Environmental Protection
More Complete Data and Continued Emphasis on Leak Prevention Could Improve EPA's Underground Storage Tank Program
Gao ID: GAO-06-45 November 30, 2005
Leaking underground storage tanks that contain hazardous products, primarily gasoline, can contaminate soil and groundwater. To address this problem, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under its Underground Storage Tank (UST) Program, required tank owners to install leak detection equipment and take measures to prevent leaks. In 1986, the Congress created a federal trust fund to assist states with cleanups. Cleanup progress has been made, but, as of early 2005, cleanup efforts had not yet begun for over 32,000 tanks, many of which may require state and/or federal resources to address. GAO identified (1) data on the number and cleanup status of leaking tanks, (2) funding sources for tank cleanups, and (3) processes used by five states with large numbers of leaking tanks--California, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania--to identify, assess, and clean up sites.
Data submitted to EPA by the states show that, as of March 31, 2005, more than 660,000 tanks were in use and about 1.6 million were no longer in use. In addition, states identified about 449,000 tank releases (leaks) and about 416,000 initiated cleanups, with almost 324,000 of those cleanups completed. States also compile limited data on abandoned tanks--tanks whose owners are unknown, or unwilling or unable to pay for their cleanup--but EPA does not require states to provide separate data on all of their known abandoned tanks. Without this separate data, EPA cannot effectively determine the number and cleanup status of these tanks, or how to most efficiently and effectively allocate federal cleanup funds to the states. Tank owners and operators are primarily responsible for paying to clean up their own sites, but abandoned tanks are cleaned up using state resources, that may be limited, and federal trust funds. EPA estimates that the average remediation costs per site have been about $125,000, but costs sometimes have exceeded $1 million. Officials from two of the five states we contacted reported that their state funds may be inadequate to address contamination at abandoned tank sites. In this regard, Michigan and North Carolina officials told GAO that, because of resource constraints, they let contamination at abandoned tank sites attenuate (diminish) naturally once immediate threats are addressed. Furthermore, due to limited resources, states must sometimes find other options for cleaning up sites. For example, Pennsylvania officials asked EPA to take over the cleanup work at the abandoned Tranguch site in 1996 because the owner was bankrupt and the state could not pay the expected cleanup costs. The five states that GAO contacted identify, assess, and clean up leaking tank sites using similar processes. Generally, owners and operators are responsible for conducting these activities under state oversight. Leaking tanks are identified when tank owners report leaks; land redevelopment activities uncover unknown tanks; or state agencies investigate contamination complaints or inspect tanks for regulatory compliance. While regular tank inspections can detect new leaks and potentially prevent future ones, as of early 2005, only two of the five states GAO contacted--California and Maryland--consistently inspected all the state's tanks at least once every 3 years, the minimum rate of inspection that EPA considers adequate. The Energy Policy Act, enacted in August 2005, among other things, requires inspections at least once every 3 years and provides federal trust funds for this and other leak prevention purposes. EPA and some state officials told GAO that increasing inspection frequency could require additional resources. Being able to use trust fund allocations for this purpose will help in this regard. The five states GAO contacted, once they become aware of leaking tanks, identify responsible parties and require them to hire consultants to conduct site assessments and plan and implement cleanup work. The states generally prioritize sites for cleanup according to the immediate threat they pose to human health, safety, and/or the environment.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-06-45, Environmental Protection: More Complete Data and Continued Emphasis on Leak Prevention Could Improve EPA's Underground Storage Tank Program
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Emphasis on Leak Prevention Could Improve EPA's Underground Storage
Tank Program' which was released on November 30, 2005.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
November 2005:
Environmental Protection:
More Complete Data and Continued Emphasis on Leak Prevention Could
Improve EPA's Underground Storage Tank Program:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-45]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-45, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Leaking underground storage tanks that contain hazardous products,
primarily gasoline, can contaminate soil and groundwater. To address
this problem, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under its
Underground Storage Tank (UST) Program, required tank owners to install
leak detection equipment and take measures to prevent leaks. In 1986,
the Congress created a federal trust fund to assist states with
cleanups. Cleanup progress has been made, but, as of early 2005,
cleanup efforts had not yet begun for over 32,000 tanks, many of which
may require state and/or federal resources to address.
GAO identified (1) data on the number and cleanup status of leaking
tanks, (2) funding sources for tank cleanups, and (3) processes used by
five states with large numbers of leaking tanks”California, Maryland,
Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania ”to identify, assess, and
clean up sites.
What GAO Found:
Data submitted to EPA by the states show that, as of March 31, 2005,
more than 660,000 tanks were in use and about 1.6 million were no
longer in use. In addition, states identified about 449,000 tank
releases (leaks) and about 416,000 initiated cleanups, with almost
324,000 of those cleanups completed. States also compile limited data
on abandoned tanks”tanks whose owners are unknown, or unwilling or
unable to pay for their cleanup”but EPA does not require states to
provide separate data on all of their known abandoned tanks. Without
this separate data, EPA cannot effectively determine the number and
cleanup status of these tanks, or how to most efficiently and
effectively allocate federal cleanup funds to the states.
Tank owners and operators are primarily responsible for paying to clean
up their own sites, but abandoned tanks are cleaned up using state
resources, that may be limited, and federal trust funds. EPA estimates
that the average remediation costs per site have been about $125,000,
but costs sometimes have exceeded $1 million. Officials from two of the
five states we contacted reported that their state funds may be
inadequate to address contamination at abandoned tank sites. In this
regard, Michigan and North Carolina officials told GAO that, because of
resource constraints, they let contamination at abandoned tank sites
attenuate (diminish) naturally once immediate threats are addressed.
Furthermore, due to limited resources, states must sometimes find other
options for cleaning up sites. For example, Pennsylvania officials
asked EPA to take over the cleanup work at the abandoned Tranguch site
in 1996 because the owner was bankrupt and the state could not pay the
expected cleanup costs.
The five states that GAO contacted identify, assess, and clean up
leaking tank sites using similar processes. Generally, owners and
operators are responsible for conducting these activities under state
oversight. Leaking tanks are identified when tank owners report leaks;
land redevelopment activities uncover unknown tanks; or state agencies
investigate contamination complaints or inspect tanks for regulatory
compliance. While regular tank inspections can detect new leaks and
potentially prevent future ones, as of early 2005, only two of the five
states GAO contacted”California and Maryland”consistently inspected all
the state‘s tanks at least once every 3 years, the minimum rate of
inspection that EPA considers adequate. The Energy Policy Act, enacted
in August 2005, among other things, requires inspections at least once
every 3 years and provides federal trust funds for this and other leak
prevention purposes. EPA and some state officials told GAO that
increasing inspection frequency could require additional resources.
Being able to use trust fund allocations for this purpose will help in
this regard. The five states GAO contacted, once they become aware of
leaking tanks, identify responsible parties and require them to hire
consultants to conduct site assessments and plan and implement cleanup
work. The states generally prioritize sites for cleanup according to
the immediate threat they pose to human health, safety, and/or the
environment.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that EPA require states to report to the agency
information on all known abandoned tanks. EPA agreed that the UST
program could benefit from more specific data on abandoned tanks, but
had concerns about the potential burden on states. GAO clarified its
recommendation to indicate that EPA should obtain data that states
currently compile.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-45.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact John Stephenson at (202)
512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
States Provide EPA with Some Tank and Cleanup Data, but Do Not Provide
Separate Information on All Known Abandoned Tanks:
Several Funding Sources Exist For Cleaning Up Tank Releases, but Some
States' Resources for Remediating Abandoned Tank Sites Are Limited:
States Identify, Assess, and Clean Up Leaking Tank Sites Using Similar
Means:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Information on the History and Status of Cleanup Activities
at Five Underground Storage Tank Sites:
Coca-Cola Enterprises, Yuba County, California:
Henry Fruhling Food Store, Harford County, Maryland:
Bob's Marathon, Grand Ledge, Michigan:
R.C. Anderson Trust, Nash County, North Carolina:
Tranguch Tire Service, Inc., Luzerne County, Pennsylvania:
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Key Data on Underground Storage Tanks, as of March 31, 2005:
Table 2: Five States' Funding from EPA's LUST Trust Fund, the Amounts
and Percentages of These Funds Used To Clean Up Tank Sites, and
Estimated Amounts of Each State's Own Funds Spent on Tank Cleanups,
Fiscal Year 2004a:
Figure:
Figure 1: Annual Confirmed Releases from Underground Storage Tanks,
Cleanups Initiated, and Cleanups Completed, Fiscal Years 1997 Through
2004:
Abbreviations:
ASTM: American Society for Testing and Materials:
ATSDR: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry:
BTEX: benzene, toluene, ethyl-benzene, xylenes:
DEHNR: North Carolina Department of Environment, Health, and Natural
Resources:
EPA: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
GAG: Group Against Gas:
LUST: Leaking Underground Storage Tank:
MDNR: Michigan Department of Natural Resources:
MTBE: methyl tertiary butyl ether:
NCP: National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan:
OSC: On-Scene Coordinator:
PADER: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources:
PADEP: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection:
PEMA: Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency:
RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act:
TPHG: total petroleum hydrocarbons as gasoline:
USACE: U.S Army Corps of Engineers:
µg/m3: micrograms per cubic meter:
UST: Underground Storage Tank:
TPHG: total petroleum hydrocarbons as gasoline:
Letter November 30, 2005:
Congressional Requesters:
Leaking underground tanks that store potentially hazardous products,
primarily gasoline at service stations, can contaminate soil as well as
groundwater, the source of drinking water for nearly half of all
Americans. Some components of gasoline can pose serious health risks to
the individuals exposed to them. For example, one gasoline additive--
methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE)--is a potential carcinogen that can
migrate quickly through the soil into groundwater. Even in small
amounts, MTBE can render groundwater undrinkable and is difficult and
costly to clean up. According to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
data, as of March 31, 2005, about 449,000 fuel releases (leaks) had
occurred from the more than 2.2 million active (currently in use) and
closed (no longer in use) federally regulated underground storage tanks
nationwide. While progress has been made in cleaning up releases,
cleanup efforts had not yet begun to address over 32,000 of them.
To address this problem, in 1984, the Congress created the Underground
Storage Tank (UST) Program within EPA, which subsequently established
the Office of Underground Storage Tanks to manage the program. Under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), tank owners and
operators must register with a designated state or local agency
underground tanks that store petroleum or hazardous substances. EPA and
the states then track and regulate these tanks. Furthermore, EPA
required tank owners to install new leak detection equipment by the end
of 1993 and new spill-, overfill-, and corrosion-prevention equipment
by the end of 1998. If these conditions were not met, owners had to
close or remove their tanks.
Tank owners and operators are ultimately responsible for cleaning up
contamination from their leaking tanks. However, in 1986, the Congress
established the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Trust Fund to
provide money for (1) overseeing and enforcing cleanup actions taken by
a tank owner or operator, and (2) cleaning up leaks at tank sites where
the owner or operator is unknown, or unwilling or unable to take
action--which we refer to in this report as "abandoned"--or which
require emergency action. EPA or a state can proceed with cleanup using
the LUST Trust Fund, and can subsequently seek reimbursement from the
owners or operators. The fund is capitalized through a $0.001/gallon
tax on gasoline and other motor fuels and the interest that accrues to
the fund balance annually. As of September 2004, the fund balance was
about $2.2 billion. The Congress annually appropriates amounts from the
LUST Trust Fund to the federal UST Program that EPA uses to negotiate
and oversee cooperative agreements with states, implement programs on
Indian lands, and support regional offices and state programs.
Appropriations from the fund have been about $70 million to $76 million
annually. The majority of these funds go to states to implement their
underground storage tank programs. As of September 2004, EPA had
approved 34 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, to
operate and enforce their own underground storage tank programs with
EPA oversight and monitoring.[Footnote 1] Fourteen other states operate
and enforce their own tank programs under state laws with limited EPA
oversight. States receiving LUST Trust Fund money can spend it on
cleanup and related activities. In addition, the Energy Policy Act,
enacted in August 2005, authorizes states to use a portion of their
federal trust funds for inspections and other leak prevention purposes
and generally requires that states inspect their underground storage
tanks at least once every 3 years. EPA also awards states annual grants
to help them fund a portion of their inspection and enforcement costs.
In this context, we identified (1) information available on the number
and cleanup status of leaking underground storage tanks, (2) existing
sources of funding for cleanups at contaminated tank sites, and (3)
processes used to identify, assess, and clean up sites in 5 states with
large numbers of leaking tanks--California, Maryland, Michigan, North
Carolina, and Pennsylvania. In addition, to provide some perspective on
how leaking underground storage tank sites are identified and cleaned
up, we are providing information on the history and cleanup status of
one leaking tank site in each of these 5 states. This information is
included in appendix I.
To address these issues, we reviewed and evaluated program data from
EPA and interviewed program officials in EPA's Office of Underground
Storage Tanks and EPA Regions 3 (Philadelphia), 4 (Atlanta), 5
(Chicago), and 9 (San Francisco). We also reviewed and evaluated data
from and conducted interviews with state program officials in
California, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. In
addition, we selected one leaking tank site in each of these 5 states
for comparison of cleanup status, costs, and other factors. We included
the Tranguch Tire Service, Incorporated, facility in Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania, among the sites in our review due to congressional
interest. We selected the remaining 4 sites primarily on the basis of
their high cleanup costs, cleanup status, and other similarities with
the Tranguch site for comparison. We interviewed site project or
incident managers and reviewed case files for each site. Additional
information regarding our objectives, scope, and methodology is
included in appendix II. We conducted our review between August 2004
and November 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards, including assessing the reliability of the data we
obtained.
Results in Brief:
EPA requires states to submit data on their tanks to the agency,
including the number of active and closed tanks, the number of
confirmed tank leaks (referred to as releases), cleanups initiated and
completed, and emergency responses. State data show that, as of March
31, 2005, more than 660,000 tanks were active and about 1.6 million had
been closed since the inception of the UST Program in 1986. In
addition, the states identified about 449,000 confirmed releases and
about 416,000 initiated cleanups, with almost 324,000 of these
completed. While states also compile some data on abandoned tanks--
tanks whose owner or operator is unknown, or unwilling or unable to
clean up leaks--EPA does not require them to separately report to the
agency information on the number and cleanup status of all of the
states' known abandoned tanks. EPA officials believe that the data the
agency currently obtains from states are sufficient for general program
oversight, identifying program trends, and determining the progress of
individual states' programs. However, without separate data on all
known abandoned sites, EPA cannot assess whether these sites are being
cleaned up or deferred because of a lack of funding. In addition,
because one of the purposes of the federal LUST Trust Fund is to
provide money for cleaning up abandoned tank sites, the lack of
separate and more complete data on abandoned tanks limits EPA's ability
to determine how to most efficiently and effectively allocate trust
fund dollars to the states. We are recommending that EPA require states
to separately report to the agency information on the number and
cleanup status of all of their known abandoned underground storage
tanks.
Tank owners and operators are primarily responsible for paying to clean
up their own sites, but abandoned tanks are cleaned up using available
state resources--which in some cases may be limited--and the LUST Trust
Fund. EPA estimates that the average remediation costs per site have
been about $125,000, but costs sometimes have exceeded $1 million. RCRA
requires tank owners and operators to provide assurance that, if a
release occurs, they can pay the costs of cleaning up a site and
compensating third parties for injury and property damage. For example,
an owner might purchase commercial insurance or participate in the
state's financial assurance or indemnification fund. While each state's
fund differs, in most cases, states capitalize their funds with tank
registration and petroleum fees. However, abandoned tanks generally do
not qualify for funding from commercial insurers and may not qualify
for a state's assurance fund. As a result, addressing contamination
from abandoned tanks depends largely on the availability of funds from
other sources, such as state appropriations and the federal LUST Trust
Fund. Environmental officials of 2 of the 5 states we contacted told us
that their states' funds are inadequate to address contamination at
some abandoned tank sites and, therefore, must rely on LUST funding.
For example, Michigan officials told us that the state has insufficient
resources to address the backlog of about 4,200 confirmed releases from
abandoned leaking underground storage tanks, which will require about
$1.7 billion in public funds to remediate. Furthermore, both Michigan
and North Carolina officials said that their states defer cleanup or
let contamination at abandoned tank sites attenuate (diminish)
naturally over a number of years once immediate threats are addressed
because resource constraints preclude complete remediation. In
addition, when emergency cleanup work was required at an abandoned site
in a third state--Pennsylvania--in 1996, state officials asked EPA to
take over the cleanup because the owner was bankrupt and the state
could not pay the expected cleanup costs. Future workload increases due
to as yet undiscovered abandoned sites could place additional demands
on state and federal trust fund resources and exacerbate this
situation. While EPA and states are undertaking initiatives to make
cleanup efforts less expensive and more effective, including using
contracts that tie payment to the accomplishment of site cleanup goals,
officials from all 5 states agreed that additional federal funds would
enhance their states' ability to respond to releases from abandoned
tanks.
The 5 states that we contacted identify, assess, and clean up leaking
tank sites using similar processes. For the most part, owners and
operators are responsible for these activities under state oversight.
Generally, the 5 states identify leaking tanks when (1) tank owners or
operators report to the state that they have confirmed a release after
leak detection equipment was activated, after they discovered a loss of
product, or after they found leaks when upgrading, replacing, or
closing their tanks; (2) land redevelopment activities uncover unknown
tanks; or (3) state environmental or health agencies investigate
contamination complaints. Furthermore, while regular tank inspections
provide the opportunity to detect new leaks and potentially prevent
future ones, as of mid-2005, only 2 of the 5 states--California and
Maryland--consistently inspected all of the state's tanks at least once
every 3 years, the minimum inspection frequency that EPA considers
necessary for effective tank monitoring. However, the Energy Policy
Act, enacted in August 2005, among other things, generally requires
inspections at least once every 3 years and authorizes federal trust
funds to be available for this and other leak prevention purposes.
These provisions should allow states to place greater emphasis on their
leak detection and prevention efforts. In the 5 states we contacted,
once the state environmental agency becomes aware of leaking tanks, it
then identifies responsible parties and requires them to hire qualified
environmental consultants to perform site assessments or
characterizations and develop and implement remedial action plans to
effectively clean up the site. All 5 state agencies prioritize most
sites for cleanup generally according to the immediate threat they pose
to human health, safety, and/or the environment. While states normally
oversee cleanups, they may ask EPA to lead or support the cleanup at
sites that present an imminent threat, that have no viable responsible
party, that do not qualify for funding under a state plan, or for which
the magnitude of the cost and cleanup work is beyond state resources.
Background:
Data collected from the states and reported by EPA indicate that EPA
and states have made progress in cleaning up releases from underground
storage tanks over the past decade and a half. According to EPA, of the
more than 447,000 releases confirmed as of the end of 2004, cleanups
had been initiated for about 92 percent, and about 71 percent of these
cleanups had been completed. Figure 1 shows confirmed releases from
underground storage tanks, cleanups initiated, and cleanups completed
annually from fiscal years 1997 through 2004.
Figure 1: Annual Confirmed Releases from Underground Storage Tanks,
Cleanups Initiated, and Cleanups Completed, Fiscal Years 1997 Through
2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As this figure indicates, the number of new releases confirmed annually
declined, from about 12,000 in 2003 to less than 8,000 in 2004--about
35 percent. However, while figure 1 shows a decline in the number of
releases confirmed annually over the period, it also shows a decrease
in the number of cleanups initiated and completed. According to EPA,
the number of cleanups completed each year has generally decreased over
recent years and fell by 23 percent--from more than 18,000 in fiscal
year 2003 to just over 14,000--in fiscal year 2004. Furthermore, there
still remains a national backlog of almost 130,000 cleanups yet to be
completed.
EPA's UST Program is primarily implemented by the states. EPA has
become directly involved in program implementation only in Indian
country and when states have been unwilling or unable to establish
effective underground storage tank programs or to address contamination
at specific sites. Instead, EPA's primary role has been to establish
standards and regulations to assist the states in implementing their
programs. While all EPA-approved underground storage tank programs must
be no less stringent than the federal program, individual aspects of
each state program differ. For example, state time frames for
conducting inspections vary widely. Also, while some states use only
state environmental personnel to conduct inspections, others use state-
certified private inspectors, or both. Furthermore, state program
requirements and standards are sometimes more stringent and inclusive
than those under the federal program. For example, states often
regulate home heating fuel tanks, tanks on farms, and above-ground
tanks that RCRA generally excludes from the federal program.[Footnote
2]
EPA's UST Program receives approximately $70 million each year from the
LUST Trust Fund, about 80 percent of which is used for administering,
overseeing, and cleaning up sites. The remaining money has been used by
EPA for negotiating and overseeing cooperative agreements, implementing
programs on Indian lands, and supporting regional and state offices.
EPA spends about $6 million annually from the LUST Trust Fund on the
agency's program implementation, management, and oversight activities.
Amounts distributed to the states from the fund each year vary
depending primarily on whether they have an EPA-approved program, the
total number of each state's tanks, and the number of releases from
those tanks. Until recently, states could use these funds only for
cleanup and related administrative and enforcement activities, and EPA
awarded each state about $187,000 annually from the agency's State and
Tribal Assistance Grant account to help administer their programs and
cover inspection and enforcement costs. Historically, states have used
about one-third of their LUST Trust Fund money for administration, one-
third for oversight and state-lead enforcement activities, and one-
third for cleanups, according to EPA.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005, enacted in August 2005, includes a
number of provisions addressing issues relating to training, tank
inspections, prohibitions on fuel deliveries to problem tanks, and
funding tank inspections and enforcement, among others. With regard to
training, the act requires EPA to publish guidelines specifying
training requirements for tank operation and maintenance personnel and
authorized EPA to award up to $200,000 to states that develop and
implement training programs consistent with these guidelines.
In addition, the act requires EPA and any state receiving federal UST
funding to inspect all regulated tanks not inspected since December 22,
1998, within 2 years of the date of enactment. After these inspections
are completed, EPA or the state must generally inspect regulated tanks
once every 3 years. The act allows EPA to extend the first 3-year
period for up to 1 additional year if an authorized state demonstrates
that it has insufficient resources to complete all inspections within
the first 3-year period. Furthermore, beginning in 2007, the act
prohibits deliveries to underground storage tanks that are not in
compliance with applicable regulations and requires EPA and states to
publish guidelines for implementing the delivery prohibition that
would, among other things, identify the criteria for determining which
tanks are ineligible for delivery. Finally, the act authorizes
substantial appropriations from the trust fund during fiscal years 2005
through 2009 for a variety of activities, including release prevention,
compliance, training, inspections, and enforcement.
States Provide EPA with Some Tank and Cleanup Data, but Do Not Provide
Separate Information on All Known Abandoned Tanks:
EPA collects data on the total number of underground storage tanks and
the status of cleanup activities relating to these tanks from all
states, and reports this information semiannually.[Footnote 3] Table 1
shows key tank-related data reported by EPA as of March 31, 2005.
Table 1: Key Data on Underground Storage Tanks, as of March 31, 2005:
Tank-related data element.
Tanks:
Active tanks;
Number: 660,274.
Closed tanks;
Number: 1,605,711.
Total Tanks;
Number: 2,265,985.
Leaks (releases):
Confirmed releases;
Number: 448,807.
Cleanups:
Cleanups initiated;
Number: 416,246.
Cleanups completed;
Number: 323,586.
Cleanups ongoing;
Number: 92,660.
Cleanup backlog;
Number: 125,221.
Source: GAO analysis of EPA data.
[End of table]
EPA's semiannual reports also include, among other data, the number of
emergency response actions taken by an implementing agency, such as the
state, to mitigate imminent threats to human health and the environment
from an underground storage tank system.
EPA, however, does not require states to provide specific data on all
known abandoned underground storage tanks. While abandoned tanks are
included in the data reported to EPA, they are generally aggregated
with the other data and cannot be separately identified. However, all 5
states we contacted compile some limited data on abandoned tanks and
report this information separately to the EPA regional office that
manages each state's LUST Trust Fund cooperative agreement. In this
regard, all 5 states separately report the number of initiated and
completed cleanups of abandoned tanks using trust fund money. However,
these data do not include separate information on cleanups of known
abandoned tanks using state funds or any known abandoned tanks where
cleanup has not yet been initiated. EPA officials believe that the data
the agency currently obtains from states are sufficient for general
program oversight, identifying program trends, and determining the
progress of individual states' programs. However, because states
generally do not provide separate data on all abandoned tanks, EPA has
limited ability to assess and track states' progress in cleaning up
contamination from these tanks. In addition, although one of the
primary purposes of the LUST Trust Fund is to provide money for
cleaning up abandoned tank sites, EPA lacks information--such as the
number of releases from known abandoned tanks in each state and how
many of these releases have been or are being cleaned up--to help it
determine how to most efficiently and effectively allocate funds to the
states for this purpose. EPA allocates amounts from the fund to each
state based, in part, on the data each currently provides, but these
allocation decisions do not now take into account the specific number
of the state's abandoned sites that may require cleanup funds.[Footnote
4]
Several Funding Sources Exist For Cleaning Up Tank Releases, but Some
States' Resources for Remediating Abandoned Tank Sites Are Limited:
While tank owners and operators are primarily responsible for cleaning
up contamination from leaks in their underground storage tanks, some
states assist them through financial assurance or indemnification
funds. These funds also sometimes pay for cleanups of abandoned tank
sites. However, not all states have indemnification funds and, in 10 of
the 40 states that have such funds, claims for cleanup cost
reimbursements exceeded fund balances in fiscal year 2004.
Consequently, EPA is monitoring the states' funds to determine their
viability as financial assurance mechanisms.
EPA, through the LUST Trust Fund, provides some limited support to
states for cleaning up abandoned sites as well as for administering,
overseeing, and enforcing their cleanup programs. The 5 states we
contacted--California, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania--use differing approaches to ensure funding to clean up
contamination from tank leaks. Three of these states--Maryland,
Michigan, and North Carolina--are experiencing difficulties in funding
cleanups of abandoned tank sites and officials of 2 of these states
told us that available resources will be insufficient to clean up all
of the abandoned tanks in their state.
Tank Owners or Operators and State Indemnification Funds Generally Pay
for Cleanups:
Owners and operators are primarily responsible for cleaning up
contamination from leaks in their underground storage tanks. However,
according to the director of EPA's UST Program, many of these
owners/operators, most of which are small, independent businesses, do
not have the financial capacity to pay for expensive cleanups. EPA
estimates that the average remediation cost per site has been about
$125,000, but costs sometimes have exceeded $1 million. Under RCRA,
tank owners and operators must maintain evidence of financial
responsibility for carrying out cleanup actions, using one or more of a
variety of mechanisms, including commercial insurance, corporate
guarantee, letter of credit, qualification as a self-insurer, or an EPA-
approved state financial assurance fund. For commercial insurance, the
owner/operator usually pays premiums as well as a deductible amount
and/or co-payments before the policy begins to cover remediation costs
up to some limit of coverage per leak incident. To assist
owners/operators in funding cleanups, as of November 2004, 40 states
had established state assurance or indemnification funds. State
indemnification funds typically have deductible and co-payment
requirements similar to those for commercial insurance, but these funds
are managed by the state. Indemnification funds are usually capitalized
through gasoline and diesel fuel taxes or fees paid by owners/operators
registering or obtaining permits for underground storage tanks, as
required. Any cleanup costs above the maximum coverage provided by
insurance or the indemnification fund are borne by the tank
owner/operator. A state fund qualifies as a financial assurance
mechanism if EPA has approved it for that purpose. In deciding whether
to approve a fund, EPA considers the certainty of the availability of
funds for cleanup, the amount of funds that will be made available, the
types of costs covered, and other relevant factors.
The 5 states we contacted vary in their approaches to ensuring that
contaminated tank sites are cleaned up and that tank owners/operators,
to the extent possible, pay the remediation costs. Three of the 5
states--California, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania--currently have
financial assurance funds that reimburse owners/operators for cleanup
costs under varying conditions. Maryland and Michigan have no such
funds, and, instead, tank owners/operators rely primarily on commercial
insurance to pay cleanup costs.
California: California's Underground Storage Tank program includes a
state financial assurance program--the Underground Storage Tank Cleanup
Fund--to assist tank owners/operators in funding site cleanups. The
fund, established in 1989, is the state's primary mechanism for
reimbursing owners/operators for their costs of cleaning up leaking
underground storage tanks incurred after January 1, 1988. The fund is
available to most owners/operators of tanks subject to EPA's
Underground Storage Tank Program, as well as owners of certain small
home heating oil tanks. The California State Water Resources Control
Board administers the fund, which is primarily capitalized through a
storage fee--paid by owners of regulated and permitted underground
storage tanks--for each gallon of petroleum placed in the tanks.
According to board officials, the fund collects about $240 million
annually and, except for $200,000 per year that is used for
enforcement, monies from the fund are all used for tank cleanups,
including such activities as direct cleanup by responsible parties,
agency oversight, and replacement of drinking water wells. In fiscal
year 2004, California spent approximately $208 million to reimburse
responsible parties for direct expenses incurred in cleaning up leaking
underground storage tanks.
The fund reimburses tank owners/operators for cleanup costs up to $1.5
million per incident for "reasonable and necessary" remediation
costs.[Footnote 5] Claimants are divided into four classes: class "A"
claimants do not have to pay a deductible before costs are reimbursed
by the fund; class "B" and "C" claimants must pay the first $5,000 in
eligible corrective action costs; and class "D" claimants are
responsible for the first $10,000. An Underground Storage Tank
Petroleum Contamination Orphan Site Cleanup subaccount was established
as part of the fund in September 2004, capitalized with $30 million
($10 million per year for 2005 through 2007) transferred from the fund
to reimburse cleanup costs incurred in cleaning up abandoned
contaminated urban brownfield sites. In addition to reimbursing
owners/operators, state officials said that $5 million a year is
transferred from the fund to a subaccount to address emergency,
abandoned, and recalcitrant tank site cleanups.
Board officials we interviewed told us that the fund is adequately
capitalized and that they do not always spend all available funds each
year. Nevertheless, these officials also said that the state is
interested in ways to minimize program costs and is experimenting with
pay-for-performance remediation contracts, which are now being used at
20 cleanup sites in the state.
Maryland: Although Maryland has 2 trust funds that have financed
certain cleanup activities, it does not have a fund that EPA has
approved for use as a financial assurance mechanism. According to state
officials, owners and operators primarily use commercial insurance to
demonstrate financial responsibility. The state's Oil Contaminated Site
Environmental Cleanup Fund has provided limited cleanup assistance to
owners/operators of federally-regulated underground storage tanks,
among others. The fund provides funding of up to $125,000 per leak
occurrence from underground storage tanks--subject to deductibles from
$7,500 to $20,000--and is primarily capitalized by a fee of 1.75 cents
per barrel of oil imposed at the first point of transfer into the
state. However, the program stopped accepting applications for
reimbursement from owners and operators of federally-regulated
underground storage tanks on June 30, 2005. In addition, the Maryland
Oil Disaster Containment, Cleanup, and Contingency Fund finances, among
other things, state cleanup costs for abandoned sites.[Footnote 6]
Revenues for this fund, according to the fund's fiscal year 2004 annual
report, are generated by a fee of 2 cents per barrel of oil transferred
into the state. From July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004, this fund paid out
about $3.5 million.
Michigan: Michigan's state financial indemnification program for
underground storage tanks was terminated in June 1995, because it had
insufficient funds to pay existing and future claims. Since that time,
tank owners/operators have been required to annually show proof of
financial assurance to cover cleanup costs in order to operate in
Michigan. Small owners/operators usually provide this proof by
obtaining commercial insurance. The state has used a number of sources
to fund limited cleanup work at underground storage tank sites,
including the Cleanup and Redevelopment Fund, the Clean Michigan
Initiative Bond Fund, the Environmental Protection Fund; State General
Funds, and the Environmental Protection Bond Fund. Appropriations from
these funds address soil, groundwater, and sediment contamination from
all sources, including leaking tanks. Most of these funds are no longer
available for new projects. According to state officials, in the fall
of 2004, state legislators voted to establish a Refined Petroleum Fund
that will be capitalized by a 7/8 cent-per-gallon fee on refined
petroleum products to be collected through 2010. This fund is expected
to accrue approximately $60 million each year, a portion of which is
expected to be used to clean up underground storage tank sites. A
Refined Petroleum Cleanup Advisory Council was also established to
provide the governor and legislature with recommendations on how to
spend the fund's revenues. State officials told us that the council is
expected to recommend an increase in the 7/8 cent fee to implement its
other recommendations.
North Carolina: North Carolina has a state fund that acts as a
financial assurance mechanism and that reimburses owners/operators for
most of the costs for site assessments, cleanups, and damages related
to leaking underground storage tanks.[Footnote 7] This fund applies to
leaks discovered after June 30, 1988, from commercial underground tanks
containing petroleum. The fund is primarily capitalized by a 0.297 cent-
per-gallon excise tax on motor fuel sales; a small part of the state
inspection tax on motor fuel and kerosene; and annual tank operating
fees. Under provisions of the fund, owners/operators of tanks that have
upgraded corrosion, leak, and overfill protection pay the first $20,000
of assessment and cleanup costs and the first $100,000 in third party
liability costs. The fund then pays all other cleanup costs deemed
reasonable and necessary, up to $1 million, and an additional $500,000,
with a 20 percent co-payment by the owner/operator, after which any
remaining amount is paid by the owner/operator. The state paid
approximately $21 million in reimbursements for tank assessment and
cleanup costs from this fund in fiscal year 2004.
Because the balance of the fund was not sufficient to cover all
obligations, in June 2002, the fund began operating from month to
month, paying out funds on a first-come, first-paid basis. This action
resulted in a significant backlog of claims with pending payments,
according to the fund's annual report. Consequently, EPA is currently
monitoring North Carolina's fund to determine its viability as a
financial assurance mechanism. To address concerns about the viability
of the trust fund, North Carolina officials are considering requiring
tank owners/operators to use other forms of financial assurance, such
as commercial insurance.
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania's Underground Storage Tank Indemnification
Fund was created by the state Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act of
1989, as amended, and is administered by the State Insurance
Department, according to the fund's 2004 annual report. The fund
reimburses tank owners/operators for reasonable and necessary cleanup
costs for leaks that occur in regulated tanks on or after February 1,
1994, the date it began operation. The maximum amount of coverage under
the fund is currently $1.5 million; however, for claims reported prior
to January 1, 2002, the limit was $1 million, according to state
officials. The aggregate limit is $1.5 million for owners of 100 or
less tanks and $3 million for owners of 101 or more tanks. The fund
also covers bodily injury and property damage claims that arise from a
leak, indemnifies certified tank installers, and provides loans to
owners/operators for upgrading their facilities. According to the
fund's 2004 annual report, a claimant for reimbursement from the fund
must be an owner or operator of a tank registered with the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection, and must report the claim to
the fund within 60 days of the discovery of the release. Claimants must
also pay the first $5,000 per tank of allowable cleanup costs and
$5,000 per tank of third-party liability claims. State program
officials told us that Pennsylvania law requires that the fund be
managed on an actuarial basis and that the fee structure be reviewed
yearly to maintain solvency. They also said that the fund's objective
is to have positive cash flow and invested assets for a projected
period of at least 5 years. The fund is primarily capitalized by (1) a
1.1 cents-per-gallon fee (for 2004) on substances such as gasoline, new
motor oil, and aviation fuel, (2) investment income generated from fund
balances, and (3) a capacity fee of 8.25 cents-per-gallon for
substances such as diesel, kerosene, and used motor oil.
While the fund does not directly cover costs for remediating abandoned
tank sites, it is authorized to provide allocations to the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection--which manages the cleanup of
contamination from these tanks--up to a maximum of $12 million
annually: $5.5 million for general environmental cleanup, $5.5 million
for catastrophic release, and $1 million for pollution prevention.
Department officials told us that each year it must request funding
from the fund's board. The board then allocates funds to the department
based on the fund's ability to pay tank owners' claims. State fund
officials told us that the department has not requested the maximum
allocation amount for the past several years, and in some years they
have not spent the full amount of the money they requested. According
to state officials, the fund collected $68 million in 2004, and paid
out $64 million. These state officials told us that the fund is fully
capitalized and is working effectively with a balance of $215 million,
as of May 2005.
The Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund Provides Support for
State Programs and Abandoned Tank Site Remediation:
In addition to the states' funding sources and mechanisms, the LUST
Trust Fund assists states in (1) overseeing and enforcing corrective
actions taken by tank owners/operators and (2) cleaning up leaking
abandoned tanks or tanks that require an emergency action. EPA
allocates amounts from the trust fund to each state based on a number
of criteria, such as the total number of tanks in the state, the number
of confirmed releases, and whether EPA has approved the state's
program, among other factors.[Footnote 8] However, these criteria do
not include the number and cleanup status of a state's abandoned tanks.
According to EPA program officials, states historically have used about
two-thirds of the federal trust fund money allocated to them each year
to oversee and support the cleanups paid for by state funds, tank
owners/operators, and other financial assurance mechanisms, while the
states have used the remaining one-third to directly pay for cleanups
of abandoned tanks that are not covered by the other funding sources.
As Table 2 shows, for the 5 states we contacted, the amount of funds
that EPA awards from the fund and the portions of these funds the
states allocate for cleaning up tank sites varies, as do the amounts of
their own funds that they spend on leak cleanups.
Table 2: Five States' Funding from EPA's LUST Trust Fund, the Amounts
and Percentages of These Funds Used To Clean Up Tank Sites, and
Estimated Amounts of Each State's Own Funds Spent on Tank Cleanups,
Fiscal Year 2004[A]:
State: California;
Amounts awarded to state from LUST Trust Fund: $3,538,351;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]: Amount:
$2,257,026;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]:
Percentage: 64%;
Estimated amount of state's own funds spent to clean up tank sites[C]:
$240,000,000.
State: Maryland;
Amounts awarded to state from LUST Trust Fund: 1,376,825;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]: Amount:
$1,336,825;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]:
Percentage: 97%;
Estimated amount of state's own funds spent to clean up tank sites[C]:
$1,800,000.
State: Michigan;
Amounts awarded to state from LUST Trust Fund: 1,750,000;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]: Amount:
$528,596;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]:
Percentage: 30%;
Estimated amount of state's own funds spent to clean up tank sites[C]:
$12,900,000.
State: North Carolina;
Amounts awarded to state from LUST Trust Fund: 3,208,081;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]: Amount:
$990,046;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]:
Percentage: 31%;
Estimated amount of state's own funds spent to clean up tank sites[C]:
$21,300,000.
State: Pennsylvania;
Amounts awarded to state from LUST Trust Fund: 1,487,152;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]: Amount:
0;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]:
Percentage: 0%;
Estimated amount of state's own funds spent to clean up tank sites[C]:
$2,200,000.
State: Total;
Amounts awarded to state from LUST Trust Fund: $11,360,409;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]: Amount:
$5,112,493;
Portion of LUST fund allocation used to clean up tank sites[B]:
Percentage: 45%;
Estimated amount of state's own funds spent to clean up tank sites[C]:
$278,200,000.
Source: GAO analysis of data obtained from EPA and individual states.
[A] Costs are for the states' fiscal year 2004. Because states' fiscal
years differ, for Michigan, costs are for the period October 1, 2003
through September 30, 2004; for the other 4 states, costs are for the
period July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2004.
[B] States use the remaining portion of their LUST funds for
administrative, enforcement, and related purposes. States do not always
spend the entire amount of the funding awarded to them during a given
year and may carry some portion of it over into subsequent years.
[C] These estimates may not include, among other things, personnel and
regulatory oversight costs.
[End of table]
The LUST Trust Fund's contribution to state cleanup efforts is
generally small compared to amounts paid by tank owners/operators,
state indemnification programs, and other state mechanisms for cleaning
up sites each year.[Footnote 9] For example, in fiscal year 2004, EPA
awarded $61.7 million in trust funds to assist states' leaking tank
cleanup efforts.[Footnote 10] However, according to EPA, states, on
average, spend a total of about $1 billion to $1.5 billion each year on
tank site cleanups. To illustrate, EPA program officials told us that
for every federal dollar spent to clean up tank sites, states spend as
much as $18 of their own funds.
If cleanup costs paid by owners/operators were included, the actual
ratio of dollars spent by other sources to federal dollars could be
significantly higher than the 18 to 1 calculation provided by EPA.
However, tank owners'/operators' costs to remediate a site are
difficult to determine since they are not always captured in state and
federal records. While state records may include deductible and co-
payment amounts paid by owners/operators under state programs, they do
not typically include any costs these parties pay that are disallowed
by the state. Furthermore, amounts that owners/operators pay in excess
of program limits are not captured in state and federal data. For
example, California program officials told us that a leaking tank site
in Santa Monica contaminated the public water supply with MTBE, which
is typically very expensive to clean up. While the owner/operator
estimated that it may require $50 million to clean up the site, the
state indemnification fund limits reimbursements for cleanup costs to a
maximum of $1.5 million per tank per leak incident. As a result, the
approximately $48.5 million in additional non-reimbursable costs paid
by the owner would not be reflected in program records.
Some States Believe That Funding From Available Sources Is Inadequate
to Address All Sites With Leaking Abandoned Tanks:
Some states' indemnification funds and other resources may be
insufficient to clean up all of the leaking abandoned tanks in their
state. For example, according to a survey of states conducted for the
Association of State and Tribal Solid Waste Management Officials in
early 2005, claims for the reimbursement of cleanup costs exceeded the
fund balances in 10 states.[Footnote 11] Of the 5 states we contacted,
officials of 3--Maryland, Michigan, and North Carolina--told us that
the state is experiencing difficulties in funding cleanups at abandoned
tank sites. Furthermore, officials of 2 of these states--Maryland and
Michigan--said that available resources will be insufficient to clean
up all of them and that additional resource allocations from the LUST
Trust Fund would help address these funding shortfalls and enhance the
states ability to clean up leaking tank sites.[Footnote 12]
Because of funding constraints, Maryland is now prioritizing and
deferring cleanups of its abandoned tank sites. The state requires tank
owners/operators to demonstrate financial responsibility to pay for
cleanup costs, which they generally do by obtaining commercial
insurance to fund cleanups of the state's nonabandoned tank sites.
However, state officials are concerned that commercial insurance may
not provide a dependable source of funding for tank site cleanups,
because insurers have sometimes been reluctant to pay cleanup costs
when leaks occur. For example, files for the Henry Fruhling Food Store
site in Harford County, Maryland (see app. I), indicated that the
site's owner/operator experienced problems in getting the insurance
company to pay for cleanup costs because he could not prove that the
leak occurred during the period of coverage. The absence of insurance
funds to pay cleanup costs may lead to more abandoned sites--sites
where the owners/operators are unable to pay the cleanup costs
themselves--which will require the state to fund cleanup with its own
funds or seek federal resources. State officials told us that, in the
absence of increased allocations of federal trust funds, they asked the
state legislature to approve an increase in Maryland's special oil
transfer fee to fund the state's tank cleanup needs. The state
legislature subsequently approved the fee increase.
Since Michigan's indemnification fund was terminated in June 1995,
because of insufficient funds to pay existing and future claims, tank
owners/operators have been required to show proof of financial
assurance to cover cleanup costs in order to operate in Michigan. Small
owners/operators usually provide this proof by obtaining commercial
insurance. However, state LUST program officials cited anecdotal
evidence showing that insurance claims for remediation costs are
frequently denied because it is often difficult to prove that the
release occurred under the period of coverage. If the owner/operator
cannot or is unwilling to pay the costs and these costs are not covered
by insurance or some other form of financial assurance, the burden for
cleaning up a site will fall on the state.
In addition, Michigan program officials told us that the state's
causation standard further exacerbates the funding problem for
abandoned tanks because it requires that the state prove that the
present owner/operator is responsible for a site's contamination before
it can be held responsible for cleanup. Proving responsibility becomes
difficult in cases where releases have occurred at some point in the
past and ownership of the property has changed. If responsibility
cannot be established, the state must then fund any cleanup of the
site. In addition, state officials said that underground storage tank
owners/operators acquiring properties after March 6, 1996, can limit
their liability for pre-existing contamination by performing a baseline
environmental assessment of the property--any contamination found at
that point becomes the responsibility of the owner/operator who caused
the contamination or the state if a responsible party cannot be
identified. According to program officials, Michigan now has a backlog
of 9,000 confirmed releases from leaking underground storage tanks, an
estimated 4,200 of which are at abandoned sites. State program
officials estimate that it will require about $1.7 billion in public
funds to remediate these 4,200 releases alone. However, according to
these officials, resources available from all state sources are not
adequate to remediate these releases.
North Carolina's commercial trust fund can be used to assist
owners/operators with cleanup costs and to assist landowners in
cleaning up abandoned sites where the tank owner/operator cannot be
located or is unwilling to perform the cleanup. In recent months,
according to program officials, claims against the fund have exceeded
revenues, causing timeframes for paying reimbursements to stretch out
over a year. As a result, the state is now prioritizing sites based on
relative risk and directing work only to emergency releases and those
leaks that pose the highest risks that can be funded with available
resources.
While neither California nor Pennsylvania are experiencing significant
problems funding cleanups of leaking tank sites, officials in both
states said that they could use more federal funding for leak
prevention initiatives and welcome the flexibility to use federal trust
funds for that purpose, as provided by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
In an ongoing review, we are examining the scope and magnitude of
states' workload and funding needs for cleaning up contamination from
leaking underground tanks. Specifically, for each of the 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and 5 U.S. Territories, we are examining (1) how
much funding is currently available for cleaning up contamination from
leaking tanks, (2) the extent to which tank cleanup funds have been
used for purposes other than cleanups, if at all, and (3) what future
revenues will be available to clean up contamination from leaking
tanks.
States Identify, Assess, and Clean Up Leaking Tank Sites Using Similar
Means:
States become aware of leaking underground storage tanks through a
variety of methods, including owner/operator reports, complaints by
local residents, incidental discovery during land redevelopment or
removal of tanks for upgrading or replacement, and compliance
inspections.[Footnote 13] Regular and frequent tank inspections also
can detect new leaks--and potentially prevent future ones--before they
can lead to serious environmental or health damage, and lessen or avoid
the need for costly cleanups. Once contamination from leaking tanks is
detected and confirmed, the 5 states we contacted generally use risk-
based systems to prioritize sites for cleanup according to the
immediate threat they pose.[Footnote 14] Whether funded by the tank
owners/operators, state indemnification or other funds, or other means,
states generally direct and oversee site remediation.[Footnote 15]
However, in circumstances where a site presents an imminent threat, has
no viable responsible party, does not qualify for funding under a state
plan, or for which the magnitude of the cost and cleanup work is beyond
state resources, the state may ask EPA to assume oversight
responsibility.
States Identify Leaking Tank Sites Through a Variety of Methods:
Tank owners/operators are primarily responsible for identifying,
confirming, and reporting any leaks that occur in their underground
storage tanks and dispensing systems. EPA and the states have
established a number of requirements that tank owners/operators must
follow to ensure and facilitate the early detection of possible leaks.
In this regard, in 1988, EPA issued regulations governing leak
detection, among other things. Under these requirements, tank
owners/operators must notify the designated state or local authority
when they discover a release or when leak detection equipment indicates
that a leak may have occurred. This notification must generally occur
within 24 hours. Tanks must generally be monitored for leaks at least
once every 30 days.
Despite these requirements, leaks can remain undetected and/or
unreported. According to state officials, owners/operators sometimes do
not conduct proper inventory checks or leak detection procedures and
may intentionally disconnect leak detection equipment. Also, tank
tightness tests are imprecise and tanks can lose small amounts of
pressure or vacuum during the test and still pass. Such small pressure
leaks can result in large releases of the tanks contents over time. In
some cases, tightness tests have failed to detect significant leaks
altogether. For example, during investigation of the Tranguch Tire
Service site in Pennsylvania, the state Department of Environmental
Protection requested tank tightness test results for that facility as
well as 3 nearby tank operating facilities. Even though test results
showed that 3 of these facilities had passed their tests, 2 of them
were ultimately found to have leaking tanks, including all 6 tanks at
the Tranguch facility (see app. I). In addition to problems in
detecting leaks, some owners/operators fail to report suspected or
actual leaks once they are discovered. For example, the tank
owner/operator of the fourth facility in the Tranguch investigation did
not provide tightness test results as requested but admitted that a
leak had occurred at the site several months earlier that he had not
reported.
While owners/operators identify many leaks through established testing
and monitoring procedures, EPA and officials of the 5 states we
contacted told us that many leaks are discovered only when tanks are
removed for replacement or closure. When tanks are replaced or
facilities closed, in some states--such as California, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania--a state certified or licensed environmental consultant or
contractor removes the tanks, sometimes with state or local agency
oversight. Other states, such as Michigan and North Carolina, do not
require the contractor to be certified. In Michigan, however, any
person who removes or installs a tank must have a million dollars in
pollution liability insurance, according to state officials. As part of
this process, soil samples generally are taken from the excavation and
tested to determine whether contamination is present. However, leaks
are often readily apparent because of the presence of liquid product
(gasoline or diesel fuel) and/or strong fumes; state or local
environmental or health agencies may discover leaking tanks when
investigating homeowner complaints about such odors in their residences
or gasoline contamination in their well-water.
Frequently, unknown and abandoned tanks are discovered when land is
being excavated during property redevelopment. In these cases, states
generally follow the same process of sampling and testing described
above to assess contamination at the site. However, if contamination is
found, the responsibility for cleaning up these sites differs from
state to state. For example, in Pennsylvania, the new owner of the
contaminated property would be responsible for cleaning it up,
according to state officials. However, Michigan state officials told us
that Michigan law limits the cleanup responsibility to those who
actually caused the contamination. Therefore, the state would have to
pay for the cleanup unless it could identify the party or parties who
caused the contamination, which can be difficult.[Footnote 16] In
general, cleanup costs for abandoned tanks where no owners or operators
can be found usually become the state's responsibility.
Some States' Inspection Rates May Have Limited the Timely Detection or
Prevention of Leaks:
In addition to other methods for discovering leaking tanks, state or
local environmental agencies may detect leaking tanks or indications of
possible leaks while inspecting facilities for compliance with
regulatory requirements. EPA recommended that states conduct tank
inspections at least once every 3 years. However, of the 5 states we
contacted, as of mid-2005, only 2 regularly inspected their tanks as
frequently as EPA recommended, according to state officials. State
officials told us that California requires annual inspections of all
tanks; Maryland inspected its state's tanks every 3 years; Michigan
generally inspected every 3 years, depending upon the location of the
tanks and state inspection staffing levels; North Carolina inspected
once every 4 or 5 years, due to funding limits; and Pennsylvania
inspected at least once every 5 years.[Footnote 17]
EPA reported that, as of September 2004, about 35 percent of the
nation's underground storage tanks were not in "significant operational
compliance" with the applicable release detection and prevention
requirements, indicating a need for greater emphasis on inspections.
EPA and state officials agreed that regular inspections of underground
storage tanks provide the opportunity to detect new leaks before
serious environmental or health damage can occur and potentially
prevent future leaks. Even if performed on a regular basis, infrequent
inspections may allow violations of leak prevention and other tank
requirements to go undetected long enough for leaks to occur and
contamination to spread, potentially resulting in environmental and
health consequences and the need for costly cleanups.
While more frequent inspections potentially could enhance preventive
efforts, state officials in 4 of the states we contacted told us that
increasing the frequency of inspections would require additional
resources. Although EPA recommended inspections at least once every 3
years, EPA program officials recognized both the value of increased
inspections and some states' need for additional resources to conduct
more frequent inspections, and supported providing more flexibility in
the use of LUST trust funds for these purposes.
In 2001, after reviewing EPA's and states' efforts to enforce UST
Program regulations, we recommended that EPA negotiate with each state
to reach a minimum frequency for physical inspections of all its tanks
and present to the Congress an estimate of the total additional
resources the agency and states would need to conduct the inspection,
training, and enforcement actions necessary to ensure tank compliance
with federal requirements.[Footnote 18] In addition, to strengthen
EPA's and the states' ability to inspect tanks and enforce federal
requirements, we suggested that the Congress consider (1) authorizing
EPA to establish a federal requirement for the physical inspections of
all tanks on a periodic basis and (2) increasing the resources
available to the UST Program, based on a consideration of EPA's
estimate of resource needs. We noted that one way to do this would be
to increase the amount of funds the Congress provides from the trust
fund and to authorize states to spend a limited portion of these
amounts on inspection, training, and enforcement activities to detect
and prevent leaks, as long as this did not interfere with tank cleanup
progress. Generally consistent with our recommendations, the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, among other things, generally requires inspections
once every 3 years, increases amounts authorized to be appropriated
from the fund, and authorizes these funds to be used for inspections,
training, and other enforcement and prevention activities.
States Use Risk-Based Assessments to Determine Cleanup Priorities:
The 5 states we contacted all use risk-based systems to prioritize
leaking underground storage tank sites for cleanup according to the
immediate threat they pose to human health, safety, and/or the
environment.
* California prioritizes cleanup sites based on risk, with the highest
risk sites remediated first. California uses many of the same
procedures employed under the American Society for Testing and
Materials' (ASTM) risk-based corrective action process. This process
has 3 tiers and tables to determine priority rankings. The highest
priority is assigned to sites that pose a threat to human health and
the next highest to those posing an environmental threat. Under this
system, immediate threats are abated first and then sites with the
likelihood of future impact are addressed.
* Maryland uses a risk-based determination to prioritize both abandoned
and nonabandoned leaking tank sites. For example, if contaminated well
water is the primary threat involved, well samples are drawn and tested
and the levels of the various compounds found are compared to EPA safe
drinking water standards. Abandoned sites whose cleanup will have to be
paid for by the state are remediated if they pose an immediate threat
to public health. The cleanup of nonabandoned sites is paid for by the
tank owners and operators and begins immediately regardless of threat
level.
* Michigan uses a modified ASTM four-tier classification system to
prioritize sites according to their threat. The classification system
ranges from class 1--an immediate threat to the public or environment-
-to class 4--no demonstrable long-term threat. Michigan also uses a
risk-based assessment and corrective action process, based on the ASTM
process, which allows contamination to remain on-site as long as it is
possible to demonstrate that human health and the environment are
adequately protected.
* North Carolina prioritizes leaking tank sites according to three
levels of risk: high, intermediate, and low. High risk sites are those
that pose an immediate threat to human health and the environment
because, for example, a leak presents an explosion hazard from
petroleum vapors or a release is within 1,000 feet of a drinking water
well. Intermediate risk sites include those that contaminate or
potentially could contaminate surface water, a wellhead protection
area, or an area that recharges drinking water aquifers, or have
groundwater contamination levels high enough that natural attenuation
may be impeded. Low risk sites involve releases that do not fall into
the other 2 categories or that pose no significant risk to human health
or the environment. The state is now addressing only the highest risk
sites and emergency releases, with the goal of moving them to the
intermediate risk level. North Carolina also uses a risk-based
assessment and corrective action process wherein more contamination can
remain on site as long as adequate protection of human health and the
environment can be demonstrated. For instance, the state groundwater
standard for benzene is 1 part per billion, but cleanup to 5,000 parts
per billion may be allowed if it can be shown that the remaining
pollution poses no threat to human health and the environment.
* Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection uses a modified
ASTM system that classifies abandoned tank sites based on 4 priority
levels. Priority 1 sites are those that pose an immediate threat to
human health, safety, or sensitive environmental receptors; Priority 2
sites pose short-term (up to 2 years) threats; Priority 3 sites pose
long-term (greater than 2 years) threats; and Priority 4 sites present
no such demonstrable long-term threats. Pennsylvania does not generally
prioritize responsible party lead cleanup sites addressed under the
state's indemnification fund--all eligible sites receive funding for
cleanup and are required to follow the corrective action regulations,
according to state officials.
States Generally Direct and Oversee Remediation, but May Ask EPA to
Lead or Support Certain Cleanups:
Under RCRA regulations, tank owners/operators must notify the
designated state or local authority when they discover a release or
when leak detection equipment indicates that a release may have
occurred. Owners and operators must then undertake appropriate cleanup
action in accordance with the regulations. Environmental consultants,
in collaboration with the state or local environmental agency, usually
perform the site assessment, determine the technology and approach
needed to contain and remediate the contamination, and implement and
complete site cleanup. The method of cleanup selected is tailored to
the specific characteristics of the site, including the probable
pathways the contamination will follow to threaten the soil,
groundwater, and/or the health of surrounding residents. Depending on
whether the contamination has reached the local groundwater, treatment
methods can range from the removal and on-site treatment of
contaminated soil to expensive on-site pump-and-treat and vapor
extraction systems, activated carbon filtration systems for municipal
water systems, and vapor extraction and water treatment units for
nearby impacted or threatened homes and businesses, among others.
EPA seldom becomes directly involved in this process unless the site is
located at federal facilities or on Indian reservations. However,
states may ask EPA to lead or support the cleanup at sites that present
an imminent threat, have no viable responsible party, do not qualify
for funding under a state plan, or for which the magnitude of the cost
and cleanup work is beyond state resources. For example, state
officials asked EPA to assume the lead on cleaning up the Tranguch Tire
Service site in Pennsylvania after they determined that site
remediation costs would far exceed the state's resources (see app. I).
This leak involved the release of an estimated 25,000 to 50,000 gallons
of gasoline. The leaking fuel reached the aquifer and the contamination
plume migrated off-site into the sewer system of the surrounding
residential neighborhood. According to an EPA Region 3 official,
gasoline and gasoline fumes seeped into the basements of 20 to 30 homes
through the sewer system as well as into a nearby creek. After
conducting an environmental investigation of the area, the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources required the owner/operator of
Tranguch to begin site characterization and cleanup work. However, in
1995, the owner of the Tranguch facility declared bankruptcy and the
state assumed responsibility for characterizing the site and mitigating
vapors in area homes. By March 1996, the state had spent $2 million on
the site and did not have the funds that were going to be necessary to
clean up the site due to its potential magnitude. According to state
officials because of the emergency nature of the situation and funding
problems, the state asked EPA to take over as the lead agency for
remediating the site, which EPA did in late August 1996. To date, in
addition to the amounts paid by the owner/operator and the state, the
Tranguch site remediation has required over $25 million in federal
funding, primarily from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.[Footnote
19]
Conclusions:
While the data that states report to EPA on underground storage tanks
provides the agency with information it can use to determine the
overall trends and status of the UST Program, the lack of specific and
complete data on known abandoned tanks limits EPA's program oversight
and its ability to efficiently and effectively allocate LUST Trust Fund
resources. Without such information, neither EPA nor the Congress can
readily determine the number of abandoned tanks requiring cleanup
nationwide, whether this number is growing, whether states are
initiating and completing or deferring work, and what the potential
impacts on state resources and, ultimately, the LUST Trust Fund may be.
Furthermore, although one of the primary purposes of the fund is to
help states clean up releases from abandoned tanks, EPA currently
allocates resources to the states without taking into account how many
abandoned tanks each state has, how many are leaking, or how many are
being cleaned up. All 5 of the states we contacted provide data to EPA
on their abandoned tanks aggregated with other tank data and separately
identify and report some limited information on abandoned tanks to EPA
regional offices. Asking the states to separately identify information
on all known abandoned tanks in the reports they currently provide to
EPA should not pose an additional burden. In any case, we believe that
requiring states to specifically report information on all known
abandoned tanks would provide EPA useful data for overseeing the UST
Program and more efficiently and effectively allocating LUST Trust Fund
resources.
While the extent to which this situation exists nationwide is unknown,
officials in 2 of the 5 states told us that the state's present
resources are inadequate to cover cleanup efforts. At the same time,
the LUST Trust Fund has continued to grow through a continuing inflow
of fuel tax revenue and accrued interest--reaching a balance of about
$2.2 billion at the end of 2004--with only about $70 million to $76
million (less than 4 percent of the total fund balance) allocated
annually to support state programs. Furthermore, the EPA and state
officials we contacted believed that greater emphasis on leak
prevention activities, such as tank inspections, is necessary to detect
compliance problems that can lead to future leaks and uncover physical
evidence of leaking tanks so that states can respond more quickly, if
warranted, to prevent or limit the potential health and environmental
impacts on nearby communities. Moreover, the cost of taking measures to
prevent a release is generally much less than the cost of cleaning up a
release after it occurs. The underground storage tank provisions of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 may lead to increased resources for cleanups
of leaking tanks and stronger enforcement efforts that could prevent
leaks and lead to the early detection of existing leaks, thereby
reducing the need for costly cleanups.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve EPA's oversight of the leaking underground storage tank
program and its ability to determine how to most efficiently and
effectively allocate, LUST Trust Fund dollars to the states, we
recommend that the Administrator of EPA require that states separately
identify, in their reports to the agency, information on the number and
cleanup status of all known abandoned underground storage tanks within
their boundaries.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to EPA and the states of California,
Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania for their review
and comment. In commenting on the draft report, EPA stated that, in
general, the agency thinks that the report's findings and conclusions
have merit, and that it will assess the feasibility of implementing our
recommendation. EPA agrees that the UST Program could benefit from more
specific information about abandoned tank sites. However, EPA notes
that the process that states must conduct to establish that a tank is
abandoned--that its owner is unknown or unwilling or unable to pay for
leak cleanups--may involve ownership searches to identify the
potentially responsible party and assessment of their financial ability
and willingness to pay for cleanup. With this in mind, EPA is concerned
about placing an undue burden on states by requiring them to provide
specific data on abandoned tanks. Therefore, EPA stated that, in
consultation with the states, the agency will consider how best to
incorporate our recommendation.
We share EPA's concern about placing an additional burden on states by
asking them to determine whether a given tank is abandoned by
undertaking a potentially labor-intensive and costly effort to
establish who owns the tank and whether this owner is financially able
and/or willing to pay for cleaning up a leak. However, we are not
suggesting that states should make an effort to identify unknown
abandoned tanks; rather we are recommending that they report to EPA
separately the information they currently have on tanks that they know
are abandoned, and, as new abandoned tanks are identified in the normal
course of program operations, report this information to EPA as well.
This should place no additional burden on the states. States currently
provide EPA data on known abandoned tanks aggregated with all other
tanks in the state. We are simply recommending that the states break
out the data on their abandoned tanks from total tank data. Because a
limited portion of these data--information on abandoned tanks being
cleaned up using LUST Trust Fund resources--is currently broken out and
provided to EPA's regions, the UST Program could easily utilize these
existing data and EPA would only have to require states to break out
the remaining data on the number and cleanup status of their known
abandoned sites. Having more complete data on abandoned tanks would
allow EPA to better determine the potential scope of the problem and
the progress that states are making towards addressing it. It would
also permit EPA to take this information specifically into account in
allocating LUST Trust Fund resources. Given EPA's concerns, we have
clarified our recommendation by explicitly stating that EPA should
require states to provide separate data on the number and cleanup
status of all their known abandoned tanks. EPA also provided technical
comments, which we have incorporated into this report as appropriate.
Appendix III contains the full text of the agency's comments in a
letter dated November 2, 2005.
Officials from the state of Maryland said that they had no comments on
the draft report. California, Michigan, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania officials provided a number of technical comments, which
have been incorporated into the report where appropriate. In addition,
Pennsylvania officials expressed concerns similar to those raised by
EPA relating to the additional burden on states of identifying unknown
abandoned tanks. As noted, we have clarified our recommendation to
address these concerns.
We will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees and to the Administrator of EPA. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3841 or at [Hyperlink, stephensonj@gao.gov]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who contributed
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
John B. Stephenson:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
List of Congressional Requesters:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Rick Santorum:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Arlen Specter:
United States Senate:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Information on the History and Status of Cleanup Activities
at Five Underground Storage Tank Sites:
The following are summaries of the major events surrounding the
discovery and cleanup of contamination from leaking underground storage
tanks at 5 sites: (1) Coca-Cola Enterprises in Yuba County, California;
(2) Henry Fruhling Food Store in Harford County, Maryland; (3) Bob's
Marathon in Grand Ledge, Michigan; (4) R.C. Anderson Trust in Nash
County, North Carolina; and (5) Tranguch Tire Service, Incorporated, in
Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. The summaries include a chronology of
significant site occurrences as well as additional information on the
amount of leaked fuel, the contaminants involved, the impacts of the
leak on the surrounding environment, the costs of remediating the site,
the extent, if any, of EPA involvement in the cleanup, communication
between state agencies and the affected public, and litigation relating
to the site.
Coca-Cola Enterprises, Yuba County, California:
The Coca-Cola distribution warehouse on this site was built around
1970, and was originally used by another business to build mobile home
units. The 5,000 gallon underground storage tank system from which the
leak at the site occurred was reportedly installed on the east side of
the building when the facility was first constructed. The property and
surrounding area are zoned for commercial use. Yuba County Municipal
Airport is located south of the site and a public drinking water supply
well operated by the City of Olivehurst is located about 850 feet east
of where the tank system was formerly located.
Chronology of Key Site Events from the Case Files:
* June 1989-August 1989: Coca-Cola Enterprises had the 5,000 gallon
unleaded gasoline underground storage tank, piping, and dispensing
system excavated and removed. The tank and piping appeared to be in
good condition, but the soil exhibited a slight petroleum odor.
According to the case file, soil samples were collected from beneath
the system during removal, as required by California law. Field
observations and analysis of soil samples determined that gasoline was
present in the soil in concentrations that required remediation. The
Yuba County Office of Emergency Services filed a report of an
unauthorized leak.
* December 1989-May 1990: The site was assessed for contamination,
which included a soil gas survey and the drilling and installation of
borings, groundwater monitoring wells, and vapor extraction test wells.
Groundwater samples were collected as monitoring wells were installed
and an analysis indicated that the groundwater at the site was
contaminated. A municipal drinking water supply well for the City of
Olivehurst was discovered 850 feet east of the tank system's former
location. However, analyses of water samples from that well did not
indicate any contamination. While the contaminant plume extended 120
feet east of the release site, it was confined within the south and
east boundaries of the property.
* May 1990-December 1990: The Yuba County Air Pollution Control Office
authorized the on-site aeration of contaminated soils that had
accumulated during drilling activities. The soil aeration began in June
1990 and was successfully completed in September 1990. A quarterly
groundwater monitoring and sampling program also began in June 1990. In
August, a vapor extraction pilot test was conducted at the site.
Petroleum was found in a monitoring well at the site in September and
about 7.5 gallons of gasoline were removed from the well from September
through November. By December, approximately 0.08 feet of gasoline
remained in the well.
* February 1991-August 1991: The environmental consultant for Coca-Cola
Enterprises submitted its contamination assessment report, which
assessed the extent of vertical and lateral petroleum contamination at
the site during the underground storage tank removal operations. The
consultant also completed a remedial action plan that presented a
conceptual system design for remediating hydrocarbon contamination in
soil and groundwater at the site. The plan proposed an integrated
remediation system incorporating (1) a groundwater pump and treat
system with an air stripper system to remove volatile compounds from
groundwater, (2) a vapor extraction system to remove vapors from
contaminated soils in the unsaturated zone, and (3) a thermal oxidizer
to burn off the vapors. The consultant estimated that remediating the
site would take 3 years, with one additional year for monitoring and
closure. Cleanup oversight was transferred from the Yuba County Office
of Emergency Services to the Regional Board in February 1991, and in
March 1991, the Board approved the contamination assessment report.
* April 1993-September 1998: The recommended remediation system began
operation in April 1993. In August 1996, an oxygen release compound was
installed in three perimeter vapor extraction wells to increase the
dissolved oxygen concentrations in groundwater to enhance the natural
bio-attenuation of petroleum hydrocarbons. The pump and treat system
was operated intermittently until mid-November 1997, when the system
was shut down to prepare for site closure following approval from the
Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board. Groundwater
monitoring and sampling continued on a quarterly basis. In September
1998, the Board approved initiation of closure activities.
* October 1998-Early 2000: Monitoring indicated that the contamination
plume might have migrated southward in late 1999 and early 2000 and
that further remediation and changes in the sampling and analysis
program were warranted. The remediation system was restarted in
December 1999, with upgrades to increase flow rates and optimize
efficiency and was completed in January 2000. The revised sampling and
analysis program was initiated shortly thereafter. A survey to identify
water wells within 2,000 feet of the leak site conducted by the site's
environmental contractor identified 2 municipal wells, with the nearest
approximately 850 feet east of the former tank location. However,
sampling and analysis conducted by the Olivehurst Public Utility
District revealed that the closer of the 2 wells had not been affected
by the contamination plume.
* April 2002-March 2004: Because monitoring and sampling showed no
hydrocarbon concentrations in the groundwater monitoring wells, the
system was again shut down in April 2002. Quarterly groundwater
monitoring after the system was shut down showed that the contamination
plume had stabilized and, in July 2003, the site's owner requested the
Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board's approval to close
the monitoring wells. The wells were abandoned by late December 2003,
and the Board closed the remediation case in March 2004.
* Status as of August 2005: Cleanup was completed.
Summary of Key Information from the Case Files:
* Contaminants and compounds of concern: Gasoline (total petroleum
hydrocarbons as gasoline--TPHG), benzene, toluene, ethyl-benzene,
xylenes (BTEX):
* Size of leak: Unknown.
* Impacts of contamination: Soil and groundwater contamination occurred
at the site but was contained within the property.
* Remediation cost: The California underground storage tank fund spent
$1,202,745 to reimburse site owners/operators for site remediation
costs. Additional amounts that may have been paid by Coca-Cola
Enterprises that were not reimbursed are unknown.
* U.S. Environmental Protection Agency involvement: None.
* Communication between responsible agencies and the public: No
evidence of public meetings appears in the case files.
* Litigation: Case files show no evidence that any lawsuits were filed
relating to this site.
Henry Fruhling Food Store, Harford County, Maryland:
The Henry Fruhling Food Store was a single family dwelling with an
attached small grocery store. The store had two 1,000 gallon
underground storage tanks and distribution systems for gasoline, which
were installed around 1966, and a 500 gallon underground tank and
distribution system for kerosene. Sometime prior to 1966, 2 similar
underground gasoline tanks and distribution systems were located on the
site but were removed by the previous owner.
Chronology of Key Site Events from the Case Files:
* 1970: A nearby resident complained to the owners of the store about
an odor or taste of gasoline in his well water. The tank maintenance
company performed a pressure test on the tanks and distribution systems
but found no leaks.
* June 1980-September 1980: Water samples taken by the Harford County
Health Department in response to another nearby resident's complaints
about gasoline in his well water indicated petroleum contamination.
That resident was warned not to consume water from his well and the
matter was referred to the Maryland Department of Natural Resources
(the predecessor of the Maryland Department of Environment) for action.
That resident also filed a complaint with the department concerning the
presence of oil in his well, which was referred to the Environmental
Health Administration and the Harford County Health Department for
follow-up actions.
* October 1980: One of the store owners was badly burned--and later
died--when gasoline fumes ignited in his basement.
* November 1980: Water samples obtained by the Harford County Health
Department identified gasoline in the store owner's well and the case
was assigned to the Department of Natural Resources for enforcement
action.
* January 1981-February 1981: In mid-January, the Department of Natural
Resources notified the company that had maintained the tanks and pumps
since 1976 of their determination that a pollution violation had
occurred. The Department ordered the company to (1) stop discharging
petroleum products into state waters, (2) test the tightness of the
tanks and supply systems, and (3) initiate actions to recover petroleum
from groundwater at the site. In late January, tightness tests were
performed on both tanks and supply systems and no leaks were found. In
early February, the Department took auger probes at various locations
throughout the Fruhling property and found explosive vapors in the soil
in the vicinity of the tanks and pumps. In a letter dated February 27,
the Department told the owners and the tank maintenance company that
(1) they had achieved substantial compliance with their order and that
no gasoline was then leaking into the groundwater, (2) based on
information they had provided the Department, there was a "strong
probability" that, at some time during the past several years, repairs
had been made to the gasoline pump that may have eliminated a leak in
the system, and (3) the results of the recent boring tests and a survey
of the area indicated "a very low probability" that the gasoline in the
groundwater was coming from any source other than the system at
Fruhling's store. Furthermore, the letter stated that the Department's
only concern was the removal of any recoverable gasoline from the
groundwater at the site.
* July 1981-August 1981: A gasoline recovery and separator system was
installed at the site and well-pumping operations began. The
accumulated effluent from the separation process was sampled by the
Harford County Health Department on a periodic basis and was spread
back on the ground with the knowledge and approval of the County Health
Department. This process continued through January 1988, at which time
a Department of Environment official ordered the owner to stop the
discharge.
* November 1981-December 1981: The Department of Natural Resources
notified both the store owner and the tank maintenance company that
they had satisfactorily removed the gasoline from the well and complied
with their January 1981 order. The Department also advised them that
the remaining unrecoverable gasoline in the groundwater was a pollution
problem that would be referred to the Harford County and state health
departments for appropriate action. Because laboratory results of
samples taken continued to show unacceptable levels of "aromatic
hydrocarbons", the County required the owner to continue well pumping
until the residuals were reduced to an acceptable level.
* May 1983: A nearby resident raised concerns regarding contamination
of his well. Water samples taken over approximately the preceding three
year period showed minimal contamination from petroleum products.
* October 1987-December 1987: Testing indicated that gasoline
contamination was migrating into a new well at the site.
* January 1988: In late January, an official from the Maryland
Department of the Environment (formerly the Department of Natural
Resources) investigated a complaint that effluent runoff from the site
was flowing onto a neighbor's property. The investigating official
informed the store owner that spreading effluent on the ground was no
longer allowed because this process allowed pollution to migrate back
into the soil and groundwater. The owner was issued a site complaint
and was directed to shut down well pumping operations until further
notice. At this point, pumping and effluent discharge on the ground had
gone on for over 6 years and the gasoline separation unit had been
removed and water had been pumped onto the owner's yard for the last 2
years.
* June 1988: The state took over cleanup operations at the site after
the LUST Trust Fund was established in 1988. Well-pumping from the old
well at the store site continued intermittently until mid-1988.
* October 1988: The Maryland Department of the Environment oversaw the
removal of the underground gasoline and kerosene tanks and distribution
systems, which was funded from the LUST Division account. Inspection
revealed no gasoline storage tank perforations, but soil beneath one
gasoline storage tank showed explosive readings. According to a state
official who visited the site in early December 1987, the store owner
stated that the tank maintenance company had pumped the tanks dry prior
to going bankrupt, but she did not recall the exact date.
* January 1989-April 1989: The Maryland Department of the Environment
contracted with an environmental consulting company to perform 2 soil
gas surveys at the site to delineate the extent of subsurface gasoline
vapor contamination. Analysis of the samples revealed the presence of
elevated gasoline vapor levels at the site, with the highest
concentrations detected near the former pump island.
* Late 1989 to early 1990: The state installed charcoal filtration
units on the store owner's water system and that of a nearby neighbor.
* March 1993-November 1993: The Maryland Department of the Environment
retained a consultant to review ongoing remediation activities at the
site and determine the adequacy of activities to control and abate
contamination. The consultant concluded that the contamination plume
appeared to be getting larger and that vapor recovery efforts were
inadequate. In November 1993, the Department had the consultant test a
combined air sparge and soil vapor extraction system.[Footnote 20] Test
results indicated that this system could significantly enhance the
existing recovery system.
* March 1997: The Maryland Department of the Environment continued to
operate the pump-and-treat system at the Fruhling residence. The system
had treated over 2 million gallons of water. The former Fruhling
domestic well, shallow monitoring wells, and deep monitoring wells all
continued to show elevated levels of dissolved gasoline constituents.
As a result, the Department periodically operated a soil venting system
to keep the wells within discharge guidelines. Periodic sampling of the
surrounding residences identified no additional contaminated domestic
wells.
* 1999: The groundwater recovery system at the site was shut down.
* September 2001: The Maryland Department of the Environment maintained
a granular activated carbon treatment system at two residences and
performed quarterly sampling at six residences. Petroleum contamination
was still present at the Fruhling property and MTBE levels were
detected at the residence across the street from the Fruhling property.
Dissolved petroleum contamination levels had decreased at all sampling
locations.
* Status as of August 2005: The site recovery system remained on site,
but was turned off. The site was being monitored in operation and
maintenance status, with sampling performed every three months. No
significant contamination had been detected in the residential wells
from which samples had been taken since July 2001. However, well-
monitoring still showed some signs of low-level contamination.
Summary of Key Information from the Case Files:
* Contaminants and compounds of concern: Benzene, toluene, ethyl
benzene, total xylenes, and MTBE.
* Size of leak: Unknown;
Very little liquid product (gasoline) was recovered.
* Impacts of contamination: One death occurred from a leak-related
explosion and fire. Groundwater and residential drinking water wells
were contaminated with petroleum products. Real estate development and
sales were impeded. Residents were granted a reduction in property
taxes.
* Remediation cost: Maryland spent about $708,595 in state funds to
remediate the site. Prior amounts that might have been spent by the
company that installed the tanks and the store owner are not included.
* U.S. Environmental Protection Agency involvement: None.
* Communication between responsible agencies and the public: In
December 1989, officials of the Maryland Department of the Environment
met with affected parties to discuss contamination at the Fruhling
site. In May 1990, the Department held a follow-up public meeting to
present the results of its initial investigation of the groundwater
contamination.
* Litigation: In late July 1981, one of the affected residents filed a
lawsuit against the company that installed the tanks on the site, the
tank maintenance company, and the store owner. Consequently, the tank
maintenance company's insurer retained a consulting company to
investigate the alleged contamination of groundwater by the producer's
petroleum products. In May 1982, the consultant for the insurance
company concluded that the products of the oil company represented by
both the tank installer and the tank maintenance company were not
responsible for the groundwater contamination in the affected
resident's well. In March 1988, the lawsuit was settled out of court
for $25,000, with the defendants expressly denying liability. Prior to
the settlement, the insurance company for the store owner settled with
the affected resident for $7,500.
In 1990, the owner's insurance company denied responsibility for any
claim under the owner's policy. Nevertheless, in early 1991, the state
of Maryland sued the owner to recover cleanup costs.
In October 1990, a neighbor in the area of the site sued various
parties involved in the purchase of his property, including the real
estate company, the real estate agent, and the former owners of his
house for not disclosing the groundwater contamination at the time of
purchase.
Bob's Marathon, Grand Ledge, Michigan:
Bob's Marathon is a gasoline service station and automobile repair shop
bordered by mixed-use commercial and residential properties in the city
of Grand Ledge, Michigan. Two reported releases occurred at the
facility and the released gasoline migrated toward a municipal water
supply well located directly down-gradient and very close (approximate
800 feet) to the site. MTBE, benzene, and other gasoline components
from this spill potentially impacted the city's water supply for about
8,300 people.
Chronology of Key Site Events from the Case Files:
* April 1986: Bob's Marathon registered all three of its underground
storage tanks with the state.
* December 1991-February 1992: Two of the three tanks failed their
tightness tests. One of the owners reported to the Michigan State
Police Fire Marshall Division that she had discovered a leak during a
routine tank gauging inventory check. The leak involved the loss of
approximately 4,500 gallons of gasoline from a 6,000 gallon tank. An
environmental consultant retained by the owners sent the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) the required 20-day report of
initial abatement measures and installed eleven monitoring wells at the
site in December. The monitoring wells were used to determine the
directional flow of groundwater at the site and intercept the gasoline
plume. In January, the consultant installed a product skimming system
in six monitoring wells and a passive recovery system in three wells
that reportedly contained product sheen on the water table and
additional monitoring wells. Also in January, the consultant submitted
a site investigation work plan, site characterization report, free
product removal report, and interim corrective action plan to MDNR.
MDNR concluded that the interim corrective action plan was unacceptable
and provided the consultant with a list of concerns in a deficiency
letter. The environmental consultant estimated that, by late February,
280,300 gallons of contaminated groundwater and 1,200 gallons of
gasoline were removed by the skimming system.
* March 1992: Because the consultant's response to the MDNR deficiency
letter was not adequate, MDNR did not approve the work plan. The
consultant then recommended that a second consulting firm with a
greater capacity to more cost-effectively manage long-term projects
take over the work at the site. The new consultant submitted an interim
corrective action plan and a site investigation work plan to MDNR for
approval. MDNR approved the second consultant's interim corrective
action plan. In an interoffice communication, a MDNR official
recommended that the first consultant be denied payment for work
conducted at the site and that MDNR consider the consultant a
potentially responsible party because of its failure to take timely
action to abate the situation at the site. Three new underground
storage tanks were installed on the west side of the service station
building--two 6,000 gallon tanks and one 15,000 gallon tank.
Approximately 400 cubic yards of soil were removed and disposed of
during excavation for these tanks.
* April 1992: MDNR tentatively approved the site investigation work
plan. The groundwater remediation system began operating.
* June 1992: An MDNR official stated that the department approved an
interim groundwater treatment system at the site because of the close
proximity of municipal wells and that this action was necessary because
of the first consultant's failure to take timely action to abate the
spread of the contamination.
* January 1993: The company operating the groundwater treatment system
decided to no longer operate and maintain it because of uncertainty
regarding reimbursement from the Michigan Underground Storage Tank
Financial Assurance program for future work.
* February 1993: The site owner replaced the second consultant with a
third after a dispute over the need to purchase the remediation
equipment and other issues. This third environmental consultant made
modifications to the existing groundwater treatment system.
* May 1993: MDNR informed the owners of Bob's Marathon that they had
failed to define the full nature and extent of the groundwater
contamination. While the groundwater plume was advancing toward the
Grand Ledge municipal well field, the leading edge of the plume had not
yet been defined. Furthermore, MDNR said that the groundwater system
was ineffective and the contamination plume continued to migrate,
impacting additional groundwater. As a result, MDNR requested that the
owners provide all information on the releases and investigations of
the releases including all soil and groundwater response actions and
investigations. MDNR conditionally approved the amended third
consultant's site investigation work plan. Approximately $850,000 of
state financial assurance program funding had been spent at the site.
* June 1993: An oil/water separator was added to the groundwater
treatment system.
* July 1993-August 1993: The site's third environmental consultant
informed MDNR that, due to delays in payment from the state financial
assurance program, it was unable to continue site investigation
activities at the site. In light of this development, MDNR reminded the
site owners of their obligation to conduct all appropriate corrective
actions to remedy the environmental problems caused by the release of
contamination at the site including eliminating any impacts to the
Grand Ledge municipal well field. The owners' attorney informed MDNR
that the owners were unable to proceed with site investigation and
remediation activities without the assurance of funding. In response,
MDNR said that if all current claims were approved and paid by the
state financial assurance program, the one million dollar limit for
reimbursement under the program would have been reached at the site and
the owners would be responsible for financing the remaining corrective
actions including a final remedy. The Michigan Department of Public
Health notified the city of Grand Ledge of MTBE contamination of a
municipal water supply well.
* October 1993: MDNR notified the owners that the site would be listed
in the "Proposed List of Michigan Sites of Contamination" for fiscal
year 1995.
* November 1993: A second leak of 400 to 800 gallons of gasoline was
discovered and reported to the Michigan State Police.
* December 1993: According to the third consultant's initial abatement
report, the second leak was discovered by the owner/operator when he
noticed a strong petroleum odor in the site treatment building. When he
opened the cover of equipment used as part of the cleanup system, he
observed approximately one foot of gasoline. The owner then inspected
the underground storage tank system and found a mixture of water and
gasoline in the area of one tank, due to a pin-hole leak in a gasoline
supply line. The leak detection equipment installed on the system--that
should have detected the leak, sounded an alarm, and automatically shut
off the system--was not functioning. The tank system was taken out of
service until the perforated line could be replaced.
* January 1994: The groundwater treatment building was damaged by fire.
According to the fourth consultant's investigation report, the owner
had discovered gasoline in the equipment and a fire started, damaging
the equipment, before he could remove it. (As of June 2005, the
equipment had not been restored to service).
* March 1994: MDNR advised the owners of their responsibility to repair
the fire damaged system and conduct hydrogeological studies related to
both leaks at the site. The owners responded that they could not
continue the remediation work required to clean up the site and they
terminated the services of the consultant at the site. MDNR assumed
control of the investigation and cleanup of the leak at the site.
* April 1994: MDNR obtained emergency funds to complete the groundwater
investigation and develop a corrective action plan. MDNR hired a
consultant to update and collect additional information for the site
with the overall goal of protecting the Grand Ledge municipal water
supply from contamination originating from the site.
* December 1994: The city of Grand Ledge expressed concern that levels
of benzene in a municipal well continued to increase, indicating
continuing migration of contamination. The city asked MDNR for
monitoring well test results and a report on the current status of the
remediation by the end of the month.
* February 1995: The mayor of Grand Ledge asked a state representative
to intercede with state agencies to facilitate the issuance of all
permits and release of state funds needed to allow the design and
construction of soil vapor extraction and groundwater extraction and
treatment systems to proceed immediately.
* July 1995: Grand Ledge allowed access to the city well field to
construct and maintain a water treatment system for the contaminated
municipal well and a groundwater blocking well.
* December 1995: The system to treat well water contaminated with
volatile organic compounds began operating and a barrier well was
installed to prevent the plume from continuing to reach the municipal
well.
* Status as of August 2005: Treatment facilities were operating and
cleanup was ongoing. Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
officials told us that the air sparge and soil vapor extraction systems
were recently turned off to conduct performance monitoring but carbon
treatment of the impacted municipal well was ongoing. According to
these officials, they expected to complete site cleanup between 2007
and 2010.
Summary of Key Information from the Case Files:
* Contaminants and compounds of concern: Benzene, toluene, ethyl
benzene, xylenes, and MTBE.
* Size of leak: The first release was approximately 4,500 gallons of
gasoline; a second release was 400 to 800 gallons of gasoline.
* Impacts of contamination: The leak impacted the water supply for the
city of Grand Ledge and the city had to provide potable water to about
8,300 residents.
* Remediation cost: As of about March 2005, approximately $2,150,000
had been spent to clean up contamination from the site. Approximately
$950,000 of this amount came from the Michigan Underground Storage
Financial Assistance Fund to reimburse costs incurred by the owner
prior to the state taking over site remediation. According to Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality officials, continuing efforts to
clean up the site through 2007 to 2010 will involve additional costs of
up to approximately $500,000.
* U.S. Environmental Protection Agency involvement: None.
* Communication between responsible agencies and the public: None
identified.
* Litigation: A number of lawsuits have been filed relating to the leak
at Bob's Marathon, according to Michigan environmental officials. An
apartment complex east of Bob's Marathon filed a lawsuit against the
facility's owners. In addition, the owners are involved in litigation
with the first two consultants and have filed a lawsuit against the
facility's gasoline supplier, which is, in turn, suing the manufacturer
of the hose that caused the site's second leak.
R.C. Anderson Trust, Nash County, North Carolina:
The R.C. Anderson Trust site was owned by R.C. Anderson from 1949 to
his death in 1984, when the property was passed on to his heirs and was
managed as a trust by a bank. Three businesses were located on the
site--a gasoline station (abandoned), a tractor dealership
(subsequently a furniture store), and an automobile repair garage.
Contamination was first reported to the North Carolina Department of
Environment, Health, and Natural Resources (DEHNR) in July 1992, during
removal and closure of the underground and above ground storage tanks
and excavation of the soil around the tanks and pump island. Land uses
in the vicinity are commercial, agricultural, and single family
residential.
Chronology of Key Site Events from the Case Files:
* July 1992-September 1992: In July 1992, three underground gasoline
storage tanks and one above ground diesel tank were removed. Evidence
of a gasoline release from a 3,000 gallon tank was discovered and
reported to DEHNR. An August 1992 closure report also concluded that
there was "high potential" of petroleum contamination on-site.
Accordingly, in September 1992, DEHNR notified the bank that was acting
as trustee for the R.C. Anderson property, that it was in violation of
pollution control rules and regulations and must take action to comply
with corrective action rules.
* December 1992: The environmental consulting company completed a
Comprehensive Site Assessment/Corrective Action Plan to assess the
surrounding conditions and risks to area populations from the remaining
contamination at the site. This report was filed to satisfy the
requirements of the North Carolina law pertaining to investigations for
soil and water cleanup.
* May 1993: DEHNR reviewed the Comprehensive Site Assessment report,
determined it to be inadequate and required the bank to submit (1) a
more complete report which adequately identified the full vertical and
horizontal extent of the contamination plume(s) and (2) a corrective
action plan. Both reports were to be submitted by July 15, 1993.
* October 1993: The environmental consultant resubmitted the
Comprehensive Site Assessment report to DEHNR for review. The report
identified several sources of pollution affecting soils and groundwater
at the site. One was a 3,000 gallon underground storage tank that had
two large rust holes. Another source was the fuel pump island where
stained soil was found when it was removed. In addition, the soil below
the 10,000 gallon above ground storage tank (which had held diesel oil)
was stained at the fill area from apparent spills during filling
operations. The above ground tank itself, however, showed no evidence
of leaks. Last, used motor oil was drained onto the ground near the
gasoline station building when it was being used as a truck repair
center. The area surrounding the site was surveyed for water wells,
public water supply intakes, and off-site monitoring wells for
potential receptors and migration pathways. Sixteen private water
supply wells and another 32 "suspected" water wells were observed
within a 1,500 feet radius of the site. There were no public water
supply intakes identified within one-half mile of the site and no off-
site monitoring wells were found within 1,000 feet of the site.
* November-December 1993: Excavation and treatment began in 1993. A
smaller (530 gallon) underground gasoline storage tank was discovered
during excavation of contaminated soil and removed. While the tank was
located in an already contaminated area of the site and was rusted, it
showed no sign of leaks, according to the consultant. A closure report
on this tank dated the end of December was filed with the Raleigh
Office of DEHNR.
* January-December 1994: A second round of soil excavation with on-site
bioremediation procedures was performed in 1994. In early March, the
environmental consultant completed a Corrective Action Plan that
included the excavation and treatment of contaminated soils and an air
sparging and pump and treat facility for groundwater remediation. Under
the plan (1) soil treatment was to be completed by August 1994; (2) a
groundwater treatment system was to be installed by January 1995, and
operated for 5 to 15 years; and (3) system shut-down and project
completion dates would be based upon monitoring test results and state
approvals. In late March, DEHNR approved the Comprehensive Site
Assessment. In July, the Raleigh Office of DEHNR issued a soil
contaminant and treatment permit. During 1994, soil excavation and on-
site bioremediation procedures were performed on approximately 6,400
tons of contaminated soil at the site. An estimated total of 11,792
tons of soil were excavated and treated on-site:
* January-December 1995: Following completion of the soil treatment,
the environmental consultant monitored groundwater quality at the site
and reported results on an approximate quarterly basis. The samples
taken in October continue to show groundwater contamination. The
contamination plume was estimated at approximately 230 feet by 210 feet
and expected to migrate slowly to the northeast. The reports continued
to recommend the design and installation of a groundwater remediation
system to remove the contamination present.
* January 1996-January 2003: Groundwater monitoring continued on a semi-
annual basis. In 1996, North Carolina enacted a law temporarily
suspending remediation work for low-priority underground storage tank
release sites. The R.C. Anderson Trust site was initially given a low-
priority ranking and, therefore, remediation work at the site stopped.
However, primarily because of the site's threat to uncontaminated
private domestic water supply wells, its ranking was changed to high
priority in July 1997 and remediation activities resumed. The
Containment and Treatment of Contaminated Soil permit originally issued
In July 1994 by the Raleigh Office of DEHNR was renewed in 1998. A
groundwater remediation system using pump and treat with air sparge
technologies was installed and began operation in late May 2002.
Groundwater at the site was sampled 10 times through January 2003.
According to the consultant's Groundwater Monitoring Report dated
September 12, 2003, as of January 2003, benzene, lead, MTBE, and 1,2-
dichloroethane were still present at on-and off-site monitoring wells
in concentrations above North Carolina groundwater quality standards.
However, according to DEHNR officials, benzene was not detected in any
off-site monitoring well during that monitoring event and lead was
detected in an off-site monitoring well but not above the NC
groundwater standards.
* Status as of August 2005: According to state officials, North
Carolina State Session Law 2004-124 suspended further work on most high
risk sites due to constrained state funds. As a result, the state is
now prioritizing sites based on relative risk and directing work only
to emergency releases and those releases that pose the highest risks
that can be funded with available resources. Initial treatment work was
completed at the Anderson Trust site and the recovery system remains on-
site but is currently shut down.
Summary of Key Information from the Case Files:
* Contaminants and compounds of concern: Benzene, toluene, ethyl
benzene, xylenes, MTBE, Naphthalene, and lead.
* Size of leak: Unknown.
* Impact of contamination: One residential drinking water well adjacent
to the site was contaminated and abandoned. A potential threat of
contamination exists for 17 additional residential wells within 1,500
feet of the site.
* Remediation cost: According to state officials, the North Carolina
Commercial Fund has reimbursed the owner (including consultants) for
$943,407.93 of reasonable and necessary expenses performed to remediate
the site. In addition, total reimbursable expenses to complete cleanup
and close the site are estimated by these officials at $1.1 million.
However, this estimate does not include deductible amounts and other
expenses not approved by the fund or otherwise deemed ineligible for
reimbursement, such as contamination from the above ground tank or used
motor oil paid by the R.C. Anderson Trust.
* U.S. Environmental Protection Agency involvement: None.
* Communication between responsible agencies and the public: No
evidence of formal public meetings was identified.
* Litigation: No information on lawsuits was found in the case files.
Tranguch Tire Service, Inc., Luzerne County, Pennsylvania:
The Tranguch site was a gasoline and tire retreading service station in
a mixed commercial and residential area of northeastern Pennsylvania
that was abandoned in 1995. Several operating gasoline service stations
as well as numerous abandoned or removed underground storage tank
systems lie within the vicinity of the site. A residential
neighborhood, part of which is built over an abandoned coal mine,
surrounds the site. While it is unknown exactly when the underground
storage tanks at the site began to leak, residents' complaints of
gasoline odors in their homes suggest that leaks may have begun
sometime in the late 1980s to early 1990s. By 1993, the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources (PADER) determined that gasoline
vapors from the sewer system were affecting homes. Although PADER found
contamination at four other facilities in the vicinity of the Tranguch
site, the department determined that the Tranguch facility was
primarily responsible for the leak impacting the residential area. EPA
estimated that the facility had released an estimated 25,000 to 50,000
gallons of gasoline. The resulting gasoline plume contaminated soil and
groundwater, and spread generally northeastward through the adjoining
community to encompass about a 70-acre area, including 11 businesses,
two doctor's offices, two churches, two parks, 26 vacant lots, and 359
residential properties and impacted the lives of up to a reported 1,500
neighborhood residents.
Chronology of Key Site Events from the Case Files:
* Prior to 1990: Neighborhood residents near the Tranguch facility had
complained of an odor from the facility that smelled like automobile or
truck emissions as early as August 1976. However, an investigation
conducted at the Tranguch facility at that time did not reveal any
problems. Case files do not contain any additional complaints about
this site until February 1990.
* February 1990-April 1993: Over the three-year period, PADER
investigated complaints of gasoline or other odors in residences in the
area of the Tranguch facility, including one home on three separate
occasions. In March 1993, a local Department of Public Safety
environmental protection specialist performed an investigation at this
residence and verified the presence of strong gasoline odors. Because
of the saturated condition of the soil, he was able to trace gasoline
residue to a nearby abandoned underground storage tank facility. The
environmental specialist referred the matter to PADER for follow-up. In
April 1993, PADER took a water sample from the basement sump of this
residence that tested positive for the presence of gasoline, and began
efforts to determine whether nearby underground gasoline storage tanks
were the source of the contamination. Out of eleven commercial
locations in the vicinity, PADER identified four operating facilities-
-including the Tranguch facility--and one abandoned underground storage
tank facility as potential contamination sources.
* May 1993-June 1993: PADER directed the owner of the abandoned
facility to register and either properly close (remove) or upgrade the
tanks at that site. At this time, PADER also asked the owners of the
Tranguch facility and the other two operating facilities to either
provide the department with proof that their tanks passed tank
tightness tests or conduct the tests.[Footnote 21] The abandoned site
owner notified PADER that he intended to close the site and PADER
directed him to submit and implement a site characterization plan.
Because none of the three operating facilities responded to the PADER
request, it asked for this information a second time.
* July 1993: The owner of one of the three operating facilities
submitted a report to PADER showing that, in June 1993, tanks at the
site had passed a tightness test. However, PADER discovered that the
owner had installed this facility's current tanks in 1991 to replace
older tanks and, at that time, 1,042 tons of fuel-contaminated soil had
been removed from the site. The older unregistered tanks remained in
operation until they were replaced in 1991. The owner filed a closure
report for these tanks in October 1993. PADER documentation indicates
that the report lacked some of the required sampling and soil analysis
information.
Also in July 1993, the owner of another of the three operating
facilities admitted to having had an unreported release in April 1993.
Tanks at this site were subsequently removed. Three of these tanks had
never been registered. Soil contamination was evident during
excavation, and during the removal process an abandoned heating oil
underground storage tank was also discovered at the site. Also, when
the owner of the facility removed his tanks, PADER observed
contamination at the site and the owner arranged for a site
investigation/characterization.
* August 1993: PADER requested a third time that the owner of the
Tranguch facility provide tank tightness test information and submit
and implement site assessment and remedial action plans. PADER surveyed
leak detection methods used at the Tranguch site and the owner stated
that the facility was performing these methods. These methods were
required to be performed under the state's applicable rules and
regulations in force at that time. PADER also requested that the owners
of the other two operating facilities and the abandoned facility submit
and implement site assessment and remedial action plans.
* September 1993: The owner of the Tranguch facility submitted
information to PADER indicating that tanks at the site had passed a
tightness test. PADER again requested that the Tranguch owner perform a
site characterization and report the results to the department within
14 days. Also, the local fire department received two additional
complaints of gasoline-like fumes in area residences. PADER Emergency
Response Program personnel also began regularly monitoring vapor levels
in area homes.
* October-November 1993: Beginning in October, the PADER Emergency
Response Program started to install interim remedial systems designed
to prevent gasoline vapors from entering affected homes and, by mid-May
1994, had installed thirteen.[Footnote 22] Also in October, PADER
identified a fourth operating facility as a potential contributor to
the area's contamination and asked the owner of that facility to
perform a site characterization. Through late November 1993, the owner
of this fourth facility took no action in this regard, but requested to
review any PADER documentation indicating that this facility had
contributed to pollution in the area, as well as files regarding the
other facilities in the area. Although PADER arranged for access to
these files, the owner never reviewed them.
PADER confirmed the presence of gasoline-like fumes in six area
residences and arranged to have a preliminary subsurface investigation
performed on the area impacted by the contamination. The investigation
revealed that gasoline had contaminated the groundwater at several
locations down-slope from the Tranguch site and that gasoline
contamination had spread to the neighborhood sewer system. The gasoline
contamination was also found to stop up-slope of the location of the
Tranguch tanks, within the property boundary. PADER officials,
representatives of the city of Hazleton, and the city fire chief met
with the owner of the Tranguch site and requested that he immediately
remove all gasoline from his tanks. The following day, the owner
informed PADER that he had discovered that 375 gallons of gasoline had
been lost from his tanks early in November. The owner admitted to PADER
officials that--contrary to what he had told PADER in August 1993--he
had just started to comply with the required leak detection methods the
previous day. Accordingly, PADER issued a second compliance order to
the Tranguch site owner, requiring him to, within 24 hours, remove all
gasoline from the underground storage tanks on-site, begin cleaning up
the leaked gasoline, and take steps to monitor and mitigate vapors in
area homes. Although the owner appealed this order, he had his tanks
and lines drained and began monitoring wells to recover gasoline.
Furthermore, although the Tranguch site owner made inquiries regarding
homes impacted by vapors, he took no action to monitor or mitigate
vapors in area homes.
City personnel began venting the neighborhood sewer system.
* December 1993-February 1994: PADER held a public meeting with area
residents, city and township representatives, and state legislators
regarding the spill. School district officials, city and township
representatives, and a state legislator were also contacted during
subsequent site activities.
In December, PADER issued a compliance order to the owner of the fourth
operating facility suspected of contributing to the contamination. The
order required a complete site investigation, including tank system
tightness testing, a review of leak detection and inventory records,
and sub-surface sampling and analysis of soil and groundwater at the
site. The owner's attorney responded with a letter stating his client's
intent to appeal the order, and included attachments with information
in defense of his decision. From the information presented in the
attachments, PADER determined that the owner had not employed any type
of automatic leak detection devices on the two underground gasoline
storage tanks installed at his site in 1962, and that he might not have
complied with applicable federal and state leak detection
regulations.[Footnote 23] In January 1994, the legal counsel for PADER
informed the owner that the information he had submitted was incomplete
and did not satisfy the compliance order's requirements. Later in
January, the owner formally appealed the December compliance order.
PADER documents indicate that problems with gasoline-like vapors
entering neighborhood homes and commercial establishments grew
progressively worse through the end of 1993 and, by early 1994, 28
residences and 1 commercial building had been impacted. The Hazleton
City Health Officer determined that a neighborhood home was unfit for
human habitation and the owner temporarily relocated because of the
presence of potentially harmful gasoline vapors and the explosion
potential from the collected gasoline vapors in the basement of his
home. (This homeowner had previously reported gasoline-like odors in
his residence in February 1990, March 1992, August 1992, and March
1993).
In January 1994, all product recovery efforts at the Tranguch site
ceased because of the owner's failure to pay his environmental
consultant, but resumed after he was able to secure a loan.
* March-April 1994: Local residents formed an organization called the
Group Against Gas (GAG) at about this time and announced plans for a
class action lawsuit against parties responsible for the contamination.
PADER received from the owner's consultant a proposed Tranguch site
characterization plan that included monitoring well locations. Upon
review, PADER requested that the consultant perform additional site
characterization work, including the installation of additional
monitoring wells. Also, PADER notified the owner of the fourth
operating facility of a June 1994 hearing date and the owner wrote to
his state senator in an unsuccessful attempt to stay the PADER
compliance order.
* May-August 1994: In May, PADER held a second public meeting with area
residents, city and township representatives, and state legislators
regarding the spill. Also in May, to avoid compliance proceedings, the
owner of the fourth operating facility conducted a site investigation
and found gasoline in the groundwater near his underground storage tank
systems. He withdrew his appeal of the compliance order, voluntarily
removed all fuel from his underground gasoline storage tank systems,
and sent a summary report of the investigation to PADER. In August,
this owner notified PADER of his intent to conduct and complete a site
characterization by the end of September 1994.
An August court order required the Tranguch facility owner to take
interim remedial actions to recover leaked fuel, monitor and mitigate
vapors in area homes, and complete and report on site characterization
by mid-October 1994.
PADER obtained funds from the state Leaking Underground Storage Tank
fund to conduct an extensive characterization study of the impacted
area.
* February 1995-September 1995: The owner had all six tanks at the
Tranguch facility removed. Tanks were found to be perforated with "fist-
sized holes," and gasoline contamination was evident at the site. The
owner of the Tranguch facility declared bankruptcy. In addition, in
May, the owner of the fourth operating facility had two tanks removed.
Both tanks were found to be deeply pitted and the fill end of one tank
had pinholes and corrosion that extended through the steel. Evidence of
gasoline contamination was observed during the excavation.
* November 1995-December 1995: The Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection (PADEP, formerly PADER) issued another
compliance order to the owner of the Tranguch facility, who again
appealed it.
* March-July 1996: PADEP's environmental consultant issued a report on,
among other things, the sources of contamination in the area. While the
consultant found contamination at all 5 of the sites, it found that the
Tranguch facility was primarily responsible for the leak impacting the
residential area. According to the consultant's report, the
contamination at the other four facilities did not significantly
contribute to the contamination plume that was affecting the area
residences.
Although PADEP continued to monitor conditions in the area, it no
longer had the funds necessary to mitigate the contamination threat.
Therefore, PADEP asked EPA to lead the remediation of the Tranguch site
and the impacted area. EPA took over as lead agency for the site, while
PADEP continued to work with EPA by providing technical support.
EPA entered into an Interagency Agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) for contracting services for the site. The first
phase of a two-phase remedial action plan developed for the site,
included soil vapor extraction of the source area and passive oil
skimmers for collection of petroleum products.
* August-October 1996: EPA confirmed PADEP's findings regarding the
contamination plume. The EPA On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) determined that
(1) gasoline contamination at the Tranguch site impacted surface
waterways as well as groundwater at the site, (2) site conditions met
or exceeded removal criteria described in the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), and (3) the site
posed an imminent and substantial threat to the public health of
residents in the area of the plume because of the threat of fire,
explosion, and direct inhalation of benzene. The OSC estimated that
over 900,000 gallons of gasoline leaked from the tanks. EPA requested
remediation funds under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and received an
initial $180,000 to begin removal actions, including installation and
maintenance of two underflow dams on Black Creek to reduce the gasoline
contamination which was entering the creek.[Footnote 24]
EPA sampled and tested air quality in 53 of 362 homes in the area. The
gasoline vapors detected in 52 of the 53 homes were below EPA's benzene
action level of 21.5 mg/m3(micrograms per cubic meter). (The state
action level at that time was 32 mg/m3). The 53rRDome while above 21.5
mg/m3 was below 32 mg/m3. In addition, not all of the 52 homes had
elevated benzene levels. Furthermore, in the residence where benzene
level was detected above EPA's action level, EPA's contractor had
observed open cans of paint, stains, and glue to which they attributed
these elevated levels. On this basis, EPA determined that remediation
of these homes was not needed.
In addition, EPA sent the owners of several facilities identified as
"potentially responsible parties"--including the Tranguch facility--a
"Legal Notice to Suspected Discharger" requesting remedial action.
* January-February 1997: A passive basement air filtration system in a
home was changed to an active system because of a health threat.
* October 1997: EPA received approval to discharge treated groundwater
from the Tranguch site remediation plant into the Hazelton sewer
system.
* November-December 1999: USACE constructed a soil vapor extraction
system on the Tranguch site.
EPA identified the Tranguch facility and three other businesses as
parties responsible for the contamination based on a USACE groundwater
flow model developed to predict the flow of spilled gasoline. According
to the model, while much of the spilled material would have come from
the Tranguch facility, some material from three other operating
facilities would have mingled with the plume from the Tranguch leak and
subsequently be transported to Black Creek. Furthermore, for part of
the year, spilled material from one of the operating facilities would
flow directly to the creek. However, EPA's Region 3 General Counsel
recommended that the agency not issue removal enforcement orders to
these parties because it considered them to be "de minimis" (small
volume) contributors to the contamination. In addition, since the
Tranguch facility was in bankruptcy, EPA believed that Tranguch would
not be able to comply with the order and, therefore, did not issue one.
Consequently, Oil Pollution Act funds continued to be used to clean up
the site.
* February 2000-September 2000: The Pennsylvania Department of Health,
concerned over air sample results, asked EPA to install ventilation and
continue testing air quality in 9 homes. EPA began installing sewer
vents at homes.
EPA, USACE, state agencies and a state Representative held public
meetings with area residents in July and August to discuss what
corrective actions EPA would take at the Tranguch facility. An
additional 72 residents (32 in July and 40 in August) requested
sampling of the air in their homes.
* October 2000: A public meeting was held to discuss site sampling,
health issues, and site history for the Tranguch site and affected
area. Officials from the (1) Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR), (2) PADEP, (3) Pennsylvania Department of Health, (4)
U.S. Coast Guard, (5) USACE, and (6) EPA were present, among others.
More than 150 Tranguch area residents were also present. The USACE
official stated that the site was complex because of the existence of
an underground coal mine. During the meeting, residents voiced concerns
about health and property values, ATSDR stated that long-term exposure
to benzene (a gasoline component) had been connected to cases of
leukemia, and officials agreed to look into the impacts of the
contamination on property values in the area and the EPA representative
noted that potential buyers of homes in the immediate area had to be
informed about the contamination. Also, based on leak data from
Tranguch's tank tightness tests, he stated that 50,000 gallons or less
of gasoline had leaked at the Tranguch site rather than the 900,000
gallons originally estimated.
* December 2000: The EPA Office of Inspector General received a hotline
complaint alleging EPA mismanagement of the Tranguch site cleanup.
* January 2001: Throughout Pennsylvania, the action level for benzene
is 32 mg/m3. However, according to EPA Region 3 officials, citing
concerns over the limited information on the extent of the
contamination, PADOH set a more conservative level for the Tranguch
site of "non-detect". In response, EPA identified 8.3 mg/m3 as a
reliable detection limit for benzene. After consultation with ATSDR,
PADOH accepted this site-specific benzene level as being protective of
human health.
In an interview with a local newspaper, a GAG representative said that
she hoped homeowners living within the affected area would be "bought
out". A city councilman proposed several resolutions for area
residents, including a resolution to reduce temporarily the real estate
assessments of affected homes to zero, relieving the affected
homeowners from property tax payments.
* February 2001: State and local elected officials held a public
meeting to update residents affected by the Tranguch leak. According to
a newspaper article, a local councilman told those in attendance that
they had no alternative but to leave the area and that they should
force federal officials to buy their properties and move them out of
the area.
The Hazle Township Supervisors commissioned a University of Pittsburgh
health study using Township funds.
EPA continued to sample air in area homes and, as of February 2001, had
sampled 308 of approximately 350 homes within the contaminated area.
Luzerne County Commissioners adopted a resolution urging the Board of
Assessment Appeals to eliminate property taxes for two years for
properties determined by the federal government and appropriate
agencies to be eligible for relief.
According to a local newspaper article, one of the state's U.S.
senators wrote to the EPA Administrator and asked the agency to buy the
homes of the area's residents and the other U.S. Senator agreed to meet
with the Administrator about the spill.
* March 2001: EPA implemented weekly "Unified Command" meetings to keep
all interested parties up to date and to provide EPA an opportunity to
address issues and/or questions any of the attending representatives
might have. While the primary members of these meetings were federal,
state, and local officials, representatives from the Group Against Gas
participated in the meetings as ex officio members.
EPA requested and received an additional $11,500,000 in funding from
the U.S. Coast Guard to install groundwater collection and soil gas
extraction systems, as well as groundwater and soil gas treatment
systems. This funding brought the Tranguch site cleanup ceiling to
$25,698,188.
The mayor of Hazelton, Pennsylvania declared the area affected by the
Tranguch leak a local disaster emergency and Luzerne County
Commissioners declared the area in a state of emergency. In addition,
the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency was asked to determine if
the area met criteria for being declared a disaster area.
* April 2001: On behalf of EPA, the USACE completed a remediation plan
for the area sewer system and began work on a groundwater collection
system, a soil vapor extraction/biovent system, and new storm and
sanitary sewer lines.
A public meeting was held with affected Tranguch site residents.
Officials from EPA, ATSDR, Pennsylvania Department of Health, and PADEP
attended the meeting.
A state elected official introduced a resolution in the state House of
Representatives to declare the affected area a national disaster area
and to purchase the homes of citizens within the affected area. The
resolution was unanimously approved.
In a letter to the Governor of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency (PEMA) stated that the impacted area did not meet the
eligibility criteria to obtain disaster assistance from the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). PEMA recommended that the Governor
not certify that a major disaster or emergency existed in order to
request assistance from FEMA. Further, PEMA determined that the hazard-
mitigation funding needed to "buy-out" (purchase the homes of) affected
residents would be inadequate, based on eligible costs, to address this
situation. Based on PEMA's review, the governor denied a state buy-out
for residents.
* May 2001: The local board of supervisors again declared a state of
emergency for the area affected by the leak and granted property tax
relief for the affected property owners.
PADEP approved EPA's permit to discharge treated contaminated
groundwater into Black Creek. However, some residents questioned EPA's
remediation strategy. EPA and city, township, and school district
attorneys met concerning Tranguch site cleanup.
The Pennsylvania Department of Health began conducting a health study
of area residents impacted by the leak.
* June 2001: An environmental consulting company retained by EPA
completed a report on subsurface airflow modeling for the soil vapor
extraction/biovent system.
EPA saw to the installation of 288 sewer vents in area homes and
allowed residents to use a suite and hotel amenities, such as the pool,
at a local lodge to get away from the site construction noise.
* August 2001: EPA's Inspector General reported that (1) EPA managed
the cleanup of contamination from the Tranguch leak adequately, but the
agency could have better communicated with the local community and the
Pennsylvania Department of Health; (2) a federal buyout was not
warranted and that residents' desire for a buy-out was based on an
inaccurate perception of the threat posed by the leak; and (3) about
$2.8 million in remediation costs might not have been warranted.
The University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health completed
a "Preliminary Findings" report that examined whether Hazle Township
residents were at increased risk for cancer compared to that of Luzerne
County residents and residents of Pennsylvania as a whole.[Footnote 25]
The authors of the study stated that "these findings suggest that the
incidence of leukemia and prostate cancer in the Hazle Township is
increased compared to Luzerne County and the state of Pennsylvania".
While prostate cancer has been linked to such factors as age, race,
family history and high intake of dietary fat, research literature has
linked leukemia--in particular, acute myelogenous leukemia--to benzene
exposure. However, the study authors could not definitively identify
the gasoline leak as the source of the excess leukemia.
* December 2001: EPA completed replacement/repair of the sewer lines in
and around the plume of contamination. PADOH issued its health study
report, which provided its recommendations for determining when indoor
air monitoring would no longer be necessary. In effect, it reset the
site-specific action level for benzene of 8.3 mg/m3 back to the
statewide action level of 32mg/m3.
* January 2002: After EPA repaired the sewer lines, installed the vapor
recovery system, and sampled indoor air in area homes, the agency
determined that the air filters in homes were no longer needed. EPA
transferred ownership of the carbon air filtration units to PADEP.
PADEP provided these filters, plus additional ones, to residents
requesting them, as well as electricity to run the filters, at no cost
for one year.
* June 2002: EPA held a public meeting regarding the Tranguch site
cleanup. Also attending the meeting were representatives from a U. S.
Congressman's office and PADEP. The focus of the meeting was to answer
questions about the property reports EPA had mailed or hand-delivered
to affected residents. However, EPA also answered questioned on plans
to restore streets, ongoing health studies, and other investigations of
the spill and its potential impacts. In response to a question on how
long residents with carbon filters in their homes to purify their
indoor air should run them, the EPA representative said "—based on the
sampling that we've done throughout the community, there's no reason to
run those filters". Following the meeting, according to a newspaper
account, the EPA representative said that as long as environmental
officials are capable of eliminating potential chemical exposure for
residents, federal officials would not consider options to relocate
affected area residents.
The University of Pittsburgh completed data collection efforts for its
health study, which was funded by a $100,000 grant from the
Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development.
* August 2002: The Luzerne County Board of Commissioners unanimously
approved a resolution requesting the Luzerne County Board of Assessment
Appeals to approve requests to reduce to zero value, for January 1,
2003 to December 31, 2003, the real estate assessments of those
properties that were adversely affected by the Tranguch gasoline leak,
as determined by the federal government.
* September 2002: EPA requested and received an additional $600,000 in
funding from the U.S. Coast Guard. This funding brought the Tranguch
site cleanup cost ceiling to $26,298,188.
* November 2002: A PADEP report on an evaluation of the abandoned mine
under the area concluded that it had no significant environmental
impact on the community.
* January 2003: Under contract with EPA, USACE found small amounts of
petroleum contamination in one tunnel of the abandoned coal mine.
PADEP discontinued support for the air filters in residences.
The local school district sent a letter to EPA asking for $44,000 in
compensation for the economic loss resulting from not having use of the
athletic field.
The University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health staff
presented their preliminary findings of the Hazleton Health Effects
study to the mayor of the city and the community at a public meeting.
According to a local newspaper article, this study (1) included more
individuals (451 compared to 207) and more households (190 compared to
84) than in the earlier "Preliminary Findings" study; and (2) found no
statistically significant increase in overall cancer or leukemia
incidence for the Laurel Gardens community of Hazleton residents in the
area of the Tranguch site compared to the county and state populations.
The study team, however, did stress that further investigation was
warranted for both thyroid and brain cancer, according to the newspaper
account.
* February 2003-March 2003: The local Board of Supervisors extended the
state of emergency for the area impacted by the leak through March 10,
2003, and supported a "buyout" of affected homes by the federal
government. The Luzerne County Board of Commissioners also declared
that a state of emergency continued to exist.
GAG wrote to the governor asking that PEMA reevaluate the designation
of the area as a disaster area, which had been denied earlier.
* April 2003: Local and national elected officials representing the
area sent letters to the new governor, requesting a reevaluation of the
previous governor's determination on the area's eligibility for being
declared a disaster area.
The Hazelton city council gave a property tax break to area residents
impacted by the leak for the third consecutive year.
According to EPA officials, the local school district verbally
requested that an athletic field in the affected area be restored. In
addition, the local school district sent a letter to EPA requesting a
meeting in May with the EPA on-site coordinator and USACE to discuss
(1) compensation for loss of use of the athletic field, and (2) a lack
of communication between EPA and the school district over the issue.
* May 2003: The federal government agreed to pay the local school
district $120,000 for the restoration of the athletic field.
EPA held a public meeting with attendees expressing concerns about the
cleanup.
* July 2003-September 2003: Citing health and property concerns, more
than 250 Hazleton and Hazle Township residents petitioned for a
congressional hearing into EPA's response to and management of the leak
impacting their community.
* October 2003: PADOH completed a study showing that, of the twenty-two
types of cancers and total cancers considered, only the incidence of
leukemia and all cancers was significantly higher in the affected
community than would be expected. However, according to the PADOH
study, the relationship of leukemia incidence to the environment was
unclear, only in rare circumstances can an occurrence be causally
linked to a specific agent with certainty, and the mechanisms for the
induction of cancer from benzene exposure are not clear.
The University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health completed
a health study providing its final "Summary of Primary Findings" on
area residents' increased risk of developing cancer. This report
summarized the university's two previous studies that separately
examined residents in the affected area of Hazle Township and the City
of Hazelton. In addition, the study examined the total population of
affected area residents by combining the Township and the City. The
study also examined affected residents living in both locations
classified into three potential exposure categories (high, medium, and
low) based on the proximity of their residence to the underground
gasoline plume. Most notably was the high exposure category of those
living directly over or adjacent to the projected contamination plume.
The study investigators concluded that while the combined population
did not experience an excess of all cancers, a statistically
significant excess of leukemia was observed. For the high exposure
category, the study investigators concluded that the observed versus
expected cases of leukemia was statistically significant, but that,
because of the small size in this subgroup, these results should be
interpreted with some caution. The study investigators made a number of
recommendations including long-term systematic surveillance and
screening for members of the potentially higher risk population.
The University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health staff
completed their final report of the Hazleton Health Effects Study 1990-
2000. The study's findings suggest that from 1990 to 2000 no
statistically significant increase in overall cancer or leukemia
incidence in the affected area of Hazleton with the exception of brain
cancer in white males compared to the county and state populations for
the period 1990 through 2000.
* December 2003: According to a local newspaper article, Laurel Garden
residents impacted by the gasoline leak asked the Luzerne County
District Attorney to investigate the case. In the request letter, the
residents said that they believe they were "needlessly and recklessly
endangered" by the owners of fuel stations in the vicinity of the
impacted area, EPA, and PADEP.
* March 2004: In a letter to local officials, EPA stated that no
further action would be taken to address contamination from the
abandoned mine based on three factors: (1) the contamination did not
appear to be from the Tranguch property, (2) the contamination did not
have a pathway to surface waters, and (3) due to the small amount of
contamination present, the vapors were not migrating from the mine
location and therefore did not threaten nearby residents.
* July 2004: EPA remained the lead agency responsible for the Tranguch
site, while PADEP agreed to provide operation and maintenance services
for the groundwater and soil vapor extraction treatment systems.
* Status as of September 2005: All leaking underground storage tanks
had been removed from the Tranguch site and only residual contamination
required remediation. In addition, cleanup efforts at all affected
residential homes had been completed and well over 95 percent of total
costs to clean up and monitor the site had been expended. Remediation
activities to remove residual contamination are expected to continue
for another 4 to 5 years, costing about $100,000 per year. The
remediation system will be shut down periodically to monitor its
effectiveness and determine whether mitigation goals for groundwater
and soil contamination have been reached. This monitoring is expected
to cost about $30,000 to $40,000 per year. The remediation system might
need to be shut down a few times before the contamination threat can be
considered mitigated and the removal project completed. However, once
this determination is made, groundwater and soil gas (vapor) monitoring
will permanently stop, all remaining monitoring wells (currently
approximately 80 but likely will be less because some are expected to
close every year depending on sampling results) will be closed (costing
about $1,000 per well), the treatment system removed, and the
underground piping abandoned in place.
Summary of Key Information From the Case Files:
* Contaminants and compounds of concern: Benzene, toluene, ethyl
benzene, and xylenes (BTEX). According to EPA officials, some methyl-
tertiary butyl-ether (MTBE) was identified but was never considered a
contaminant of concern.
* Size of leak: An estimated 25,000 to 50,000 gallons of gasoline was
released into the soil.
* Impacts of contamination: The leaking gasoline contaminated soil and
groundwater, entered into the sewer system through cracked pipes, and
further spread generally northeastward through the adjoining community
to encompass an area of about 70-acres, including 11 businesses, two
doctor's offices, two churches, two parks, 26 vacant lots, and 359
residential properties.
* Remediation cost: According to EPA officials, about $25.2 million of
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund monies have been spent to date to clean
up the contamination resulting from the Tranguch leak. In addition,
according to state officials, Pennsylvania spent about $2 to $3 million
in cleanup funds. The site owner spent an unknown additional--but
relatively small amount--on cleanup.
* U.S. Environmental Protection Agency involvement: EPA assumed
responsibility for cleaning up the site at the request of PADER in
1996.
* Communication between responsible agencies and the public:
Pennsylvania state agencies and EPA either held or participated in at
least nine public meetings and other forums regarding the Tranguch leak
from 1993--when the leak was first confirmed--through 2003. In December
1993 and May 1994, PADER held public meetings with area residents, city
and township representatives, and state legislators regarding the
contamination. According to EPA officials, beginning in July 1996, EPA
held meetings with local officials and public meetings with area
residents and others to discuss plans for remediating the contamination
at and around the Tranguch site and to update the status of the
cleanup. Through May 2003, EPA held at least five such meetings and
participated in at least one meeting sponsored by GAG. The meetings
often included representatives from the state and other federal
agencies--such as USACE--involved in cleanup operations, among others.
* Litigation: Nearby residents affected by the contamination sued
numerous parties, including the owners of the gas stations in the
vicinity of the leak as well as certain oil companies, asserting that
the contamination had caused personal injury and property damage, among
other things. These lawsuits are still pending.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of this review were to identify (1) information
available on the number and cleanup status of leaking underground
storage tanks, (2) existing sources of funding for cleanups at
contaminated tank sites, and (3) processes used to identify, assess,
and clean up sites in 5 states with large numbers of leaking tanks--
California, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. In
addition, to provide some perspective on how leaking underground
storage tank sites are identified and cleaned up, we are providing
information on the history and cleanup status of one leaking tank site
in each of these 5 states.
To identify information available on the number and cleanup status of
leaking underground storage tanks, we reviewed and evaluated data from
EPA's underground storage tank program semi-annual activity reports for
the period from March 31, 2001 through March 31, 2004. Each activity
report contains data on the number of active and closed tanks,
confirmed releases, cleanups initiated and completed, and cleanup
backlog for the 50 states, 5 territories, and the District of Columbia,
arranged by EPA region.[Footnote 26] To assess the reliability of the
EPA data, we interviewed EPA program officials at headquarters and in
Regions 3, 4, 5, and 9; conducted electronic (logic and other)
reliability testing of the data itself; and obtained and reviewed EPA's
responses to questions designed to determine the reliability of the
data. In addition, we compared the semiannual data reported by EPA with
data provided by the states we visited. In general, we found only minor
discrepancies during our reliability testing of the data. For example,
the Maine and Massachusetts semi-annual data for the period ending
March 31, 2002, were inadvertently switched. Once we brought this to
EPA's attention, it was immediately corrected. We also found that EPA
reported 1,000 less closed tanks and 1,000 more active tanks than
reported by the state of Pennsylvania. The state had initially provided
EPA data on the number of closed tanks as of September 30, 2004 but the
following day provided EPA a correction to this amount. However, EPA
inadvertently did not update its records to reflect this correction.
While acknowledging these problems, we have determined that the
reliability of the semi-annual data is adequate for the purposes used
in this report.
To identify funding options available for cleaning up contaminated tank
sites and the processes used for identifying, assessing, and cleaning
up leaking tanks by 5 states with large numbers of leaking tanks, we
discussed possible funding options with EPA officials, conducted
structured interviews with state program officials, and reviewed
documents provided by these officials or located on their internet
sites. To select which states to include in our review, we used data
from EPA's semi-annual activity report and applied it to our selection
criteria and picked the five states having the highest combined score.
Our selection criteria consisted of the following five quantitative
indicators:
* states with the largest average number of active tanks for the last 3
years;
* states with the largest average number of confirmed releases for the
last 3 years;
* states with the largest average number of backlogs for the last 3
years;
* states with the largest increase in backlogs during the last year
divided by the number of active tanks for that state; and:
* states with the largest increase in new tank releases for the last
year divided by the number of active tanks for that state.
Three of the five indicators used 3-year average data to minimize the
impact of single-year fluctuations and to reduce the effect of state
officials' periodic revisions to the data. Two of the five indicators
included adjustments for the number of active tanks in the state so as
to reduce the possible selection bias in favor of states that have
large numbers of active tanks.
For each indicator, we assigned a numerical score corresponding to its
ranking compared to the other states. For example, because EPA data
indicated that California averaged the most releases over the last
three years, we assigned it a score of 56 out of a possible 56 points;
alternatively, because American Samoa averaged the least number of
releases over the last three years, we assigned it a score of
one.[Footnote 27] To determine a state's total ranking for all five
indicators, we added the scores for each state across all indicators
and ranked each from highest to lowest.
As a final step in our state selection process, we reviewed the 5
states with the highest quantitative score to ensure that, taken as
whole, these states (1) were geographically diverse, (2) had different
EPA regional offices overseeing their LUST programs, (3) included
states with and without EPA-approved LUST programs, and (4) included
states with and without LUST assurance funds. This process resulted in
our including California rather than Ohio. While both states had the
same quantitative score, including California, in our opinion,
increased geographic diversity and added a different regional office to
our selected states.
To provide information on the history and cleanup status of one leaking
underground storage tank site in each of the 5 states, we identified
the 5 sites--Coca-Cola Enterprises, Yuba County, California; Henry
Fruhling Food Store, Harford County, Maryland; Bob's Marathon, Grand
Ledge, Michigan; R.C. Anderson Trust, Nash County, North Carolina; and
Tranguch Tire Service, Incorporated, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania--
interviewed state program officials responsible for overseeing or
managing the cleanup at these sites, reviewed case files, and visited
each site. In identifying these sites, we first selected the Tranguch
site because of congressional interest. For comparison with Tranguch,
we selected the remaining 4 sites primarily on the basis of the
following similarities to that site:[Footnote 28]
* Cleanup was either completed in 2004 or is relatively close to
completion based on total estimated costs;
* Remediation costs significantly exceeded the average cost of cleanup
of about $125,000; and:
* The risk priority ranking for remediation was above normal.
Specifically, we selected each of the 4 remaining sites as follows:
* Coca-Cola Enterprises n Yuba County, California: From California's
GeoTracker database, we obtained a list of about 3,400 closed sites--
that is, sites where cleanup has been completed--and identified the 10
most expensive cleanup sites for further investigation. The Coca-Cola
site had the highest risk rating among those sites closed since January
2004, and while all of the remaining 9 sites were more costly than the
Coca-Cola site, the cost differential was not significant and all had
the same or lower risk ratings.
* Henry Fruhling Food Store in Harford County, Maryland: For site
selection, we obtained a list of 39 sites from Maryland's Oil Control
Program, administrating the state's underground storage tank program.
Because Maryland does not track cleanup costs for sites being
remediated by responsible parties, these were all sites with state-lead
cleanups. In addition, they were sites still undergoing remediation,
because the state has not closed a site within the last 2 years. From
this list we selected the Fruhling Food Store site primarily based on
its high cost and high risk. This site was the most costly to clean up
and had a high risk ranking, having impacted residential water
supplies.
* Bob's Marathon in Grand Ledge, Michigan: We obtained a list of 68
sites with remediation costs of at least $250,000 from Michigan's
Department of Environmental Quality, administrating the state's
underground storage tank program. Because Michigan does not track
cleanup costs for sites being remediated by responsible parties, these
were all sites with state-lead cleanups. We selected the Bob's Marathon
site primarily based on its high cost and high risk. Bob's Marathon was
the most costly of sites that were either completed or nearly completed
and was high risk because it impacted municipal water supplies and the
community.
* R.C. Anderson Trust in Nash County, North Carolina: We obtained a
list of 108 sites with remediation costs of at least $250,000 from
North Carolina's Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
administrating the state's underground storage tank program. We
selected the 4 sites with the highest remediation costs for further
analysis. From these 4, we selected the R.C. Anderson Trust site
primarily based on high risk and high cost. This site was the only site
ranked high risk because of its potential impact on nearby water wells
and on the community. While this site was the least costly of the four
high-cost sites, the cost differential between this site and the
highest cost one was only about $24,000.
We conducted our review from August 2004 through November 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency:
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 1'F111mole:
NOV 2, 2005:
Mr. John B. Stephenson:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stephenson:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report entitled, "More Complete
Data and Continued Emphasis on Leak Prevention Could Improve EPA's
Underground Storage Tank Program". In general, we think the report's
findings and conclusions have merit, and we will assess the feasibility
of implementing the specific recommendations. We had a few editorial
comments which are provided in the enclosure.
The draft report recommends that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) require states to separately identify information on the number
and cleanup status of their abandoned tanks (i.e., those in which the
owner is unknown, unwilling, or unable to pay for the cleanup). It also
recommends that EPA use this information to improve both the oversight
of the leaking underground storage tank (LUST) program and our ability
to determine how to most efficiently and effectively allocate LUST
Trust Fund dollars to states. As the report correctly indicates, EPA
collects data from the states, which include information on abandoned
tanks, and factors these data into the allocation of Trust Fund dollars
among states.
We agree with GAO's recommendation that the underground storage tank
program could benefit from more specific information about abandoned
tank sites. However, as you know, obtaining this information is not a
simple matter. States may not know up front if an owner is unknown,
unwilling, or unable. States would have to search to determine the
potentially responsible party before they could report to EPA on the
status of ownership. Similarly, states would have to complete a
financial assessment to determine an owner's solvency, and would have
to issue an enforcement order before an owner could be designated as
unwilling to pay for a cleanup. In addition, although some states
already collect specific information on abandoned tanks, we would want
to be careful not to place an undue burden on states. Therefore, in
consultation with states, we will consider how best to incorporate
GAO's recommendation of using more specific abandoned tank data to more
efficiently and effectively allocate Trust Fund dollars. However, we
want to continue to ensure states are able to use these funds to
oversee and administer a program that addresses high risk sites and
moves all sites forward. We also want to ensure there are incentives
for states to continue to assist in funding cleanups of abandoned
tanks.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on your draft report and
for suggesting areas for additional focus within the abandoned tank
universe. We will consider implementing GAO's recommendations.
If you have any questions concerning our response, please contact Judy
Barrows in the Office of Underground Storage Tanks at (703) 603-7142.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
Thomas P. Dunne:
Acting Assistant Administrator:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
John B. Stephenson (202) 512-3841:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition, Vincent P. Price, Michael J. Rahl, and Michael S. Sagalow
made key contributions to this report. Important contributions were
also made by John W. Delicath, Wilfred B. Holloway, and Richard P.
Johnson.
(360483):
FOOTNOTES
[1] EPA retains primary implementation and enforcement authority for
more than 2,600 tanks on Indian lands and for approximately 3,500 tanks
in Idaho, which does not have the necessary state laws in place. In
addition, while New York is responsible under state law for tank
inspections, EPA retains enforcement authority over noncompliant tanks
in the state because New York lacks the necessary laws regarding leak,
overfill, and corrosion protection.
[2] RCRA excludes several categories of tanks from regulation under the
underground storage tank program, including farm and residential motor
fuel tanks with a capacity of 1,100 gallons or less, tanks for storing
home heating oil, and septic tanks.
[3] The activity reports also include tank information for the District
of Columbia and 5 territories.
[4] EPA allocates LUST trust funds to states primarily on the basis of
(1) whether the state has an EPA-approved program and (2) each state's
need, as measured by three weighted factors: the total number of tanks,
the number of cumulative confirmed releases, and the percentage of the
population using groundwater for drinking water. However, while the
number of cumulative confirmed releases includes releases from
abandoned tanks, the actual number of these releases is not separately
taken into account in allocation decisions.
[5] The fund also reimburses third-party compensation claims for
amounts awarded under a court-approved settlement, final judgment, or
arbitration award for bodily injury or property damage.
[6] For releases occurring from improperly abandoned storage systems,
the current landowner, and any person who owned, leased, or was
otherwise responsible for a system at the time it was abandoned are
responsible for cleanup costs.
[7] The state also has a second fund to pay for, among other things,
the cleanup of noncommericial tanks, such as home heating oil tanks.
[8] A small portion of the total funds is allocated according to
performance-based factors, such as the number of cumulative cleanups
initiated and completed by each state. Of the 5 states we contacted for
our review, 3--Maryland, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania--have EPA-
approved underground storage tank programs and the remaining 2--
California and Michigan--do not have EPA-approved programs.
[9] Cleanups at federal facilities, tribal lands, or high priority
abandoned sites that exceed the state's remediation abilities and/or
resources potentially may involve large amounts of federal trust fund
resources relative to the annual amounts provided to states.
[10] This amount excludes the $187,000 in annual grants awarded to each
state to assist them in managing their underground storage tank
programs.
[11] Vermont Department of Environmental Conservation, A Summary of
State Fund Survey Results (June 2005). In the survey, 10 states
reported that they did not have sufficient funds available to cover
their current tank cleanup costs. However, according to a Vermont
official familiar with the survey, 1 of the 10 state funds that were
experiencing shortfalls did not address federally-regulated tanks.
Furthermore, he said that while the other 9 state funds may have had
excess claims, most if not all, of these funds continued to receive
revenue and pay claims. The Vermont Department of Environmental
Conservation conducts this survey annually for the Association of State
and Tribal Solid Waste Management Officials an organization supporting
the environmental agencies of the states and trust territories and, in
particular, their hazardous waste programs; non-hazardous municipal
solid waste and industrial waste programs; recycling, waste
minimization, and reduction programs; Superfund and state cleanup
programs; waste management and cleanup activities at federal
facilities; and underground storage tank and leaking underground
storage tank programs.
[12] While Maryland was experiencing a funding shortfall as of February
2005, state officials told us that they expected that current funding
would be sufficient for cleaning up abandoned sites.
[13] Owners/operators might, for example, become aware of leaks when
their tanks fail tank system (liquid and vapor) integrity tests and
report such findings to the state.
[14] In Michigan, a site's redevelopment potential may also be
considered. Furthermore, responsible party-lead sites (those not led by
the state) in Pennsylvania receive funding from the state's
indemnification fund regardless of risk level.
[15] Of the 5 states we contacted, Michigan does not have direct
oversight of owner/operator conducted cleanups. Rather the state
requires that the owner/operator retain a consultant from an approved
list to conduct the necessary investigations, file the required
reports, and conduct the cleanup.
[16] According to state officials, while this law makes it difficult in
certain cases to identify liable owners/operators, it has been very
successful in promoting redevelopment of brownfield properties--the new
owners/operators who did not actually cause the release are not liable
for cleanup and have an incentive to develop the property.
[17] According to state officials, Pennsylvania inspects tanks with
total secondary containment at least once every 10 years. State
officials also told us that Pennsylvania has drafted regulations that
would require inspections to be conducted every 3 years.
[18] GAO, Environmental Protection: Improved Inspections and
Enforcement Would Better Ensure the Safety of Underground Storage
Tanks, GAO-01-464 (Washington, D.C. May 4, 2001). Our subsequent work
confirmed and updated our 2001 findings: GAO, Environmental Protection:
Improved Inspections and Enforcement Would Ensure Safer Underground
Storage Tanks, GAO-02-176T (Washington, D.C. November 1, 2001); GAO,
Environmental Protection: Improved Inspections and Enforcement Would
Ensure Safer Underground Storage Tanks, GAO-02-712T (Washington, D.C.
May 8, 2002); and GAO, Environmental Protection: Recommendations for
Improving the Underground Storage Tank Program, GAO-03-529T
(Washington, D.C. Mar. 5, 2003).
[19] The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund is a $1 billion fund authorized
by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to pay for (1) federal cleanup
actions, (2) certain claims for uncompensated removal costs and
damages, and (3) natural resource damage and restoration activities
resulting from oil spills or the substantial threat of oil spills to
the waters or shorelines of the United States. This fund is
administered by the National Pollution Funds Center of the U.S. Coast
Guard.
[20] Air sparging involves the injection of air into petroleum-
saturated subsurface soil or groundwater to convert dissolved
hydrocarbons to vapor, which is then vented.
[21] At the time, many tanks were required to undergo annual tank
tightness tests.
[22] In commenting on our draft report, PADEP officials referred to
these installations as remedial ventilation systems.
[23] Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, Preliminary
Status Report of the Hazleton LUST Case, Area of 22ND and Church
Streets, (October 1994), pages 71-72.
[24] Oil Pollution Act funding is administered by the U.S. Coast Guard.
[25] Hazle Township Health Effects Study 1990-2000 Preliminary
Findings, University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public Health,
Department of Environmental and Occupational Health and Epidemiology,
August 29, 2001.
[26] According to EPA, "confirmed releases" are identified by the
incident, not the receptors. For example, 10 contaminated residential
wells would be considered one release if the contamination was caused
by a leaking tank at a single gasoline station, even if more than one
tank at the station was leaking. However, if tanks at three different
gasoline stations leaked, three confirmed releases would be recorded,
regardless of the number of receptors. The number recorded by EPA
represents the cumulative number of incidents where an owner/operator
has identified a release from a regulated petroleum underground storage
tank system, reported the release to the state/local or other
designated implementing agency, and that agency has verified the
release. "Cleanups initiated" records confirmed releases for which the
state or responsible party has evaluated the site and initiated (1)
management of petroleum-contaminated soil, (2) removal of free product,
(3) management or treatment of dissolved petroleum contamination, or
(4) monitoring of the groundwater or soil being remediated by natural
attenuation; or for which the state has determined that no further
actions are currently necessary to protect human health and the
environment. The number reported by EPA represents the cumulative
number of releases for which some physical remediation activity has
begun, unless the state has determined that no such activity is
necessary. "Cleanups completed" represent the number of confirmed
releases where cleanups have been initiated and conducted to the point
that the state determines that no further actions are needed to protect
human health and the environment. The number reported by EPA is the
cumulative number of cleanups completed. "Cleanup backlog" is the
number of confirmed releases minus the number of cleanups completed.
The five territories are (1) American Samoa, (2) the Commonwealth of
Northern Mariana Islands, (3) Guam, (4) Puerto Rico, and (5) the U.S.
Virgin Islands.
[27] The total number of possible locations was 56, including the 50
states, 5 territories, and the District of Columbia.
[28] As a secondary factor in selecting sites, we took into account
travel costs. This was necessary because remediation site files are not
normally maintained on-site, state underground storage tank program
managers are usually not co-located with incident case managers
responsible for overseeing the cleanup, and the sites themselves can be
located at great distances from the underground storage tank program
managers.
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