World Trade Center
Preliminary Observations on EPA's Second Program to Address Indoor Contamination
Gao ID: GAO-07-806T June 20, 2007
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster site. As the towers collapsed, Lower Manhattan was blanketed with building debris and combustible materials. This complex mixture created a major concern: that thousands of residents and workers in the area would now be exposed to known hazards in the air and in the dust, such as asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and pulverized concrete. In May 2002, New York City formally requested federal assistance to address indoor contamination. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an indoor clean and test program from 2002 to 2003. Several years later, after obtaining the views of advisory groups, including its Inspector General and an expert panel, EPA announced a second test and clean program in December 2006. Program implementation is to begin later in 2007, more than 5 years after the disaster. GAO's testimony, based on preliminary work evaluating EPA's development of its second program, addresses (1) EPA's actions to implement recommendations from the expert panel and its Inspector General, (2) the completeness of information EPA provided to the public in its second plan, and (3) EPA's assessment of available resources to conduct the program. We discussed the issues we address in this statement with EPA.
EPA has taken some actions to incorporate recommendations from the Inspector General and expert panel members into its second program, but its decision not to incorporate other recommendations may limit the overall effectiveness of this program. For example, EPA's second program incorporates recommendations to expand the list of contaminants it tests for, and to test for contaminants in dust as well as the air. However, it does not incorporate a recommendation to expand the boundaries of cleanup to better ensure that WTC contamination is addressed in all locations. EPA reported that it does not have a basis for expanding the boundaries because it cannot distinguish between normal urban dust and WTC dust. EPA did not begin examining methods for differentiating between normal urban dust and WTC dust until nearly 3 years after the disaster, and therefore the process for finding distinctions was more difficult. In addition, EPA's second program does not incorporate recommendations to sample heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. According to EPA's plan, the agency chose to offer limited testing in a greater number of apartments and common areas rather than provide more comprehensive testing (such as in HVACs) in a smaller number of these areas. EPA's second plan does not fully inform the public about the results of its first program. EPA concluded that a "very small" number of samples from its first program exceeded risk levels for airborne asbestos. However, EPA did not explain that this conclusion was to be expected because it took over 80 percent of the samples after residences were professionally cleaned. Without this additional information, residents who could have participated might have opted not to do so because of EPA's conclusion. EPA did not assess the adequacy of available resources for the second program. EPA stated that it plans to spend $7 million on this program, which is not based on any assessment of costs, but is the funding remaining from the first program. Without careful planning for future disasters, timely decisions about data collection, and thorough communication of sampling results, an evaluation of the adequacy of cleanup efforts may be impossible.
GAO-07-806T, World Trade Center: Preliminary Observations on EPA's Second Program to Address Indoor Contamination
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Superfund and Environmental Health,
Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 20, 2007:
World Trade Center:
Preliminary Observations on EPA's Second Program to Address Indoor
Contamination:
Statement of John B. Stephenson, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-07-806T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-806T, testimony before the Subcommittee on
Superfund and Environmental Health, Committee on Environment and Public
Works, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center
(WTC) turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster site. As the towers
collapsed, Lower Manhattan was blanketed with building debris and
combustible materials. This complex mixture created a major concern:
that thousands of residents and workers in the area would now be
exposed to known hazards in the air and in the dust, such as asbestos,
lead, glass fibers, and pulverized concrete. In May 2002, New York City
formally requested federal assistance to address indoor contamination.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an indoor clean and
test program from 2002 to 2003. Several years later, after obtaining
the views of advisory groups, including its Inspector General and an
expert panel, EPA announced a second test and clean program in December
2006. Program implementation is to begin later in 2007, more than 5
years after the disaster.
GAO‘s testimony, based on preliminary work evaluating EPA‘s development
of its second program, addresses (1) EPA‘s actions to implement
recommendations from the expert panel and its Inspector General, (2)
the completeness of information EPA provided to the public in its
second plan, and (3) EPA‘s assessment of available resources to conduct
the program. We discussed the issues we address in this statement with
EPA.
What GAO Found:
EPA has taken some actions to incorporate recommendations from the
Inspector General and expert panel members into its second program, but
its decision not to incorporate other recommendations may limit the
overall effectiveness of this program. For example, EPA‘s second
program incorporates recommendations to expand the list of contaminants
it tests for, and to test for contaminants in dust as well as the air.
However, it does not incorporate a recommendation to expand the
boundaries of cleanup to better ensure that WTC contamination is
addressed in all locations. EPA reported that it does not have a basis
for expanding the boundaries because it cannot distinguish between
normal urban dust and WTC dust. EPA did not begin examining methods for
differentiating between normal urban dust and WTC dust until nearly 3
years after the disaster, and therefore the process for finding
distinctions was more difficult. In addition, EPA‘s second program does
not incorporate recommendations to sample heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning (HVAC) systems. According to EPA‘s plan, the agency chose
to offer limited testing in a greater number of apartments and common
areas rather than provide more comprehensive testing (such as in HVACs)
in a smaller number of these areas.
EPA‘s second plan does not fully inform the public about the results of
its first program. EPA concluded that a ’very small“ number of samples
from its first program exceeded risk levels for airborne asbestos.
However, EPA did not explain that this conclusion was to be expected
because it took over 80 percent of the samples after residences were
professionally cleaned. Without this additional information, residents
who could have participated might have opted not to do so because of
EPA‘s conclusion.
EPA did not assess the adequacy of available resources for the second
program. EPA stated that it plans to spend $7 million on this program,
which is not based on any assessment of costs, but is the funding
remaining from the first program. Without careful planning for future
disasters, timely decisions about data collection, and thorough
communication of sampling results, an evaluation of the adequacy of
cleanup efforts may be impossible.
Figure: Aerial Image of North World Trade Center Tower on 9/11:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: NYPD Photo Unit.
[End of figure]
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-806T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact John B. Stephenson at
(202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the preliminary results of our
ongoing work on the development of the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) second program to address World Trade Center (WTC)
indoor contamination. As you know, the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attack on the World Trade Center turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster
site, on a scale the nation had never experienced. The World Trade
Center was a complex of seven buildings on 16 acres surrounding a 5-
acre plaza in Lower Manhattan. The twin towers were at the center of
the complex. Each tower had 110 floors, with approximately 43,200
square feet on each floor. As the towers collapsed, Lower Manhattan was
blanketed in a mixture of building debris and combustible materials
that coated building exteriors and streets, as well as the interiors of
apartments and offices. This complex mixture gave rise to another major
concern: that thousands of residents and workers in the area would now
be exposed to known hazards in the air and in the dust, such as
asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and pulverized concrete.
On the day of the attacks, the President signed a major disaster
declaration, which activated the Federal Response Plan. The Federal
Response Plan, now replaced by the National Response Plan, established
the process and structure for the federal government's assistance to
state and local agencies when responding to any major disaster or
emergency declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act).[Footnote 1] In May 2002, after
numerous cleanup, dust collection, and air monitoring activities were
conducted outdoors by EPA, other federal agencies, New York City and
New York State, New York City formally requested federal assistance to
clean and/or test residences in the vicinity of the WTC site for
airborne asbestos.[Footnote 2]
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administered the
Federal Response Plan, provided such assistance, entering into
interagency agreements with EPA in 2002 to develop EPA's first program.
This program allowed residents of Lower Manhattan living south of Canal
Street (representing over 20,000 residences) to elect to have their
home professionally cleaned, followed by testing, or to have their home
tested only. Approximately 20 percent of the eligible residences
participated in the program. The majority of these residences were
professionally cleaned before they were sampled for asbestos because
their owners selected the clean and test option rather than the test
only option.[Footnote 3] Even though samples were collected after
cleaning in most cases, some residences (less than 1 percent) were
still found to have unsafe levels of asbestos.
EPA's first program was criticized by several entities; as a result,
EPA developed a second program, which is the focus of our ongoing work
and our testimony today.[Footnote 4] Let me provide some information on
the events leading up to the second program.
In August 2003, EPA's Inspector General made recommendations that
addressed EPA's initial efforts to clean up indoor contamination
following the towers' collapse, as well as recommendations that focused
on EPA's future preparedness for large-scale disasters resulting in
indoor contamination. The Inspector General reported that the effort to
clean up indoor WTC contamination was inadequate for multiple reasons.
For example, according to the Inspector General, the WTC cleanup did
not require that entire buildings be systematically cleaned, including
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. As a result,
the Inspector General concluded, the contaminants in uncleaned
apartments and common areas could enter the air supply system and re-
contaminate cleaned spaces. With regard to future preparedness, the
Inspector General recommended, among other things, that EPA develop
protocols for determining how indoor environmental contamination would
be handled in the event of a future disaster.
The White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) indicated in
October 2003 that EPA would organize and lead an expert technical
review panel to address the concerns of the Inspector General and
others. In March 2004, EPA convened the WTC Expert Technical Review
Panel, which met periodically through December 2005. The panel was
composed of 20 individuals from academia and from city and federal
health and science agencies, such as the Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS). It also included two
representatives from the Community-Labor Coalition (CLC), which is a
network of community, tenant, labor, and environmental organizations
formed after September 11, 2001, to advocate for appropriate health and
safety efforts in the recovery from the WTC attack. The panel's overall
task, as outlined by CEQ, was to advise EPA on efforts to protect New
York City residents and workers potentially affected by the collapse of
the World Trade Center. Specifically, the panel's goals were to help
guide EPA in (1) identifying any remaining risks using exposure and
health surveillance information; (2) identifying any unmet public
health needs; and (3) determining steps to further minimize the risks.
In addition, the panel was asked to provide advice for EPA's second
program. Panel members, including the CLC representatives, submitted
individual recommendations to EPA.
After obtaining the views of advisory groups, including the Inspector
General, the expert panel, and the CLC, EPA announced its plan for a
second program in December 2006. This 2006 plan targets residents and
building owners in the same portion of Lower Manhattan as EPA's first
program. In the 2006 plan, EPA also provided the results of the
sampling from its first program. The second program is set to begin
later in 2007. As of May 10, 2007, EPA told us, 295 residents and
building owners had enrolled in the second program, compared with 4,166
eligible participants in the first program. Figure 1 shows the
chronology of events preceding the second program.
Figure 1: Timeline of EPA's WTC Indoor Contamination Activities:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of EPA data; photos top to bottom: top photo, NYPD
Photo Unit; center photo, Federal Emergency Management Agency; bottom
photo, Dr. Lung Chi Chen, New York University.
[A] EPA's registration period ended in March 2007, but as of June 20,
2007, EPA has not begun implementing the program.
[End of figure]
Our testimony, which is based on our ongoing work evaluating EPA's
development of its second program, discusses (1) EPA's actions to
implement recommendations from the expert panel and its Inspector
General, (2) the completeness of information EPA provided to the public
in its second plan, and (3) EPA's assessment of available resources to
conduct the program.
In summary, while we found that EPA has taken some actions to
incorporate recommendations from the Inspector General and expert panel
members into its second program, it decided 'not to incorporate other
recommendations, which may limit the program's overall effectiveness.
For example, EPA's second program incorporates recommendations to
expand the number of contaminants tested, from asbestos only, to three
additional contaminants and to test in dust as well as in the air.
However, EPA's program does not incorporate a recommendation to expand
the boundaries of cleanup to north of Canal Street and to Brooklyn. EPA
reported that it was unable to develop a method for distinguishing
between normal urban dust and WTC dust; therefore, the agency reported
that it cannot assess the extent of WTC contamination, and has no basis
for expanding the cleanup effort. EPA did not begin examining methods
for differentiating between normal urban dust and WTC dust until May
2004--nearly 3 years after the disaster--and therefore the process for
differentiating was more difficult. In addition, EPA's second program
does not incorporate recommendations to sample in HVACs or
"inaccessible" locations within apartments and common areas, such as
behind dishwashers. The agency chose to offer more limited testing in a
greater number of apartments and common areas rather than to provide
more comprehensive testing (such as in HVACs) in a smaller number of
these areas. Testing in such a restricted manner make evaluating the
adequacy of clean up efforts very difficult, and may discourage
participation. Moreover, this program does not incorporate the
recommendation to test workplaces because, according to EPA officials,
other federal agencies have procedures to address worker safety. We
discussed the issues we address in this statement with EPA.
EPA did not provide sufficient information in its second plan to allow
the public to make informed choices about their participation.
Specifically, EPA did not fully disclose the limitations in the testing
results from its first program. EPA concluded that a "very small"
number of samples from its first program exceeded risk levels for
airborne asbestos. However, EPA did not explain that this conclusion
was to be expected because it took over 80 percent of the samples after
residences were professionally cleaned. In addition, EPA did not fully
explain that its conclusion was based on participation from only 20
percent of the eligible residences. Without this additional
information, residents who could have elected to participate might have
been discouraged from doing so because of EPA's conclusion.
EPA did not assess the adequacy of available resources to carry out its
second program effectively. Instead of assessing the costs of carrying
out its program and providing resources accordingly, EPA has simply
identified how much money was left over from the first program.
Further, the amount of funding provided for the second program seems
inconsistent with the scale of second program activities. Specifically,
the $7 million EPA plans to spend for the second program's testing and
cleaning is less than 20 percent of the first program's funding,
despite an increase in the number and type of contaminants being
sampled. EPA indicated that if demand had exceeded available resources,
EPA would have simply limited participation in the program.
Background:
After the collapse of the World Trade Center and the accompanying
spread of dust resulting from the collapse, EPA, other federal
agencies, and New York City and New York State public health and
environmental authorities focused on numerous outdoor activities,
including cleanup, dust collection, and air monitoring. In May 2002,
New York City formally requested federal assistance to clean and test
building interiors in the vicinity of the WTC site for airborne
asbestos. Such assistance may be made available to state and local
governments under the Stafford Act and the National Response Plan,
which establishes the process and structure for the federal government
to provide assistance to state and local agencies when responding to
threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other
emergencies.[Footnote 5] FEMA, which coordinates the federal response
to requests for assistance from state and local governments, entered
into interagency agreements with EPA to develop and implement the first
and second indoor cleanup programs for residents in Lower Manhattan.
EPA Incorporated Some Recommendations, but Its Decision Not to Adopt
Others May Limit the Second Program's Effectiveness:
In response to recommendations from the Inspector General and expert
panel members, EPA's second program incorporates some additional
testing elements. For example, EPA is testing for a wider range of
contaminants. In addition to asbestos, EPA will test for man-made
vitreous fibers, which are in such materials as building and appliance
insulation; lead; and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, a group of over
100 different chemicals that are formed during the incomplete burning
of coal, oil, gas, and garbage. EPA will also test dust as well as the
air. In order to test the dust for these contaminants, EPA had to
develop cleanup standards. However, EPA's second program does not
incorporate the following other recommendations: (1) broadening the
geographic scope of the testing effort, (2) testing HVACs and
"inaccessible" locations, and (3) expanding the program to include
workplaces.[Footnote 6]
Broadening the geographic scope of testing. EPA did not expand the
scope of testing north of Canal Street, as well as to Brooklyn, as
advisory groups had recommended. EPA reported that it did not expand
the scope of testing because it was not able to differentiate between
normal urban dust and WTC dust, which would have enabled it to
determine the geographic extent of WTC contamination. Some expert panel
members had suggested that EPA investigate whether it was feasible to
develop a method for distinguishing between normal urban dust and WTC
dust. EPA ultimately agreed to do so. Beginning in 2004--almost 3 years
after the disaster--EPA conducted this investigation. EPA officials
told us that because so much time had passed since the terrorist
attack, it was difficult to distinguish between WTC dust and urban
dust. EPA ultimately abandoned this effort because peer reviewers
questioned its methodology; EPA decided not to explore alternative
methods that the peer reviewers had proposed. Instead, EPA will test
only in an area where visible contamination has been confirmed by
aerial photography conducted soon after the WTC attack. However, aerial
photography does not reveal indoor contamination, and EPA officials
told us that they knew that some WTC dust was found immediately after
the terrorist attacks outside the area eligible for its first and
second program, such as in Brooklyn.
Testing HVACs and in inaccessible areas. In its November 2005 draft
plan for the second program, EPA had proposed collecting samples from a
number of locations in HVACs. In some buildings HVACs are shared, and
in others each residence has its own system. In either case,
contaminants in the HVAC could re-contaminate the residence unless the
system is also professionally cleaned. However, EPA's second program
will not provide for testing in HVACs unless tests in common areas
reveal that standards for any of four contaminants have been exceeded.
EPA explains in the second plan that it will not sample within HVACs
because it chose to offer more limited testing in a greater number of
apartments and common areas rather than provide more comprehensive
testing in a smaller number of these areas. Similarly, EPA had proposed
sampling for contaminants in "inaccessible" locations, such as behind
dishwashers and rarely moved furniture within apartments and common
areas. Again, because it was unable to differentiate between normal
urban dust and WTC dust, EPA stated that it would not test in
inaccessible locations in order to devote its resources to as many
requests as possible. In fact, EPA only received 295 requests from
residents and building owners to participate in the second program,
compared with 4,166 eligible participants in the first
program.[Footnote 7]
Expanding the program to include workers/workplaces. According to EPA's
second program plan, the plan is "the result of ongoing efforts to
respond to concerns of residents and workers." Workers were concerned
that workplaces in Lower Manhattan experienced the same contamination
as residences. In its second program, EPA will test and clean common
areas in commercial buildings, but will do so only if an individual
property owner or manager requests the service. EPA stated that
employees who believe their working conditions are unsafe as a result
of WTC dust may file a complaint with OSHA or request an evaluation by
HHS's National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. Concerns
remain, however, because these other agencies do not have the authority
to conduct cleanup in response to contaminant levels that exceed
standards. In addition, OSHA's standards are designed primarily to
address airborne contamination, while EPA's test and clean program is
designed to address contamination in building spaces, whether the
contamination is airborne or in settled dust. Thus, OSHA can require
individual employers to adopt work practices to reduce employee
exposure to airborne contaminants, whereas EPA's test and clean program
is designed to remove contaminants from affected spaces.
EPA Did Not Provide the Public With Sufficient Information to Make
Fully Informed Decisions:
EPA did not provide sufficient information in its second plan so that
the public could make informed choices about their participation.
Specifically, EPA did not fully disclose the limitations in the testing
results from its first program. While EPA stated that the number of
samples in its first program exceeding risk levels for airborne
asbestos was "very small," it did not fully explain that this
conclusion was limited by the following factors.
Participation. Participation in the program came from about 20 percent
of the residences eligible for participation. In addition,
participation was voluntary, which may suggest that the sample of
apartments was not representative of all the residences eligible for
the program. Those who chose to participate may not have been at
greatest risk.
Contaminants tested. EPA's cleanup decisions were based only on tests
for asbestos, rather than other contaminants, and the decisions focused
on airborne contamination rather than contamination in dust inside
residences.
Sampling protocol. EPA took over 80 percent of the samples after
professional cleaning was complete. Therefore it is not surprising that
EPA found few samples exceeding its asbestos standard.
EPA also did not explain in its second program plan that its first
program's test results excluded samples that were discarded because
they were "not cleared"--that is, could not be analyzed because the
filter had too many fibers to be analyzed under a microscope. However,
EPA's final report on its first program stated that residences with
more than one inconclusive result, such as filter overload, were
encouraged to have their residences re-cleaned and re-tested. EPA did
not explain the impact of excluding these samples or other data
limitations from its conclusion that the number of samples exceeding
asbestos standards was very small. Without providing complete
explanations of the data, residents who could have elected to
participate might have been discouraged from doing so.
EPA Did Not Adequately Assess Resource Needs for the Second Program:
EPA did not take steps to ensure that resources would be adequate to
achieve the second program's objectives. Instead, EPA is implementing
this program with the funding remaining after its first program--
approximately $7 million. EPA could not provide us with any basis for
determining whether this funding level is appropriate. EPA officials
told us that they were unable to determine the cost of the program
without knowing the number of participants. However, we note that funds
available for the second program are less than 20 percent of the first
program's funding, despite an increase in the number and type of
contaminants being sampled.
Almost two-thirds of the panel members told us they did not believe the
$7 million for the sampling and cleanup was sufficient. According to
one of the expert panel's chairmen--a former EPA Assistant
Administrator--the $7 million was sufficient for initial sampling in
the second program, but not for sampling and cleanup. If demand had
exceeded available resources, EPA would have simply limited
participation by ranking program applicants on the basis of their
proximity to the WTC site.
Concluding Observations:
Shortcomings in EPA's second program to test and clean residences for
WTC contamination raise questions about the agency's preparedness for
addressing indoor contamination resulting from future disasters. The
effectiveness of this program may be limited because some important
recommendations were not incorporated, and because program
implementation will not begin until later this year--more than 5 years
after the World Trade Center collapsed. Furthermore, owing to these
factors, the majority of panel members do not support EPA's second
program, noting that it was not responsive to the concerns of residents
and workers harmed by the collapse of the WTC towers, it was
scientifically and technically flawed, or it was unacceptable because
it would not identify the extent of contamination. Some panel members
questioned the value of participating in EPA's program, and even stated
that they would discourage participation.
Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy
to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may
have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. For further
information about this testimony, please contact John B. Stephenson,
Director, Natural Resources and Environment (202) 512-3841, or
stephensonj@gao.gov. Key contributors to this testimony were Janice
Ceperich, Katheryn Summers Hubbell, Karen Keegan, Omari Norman, Diane
B. Raynes, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, and Sandra Tasic. Additional
assistance was provided by Katherine M. Raheb.
FOOTNOTES
[1] 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq. The purpose of the Stafford Act is "to
provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal
Government to State and local governments in carrying out their
responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result
from such disasters." 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b).
[2] In addition to using asbestos as a trigger for cleanup, in a small
subset of residences, EPA conducted sampling for dioxin, mercury, and
22 metals to inform a study about the effectiveness of its cleaning
techniques.
[3] EPA regional officials overseeing the program told us they assumed
that some residents elected to have testing only because they had their
residences cleaned before EPA's program.
[4] A lawsuit was filed in March 2004 that, among other things,
challenged the adequacy of EPA's first test and clean program. The case
is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Benzman v. Whitman, No. 04-1888 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 10, 2004), appeal
docketed, Nos. 06-1166-cv, 06-1346-cv, 06-1454-cv (2nd Cir. March 10,
2006). Pursuant to its long-standing policy of not addressing issues in
ongoing litigation, GAO has not addressed EPA's first test and clean
program.
[5] The National Response Plan replaced the Federal Response Plan. The
Federal Response Plan was in effect on September 11, 2001.
[6] EPA's second program does allow commercial building owners to
request testing and cleaning, but does not permit workers or employers
to do so.
[7] A total of 640 individual residents and building owners registered
for the second program. Of this total, 295 eligible participants
submitted the necessary access agreements.
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