Impoundment Control Act
Use and Impact of Rescission Procedures Gao ID: T-OGC-99-56 July 30, 1999Since the Impoundment Control Act was enacted 25 years ago, Presidents have used the rescission process to advance their own priorities for spending cuts. But, Congress has increasingly used rescissions to express its own view of changing priorities, especially in an era of tight discretionary spending caps. As Congress has come to enact larger budget cuts than those proposed by presidents, the debate has shifted from whether to cut to where to cut. This testimony discusses GAO's role in the congressional rescission process and provides some perspective on the use and impact of rescissions.
GAO noted that: (1) the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA) was enacted to tighten congressional control over Presidential impoundments and establish a procedure under which Congress could consider the merits of impoundments proposed by the President; (2) under the ICA, the President may propose a rescission when he wishes to withhold funds from obligation permanently or submit a deferral when the withholding of funds is temporary; (3) funds proposed for rescission may be withheld from obligation for 45 days of continuous congressional session; (4) if Congress does not approve the rescission during this period, the President must release the funds on the forty-sixth day; (5) the ICA also provides a special discharge procedure permitting 20 percent of the members of either house to force a floor vote on any presidential rescission proposal; (6) rescissions under the ICA have not historically served as a significant spending reduction tool; (7) since enactment of the ICA in 1974, Presidents have proposed 1,172 rescissions totalling $75.8 billion dollars; (8) Congress has accepted 459 of those proposals, totalling $24.9 billion; (9) during this period, Congress has initiated $104.8 billion in rescissions to revise spending decisions; (10) the President is required to send a copy of the special message proposing rescissions or deferrals to the Comptroller General on the same day it is sent to Congress; (11) the Comptroller General is required to review each special message and report his findings to Congress as soon as practicable; (12) the ICA requires the Comptroller General to report to Congress any impoundment which the President has failed to report; (13) after the President submits an impoundment message to Congress, GAO is responsible for monitoring the status of affected funds; and (14) GAO provides statistical summaries and analyses on the impoundment process.