Combating Terrorism
Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists Gao ID: GAO-07-697 May 25, 2007Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on the prevention of terrorist attacks. The strategies called for LEAs to intensify their efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. GAO was asked to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies that provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. However, these strategies did not articulate which LEAs should implement the guidance to enhance efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism or how they should do so. While one of the strategies tasked State with developing and coordinating U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad, we found State did not develop or coordinate the development of a plan to use the combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. In December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which charged the NCTC with developing a plan to use all elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June of 2006. According to NCTC, State, Justice, and DHS officials, implementing guidance for the plan is under development, and they would not discuss the contents of the plan or the guidance. Some LEAs have increased efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, DHS has implemented its Container Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports, and State has expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. However, we found that because most LEAs, with the exception of the FBI, have not been given clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities on helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. In addition, we found LEAs generally lacked guidance on using resources to assist foreign nations in addressing terrorist vulnerabilities and generally lacked performance monitoring systems and formal structures for sharing information and collaborating. We also found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not conducted, LEAs may not be tailoring their full range of training and assistance to address key terrorism vulnerabilities in foreign countries.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-697, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists
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Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2007:
Combating Terrorism:
Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to
Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists:
=GAO-07-697:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-697, a report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11
attacks, directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on the
prevention of terrorist attacks. The strategies called for LEAs to
intensify their efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. GAO was asked to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs
to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this
guidance.
What GAO Found:
Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies
that provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
However, these strategies did not articulate which LEAs should
implement the guidance to enhance efforts to help foreign nations
combat terrorism or how they should do so. While one of the strategies
tasked State with developing and coordinating U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism abroad, we found State did not develop or coordinate the
development of a plan to use the combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to
help foreign nations identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. In
December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, which charged the NCTC with developing a plan
to use all elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat
terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had drafted a general plan,
which was approved by the President in June of 2006. According to NCTC,
State, Justice, and DHS officials, implementing guidance for the plan
is under development, and they would not discuss the contents of the
plan or the guidance.
Some LEAs have increased efforts to help foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, DHS has implemented its
Container Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign
ports, and State has expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)
program. However, we found that because most LEAs, with the exception
of the FBI, have not been given clear guidance, they lacked clearly
defined roles and responsibilities on helping foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the lack
of clear roles and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have
compromised several joint operations intended to identify and disrupt
potential terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and foreign
nation LEAs. In addition, we found LEAs generally lacked guidance on
using resources to assist foreign nations in addressing terrorist
vulnerabilities and generally lacked performance monitoring systems and
formal structures for sharing information and collaborating. We also
found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not conducted,
LEAs may not be tailoring their full range of training and assistance
to address key terrorism vulnerabilities in foreign countries.
Figure: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism
Exercises:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
We recommend that the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) ensure
that the implementing guidance for its NCTC‘s plan for combating
terrorism articulates a clear strategy for using LEAs to help foreign
nations combat terrorism. We also recommend that State, Justice, and
DHS explore enhancements to overseas coordination mechanisms and
develop clear guidance and performance monitoring to enhance efforts to
help foreign nations combat terrorism.
NCTC stated it had already begun to implement our recommendations. DHS
generally agreed with our recommendations. State and Justice stated
they would consider ways to improve overseas coordination, but did not
indicate whether they concurred with our other recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Key Elements
for a Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration:
LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and
Prosecute Terrorists Have Been Limited by Several Factors:
Conclusion:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice:
GAO Comments:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Status of Key Elements of Strategic Plans and Interagency
Collaboration in the National Strategies, for Foreign Nation Assistance
to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists:
Figure:
Figure 1: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism
Exercises:
Abbreviations:
ATA: Antiterrorism Assistance:
ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency:
CSI: Container Security Initiative:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DS: Bureau of Diplomatic Security:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
ILEA: International Law Enforcement Academy:
INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs:
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service:
JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Forces:
LEA: Law enforcement agency:
LEGAT: Legal Attaché:
NCTC: National Counterterrorism Center:
NSC: National Security Council:
OIG: Office of Inspector General:
RAP: Regional Action Plans:
RSO: Regional Security Officer:
S/CT: Department of State/Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism:
WMD: Weapons of mass destruction:
USMS: U.S. Marshals Service:
USSS: United States Secret Service:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 25, 2007:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Shays:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), combating
terrorism has become the nation's top national security goal and the
highest strategic objective at U.S. embassies worldwide. Law
enforcement agencies (LEA) from the Departments of State (State),
Justice (Justice), and Homeland Security (DHS)--including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and State's Bureau of
Diplomatic Security (DS)--operate from U.S. embassies overseas and
assist foreign nation governments on a broad array of law enforcement
issues, such as investigating crime, reducing illegal drug activity,
controlling borders and immigration, and protecting U.S. embassies and
diplomats from attack. Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the
wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, directed that law enforcement
activities be increasingly focused on the prevention of further
terrorist attacks, including helping foreign nations identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists. This includes technical assistance, such as
antiterrorism training and the provision of technologies used to
identify terrorist threats, and operational assistance, such as joint
U.S.-foreign nation investigations and operations against terrorists.
This new focus on working with foreign nations to prevent terrorist
attacks represents a notable shift from pre-9/11 objectives, with
potentially significant implications for the strategies, resources, and
overseas presence of U.S. LEAs.
Because of the continuing threat of terrorist attacks against the
United States and its embassies, diplomats, and citizens abroad, you
requested that we evaluate the federal government's efforts to
implement national security strategies to use its LEAs to assist
foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists.
Specifically, you asked us to assess (1) the guidance for LEAs to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists
and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance. We
agreed that this review would be limited to U.S. law enforcement
efforts overseas to assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting,
and prosecuting terrorists and would not focus on (1) U.S. domestic law
enforcement efforts to combat terrorism; (2) other instruments of
national power--including military, intelligence, diplomatic, or
financial--currently being used to combat terrorism; and (3) U.S.
efforts to combat terrorist financing, since we had recently completed
a review of this effort.[Footnote 1]
To assess the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations in
identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists, we analyzed the
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the
National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy to
Combat Terrorism,[Footnote 2] the 9/11 Commission Report, and related
legislation to determine if the strategies contained key elements that
we have recommended[Footnote 3] and the Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA) requires, such as clearly defined objectives, roles
and responsibilities, leveraged funding, and monitoring systems. We
also discussed the guidance with representatives from State, Justice,
and DHS, along with embassy and LEA officials involved with working
with foreign nation counterparts. To assess the extent to which LEAs
have implemented this guidance to assist foreign nations, we reviewed
State, Justice, and DHS strategic plans and annual performance reports;
requested all implementing guidance; and asked that each agency provide
a listing of their general accomplishments in assisting foreign nations
to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We also conducted
detailed work in four countries with key roles in combating terrorism,
where we met with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation officials. We are
not naming the specific countries we visited for this review due to
diplomatic and security concerns. After our work abroad, we reviewed
and verified our overall observations with senior representatives from
each department and agency. We also met with National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) officials to brief them on our observations and to
determine the status of ongoing efforts to develop a plan to use all
elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC
officials would not discuss the plan, its contents, or any issues
raised in this report. According to NCTC officials, the implementing
guidance for the plan was still under development as of March 1, 2007.
During the course of our work we experienced considerable delays
obtaining information from Justice and State, which resulted in this
report being issued several months later than initially planned. We
were eventually able to obtain information sufficient for answering our
objectives. We conducted our work between August 2005 and March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the President issued a series
of national strategies, beginning in 2002 and updated in 2006, that
provided broad direction for overseas U.S. law enforcement efforts to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
These strategies collectively called for reorienting U.S. LEAs to
proactively work to prevent terrorist attacks at home and abroad.
However, they lacked key components, such as clearly defined
objectives, roles and responsibilities, and procedures for working
across agency boundaries toward a common goal, necessary for a
strategic plan and for facilitating interagency collaboration. Further,
they did not articulate which LEAs should implement the general
guidance or how they should do so. For example, officials from seven
LEAs as well as embassy officials in the four countries we visited told
us that they had received little-to-no guidance from the National
Security Council (NSC), NCTC,[Footnote 4] or State, Justice, and DHS on
how to implement the directive to assist foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Only the FBI received and has issued
some implementing guidance--for example, stating that it planned to
increase its presence abroad and increase joint operations with foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. While one of
the three strategies tasked State with developing and coordinating U.S.
efforts to combat terrorism abroad, we found that State did not develop
or coordinate a plan to use the combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to
help foreign nations combat terrorism. In December 2004, Congress
passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act),[Footnote 5] which charged the NCTC
with developing a plan to use all elements of national power, including
LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had drafted a
general plan, which was approved by the President in June 2006.
According to NCTC officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was
still under development as of March 1, 2007, and they would not discuss
the plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance.
Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to help foreign
nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, the
FBI has increased its overseas activities, DHS has worked with foreign
nations to implement the Container Security Initiative, and State has
expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance program to improve foreign nation
capacities to combat terrorism. Despite such actions, we found that
because most LEAs, with the exception of the FBI, have not been given
clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities
for helping foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. For example, in one country we visited, the lack of clear
roles and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised
several joint operations intended to identify and disrupt potential
terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs
involved in these efforts. In addition, we found that departments and
LEAs generally lacked guidance on setting funding priorities and
providing resources to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. As a result, for example, we found that State's
office responsible for coordinating all U.S. assistance to combat
terrorism abroad was hampered by a lack of resources, limiting its
ability to carry out this vital function. LEAs also lacked performance
monitoring systems to determine the effectiveness of their technical or
operational assistance and, as a result, found it difficult to assess
whether they were making progress in their efforts to help foreign
nations combat terrorism. In addition, embassies generally lacked
formal structures for LEAs to share information and collaborate on
operational efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists; LEA and embassy officials told us that existing
embassy structures do not provide a means for all LEAs at embassies to
work collaboratively to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We
also found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not
conducted to identify technical and operational assistance needs in the
four countries we visited, the full range of assistance that LEAs could
provide may not be utilized to address foreign nations' needs for
identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists.
To ensure that LEAs, a key element of national power, are fully focused
on assisting foreign nations to identify and prevent future terrorist
attacks and protect Americans around the world, we are making
recommendations to the NCTC, NSC, and three executive departments with
LEAs stationed abroad. We recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in
consultation with the NSC, ensure that the implementing guidance for
the NCTC's plan for combating terrorism (1) articulates a clear
strategy to implement the national strategies' goal of using U.S. LEAs
to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists;
(2) clarifies roles and responsibilities for each LEA for implementing
the goal; (3) provides guidance to LEAs on setting funding priorities
and providing resources to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists; (4) requires comprehensive needs assessments
for foreign nations and tailored assistance programs to address those
needs; and (5) requires a monitoring system to report on
accomplishments or progress.
In addition, we recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the
Secretaries of Homeland Security and State each take the following two
actions:
* Issue clear guidance to their respective component agencies and
bureaus on how those agencies and bureaus should implement the national
strategies' goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs to assist
foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists.
* Establish a monitoring system that provides the respective department
and Congress accurate reporting on that department's accomplishments,
impediments, and planned improvements in its LEAs' efforts to help
foreign nations combat terrorism.
We also recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the
U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security take the
following action:
* Explore the creation of new structures at U.S. embassies to improve
information-sharing and coordination among U.S. LEAs for assisting
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
We received written comments on a draft of this report from DHS,
Justice, and State, which are reprinted in appendixes II, III, and IV.
DHS generally agreed with the findings and recommendations in the
report and said it would take action to implement them based upon
direction from the NSC and NCTC.
Justice agreed to work with State to consider ways to enhance
interagency coordination at embassies. Justice also said it will work
with NCTC to address guidance to implement the NCTC plan. Justice did
not indicate whether it concurred with our recommendations that the
Attorney General issue clear guidance to LEAs or establish a monitoring
system for ongoing efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism.
Justice also expressed concern that our analysis did not clearly
distinguish between operational and technical assistance.
State said it would consider working with relevant LEAs to improve the
coordination of law enforcement activities overseas. State did not
indicate whether it concurred with our recommendations that the
Secretary of State issue clear guidance and establish a monitoring
system for ongoing efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism.
State also indicated that we did not fully reflect the department's
lack of resources necessary to carry out its mandate to coordinate U.S.
efforts to combat terrorism abroad and provided additional information
on its Regional Strategic Initiatives and the role of DS.
The NCTC provided oral comments on a draft of this report and stated
that it is in the process of implementing the plan in conjunction with
other departments and agencies, including the law enforcement agencies.
According to NCTC, it has already begun to implement the
recommendations made to NCTC in our report. We also received technical
comments from State, DHS, Justice, and NCTC, which we have incorporated
throughout the report where appropriate.
Background:
State, Justice, and DHS each include LEAs that operate from U.S.
embassies. LEAs abroad work on a wide array of law enforcement issues,
including those that cover criminal enterprises, drug cartels, visa and
immigration fraud, financial crimes, criminal and terrorist threats
against U.S. embassies and personnel, and fugitive capture and
extraditions. LEA assistance can include technical assistance, such as
the provision of training in police techniques and legal reforms, as
well as investigative or operational assistance, which can support
efforts such as joint teams of U.S. and foreign nation LEAs working
together to stop crimes, illegal drug operations, or terrorists
attacks.
LEAs face a number of challenges in working with foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In particular, LEAs lack
arrest authority overseas and therefore heavily rely on the cooperation
of the foreign nation. The degree of cooperation and the capabilities
of foreign nation law enforcement agencies vary widely. According to
FBI officials, forging partnerships with foreign nation LEAs can be an
arduous and sometimes impractical task. They said that the ability to
engage in joint investigations with foreign nation LEAs was dictated
both by the will and the ability of their counterparts to engage in
complex investigative techniques.
Department of Justice:
The Department of Justice's primary goal is preventing terrorist
attacks within the United States and promoting the nation's security,
as well as investigating and prosecuting those who have committed, or
intend to commit, terrorist attacks in the United States. Four Justice
LEAs have a permanent overseas presence, including the FBI; DEA; the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and the
U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).
The FBI is charged with protecting the United States from terrorist
attacks; preventing, disrupting, and defeating terrorist operations;
improving efforts to combat terrorism with U.S. state and local LEAs by
expanding the use of multiagency Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF);
and expanding operational partnerships with foreign nation law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt and prevent terrorism.
The FBI operates abroad through its Legal Attaché (LEGAT) offices
located in 59 U.S. missions around the world. The FBI's Web site states
that LEGATs (1) coordinate international investigations with their
foreign nation colleagues; (2) cover international leads for domestic
U.S. investigations; (3) link U.S. and international resources in
critical criminal and terrorist areas to protect Americans at home and
abroad; and (4) coordinate FBI training, including counterterrorism
classes, for police in their geographic regions. According to the FBI,
a July 2005 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Overseas and
Domestic Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigations controls the interaction of the CIA
and the FBI in regard to foreign counterterrorism operations abroad.
DEA's mission is to target organizations that pose the greatest drug
threats to American citizens. It cooperates closely with foreign
nations to help them identify, disrupt, and prosecute those involved in
the illegal drug trade to reduce the availability of illicit drugs. DEA
has around 696 officials in 63 countries.
ATF's mission is to enforce regulations on the firearms and explosives
industries, assist other LEAs during criminal and post-blast
investigations, conduct ballistics analysis, and trace the origins of
guns and bombs used during criminal activity. ATF provides ballistics
training and tracing assistance to foreign nation police, and, ATF
officials told us, its analytical capabilities could be used to trace
the origins of explosives used in terrorist bombings, and to help
identify and capture terrorist cells. ATF has a permanent presence in
four countries with a total of 10 officials.
The USMS's mission is to track, apprehend, and extradite fugitives
domestically and internationally, as well as protect federal judicial
officials, including judges, attorneys, and jurors. USMS officials told
us that USMS has provided assistance and training to foreign nation
LEAs in establishing systems for protecting judicial officials. USMS
has a permanent presence in three countries with a total of 7 agents.
In addition, USMS currently has 16 agents in Iraq and 5 in Afghanistan.
Department of Homeland Security:
DHS's primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United
States and reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism by detecting,
deterring, and mitigating terrorist threats. It is also responsible for
border security, and extending the zone of security beyond U.S. borders
by working with foreign nations to identify, prioritize, and interdict
threats. We examined three DHS LEAs that work from U.S. embassies
abroad, including ICE, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the
United States Secret Service (USSS).
ICE's primary mission is to protect the United States and uphold public
safety by identifying criminal activities and eliminating
vulnerabilities that pose a threat to U.S. borders. By investigating
threats to U.S. border security, ICE seeks to eliminate the potential
threat of terrorist acts against the United States. As of December
2006, ICE had 298 investigative agents in 52 offices in 41 countries.
CBP's primary mission includes preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States. CBP officials generally
operate at U.S. ports of entry along the U.S. borders with Mexico and
Canada, but also operate in parts of the Caribbean and other countries
around the world. CBP has 943 personnel deployed to 28 countries
abroad. The duties of these personnel include preclearing passengers
flying to the United States, working at foreign nation maritime ports
abroad in search of weapons of mass destruction, as well as working to
address CBP activities in-country and general CBP related support at
embassies. In addition, CBP works to protect global supply lines from
terrorism through both bilateral and multilateral fora.
The USSS's primary mission includes protecting the U.S. President, the
Vice President, their families, and other high-ranking U.S. government
officials from terrorism and other threats, as well as investigating
and facilitating prosecution of financial and electronic crimes,
counterfeit currency, and identity theft. USSS officials operate abroad
with 54 agents staffed to 19 offices in 15 countries.
Department of State:
The Department of State's primary mission is to "create a more secure,
democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people
and the international community."[Footnote 6] According to State's
Strategic Plan for 2004 to 2009, State is charged with developing,
coordinating, and implementing American counterterrorism policy. Within
State, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism's (S/ CT)
mission is to develop and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism
using all instruments of national power, including law enforcement,
diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, and military. S/ CT provides
foreign policy oversight and guidance to all U.S. government activities
to combat terrorism, including those of U.S. LEAs operating abroad.
DS is the department's law enforcement arm.[Footnote 7] The Bureau's
Regional Security Officers (RSO) are responsible for protecting the
embassy, its diplomats, and their families from criminal and terrorist
attacks. The RSO is the ambassador's senior advisor on law enforcement
and security issues. RSOs investigate passport and visa fraud, conduct
counterintelligence investigations, and can provide investigative
assistance to local, state, and federal agencies. DS personnel also
monitor and analyze terrorist activities and threats, train foreign
police in antiterrorism procedures, and protect U.S. and foreign
dignitaries. DS has approximately 590 RSO special agents assigned to
202 Foreign Service posts throughout the world, making it the most
widely represented U.S. LEA overseas.
National Security Council:
The National Security Act of 1947 created the NSC to improve the
coordination of national security concerns among executive departments
and agencies.[Footnote 8] The act charges the NSC with more effectively
coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies
related to national security. Specifically, the act states that the
function of the NSC shall be to advise the President with respect to
the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to
national security to enable the departments and agencies to cooperate
more effectively in matters involving national security.
The NSC is chaired by the President. According to the White House, its
regular attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory) include the Vice
President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and
the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is
the statutory military advisor to the NSC, and the Director of National
Intelligence is its intelligence advisor. The Attorney General and the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend
meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other
executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials,
are also invited to attend meetings when appropriate.
The 9/11 Commission:
The 9/11 Commission was an independent, bipartisan commission created
by congressional legislation in late 2002 and charged with preparing a
full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the 9/11
terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate
response to the attacks.[Footnote 9] The commission was also mandated
to provide recommendations designed to guard against future terrorist
attacks. On July 22, 2004, the commission released its public report.
The commission identified a number of weaknesses in the ability of U.S.
LEAs to identify and disrupt terrorist threats to the United States.
For example, it reported that the vast majority of LEAs did not
consider protecting Americans from terrorist threats their primary
goal. With the exception of one portion of the FBI, the commission
found that very little of the U.S. law enforcement community was
engaged in combating terrorism before the 9/11 attacks, despite each
agency's ability to make contributions to the U.S. effort. For example,
the commission found that:
* USMS had almost 4,000 agents on 9/11 and was expert in tracking
fugitives, but its expertise was not used to identify and apprehend
terrorists.
* DEA had more than 4,500 agents on 9/11, and there were a number of
occasions when DEA agents were able to introduce sources to the FBI or
CIA for counterterrorism use, despite the agency having no direct
mission to combat terrorism.
* The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),[Footnote 10] with
its 9,000 border patrol agents, 4,500 inspectors, and 2,000 immigration
special agents, had perhaps the greatest potential to develop an
expanded role in counterterrorism. However, INS was instead focused on
the formidable challenges posed by illegal entry over the southwest
border, criminal aliens, and a growing backlog in applications for
naturalizing immigrants.
* USSS had the mission to protect the President and other high-ranking
officials, and its agents did not become involved with counterterrorism
efforts except when terrorist assassination plots were rumored or
suspected.
* The Customs Service (which is now part of DHS) deployed agents at all
points of entry into the United States to screen imported goods and
collect duties, and while these agents worked alongside INS agents, the
two groups did not regularly cooperate on joint investigations.
* ATF was used only occasionally by the FBI as a counterterrorism
resource prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, despite its expertise in
ballistics and explosives tracing. The ATF's laboratories,
investigators, and analyses were critical to the investigation of the
February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the April 1995
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
The commission noted that counterterrorism investigations often
overlapped with or were cued by other criminal investigations, such as
for money laundering or smuggling contraband, and that, because of this
nexus between counterterrorism and criminal investigations, LEAs could
fundamentally expand U.S. efforts to identify and disrupt terrorist
threats to America.
However, the commission found that numerous impediments to using U.S.
LEAs to protect America from further terrorist attacks existed prior to
9/11. For example, the commission found that that no one was in charge
of using the full capabilities of these agencies to identify and
disrupt the terrorist threat; roles and responsibilities were not
adequately defined; accountability was diffuse; and the federal
government lacked a performance monitoring system to track LEA progress
at identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. In addition,
the commission found that LEAs were not oriented to prevent terrorist
attacks. Finally, the commission found that these agencies cooperated
only some of the time, and this cooperation did not amount to the type
of joint action that harnessed the combined capabilities of all U.S.
LEAs.
The National Counterterrorism Center:
In recognition of these and other problems, the commission recommended
that Congress authorize the creation of a single, centralized center
for combating terrorism to coordinate all instruments of national
power, including law enforcement, to prevent another attack. In
December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, which
created the NCTC and charged it with conducting "strategic operational
planning" for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments
of national power--including diplomatic, financial, military,
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities--
within and among agencies, with the ultimate goal of preventing future
attacks against America and its interests worldwide.
The act defined strategic operational planning to include the
counterterrorism mission, objectives to be achieved, tasks to be
performed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and the
assignment of roles and responsibilities. It also required NCTC to
monitor the implementation of strategic operational plans for each
relevant U.S. government department or agency. The NCTC is a part of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and reports to the
Director on matters of intelligence collection and analysis; however,
on matters of strategic operational planning for counterterrorism, the
Director of the NCTC reports directly to the President. As a result,
the NCTC works under the policy direction of the NSC on matters of
counterterrorism planning.
National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Key Elements
for a Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration:
A series of national strategies have provided broad guidance for U.S.
LEAs to help foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. However, the strategies lack essential elements of a
strategic plan and for facilitating interagency collaboration, and they
do not clearly delineate what role, if any, the various LEAs should
play in assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. While State was
charged in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism with
developing and coordinating U.S. counterterrorism policy abroad, it did
not develop a plan to do so, because, according to State officials, it
lacked sufficient authority and resources. The 2004 Intelligence Reform
Act requires the NCTC to develop U.S. governmentwide strategic
operational plans to combat terrorism. According to the act, NCTC's
planning should include the mission, objectives, tasks to be performed,
interagency coordination of operational activities, and the assignment
of roles and responsibilities among participating agencies. NCTC
officials told us that, in response to the act, they had drafted a
general plan, which was approved by the President in June 2006.
According to NCTC officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was
still under development as of March 1, 2007.
National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assist Foreign
Nations to Combat Terrorism:
A series of national strategies have provided some strategic-level
guidance for U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. For example, the National Security Strategy,
issued in 2002 and updated in March 2006, states that the United States
will continue to encourage regional partners to take up a coordinated
effort that isolates the terrorists, and help ensure that foreign
nations have the law enforcement, military, political, and financial
tools necessary to disrupt and destroy terrorist operations before they
reach American borders.
Additionally, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
primarily focuses on domestic efforts to secure America from further
terrorist attacks. It clarifies the role of LEAs in the post 9/11
world, stating that, "Our Nation's highest law enforcement objective
must be the prevention of terrorist acts--a significant shift from pre-
9/11 objectives." The strategy also notes that, in a world where the
terrorist threat pays no respect to traditional boundaries, the
American strategy for homeland security cannot stop at the country's
borders. It calls for a sustained and systematic international agenda
to counter the global terrorist threat and improve homeland security,
and identifies a number of initiatives in this area, including (1)
intensifying international law enforcement cooperation and helping
foreign nations fight terrorism and (2) augmenting the FBI's overseas
presence by increasing the number of LEGATs around the world. It states
that Justice, in cooperation with State, is to work with foreign nation
counterparts on these law enforcement issues.
Also, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in 2003 and
updated in 2006, focuses on the United States' efforts to combat
terrorism abroad. It also provides greater detail on the objectives and
strategies for U.S. LEAs in working with their foreign nation
counterparts. According to the strategy, the United States is to:
* Expand, where appropriate, the U.S. law enforcement presence abroad
to further the investigative and operational assistance related to the
interdiction, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist suspects.
* Increase technical and operational assistance efforts to help foreign
nation LEAs acquire the necessary capabilities to fight terrorism
through a variety of means, including (1) improved legislation, (2)
technical assistance, (3) new investigative techniques, (4)
intelligence sharing, and (5) law enforcement training.
* Enhance operational assistance to expand international cooperation to
combat terrorism through expanded sharing of law enforcement
information.
In 2006, the White House released updates of the National Security
Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. Both updated
strategies reinforce the basic concepts of using U.S. LEAs to assist
foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists
abroad. For example, the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism supports
intensifying training and other types of assistance to improve foreign
nation LEA capacities to identify and disrupt terrorists threats, as
well as implementing legal reforms aimed at ensuring that foreign
nations have the necessary laws to carry out this effort, and that
investigators, prosecutors, and judges have the capacity to effectively
prosecute terrorists using these new laws. The strategies state that
this approach has succeeded in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
terrorist plots since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The National Strategies Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Plan and
Interagency Collaboration:
Our past work has stressed the importance of developing a strategy to
combat terrorism that would establish goals, objectives, priorities,
outcomes, milestones, and performance measures.[Footnote 11] In March
2003, we reported that strategic plans should clearly define objectives
to be accomplished, identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting
each objective, ensure that funding necessary to achieve the objectives
is available, and employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress
and identify needed improvements. For example, our past work has found
that identifying clear roles and responsibilities for each federal
agency combating terrorism is a major challenge in implementing
national strategies related to terrorism.
In addition, GPRA requires each federal agency to develop strategic
plans that cover a period of at least 5 years and include the agency's
mission statement; identify the agency's general goals and objectives;
and describe how the agency intends to achieve those goals through its
activities and human, capital, information, and other resources. Under
GPRA, strategic plans are the starting point for agencies to set annual
performance plans for programs and to measure the performance of the
programs in achieving those goals. Our past work has found that GPRA
has the potential for greatly enhancing agency performance. For
example, managers can use performance information to identify problems
in existing programs, to try to identify the causes of problems, and to
develop corrective actions.[Footnote 12]
Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort where interagency
collaboration is essential, we have found that agencies should (1)
define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually
reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address funding needs
by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; (5)
establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate
across agency boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate,
and report on results; (7) reinforce agency accountability for
collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and (8)
reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through
performance management systems.[Footnote 13] We have specifically noted
that, given the number of agencies involved in U.S. government efforts
to combat terrorism, it is particularly important that there be
mechanisms to coordinate across agencies.[Footnote 14]
We found that while the national strategies, as well as their updates
in 2006, provided broad guidance, they lacked key strategic elements,
including those to promote LEA collaboration in assisting foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists (see table 1).
For example, none of the three national strategies established joint
agency strategies that would capitalize on the unique capacity of each
LEA to combat terrorism. Further, none of them identified funding needs
or leveraged resources; reached agreement on roles and
responsibilities; or established procedures to operate across agency
boundaries. Moreover, none of the strategies included mechanisms to
monitor, evaluate, and report on their overall results, nor did they
reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through
agency plans and reports.
Table 1: Status of Key Elements of Strategic Plans and Interagency
Collaboration in the National Strategies, for Foreign Nation Assistance
to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists:
Key elements: Common or joint strategy;
National Security Strategy: [Empty];
National Strategy for Homeland Security: [Empty];
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: [Empty].
Key elements: Goals and objectives;
National Security Strategy: Check;
National Strategy for Homeland Security: Check;
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Check.
Key elements: Roles and responsibilities;
National Security Strategy: [Empty];
National Strategy for Homeland Security: [Empty];
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: [Empty].
Key elements: Performance measures;
National Security Strategy: [Empty];
National Strategy for Homeland Security: [Empty];
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: [Empty].
Key elements: Funding;
National Security Strategy: [Empty];
National Strategy for Homeland Security: [Empty];
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: [Empty].
Key elements: Policies to operate across agency boundaries;
National Security Strategy: [Empty];
National Strategy for Homeland Security: [Empty];
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: [Empty].
Key elements: Mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results;
National Security Strategy: [Empty];
National Strategy for Homeland Security: [Empty];
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: [Empty].
Legend: Check = Contains key element.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. national strategies.
[End of table]
State Department Unable to Fully Implement National Strategy Goal:
According to the 2003 and 2006 versions of the National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism, State has the lead role in coordinating the
implementation of the strategy to combat terrorism abroad. However, we
found that State's office charged with this mission--State's
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)--did not develop or implement a
plan to use the combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. According to
its mission statement, S/CT is to develop and lead a worldwide effort
to combat terrorism using all instruments of national power, including
law enforcement, diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, and military.
S/CT is to provide foreign policy oversight and guidance to all U.S.
government activities to combat terrorism, including those of U.S. LEAs
operating abroad. This includes coordinating all U.S. government
efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign
governments and participating in the development, coordination, and
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. As discussed below, S/
CT has undertaken a number of initiatives to coordinate U.S.
counterterrorism efforts. However, the deputy director of S/CT told us
that the office lacked the staff, resources, and authority necessary to
meet the national security goal of using LEAs to assist foreign nations
to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
In addition, we found that:
* S/CT does not have the authority to direct Justice and DHS LEAs to
undertake this new mission and therefore has limited ability to lead a
coordinated governmentwide effort. According to State, Justice, and DHS
officials, only the NSC and, since December 2004, the NCTC, have the
authority to ensure that executive branch agencies are working toward
the common objective of assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists.
* S/CT cites its bilateral consultations process as a key mechanism to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
The consultations can include the participation of multiple U.S.
departments and agencies. S/CT reported that it had led about 83 of
these consultations with foreign nations between 2001 and 2005. We
asked State for access to S/CT's records on the bilateral consultations
for each of the four countries we visited, and found that S/CT had only
conducted consultations for one of those countries. When we reviewed
the 2002 to 2005 documentation of consultations for that country, we
found that much of the assistance was for counter-drug efforts or
general capacity building of the country's legal system, such as
training of police in basic investigative techniques. The assistance
also included a $10 million effort to develop a special investigative
group within the national police, focused on terrorist investigations
and crisis response.[Footnote 15] According to representatives from the
national police force, the U.S. assistance brought about a significant
improvement in their ability to investigate terrorist attacks, but it
was not focused on improving their ability to identify and disrupt
terrorist attacks. In addition, we reviewed the three bilateral
consultations held between 2002 and 2005 for this country and found
there was no discussion of any initiatives to use the combined
capabilities of U.S. LEAs to assist the foreign nation to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
* The 2003 National Strategy to Combat Terrorism directed State to take
the lead in developing specific regional strategies to defeat
terrorism. State told us that, in response to a NSC tasking, it began
developing interagency-coordinated Regional Action Plans (RAP).
However, State officials told us the RAPs were incomplete, had never
been implemented, and were now out of date. State said that it
transferred management of the RAPs to the NCTC in 2005. However, none
of the LEAs or embassy officials we met with said they had received any
guidance based on the RAPs, nor any from the NCTC.
* In 2006, S/CT began a new effort called the Regional Strategic
Initiative that stressed a regional approach to combating terrorism.
Four Regional Strategic Initiatives were established in 2006: for
Southeast Asia, Iraq and its surrounding region, the Horn of Africa,
and the Eastern Mediterranean. However, based on documentation we
reviewed, the Southeast Asia initiative did not include the use of the
combined capabilities of LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. For example, in the documentation we
reviewed--which focused on identifying terrorists transiting through a
region where several high-profile attacks against U.S. interests had
occurred--there was only one sentence dedicated to law enforcement, and
it focused solely on DHS LEAs and border control issues.
A March 2006 report by State's Office of Inspector General (OIG) found
that S/CT faced significant problems in meeting its mandate to
coordinate U.S. counterterrorism assistance to foreign nations. The OIG
found that S/CT was viewed by many elements of the U.S. government as
"marginal" to the Global War on Terror. It also found that the
difficulty of helping to coordinate the wide scope of U.S.
counterterrorism efforts abroad challenged S/CT and that it had not
fulfilled its oversight role over U.S. assistance to foreign
nations.[Footnote 16]
The OIG also found that some S/CT components lacked sufficient
resources to carry out their responsibilities and, specifically, that
S/CT's regional affairs unit was under funded, and "scarcely" had the
resources to meet its mandate to provide advice, coordination, and
action on regional and bilateral counterterrorism issues. The OIG also
stated that, if counterterrorism is the single most important U.S.
priority, State could not afford to have the regional affairs unit
understaffed, with no career paths for its counterterrorism officers.
The OIG found that, in accordance with State's mandate in the 2003
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, S/CT had worked hard to
exercise its interagency lead in developing Regional Action Plans.
However, according to the inspection report, observers reported to the
OIG that the exercise did not produce concrete, comprehensive
strategies, although it did produce a useful dialogue and the first
detailed matrix of current and planned U.S. counterterrorism strategies
in each region.
The OIG report made numerous recommendations intended to improve S/CT's
ability to coordinate U.S. assistance to combat terrorism abroad. It
made several recommendations about adding staff to individual units,
but did not make broader recommendations on overall organizational
structure or funding levels. According to an OIG official, as of
January 26, 2007, S/CT was in the process of addressing all of the
report's recommendations directed to it.
In responding to our draft report, State indicated that S/CT continues
to be hampered by the lack of resources discussed in the March 2006
State OIG report, limiting S/CT's ability to coordinate the U.S.
government's international counterterrorism activities. In addition,
State said that our draft did not give its new Regional Strategic
Initiatives sufficient credit and that law enforcement coordination was
a key aspect of the process. However, State did not provide us
additional information to support this position and did not comment on
our finding that the one Regional Strategic Initiative we reviewed
showed little involvement by U.S. or foreign nation law enforcement
agencies.
NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implementing
Guidance Is Still under Development:
In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act,
creating the NCTC and charging it with developing strategic operational
plans to combat terrorism using every element of national power,
including those of U.S. LEAs. Under the act, the NCTC is expected to
(1) conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism
activities; (2) integrate all instruments of national power in such
planning, including law enforcement, diplomatic, military,
intelligence, and financial activities; (3) assign roles and
responsibilities to lead departments and agencies; (4) ensure that
agencies have access to intelligence and intelligence support needed to
execute their counterterrorism plans and accomplish their assigned
activities; and (5) monitor implementation of these operational plans.
In June 2006, the NCTC Director testified before Congress that the lack
of a detailed plan to ensure full implementation of the national
security strategy had been a void that stretched back for
decades.[Footnote 17] According to the director, what has long been
missing is a plan to ensure that national strategies are implemented at
the operational level in a coordinated, integrated fashion, and that
there has been no formal process to translate the national strategies
into strategic and tangible objectives, assigned to lead agencies, with
roles and responsibilities clearly defined. In addition, there has been
no plan to ensure the coordination, integration, and synchronization of
joint departmental operations, or any effort to monitor the combined
impact of the multiple agencies engaged in implementing the national
security strategy.
NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, they had drafted a
general plan, which was approved by the President in June of 2006.
According to NCTC officials, implementing guidance for the plan was
still under development as of March 1, 2007, and they would not discuss
the plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance.
LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and
Prosecute Terrorists Have Been Limited by Several Factors:
Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, including the
expansion of the FBI presence abroad; assistance to help foreign
nations identify and disrupt terrorist threats at certain maritime
ports; and antiterrorism training to assist foreign nation law
enforcement personnel. However, LEA efforts have been hindered by a
lack of (1) clearly articulated roles and responsibilities to assist
foreign nations in combating terrorism; (2) guidance on setting funding
priorities and providing resources to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists; (3) performance monitoring
systems to assess progress at identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
terrorists and reducing terrorist attacks; (4) formal structures to
promote joint investigations and operations between U.S. and foreign
nation LEAs and coordinate LEA technical assistance to foreign nation
LEAs; and (5) comprehensive country needs assessments to tailor LEA
technical and operational assistance to specific foreign nation needs
for identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists.
LEAs Have Taken Steps to Assist Foreign Nations Combat Terrorism:
Some LEAs have increased their efforts to help foreign nations combat
terrorism. For example, the FBI is attempting to operationally assist
foreign nations to identify and disrupt terrorist attacks before they
occur, and it has responded to specific terrorist attacks by assisting
foreign nations to identify and prosecute the suspected terrorists. In
addition, new programs have been specifically designed to assist
foreign nations to identify and disrupt potential terrorist threats,
such as the DHS Container Security Initiative (CSI). Moreover, some
existing technical assistance programs, like State's Antiterrorism
Assistance (ATA) program, have been significantly expanded in an effort
to improve foreign nation capabilities. While this list is not all
inclusive, these represent some significant U.S. efforts to use U.S.
LEAs to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We found that these
three efforts were limited by a variety of factors.
The FBI Has Made Some Effort to Increase Assistance to Foreign Nations,
but it Faces Staffing Limitations:
In our past work, we found that, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the
FBI has permanently realigned a substantial number of its domestic
field agents from traditional criminal investigative programs to
counterterrorism investigations.[Footnote 18] In 2002, the FBI Director
announced that, in keeping with its new priorities, the agency would
move more than 500 field agent positions from its drug, violent crime,
and white-collar crime programs to counterterrorism. The FBI has
transferred more agent positions to work on counterterrorism than it
had originally announced, including through the short-term reassignment
of additional field agents from drug and other law enforcement areas.
Prior to the FBI's change in priorities, about 25 percent of the FBI's
field agent positions were allocated to counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, and cyber crime programs. As a result of the staff
reprogramming and funding for additional special agent positions
received through various appropriations, the FBI staffing levels for
these areas had increased domestically to about 36 percent in 2004 and
represented the single largest concentration of FBI resources.
The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the United
States will augment the FBI's overseas presence. The FBI's Strategic
Plan states that it will expand the role of its LEGAT offices overseas
from that of a simple liaison office to one with a dynamic operational
partnership with foreign nation counterparts. According to Justice and
FBI documents and officials, this includes undertaking joint
investigative and operational partnerships with foreign nation LEAs to
identify and stop terrorist attacks against U.S. interests around the
globe. We found that the FBI has both responded to specific terrorist
attacks by operationally assisting foreign nation LEAs to identify and
prosecute terrorists involved in those attacks, as well as tried to
proactively assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. In one country we visited, the FBI provided limited but
vital operational assistance to locate terrorist suspects and provided
key evidence for their successful prosecution. In another country we
visited, the FBI was working proactively with ICE and with foreign
nation counterparts to track suspicious migrants and identify and
disrupt potential terrorists before they entered the United States.
In addition, in response to our requests for their accomplishments
assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists, the FBI provided some anecdotal information on its
cooperation with and assistance to foreign nations. For example, in one
country where terrorists had attacked U.S. citizens, foreign nation
authorities permitted the FBI to participate in witness interviews. In
another example, foreign nation officials planning to provide amnesty
to approximately 2,000 criminals allowed the FBI to document the
criminals' biometric data prior to their release. In a third example,
the FBI provided approximately $1 million worth of forensic equipment
to support a foreign nation's law enforcement entities. However, FBI
officials told us they lacked a centralized database or a performance
monitoring system needed to collect, store, and report on their
accomplishments and, therefore, were unable to provide us with a
systematic or comprehensive set of accomplishments in assisting foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
According to the FBI, it has increased the number of personnel and
offices abroad since 2001. In May 2007, the FBI reported that, prior to
9/11, the FBI had 127 agents and 74 support personnel stationed in 44
LEGATs and four suboffices; however, as of May 2007, the FBI stated
that it now has 167 agents and 111 support positions staffing its 59
LEGATs and 14 suboffices abroad. In addition, the FBI has revised the
number of countries covered by regional offices, in an effort to reduce
the geographic span of coverage for the LEGAT offices. For example,
before 2005, LEGAT Paris provided coverage for 17 countries in Africa.
However, since the regional LEGAT office in Rabat, Morocco, LEGAT Paris
has covered only France and Monaco.
Despite these actions, we found that the impact of the FBI's expansion
and realignment to combat terrorism has been limited in some posts
overseas. We found during overseas work in 2006 that while the FBI has
increased its overseas offices, not all of those offices had been
staffed with permanent positions, or permanent positions remained
unfilled. For example, although the FBI had permanent LEGAT offices in
two countries where there had been terrorist attacks against American
interests, we found at the time of our fieldwork in 2006 that temporary
FBI staff were filling slots designated as permanent staff positions.
Both FBI headquarters staff and agents in the field at all four
countries we visited said that it was essential to have long-term
rotations in a country in order to establish the types of working
relationships with foreign country LEAs needed to effectively assist
them to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
Further, the LEGATs in three of the four countries we visited said they
generally lacked the resources, time, and staff to develop the close,
collaborative relationships necessary to develop joint investigations
or operations. In one country we visited, where FBI rotations are
generally limited to 1 year and the current LEGAT was there for only a
90-day tour, the LEGAT told us that he and his staff had little
interaction with the national LEAs in the country because of their
short tours. In contrast, in the fourth country, which had the greatest
number of LEAs of any embassy we visited, and where the LEGAT office
was more fully staffed with permanent FBI agents and analysts, the FBI
was providing both investigative and operational assistance to the
foreign nation to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
FBI headquarters management, as well as two temporary duty agents in
the field, told us in 2006 that, while the LEGAT positions were
approved for the two countries that had temporary staff filling the
permanent FBI slots, the FBI had difficulty filling the positions due
to the bureau's lack of career incentives or overseas staffing culture.
In 2006, the deputy assistant director of the counterterrorism division
told us that the FBI has had difficulty staffing overseas LEGAT
positions for years and that, despite recent transformation efforts, it
has not yet solved the problem of staffing overseas positions by
providing career rewards and incentives to agents or by developing a
culture that promotes the importance and value of overseas duty. As a
result, permanent FBI positions were either unfilled or staffed with
nonpermanent staff on temporary duty, and the LEGATs have been limited
in their ability to work with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists.
In December 2006, FBI officials told us that, in an attempt to improve
staffing at high-threat posts, the FBI Director implemented career
incentives in June 2006 to encourage staff to volunteer for overseas
placement.[Footnote 19] In May 2007, the FBI stated that this career
incentives package addressed the difficulties encountered in staffing
the high threat LEGAT offices.[Footnote 20]
In responding to our draft report in May 2007, the FBI stated that all
of the LEGAT positions at its nine highest threat posts were now
staffed with full-time, permanent LEGAT staff. Specifically, the FBI
stated that it now has permanent, full-time FBI personnel assigned to
the two high-threat countries where we found only temporary staff in
2006. However, the FBI provided no additional documentation to support
this contention. In addition, the FBI observed that in two of the four
locations we visited, both arguably high-threat posts, the respective
LEGATs departed post out of the normal rotational cycles and with
little advance notice, creating temporarily unfilled positions.
However, in one of those posts, we were told that the position was
difficult to fill and it would not be permanently filled for almost a
year.
The FBI stated that it also relies on short-term rotations of 2 to 6
months and temporary short term assignments to supplement permanent
staff. According to the FBI, through the use of deputies, assistant
LEGATs and temporarily assigned personnel, LEGATs are able to establish
and maintain liaison with principal law enforcement and intelligence/
security services in designated foreign territories while meeting the
FBI's international responsibilities in international terrorism,
foreign counterintelligence, organized crime, and general criminal
matters. However, FBI officials at headquarters and overseas in all
four countries we visited agreed that the types of relationships
necessary to facilitate joint investigations and operations with
foreign nations cannot be built or sustained by agents on short-term,
temporary assignments at overseas posts.
CSI Works with Foreign Nations, but It Has Had Limitations:
CSI, which targets for inspection at foreign seaports high-risk cargo
shipments before they leave for the United States, was created after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and requires U.S. law enforcement personnel
to be physically colocated with foreign nation LEAs to identify and
disrupt terrorist threats to America. As more than 11 million cargo
containers are off-loaded at U.S. seaports each year, CSI was developed
to extend the U.S. zone of security outward by working with foreign
nation counterparts to identify and examine sea containers that pose a
risk for terrorism. Under the initiative, foreign governments allow CBP
personnel to be stationed at foreign seaports to use intelligence and
automated risk assessment information to target shipments identified as
at risk of containing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other
terrorist contraband. As of September 2006, CSI was in place at 50
ports overseas in 29 countries, with a 2007 goal of being operational
in 58 ports.
In 2005, we reported that CSI had led to improved information sharing
between U.S. and foreign customs staff and a heightened level of
bilateral cooperation and international awareness of the need to
identify and disrupt terrorist threats.[Footnote 21] However, we also
found that several issues limited its effectiveness. These included the
inability to fully staff some ports because of diplomatic constraints,
such as the need for foreign government permission, and practical
considerations, such as workspace limitations. In addition, the
technologies used to detect WMDs have limitations. We concluded that,
given these issues, CBP had limited assurance that inspections
conducted under CSI were effective at detecting and identifying
terrorist WMDs.
At the CSI location we visited, an ICE law enforcement agent was
colocated at a foreign nation maritime port and worked directly with
foreign nation law enforcement officials in their security area. The
ICE official had been there 2 years and was learning the local
language; he and foreign nation officials agreed that, by working
closely together during that time, they had developed a trusting,
collaborative relationship necessary to conduct joint investigations.
While this effort had not led to the identification or disruption of
terrorist-related shipments, the foreign nation customs control
director said that, to his knowledge, this was the first time that a
U.S. law enforcement official was colocated with foreign nation LEAs to
conduct joint investigations to identify and disrupt terrorist threats
against the United States. He recommended greater efforts to colocate
U.S. law enforcement officers with other counterparts in the country.
He also recommended that, to improve collaboration, U.S. officials
should learn the local language and work within the local law
enforcement offices for extended periods.
State Has Expanded the ATA Program:
In 1983, State established the ATA program to train civilian security
and law enforcement personnel from friendly governments in police
procedures that address terrorism. DS administers the ATA program. DS
officers work with the foreign country's government and a team from
that country's U.S. mission to develop training in areas such as bomb
detection, crime scene investigation, airport and building security,
maritime protections, and VIP protection. (See fig. 1 for an example of
ATA training to foreign nation LEAs.)
Figure 1: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism
Exercises:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
According to State's Congressional Budget Justifications, after the 9/
11 terrorist attacks, ATA program funding more than tripled, from
approximately $38 million in fiscal year 2001 to over $122 million in
fiscal year 2006. A March 2006 report by State's OIG recognized that
ATA funding and the number of students trained had increased. However,
the report also stated that the program's procedures should be
improved. Specifically, the report recommended that ATA courses should
receive timely, independent, in-depth evaluations to establish and
maintain quality control.[Footnote 22]
LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations Have Been Limited by Several
Factors:
LEA efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists have been limited by several factors.
Specifically, we found that LEAs generally lacked (1) clearly defined
roles and responsibilities to assist foreign nations; (2) guidance on
setting funding priorities and providing resources to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists; (3) performance
monitoring systems to assess progress at identifying, disrupting, and
prosecuting terrorists and reducing terrorist attacks; (4) formal
structures needed to promote joint investigations and operations
between U.S. and foreign nation LEAs and coordinate LEA technical
assistance to foreign nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive country needs
assessments to tailor LEA technical and operational assistance to
specific foreign nation needs for identifying, disrupting, and
prosecuting terrorists.
Most LEAs Lacked Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities:
Our past work has stressed the importance of a strategy to combat
terrorism that would clearly define the roles and responsibilities of
each agency for meeting specific objectives related to combating
terrorism. Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort where
interagency collaboration is essential, such as this effort to use the
combined capabilities of each LEA to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, we have recommended that
agencies agree on roles and responsibilities so each agency understands
its role and how it supports the greater overall effort.
We found that the national strategies' broad strategic objectives have
not been clearly translated to agency-specific roles and
responsibilities. In particular, with the exception of Justice and the
White House issuing some guidance to the FBI, we found Justice, DHS,
and State had not issued guidance to their component LEAs to implement
this new national security goal of assisting foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists, and most U.S. LEAs--
including ATF,[Footnote 23] CBP, DEA, DS, ICE, USMS, and USSS--
continued to operate based on their traditional objectives and
guidance. As a result, LEAs lacked clearly defined roles and
responsibilities for implementing the broad objective articulated in
the national strategies to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists.
As of February 2007, no single LEA was in charge of coordinating or
directing the efforts of all the U.S. LEAs to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. Some of the presidential
directives governing LEA activities had not been updated since the mid
to late 1990s, and with the exception of the FBI, none of the other
LEAs had been provided guidance to make assisting foreign nations to
identify and disrupt terrorist threats a primary mission.
The FBI has been given some guidance on its roles and responsibilities
from the White House and Justice. The FBI traditionally has had the
general statutory authority to conduct, both domestically and overseas,
investigations related to criminal and terrorist activities, including
those overseas.[Footnote 24] Under the general authority, the Attorney
General, in regulations, has placed the FBI in the lead agency role for
investigating crimes of terrorism in the United States.[Footnote 25] In
1995, Presidential Decision Directive 39 confirmed the FBI's lead
agency role in investigating terrorism. In 2002, the Attorney General
issued guidance to the FBI that its new priority was to act to prevent
terrorist attacks,[Footnote 26] and the FBI has been in the process of
transforming to meet that mission.
In 2003, the Attorney General issued further guidance to the FBI
authorizing it to work with foreign nations to provide investigative
and technical assistance for combating terrorism.[Footnote 27] In turn,
the FBI's 2004 to 2009 strategic plan reflects this new direction,
stating that the FBI plans to increase its presence abroad and increase
joint operations with foreign nations to combat terrorism. As a result
of the guidance, FBI officials in Washington and in the countries we
visited told us that FBI agents abroad were expected to work with
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
However, with the exception of the LEGAT in one of the four countries
we visited, FBI officials told us that the implementation of that goal
was still in transition and that there was some uncertainty as to how
to accomplish that goal, given their limited staff and other overseas
duties.
According to FBI officials, as of December 2006, the issue of roles and
responsibilities for the LEAs remains unresolved and is still subject
to on-going debates within the administration. DHS officials reiterated
similar concerns and, in response to our preliminary findings, agreed
that their roles and responsibilities related to combating terrorism
abroad could be more clearly articulated to ensure understanding among
DHS officials working abroad. In particular, DHS officials told us, in
January 2007, that neither the NSC nor the NCTC have determined who
will lead the effort to use the combined capabilities of the LEAs to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists,
or clearly defined their roles and responsibilities. State indicated
that it was not in charge of LEA efforts to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and referred us to Justice
and DHS for such plans. State indicated that this was the
responsibility of the NSC or the White House, and that neither entity
had clearly defined or identified the roles and responsibilities of
State, Justice, and DHS LEAs.
We found other examples related to the lack of guidance on roles and
responsibilities, including the following:
* The DEA is a "single mission" agency dedicated to reducing the
threat, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Although it has not been
given the specific goal to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
or prosecute terrorists, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it
has expanded its intelligence capabilities and information sharing, and
instituted a formal procedure to query its in-country sources on
terrorist-related information, which is then shared with the FBI and
other agencies involved with efforts to fight terrorism. In addition,
in February of 2004, the Administrator of DEA testified before Congress
that:
"During December 2001, the DEA formed a Special Coordination Unit at
its Special Operations Division— [which] coordinates all DEA
intelligence and investigations having a possible nexus to terrorism
and shares information with agencies responsible for coordinating
terrorist intelligence and investigations. DEA drug investigations have
generated such narco-terrorist related intelligence and investigations
both domestically and internationally."
* While the strategic plans for both ICE and CBP generally charged them
with preventing terrorists from entering the United States, neither
agency is explicitly tasked with assisting foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Overseas, we found that ICE and CBP
were working proactively with foreign nation officials in one country
we visited to identify terrorists threats bound for the United States.
However, ICE officials, who comprise the primary DHS law enforcement
presence abroad, were present in the remaining three countries we
visited but were generally not assisting foreign nation LEAs to
identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. There were no CBP officials
in these three countries. The lack of clear guidance was evident when
we spoke with DHS officials abroad. For example, some ICE and CBP
officials told us they were responsible for working with foreign
nations to stop attacks, while other ICE and CBP officials said they
did not have that responsibility. ICE officials told us in December
2006 that they were not working with foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists because neither the NSC, the NCTC,
nor DHS had given them any directives or funding to do so.
* Two LEAs--USMS and ATF--indicated that they had not been given clear
roles in the U.S. effort to assist foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists despite having the capabilities to do
so. For example, officials from USMS, which specializes in tracking,
capturing, and extraditing criminals, indicated they had unique skills
and capabilities that could be used to identify and capture terrorists
abroad. Similarly, officials from ATF, which specializes in tracing
weapons and explosives, told us they could help identify bombs and
other weapons used by terrorists.
* The USSS has not been tasked with assisting foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. According to USSS
officials, the service does not currently have a role in combating
terrorism abroad, nor does it want this role. However, it could provide
assistance in investigative techniques and information sharing on
terrorist-related cases. USSS officials said that the service wants to
maintain its traditional focus and not assume new responsibilities
related to combating terrorism.
* RSOs are charged with providing a safe and secure environment for the
conduct of U.S. foreign policy.[Footnote 28] A key responsibility for
RSOs is identifying and disrupting terrorist attacks against U.S.
embassies and personnel. However, the RSOs have been given no post 9/11
guidance from State on how to assist foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and RSOs voiced confusion about this
role. In three of the four countries we visited, RSOs told us that
State has never given the RSOs the goal to work with foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and RSOs have never been
given a specific role or directives to implement this aspect of the
national security strategy. However, we did find some cases where RSOs
were undertaking initiatives to assist the foreign nation identify,
disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. In one country, the RSO was critical
in embassy efforts to support the foreign nation to capture and
prosecute terrorists responsible for attacks against Americans and
others. In that same country, an assistant RSO stationed at a
consulate, working with foreign nation police, exposed a criminal
operation selling counterfeit and legitimate visas and other travel
documents that could be used by terrorists to gain entry into the
United States. In commenting on our findings, a senior official with DS
agreed that the primary responsibility of RSOs was the protection of
the embassy and its officials, and said that additional directives
would be needed from the NSC if RSO responsibilities were to be
expanded to include assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. In commenting on the draft report, State
indicated that broadening DS's law enforcement mandate to play a
broader role could require statutory changes in addition to new
directives.
At the four embassies we visited, we found State had not provided
guidance on how to use LEA assets to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Ambassadors or deputy
chiefs of missions at each embassy we visited voiced their concern
that, despite combating terrorism being the embassy's highest priority,
they received little to no guidance on how to design a coordinated
assistance program using the full capacities of U.S. technical and
operational assistance of LEAs, and ensure that LEAs had the necessary
goals, skills, capabilities, and time to work closely with foreign
nation officials to stop terrorist attacks. In all four countries,
ambassadors and deputy chiefs of missions believed that the roles and
responsibilities of LEAs for assisting foreign nations to identify and
prevent future attacks needed to be clarified. Foreign nation officials
in two of the countries we visited said that they were confused by the
number of officers and agencies at embassies working on
counterterrorism issues, and said they did not know which LEA was in
charge, or which LEA to work with regarding specific terrorist threats.
Ambassadors or deputy chiefs of mission, who are responsible for trying
to coordinate law enforcement agencies at embassies, stated that--given
the strategic importance of stopping further attacks, and the
complexity of disparate U.S. programs and agencies that can be used to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists-
-they believed that State should consider appointing an officer with
law enforcement experience or training who would be dedicated to
helping embassies develop, implement, and monitor U.S. law enforcement
efforts. They suggested that a "coordinator for combating terrorism"
could be placed in high-threat posts to integrate LEA capabilities and
ensure use of their full expertise to cover the range of
vulnerabilities terrorists could exploit to harm U.S. interests.
During our work in four countries, we found numerous issues related to
the lack of clear guidance on roles and responsibilities of LEAs in
assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. For example:
* In the four countries we visited, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of
mission, and political officers, who were responsible for implementing
this new national security goal, said that they lack the guidance,
training, and funding to effectively use LEA technical or operational
assistance to assist foreign nations. As a result, they questioned
whether they could effectively implement and coordinate a joint U.S.-
foreign nation assistance effort to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists that pose a threat to U.S. citizens and interests.
* In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and
responsibilities between ICE and the FBI led to both investigative and
operational problems, according to foreign nation, ICE, and FBI
officials. ICE was responsible for tracking special interest aliens,
while the FBI was responsible for identifying terrorists trying to
enter the United States. Because it was unclear whether some of these
special interest aliens were migrants or potential terrorists--and ICE
and FBI were not given clear guidance to determine which LEA had the
lead role--foreign nation and agency officials noted instances where
joint U.S.-foreign nation investigations or operations were poorly
coordinated. As a result, ICE and FBI, unknowingly working with
different foreign nation LEAs, moved in on the same subject. According
to the foreign nation law enforcement and FBI officials, such actions
may have compromised several of their investigations.
* In another country we visited, neither DHS nor the former agencies
that now largely constitute ICE and CBP--including the Customs Service
and INS--were given a role when State designed the embassy's extensive
program to assist in controlling and documenting migration flows across
a known terrorist-rich border region, despite their expertise in border
control, immigration, and customs issues. State officials told us that
they were given no guidance to seek the expertise of DHS or these
agencies when State designed the program in 2002. These agencies were
subsequently abolished and their responsibilities divided among new
entities in DHS, yet DHS officials told us in January 2007 that they
were unaware of the program and had never been consulted on it.
According to embassy officials, the key goal of the program related to
identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists crossing this
border region, has not resulted in the prosecution of any terrorists.
* In a third country that served as both a source country and a transit
point for terrorists, the ambassador told us that, despite the need for
DHS expertise to improve border control, he has delayed approving three
full time DHS positions because of a mismatch between his and DHS's
views on DHS's specific roles and responsibilities once in-country. The
ambassador said that he believed the DHS representatives should be
colocated with foreign nation police at airports, maritime ports,
immigration offices, customs offices, and land borders to develop the
strong collaborative relationships necessary to conduct joint
investigations or operations. However, he was concerned that the DHS
officials would principally work from the embassy.
In commenting on our findings, officials from State, Justice, and DHS
agreed that there was a lack of clear guidance instructing LEAs to
assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
Officials noted that the NSC and now the NCTC have the authority to
compel U.S. LEAs to work together in a coordinated, systematic fashion
to help stop terrorist attacks. Officials said that no executive
department has the authority to direct the LEAs from other departments
to focus on this goal, and they noted that recommendations to
individual agencies would not result in a unified multidepartmental
effort to help foreign nations combat terrorism.
In a February 2007 letter to GAO, the Senior Counsel for National
Security Affairs at Justice stated that, for operational assistance to
foreign nations, the FBI was designated the lead federal LEA with
jurisdiction to investigate terrorism-related crimes. However, this
view was not shared by other LEAs in Washington and in the embassies we
visited. LEAs, including Justice's FBI, USMS, ATF, and DEA; DHS's ICE,
CBP, and USSS; and State's RSOs all told us there was no lead LEA
charged with using the combined capabilities of federal LEAs to assist
foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In
December 2006, FBI officials agreed that the issue of which LEA would
lead this effort was still unresolved.
Executive Departments and LEAs Lacked Clear Guidance on Setting Funding
Priorities for Assisting Foreign Nations to Combat Terrorism:
Our guidelines on developing an effective collaborative strategy note
the importance of identifying needs and addressing them by leveraging
resources to meet strategic objectives. In addition, in our past work
on agencies creating strategic plans to meet GPRA requirements, we
reported that the alignment of activities and resources is
critical.[Footnote 29] In this review, however, we found that State,
Justice, DHS, and their LEAs lacked clear guidance on setting funding
priorities to meet the national security goal of helping foreign
nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
Officials from State, Justice, and DHS told us that they are attempting
to fund a broad array of LEA activities abroad with limited staffing
and funds, and without guidance from the NSC on reprioritizing funds
from other activities to assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. As a result, their efforts to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists have been
hindered. For example, a March 2006 report by State's OIG found that S/
CT lacked adequate resources to meet its mandate to coordinate U.S.
counterterrorism assistance abroad. The OIG found that S/CT's regional
affairs unit was under-funded to provide advice, coordination, and
action on regional and bilateral counterterrorism issues and that, if
counterterrorism is the single most important U.S. priority, State
could not afford to have the regional affairs unit understaffed.
In addition, as noted above, while the FBI has reprioritized and
realigned a significant amount of its resources domestically from
criminal investigation to efforts to combat terrorism, we found that
this realignment has been limited overseas. For example, senior FBI
officials from the Counterterrorism Division and the Office of
International Operations told us that they lacked funds to establish
offices and permanently fill LEGAT positions in some high-threat posts.
Furthermore, DHS officials from ICE and CBP agreed that NSC has not
provided guidance on how to reprioritize funding to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result,
officials said they were limited in their ability to undertake new
initiatives in this area or to fully staff existing positions already
approved by embassies.
In the countries we visited, we observed that this lack of guidance
limited the embassies' ability to assist foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In four countries we visited,
ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and others indicated that, due
to the lack of guidance from either the NSC, NCTC, or their executive
departments, LEA headquarters in Washington have generally not
reallocated funding from lower priority activities to support the new
national priority of assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists. In one country, the ambassador said that the
most significant concern facing the embassy was the mismatch between
U.S. objectives and available funding for assisting foreign nations to
combat terrorism.
In all four countries we visited, embassy, LEA, and foreign nation
officials identified terrorist transit and border vulnerabilities as
the primary challenges; yet, in three of these countries, officials
said that, due to funding not being realigned to support the goal of
assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism, they did not provide
specific assistance to foreign nation LEAs to address these needs.
Specifically, ICE officials in one country told us that because funding
had not been reprioritized, ICE had not provided training to foreign
nation LEAs to counter immigration, travel, and border threats. In
another country, although the embassy wanted DHS officials to assist
the foreign nation for port security, customs, and immigration, DHS
officials from a regional office were unable to provide this assistance
because funding limitations restricted their ability to visit the
country, and, moreover, they were focused on performing their other
responsibilities when they were able to visit.
In all four countries we visited, there was more funding designed to
assist foreign nations combat illegal drugs and criminals than to
combat terrorism, despite the fact that efforts to combat terrorism
were the highest priority of each embassy. For example, in one country
with an extremely high terrorist threat to American interests globally,
State provided more than six times the amount of funding to stop
illicit drugs and crime ($220.2 million) than it did for antiterrorism
assistance ($34.5 million) from fiscal years 2002 to 2006. We found
similar issues at the other three embassies we visited. For instance,
in one country, the deputy chief of mission told us that most of the
training and assistance funding there was dedicated for counter
narcotics efforts, even though drugs were no longer a key strategic
concern in that country. From fiscal years 2002 to 2006, this country
received $12.3 million in funding intended to combat drugs, compared
with $8.8 million for assisting the foreign nation to combat terrorism.
Based on a review of our findings, State Department officials
representing offices involved with U.S. efforts to combat crime, drugs,
and terrorism abroad, agreed that there was significantly more funding
available for combating crime and drugs than for assisting foreign
nations to combat terrorism. However, officials said that some of the
funding allotted to help foreign nations to combat crime and drugs was
fungible and could be used to combat terrorism. We found that, in all
four countries we visited, embassies used funding intended for
objectives such as combating crime and drugs, and improving law
enforcement and judicial capacity, to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In other instances,
embassies allowed some key needs to not be fully addressed because
funding had not been reprioritized from other activities.
In a February 2007 letter to GAO, Justice stated that the ability of
foreign nations to combat terrorism depends on having functioning law
enforcement and judicial sector institutions and professionals capable
of carrying out complex investigations and prosecutions. While these
capabilities are not terrorism specific, they are often prerequisites
to an ability to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, Justice
stated. As a result, some general capacity building training can
potentially provide a benefit to a foreign nation's ability to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
LEAs Are Not Systematically Assessing Their Accomplishments or Progress
in Assisting Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute
Terrorists:
The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 2004 Intelligence
Reform Act, and GPRA all require the monitoring of LEA performance to
measure progress toward stated goals and objectives. The National
Strategy for Homeland Security addresses the need for accountability in
the nation's efforts to combat terrorism. It states that every
department or agency involved with combating terrorism will create
performance monitoring systems that will allow agencies to measure
their progress, make resource allocation decisions, and adjust
priorities accordingly. In addition, the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act
charged the NCTC with monitoring the implementation of strategic
operational plans to combat terrorism and obtaining information from
each department, agency, or element of the U.S. government relevant for
monitoring the progress of each entity in implementing such plans.
Moreover, GPRA requires that agencies in charge of U.S. government
programs and activities identify goals and report on the degree to
which goals are met. Our own past work has also stressed the importance
of a strategy to combat terrorism that would establish goals,
objectives, priorities, outcomes, milestones, and measures to use in
monitoring performance.
We found that none of the LEAs had in place a systematic method for
determining progress or documenting their accomplishments in assisting
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, either
for technical or operational assistance. As a result, these departments
or agencies generally found it difficult to assess whether they were
making progress implementing this national security goal, or to
determine what was needed to improve their overall assistance to
foreign countries.
To ensure we fully reflected U.S. efforts in assisting foreign nations,
we requested from all eight LEAs a comprehensive list of all key
accomplishments from 2001 to 2005. However, LEA and executive
department officials told us that, because they have no systematic
method of documenting their efforts to assist foreign nations, they
could provide anecdotal information but no comprehensive list of
accomplishments.
State, Justice, and DHS agreed they lacked systems to systematically
document their accomplishments or assess their progress in assisting
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. State
said that its bureau performance plans, State's annual Country Reports
on Terrorism, and U.S. mission performance plans allowed them to both
monitor progress and document the department's accomplishments.
According to State's Strategic Plan for 2004 to 2009, each mission,
including all the U.S. agencies located in the country, develops
mission performance plans that outline the intended goals, priority
initiatives, and performance indicators for the mission. However, based
on our review of these documents, we found they were not sufficiently
detailed to clearly determine the role of State, Justice, or DHS LEAs,
or their accomplishments or progress, in meeting this national security
goal.
Justice, along with FBI, DEA, ATF,[Footnote 30] and USMS officials,
said that it was not monitoring its progress in assisting foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. The FBI
indicated that it was in the process of developing such a system.
DHS officials told us that neither the NSC nor the NCTC have directed
executive branch agencies to systematically assess their performance
and progress in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. Officials from DHS, including those from ICE,
CBP, and USSS, agreed that they had no performance measures at the
national strategic level to measure LEA success at assisting foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and that DHS
was not compiling this information at the agency level.
Due to the lack of performance information, we could not conduct or
provide a full assessment of all three departments' LEAs' progress in
assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists.
In one of the countries we visited, we met with the Director of State's
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), which provides training
to foreign nation LEAs from 12 countries in the region. The director
said that, because no independent, governmentwide evaluations were
being conducted of U.S. training efforts, it was impossible to
determine whether the general training that was provided was improving
the ability of the foreign nation to combat terrorism.
In responding to our findings, State Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) officials involved with the
administration of the ILEA program agreed that it was critical to
conduct independent, long-term impact evaluations to verify that
training was actually improving the foreign nation capabilities to
combat terrorism. The officials indicated that, in the past, they had
conducted such studies, but that funding for the evaluations was
suspended in fiscal year 2003, and that without adequate funding, they
had not been able to undertake these activities. The officials said
that, without such studies, it was impossible to determine whether the
training was actually increasing the ability of foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. To be effective, impact
studies should include assistance provided by all departments, such as
that provided by State, Justice, and DHS.
LEAs Generally Lacked Mechanisms for Collaboration Abroad:
We found in our past work that effective interagency collaboration is
essential, as laid out in the national strategies and as provided for
in the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act. And we have identified necessary
elements for collaboration across agencies. However, we found that LEAs
abroad lacked formal mechanisms to promote collaboration among LEAs to
combat terrorism.
Domestically, to improve collaborative investigations and operations
among various LEAs within the United States, the National Strategy for
Homeland Security supported the expanded use of structures called Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF),[Footnote 31] which combine the national
and international investigative capacity of the federal government with
state and local knowledge and capabilities in an effort to identify and
detect terrorist groups and prevent them from carrying out attacks
against the United States. The 9/11 Commission further supported the
use of JTTFs, noting that, by expanding their use, the FBI could
leverage the expertise, manpower, and resources of federal, state, and
local LEAs.
In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI expanded the number
of JTTFs from 35 to over 100 by 2005. According to the FBI, JTTFs have
played a central role in virtually every significant terrorism
investigation, prevention, or interdiction within the United States.
These include the conviction of Ramzi Yousef and Eyad Mahmoud Ismal for
conspiracy in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 2004 arrest
in New York of Yassin Muhiddin Aref on money-laundering charges
connected to a possible terrorist plot to kill a Pakistani diplomat.
We found that State has generally not created structures, similar to
JTTFs, at embassies to foster collaborative LEA efforts to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. FBI
officials told us that neither the FBI nor State had considered
implementing this model at embassies, but said that State should
consider doing so. In addition, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission,
and LEA officials abroad said that while they had received no
directives from State to consider such a model, they supported
implementing such a concept at the embassies we visited. In addition,
DHS officials told us, in January 2007, that neither the NCTC nor the
NSC had developed policies to facilitate joint LEA investigations and
operations abroad. In three of the four embassies we visited, we found
that the embassies still generally retained pre-9/11 structures for
information sharing and collaboration among LEAs, and LEAs noted that
the embassies had not been reoriented to harness the combined
capabilities of all LEAs in a collective effort to prevent another
terrorist attack on the United States or its interests.
We were told by officials at the four embassies we visited, and by some
State and LEA officials in Washington, that missions generally use law
enforcement working groups to share information or to coordinate LEA
activities at embassies. Based on our work at embassies, we found that
these working groups did not function in an integrated, collaborative
manner, and were not focused on joint investigative or operational
efforts to identify and disrupt terrorist acts. We were told that these
groups often met infrequently and usually discussed general,
nonoperational information. For example, in one country we visited with
an extremely high terrorist threat, an FBI official told us that the
law enforcement working group had never been asked to try to identify
or disrupt any of the terrorists on the most wanted lists of the
departments of State or Defense, or of the foreign nation itself. In
general, LEAs told us that terrorist information was not always shared
or acted on across all key agencies at the missions, including the
LEAs.
While none of the embassies we visited had implemented formal
structures that ensured information sharing and collaboration among all
U.S. LEAs for assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism, one
embassy did have a structure that included some collaborative LEA
elements. At that embassy, the ambassador had created a fusion center
and a working group to combat terrorism. The fusion center colocated
FBI, DHS, and other assets in a common workspace. As potential
terrorist information was received in the fusion center, each agency
could check its databases for information needed to identify or locate
the terrorists. This information was then operationalized through the
members of the working group, who would use their contacts with the
foreign nation to conduct joint investigations or operations. According
to the ambassador and the LEAs, despite some continuing instances of
coordination problems between some LEAs at the post, this structure had
significantly improved coordination and operations among both U.S. and
foreign nation LEAs.
While ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and other embassy
officials generally supported implementing formal structures for
integrated, collaborative LEA efforts at embassies, they noted some
challenges to doing so. For example, the RSO and LEGAT in one country
we visited strongly supported a formal structure for integrated,
collaborative LEA efforts at the embassy. The RSO said that for such a
structure to work properly, all the agencies must be colocated in the
same room, share space and telephones, and work together constantly on
joint investigations and operations.
However, according to the LEGAT, LEAs were not colocated at the embassy
and several LEAs, such as USSS, ICE, CBP, and the Transportation
Security Administration, were all located apart from the main embassy
building at his post. As a result, the LEAs were not able to access the
combined databases of each agency. He said that bringing these elements
together would likely require construction of an additional secure
facility and dedicated classified connections to each LEA's respective
headquarters office. In addition, he also recommended that foreign
nation law enforcement officials be included in a new collaborative LEA
structure, but he noted that this would raise classification issues,
since much of the terrorist related information cannot be shared with
foreign nationals. Despite these challenges, he said creating a formal
structure at the embassy for integrated collaboration, information-
sharing, and joint operations could be very helpful. State officials,
in commenting on our findings, stated that both security and space
limitations could be a challenge to colocating LEAs at embassies.
LEAs Lack Comprehensive Country Needs Assessments:
In our past work, we found that identifying and addressing needs and
leveraging resources was an essential element of a strategic plan and
for interagency collaboration.[Footnote 32] The United States provides
a broad range of technical assistance to foreign nations related to
legal reforms and improving the general capacity of police,
prosecutors, and judges. State provides training programs under the ATA
program, a training program designed to address foreign nation
capabilities to combat terrorism, and the INL programs. In addition,
the FBI provides some foreign nation training overseas and at its
National Training Center at Quantico, VA. Justice also administers the
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, which
works to build the general capacity of foreign nation LEAs. It also
administers the Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and
Training program, which, for example, through its Resident Legal
Advisor program, assists foreign nations with legal reform efforts and
can include assistance in crafting needed legislation and revising
existing terrorism law, as well as assistance to prosecutors and judges
in utilizing new and revised terrorism law to process terrorist
suspects. In two of the four countries we visited, we found that
Justice officials were working with foreign nations to draft new
legislation. In one case, a Justice official assisted the foreign
nation in passing legislation to make it a criminal offense to possess
fraudulent passports; such passports can be used by terrorists to
travel to the United States.
We found a lack of a single, comprehensive country needs assessment,
which considers all U.S. assistance for addressing the country's needs
in combating terrorism. As a result, State, Justice, DHS, and their
LEAs may not be tailoring and targeting their full range of training
and assistance to assist foreign countries to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. For example, according to embassy officials in
three of the four countries we visited, terrorist transit across their
borders was a key vulnerability, yet there was no comprehensive effort
by State, Justice, DHS, or their LEAs to provide training to the
foreign nation border patrols, immigration officers, and customs agents
to identify and disrupt terrorists transiting their borders.
In one of the countries we visited, the Director of State's ILEA stated
that, to be effective, comprehensive governmentwide needs assessments
should be conducted and that State, Justice, and DHS should coordinate
their training programs to meet the key terrorism vulnerabilities in
each country. This could include combined training of small, vetted
units of police, prosecutors, and judges on how to collaboratively
investigate and prosecute terrorists, as well as training needed to
identify and capture terrorists involved with transnational travel.
Further, in responding to our preliminary findings, State/INL officials
involved with administering the ILEAs agreed that it was critical to
conduct needs assessments. The officials indicated that, in the past,
they had conducted such studies, but that funding was suspended in
fiscal year 2003. The officials said that, without adequate funding,
they had not been able to undertake these activities and, without such
assessments, it was impossible to determine training needs.
Moreover, we found that an embassy's ability to provide effective,
targeted, and coordinated assistance to meet country needs could vary
significantly. For example, in one country we visited, despite problems
with the foreign nation's legal system that hindered terrorist
prosecutions, the embassy had no on-going programs to assist the
foreign nation to strengthen terrorism laws and train police,
investigators, prosecutors, and judges to develop the capacity of the
legal system to prosecute terrorists. Embassy officials told us that
because of these limitations in the legal system, foreign nation LEAs
were not the most effective instruments for combating terrorism, and
instead the embassy relied on the use of the military and other assets
to combat terrorism.
In contrast, another embassy successfully employed a variety of State
and Justice programs to assist the foreign nation to identify, arrest,
and prosecute terrorists, despite limitations in the foreign nation's
legal system that hindered successful prosecutions. In that country,
the embassy, in close cooperation with the foreign nation, used State's
ATA and INL assets to train a specialized unit of the local police to
capture terrorist suspects. The U.S.-foreign nation team then assembled
a small task force of foreign nation investigators, prosecutors, and
judges, and, using Justice-administered funds, provided specialized
training to develop a case using recently passed legislation. The case
resulted in the successful prosecution of the terrorists accused of
killing Americans and others at popular tourist sites.
Conclusion:
Combating terrorism is the United States' top national security
priority at home and at embassies abroad. Since 9/11, U.S. national
strategies have consistently called for using all elements of national
power to combat terrorism, including changing the role of LEAs. In
particular, these strategies have called for expanding LEAs' overseas
activities to include working with foreign nations and building their
capacity toward a shared goal of identifying and disrupting terrorist
plots, and bringing these terrorists to justice in courts of law. In
response, some LEAs have taken steps to expand existing programs or
initiate new technical assistance efforts to, among other things, help
train foreign police, prosecutors, and judges. The FBI has made efforts
to work more closely with foreign counterparts on operational efforts
to detect and disrupt terrorist attacks before they occur.
However, while the national strategies have articulated this change in
direction and emphasis, they have not provided specific roles,
objectives, resources, or mechanisms for determining success. At the
embassies we visited, ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission voiced
their concern that, despite counterterrorism being the embassy's
highest priority, they received little to no guidance on how to
determine country assistance needs in this area; design a coordinated
assistance program using the full capacities of U.S. LEAs; and ensure
that the LEAs had the necessary directives, capabilities, and time to
work closely with foreign nation officials to stop terrorist attacks.
As a result of these weaknesses, LEAs, a key element of national power,
are not being fully used abroad to protect U.S. citizens and interests
from future terrorist attacks.
Looking forward, the United States needs to develop clear implementing
guidance for integrating the variety of overseas LEA activities
assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. We recommend that the
Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the NSC, ensure that the
implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan for combating terrorism
clearly articulates the specific objectives for each LEA, clarifies
their roles and responsibilities, and proposes actions linked to
available resources and directed at the most pressing needs for
assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. In addition, since these activities are central to the
overall U.S. effort to combat terrorism, DHS, Justice, and State need
to ensure that their component agencies have clear guidance to
implement the national security strategies' goal of using the full
capabilities of LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists, and also need to assess progress toward
objectives and provide regular reporting to Congress on the results,
impediments, and planned improvements.
Recommendations:
We recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the
NSC, ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan for
combating terrorism:
* Articulates a clear strategy to implement the national security goal
of using the combined capabilities of LEAs to help foreign nations
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
* Clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each LEA for (1) helping
enhance the capabilities of foreign police, prosecutors, and judges for
combating terrorism; and (2) working more closely with foreign nations
on operational efforts to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
* Includes a mechanism for comprehensively (1) assessing the needs of
foreign nations for identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
terrorists; (2) deciding which needs U.S. LEAs should help address; (3)
determining which U.S. LEA programs or activities are best suited to
address those needs; and (4) ensuring that U.S. LEAs are provided
guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources to
address those needs.
* Requires a monitoring system that provides the executive departments,
LEAs, and Congress accurate reporting on accomplishments, impediments,
and planned improvements for LEAs assisting foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
We recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretaries of
Homeland Security and State each:
* Issue clear guidance to their respective component agencies and
bureaus on how those agencies and bureaus should implement the national
security strategies' goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
* Establish a monitoring system that provides the respective department
and Congress with accurate reporting on that department's
accomplishments, impediments, and planned improvements in their LEAs'
efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism.
We recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the U.S.
Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security:
* Explore the creation of new structures at U.S. embassies to improve
information sharing and coordination among U.S. LEAs for assisting
foreign nations combat terrorism.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DHS, Justice, and State provided written comments on a draft of this
report, which are reproduced in appendixes II, III, and IV.
DHS generally agreed with the findings and recommendations in the
report. DHS said it would work closely with the NSC, NCTC, Justice, and
State on planning efforts to enhance the ability of DHS LEAs to help
foreign nations combat terrorism. DHS also plans to issue implementing
guidance and establish a monitoring system based upon direction from
the NSC and NCTC.
Justice agreed to work with State to consider ways to enhance
interagency coordination at embassies. Justice also said it will work
with NCTC to address guidance to implement the NCTC plan. Justice did
not indicate whether it concurred with our recommendations that the
Attorney General issue clear guidance to LEAs or to establish a
monitoring system for ongoing efforts to help foreign nations combat
terrorism. Justice expressed concern that our analysis did not clearly
distinguish between operational and technical assistance. Justice's
written response also includes a February 16, 2007, Justice letter to
GAO providing comments on a draft statement of fact we provided Justice
on January 26, 2007. In its February 16, 2007, letter Justice raised
several concerns about the information we provided in the draft
statement of fact, including their contention that we (1) misunderstood
the roles and responsibilities of Justice's overseas components, and
(2) did not clearly define what we meant by assisting foreign nations
to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Justice's letter was
not based on a complete draft of our report, which we provided the
department on March 27, 2007. In the March 27 draft report, we made
several changes as a result of (1) Justice's February 16 letter; (2)
the comments we received during exit conferences with Justice, State,
and DHS; and (3) our own internal review and fact-checking processes.
Our report (1) clarified the roles and responsibilities of Justice's
overseas components, and (2) more clearly defined what we meant by
assisting foreign nations. In its May 11, 2007, letter formally
commenting on our draft report, Justice continued to contend that our
analysis did not clearly distinguish between operational and technical
assistance. As a result, we have further clarified our discussion of
these issues. Specifically, we have noted that the purpose of our
review was to assess the federal government's efforts to implement the
various national security strategies that generally guide law
enforcement efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism, and to
determine if the technical and operational assistance implemented by
the various U.S. departments and agencies has been reoriented to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
The Department of State said it would consider working with relevant
LEAs to improve the coordination of law enforcement activities
overseas. State did not indicate whether it concurred with our
recommendations that the Secretary of State issue clear guidance and
establish a monitoring system for ongoing efforts to help foreign
nations combat terrorism. State also indicated that we did not fully
reflect the department's lack of resources necessary to carry out its
mandate to coordinate U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad. As a
result, we have incorporated State's position on this issue into our
discussion of State's ability to effectively coordinate U.S.
international counterterrorism activities. State also believed we had
not sufficiently credited the department's Regional Strategic
Initiatives as examples of coordinated, interagency efforts to guide
overseas efforts to combat terrorism. However, State did not provide
any additional information to support this contention. Finally, State
also expressed concern about our characterization of the role DS
special agents play when working overseas. We clarified our discussion
of this point in the report, along the lines State suggested in its
response.
The NCTC provided oral comments on a draft of this report. The NCTC
stated that it is in the process of implementing its plan in
conjunction with other departments and agencies, including the law
enforcement agencies. According to NCTC, it has already begun to
implement our recommendations to NCTC. For example, NCTC stated that
its plan coordinates all instruments of national power, including law
enforcement agencies, to combat terrorism. NCTC also said the plan
provides direction and guidance to the various law enforcement agencies
on their efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism and includes
coordination mechanisms and a monitoring system to track implementation
of the plan. NCTC did not provide any documentation to verify these
statements.
We also received technical comments from DHS, Justice, State, and the
NCTC, which we have incorporated throughout the report where
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. We are also sending copies of this report to the Attorney
General of the United States, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and
State, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and the
National Security Council. Copies will be made available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will also be available at no charge
on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact Jess T. Ford on (202) 512-4128, e-mail fordj@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. Other GAO contact and
staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the guidance for law enforcement agencies (LEA) to assist
foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, we
reviewed the 2002 and 2006 versions of the National Security Strategy
of the United States of America, the 2002 National Strategy for
Homeland Security, the 2003 and 2006 versions of the National Strategy
to Combat Terrorism, the 9/11 Commission Report, and related
legislation. To determine whether this strategic level guidance was
translated into specific guidance for the Departments of State,
Justice, and Homeland Security, we analyzed their 5-year strategic
plans and their annual performance reports. In addition, we analyzed
the national strategies, strategic plans, and performance reports to
determine if they contained key elements we have recommended[Footnote
33]
and that are provided for in the Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA). These key elements include having clearly defined objectives
and roles and responsibilities; leveraged funding; and monitoring
systems related to assisting foreign governments to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists. We also requested all guidance issued by
State, Justice, and DHS to implement the national strategies' goal to
make combating terrorism their priority, and any specific guidance to
ensure their LEAs were assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists. To verify that our analysis was accurate, we
conducted detailed discussions with representatives from State,
Justice, DHS, and the eight LEAs, along with embassy and LEA officials
involved with working with foreign nation counterparts.
To assess the extent to which LEAs have implemented the strategic
guidance to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists and determine if the departments and their LEAs were
reporting on their progress in providing this assistance, we reviewed
strategic plans and annual performance reports for State, Justice, and
DHS and their component LEAs, where available. We also asked each
department and agency to provide a list of its accomplishments in
assisting foreign nations in this endeavor, including the number of
terrorist plots that had been identified and disrupted, and the number
of terrorists prosecuted as a result of this assistance, from 2001 to
2005. In addition, we asked for documentation on 11 cases highlighted
by the State Department as successful examples of foreign nations
identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists linked with high
profile attacks against Americans. However, none of the agencies
provided a comprehensive list of accomplishments or documentation of
the role that U.S. assistance played in these cases.[Footnote 34] We
also conducted detailed interviews with officials from State, Justice,
DHS, and their eight LEAs to further determine their progress and
impediments to fully implementing this strategic guidance. In addition,
we conducted detailed work in four countries with key roles in
combating terrorism, where we met with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation
officials to determine what role U.S. LEAs played in assisting the
foreign country to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We did
not name the specific countries we visited for this review due to
diplomatic and security concerns.
After our work abroad, we provided State, Justice, and DHS written
summaries of our findings, and conducted follow-up meetings with
department representatives to ensure that our findings accurately
characterized any guidance provided by the White House, NSC, and NCTC,
as well as State, Justice, and DHS. We also met with NCTC officials to
brief them on our observations and to determine the status of their
ongoing efforts to develop a plan to use all elements of national
power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they
had drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June
2006. According to NCTC officials, the implementing guidance for the
plan was still under development as of March 1, 2007, and they would
not discuss the plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance.
During the course of our work we experienced considerable delays
obtaining information from Justice and State, which resulted in this
report being issued several months later than initially planned. We
were eventually able to obtain information sufficient for answering our
objectives. We conducted our work between August 2005 and March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
April 27, 2007:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
RE: Draft Report GAO-07-697, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement
Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations Identify, Disrupt,
and Prosecute Terrorists (GAO Job Code 320365):
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the draft report referenced above. We agree,
generally, with the report and recommendations urging greater guidance
to law enforcement agencies on their roles and responsibilities, We
believe, however, that our component agencies with an overseas presence
have adequate guidance on their primary responsibilities, DHS efforts
to enhance border security and the security of cargo and transportation
overseas leads to the disruption of terrorist travel and methods even
if the foreign jurisdiction or the United States is unable to prosecute
specific individuals, DHS is prepared to work in close cooperation with
the National Security Council (NSC), National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), Department of State and Department of Justice on any planning
efforts that would enhance the ability of DHS and DHS law enforcement
agencies to assist foreign nations. We intend to issue implementing
guidance and establish a related monitoring system based upon direction
from the NSC and NCTC. Issuance of guidance in the absence of Executive-
wide coordination risks an uncoordinated response from disparate
departments.
Technical comments will be provided under separate cover.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
U.S. Department of Justice:
Office of the Deputy Attorney General:
Washington, D.C. 20530:
May 11, 2007:
Mr. Jess Ford:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
We have reviewed the draft final report, "Combating Terrorism --Law
Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations
Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists GAO 07-697" As you recall,
we reviewed the draft statement of facts with your staff on Thursday,
February 1, 2007, and submitted comments on February 16, 2007. Both in
the discussion and the written comments, we expressed numerous concerns
about some assumptions and what we saw as fundamental misunderstandings
about the roles, responsibilities, and activities of Department of
Justice components and.other Departments and agencies overseas in their
efforts in support of the national counterterrorism-related strategies.
While we appreciate that the final draft modified the conclusions to
suggest a lead role for the National Counterterrorism Center in
developing implementing plans and guidance, we still are concerned that
the analysis conflates operational and other activities into a concept
of "assistance" to foreign governments that is not defined. Insofar as
the final recommendations directed to the Attorney General, we
understand that the Department of State is preparing guidance to U.S.
Chiefs of Mission to undertake country-specific assessments on
necessary coordination. We will work with the Department of State
through that process and, with regard to the larger issue concerning
policy guidance, will work through established interagency coordination
processes with the NCTC to address guidance as it will relate to
implementation of the pending plan.
For the sake of completeness and full understanding of the Department's
concerns with the report, we ask that our February 16, 2007, comments
be published in the final report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James A. McAtamney:
Senior Counsel for National Security Affairs:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Office of the Deputy Attorney General:
Washington, D.C. 20530:
February 16, 2007:
Mr. Jess Ford:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
This responds to the "Statement of Facts: GAO Review of U.S. Law
Enforcement Agencies Abroad (320365)" (SOF) which we discussed With you
on Thursday, February 1, 2007. As noted during that exit conference,
the Department of Justice has numerous concerns about the document in
terms, of sonic assumptions and other elements that lead to possible
misunderstandings about the roles, responsibilities, and activities of
Department of Justice components overseas in their efforts in support
of the national counterterrorism-relAted strategies. Our fundamental
concern relates to the imprecise definition of the true focus of the
review and the consequent effects on the review's findings and
recommendations.
The principal difficulty we faced in reviewing tile SOF was
understanding the main focus of the review: evaluating law enforcement
efforts to "assist host nations identify. disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists." The document does not clearly define what is meant by
"assist" or tile activities that this concept would include. From that
broad term, however, all other discussion, finding, and recommendations
follow,
"Assist" with regard to foreign law enforcement can connote two broad
areas of:
a. Joint law enforcement activities, whether investigative, information-
sharing, or otherwise, that are aimed at either specific or general
terrorist threats or vulnerabilities; or:
b. Efforts by US agencies to provide expert advice, technical
assistance, training, or other support to increase the capacity of
foreign countries either to cooperate with us on operational matters or
independently to :identify, disrupt, or prosecute" terrorists
threatening those countries.
The findings and recommendations about such matters as lead agencies,
roles and responsibilities, and the like flow inexorably from whichever
connotation one accepts. Significant differences distinguish the two
connotations. Although they share similar terminology their
characteristics are quite disparate. Indeed, a study and review based
on the former would necessarily differ remarkably from a study and
evaluation based on the latter. The SOF reflects a failure to
appreciate these differences; concepts from both are intertwined,
misconstrued and confused. As such the approaches and analyses are
critically flawed, as are the resultant findings. We therefore
recommend that the review be revised and that the analyses be revisited
to reflect the clear distinctions between these two broad categories of
activities.
For example, the lack of clarity in the underlying definition has
second-order effects in several areas.
1. Government Performance and Results Act:
The SOF discusses strategic planning and the Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA) and stresses the inability to identify in some
federal law enforcement agency's strategic plans and aimed implementing
the "new strategy." As the "new strategy" relies on the imprecise
definition of its essential component, "assisting host nations
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists," the conclusions about
GPRA documents will necessarily depend on either of the two
connotations:
a. If the joint operational preventive and investigative law
enforcement connotation is the focus of the review, then those
activities will be and are included in strategic plans. For example,
the review, at page 11, addresses the expansion of law enforcement
presence overseas and states, "Since the national strategies did not
clearly delineate what LEAs were supposed to do to enhance their
overseas efforts with host nations, there was little guidance for LEAs
on how to implement this general mandate." For the FBI, however, the
guidance in its strategic plan is clear. FBI's Strategic Goal II.B.2
states that the FBI "will focus on exploiting intelligence developed by
Special Agents and others working in the United States and overseas,
and integrating Intelligence Community products into actionable
information targeting those terrorist vulnerabilities. [, and will do
so with bolstered] international participation through foreign
government liaison and enhanced Legal Attaché operations."
b. If, on the other hand, "assist" means providing technical, training,
or other capacity-building support, the LEAs' strategic plans will not
contain guidance. Section 306 of title 5, United States Code, provides,
in pertinent part:
[T]he head of each agency shall submit to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget and to the Congress a strategic plan for program
activities. Such plan shall contain-:
(1) a comprehensive mission statement covering the major functions and
operations of the agency;
(2) general goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and
objectives, for the major functions and operations of the agency
(emphasis added).
For the law enforcement components of the Department of Justice,
therefore, those strategic plans will address their core functions and
operations, For the DEA, for example, these core functions are to
coordinate the overall Federal drug law enforcement mission-, for FBI,
the core functions include:
Conduct[ing] professional investigations and authorized intelligence
collection to identify and counter the threat posed by domestic and
international terrorists and their supporters within the United States,
and to pursue extraterritorial criminal investigations to bring the
perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice. In furtherance of this
function, the FBI designs, develops, and implements counterterrorism
initiatives which enhance the FBI's ability to minimize the terrorist
threat.
Thus, the various DOJ component strategic plans will not reflect
training and capacity-building activities the components might
undertake in coordination with other departments and agencies,
utilizing non-DOJ appropriations.
2. Roles and Responsibilities:
Portions of the SOF conclude that more explicit definition of roles and
responsibilities ties is required in the strategic direction to "assist
host a nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists," The
imprecise definition of this concept further complicates analysis of
how the roles and responsibilities can properly be identified. For
example, the draft, at page 10 states that the three cited national
security strategies lacked key strategic elements "including those to
promote LEA collaboration in assisting host nations identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists."
As noted above, however, the lack of clear definition of the "assist"
concept complicates the determination of the elements of collaboration
mission. If that is intended as joint law enforcement efforts of an
operational nature, the role falls principally to the FBI in its role
as the lead federal law enforcement agency with investigative
jurisdiction over most federal criminal statutes generally and
terrorist offenses in particular. If the concept is intended as
collaborative efforts to increase the capacity of foreign governments'
law enforcement or justice sector institutions to engage in such
operational activities, the lead coordinative entity is the Department
of State, as the statutory authority for such efforts derives from
foreign assistance legislation and funding flows from foreign
operations appropriations,
3. Foreign Presence of Law Enforcement Agencies:
The SOF also discusses the missions of U.S. law enforcement agents
assigned overseas, such as FBI Legats and DEA and ATF Attachés, but the
analysis of roles and responsibilities associated with these positions
depends, in turn, on the undefined "assist" concept. As outlined, for
example, in the FBI web site on FBI's Legats, Legats:
* Coordinate international investigations with their colleagues;
* Cover international leads for domestic U.S. investigations;
* Link U.S. and international resources in critical criminal and
terrorist areas that better ensure the safety of the American public
here and abroad. The rules for Joint activities and information sharing
are generally spelled out in formal agreements between the United
States and the Legat's host country; and:
* Coordinate FBI King classes for police in their geographic areas--
everything from counterterrorism and cybercrime matters to forensic
techniques to human trafficking and human rights,
Thus, the fundamental mission of U.S. law enforcement representatives
overseas is to perform their core missions in foreign locations in
furtherance of their overall investigative jurisdiction. The boundaries
of their activities, just as in domestic activities, are defined by
their statutory jurisdiction. As a consequence, the FBI's lead role in
prevention and investigation of terrorist attacks "travels with" the
Legats overseas just as tile DEA's lead role in counternarcotics law
enforcement efforts accompanies DEA Attachés overseas. Therefore, at an
overseas location, the FBI will lead the law enforcement effort within
the defined area of its investigative jurisdiction.
The same specificity of mission might not apply in the case of U.S. law
enforcement agents deployed overseas on a capacity-building mission.
Those missions are defined by the interagency arrangements underlying
the program sponsoring the effort. For example, the SOF frequently
cites the Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program administered by the
Department of State. The inference from the discussion, however, is
that "administration" of a program is synonymous with "execution" of
the program. In fact, many of the capacity-building efforts conducted
Under the overall authority of the ATA Program are conducted by FBI or
other agents, under agreements with the Department of State.
This apparent confusion is exemplified in the discussion on page 27,
wherein the SOF discusses the GAO review of State Department bureau and
mission performance plans. Tile text states, that, while State
officials said the documents allowed them to monitor progress and
document progress, "based on [the GAO's] review of these documents,
[the GAO] found they were not sufficiently detailed to clearly
determine the role of State, Justice, or DHS LEAs, or their
accomplishments or progress, in meeting this national security goal."
The documents in question, however, relate to programs authorized under
State Department's authorizing legislation and its appropriations. The
implementation of the programs, however, is conducted through various
means, in many cases interagency agreements providing funding for the
U.S. LEAs to provide specialized assistance to foreign Counterparts
depending oil the capabilities that are to be imparted and tile
relative expertise of the law enforcement agencies to provide such
assistance. As program implementation is thus dependent on various
modes of execution, it is not surprising that the general budget
documents do not designate roles and responsibilities, as program
execution is generally tailored to the host nation's needs and the
agency providing the specialized support.
Similar confusion of the purpose and mission of deployed Criminal
Division personnel results from a lack of clear definition of the
"assist" concept. Page 31 of the SFO states, that "Justice provides
legal assistance through its attaché program, which is designed to
assist host nations with legal reform efforts and can include
assistance in crafting needed legislation and revising existing
terrorism law, as well as assistance to prosecutors and judges in
utilizing new and revised terrorism law to process terrorist suspects,"
The role described in this extract, however, is not that of Justice
Attachés, but of Resident Legal Advisors under the Criminal Division's
OPDAT program, which is funded by the Department of State. Justice
Attachés, like FBI Legats, are assigned overseas under Department of
Justice authority to facilitate the coordination of operational
prosecution activities, such as implementation of extradition or mutual
legal assistance treaties. This misstatement of the role of Justice
Attaches explains the comment on page 32 that the Justice Attaché
program "is currently limited to a flew nations and was absent in one
of the countries [GAO] visited, which was a key country in the war on
terror."
4. Defining the Counterterrorist Mission:
Related to the issue of how to define the term "assist" with respect to
identification and prosecution of terrorists is the failure of the
draft to define what is meant by "terrorist". Is a terrorist only one
who actively conducts attacks? Is he or she a financier, a travel
facilitator, or a procurer of fraudulent documents? Does a successful
prosecution of a "terrorist" necessarily mean a conviction of an
offense defined in a criminal code as a terrorist act, or can it be a
conviction for aiding or abetting such an act through providing
material support to the actual perpetrator or planner of a terrorist
as?
These distinctions are important in assessing the programs that serve
as the basis for the programs to "assist" foreign nations. If
"assistance" is operational, the responsible agencies can provide
operational support in joint investigations through the exercise or
their statutory responsibilities. For example, as the Administrator of
the Drug Enforcement Administration testified before the Committee on
International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, February 12,
2004, concerning, "United States Policy Towards Narco-Terrorism in
Afghanistan":
During December 2001, the DEA formed a Special Coordination Unit at its
Special Operations Division. This multi-agency unit coordinates all DEA
intelligence and investigations having a possible nexus to terrorism
and shares information with agencies responsible for coordinating
terrorist intelligence and investigations. DEA drug investigations have
generated such narco-terrorist related intelligence and investigations
both domestically and internationally.
In 2004, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report on "Terrorist
Financing Current Efforts and Policy Policy Issues for Congress"
discussed in some detail the capabilities and efforts of Justice law
enforcement components to support efforts to attack terrorist
financing. The report noted the ability of ATF to leverage its core
authority to "1) Disrupt and eliminate criminal and terrorist
organizations by identifying, investigating and arresting offenders who
traffic in contraband cigarettes and illegal liquor; [and] 2) Conduct
financial investigations in conjunction with alcohol and tobacco
diversion investigations in order to seize and deny further access to
assets and funds utilized by criminal enterprises and terrorist
organizations.
In the area of capacity-building efforts aimed at "assisting host
nations," examples abound of the efforts that Justice Components have
undertaken in coordination with other agencies to attack terrorist
activities. For example, in testimony before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on "Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing in the Middle East and South Asia," in July 2005, Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs E. Anthony Wayne
described the capacity-building efforts coordinated by the State-
chaired Terrorist Finance Working Group. At the time of the testimony,
"over twenty U.S. Government offices and agencies participating in tile
TFWG, which include the Justice, Treasury and Homeland Security
Departments and financial regulatory agencies, have provided assistance
provided assistance to eighteen countries on five different continents
including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt in the
Middle East and Bangladesh and Pakistan in South Asia regions. These
comprehensive training and technical assistance programs include
legislative drafting, financial regulatory training, Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU) development, law enforcement training, and
prosecutorial judicial development."
The definition of counterterrorist efforts is important, in particular,
with respect to the SOF's concerns that some embassy officials said
"they lacked funding specifically available to assist ]lost nations
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists" (m. 25), This concern is
mirrored in comments about We amount of funding available to combat
general crime, for example, The ability of foreign countries to
prosecute terrorists, however, as is the case with the United States,
depends on having functioning law enforcement and justice sector
institutions and professionals capable of the carrying out complex
investigations and prosecutions. These capabilities are not "terrorism-
specific, tic," but they are necessary prerequisites to an ability to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorist using the most modern
techniques, Thus capacity-building may vary from specialized techniques
taught through tile ATA Program to more -general" techniques such as
those described in CRS Report: "[The FBI] provided basic training to
law enforcement entities on how to take viable and legible fingerprints
that can be used reliably by tHe FBI and our partners.
5. Strategic Direction:
The SOF incorrectly finds that Justice's activities overseas suffer
from a lack of strategic direction on how to assist host nations
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. This finding is
inconsistent with tile fact that Goal 1 in the Department's Strategic
Plan is to "Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation's Security." For
example, the strategy states, "Much of the terrorism that threatens the
United States emanates from foreign nations. As part of its war on
terrorism, the Department assists other countries in developing
effective criminal justice systems that can prevent terrorism, or
disrupt it before it passes through their borders to threaten the U.S."
Likewise the Department's Organization, Missions and Functions Manual
provides supplementary guidance, So, for example, the Criminal
Division's role includes:
* Overseas prosecutorial development, assistance, and training for
prosecutors and judicial personnel in other countries to develop and
sustain democratic criminal justice:
* Development assistance to foreign law enforcement institutions
(police and corrections), including the creation/reform of new/existing
police forces in international peacekeeping operations and nations in
post-conflict; the enhancement of capabilities of existing police
forces in emerging democracies; and assistance to nations that are on
the front lines of the war on terrorism. The technical assistance and
training provided strengthens U.S. national security creating
sustainable foreign law enforcement institutions that promote
democratic principles, instill respect for human rights and human
dignity, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism.
6. Coordination:
Finally, the SOF recommends, inter alia, that the Secretaries of State
and Homeland Security to implement the national security goal of using
U.S. LEAs to help host nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists." As the SFO notes, however, the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) is charged by statute to: "(1) conduct strategic
operational planning for counterterrorism activities; (2) integrate all
instruments of national power in the U.S. effort to combat terrorism,
including law enforcement, diplomatic, military, intelligence, and
economic activities; (3) assign roles and responsibilities; (4) ensure
that agencies have access to intelligence needed to execute their
counterterrorism plans; and (5) monitor implementation of these
operational plans." The SOF acknowledges that a plan has been completed
and it is undergoing interagency review by executive departments. The
recommendation that three department heads conduct a separate strategic
planning effort, therefore, is inconsistent with the statutory mission
of the NCTC.
In we urge you to review the SOF in the context of the above
information and analysis before releasing the draft Report. If l may be
of assistance in that regard, please contact me.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James A. McAtamney:
Senior Counsel Or National Security Affairs:
Following are GAO's comments on the Department of Justice's letter
dated May 11, 2007.
GAO Comments:
1. On March 27, 2007, we provided Justice a complete draft report
reflecting several changes stemming from (1) the comments and
suggestions we obtained during exit conferences with Justice, DHS, and
State; (2) Justice's February 16, 2007 letter; and (3) our internal
review and fact checking process. As such, a number of the comments and
concerns Justice raised in the February 16, 2007, letter were addressed
in our draft report.
2. In response to Justice's concern about our distinction between
operational and technical assistance, we have clarified the language
that describes the purpose of our review. This report assesses the
federal government's efforts to implement the various national security
strategies that generally guide law enforcement efforts to help foreign
nations combat terrorism overseas. As such, our review focused on
assessing the guidance and implementation of those strategies. We also
clarified our definition of assistance to differentiate between
operational and technical assistance and made changes throughout the
report to clarify when our discussion focuses on operational or
technical assistance. Our definition of what we mean by technical and
operational assistance is based on language Justice suggested in its
February 16, 2007, letter.
3. We no longer use the phrase "new strategy" in our report because the
various national strategies guiding overseas efforts to combat
terrorism were first published more than 4 years ago.
4. We include a discussion of the FBI's strategic guidance in the
report.
5. Even if the LEAs are not specifically required by law to develop
plans guiding and coordinating their technical assistance efforts, we
believe this is a best-practice and a fundamental aspect of good
governance.
6. The national strategies offer few details on which department should
have lead responsibility and do not specify what supporting roles other
departments and agencies should play.
7. We modified our discussion of FBI LEGATs.
8. According to State Department's Strategic Plan for 2004 to 2009,
each mission annually develops mission performance plans that
incorporate the activities of all U.S. agencies and departments located
in the country. These plans outline the intended goals, initiatives,
and performance indicators for each strategic objective of the mission,
and the role that each agency and department is expected to contribute
in order to attain each objective. As such, the plans should include a
discussion of the progress and accomplishments of law enforcement
efforts to help foreign nations to combat terrorism.
9. We modified our discussion of Justice's overseas personnel.
10. Our recent work on U.S. efforts to combat terrorist financing found
significant problems. Specifically, the U.S. government lacks an
integrated strategy to coordinate the delivery of counter-terrorism
financing training and technical assistance to countries vulnerable to
terrorist financing. In addition, the effort does not have key
stakeholder acceptance of roles and procedures, a strategic alignment
of resources with needs, or a process to measure performance.[Footnote
35]
11. We agree that general assistance to bolster foreign law enforcement
and judicial sectors is an essential component of the broader U.S.
effort to combat overseas terrorism. However, the allocation of
resources for law enforcement programs specifically targeted for
combating terrorism did not seem to match the preeminent role combating
terrorism plays in U.S. national security strategies and law
enforcement agencies' strategic guidance.
12. With the exception of the FBI, Justice LEAs reported that they
lacked clear implementing guidance on how to carry out the broad
guidance contained in the Justice strategic plan and U.S. national
security strategies.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
May 08 S 2007
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Combating
Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign
Nations Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists," GAO Job Code
320365.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Marc
Norman, Deputy Director, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, at (202) 647-8911.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - David Maurer:
S/CT - Susan Burk:
DS - Richard Griffin:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist
Foreign Nations Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists GAO-07-697,
GAO Code 320365:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report entitled
"Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to
Assist Foreign Nations Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists,"
The report notes past difficulties encountered by the Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) in coordinating LEA activities
at some posts during the limited timeframe it examines, but fails to
take seriously into account the lack of resources available to the
Department to fully coordinate the entire U.S. government's
international counterterrorism activities. The constraints such
resource shortfalls place on the Department's counterterrorism
coordination activities were duly noted in the March 2006 report of the
Department's Office of the Inspector General, which the GAO report
itself cites, albeit only briefly. These resource shortfalls still
exist.
In addition, the GAO Report gives insufficient credit to new S/CT
initiatives designed to improve and streamline interagency coordination
on counterterrorism issues, such as the Regional Strategic Initiatives
(RSIs). RSIs have now been held in six regions of the world; they bring
together senior-level interagency officials representing all elements
of national power to ensure provision of just the sort of coordinated
guidance the report rightly notes is required. The RSI process is as
well structured to provide the Washington follow-through needed to
implement those decisions. Law enforcement coordination is a key aspect
of the RSI process.
Furthermore, the explanation and description of the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security's (DS) role and mandate described on pages 9-10 and
pages 32-33 needs to be clarified and expanded. DS in its current form
is an outgrowth of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism
Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-399; 22 USC 4801 et. seq.) It has a broad mandate,
in furtherance of the Secretary of State's responsibilities under this
Act, to protect and perform protection functions in relation to U.S.
missions and personnel overseas. As relevant to this report, DS'
specific law enforcement authorities are largely defined by 22 USC
2709, which confer on DS a lead law enforcement role with respect to
passport and visa fraud. Over the past 21 years DS has made several
efforts to expand its law enforcement activities, both domestic and
abroad, as they pertain to the enforcement of passport and visa fraud
criminal statutes.
With respect to DS's mission to provide a safe and secure environment
for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, DS special agents assigned to
Regional Security Offices (RSO) are primarily responsible for providing
overall security and protection for U.S. missions and personnel
overseas. RSOs also have law enforcement responsibility and statutory
authorities in the areas of passport and visa fraud. This often
involves working with foreign nations to identify and disrupt terrorist
activity, and may on occasion call for assisting foreign nations to
prosecute terrorists, or to extradite or deport terrorists to the U.S.
or other countries for prosecution. Accordingly, consideration to
broadening DS' law enforcement mandate and authorities so that they can
play a broader role (i.e. coordinating all law enforcement activities
overseas) would likely require statutory changes.
In an effort to enhance investigative capacity overseas, DS has
assigned Special Agents (Assistant Regional Security Officer for
Investigations or "ARSO/I") to overseas posts solely dedicated to
investigating travel document fraud. The framework for the future
expansion of DS efforts is outlined in the DS Strategic Plan provided
to Congress in 2006. In December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) to implement the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Section 7128 of the IRTPA
mandated the establishment of a Visa and Passport Security Program
within DS and the development of a Strategic Plan that targets and
disrupts terrorist travel and travel document fraud.
The DS Strategic Plan is a comprehensive strategy built upon three
goals that emphasize law enforcement efforts and coordination;
interagency collaboration, information exchange, and intelligence
analysis; and foreign cooperation and capacity building in an effort to
target and disrupt individuals and organizations that attempt to
compromise the integrity of U.S. travel documents. Successful
implementation of this strategy will diminish terrorists' opportunities
to operate and recruit; restrict access to potential U.S. targets; and
allow U.S. domestic agencies to concentrate more of their resources on
critical infrastructure, border security, and immigration policy.
To date, the DS and Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) partnership has
resulted in the deployment of 33 Special Agents to consular posts that
encounter high numbers of fraudulent travel documents. DS's expertise
in overseas operations and the State Department's established
infrastructure provide a quick and efficient capability to deploy
additional personnel overseas. Using a comprehensive methodology, DS
has identified and prioritized additional posts with high volumes of
fraudulent travel documents for the future deployment of DS Agents, In
2008, DS plans to increase overseas deployments by adding 17 additional
DS agents (bringing the total to 50 worldwide).
Since 2004, the program has generated 1206 arrests for travel document
fraud offenses, 3826 visa refusals and revocations, 7070 personnel
trained (to include mission personnel, local police, immigration,
airport and airline officials) and 434 denials of U.S. passports
applications (due to fraudulent claim of birth abroad). Pending the
availability of resources, future expansion will significantly build
upon those successes through the deployment of additional DS personnel
at critical posts around the globe, resources to enhance intelligence
and data-sharing efforts, and vital training and technical assistance
to our foreign partners.
The State Department and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
coordinate on an ongoing basis to ensure that country counterterrorism
priorities are consistent with NCTC guidance. In view of the GAO
recommendations, the Department intends to alert ambassadors to the
coordination issue, instruct them to convene the LEA members in their
embassies to review past practice and to identify deficiencies; and to
report back on their findings. The Department will also consider
coordinating with relevant LEAs to look at possible establishment of a
pilot program to determine if new structures should be put in place and
how such structures might contribute to better coordination of law
enforcement activities and consolidation of overlapping or redundant
responsibilities. Following the evaluation of past practices, the
Department will review and revise its guidance to the field regarding
LEAs with special attention to the need for effective coordination.
Following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter dated
May 8, 2007.
GAO Comments:
1. We added additional discussion of S/CT's lack of resources.
2. Our discussion of Regional Strategic Initiatives in the report was
limited by the information State provided on these activities. Although
we asked to review all four of the Regional Strategic Initiatives
completed during 2006, we were only able to review one. State provided
us no additional information to support the claims it makes in its
agency comments.
3. We modified the report to better reflect the role and legal
authority of Regional Security Officers.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, (202) 512-
4128, email fordj@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Dave Maurer, Assistant
Director; Edward J. George; J. Addison Ricks; Diana Glod; Ernie
Jackson; and Joe Carney made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to
Coordinate U.S. Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training
and Technical Assistance Abroad, GAO-06-19 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24,
2005). The report found that the Departments of Justice, State, and
Treasury lacked a strategic plan to carry out this effort; roles and
responsibilities needed clarification; there was no mechanism to
determine resource needs; and there was no monitoring system to assess
progress.
[2] In addition to the strategies discussed in this report, the White
House has released a number of other strategies related to the War on
Terrorism, including (1) the September 2004 National Border Patrol
Strategy and (2) the May 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorist
Travel. For this report, we focused on the strategies released shortly
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks that discussed the use of LEAs to
combat terrorism and assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists, in order to determine the extent to which LEAs
had implemented these strategies in the 5 years since the 9/11
terrorist attacks. We also included any updates to these strategies to
ensure that there was a strategic continuum in the use of LEAs to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
[3] GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005); GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That
Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-
06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); GAO, Combating Terrorism:
Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-03-519T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003); and GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively
Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118
(Washington, D.C.: June 1996).
[4] The NCTC was created by Congress as part of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). NCTC's mission
includes developing plans that coordinate the use all elements of
national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism and prevent
terrorist attacks. As detailed in the background section of this
report, the NCTC reports directly to the President on matters of
strategic operational planning for counterterrorism and works under the
policy direction of the NSC.
[5] P.L. 108-458, section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 404o).
[6] Fiscal year 2004 to 2009 Department of State and USAID Strategic
Plan; source: Hyperlink,
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm.
[7] DS in its current form is an outgrowth of the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. (P.L. 99-399; 22 U.S.C. 4801
et. seq.) It has a broad mandate, in furtherance of the Secretary of
State's responsibilities under this Act, to protect and perform
protection functions in relation to U.S. missions and personnel
overseas. As relevant to this report, DS's specific law enforcement
authorities are largely defined by 22 U.S.C. 2709, which confer on DS a
lead law enforcement role with respect to passport and visa fraud.
[8] 50 U.S.C. 402(a),(b).
[9] Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law 107-
306, Title VI.
[10] INS was abolished by the Homeland Security Act, and its
responsibilities were divided among ICE, CBP, and Citizens and
Immigration Services, which are now part of DHS.
[11] GAO-03-519T.
[12] GAO-05-927.
[13] GAO-06-15.
[14] GAO-03-519T.
[15] This effort was funded by State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)
program, which was created in 1983 to assist civilian security and law
enforcement personnel in police procedures that address terrorism.
[16] U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General, Inspection of the Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, OIG Report ISP-I-06-25A (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006).
[17] Admiral John Scott Redd, in testimony before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, June 13, 2006.
[18] GAO, FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its
Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities GAO-04-578T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004).
[19] Because these incentives had just been implemented, we did not
assess their impact on staffing problems abroad.
[20] Because FBI provided these comments after our audit time frames,
we were unable to verify the FBI's statement.
[21] GAO, Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum
Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection
Efforts, GAO-05-557 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005).
[22] On November 16, 2006, we initiated a review of the ATA program,
including the extent to which State has assessed program outcomes and
achieved program objectives.
[23] ATF officials told us that ATF incorporated terrorism-prevention
into its strategic plan but that it had not received or issued guidance
specific to assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists.
[24] 18 U.S.C. 2331, 2332, and 3052; 28 U.S.C. 533; 28 U.S.C. 3052.
[25] 28 C.F.R. 0.85(l).
[26] Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations.
[27] Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security
Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection.
[28] RSO authorities are found in the State Department Basic
Authorities Act (P.L. 84-885, section 37; 22 U.S.C. 2709). RSOs are
responsible for implementing and managing State's security and law
enforcement programs for a geographic region, which includes at least
one Foreign Service post. RSOs are resident at a particular post and
may have constituent posts within their region for which they are
responsible. The RSOs or Post Security Officers are responsible for
overseeing the day-to-day management of security programs at their
constituent posts (12 FAM 422.1). The RSOs responsibilities and duties
are enumerated in 12 FAM 422.2 through 422.5.
[29] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[30] In response to our draft report, ATF's technical comments stated
that ATF has systems in place to monitor its progress and
accomplishments in program areas, including assistance given to foreign
nations; however, ATF did not provide us with documentation to support
their position. Further, ATF does not have a specific program to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
[31] Agencies and departments that participate in JTTFs include FBI,
DEA, USMS, ATF, ICE, CBP, USSS, the Department of Defense, Coast Guard,
the Department of Treasury, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S.
Capitol Police, U.S. Park Police, and state and local partners, such as
the state and local police.
[32] GAO/GGD-96-118, GAO-05-927, and GAO-06-15.
[33] GAO-05-927, GAO-06-15, and GAO-03-519T.
[34] Although State Department officials said they were unable to find
any relevant documents related to our case studies, we found detailed
reporting on one of our case studies at an embassy we visited.
[35] GAO-06-19.
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U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
