Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance Program
Gao ID: GAO-05-988R August 19, 2005
On June 28, 2005, GAO testified before Congress at a hearing on "Access Delayed: Fixing the Security Clearance Process." This letter responds to a Congressional request that GAO provide answers to Senator Frank R. Lautenberg's questions for the record.
GAO is unaware of any progress that DOD has made toward implementing our May 2004 recommendation to "develop and implement an integrated, comprehensive management plan to eliminate the backlog, reduce the delays in conducting investigations and determining eligibility for security clearances, and overcome the impediments that could allow such problems to recur." GAO does not have an up-to-date estimate of the costs resulting from delays in determining eligibility for a personnel security clearance. However, our February 2004 report documents some past estimates as well as cost-related considerations that apply today. For example, we noted that in our 1981 report, we estimated the DOD investigative backlog could cost nearly $1 billion per year in lost productivity. More than a decade later, the Joint Security Commission report noted that the costs directly attributable to investigative delays in fiscal year 1994 could be as high as several billion dollars because workers were unable to perform their jobs while awaiting a clearance. In addition to the costs associated with delays in employees being able to start classified work, our February 2004 report also documented other types of costs that have been cited by industry personnel. Representatives from one company with $1 billion per year in sales stated that their company offers a $10,000 bonus to employees for each person recruited who already has a security clearance. Such operating costs are then passed on to government customers in the form of higher bids for contracts. In turn, the recruit's former company may need to back-fill a position, as well as possibly settle for a lower level of contract performance while a new employee is found, obtains a clearance, and learns the former employee's job. Also, industry representatives discussed instances where their companies gave hiring preference to personnel who could do the job but were less qualified than others who did not possess a clearance. The chair of the interagency Personnel Security Working Group noted that a company might hire an employee and begin paying that individual, but not assign any work to the individual until a clearance is obtained. The head of the interagency group additionally noted that commands, agencies, and industry might incur lost-opportunity costs if the individual chooses to work somewhere else rather than wait to get the clearance before beginning work.
GAO-05-988R, Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance Program
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-988R
entitled 'Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security
Clearance Program' which was released on August 19, 2005.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
August 19, 2005:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Dear Senator Voinovich:
Subject: Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security
Clearance Program:
On June 28, 2005, I testified before your Subcommittee at a hearing on
"Access Delayed: Fixing the Security Clearance Process."[Footnote 1]
This letter responds to your request that I provide answers to Senator
Frank R. Lautenberg's questions for the record. The questions, along
with my responses follow.
1. Your 2004 report recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD)
work closely with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to design
and implement a plan for getting rid of clearance backlogs and delays.
To your knowledge, what progress has DOD made on this?
GAO is unaware of any progress that DOD has made toward implementing
our May 2004 recommendation to "develop and implement an integrated,
comprehensive management plan to eliminate the backlog, reduce the
delays in conducting investigations and determining eligibility for
security clearances, and overcome the impediments that could allow such
problems to recur." Information supplied by DOD as part of a required
follow-up action on all GAO recommendations lists a few actions, but
nothing is mentioned about developing an integrative approach that
incorporates objectives and outcome-related goals, sets priorities,
identifies resources, establishes performance measures, and provides
milestones for permanently eliminating the backlog and reducing delays.
On June 17, 2005, the Deputy Director of Management at the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) announced that OMB would work with agencies
to set clear and aggressive milestones for reducing risk in each area
that GAO had designated high risk. On July 12, 2005, shortly after this
Subcommittee's hearings, GAO officials met with OMB's Deputy Director
for Management, Clay Johnson, and his staff to discuss DOD's personnel
security clearance program, the clearance backlog, and impediments to
timely, high-quality clearances. Among other things, Mr. Johnson
indicated that (1) OMB staff would work with DOD and OPM to develop
preliminary milestones and metrics for correcting problems associated
with the program and (2) GAO would be asked to comment on that
information in August or September 2005.
2. Based on your analysis, how much money do you think has been wasted
due to lengthy security clearance processes, when employees come into
work but cannot participate in substantive assignments until cleared?
GAO does not have an up-to-date estimate of the costs resulting from
delays in determining eligibility for a personnel security clearance.
However, our February 2004 report documents some past estimates as well
as cost-related considerations that apply today.[Footnote 2] For
example, we noted that in our 1981 report, we estimated the DOD
investigative backlog could cost nearly $1 billion per year in lost
productivity.[Footnote 3] More than a decade later, the Joint Security
Commission report noted that the costs directly attributable to
investigative delays in fiscal year 1994 could be as high as several
billion dollars because workers were unable to perform their jobs while
awaiting a clearance.[Footnote 4]
In addition to the costs associated with delays in employees being able
to start classified work, our February 2004 report also documented
other types of costs that have been cited by industry
personnel.[Footnote 5] Representatives from one company with $1 billion
per year in sales stated that their company offers a $10,000 bonus to
employees for each person recruited who already has a security
clearance. Such operating costs are then passed on to government
customers in the form of higher bids for contracts. In turn, the
recruit's former company may need to back-fill a position, as well as
possibly settle for a lower level of contract performance while a new
employee is found, obtains a clearance, and learns the former
employee's job. Also, industry representatives discussed instances
where their companies gave hiring preference to personnel who could do
the job but were less qualified than others who did not possess a
clearance. The chair of the interagency Personnel Security Working
Group noted that a company might hire an employee and begin paying that
individual, but not assign any work to the individual until a clearance
is obtained. The head of the interagency group additionally noted that
commands, agencies, and industry might incur lost-opportunity costs if
the individual chooses to work somewhere else rather than wait to get
the clearance before beginning work.
If you or other members of the Subcommittee have any additional
questions about DOD's personnel security clearance program, please
contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this correspondence. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this correspondence are listed in the enclosure.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Derek B. Stewart:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosure:
Enclosure:
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact: Derek B. Stewart (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments: In addition to the contact above, Jack E. Edwards,
Assistant Director, and Mark A. Pross made key contributions to this
correspondence.
(350747):
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but
Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation, GAO-05-842T (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005).
[2] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size, GAO-04-344 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004).
[3] GAO, Faster Processing of DOD Personnel Security Clearances Could
Avoid Millions in Losses, GAO/GGD-81-105 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15,
1981).
[4] Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A Report to the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, Chapter
4, Personnel Security--The First and Best Defense (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 28, 1994).
[5] GAO-04-344.