require contractors to
input daily contract costs into the system, EPA can readily monitor
total costs as well as individual cost categories on a daily basis.
Daily cost information supports oversight better than monthly
information because it allows timely, on-site reviews of costs that can
uncover inefficient or excessive use of labor and equipment.
While a 1989 memorandum requiring the use of the tracking system
indicated that all site costs were to be input into the system,
generally only the costs associated with removal contracts are entered
daily into the system. For example, on the Capitol Hill anthrax
cleanup, the expenditures ($10.2 million) for the four multi-year
removal contracts were input into the system, but the expenditures ($7
million) for the four multi-year technical contracts were not.
According to EPA officials, part of the rationale for inputting removal
contract costs into the system is that the type of contract used--"time
and materials" contracts--requires more oversight than some other
contract types, such as fixed-price contracts. That is, the removal
contracts provide for specific labor rates but do not specify the
number of hours that may be applied under the contracts. Most of the
technical contracts currently used by the regions are cost
reimbursement contracts and a few are fixed-priced contracts. Further,
the fixed-priced contracts used by the regions will include a cost
reimbursement portion that may cover activities such as contractor
travel and subcontracts, according to a Region III contract official.
For example, the cost reimbursement portion of one of the fixed-price
technical contracts used for the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup was
substantial--about half of the contract cost of $4.4 million was
invoiced under the cost reimbursement portion, according to a Region
III contract official.[Footnote 16] As with work performed on a time-
and-materials basis, cost-reimbursement work requires appropriate
surveillance during performance to provide reasonable assurance that
efficient methods and effective cost controls are used. In addition,
the technical contracts support work at numerous cleanup sites, and EPA
also needs to track site-specific costs as well as total contract
costs. However, because EPA does not consistently use the contractor
cost-tracking system to track the costs incurred under its technical
contracts, complete and consistent cost data on specific cleanup sites
are not readily available.
Although EPA generally does not use the tracking system for technical
contract costs, individual on-scene coordinators in some regions have
required that these costs, as well as others, such as those incurred by
state and federal agencies, be entered into the system. According to
two such on-scene coordinators with whom we spoke, a key benefit of
using the tracking system is that it gives them timely information on
costs which helps them oversee and manage the work. According to an
environmental engineer with EPA's Environmental Response Team, the
benefits of using the tracking system for all of the contracts would
include having consistent cost data about each cleanup site in one
place, thereby enabling the agency to quickly respond to the numerous
site-specific questions frequently asked by EPA management, the
Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and others. For example, using the tracking system
one can quickly break out the expenditures into individual cost
categories. The four Capitol Hill contracts entered into the tracking
system include, in the aggregate, personnel costs of $2.8 million,
lodging costs of $1.6 million, and per diem costs of $0.6 million.
Using the tracking system, analyses of contract cost categories can be
performed on individual contracts and individual sites. However,
because technical contracts generally are not included in the tracking
system, information on individual cost categories for the entire
cleanup is incomplete.
Documentation of Invoice Reviews:
EPA's Contracts Management Manual describes responsibilities and
procedures for processing contractors' invoices. Contract invoices are
to be reviewed thoroughly for cost reasonableness and to be processed
in a timely manner. While the guidance may be tailored to specific
contracts and the use of checklists is optional, EPA's policy requires
documentation to show that the appropriate reviews have been performed.
The manual defines the roles of the various staff involved in reviewing
and approving invoices. Among the key personnel in this process are the
EPA staff who oversee the actual contract work[Footnote 17]--primarily
on-scene coordinators in the case of the Capitol Hill anthrax site--and
the project officer. In general, the staff who oversee the work are
responsible for reviewing individual contract costs for reasonableness
and informing the project officers of any problems with the costs, such
as excess hours charged. The project officers are responsible for
reviewing contract invoices for payment and completing and submitting
invoice approval forms to EPA's financial management center for
payment. The contract invoices for the removal and technical contracts
are typically highly detailed and presented in varying formats.
Invoice reviews for removal contracts are generally more standardized
across EPA than the invoice reviews for the technical contracts.
Regions use varying invoice review approaches for the technical
contracts. For example, beginning in November 2002, EPA Region III
established a new process for reviewing invoices of technical
contracts: the relevant EPA staff who oversaw or are overseeing the
work at the sites receive monthly site-specific invoices from
contractors, and the EPA staff are required to provide a written
statement to the EPA project officer either indicating agreement with
the costs or identifying questions about them. Region III revised its
invoice review process after a new project officer with prior auditing
experience was hired. This individual proposed the change to better
ensure that invoices were reviewed by the on-site person familiar with
the work that was performed--such as the on-scene coordinator--and that
the review was documented before invoices were paid. Similarly, Regions
V and IX send forms requiring responses to questions about the
invoices, along with the monthly invoices, and require the work
assignment managers overseeing the contract work to return the
completed forms to the project officers.
However, before this change, and during the Capitol Hill anthrax
cleanup, Region III did not require written certification of invoice
reviews. Region III's earlier approach is similar to the one currently
used in Region IV, where the project officer sends monthly invoices to
the EPA work assignment managers for review and asks them to respond if
they have concerns. Lacking a response from an EPA work assignment
manager, the project officer approves the invoice for payment after a
specified date. In these cases, the agency does not have documentation
of the appropriate invoice reviews by the EPA staff who oversaw the
contract work. Another variation is used in Region X: the project
officer approves the monthly invoices without providing the EPA work
assignment manager the opportunity to review them for reasonableness.
As a result, the review is performed by an individual who did not
oversee the work rather than by on-site staff who know the specifics of
the work performed.
Dedicated Administrative Specialists to Review Costs:
EPA's on-scene coordinators generally are responsible for managing all
aspects of emergency environmental cleanups: organizing, directing, and
documenting cleanup actions.[Footnote 18] Specific tasks include
conducting field investigations, monitoring on-scene activities, and
overseeing the cleanup actions. The on-scene coordinator is also the
individual with primary responsibility for ensuring that cleanup costs
are managed and tracked as the cleanup progresses. The cost reviews
that are required to ensure that EPA approves only reasonable and
allowable costs are detailed and time-consuming. An EPA cost management
principle for the Superfund program is that costs can be managed and
documented most effectively from the cleanup site as they occur.
However, EPA's Removal Cost Management Manual recognizes that the
demands on the on-scene coordinator's time and attention are great and
that, therefore, some cost management responsibilities have to be
delegated to other on-site or off-site personnel.
To address this workload issue, Region III established an
administrative position to provide on-site cost management support to
its on-scene coordinators. As discussed earlier, one of Region III's
site administrative officers[Footnote 19] worked on site at the Capitol
Hill anthrax cleanup, supporting the lead on-scene coordinator
essentially full-time from October 2001 through April 2002 and part-
time for several more months. As a result, the daily costs for four
removal contracts were examined, contractor hours were traced back to
sign-in sheets, and equipment deliveries and uses confirmed. The lead
on-scene coordinator could not have conducted these detailed cost
reviews because of other demands, and the other on-scene coordinators
on site (many of whom were assigned to the site for only several weeks)
also were involved overseeing the work being performed and would not
have been able to conduct timely, detailed cost reviews.
Also, as discussed above, one of the lessons EPA learned from its
assessments of its responses to the recent terrorist attacks, including
the anthrax incidents, is that the agency needs to provide more
administrative support to its on-scene coordinators who are responding
to threats associated with terrorist incidents. The 60-Day Counter-
Terrorism Contracting Assessment Final Report specifically said that
on-scene coordinators need increased support to review daily cost
reports and invoices and to process paperwork on-site. Although EPA's
Region III provides cost management support to its on-scene
coordinators on a routine basis, most of the regions do not have
positions dedicated to assist on-scene coordinators with their cost
management responsibilities and, therefore, do not have trained support
staff readily available to augment large or complex emergency cleanup
efforts. Region III, which was responsible for the contracting for the
Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, has three such positions and was able to
provide a site administrative officer to perform detailed cost reviews
of removal contracts at the Capitol Hill site. Region II also has three
similar positions. Five other regions we contacted do not have a
similar position.[Footnote 20]
EPA Negotiated Indemnification Agreements with Two Contractors to
Address Their Liability Concerns:
People in or near the contaminated Capitol Hill buildings could have
been harmed by anthrax that was not successfully removed or by a
release of the chemicals used to decontaminate the buildings. For
example, the decontaminant used in the fumigation cleanup method--
chlorine dioxide gas--may irritate the respiratory tract at low
concentrations and is fatal at high concentrations. In many cases,
contractors can obtain pollution liability insurance to cover harm to
third parties that may arise from cleanup activities; in other cases,
the cost of such insurance may be prohibitive. In the case of the
Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, two contractors with key roles in the
fumigation of the Hart Senate Office Building informed EPA that they
were not able to obtain such insurance at a reasonable cost, and they
requested indemnification. As discussed below, EPA agreed to provide
the indemnification authorized by CERCLA to the two contractors,
protecting them from the financial liability that could result if a
third party were injured by the contractors' release of a harmful
substance, including anthrax.
For example, numerous uncertainties about the use of chlorine dioxide
gas for this task existed, and IT Corporation--which was tasked to
fumigate the Hart office building using chlorine dioxide gas--would not
start removal procedures without receiving indemnification from EPA
against liability for damages. According to EPA officials, chlorine
dioxide had not been used previously for removing anthrax or for
fumigating such a large area. After EPA determined that IT Corporation
and three of its subcontractors supplying the fumigation chemicals and
technologies had diligently sought insurance and none was available at
a reasonable price, in November 2001, the agency agreed to provide them
with indemnification. Specifically, EPA agreed to compensate IT
Corporation and its three subcontractors up to $90 million if they were
deemed liable for damages caused by a negligent release of a hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant, including but not limited to
anthrax and chlorine dioxide. According to EPA officials, the
negotiations for the indemnification agreement were completed in about
4 weeks. The indemnification does not cover liability for intentional
misconduct or gross negligence. It appears that the cleanup was handled
without harmful incidents occurring. According to EPA officials,
neither IT Corporation nor the subcontractors have sought compensation
under the indemnification agreement.
In December 2001, after the agreement with IT Corporation was in place,
another contractor supporting the fumigation requested and obtained
indemnification. CDM Federal Programs Corporation (CDM), whose
responsibilities included placing the materials to test for the
presence of anthrax during fumigation, received indemnification terms
similar to those granted IT Corporation but with significantly lower
compensation amounts. Specifically, EPA agreed to compensate CDM up to
$1 million if it were deemed liable for damages caused by a negligent
release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, including
but not limited to anthrax. This indemnification also does not extend
to liability arising from intentional misconduct or gross negligence.
Negotiations for this agreement built on the previously negotiated
agreement with IT Corporation, and, according to EPA officials, were
accomplished in about a week. CDM was already working at the site when
it requested indemnification and continued to work while the
negotiations were in process.
Although IT Corporation required that an indemnification agreement be
in place before it would begin the decontamination of the Hart
building, the cleanup itself was not delayed because other issues
needed to be resolved before IT Corporation started the fumigation
process. For example, tests had to be conducted and then reviewed by
EPA, the Capitol Police Board, and others to confirm that chlorine
dioxide had the antimicrobial properties to effectively destroy
anthrax. By the time open issues were resolved and the decontamination
could begin, EPA had reached its agreement with IT Corporation and its
subcontractors. However, in other emergency cleanups, such negotiations
could delay the start of decontamination work. In this regard, EPA has
concluded that in the future, a more expedient way to indemnify
contractors for emergency situations such as anthrax incidents needs to
be in place to prevent delays. In fact, two of the EPA reviews of its
responses to the anthrax incidents recommended that EPA take steps to
expand contractor liability indemnification to address counter-
terrorism response activities. Once Subtitle G of the recently enacted
Homeland Security Act of 2002 is fully implemented, agency officials
believe that their emergency response contractors will face little or
no legal liability to injured third parties if the contractors use
qualified antiterrorism technologies previously approved by the
Secretary of Homeland Security. According to an EPA official, if this
act had been in effect at the time of the anthrax cleanup, and the
Department of Homeland Security had approved the chlorine dioxide
technology, the contractor would not have needed any indemnification
protection.
Conclusions:
In about 3 months and without harm to emergency response workers or
congressional staff, EPA, the Capitol Police Board, and others planned
and successfully conducted the first cleanup of office buildings
contaminated by a lethal form of anthrax that had caused several deaths
elsewhere. Moreover, EPA has taken the initiative to study its response
actions to better prepare itself for other emergency cleanups,
including other potential terrorism attacks, and has identified areas
in which it could improve. Despite the success of the cleanup, our
review identified certain inconsistencies in EPA's contractor cost
oversight that may affect its quality. First, regarding tracking
contract costs, because few regions use the cost-tracking system for
technical as well as removal contracts, EPA does not have readily
accessible, consistent contracting data on its cleanup sites. One
result of this lack is that the agency was unable to readily respond to
your questions about the costs of this cleanup, including the
categories of expenditures--how much was spent on personnel, travel,
equipment, and so on. In addition, EPA has less assurance that it is
providing effective, consistent oversight of its contracts. Second,
because EPA has not ensured that all of its regions document the
reviews of contractor invoices conducted by cognizant on-site
officials, the agency's ability to ensure that contractors' charges are
accurate and reasonable is lessened. Finally, on-scene coordinators
face many competing demands; therefore, their reviews of costs may be
less timely than those that can be provided by a specialist working on
site to support the on-scene coordinators' cost reviews. Such
administrative support could provide EPA with better assurance that its
payments to contractors are appropriately reviewed and adjusted on a
routine basis. It could also be readily called upon to conduct these
cost reviews during large and complex emergency cleanups, such as those
that may stem from terrorism.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To enhance its ability to ensure that the agency is providing effective
and efficient contractor oversight, we recommend that the Administrator
of EPA direct the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to
require:
* the regions to track and monitor both technical and removal contract
cost data in the agency's computerized cost-tracking system and:
* the on-site staff who are responsible for reviewing contractor
cleanup costs to certify that they have done so before the costs are
approved for payment.
In addition, we recommend that the Administrator direct the Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response to examine whether more or all of
the regions should hire specialists--either EPA or contractor staff--to
support the on-scene coordinators by providing timely, detailed reviews
of contract costs. If EPA uses contractor staff for this purpose, the
agency will need to provide appropriate contract oversight and ensure
that potential conflicts of interest are identified and mitigated.
Agency Comments and Our Response:
We provided copies of our draft report to EPA for review and comment.
In commenting on the draft, the Director of the Contract Management
Center in the Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, agreed to (1) consider adding the
technical contracts to the computerized cost-tracking system as the
agency awards the next round of these multiyear contracts and (2)
ensure all regions coordinate with on-site staff for invoice reviews
prior to approval. The Director also said that EPA is currently
examining providing additional administrative support at cleanup sites
and is considering using contractor support when in-house positions are
not available.
One of the considerations the Director of the Contract Management
Center cited regarding the inclusion of the technical contracts in the
cost-tracking system is that reengineering the system to fit the
different types of technical contracts that EPA uses might involve a
considerable expense for the agency. Further, while she acknowledged
that the cost tracking system may be particularly applicable when the
technical contractors are involved in removal (cleanup) activities, she
said the additional cost of using the system may not be justified in
some cases, such as for finite work performed under a negotiated work
plan or a fixed level of effort. However, we believe reengineering
costs may not be a barrier to using the system for both technical and
removal contracts. Specifically, the system is already being used to
track the costs of some of EPA's technical contracts. Further, an EPA
environmental engineer with extensive experience working with the
tracking system told us that changes to the system would not be
required to add technical contracts. In addition, effective oversight
of both time-and-materials work and cost-reimbursement work is
essential to ensure costs are reasonable and accurate. However,
currently the tracking system is used to support the on-site review of
the time-and-materials work done under the removal contracts but not
for the contract-reimbursement work done under the technical contracts.
We believe that the existing tracking system offers EPA an economical
vehicle for enhancing both its contracting data and its contractor
oversight by including the technical contracts in the cost tracking
system as was envisioned when the system was developed.
Regarding our recommendation that the on-site staff responsible for
reviewing contractor invoices certify that they have done so before the
costs are approved for payment, the Director agreed to require all EPA
regions to coordinate their invoice reviews with the on-site staff
before approving invoices for payment. If EPA requires the reviewers in
all the regions to certify their invoice reviews--as we recommend and
as some EPA regions currently do--the agency will be fully responsive
to our recommendation. Such a requirement will provide greater
assurance that the invoices EPA approves are accurate and reasonable.
EPA told us that it is currently examining the issue of additional
administrative support at cleanup sites by either EPA staff or
contractors, and we have revised our recommendation to take into
account concerns that would arise if EPA delegated its contract cost
review function to contractors.
EPA agreed that the information the report provides on the
indemnification agreements that the agency negotiated with two
contractors is accurate but suggested that the report also discuss the
limitations of the indemnification that EPA can provide under CERCLA.
As our report accurately addresses the extent to which EPA agreed to
indemnify contractors against liability for potential damages related
to the cleanup, we believe that a broader discussion of indemnification
issues is not necessary.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the costs to EPA of removing anthrax from the Capitol Hill
site, we obtained and reviewed cost information from the agency's
Office of the Chief Financial Officer. We discussed cleanup estimates
and contract costs for the Capitol Hill anthrax site with EPA financial
and contract staff. We also obtained detailed cost information on four
of EPA's removal contracts that was available from EPA's Removal Cost
Management System, the database that tracks costs by site and cost
categories. We were not able to obtain this level of detailed cost
information for all contractors because EPA does not use this database
for all the contractors who work at cleanup sites. To determine how
EPA's costs for the cleanup were funded, we reviewed relevant EPA
financial documentation and appropriations legislation that reimbursed
the agency's Superfund program for expenditures associated with the
resources used on the cleanup. We did not validate or verify these
data.
To determine the extent to which the contracts used at the Capitol Hill
anthrax site were competitively awarded, we reviewed EPA regional
contract documents and discussed the competitive contract process EPA
used with agency contract officials. We obtained and reviewed EPA
noncompetitively awarded contract documents and the regulations that
the agency is required to follow to justify awarding such contracts. We
reviewed contracts and agency reports to identify the roles and tasks
of the contractors that participated in the Capitol Hill anthrax
cleanup and discussed specific contract roles and tasks with EPA
officials who were responsible for the cleanup.
To describe the extent to which EPA oversaw contractors' work on the
Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup to ensure it was done appropriately and
the charges were reasonable, we interviewed Region III contract
officials and the site administrative officer who oversaw four
contracts during the cleanup. We also examined documentation of the
oversight provided by reviewing Capitol Hill site contracting files. We
reviewed documentation of, and talked with agency officials about, the
current contract oversight practices EPA uses, including staff
responsibilities for cost oversight and the use of the contractor cost
tracking system. In addition, in part because of delays in obtaining
contract information, we surveyed the 63 EPA personnel whom the agency
identified as having provided contractor oversight to obtain
information on their roles in overseeing the contractors' cleanup work
for the Capitol Hill anthrax site. Using a Web-based survey, we
received responses from 56 individuals, a response rate of 89 percent.
We also interviewed nine EPA personnel who the survey identified as
having spent considerable time at the cleanup site performing contract
oversight. In addition, we reviewed four EPA assessments that either
focused on or included the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup and that
identified contract oversight issues and recommendations. We obtained
information on actions EPA has taken or is taking to respond to the
recommendations addressing contracting issues.
To describe EPA's indemnification of contractors against liability for
potential damages, we reviewed CERCLA provisions and EPA guidance
governing indemnity authority, as well as contract modifications
regarding indemnification that EPA made to two contracts used for the
Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup. We also discussed with EPA officials how
the indemnification process affected the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup.
We conducted our review from June 2002 through May 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 14 days
after the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Administrator of EPA and other interested parties. We will make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-
3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
Sincerely yours,
John B. Stephenson
Director,
Natural Resources and Environment:
Signed by John B. Stephenson:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Contract Tasks and Roles:
Competitively awarded contracts:
Contract: IT Corporation; Purpose:
Removal; Task/role performed: Prepare
buildings for decontamination. Conduct and support decontamination
operations, including fumigation with chlorine dioxide gas.
Decontaminate interior surfaces of buildings, other structures, cars,
and other vessels. Provide for collection, containment, and
transportation and disposal of contaminated materials from the site
operations; Provide support to EPA sampling teams and other federal
responders, including response technicians, to assist with
decontamination activities.
Contract: Tetra Tech EM, Inc.; Purpose:
Technical; Task/role performed:
Provide the on-scene coordinator and incident commander
fumigation design procedures, including details on fumigant delivery;
concentration; operating conditions, such as temperature and humidity;
fumigant containment and recovery; and monitoring of parameters.
Provide detailed design for delivery of fumigant, equipment
requirements and specifications, flow schematics, and detailed
schedules and operating procedures to use during fumigation. Provide a
chlorine dioxide specialist to assist EPA in overseeing the fumigation
setup; Provide technical support to the on-scene coordinator in
developing chronology of events at the site, including researching
various files, documents, and logbooks in order to develop a
comprehensive report; Monitor and assist with the oversight of the
chlorine dioxide fumigation process. Assist with health and safety
matters at the site, conduct sampling, assist and oversee off-gassing,
inventory, and return items being treated; Support the on-scene
coordinator in conducting presentations and briefings related to post-
treatment and design of chlorine dioxide use in the heating,
ventilation, and air-conditioning system; Sample a small number of
critical items (plastic, leather, and polyester) for ethylene oxide and
its derivations to determine how the ethylene oxide and its derivatives
are maintained in the materials and off-gas over time.
Contract: Earth Tech, Inc.; Purpose:
Removal; Task/role performed: Provide
decontamination services and other direct support to sampling teams.
Decontaminate interior surfaces of buildings, other structures, and
interior and exterior surfaces of cars and other vessels identified by
the on-scene coordinator. Collect all expended cleaning agents and
materials for treatment and/or disposal; Provide decontamination
facilities and services for response personnel and their equipment.
Inventory items--segregating clean and contaminated materials and
salvageable and expendable items--and provide documentation of
inventoried items; Propose a decontamination strategy for critical
items (including personal items such as photographs, framed diplomas,
and equipment). Decontaminate critical and salvageable items from the
Capitol Complex, including setting up work zones for items to be
decontaminated and for personnel decontamination. Return property after
decontamination.; Provide contamination reduction and isolation
facilities and operations that improve and ensure safe access to
contaminated areas and items and prevent further spread of
contamination.
Contract: Environmental Quality Management, Inc.; Purpose:
Removal; Task/role performed:
Provide personnel and equipment,
including portable decontamination facility. Collect expended cleaning
agents and materials for treatment and/or disposal. Dispose of
materials or items that could not be decontaminated.
Contract: CDM Federal Programs Corporation; Purpose:
Support; Task/role performed:
Oversee preparation, handling, placement, and collection of
spore strips used during fumigation with chlorine dioxide gas and
ethylene oxide gas. Develop a procedure for spore strip emplacement;
removal; and critical item tagging, tracking, and shipping; Provide
sampling such as swipe and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA)
vacuum (including efforts to collect, prepare, and ship samples), item
decontamination, and minor remediation work; Support critical item
degassing activities in Beltsville, Maryland. Maintain critical item
inventories and coordinate the release and return of critical items to
congressional staffers; Support chlorine dioxide decontamination of
congressional mail packages.
Contract: Roy F. Weston, Inc.; Purpose:
Technical; Task/role performed:
Develop various documents/plans to be used during the
response activities (e.g., standard operating procedures for sampling,
decontamination, source reduction). Provide reconnaissance, photo
documentation, and sampling of congressional office buildings;
Provide technical support for the selection and implementation of
decontamination procedures; building-specific plan development for
anthrax remediation, including sampling plans, isolation plans,
decontamination plans, and item recovery plans; and sampling support
for anthrax analysis using HEPA and wipe sampling techniques; perform
oversight of removal crews. Provide swab and HEPA sampling and
decontamination support; Provide bag-and-tag operations of critical
and salvageable items in congressional office buildings. Provide air
monitoring operations during chlorine dioxide fumigation operations.
Contract: Ecology & Environment, Inc.; Purpose:
Technical; Task/role performed:
Develop sampling and decontamination plans, sample labels
and chain-of-custodies, and maps to support sampling activities and to
track sampling results; Perform sampling, monitoring, and
decontamination of areas in the Capitol Hill complex. Conduct sampling
tracking and handling activities, including preparing samples for
shipping; Compile and review background data and organize site
documentation files; Provide technical support to the operations
section and support to the EPA Mobile Lab.
Contract: Lockheed Martin; Purpose:
Support; Task/role performed: Assist
in monitoring temperature and relative humidity inside office buildings
and in monitoring chlorine dioxide, chlorine, wind speed and direction,
temperature and relative humidity in surrounding area; Assist with
development and evaluation of anthrax fumigation procedures using spore
strips in a test facility and train other contractors in the handling
and placement of spore strips in the office building; Provide
ambient air monitoring for chlorine dioxide using tape meters and a
portable meteorological tower to document that no chlorine dioxide is
being emitted from the treatment area. Provide on-site assistance to
ensure that spore strip sampling is being conducted properly and that
data management is being performed accurately and completely.
Contract: Guardian Environmental Services, Inc.; Purpose:
Removal; Task/role performed:
Assist in the removal of items from
the contaminated office suites in the congressional office buildings,
including removal of contaminated office furniture, office equipment,
and carpet. Construct isolation chambers, decontamination chambers, and
other related structures.
Contract: URS Operating Services, Inc.; Purpose:
Technical; Task/role performed:
Provide sampling for anthrax in the Capitol Hill complex.
Contract: MVM Security & Staffing Services; Purpose:
Security; Task/role performed:
Provide security personnel to staff the single
entrance/exit and to patrol perimeter of the storage location used for
property removed from U.S. Senate offices during the cleanup to ensure
that no unauthorized personnel enter the work area and assure that
property items are not removed from the work area without approval of
EPA.
Contract: TSI, Inc.; Purpose:
Supplies; Task/role performed:
Provide Porta Count plus respirator fit tester.
Contract: Noncompetitively awarded contracts.
Contract: Kemron Environmental Services, Inc.; Purpose:
Technical; Task/role performed:
Perform air sampling and perform HEPA vacuuming
services; Remove critical items and documents, spray affected areas
with chlorine dioxide, and perform cleaning and breakdown of work
zones; Assist EPA in the evaluation of possible remediation of the
heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning system, including
evaluation of affected areas, and construction of critical barriers
inside the ductwork to isolate affected areas from uncontaminated
areas. After fumigation of the affected heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning system, provide confirmatory sampling support, interior
duct sampling, additional cleaning of the system (including post-
fumigation scrub down inside the ducts), and removal of duct
insulation.
Contract: HMHTTC Response Team, Inc.; Purpose:
Removal; Task/role performed:
Perform cleanup activities, including construction and
removal of isolation barriers, HEPA vacuuming operations, and
application of liquid chlorine dioxide; Provide 24-hour support for
decontamination and rescue operations at the Capitol Hill anthrax
site.
Contract: Southwest Research Institute; Purpose:
Laboratory work; Task/role performed:
Provide analysis of spore strips placed in various locations
during cleanup operations. Receive and perform daily observations of
thousands of spore strips.
Contract: University of California--Berkeley Sponsored Projects
Office; Purpose: Technical; Task/role
performed: Participate in and support
program plan development relating to spore sterilization technologies
for remediation of federal facilities; Develop experimental and
field test plans and methodologies for characterization/modeling spore
killing processes and kinetics and factors that affect the efficacy of
spore killing in field-scale applications; Establish laboratory
systems for the measurement of gas phase sporicidal effects at federal
office and mail facilities. Provide laboratory analytical support for
measurement of gas phase sporicidal effects. Develop experimental and
test plans and methodologies for assessing and validating spore killing
processes; Determine the concentrations of chlorine dioxide needed
to decontaminate anthrax on Capitol Hill. Prepare 31,500 test strips
containing a bacillus similar to anthrax and send to Capitol Hill. The
exposed strips will be sent to labs and results then will be sent to
the University of California, Berkeley, to be included in a
consolidated final report.
Contract: Silva Consulting Services, LLC; Purpose:
Technical; Task/role performed:
Maintain sample management system software in a
private, secure environment on the Internet. Provide EPA personnel and
designated contractor personnel secure, controlled access to the
database. This system could generate a large variety of reports to
address particular questions about sampling results.
Contract: Science Applications International Corporation; Purpose:
Technical; Task/role performed:
Provide consulting services to EPA on-
scene coordinator in environmental remediation of anthrax-contaminated
buildings in the Capitol Hill complex. Support includes data
interpretation of the spore strips used to test the efficacy of the
kill of anthrax, data validation, review of documents, assistance in
document preparation, and report writing. Coordinate efforts with the
University of California, Berkeley.
Contract: Biomarine, Inc.; Purpose:
Supplies; Task/role performed:
Provide equipment that includes biopaks, facemasks, oxygen cylinders,
gel tubes, foam scrubbers, coolant canister foam, flow restrictors, and
biopak service and retrofit kits.
Contract: Envirofoam Technologies, Inc.; Purpose:
Supplies; Task/role performed:
Provide Sandia foam and backpack dispensing units.
Contract: Safeware, Inc.; Purpose:
Supplies; Task/role performed:
Provide respirators with battery and cartridge.
Contract: Airgas Safety; Purpose:
Supplies; Task/role performed:
Provide air purifying respirators.
Contract: Sabre Oxidation Technologies, Inc.; Purpose:
Technical; Task/role performed:
Provide engineering support during the assessment of
the feasibility and design of the systems for fumigating air handling
return system.
Contract: U.S. Art Company, Inc.; Purpose:
Technical; Task/role performed:
Provide training on proper procedures for handling,
packaging, and decontaminating artifacts (paintings, sculptures, and
other art forms) from the Hart Senate Office Building.
Contract: Mine Safety Appliances; Purpose:
Supplies; Task/role performed:
Provide self-contained breathing apparatus system.
Contract: Coastal Safety & Health Services, Inc.; Purpose:
Supplies; Task/role performed:
Provide indoor air quality meter.
Contract: New Horizons Diagnostics Corporation; Purpose:
Supplies; Task/role performed:
Provide anthrax detection kits.
Source: EPA.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
John B. Stephenson (202) 512-3841:
Christine Fishkin (202) 512-6895:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Heather Balent, Greg Carroll, Nancy
Crothers, Richard Johnson, and Susan Lawes made key contributions to
this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Technically, the term "anthrax" refers to the disease caused by the
spore-forming bacterium, Bacillus anthracis, and not the bacterium or
its spores. In this report, we use the term to refer to the bacterium
and its spores to reflect terminology commonly used in the media and by
the general public.
[2] The cleanup decisions were authorized by EPA in "action memoranda"
the agency uses for Superfund response decisions.
[3] Sandia foam is a decontaminant that neutralizes chemical and
biological agents.
[4] The Brentwood Processing and Distribution Center was renamed the
Joseph Curseen, Jr., and Thomas Morris, Jr., Processing and
Distribution Center in September 2002 in honor of two postal employees
who died as a result of anthrax exposure at the facility. The facility
is still commonly referred to as Brentwood.
[5] The expenditures reported are as of March 14, 2003, and were paid
under total obligations of about $30 million. Obligations are contracts
awarded, services received, and similar transactions during a given
period that will require payment during the same or future period.
[6] Including the four fatalities discussed, the letters contaminated
with anthrax caused 23 illnesses and resulted in five deaths.
[7] We did not validate the personnel costs reported by the Office of
the Chief Financial Officer. These costs may be somewhat understated
because documents we reviewed showed that at least five of the on-scene
coordinators who worked at the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup for 3 weeks
or less were not identified by EPA as having their hours worked and/or
transportation expenses assigned to the cleanup job.
[8] According to EPA officials, the agency decided to allocate direct
personnel costs (salaries and travel expenses) to the anthrax cleanup
but not indirect costs, such as contract management support, which it
normally allocates to Superfund cleanups. Under the Superfund program,
EPA seeks to recover costs from the responsible party or parties.
[9] Most of these contracts are for 5-year terms.
[10] Under the Federal Supply Schedule, GSA awards contracts to
multiple companies supplying comparable products and services after
determining that the prices negotiated were fair and reasonable.
Federal agencies may use the supply schedule to purchase commercial
services requiring a statement of work but are responsible for
determining that the total contract prices are fair and reasonable,
considering the level of effort and mix of labor skills needed to
perform specific tasks. Agencies ordering services that require a
statement of work are to transmit their requests for services to at
least three contractors. However, EPA awarded this contract without
soliciting bids from three contractors on the basis that there was an
unusual and compelling need to obtain the services without delay.
[11] The Environmental Response Team assists EPA regions and other
federal agencies responding to environmental emergencies by providing a
wide range of technical expertise and equipment.
[12] Forty-six of the survey respondents were on-scene coordinators.
[13] The site administrative officer did not review the costs
associated with the other two removal contracts--a GSA federal supply
contract and a noncompetitive contract awarded for a limited period of
time--on a daily basis because the contractors had not input these into
the computerized cost tracking system used for the review.
[14] This report focused largely on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup
but also included EPA's roles in other anthrax incidents, such as at
other federal facilities.
[15] Generally on-scene coordinators review and approve costs for
removal contracts and review costs for technical contracts; project
officers generally approve costs for technical contracts.
[16] This and the other Region III technical contract were negotiated
as fixed-price contracts with cost reimbursement provisions. Under
these contracts, contractors provide EPA with "dedicated teams" that
provide technical assistance at set monthly rates for up to a
predetermined amount of time; additional time may be provided at fixed
hourly rates; and other specialized personnel and contractor travel and
subcontracting are included among the items that are paid under the
cost reimbursement provisions.
[17] EPA staff overseeing the work are referred to as "work assignment
managers" in the EPA manual.
[18] As discussed, at the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, EPA's lead on-
scene coordinator reported to the Capitol Police Board, and about 50
on-scene coordinators worked at the site during the cleanup.
[19] Region III refers to this position as site administrative officer
or field administrative specialist.
[20] We contacted regions II, III, IV, V, VIII, IX, and X.
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