Terrorist Watch List Screening
Recommendations to Promote a Comprehensive and Coordinated Approach to Terrorist-Related Screening Gao ID: GAO-08-253T November 8, 2007The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. This testimony discusses (1) standards for including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities in screening processes and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening. This statement is based on GAO's report (GAO-08-110). To accomplish the objectives, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that perform terrorism-related screening.
The FBI and the intelligence community use standards of reasonableness to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated terrorist watch list. In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism--in addition to individuals with known links--are to be nominated. As such, being on the list does not automatically prohibit, for example, the issuance of a visa or entry into the United States. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what action to take, if any. As of May 2007, the consolidated watch list contained approximately 755,000 records. From December 2003 through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times. Many individuals were matched multiple times. The outcomes of these encounters reflect an array of actions, such as arrests; denials of entry into the United States; and, most often, questioning and release. Within the federal community, there is general agreement that the watch list has helped to combat terrorism by (1) providing screening and law enforcement agencies with information to help them respond appropriately during encounters and (2) helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals on the watch list and collect information about them for use in conducting investigations and in assessing threats. Regarding potential vulnerabilities, TSC sends records daily from the watch list to screening agencies. However, some records are not sent, partly because screening against them may not be needed to support the respective agency's mission or may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records. Also, some subjects of watch list records have passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not identified, for example, until after they had boarded and flew on an aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. TSC and other federal agencies have ongoing initiatives to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities, including efforts to improve computerized name-matching programs and the quality of watch list data. Although the federal government has made progress in promoting effective terrorism-related screening, additional screening opportunities remain untapped--within the federal sector, as well as within critical infrastructure components of the private sector. This situation exists partly because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for optimizing use of the terrorist watch list. Also lacking are clear lines of authority and responsibility. An up-to-date strategy and implementation plan, supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure, would provide a platform to establish governmentwide screening priorities, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, consider factors related to privacy and civil liberties, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness.
GAO-08-253T, Terrorist Watch List Screening: Recommendations to Promote a Comprehensive and Coordinated Approach to Terrorist-Related Screening
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Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, November 8, 2007:
Terrorist Watch List Screening:
Recommendations to Promote a Comprehensive and Coordinated Approach to
Terrorist-Related Screening:
Statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director Homeland Security and Justice
Issues:
GAO-08-253T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-253T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation‘s (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately
suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to
support terrorism-related screening.
This testimony discusses (1) standards for including individuals on the
list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3)
potential vulnerabilities in screening processes and efforts to address
them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related
screening.
This statement is based on GAO‘s report (GAO-08-110). To accomplish the
objectives, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed
officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the
Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that perform
terrorism-related screening.
What GAO Found:
The FBI and the intelligence community use standards of reasonableness
to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated terrorist
watch list. In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of
having possible links to terrorism”in addition to individuals with
known links”are to be nominated. As such, being on the list does not
automatically prohibit, for example, the issuance of a visa or entry
into the United States. Rather, when an individual on the list is
encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses
to determine what action to take, if any. As of May 2007, the
consolidated watch list contained approximately 755,000 records.
From December 2003 through May 2007, screening and law enforcement
agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch
list records approximately 53,000 times. Many individuals were matched
multiple times. The outcomes of these encounters reflect an array of
actions, such as arrests; denials of entry into the United States; and,
most often, questioning and release. Within the federal community,
there is general agreement that the watch list has helped to combat
terrorism by (1) providing screening and law enforcement agencies with
information to help them respond appropriately during encounters and
(2) helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals
on the watch list and collect information about them for use in
conducting investigations and in assessing threats.
Regarding potential vulnerabilities, TSC sends records daily from the
watch list to screening agencies. However, some records are not sent,
partly because screening against them may not be needed to support the
respective agency‘s mission or may not be possible due to the
requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against
watch list records. Also, some subjects of watch list records have
passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not
identified, for example, until after they had boarded and flew on an
aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the
United States. TSC and other federal agencies have ongoing initiatives
to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities, including efforts to
improve computerized name-matching programs and the quality of watch
list data.
Although the federal government has made progress in promoting
effective terrorism-related screening, additional screening
opportunities remain untapped”within the federal sector, as well as
within critical infrastructure components of the private sector. This
situation exists partly because the government lacks an up-to-date
strategy and implementation plan for optimizing use of the terrorist
watch list. Also lacking are clear lines of authority and
responsibility. An up-to-date strategy and implementation plan,
supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure,
would provide a platform to establish governmentwide screening
priorities, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes,
consider factors related to privacy and civil liberties, ensure that
any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder
effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends several actions to promote a comprehensive and
coordinated approach to terrorist-related screening. Among them are
actions to monitor and respond to vulnerabilities and to establish up-
to-date guidelines, strategies, and plans to facilitate expanded and
enhanced use of the list.
The departments that provided comments on the report generally agreed
with GAO‘s findings and recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-253T]. For more information, contact
Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our report on U.S. efforts to
develop and use the terrorist watch list to screen for known or
suspected terrorists who pose a threat to homeland security. The list
is an important tool in the government's overall efforts to combat
terrorism.
The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) is responsible for maintaining the
watch list and providing for its use during agency screening processes.
TSC receives the vast majority of its watch list records from the
National Counterterrorism Center, which compiles information on known
or suspected international terrorists from executive branch departments
and agencies. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
provides TSC with information on known or suspected domestic terrorists
who operate primarily within the United States, such as Ted Kaczynski
(the "Unabomber"). TSC consolidates this information into its watch
list database and makes records available for a variety of screening
purposes, such as the screening of visa applicants and the screening of
airline passengers. When an individual on the watch list is encountered
during screening, several entities--TSC, the screening agency,
investigative agencies, and the intelligence community--can be involved
in deciding what action to take, if any.
My testimony today discusses (1) the standards agencies use for
including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with
individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities in agencies'
watch list screening processes and efforts to address them, and (4)
actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening.
This statement is based on the report we issued in October
2007.[Footnote 1] To accomplish our report objectives, we reviewed
procedural guidance, statistics, and other relevant documentation
obtained from and interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National
Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other
agencies that perform terrorism-related screening. Specifically, at the
Transportation Security Administration, we examined the prescreening of
airline passengers prior to their boarding a flight; at U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, we examined the screening of travelers entering
the United States through ports of entry; and at the Department of
State, we examined the screening of visa applicants. We conducted our
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Summary:
In summary, we found the following:
* The National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI rely upon standards
of reasonableness in determining which individuals are appropriate for
inclusion on TSC's consolidated terrorist watch list. In general,
individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to
terrorism--in addition to individuals with known links--are to be
nominated. As such, inclusion on the list does not automatically
prohibit an individual from, for example, obtaining a visa or entering
the United States. As of May 2007, TSC's watch list contained
approximately 755,000 records.
* From December 2003 (when TSC began operations) through May 2007,
agencies encountered individuals who were on the watch list about
53,000 times. Many individuals were encountered multiple times. Actions
taken in response included arresting individuals and denying others
entry into the United States. Most often, however, agencies questioned
and then released the individuals because there was not sufficient
evidence of criminal or terrorist activity to warrant further legal
action. Nevertheless, such questioning allowed agencies to collect
information on the individuals, which was shared with law enforcement
agencies and the intelligence community.
* Screening agencies do not check against all records in the
consolidated watch list, partly because screening against certain
records (1) may not be needed to support the respective agency's
mission or (2) may not be possible due to the requirements of computer
programs used to check individuals against watch list records. Not
checking against all records may pose a security risk. Also, some
subjects of watch list records have passed undetected through agency
screening processes and were not identified, for example, until after
they had boarded and flew on an aircraft. Federal agencies have ongoing
initiatives to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities.
* The federal government has made progress in using the consolidated
watch list for screening purposes, but it has not (1) finalized
guidelines for using watch list records within critical infrastructure
components of the private sector or (2) identified all appropriate
opportunities for which terrorist-related screening should be applied.
Further, the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation
plan--supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance
structure--which are important for enhancing the effectiveness of
terrorist-related screening.
We have recommended several actions to promote a more comprehensive and
coordinated approach to terrorist-related screening. Among them are
actions to monitor and respond to vulnerabilities and to establish up-
to-date guidelines, strategies, and plans to facilitate expanded and
enhanced use of the list. The Department of Homeland Security and the
FBI, which provided the Department of Justice's comments on a draft of
the report, generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. The
Homeland Security Council was provided a draft of the report but did
not provide comments.[Footnote 2]
Background:
Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, the Attorney
General established TSC in September 2003 to consolidate the
government's approach to terrorism screening and provide for the
appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in screening
processes. TSC's consolidated watch list is the U.S. government's
master repository for all records of known or appropriately suspected
international and domestic terrorists used for watch list-related
screening.
* When an individual makes an airline reservation, arrives at a U.S.
port of entry, or applies for a U.S. visa, or is stopped by state or
local police within the United States, the frontline screening agency
or airline conducts a name-based search of the individual against
applicable terrorist watch list records. In general, when the
computerized name-matching system of an airline or screening agency
generates a "hit" (a potential name match) against a watch list record,
the airline or agency is to review each potential match. Any obvious
mismatches (negative matches) are to be resolved by the airline or
agency, if possible, as discussed in our September 2006 report on
terrorist watch list screening.[Footnote 3] However, clearly positive
or exact matches and matches that are inconclusive (difficult to
verify) generally are to be referred to TSC to confirm whether the
individual is a match to the watch list record. TSC is to refer
positive and inconclusive matches to the FBI to provide an opportunity
for a counterterrorism response. Deciding what action to take, if any,
can involve collaboration among the frontline screening agency, the
National Counterterrorism Center or other intelligence community
members, and the FBI or other investigative agencies. If necessary, a
member of an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force can respond in person to
interview and obtain additional information about the person
encountered.[Footnote 4] In other cases, the FBI will rely on the
screening agency and other law enforcement agencies--such as U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement--to respond and collect
information. Figure 1 presents a general overview of the process used
to resolve encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch list.
Figure 1: General Overview of the Process Used to Resolve Encounters
with Individuals on the Terrorist Watch List:
This figure is a chart with illustrations showing a general overview of
the process used to resolve encounters with individuals on the
terrorist watch list.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSC information.
[End of figure]
To build upon and provide additional guidance related to Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 6, in August 2004, the President signed
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11. Among other things, this
directive required the Secretary of Homeland Security--in coordination
with the heads of appropriate federal departments and agencies--to
submit two reports to the President (through the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security) related to the government's approach
to terrorist-related screening. The first report was to outline a
strategy to enhance the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening
activities by developing comprehensive and coordinated procedures and
capabilities. The second report was to provide a prioritized investment
and implementation plan for detecting and interdicting suspected
terrorists and terrorist activities. Specifically, the plan was to
describe the "scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones,
training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of activities" to
implement the U.S. government's terrorism-related screening policies.
Agencies Rely upon Standards of Reasonableness in Assessing Individuals
for Inclusion on TSC's Watch List:
The National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI rely upon standards of
reasonableness in determining which individuals are appropriate for
inclusion on TSC's consolidated watch list.[Footnote 5] In accordance
with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, TSC's watch list is to
contain information about individuals "known or appropriately suspected
to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for,
in aid of, or related to terrorism." In implementing this directive,
the National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI strive to ensure that
individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to
terrorism--in addition to individuals with known links--are nominated
for inclusion on the watch list. To determine if the suspicions are
reasonable, the National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI are to
assess all available information on the individual. According to the
National Counterterrorism Center, determining whether to nominate an
individual can involve some level of subjectivity. Nonetheless, any
individual reasonably suspected of having links to terrorist activities
is to be nominated to the list and remain on it until the FBI or the
agency that supplied the information supporting the nomination, such as
one of the intelligence agencies, determines the person is not a threat
and should be removed from the list.
Moreover, according to the FBI, individuals who are subjects of ongoing
FBI counterterrorism investigations are generally nominated to TSC for
inclusion on the watch list, including persons who are being
preliminarily investigated to determine if they have links to
terrorism. In determining whether to open an investigation, the FBI
uses guidelines established by the Attorney General. These guidelines
contain specific standards for opening investigations, including formal
review and approval processes. According to FBI officials, there must
be a "reasonable indication" of involvement in terrorism before opening
an investigation. The FBI noted, for example, that it is not sufficient
to open an investigation based solely on a neighbor's complaint or an
anonymous tip or phone call. If an investigation does not establish a
terrorism link, the FBI generally is to close the investigation and
request that TSC remove the person from the watch list. Based on these
standards, the number of records in TSC's consolidated watch list has
increased from about 158,000 records in June 2004 to about 755,000
records as of May 2007 (see fig. 2). It is important to note that the
total number of records in TSC's watch list does not represent the
total number of individuals on the watch list. Rather, if an individual
has one or more known aliases, the watch list will contain multiple
records for the same individual.
Figure 2: Increase in Terrorist Watch List Records, June 2004 through
May 2007:
This figure is a line chart showing increase in terrorist watch list
records, between June 2004 through May 2007. The X axis is the month
and year, and the Y axis is the total records.
June 2004: 158,374;
May 2005: 287,982;
June 2006: 515,906;
May 2007: 754, 960.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSC data.
[End of figure]
TSC's watch list database is updated daily with new nominations,
modifications to existing records, and deletions. Because individuals
can be added to the list based on reasonable suspicion, inclusion on
the list does not automatically prohibit an individual from, for
example, obtaining a visa or entering the United States when the person
is identified by a screening agency. Rather, when an individual on the
list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the
person poses to determine what action to take, if any.
Agencies Have Had Approximately 53,000 Encounters with Individuals on
the Watch List, and Outcomes Indicate the List Has Helped to Combat
Terrorism:
From December 2003 (when TSC began operations) through May 2007,
screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were
positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times,
according TSC data. A breakdown of these encounters shows that the
number of matches has increased each year--from 4,876 during the first
10-month period of TSC's operations to 14,938 during fiscal year 2005,
to 19,887 during fiscal year 2006. This increase can be attributed
partly to the growth in the number of records in the consolidated
terrorist watch list and partly to the increase in the number of
agencies that use the list for screening purposes. Our analysis of TSC
data also indicates that many individuals were encountered multiple
times. For example, a truck driver who regularly crossed the U.S.-
Canada border or an individual who frequently took international
flights could each account for multiple encounters. Further, TSC data
show that the highest percentage of encounters involved screening
within the United States by a state or local law enforcement agency,
U.S. government investigative agency, or other governmental entity. The
next highest percentage involved border-related encounters, such as
passengers on airline flights inbound from outside the United States or
individuals screened at land ports of entry. The lowest percentage of
encounters occurred outside of the United States.
The watch list has enhanced the U.S. government's counterterrorism
efforts by allowing federal, state, and local screening and law
enforcement officials to obtain information to help them make better-
informed decisions during encounters regarding the level of threat a
person poses and the appropriate response to take, if any. The specific
outcomes of encounters with individuals on the watch list are based on
the government's overall assessment of the intelligence and
investigative information that supports the watch list record and any
additional information that may be obtained during the encounter. Our
analysis of data on the outcomes of encounters revealed that agencies
took a range of actions, such as arresting individuals, denying others
entry into the United States, and most commonly, releasing the
individuals following questioning and information gathering.
* TSC data show that agencies reported arresting many subjects of watch
list records for various reasons, such as the individual having an
outstanding arrest warrant or the individual's behavior or actions
during the encounter. TSC data also indicated that some of the arrests
were based on terrorism grounds.
* TSC data show that when visa applicants were positively matched to
terrorist watch list records, the outcomes included visas denied, visas
issued (because the consular officer did not find any statutory basis
for inadmissibility), and visa ineligibility waived.[Footnote 6]
* Transportation Security Administration data show that when airline
passengers were positively matched to the No Fly or Selectee lists, the
vast majority of matches were to the Selectee list.[Footnote 7] Other
outcomes included individuals matched to the No Fly list and denied
boarding (did not fly) and individuals matched to the No Fly list after
the aircraft was in flight. Additional information on individuals on
the watch list passing undetected through agency screening is presented
later in this statement.
* U.S. Customs and Border Protection data show that a number of
nonimmigrant aliens encountered at U.S. ports of entry were positively
matched to terrorist watch list records. For many of the encounters,
the agency determined there was sufficient information related to watch
list records to preclude admission under terrorism grounds. However,
for most of the encounters, the agency determined that there was not
sufficient information related to the records to preclude admission.
* TSC data show that state or local law enforcement officials have
encountered individuals who were positively matched to terrorist watch
list records thousands of times. Although data on the actual outcomes
of these encounters were not available, the vast majority involved
watch list records that indicated that the individuals were released,
unless there were reasons other than terrorism-related grounds for
arresting or detaining the individuals, such as the individual having
an outstanding arrest warrant.
Also, according to federal officials, encounters with individuals who
were positively matched to the watch list assisted government efforts
in tracking the respective person's movements or activities and
provided the opportunity to collect additional information about the
individual. The information collected was shared with agents conducting
counterterrorism investigations and with the intelligence community for
use in analyzing threats. Such coordinated collection of information
for use in investigations and threat analyses is one of the stated
policy objectives for the watch list.
Potential Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes and Agency
Efforts to Address Them:
The principal screening agencies whose missions most frequently and
directly involve interactions with travelers do not check against all
records in TSC's consolidated watch list because screening against
certain records (1) may not be needed to support the respective
agency's mission, (2) may not be possible due to the requirements of
computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records,
or (3) may not be operationally feasible. Rather, each day, TSC exports
applicable records from the consolidated watch list to federal
government databases that agencies use to screen individuals for
mission-related concerns. For example, the database that U.S. Customs
and Border Protection uses to check incoming travelers for immigration
violations, criminal histories, and other matters contained the highest
percentage of watch list records as of May 2007. This is because its
mission is to screen all travelers, including U.S. citizens, entering
the United States at ports of entry. The database that the Department
of State uses to screen applicants for visas contained the second
highest percentage of all watch list records. This database does not
include records on U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents because
these individuals would not apply for U.S. visas.
The FBI database that state and local law enforcement agencies use for
screening contained the third highest percentage of watch list records.
According to the FBI, the remaining records were not included in this
database primarily because they did not contain sufficient identifying
information on the individual, which is required to minimize instances
of individuals being misidentified as being subjects of watch list
records. Further, the No Fly and Selectee lists disseminated by the
Transportation Security Administration to airlines for use in
prescreening passengers contained the lowest percentage of watch list
records. The lists did not contain the remaining records either because
they (1) did not meet the nomination criteria for the No Fly or
Selectee list or (2) did not contain sufficient identifying information
on the individual.[Footnote 8] According to the Department of Homeland
Security, increasing the number of records used to prescreen passengers
would expand the number of misidentifications to unjustifiable
proportions without a measurable increase in security. While we
understand the FBI's and the Department of Homeland Security's concerns
about misidentifications, we still believe it is important that federal
officials assess the extent to which security risks exist by not
screening against certain watch list records and what actions, if any,
should be taken in response.
Also, Department of Homeland Security component agencies are taking
steps to address instances of individuals on the watch list passing
undetected through agency screening. For example, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection has encountered situations where it identified the
subject of a watch list record after the individual had been processed
at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. U.S. Customs
and Border Protection has created a working group within the agency to
study the causes of this vulnerability and has begun to implement
corrective actions. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services--the
agency responsible for screening persons who apply for U.S. citizenship
or immigration benefits--has also acknowledged areas that need
improvement in the processes used to detect subjects of watch list
records. According to agency representatives, each instance of an
individual on the watch list getting through agency screening is
reviewed to determine the cause, with appropriate follow-up and
corrective action taken, if needed. The agency is also working with TSC
to enhance screening effectiveness.
Further, Transportation Security Administration data show that in the
past, a number of individuals who were on the government's No Fly list
passed undetected through airlines' prescreening of passengers and flew
on international flights bound to or from the United States. The
individuals were subsequently identified in-flight by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, which checks passenger names against watch list
records to help the agency prepare for the passengers' arrival in the
United States. However, the potential onboard security threats posed by
the undetected individuals required an immediate counterterrorism
response, which in some instances resulted in diverting the aircraft to
a new location.[Footnote 9] According to the Transportation Security
Administration, such incidents were subsequently investigated and, if
needed, corrective action was taken with the respective air carrier. In
addition, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has issued a final rule
that should better position the government to identify individuals on
the No Fly list before an international flight is airborne.[Footnote
10] For domestic flights within the United States, there is no second
screening opportunity--like the one U.S. Customs and Border Protection
conducts for international flights. The government plans to take over
from air carriers the function of prescreening passengers prior to
departure against watch list records for both international and
domestic flights. Also, TSC has ongoing initiatives to help reduce
instances of individuals on the watch list passing undetected through
agency screening, including efforts to improve computerized name-
matching programs.
The U.S. Government Has Made Progress in Using the Watch List, but a
Strategy and Plan Supported by a Governance Structure Would Enhance Use
and Effectiveness:
Although the federal government has made progress in using the
consolidated watch list for screening purposes, additional
opportunities exist for using the list. Internationally, the Department
of State has made progress in making bilateral arrangements to share
terrorist screening information with certain foreign governments. The
department had two such arrangements in place before September 11,
2001. More recently, the department has made four new arrangements and
is in negotiations with several other countries.
Also, the Department of Homeland Security has made progress in using
watch list records to screen employees in some critical infrastructure
components of the private sector, including certain individuals who
have access to vital areas of nuclear power plants, work in airports,
or transport hazardous materials. However, many critical infrastructure
components are not using watch list records. The Department of Homeland
Security has not, consistent with Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 6, finalized guidelines to support private sector screening
processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland security.
Finalizing such guidelines would help both the private sector and the
Department of Homeland Security ensure that private sector entities are
using watch list records consistently, appropriately, and effectively
to protect their workers, visitors, and key critical assets. Further,
federal departments and agencies have not identified all appropriate
opportunities for which terrorist-related screening will be applied, in
accordance with presidential directives.
A primary reason why screening opportunities remain untapped is because
the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan--
supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure--for
enhancing the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening, consistent
with presidential directives. Without an up-to-date strategy and plan,
agencies and organizations that conduct terrorist-related screening
activities do not have a foundation for a coordinated approach that is
driven by an articulated set of core principles. Furthermore, lacking
clearly articulated principles, milestones, and outcome measures, the
federal government is not easily able to provide accountability and a
basis for monitoring to ensure that (1) the intended goals for, and
expected results of, terrorist screening are being achieved and (2) use
of the list is consistent with privacy and civil liberties. These plan
elements, which were prescribed by presidential directives, are crucial
for coordinated and comprehensive use of terrorist-related screening
data, as they provide a platform to establish governmentwide priorities
for screening, assess progress toward policy goals and intended
outcomes, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond
to issues that hinder effectiveness.
Although all elements of a strategy and implementation plan cited in
presidential directives are important to guide realization of the most
effective use of watch list data, addressing governance is particularly
vital, as achievement of a coordinated and comprehensive approach to
terrorist-related screening involves numerous entities within and
outside the federal government. However, no clear lines of
responsibility and authority have been established to monitor
governmentwide screening activities for shared problems and solutions
or best practices. Neither does any existing entity clearly have the
requisite authority for addressing various governmentwide issues--such
as assessing common gaps or vulnerabilities in screening processes and
identifying, prioritizing, and implementing new screening
opportunities. Thus, it is important that the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism address these
deficiencies by ensuring that an appropriate governance structure has
clear and adequate responsibility and authority to (a) provide
monitoring and analysis of watch list screening efforts governmentwide,
(b) respond to issues that hinder effectiveness, and (c) assess
progress toward intended outcomes.
Conclusions and Recommendations for Executive Action:
Managed by TSC, the consolidated terrorist watch list represents a
major step forward from the pre-September 11 environment of multiple,
disconnected, and incomplete watch lists throughout the government.
Today, the watch list is an integral component of the U.S. government's
counterterrorism efforts. However, our work indicates that there are
additional opportunities for reducing potential screening
vulnerabilities, expanding use of the watch list, and enhancing
management oversight. Thus, we have made several recommendations to the
heads of relevant departments and agencies. Our recommendations are
intended to help (1) mitigate security vulnerabilities in terrorist
watch list screening processes that arise when screening agencies do
not use certain watch list records and (2) optimize the use and
effectiveness of the watch list as a counterterrorism tool. Such
optimization should include development of guidelines to support
private sector screening processes that have a substantial bearing on
homeland security, as well as development of an up-to-date strategy and
implementation plan for using terrorist-related information. Further,
to help ensure that governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts
are effectively coordinated, we have also recommended that the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
ensure that an appropriate leadership or governance structure has clear
lines of responsibility and authority.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of our report, which provides the basis for my
statement at today's hearing, the Department of Homeland Security noted
that it agreed with and supported our work and stated that it had
already begun to address issues identified in our report's findings.
The FBI noted that the database state and local law enforcement
agencies use for screening does not contain certain watch list records
primarily to minimize instances of individuals being misidentified as
subjects of watch list records. Because of this operational concern,
the FBI noted that our recommendation to assess the extent of
vulnerabilities in current screening processes has been completed and
the vulnerability has been determined to be low or nonexistent. In our
view, however, recognizing operational concerns does not constitute
assessing vulnerabilities. Thus, while we understand the FBI's
operational concerns, we maintain it is still important that the FBI
assess to what extent security risks are raised by not screening
against certain watch list records and what actions, if any, should be
taken in response. Also, the FBI noted that TSC's governance board is
the appropriate forum for obtaining a commitment from all of the
entities involved in the watch-listing process. However, as discussed
in our report, TSC's governance board is responsible for providing
guidance concerning issues within TSC's mission and authority and would
need additional authority to provide effective coordination of
terrorist-related screening activities and interagency issues
governmentwide. The Homeland Security Council was provided a draft of
the report but did not provide comments.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-
8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this statement were
Danny R. Burton, Virginia A. Chanley, R. Eric Erdman, Michele C.
Fejfar, Jonathon C. Fremont, Kathryn E. Godfrey, Richard B. Hung,
Thomas F. Lombardi, Donna L. Miller, and Ronald J. Salo.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance
Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening
Processes, and Expand Use of the List, GAO-08-110 (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 11, 2007).
[2] The Homeland Security Council was established to ensure
coordination of all homeland security-related activities among
executive departments and agencies and promote the effective
development and implementation of all homeland security policies. See
The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-1,
Subject: Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2001).
[3] Terrorist watch list-related screening can cause travel delays and
other inconveniences, which may be inevitable consequences of enhanced
homeland security. Nonetheless, as we reported in September 2006, it is
important for TSC and screening agencies to provide effective redress
for individuals who are inadvertently and adversely affected by watch
list-related screening. See GAO, Terrorist Watch List Screening:
Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the Public, GAO-06-1031
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006).
[4] Joint Terrorism Task Forces are teams of state and local law
enforcement officials, FBI agents, and other federal agents and
personnel whose mission is to investigate and prevent acts of
terrorism. There is a Joint Terrorism Task Force in each of the FBI's
56 main field offices, and additional task forces are located in
smaller FBI offices.
[5] In general, and in this context, a standard of reasonableness can
be described as a government agent's particularized and objective basis
for suspecting an individual of engaging in terrorist-related
activities, considering the totality of circumstances known to the
government agent at that time. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 184
F.3d 637, 640-41 (7th Cir. 1999); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
[6] In this context, ineligibility waived refers to individuals who
were ineligible for a visa based on terrorism grounds, but the
Department of Homeland Security approved a waiver for a one-time visit
or multiple entries into the United States. In general, waivers are
approved when the U.S. government has an interest in allowing the
individual to enter the United States, such as an individual on the
terrorist watch list who is invited to participate in peace talks under
U.S. auspices.
[7] In general, individuals on the No Fly list are to be precluded from
boarding an aircraft, and individuals on the Selectee list are to
receive additional physical screening prior to boarding an aircraft.
[8] Of all of the screening databases that accept watch list records,
only the No Fly and Selectee lists require certain nomination criteria
or inclusion standards that are narrower than the "known or
appropriately suspected" standard of Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 6.
[9] In July 2007, we issued a report that examined federal coordination
for responding to in-flight security threats. See GAO, Aviation
Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security
Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, GAO-07-891R
(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
[10] See 72 Fed. Reg. 48,320 (Aug. 23, 2007). The provisions of the
final rule take effect on February 19, 2008.
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