Energy Task Force
Process Used to Develop the National Energy Policy Gao ID: GAO-03-894 August 22, 2003On January 29, 2001, the President established the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG)--a group of cabinet-level and other senior administration officials, chaired by the Vice President--to gather information, deliberate, and recommend a national energy policy. The group presented its final report to the President in May 2001. GAO was asked to (1) describe the process used by the NEPDG to develop the National Energy Policy report, including whom the group met with and what topics were discussed and (2) determine the costs associated with that process. Although appointed NEPDG Chair, the Vice President elected not to respond to GAO's request for certain factual NEPDG information. Accordingly, as authorized by GAO's access-torecords statute, and after exhausting efforts to achieve a resolution and following the processes specified in that statute, GAO filed suit in U.S. District Court to obtain the information. The district court later dismissed GAO's suit on jurisdictional grounds, without reaching the merits of GAO's right to audit and evaluate NEPDG activities or to obtain access to NEPDG records. For a variety of reasons, GAO decided not to appeal the district court decision. DOE, Interior, and EPA reviewed the draft report and chose not to comment. OVP declined an offer to review the draft and comment.
According to the best information that GAO could obtain, the National Energy Policy report was the product of a centralized, top-down, short-term, and labor-intensive process that involved the efforts of several hundred federal employees governmentwide. In the 3 = months between the inception of NEPDG and its presentation of the final report, the Principals (the Vice President, selected cabinet-level and other senior administration officials) and their support staff (Support Group) controlled most facets of the report's development, including setting meeting schedules and agendas, controlling the workflow, distributing work assignments, rewriting chapters, and approving recommendations. Senior agency officials served on a select interagency Working Group, while the majority of agency staff working on the NEPDG effort played a tributary role, helping their agencies fulfill their NEPDG-related obligations and responding to the Support Group's subsequent requests for information, review, or comment. In developing the National Energy Policy report, the NEPDG Principals, Support Group, and participating agency officials and staff met with, solicited input from, or received information and advice from nonfederal energy stakeholders, principally petroleum, coal, nuclear, natural gas, and electricity industry representatives and lobbyists. The extent to which submissions from any of these stakeholders were solicited, influenced policy deliberations, or were incorporated into the final report cannot be determined based on the limited information made available to GAO. NEPDG met and conducted its work in two distinct phases: the first phase culminated in a March 19, 2001, briefing to the President on challenges relating to energy supply and the resulting economic impact; the second phase ended with the May 16, 2001, presentation of the final report to the President. The Office of the Vice President's (OVP) unwillingness to provide the NEPDG records or other related information precluded GAO from fully achieving its objectives and substantially limited GAO's ability to comprehensively analyze the NEPDG process. None of the key federal entities involved in the NEPDG effort provided GAO with a complete accounting of the costs that they incurred during the development of the National Energy Policy report. The two federal entities responsible for funding the NEPDG effort--OVP and the Department of Energy (DOE)--did not provide the comprehensive cost information that GAO requested. OVP provided GAO with 77 pages of information, two-thirds of which contained no cost information while the remaining one-third contained some miscellaneous information of little to no usefulness. OVP stated that it would not provide any additional information. DOE, the Department of the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provided GAO with estimates of certain costs and salaries associated with the NEPDG effort, but these estimates, all calculated in different ways, were not comprehensive.
GAO-03-894, Energy Task Force: Process Used to Develop the National Energy Policy
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
August 2003:
Energy Task Force:
Process Used to Develop the National Energy Policy:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-894] GAO-03-894:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-894, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
On January 29, 2001, the President established the National Energy
Policy Development Group (NEPDG)”a group of cabinet-level and other
senior administration officials, chaired by the Vice President”to
gather information, deliberate, and recommend a national energy
policy. The group presented its final report to the President in May
2001. GAO was asked to (1) describe the process used by the NEPDG to
develop the National Energy Policy report, including whom the group
met with and what topics were discussed and (2) determine the costs
associated with that process.
Although appointed NEPDG Chair, the Vice President elected not to
respond to GAO‘s request for certain factual NEPDG information.
Accordingly, as authorized by GAO‘s access-to-records statute, and
after exhausting efforts to achieve a resolution and following the
processes specified in that statute, GAO filed suit in U.S. District
Court to obtain the information. The district court later dismissed
GAO‘s suit on jurisdictional grounds, without reaching the merits of
GAO‘s right to audit and evaluate NEPDG activities or to obtain access
to NEPDG records. For a variety of reasons, GAO decided not to appeal
the district court decision.
DOE, Interior, and EPA reviewed the draft report and chose not to
comment. OVP declined an offer to review the draft and comment.
What GAO Found:
According to the best information that GAO could obtain, the National
Energy Policy report was the product of a centralized, top-down, short-
term, and labor-intensive process that involved the efforts of several
hundred federal employees governmentwide. In the 3 ½ months between
the inception of NEPDG and its presentation of the final report, the
Principals (the Vice President, selected cabinet-level and other
senior administration officials) and their support staff (Support
Group) controlled most facets of the report‘s development, including
setting meeting schedules and agendas, controlling the workflow,
distributing work assignments, rewriting chapters, and approving
recommendations. Senior agency officials served on a select
interagency Working Group, while the majority of agency staff working
on the NEPDG effort played a tributary role, helping their agencies
fulfill their NEPDG-related obligations and responding to the Support
Group‘s subsequent requests for information, review, or comment.
In developing the National Energy Policy report, the NEPDG Principals,
Support Group, and participating agency officials and staff met with,
solicited input from, or received information and advice from
nonfederal energy stakeholders, principally petroleum, coal, nuclear,
natural gas, and electricity industry representatives and lobbyists.
The extent to which submissions from any of these stakeholders were
solicited, influenced policy deliberations, or incorporated into the
final report cannot be determined based on the limited information
made available to GAO. NEPDG met and conducted its work in two
distinct phases: the first phase culminated in a March 19, 2001,
briefing to the President on challenges relating to energy supply and
the resulting economic impact; the second phase ended with the May 16,
2001, presentation of the final report to the President. The Office of
the Vice President‘s (OVP) unwillingness to provide the NEPDG records
or other related information precluded GAO from fully achieving its
objectives and substantially limited GAO‘s ability to comprehensively
analyze the NEPDG process.
None of the key federal entities involved in the NEPDG effort provided
GAO with a complete accounting of the costs that they incurred during
the development of the National Energy Policy report. The two federal
entities responsible for funding the NEPDG effort”OVP and the
Department of Energy (DOE)”did not provide the comprehensive cost
information that GAO requested. OVP provided GAO with 77 pages of
information, two-thirds of which contained no cost information while
the remaining one-third contained some miscellaneous information of
little to no usefulness. OVP stated that it would not provide any
additional information. DOE, the Department of the Interior, and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provided GAO with estimates of
certain costs and salaries associated with the NEPDG effort, but these
estimates, all calculated in different ways, were not comprehensive.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-894.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Robert A. Robinson at
(202) 512-3841 or robinsonr@gao.gov.
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
The National Energy Policy Report Was the Product of a Centralized,
Top-Down Process:
Federal Agencies Did Not Track the Amount of Public Money Spent on
NEPDG Activities:
Agency Comments:
Appendix:
Appendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment:
GAO Contacts:
Acknowledgment:
Table:
Table 1: NEPDG Principals' Meetings from January 29 to May 16, 2001:
Figure:
Figure 1: Structure Used in Developing the National Energy Policy:
Abbreviations:
DOE: Department of Energy:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
NEPDG: National Energy Policy Development Group:
OVP: Office of the Vice President:
Letter August 22, 2003:
Congressional Requesters:
As one of the new administration's first major actions, on January 29,
2001, the President created a group of cabinet-level and other senior
federal officials, chaired by the Vice President, to develop a national
energy policy. The President charged the group, called the National
Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), with developing "a national
energy policy designed to help the private sector, and government at
all levels, promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound
production and distribution of energy for the future."[Footnote 1]
NEPDG presented its final report to the President on May 16,
2001.[Footnote 2] The report contained over 100 recommendations for
executive actions or new legislation. The Congress is now considering
the energy-related legislative proposals.
You asked us to examine the process used by the President's energy
policy taskforce.[Footnote 3] Specifically, our objectives were to (1)
describe the process used by NEPDG to develop the National Energy
Policy report, including whom the group met with and the topics
discussed at these meetings, and (2) determine the costs associated
with that process. In order to close out this request, we are providing
a limited analysis based on the best information that has been made
available to us.
To address our objectives, we followed a two-pronged information
gathering effort. First, starting in the spring of 2001, we began
gathering information from several federal agencies involved in the
report's development--the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of
the Interior (Interior), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
At each of the agencies, we interviewed senior agency officials that
were involved in the NEPDG effort and received written correspondence
and other materials from them providing detailed responses to our
questions. Agency officials based most of their answers on their best
recollections or on information reconstructed from electronic
schedules. Our meetings with officials yielded information regarding
the meetings that Cabinet-level agency officials attended and meetings
that agency officials held with NEPDG support staff (Support Group).
Officials also provided us with selected information on meetings held
with nonfederal energy stakeholders to discuss issues related to energy
aspects of their agency's activities.
Second, also starting in spring of 2001, we initiated contact with the
Office of the Vice President (OVP), as NEPDG Chair, to obtain NEPDG
records responsive to your request. From the outset, OVP did not
respond to our request for information, including descriptive
information on the process by which the National Energy Policy report
was developed, asserting that we lacked statutory authority to examine
NEPDG activities. We were also denied the opportunity to interview
staff assisting the Vice President on the NEPDG effort. As a result,
throughout the spring and summer of 2001, we engaged in extensive
attempts to reach an agreement with OVP on our information request in
an effort to fulfill our statutory responsibilities in a manner that
accommodated the Vice President's asserted need to protect certain
executive deliberations. Importantly, we significantly narrowed the
scope of our review by, among other things, withdrawing our initial
request for minutes of NEPDG meetings. We also offered flexibility in
how we would access certain documents. Despite our concerted efforts to
reach a reasonable accommodation, the Vice President denied us access
to virtually all requested information, with the exception of a few
documents purportedly related to NEPDG costs that OVP provided to us.
The Vice President's denial of access challenged GAO's fundamental
authority to evaluate the process by which NEPDG had developed a
national energy policy and to obtain access to records that would shed
light on that process. As authorized by GAO's access-to-records
statute, after exhausting the processes specified in that statute for
achieving a resolution and receiving a request from two senate full
committee chairs and two senate subcommittee chairs to pursue our
evaluation,[Footnote 4] we filed suit in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia on February 22, 2002, to obtain
the limited factual NEPDG information that we had requested.[Footnote
5] On December 9, 2002, the district court dismissed GAO's suit on
jurisdictional grounds, without reaching the merits of GAO's authority
to audit and evaluate NEPDG activities or to obtain access to NEPDG
records.[Footnote 6] After considerable bipartisan outreach efforts to
the Congress, GAO decided not to appeal the district court
decision.[Footnote 7] A detailed chronology of our efforts to obtain
access to NEPDG records can be found on GAO's Web site.
OVP's unwillingness to provide NEPDG records and other related
information precluded us from fully achieving our objectives in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and
substantially limited our ability to answer the questions you asked and
the depth of our analysis. Yet, given the unique circumstances
surrounding this request, our protracted attempts to acquire this
information, and the availability of certain related documents in the
public realm, we gathered and analyzed available information on the
NEPDG effort to provide as robust an account as possible under the
circumstances. Specifically, in order to more fully analyze and
describe the NEPDG report development process, beginning in March 2002,
we obtained, reviewed, and analyzed NEPDG-related information from
federal agencies involved in the NEPDG effort that was released under
court order in four other ongoing lawsuits filed under other
statutes.[Footnote 8] The agencies releasing documents included DOE,
Interior, and EPA, as well as the Department of Transportation,
Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture, and the Office of
Management and Budget. We could not independently verify some of the
information contained in these documents because the agencies had
redacted data from more than one-third of the pages. The agencies
asserted that the redacted information was exempt from production under
the Freedom of Information Act because it reflected deliberative
processes among other things. For the thousands of pages that contained
some information responsive to our objectives, we compared and
contrasted their contents, sought corroboration from other sources, and
pieced together a general description of the National Energy Policy
report development process. Included in these pages were several
hundred E-mails and other documents generated by OVP or the Support
Group. Some of these documents revealed information about the process
used to develop the NEPDG report, but none of them contained cost
information beyond that which we had previously obtained.
Results in Brief:
According to the best information that we could obtain, the National
Energy Policy report was the product of a centralized, top-down, short-
term, and labor-intensive process that involved the efforts of several
hundred federal employees governmentwide. NEPDG--comprised mostly of
cabinet-level officials (Principals)--and its Support Group--comprised
mostly of select DOE officials detailed to OVP--controlled most facets
of the report's development. Officials from each participating agency
served on a select interagency working group (Working Group), which
prepared draft report chapters for the Principals' review. Agency staff
played a tributary role, helping their respective agency complete its
NEPDG-related assignments, providing draft outlines and chapters to the
Working Group and Principals, and responding to the Support Group's
subsequent requests for information, review, or comment. In developing
the National Energy Policy report, the Principals, Support Group, and
participating agency staff also met with, solicited input from, or
received information and advice from nonfederal energy stakeholders,
principally petroleum, coal, nuclear, natural gas, and electricity
industry representatives and lobbyists. To a more limited degree, they
also obtained information from academic experts, policy organizations,
environmental advocacy groups, and private citizens. The extent to
which submissions from any of these stakeholders were solicited,
influenced policy deliberations, or were incorporated into the final
report is not something that we can determine based on the limited
information at our disposal. Nor can we, because of OVP's unwillingness
to provide us with information, provide a comprehensive listing of the
dates or purposes of these meetings, their attendees, or how the
attendees, when solicited, were selected. NEPDG held periodic meetings
and conducted its work in two distinct phases: the first culminating in
a March 19, 2001, briefing on challenges relating to energy supply and
the resulting economic impact; the second ending with the May 16, 2001,
presentation of the final report to the President.
None of the federal entities involved in the NEPDG effort that we
contacted provided us with a complete accounting of the costs that they
incurred during the development of the National Energy Policy report.
The two federal entities responsible for funding the NEPDG effort--OVP
and DOE--did not provide us with the comprehensive cost information
that we requested. Instead, OVP provided us with 77 pages of
information, two-thirds of which contained no cost information or were
essentially blank, while the remaining one-third contained some
miscellaneous information--such as a meal receipt or telephone bills--
of little to no usefulness. In response to our requests seeking
clarification of the provided information, OVP stated that it would not
provide any additional information. DOE, EPA, and Interior provided us
with estimates of their costs associated with the report development
process, but these estimates, all calculated in different ways, were
not comprehensive. DOE provided us with selected cost information,
including salary estimates for its employees detailed to OVP, printing
and publication costs, and other incidental expenses. EPA and Interior
provided salary cost estimates for some of their senior officials
involved in the report's development. The precision of these estimates
varied. Although most of the identified costs were salary-oriented,
officials noted that employees did not specifically record the amount
of time spent on NEPDG-related tasks because many of them already
worked on energy policy and thus would have likely conducted a
substantial portion of the work even without the NEPDG project taking
place. One agency cautioned us not to expect its salary estimate to be
precise, noting that it had been primarily based on employee
recollection and guesswork.
The National Energy Policy Report Was the Product of a Centralized,
Top-Down Process:
The National Energy Policy report was the product of a short-term,
labor-intensive process that involved the efforts of several hundred
federal employees governmentwide. In the 3½ months between NEPDG's
inception and its presentation of the final report, the Principals and
Support Group controlled most facets of the report's development,
including setting meeting schedules and agendas, controlling the
workflow, distributing work assignments, rewriting chapters, approving
recommendations, and securing the report's contents from premature
disclosure. Senior agency officials served on a select interagency
Working Group, while the majority of staff working on the NEPDG effort
played a tributary role, (1) helping their agency fulfill its NEPDG-
related obligations, (2) providing NEPDG with analytical information,
and (3) responding to the Support Group's subsequent requests for
information, review, or comment. In developing the National Energy
Policy report, the NEPDG Principals, Support Group, and participating
agency staff also met with, solicited input from, or received
information and advice from nonfederal energy stakeholders, primarily
petroleum, coal, nuclear, natural gas, electricity industry
representatives and lobbyists. To a more limited degree, they also
received information from academic experts, policy organizations,
environmental advocacy groups, and private citizens. NEPDG met and
conducted its work in two distinct phases: the first phase culminated
in a March 19, 2001, briefing on challenges relating to energy supply
and the resulting economic impact; the second phase ended with a May
16, 2001, presentation of the final report to the President. Figure 1
depicts the top-down process and its participants.
Figure 1: Structure Used in Developing the National Energy PolicyA:
[See PDF for image]
[A] All of the tiers shown here to some extent met with, solicited
input from, or received information and advice from nonfederal energy
stakeholders.
[End of figure]
Cabinet-Level Officials and Support Group Staff Controlled the Report
Development Process:
In a January 29, 2001, memorandum, the President established NEPDG--
comprised of the Vice President, nine cabinet-level officials, and four
other senior administration officials--to gather information,
deliberate, and
make recommendations to the President by the end of fiscal year
2001.[Footnote 9] The President called on the Vice President to chair
the group, direct its work and, as necessary, establish subordinate
working groups to assist NEPDG. The President requested NEPDG to submit
two reports: the first, an assessment of the difficulties experienced
by the private sector in ensuring that local and regional energy needs
are met; the second, a report outlining a recommended national energy
policy designed to help the private sector, and as necessary and
appropriate, federal, state, and local governments, to promote
dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production and
distribution of energy for the future. More specifically, the
memorandum mentioned four areas of concentration: (1) growing demand
for energy; (2) the potential for disruptions in energy supplies or
distribution; (3) the need for responsible policies to protect the
environment and promote conservation; and (4) the need for
modernization of the energy generation, supply, and transmission
infrastructure.
NEPDG Principals:
The 14 NEPDG members--the Vice President, 9 Cabinet-level officials,
and 4 other senior administration officials--were responsible for
developing the National Energy Policy report. In a series of formal
meetings convened by the Vice President, the group presented briefings,
received assignments and the latest drafts, and discussed agenda items
and recommendations. The following list shows the NEPDG members.
* The Vice President, NEPDG Chair;
* The Secretary of State;
* The Secretary of the Treasury;
* The Secretary of the Interior;
* The Secretary of Agriculture;
* The Secretary of Commerce;
* The Secretary of Transportation;
* The Secretary of Energy;
* The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency;
* The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency;
* The Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
* The Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy;
* The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy; and:
* The Deputy Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental
Affairs.[Footnote 10]
NEPDG formally convened 10 times between January 29, 2001, and May 16,
2001. Meetings were held on the following dates: January 29, February 9
and 16, March 12 and 19, April 3, 11, and 18, May 2 and 16,
2001.[Footnote 11] All but two of the meetings were held in the Vice
President's Ceremonial Office. According to OVP staff and other federal
officials who attended these formal meetings, attendance was strictly
limited to officers and employees of the federal government. These
officials indicated that none of the Principals' meetings was open to
the public nor did any nonfederal participants attend. However, no
party provided us with any documentary evidence to support or negate
this assertion. Due to space constraints, the Principals' meetings
typically included the Vice President, the Principals and their
accompanying staff, the Support Group, and members of the Vice
President's staff. For meetings that took place when the Principals
could not be present, or when the Principal had yet to be appointed,
another agency official would attend instead. Agency officials
participating in these meetings could not recollect whether official
rosters or minutes were kept at the meetings.
The 10 Principals' meetings covered a variety of topics, depending on
the status of efforts on the report and concerns raised about these
efforts. The Support Group developed the meeting agendas and sent them
out to agencies shortly before the meetings commenced. According to the
proposed meeting agendas and our discussions with agency officials, the
meetings generally lasted between 1 and 2 hours, and nearly all of them
included a brief update on the California energy situation. The early
meetings involved more procedural discussions than the later meetings,
which focused more on a discussion of specific policy recommendations.
(See table 1.):
Table 1: NEPDG Principals' Meetings from January 29 to May 16, 2001:
Meeting date: January 29, 2001; Location: The Vice President's
Ceremonial Office, Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB); Meeting
agenda: A brief, ceremonial event at which the President announced the
formation of NEPDG, its mission, membership, and chair.
Meeting date: February 9, 2001; Location: The Vice President's
Ceremonial Office, EEOB; Meeting agenda: (1) Status report on the
California crisis, (2) Discussion of Senator Murkowski's and
Congressman Barton's pending legislative initiatives, (3) Discussion of
the seven working subgroups to be established: short-term energy
supply; programs for consumers and low-income households; economic
impact of energy; development of alternative and renewable energy
sources; conservation and increased energy efficiency; increased
production of traditional energy sources; infrastructure investment,
integrity, and safety; and national energy security and international
affairs.
Meeting date: February 16, 2001; Location: The Vice President's
Ceremonial Office, EEOB; Meeting agenda: (1) Briefing on California/
Western electricity and natural gas situation, (2) Energy Information
Administration briefing on its Annual Energy Outlook 2001, and (3)
Review of final report outline.
Meeting date: March 12, 2001; Location: The Vice President's Ceremonial
Office, EEOB; Meeting agenda: An Energy Information Administration
briefing, distribution of final draft interim report, discussion of
rollout, and status update on final report.
Meeting date: March 19, 2001; Location: The White House, Cabinet Room;
Meeting agenda: Oral presentation of interim report to the President.
Meeting date: April 3, 2001; Location: The Vice President's Ceremonial
Office, EEOB; Meeting agenda: Discussions of the following issues/
recommendations: Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards; a multi-
pollutant strategy; nuclear energy; Outer Continental Shelf/Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge; safe drinking water/hydraulic fracturing;
energy efficiency. A last-minute agenda item was added shortly before
the meeting.
Meeting date: April 11, 2001; Location: The Vice President's Ceremonial
Office, EEOB; Meeting agenda: Discussions of the following issues/
recommendations: carbon dioxide, hydropower licensing, Coastal Zone
Management Activities, tax credit issues, and permitting.
Meeting date: April 18, 2001; Location: The Vice President's Ceremonial
Office, EEOB; Meeting agenda: (1) Update on California energy
situation; (2) update on final written report to the President; (3)
discussion of key report issues and proposed recommendations: energy
policy principles, tax credit issues, New Source Review reform,
reformulated gas, and electricity deregulation; and (4) an executive
session without staff to further discuss proposed recommendations.
Meeting date: May 2, 2001; Location: The Vice President's Ceremonial
Office, EEOB; Meeting agenda: Agenda items: (1) Update on California
energy situation; (2) Update on final written report to the President;
(3) Discussion of following energy issues: spiking gasoline prices,
refineries, New Source Review, boutique fuels, final report rollout
status. An executive session followed for further discussion.
Meeting date: May 16, 2001; Location: The White House, Cabinet Room;
Meeting agenda: Presentation of final report to the President.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
NEPDG Support Group:
A support staff of seven--six DOE employees assigned to OVP and one
White House fellow--assisted NEPDG in developing the National Energy
Policy. The Support Group consisted of an executive director, a deputy
director, two senior professionals, a communications director, the
fellow, and a staff assistant.[Footnote 12]
The Support Group served as the hub of the overall NEPDG effort and
coordinated its workflow. Among its many tasks, the Support Group
assigned specific responsibilities and chapters to individual agencies;
established and presided over an interagency Working Group; scheduled
and attended NEPDG-related meetings and determined their agendas; set
internal deadlines; controlled the workflow; served as a central
collection and distribution point for participating agencies' draft
outlines, report chapters, comments, and recommendations; and drafted
the final report. The executive director and deputy director also held
meetings with various agency staff to discuss their agencies' input to
individual chapters, conduct peer review sessions, and discuss other
issues.
The Support Group did not generally discuss its activities with staff
at the agencies. Instead the Support Group frequently used meetings as
a forum to unveil new assignments, drafts, topics, and guidance for
Working Group members to deliver back to their respective agencies. The
Support Group staff, specifically the executive director and deputy
director, provided instructions to the Working Group participants and
coordinated the activities of each participating agency. Agencies
transmitted their work product to other Working Group members largely
through the White House.
NEPDG Interagency Working Group:
To coordinate the day-to-day work of developing the National Energy
Policy report, the NEPDG executive director established an interagency
Working Group, comprised of staff-level officials from each
participating agency and several White House and Support Group staff.
The NEPDG executive director and deputy director oversaw the Working
Group's activities, instructed participating agencies on their roles
and assignments, and facilitated communication among the Working Group
participants. The Working Group developed a draft outline for the
energy policy report and relayed work assignments to the agencies
responsible for particular areas. Available information did not allow
us to determine the number of Working Group meetings held or the number
of attendees at any given meeting.
NEPDG members were free to assign one or more staff to the Working
Group. The Working Group met frequently in February and March 2001 to
review the latest outlines and drafts, report on the status of their
specific assignments, represent agency views, provide comments to other
agencies, and obtain further instructions. For example, the first
Working Group meeting held on February 9, 2001, concentrated on the
group's approach to developing a national energy policy and the
milestones for completing the process. The second meeting held on
February 13, 2001, focused on determining the chapters that would be
included in the final report. Subsequent meetings typically involved a
review of drafts in which the lead authors would lead discussion on a
chapter's main points. Attendees would comment on the chapters or
propose new or revised text for the group's discussion. The Working
Group considered various alternatives in language, tone, and
recommendations for the report and then decided on a particular course
of action to recommend to the Vice President.
The Working Group met often in February and March 2001, generally
several days before and immediately following the Principals' meetings.
Most of these meetings took place in the Vice President's Ceremonial
Office, although several had to be rescheduled elsewhere. Working Group
meetings were frequently cancelled or postponed as a result of
scheduling conflicts. In a sworn declaration submitted to the court in
one of the
lawsuits seeking NEPDG records,[Footnote 13] the NEPDG deputy director
stated that all attendees at the Working Group meetings were federal
employees, with one exception--a contractor, who engaged in providing
technical writing and graphic design services, worked with the group
and sat in on portions of no more than three of the meetings. However,
attendance lists and minutes of these meetings, if kept, were not made
available to us, nor were members of the Support Group allowed to
discuss these meetings with us. Thus we were unable to verify any
assertions about the composition of personnel at the meetings or about
the general subjects discussed.
The Working Group met with Support Group staff for the last time on
April 3, 2001. For the remainder of April 2001, the Support Group
worked alone, condensing the list of potential recommendations for
NEPDG discussion and recasting the chapters to fit the recommendations.
During this period, the Support Group contacted agencies primarily to
verify facts or rewrite specified sections of the report. Agency
officials rejoined the process after April 30, 2001, when the Support
Group released the draft chapters for final comment.
Staff from Multiple Federal Agencies Participated in the NEPDG Effort:
The development of the National Energy Policy report involved hundreds
of staff from nine federal agencies and several White House offices.
Agencies had considerable latitude in determining how to staff their
NEPDG assignments. Most agencies developed a multilevel, top-down
process coordinated by the agency's lead NEPDG contact or Working Group
member. Generally, the NEPDG Support Group forwarded specific writing
assignments, information requests, meeting times and agendas to the
agency contacts, who then disseminated the information to a
coordination team. The coordination team distributed assignments to
lead officials in offices or bureaus throughout the department. These
officials then assigned staff to complete the tasks. When the completed
work had interoffice concurrence, it was then passed back up the chain
of command. The NEPDG agency staff contact then reviewed and approved
all agency submissions before releasing them to the Principals, the
Support Group, or other agencies for review or comment. Agency staff
contacts also held regular update meetings with the coordination team
and provided assorted updates and briefings to the agency Principal.
Not all agencies experienced the same workload. For example, DOE, which
was assigned the lead role in developing multiple chapters, had greater
responsibilities, more meetings to attend, and larger efforts to
coordinate than some other agencies, such as Interior, that played more
of an advisory role. Frequent interaction also took place between
agencies in developing the report chapters.
More than 80 DOE employees from eight departmental offices had direct
input into the development of the National Energy Policy report,
including science specialists and representatives with significant
science expertise. DOE's Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary led the
department's internal effort to develop information for an interim and
final report, and to identify policy recommendations for the report.
The official joined the Acting Director of the then Office of Policy in
periodic meetings with the Support Group staff and other agency
officials to discuss drafts of specific chapters. In addition, the
official joined DOE Office of Policy and program officials to relay
comments from NEPDG meetings and to coordinate writing activities
within DOE. The Acting Director of the Office of Policy, who was
responsible for the day-to-day coordination and management of the
process of producing DOE's contributions to the NEPDG effort, led a
coordination team of senior managers from the department's Office of
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy,
Office of Fossil Energy, Office of Policy, Office of International
Affairs, Energy Information Administration, and the Bonneville Power
Administration. The team was charged with coordinating the writing of
chapters, and each office formed a similar group within their areas of
expertise to write its respective chapters. The Office of Policy took
the lead on chapter 1 (Taking Stock), Energy Efficiency took the lead
on chapter 4 (Using Energy Wisely) and chapter 6 (Nature's Power), and
Fossil Energy took the lead on chapter 5 (Energy for a New Century). In
addition, DOE contributed draft sections to chapters for which other
agencies had been assigned the lead role. Each office developed
recommendations and, after internal discussions, forwarded them for
high-level review within DOE before they were released to the NEPDG
Principals for review.
DOE staff researched historical information about energy and energy
markets; identified key energy issues; examined and analyzed the
current situation in energy markets; discussed likely energy issues,
such as energy production, conservation and energy efficiency, energy
prices, renewable and alternative energy sources, and national energy
security; and prepared issue papers, memoranda, and talking points
relating to these subjects. They also assisted with writing and
reviewing drafts of report chapters, providing supporting statistical
and other information, reviewing and responding to comments from other
executive branch components, fact-checking, developing citations and
graphics, and briefing the Secretary on energy policy issues.
Interior was not assigned a lead role in writing any of the report
chapters. The department's relationship with NEPDG, including the
Working Group and Support Group staff, therefore consisted of the
discussions at Principals' and Working Group meetings, comments on
drafts, provision of an options paper, and responses to questions from
NEPDG staff. To support the NEPDG effort, Interior's Office of Policy
Analysis formed an energy task force comprised of 11 issue teams to
examine opportunities to make more energy available from public lands
and to streamline and improve various planning and permitting processes
for facilitating energy development. Approximately 100 Interior
employees, representing 13 departmental offices or bureaus, helped to
develop information for the NEPDG effort. These teams helped develop an
internal paper that agency officials used during Working Group
discussions of other agencies' draft chapters.
EPA's general role was to ensure that environmental issues were
accurately and adequately addressed and reflected in the development of
the report. More than 110 EPA employees participated in the agency's
internal NEPDG efforts. EPA's Associate Administrator for Policy,
Economics, and Innovation served as the lead manager of the agency's
NEPDG activities, overseeing its role in drafting the report chapter on
the environment (Protecting America's Environment) and analyzing
environmental issues contained in the other draft chapters of the
report. This EPA official and two senior managers from the Office of
Air and Radiation worked closely with senior staff from other offices
within EPA and senior officials from other contributing agencies. The
office leads circulated the draft to others, usually to staff within
their particular office, as they deemed appropriate. The managers
reviewed documents each time EPA staff prepared or revised them. Upon
approval, EPA's draft was then conveyed to the Support Group.
Nonfederal Energy Stakeholders Contributed to the NEPDG Effort:
The NEPDG Principals, Support Group, Working Group, and participating
agency officials met with, solicited input from, or received
information and advice from a variety of nonfederal energy stakeholders
while developing the National Energy Policy report. According to our
analysis of agency documents produced under court order, stakeholder
involvement in the NEPDG process included private citizens offering
general energy advice to the President, industry leaders submitting
detailed policy recommendations to NEPDG, and individual meetings with
Principals as well as the Vice President. The extent to which
submissions from any of these stakeholders were solicited, influenced
policy deliberations, or were incorporated into the final report is not
something that we can determine based on the limited information at our
disposal. Nor can we provide a comprehensive listing of the dates or
purposes of these meetings, their attendees, or how the attendees, when
solicited, were selected, because of OVP's unwillingness to provide us
with information.
The Principals met with a variety of nonfederal entities to discuss
energy issues and policy. DOE reported that the Secretary of Energy
discussed national energy policy with chief executive officers of
petroleum, electricity, nuclear, coal, chemical, and natural gas
companies, among others. The Secretary of Energy also reportedly asked
nonfederal parties for their recommendations for short-and long-term
responses to petroleum product price and supply constraints. Several
corporations and associations, including Chevron, the National Mining
Association, and the National Petrochemical & Refiners Association,
provided the Secretary of Energy with detailed energy policy
recommendations. EPA reported that agency managers--including the EPA
Administrator--held many meetings with outside parties, where the issue
of energy policy was raised. For example, according to the
Administrator's schedule, the Administrator and agency staff met
separately with the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the Edison
Electric Institute, and a group of environmental and conservation
leaders. Interior reported that the Secretary of the Interior and staff
attended meetings with private industry to discuss energy issues,
including one meeting with Rocky Mountain-based petroleum companies
interested in leasing federal lands and another meeting with an Indian
tribe from Pyramid Lake, Nevada interested in building a power plant on
its lands. In addition, in its response to a congressional inquiry, OVP
reported that the Vice President met with the chairman and chief
executive officer of Enron Corporation to discuss energy policy
matters.[Footnote 14] The Vice President also received a lobbying
group's appeal to stop treating carbon dioxide as a pollutant and
policy recommendations from a coalition of utilities, coal producers
and railroads calling itself the Coal-Based Generation Stakeholders. We
cannot determine the extent to which any of these communications with
NEPDG Principals affected the content or development of the final
report.
In response to another congressional inquiry,[Footnote 15] the NEPDG
executive director reported that the Support Group staff held meetings
with individuals involved with companies or industries, including those
in the electricity, telecommunications, coal mining, petroleum, gas,
refining, bioenergy, solar energy, nuclear energy, pipeline, railroad
and automobile manufacturing sectors; environmental, wildlife, and
marine advocacy; state and local utility regulation and energy
management; research and teaching at universities; research and
analysis at policy organizations; energy consumers, including
consumption by businesses and individuals; a major labor union; and
about three dozen Members of Congress or their staffs. However, the
NEPDG executive director did not specify the frequency, length, or
purpose of the meetings, or how participants were selected to attend.
In addition, OVP reported that the Support Group staff also met with
numerous nonfederal stakeholders during the development of the final
report, including a meeting with representatives of various utilities
and two meetings with representatives of Enron Corporation.[Footnote
16]
Finally, senior agency officials participated in numerous meetings with
nonfederal energy stakeholders to discuss the national energy policy.
Based on our analysis of the agency documents produced under court
order, senior DOE officials, in addition to attending meetings with the
Secretary of Energy, met with a variety of industry representatives,
lobbyists, and energy associations, including the American Coal
Company, Small Refiners Association, the Coal Council, CSX,
Enviropower, Inc., Detroit Edison, Duke Energy, the Edison Electric
Institute, General Motors, the National Petroleum Council, and the
lobbying firm of Barbour, Griffith & Rogers. These senior DOE officials
also solicited recommendations, views, or points of clarification from
other parties. For example, one senior DOE official solicited detailed
energy policy recommendations from a variety of nonfederal energy
stakeholders, including the American Petroleum Institute, the National
Petrochemical and Refiners' Association, the American Council for an
Energy-Efficient Economy, and Southern Company. This official also
received policy recommendations from others, including the American Gas
Association, Green Mountain Energy, the National Mining Association,
and the lobbying firms the Dutko Group and the Duberstein Group. Senior
EPA officials, in addition to accompanying the Administrator to
meetings with nonfederal energy stakeholders, discussed issues related
to the development of an energy policy at meetings with the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers, the American Public Power Association, and
the Yakama Nation Electric Utility. Interior told us that senior agency
officials met with nonfederal parties to discuss energy policy or other
energy-related issues, but provided us with no further details about
these meetings.
In addition to the meetings listed above, the agency documents reveal
that the NEPDG Principals, Support Group, and agency staff received a
considerable amount of unsolicited advice, criticisms, meeting
requests, and/or recommendations from other parties, including private
citizens; university professors; local, state, and international
officials; regional energy stakeholders; and a variety of interest
groups representing energy-related causes. Again, because of the
limited information available to us, we cannot determine the extent to
which these communications affected the content or development of the
final report.
The National Energy Policy Report Was Developed in Two Distinct Phases:
The National Energy Policy report was developed in two distinct phases,
in accordance with the general criteria defined in the President's
January 29, 2001, memorandum. The first phase involved the development
of an outline; the distribution of research and writing assignments to
participating agencies; and the development of narrative, topical
chapters that ultimately formed the basis of the final report. The
first phase culminated in a March 19, 2001, presentation to the
President on energy supply disruptions and their regional effects. In
the second phase, agency officials reviewed and finalized draft
chapters; consolidated a list of options and recommendations and
discussed them with the Working Group; and developed short position
papers on each of the recommendations that the Working Group considered
to be controversial. These papers served as the primary basis for
discussion at subsequent Principals' meetings. After the final meeting
of the Working Group on April 3, 2001, the Support Group took the
provided materials under consideration and drafted the final report.
Agency officials had a final opportunity to review the partial draft of
the recommendations before the report was finalized, published, and
presented to the President on May 16, 2001, as the National Energy
Policy.
NEPDG Drafted Chapters and Prepared an Interim Report in the First
Phase:
In the first week of the administration, the Vice President worked with
the soon-to-be-named NEPDG executive director to define the process for
developing a proposed national energy policy. They decided that a group
of senior federal officials would generate an interim report that would
detail energy supply problems and a final report that would outline
solutions. The President's memorandum, released on January 29, 2001,
reflected this work plan.
In early February 2001, the NEPDG executive director distributed a
memorandum at the first Working Group meeting detailing the group's
mission, reporting requirements, and a proposed structure of seven
targeted interagency workgroups to review specific issue areas. At the
meeting, the Support Group named lead agencies to coordinate the
development of each of the 10 assigned chapters.[Footnote 17]
The Support Group tasked the lead agencies--DOE, DOT, EPA, Treasury,
and the State Department--with developing a report outline for each of
their assigned chapters to be forwarded to the White House for final
approval. The Support Group instructed agencies to write chapters
without proposing improvements, noting that the draft chapters would
not be sent to the President, but would serve as the basis of a more
detailed version that NEPDG would use when drafting the final report.
While the drafting of chapters for the final report continued, the
Support Group, Working Group, and participating agency staff focused
much of their collective effort throughout February on developing
sections of an interim report. The Support Group released the interim
report to the Principals for review in early March 2001, then shifted
its attention to the second phase of the process--finalizing the draft
and making recommendations. The interim briefing, which took place at
the White House on March 19, 2001, mostly consisted of oral
presentations on the energy supply and demand situation and short-term
regional energy supply disruptions.
NEPDG Selected Recommendations and Finalized the Report in the Second
Phase:
Immediately following the March 19, 2001, presentation of the interim
report to the President, the Working Group met to refine the chapters
of the final report and to discuss potential recommendations that
agencies had accumulated. The Support Group provided the agencies with
a copy of the Bush-Cheney energy-related initiatives developed during
the presidential campaign, asking them to ensure that they incorporated
these initiatives when developing their respective recommendations.
They asked each agency in the Working Group to prepare an "option
paper" that included proposals for streamlining energy production and
steps to implement them.
In March 2001, the Working Group continued to develop chapters and
discuss recommendations, and pared down each agency's list of potential
recommendations. The Support Group prepared five one-page issue paper
summaries of the recommendations that the Working Group considered to
be controversial--a multi-pollutant strategy, fuel efficiency
standards, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, and the moratoria on
Outer Continental Shelf leasing--to the Principals for further
discussion. Shortly before the April 3, 2001, Principals' meeting, the
Support Group added a last-minute agenda item to be discussed with the
other recommendations. The actual agenda item, however, had been
redacted from the documents that we reviewed.
In early April 2001, the Support Group stopped accepting comments on
the proposals and began sorting through them, asking agencies to
incorporate what the Support Group deemed to be the less controversial
recommendations into the draft chapters. For the remainder of April
2001, the Support Group mostly worked alone, selecting recommendations
to present to NEPDG Principals and rewriting the chapters to fit the
recommendations. The Principals met to discuss several of the
potentially more controversial recommendations and to decide which
proposals to add to the chapters. In some cases, agencies were told to
rewrite sections of the chapters to incorporate the proposed
recommendations.
The agencies continued to draft their chapters and incorporate various
other agencies' comments until the Support Group issued a deadline and
requested the final submission of chapters for editing. The Support
Group then released the drafts to all of the agencies for a cursory
review, informing agency officials that the drafts were now considered
"final" and that only high priority comments would be accepted.
The Support Group asked agencies to protect their lists of proposed
recommendations, instructing officials to hold all proposals closely
and not to circulate them. The Support Group then sent the draft
chapters to the agencies without any recommendations. On April 30,
2001, the Support Group invited each agency's Principal or chief of
staff to visit the White House for an on-site review of the final draft
recommendations. The Support Group continued to make last-minute
alterations to the report to incorporate revised recommendations,
called on the agencies to verify facts and to provide citations, and
ushered the final draft through the editing and printing processes. On
May 16, 2001, the Vice President presented the final National Energy
Policy report to the President. The final report contained over 100
proposals to increase the nation's energy supply. The presentation
brought the National Energy Policy report development process to a
close.
Federal Agencies Did Not Track the Amount of Public Money Spent on
NEPDG Activities:
None of the key federal entities involved in the NEPDG effort provided
us with a complete accounting of the costs they incurred during the
development of the National Energy Policy report. Several agencies
provided us with rough estimates of their respective NEPDG-related
costs; but these estimates, all calculated in different ways, were not
comprehensive. The two federal entities responsible for funding the
NEPDG effort--OVP and DOE--did not provide us with the comprehensive
cost information we requested. OVP provided us with 77 pages of
information, two-thirds of which contained no cost information, while
the remaining one-third contained miscellaneous information of little
to no usefulness. In response to our requests seeking clarification on
the provided information, OVP stated that it would not provide any
additional information. DOE, EPA, and Interior provided us with their
estimates of costs associated with the NEPDG effort, which aggregated
about $860,000. DOE provided us with selected cost information,
including salary estimates, printing and publication costs, and other
incidental expenses. EPA and Interior provided salary cost estimates
for some of their senior officials involved in the report's
development. DOE and Interior officials reported that although most of
the identified costs were salary-oriented, employees had not
specifically recorded the amount of time they had spent on NEPDG-
related tasks because many of them already worked on energy policy and
thus would have likely conducted a substantial portion of the work,
even without the NEPDG project taking place. An Interior official
cautioned us not to expect a precise estimate, noting that the estimate
primarily had been based on employee recollection and guesswork.
DOE and OVP Were Responsible for Funding NEPDG Activities:
In his January 29, 2001, memorandum that established NEPDG, the
President instructed the Vice President to consult with the Secretary
of Energy to determine the need for funding. DOE was to "make funds
appropriated to the Department of Energy available to pay the costs of
personnel to support the activities of the Energy Policy Development
Group." The memorandum further stated that if DOE required additional
funds, the Vice President was to submit a proposal to the President to
use "the minimum necessary portion of any appropriation available to
the President to meet the unanticipated need" or obtain assistance from
the National Economic Council staff.[Footnote 18]
OVP Provided Limited Cost Information Responsive to Our Request
Regarding NEPDG's Receipt, Disbursement, and Use of Public Funds:
In response to our inquiry about the NEPDG's receipt, disbursement, and
use of public funds, OVP provided us with 77 pages of "documents
retrieved from the files of the Office of the Vice President responsive
to that inquiry."[Footnote 19] The Vice President later referred to
these documents as "responsive to the Comptroller General's inquiry
concerning costs associated with the Group's work."[Footnote 20] Our
analysis of the documents, however, showed that they responded only
partially to our request.
The documents that OVP provided contain little useful information or
insight into the overall costs associated with the National Energy
Policy development. Of the 77 pages that we received, 52 contained no
cost information while the remaining 25 contained some miscellaneous
information of little to no usefulness. For example, OVP provided us
with two pages illustrating a telephone template and four pages
containing indecipherable scribbling, but no discernible cost
information. OVP also provided documents that contained some
miscellaneous information, predominantly reimbursement requests,
assorted telephone bills and random items, such as the executive
director's credit card receipt for pizza. In response to our requests
seeking clarification of the provided information, OVP stated that it
would not provide us with any additional information. Consequently, we
were unable to determine the extent to which OVP documents reflected
costs associated with the report's development.
DOE Did Not Comprehensively Track Overall NEPDG Costs:
DOE reported spending about $300,000 on NEPDG-related activities, more
than half of which was used for the salaries of its employees detailed
to OVP and two designated DOE staff contacts for the period from
January 29, 2001, through May 29, 2001. DOE reported spending most of
the remaining funds to print and produce 10,000 policy publications and
graphic support, pay for 16 large briefing boards, and reimburse the
NEPDG executive director for his lodging and per diem expenses. DOE did
not provide any information on the Support Group members' requests for
the reimbursement of taxi, parking, meal, or duplicating expenditures
contained in the 77 pages of OVP documents. However, DOE officials
noted that the department did not pay for furniture, telephones, or
other expenses that DOE employees on the Support Group may have
incurred setting up their offices, saying that they assumed that the
White House paid these costs.
EPA Provided Estimates of Its NEPDG-Related Salary Costs, but Did Not
Include Its Incidental Expenses:
EPA reported spending an estimated $131,250 in NEPDG-related costs to
pay the salaries of the officials most involved in NEPDG activities.
EPA officials calculated this estimate by taking the number of full-
time equivalents, the officials' average annual salaries, and prorating
the amount for the 3½ months they spent working on the NEPDG effort.
EPA officials also reported that the agency incurred multiple
incidental expenses in helping to prepare the NEPDG report, such as
taxi fares, duplication costs, and courier fees, but they neither
itemized these expenditures nor provided us with any further
documentation.
Federal Employee Salaries Accounted for All of Interior's Reported
NEPDG-Related Costs:
Interior reported spending an estimated $430,000 on salary-related
costs associated with the NEPDG report development. It also reported
that it did not incur any NEPDG-related contracting costs. The agency
official who provided us with the estimate warned that although it was
the best possible, its precision was uncertain because it had been
based on employees' personal recollections and guesswork as to the
amount of time they spent working on NEPDG-related activities. The
official then added an additional 20 percent to the estimated sum to
reflect the employee benefits that accrued during the period. Interior
did not create a unique job code or accounting process to track the
time that Interior employees spent on developing the NEPDG report.
According to one official, many of the staff involved with the NEPDG
effort already worked on energy policy for their respective bureaus or
offices and thus a substantial portion of the work would likely have
been conducted, even without the NEPDG project taking place.
Agency Comments:
We provided DOE, Interior, and EPA with an opportunity to review and
comment on a draft of this report. Representatives from each of these
three agencies reviewed the report and chose not to provide written
comments. Interior and EPA provided several technical clarifications
orally, which we incorporated, as appropriate, into the final report.
We also provided OVP with an opportunity to review and comment on our
draft report, but the office did not avail itself of the opportunity.
We conducted our review from May 2001 through July 2003. We plan no
further distribution of this report until August 25. On that date, we
will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees.
This report is also available on GAO's home page at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please call
me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix I.
Robert A. Robinson
Managing Director,
Natural Resources and Environment:
Signed by Robert A. Robinson:
List of Congressional Requesters:
Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman[A]
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate;
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives.
The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings[A]
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate;
The Honorable John D. Dingell
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives.
The Honorable Carl M. Levin[A]
Ranking Minority Member
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate;
The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan[A]
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Competition, Foreign Commerce, and Infrastructure[b]
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate;
[A] At the time of their joint request to GAO, the four senators were
chairmen of their respective committees or subcommittees.
[B] This subcommittee was formerly called the Subcommittee on Consumer
Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment:
GAO Contacts:
Robert A. Robinson (202) 512-3841 Peg Reese (202) 512-9695:
Acknowledgment:
In addition to the individuals named above, Doreen Feldman, Lynn
Gibson, Richard Johnson, Bob Lilly, Jonathan S. McMurray, Susan Poling,
Susan Sawtelle, Amy Webbink, and Jim Wells made key contributions to
this report.
(360086):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pres. Memorandum (Jan. 29, 2001).
[2] National Energy Policy: Report of the National Energy Policy
Development Group. U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.
May 2001).
[3] In April 2001, Representatives Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell
asked us to examine the process and costs associated with the NEPDG.
Subsequently, Senators Joseph I. Lieberman, Ernest F. Hollings, Carl M.
Levin, and Byron L. Dorgan, chairs of their respective committees or
subcommittees at the time of their request, also requested this
analysis.
[4] 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(3) requires GAO to conduct evaluations requested
by chairs of congressional committees of relevant jurisdiction.
[5] As authorized by 31 U.S.C. § 716(b)(1), the Comptroller General
sent a formal request for the NEPDG records to OVP on July 18, 2001.
After a requisite 20-day period passed without any meaningful action,
the Comptroller General reported on August 17, 2001, to the Congress,
the President, the Vice President, and other officials, that OVP had
not provided the requested information. After a second requisite 20-day
period passed, again without any meaningful action, and subsequent to a
reasonable amount of time after the tragic events of September 11,
2001, and additional attempts to reach resolution of this matter, the
Comptroller General filed suit on February 22, 2002, as authorized by
31 U.S.C. § 716 (b)(2). The executive branch chose not to invoke the
"safety valve" certification mechanism in 31 U.S.C. § 716 (d)(1)(C)
that would have precluded GAO from taking the unprecedented step of
going to court. Furthermore, the President did not seek to protect the
information from disclosure by claiming that it was subject to
executive privilege.
[6] Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002).
[7] Although GAO believes the district court's decision is incorrect,
as detailed in the Comptroller General's statement on February 7, 2003,
continuing to pursue GAO's access request through the courts would have
required significant time and resources over several years. At the same
time, several private litigants are seeking much of the same NEPDG
information from OVP that GAO sought, and we plan to obtain those
records, if these cases are successful. Moreover, because the district
court's decision in GAO's case did not reach the merits of GAO's audit
or access authority, the decision in no way diminishes these
authorities or the obligation of agencies to provide GAO with
information. The court's decision is confined to the unique
circumstances posed by this particular case and does not preclude GAO
from filing suit on a different matter involving different facts in the
future.
[8] These suits have since been consolidated into two lead suits:
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Department of Energy, No.
1:01CV2545 (D.D.C.) (filed under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)), and Judicial Watch, Inc. v. NEPDG et al., No. 01-1530 (D.D.C.)
(filed under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and other
statutes). OVP has refused to produce any documents to date in either
litigation and the Vice President filed an action in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit seeking to have the latter district court
case dismissed. See In re Cheney, No. 02-5354 (D.C. Cir.). On July 8,
2003, the D.C. Circuit denied the Vice President's petition in the D.C.
Circuit; the Vice President is seeking rehearing of this denial. As
part of the court proceedings in the consolidated FACA cases, DOE,
Interior, and EPA produced interrogatory responses, which were provided
to us. Certain documents generated by OVP personnel were produced in
the NRDC v. DOE FOIA cases, but these were produced by other agencies,
not by OVP.
[9] In the Judicial Watch FACA litigation now pending in district court
(see footnote 8), the plaintiffs contend that NEPDG membership was not
limited to these federal officials but also included certain nonfederal
parties. The court has not yet decided this issue, and this report
takes no position on it.
[10] The President originally named the Assistant to the President for
Intergovernmental Affairs as an NEPDG member. However, because the
President had not appointed anyone to serve in this position, the Vice
President instead invited the Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of Intergovernmental Affairs to attend the meetings.
[11] NEPDG Principals met one more time on July 13, 2001, after the
publication of the final report. We did not include this meeting in our
total because it lay beyond the scope of our review.
[12] Two members of the Support Group staff joined the NEPDG effort in
April 2001: a senior professional, who was brought in to help draft the
final report, and the communications director, who was brought in to
develop a marketing strategy for rolling out the final report.
[13] Declaration of Karen Y. Knutson, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. NEPDG et
al., No. 01-1530 (D.D.C.) (Sept. 3, 2002).
[14] David S. Addington, Counsel to the Vice President, to the
Honorable Henry A. Waxman, U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 3,
2002).
[15] Responses of Andrew Lundquist, Executive Director for the National
Energy Policy Development Group, to questions from the Ranking Minority
Members of the House Committee on Government Reform and the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce (May 4, 2001).
[16] Addington to Waxman (Jan. 3, 2002).
[17] The number of chapters was later reduced from 10 to 8, as several
chapters were consolidated during the writing process.
[18] Pres. Memorandum (Jan. 29, 2001).
[19] Letter from David Addington, Counsel to the Vice President, to
Anthony Gamboa, General Counsel, the U.S. General Accounting Office
(June 21, 2001).
[20] Letter from the Vice President to the U.S. House of
Representatives (Aug. 2, 2001).
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