DOD Personnel Clearances
Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for Industry Personnel Gao ID: GAO-07-842T May 17, 2007Individuals working for the private industry are playing a larger role in national security work conducted by Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. As of May 2006, industry personnel held about 34 percent of DOD-maintained personnel security clearances. The damage that the unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause to national security necessitates the prompt and careful consideration of who is granted a security clearance. Long-standing delays in determining clearance eligibility and other challenges led GAO to designate the DOD personnel security clearance program as a high-risk area in January 2005 and again in GAO's January 2007 update of the high-risk areas. In February 2005, DOD transferred its security clearance investigations functions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and now obtains almost all of its clearance investigations from OPM. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for effective implementation of policy relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information. This testimony addresses the timeliness of the process and completeness of documentation used to determine eligibility of industry personnel for top secret clearances in January and February 2006. This statement relies primarily on GAO's September 2006 report (GAO-06-1070).
GAO's analysis of timeliness data showed that industry personnel contracted to work for the federal government waited more than 1 year on average to receive top secret clearances, longer than OMB- and OPM-produced statistics would suggest. GAO's analysis of 2,259 cases in its population showed the process took an average of 446 days for initial clearances and 545 days for clearance updates. While the government plan has a goal for the application-submission phase of the process to take 14 days or less, it took an average of 111 days. In addition, GAO's analyses showed that OPM used an average of 286 days to complete initial investigations for top secret clearances, well in excess of the 180-day goal specified in the plan that OMB and others developed for improving the clearance process. Finally, the average time for adjudication (determination of clearance eligibility) was 39 days, compared to the 30-day requirement that began in December 2006. An inexperienced investigative workforce, not fully using technology, and other causes underlie these delays. Delays may increase costs for contracts and risks to national security. In addition, statistics that OMB and OPM report to Congress on the timeliness of the clearance process do not portray the full length of time it takes many applicants to receive a clearance. GAO found several issues with the statistics, including limited information on reinvestigations for clearance updating and failure to measure the total time it took to complete the various phases of the clearance process. Not fully accounting for all the time used in the process hinders congressional oversight of the efforts to address the delays. OPM provided incomplete investigative reports to DOD, and DOD personnel who review the reports to determine a person's eligibility to hold a clearance (adjudicators) granted eligibility for industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues, such as unexplained affluence and potential foreign influence. In its review of 50 investigative reports for initial clearances, GAO found that that almost all (47 of 50) cases were missing documentation required by federal investigative standards. Moreover, federal standards indicate expansion of investigations may be necessary to resolve issues, but GAO found at least one unresolved issue in 27 of the reports. GAO also found that the DOD adjudicators granted top secret clearance eligibility for all 27 industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues without requesting additional information or documenting in the adjudicative report that the information was missing. In its November 2005 assessment of the government plan for improving the clearance process, GAO raised concerns about the limited attention devoted to assessing quality in the clearance process, but the plan has not been revised to address the shortcomings GAO identified. The use of incomplete investigations and adjudications in granting top secret clearance eligibility increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Also, it could negatively affect efforts to promote reciprocity (an agency's acceptance of a clearance issued by another agency) being developed by an interagency working group headed by OMB's Deputy Director.
GAO-07-842T, DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for Industry Personnel
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, May 17, 2007:
DOD Personnel Clearances:
Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for Industry Personnel:
Statement of Derek B. Stewart, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-07-842T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-842T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
Individuals working for the private industry are playing a larger role
in national security work conducted by Department of Defense (DOD) and
other federal agencies. As of May 2006, industry personnel held about
34 percent of DOD-maintained personnel security clearances. The damage
that the unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause to
national security necessitates the prompt and careful consideration of
who is granted a security clearance. Long-standing delays in
determining clearance eligibility and other challenges led GAO to
designate the DOD personnel security clearance program as a high-risk
area in January 2005 and again in GAO‘s January 2007 update of the high-
risk areas. In February 2005, DOD transferred its security clearance
investigations functions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
and now obtains almost all of its clearance investigations from OPM.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for effective
implementation of policy relating to determinations of eligibility for
access to classified information.
This testimony addresses the timeliness of the process and completeness
of documentation used to determine eligibility of industry personnel
for top secret clearances in January and February 2006. This statement
relies primarily on GAO‘s September 2006 report (GAO-06-1070).
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s analysis of timeliness data showed that industry personnel
contracted to work for the federal government waited more than 1 year
on average to receive top secret clearances, longer than OMB- and OPM-
produced statistics would suggest. GAO‘s analysis of 2,259 cases in its
population showed the process took an average of 446 days for initial
clearances and 545 days for clearance updates. While the government
plan has a goal for the application-submission phase of the process to
take 14 days or less, it took an average of 111 days. In addition,
GAO‘s analyses showed that OPM used an average of 286 days to complete
initial investigations for top secret clearances, well in excess of the
180-day goal specified in the plan that OMB and others developed for
improving the clearance process. Finally, the average time for
adjudication (determination of clearance eligibility) was 39 days,
compared to the 30-day requirement that began in December 2006. An
inexperienced investigative workforce, not fully using technology, and
other causes underlie these delays. Delays may increase costs for
contracts and risks to national security. In addition, statistics that
OMB and OPM report to Congress on the timeliness of the clearance
process do not portray the full length of time it takes many applicants
to receive a clearance. GAO found several issues with the statistics,
including limited information on reinvestigations for clearance
updating and failure to measure the total time it took to complete the
various phases of the clearance process. Not fully accounting for all
the time used in the process hinders congressional oversight of the
efforts to address the delays.
OPM provided incomplete investigative reports to DOD, and DOD personnel
who review the reports to determine a person‘s eligibility to hold a
clearance (adjudicators) granted eligibility for industry personnel
whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues, such as
unexplained affluence and potential foreign influence. In its review of
50 investigative reports for initial clearances, GAO found that that
almost all (47 of 50) cases were missing documentation required by
federal investigative standards. Moreover, federal standards indicate
expansion of investigations may be necessary to resolve issues, but GAO
found at least one unresolved issue in 27 of the reports. GAO also
found that the DOD adjudicators granted top secret clearance
eligibility for all 27 industry personnel whose investigative reports
contained unresolved issues without requesting additional information
or documenting in the adjudicative report that the information was
missing. In its November 2005 assessment of the government plan for
improving the clearance process, GAO raised concerns about the limited
attention devoted to assessing quality in the clearance process, but
the plan has not been revised to address the shortcomings GAO
identified. The use of incomplete investigations and adjudications in
granting top secret clearance eligibility increases the risk of
unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Also, it could
negatively affect efforts to promote reciprocity (an agency‘s
acceptance of a clearance issued by another agency) being developed by
an interagency working group headed by OMB‘s Deputy Director.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-842T].
To view the full product, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Derek B. Stewart on (202)512-5559 or
stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's
(DOD) personnel security clearance program and problems that continue
to negatively affect that program. We have testified on clearance-
related issues in three prior hearings that this Subcommittee has held
since January 2005 when we first placed DOD's security clearance
program on our list of high-risk government programs and
operations.[Footnote 1] To facilitate an understanding of our recent
findings on private industry personnel who applied for top secret
clearances,[Footnote 2] I would like to first provide some information
about the clearance process and events that have occurred since we
placed DOD's program on our high-risk list.
DOD is responsible for about 2.5 million security clearances issued to
servicemembers, DOD civilians, and industry personnel who work on
contracts for DOD and 23 other federal agencies. Individuals working
for the private industry are playing an increasingly larger role in
national security work conducted by DOD and other federal agencies as a
result of an increased awareness of threats to our national security
stemming from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and increased
efforts over the past decade to privatize federal jobs. As of May 2006,
industry personnel held about 34 percent of DOD-maintained personnel
security clearances.
As with servicemembers and federal workers, industry personnel must
obtain security clearances to gain access to classified information,
which is categorized into three levels: top secret, secret, and
confidential. The level of classification denotes the degree of
protection required for information and the amount of damage that
unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to
national defense or foreign relations. For top secret information, the
expected damage that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be
expected to cause is "exceptionally grave damage;" for secret
information, it is "serious damage;" and for confidential information,
it is "damage."[Footnote 3]
DOD's Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(OUSD(I)) has overall responsibility for DOD clearances. Two offices
are responsible for adjudication (eligibility determination to hold a
clearance) for industry personnel. The Defense Industrial Security
Clearance Office (DISCO) within OUSD(I) is responsible for adjudicating
cases that contain only favorable information or minor issues regarding
security concerns (e.g., some overseas travel by the individual). The
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) within the Defense Legal
Agency is responsible for adjudicating cases that contain major
security issues (e.g., an individual's unexplained affluence or
criminal history), which could result in the denial of clearance
eligibility.
Long-standing delays in determining clearance eligibility and other
clearance challenges led us to designate DOD's personnel security
clearance program as a high-risk area in January 2005 and continue that
designation in the updated list of high-risk areas that we published in
2007.[Footnote 4] In February 2005, DOD transferred its security
clearance investigations functions to the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) and now obtains almost all of its clearance
investigations from OPM, which conducts about 90 percent of all federal
clearance investigations. Other recent significant events affecting
DOD's clearance program have been the passage of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)[Footnote 5] and the
June 2005 issuance of Executive Order No. 13381,[Footnote 6]
Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access
to Classified National Security Information. IRTPA included milestones
for reducing the time to complete clearances, general specifications
for a database on security clearances, and requirements for reciprocity
of clearances (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by
another department, agency, or military service). Executive Order No.
13381 assigned the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) responsibility
for the effective implementation of a uniform, efficient, effective,
timely, and reciprocal policy related to determinations of personnel
eligibility for access to classified information.
In June 2005, OMB's Deputy Director of Management was designated as the
OMB official responsible for improving the process by which the
government determines eligibility for access to classified national
security information. One of OMB's efforts to improve the security
clearance process involved taking a lead in preparing a November 2005
strategic plan to improve personnel security clearance processes
governmentwide. In its February 2007 annual IRTPA-mandated report to
Congress,[Footnote 7] OMB noted additional improvements that had been
made to the clearance process governmentwide. For example, OMB
indicated that it had issued reciprocity standards, OPM had increased
its investigative workforce to an estimated 9,367 total staff in
efforts to reach an earlier goal of having 8,000 full-time staff, and
agencies had dramatically increased the use of OPM's Electronic
Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (eQIP) system to reduce
the time required to get a clearance by 2 to 3 weeks. The report also
identified several challenges associated with accessing records
repositories.
In requesting our past work, you have expressed concern about the
negative consequences of untimely, inadequate, or inconsistent
investigations and adjudications. This testimony summarizes our earlier
work that examined those issues and supplements other clearance-related
reports that we have issued since originally placing DOD's personnel
security clearance program on our high-risk list (see the list of
Related GAO Products at the end of this statement). It addresses two
questions: (1) How timely are the processes used to determine whether
industry personnel are eligible for top secret clearances? and (2) How
complete is the documentation of the processes used to determine
whether industry personnel are eligible for top secret clearances?
This statement relies primarily on GAO's September 2006
report.[Footnote 8] In conducting our prior work on these two key
questions, we reviewed laws, executive orders, policies, and reports
related to the timeliness and completeness of security clearance
investigations and adjudications for industry personnel as well as
servicemembers and civilian government employees. Those sources
provided the criteria used for assessing timeliness and documentation
completeness, and identified causes for and effects from delayed
clearances and incomplete investigative and adjudicative reports.
Additional insights about causes of and effects from delayed clearances
and incomplete investigative and adjudicative reports were obtained
from interviews with and documentary evidence from personnel associated
with a variety of government offices: OUSD(I), DISCO, DOHA, other DOD
adjudication facilities that make clearance determinations for
servicemembers and DOD civilians; DOD's Defense Personnel Security
Research Center; the Defense Security Service's Training Academy that
offers adjudicator training; and OPM. Nongovernmental organizations
supplying information on conditions, causes, and effects included
officials representing two of OPM's investigations contractors and
technology associations whose member organizations require clearances
for their industry personnel. We also reviewed the February 2007 annual
IRPTA-mandated report to Congress by the Security Clearance Oversight
Group. For the timeliness question, our analyses of conditions included
a review of computerized data abstracted from DOD's Joint Personnel
Adjudication System (JPAS) and statistical reports on timeliness that
OPM produced for DOD. The abstract was for the population of 1,685
industry personnel granted initial top secret clearances and 574
industry personnel granted top secret clearance updates by DISCO during
January and February 2006. The clearance investigations for those 2,259
industry personnel were started at various times prior to the
adjudications. While we found problems with the accuracy of some of the
JPAS data, we determined they were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our September 2006 report. DOD and OPM also supplied
timeliness statistics for other periods, levels of clearances, types of
personnel, and agencies to provide us with a broader context with which
to interpret the timeliness statistics that we computed from the JPAS
database abstract. We addressed the completeness question with a
multiple-step process. We (1) randomly selected 50 cases from the
previously described population of 1,685 initially cleared industry
personnel, (2) obtained paper files of the 50 investigative and
adjudicative reports, (3) created a data collection instrument using
federal investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines to
standardize our data gathering, (4) sought experts' comments to refine
our instrument and process, (5) coded data from the paper files, (6)
had a second team member independently verify the information that
another team member had coded, and (7) computed statistics to indicate
the numbers of investigative and adjudicative reports with various
types of missing documentation. In addition, two team members attended
OPM's basic special agent training course to obtain an understanding of
the investigative requirements as promulgated by OPM, and two other
members of our team took about 40 hours of online adjudication
training. We performed our original work from September 2005 through
August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Summary:
At the time we issued our report in September 2006, our analysis of
timeliness data showed that industry personnel contracted to work for
the federal government waited more than 1 year on average to receive
top secret security clearances and that timeliness statistics reported
to Congress by OMB and OPM do not convey the full magnitude of the
delays. Industry personnel granted eligibility for top secret clearance
from DISCO from January to February 2006 waited an average of 446 days
for their initial clearances and 545 days for their clearance updates.
Delays were found in each phase of the clearance process that we
examined. First, the application submission phase took an average of
111 days, nearly 100 days more than the government's goal. Inaccurate
data that the employee provided in the application, multiple reviews of
the application, and manual entry of some application forms are some of
the causes for the extended application-submission phase. Second, the
investigation phase took an average of 286 days for initial top secret
clearances, well in excess of the 180-day goal. In addition, it took
419 days for top secret clearance updates (no goal is given for
clearance update investigations). Factors contributing to the slowness
of completing the investigation phase include an inexperienced
investigative workforce and problems accessing national, state, and
local records. Finally, it took DISCO adjudicators an average of 39
days to grant initial clearance eligibility to the industry personnel
in our study population, compared to IRTPA's December 2006 requirement
that 80 percent of all adjudication cases be completed in 30 days.
Regardless of when in the process the delays occur, the outcome is the
same--the government may incur additional costs from new industry
employees being unable to begin work promptly and increased risks to
national security because previously cleared industry employees are
likely to continue working with critical information while it is
determined whether they should still be eligible to hold a clearance.
Moreover, the statistics that OMB and OPM report to Congress on the
timeliness of the clearance process do not portray the full length of
time it takes many applicants to receive clearances. We found several
issues with the statistics, including limited information on
reinvestigations for clearance updating and failure to measure the
total time it took to complete the various phases of the clearance
process. Statistics that underrepresent the time that it takes for
investigations to be completed prevent Congress from having a full
understanding of the government's efforts to decrease delays in the
clearance process and determining if legislative actions are necessary.
In addition to delays in the clearance process, we found that that OPM
provided incomplete investigative reports to DISCO adjudicators, which
they used to determine top secret clearance eligibility. In our review
of 50 initial investigations for top secret clearances randomly sampled
from the population used in our timeliness analyses, we found that
almost all (47 of 50) of the sampled investigative reports were missing
documentation required by federal investigative standards. The missing
data were of two general types: (1) the absence of documentation
showing that an investigator had gathered all required information and
(2) the absence of information to help resolve issues (such as
conflicting information on indebtedness) that were raised in other
parts of the investigative report. The federal standards indicate that
investigations may be expanded as necessary to resolve issues. However,
we found a total of 36 unresolved issues in 27 of the investigative
reports. The most common unresolved issues pertained to financial
consideration, foreign influence, and personal conduct. OPM officials
suggested that the need to rapidly increase the size of the
investigative workforce and prior quality control procedures that have
since been replaced were some of the causes for the delivery of
incomplete investigative reports to DISCO. Our review also found that
DISCO adjudicators granted top secret eligibility to all 27 industry
personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues. In
our November 2005 assessment of the government plan for improving the
clearance process, we raised concerns about the limited attention
devoted to assessing quality in the clearance process, but the plan has
not been revised to address the shortcoming we identified.[Footnote 9]
The use of incomplete investigations and adjudications in the granting
of top secret clearance eligibility increases the risk of unauthorized
disclosure of classified information. Also, it could negatively affect
the government's efforts to move toward greater reciprocity. To improve
the timeliness and completeness of investigations and adjudications,
our report contained several recommendations to OMB.
Background:
To ensure the trustworthiness, reliability, and character of personnel
in positions with access to classified information, DOD relies on a
multiphased personnel security clearance process.[Footnote 10] Figure 1
shows six phases that could be involved in determining whether to grant
an actual or a potential job incumbent a clearance. The three phases
shown in gray are those that are most transparent to individuals
requesting an initial clearance, and they are the three phases that
were the primary focus of the findings in this testimony.
Figure 1: Six Phases in the Personnel Security Clearance Process:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD-provided information.
[End of figure]
Determining Top Secret Clearances for Industry Personnel Averaged More
Than a Year, and Government Statistics Did Not Portray All Delays:
At the time of our September 2006 report, our independent analysis of
timeliness data showed that industry personnel contracted to work for
the federal government waited more than 1 year on average to receive
top secret security clearances, and government statistics did not
portray the full length of time it takes many applicants to obtain
clearances. We found delays in all phases of the clearance process that
we examined, and government statistics did not account for the full
extent of the delays. Delays in the clearance process may cost money
and pose threats to national security (see table 1).
Table 1: Time Required to Grant Eligibility for a Top Secret Clearance
to Industry Personnel--Cases Adjudicated in January and February 2006:
Total clearance process:
Clearance type: Initial;
Average days[B]: 446;
Clearance type: Update;
Average days[B]: 545;
Clearance type: All;
Average days[B]: 471;
Phases of security clearance process [A]: 2. Application submission:
Average days: 111;
Average days: 81;
Average days: 103;
Phases of security clearance process [A]: 3. Investigation:
Average days: 286;
Average days: 419;
Average days: 320;
Phases of security clearance process [A]: 4. Adjudication:
Average days: 39;
Average days: 36;
Average days: 38.
Example tasks and decisions required in each phase;
Phases of security clearance process [A]: Application submission:
* Subject signs and dates the application;
* Facility security officer checks application materials for
completeness and accuracy, and forwards them to DISCO after any
applicable changes;
* DISCO adjudicator reviews materials for completeness and other
concerns, and returns deficient materials to the facility security
officer for further work;
* If the application materials are approved, DISCO adjudicators
determine whether the applicant is eligible for an interim clearance;
* DISCO then forwards the completed application to OPM to begin the
investigation;
* OPM reviews the application for completeness and other concerns and
returns deficient materials to DISCO for further work;
Phases of security clearance process [A]: Investigation:
* If application is not submitted via eQIP, OPM key enters information
for the application into its investigative database;
* OPM schedules the investigation, assigning the investigation to its
federal investigative workforce or one of its investigations
contractors;
* Investigators gather information on the individual in order to
produce an investigative report;
* OPM's PIPS database obtains a variety of electronic information that
is available via government databases;
* Once the investigative work has been completed, OPM checks the
investigative report for completeness before sending the report to an
adjudication facility;
Phases of security clearance process [A]: 4. Adjudication:
* OPM prints a paper copy of the investigative report;
* OPM ships the paper copy of the report to the adjudication facility
if the agency chose that format or cannot get it electronically.[C];
* DISCO adjudicator reviews the information in the investigative
report;
* DISCO adjudicator determines if industry employee is eligible for a
clearance. [D].
Source: GAO analysis of OPM and DOD information.
Legend: PIPS = OPM's Personnel Investigations Processing System.
[A] The phases referred to here are based on those in figure 1.
[B] The average days for the phases do not sum to the average days for
the total clearance process because the number of applicable cases
varies for each calculation.
[C] According to OPM, the requesting agency has the option to request
that the investigation be delivered through PIPS, eliminating the mail
time, for all completed investigations that do not contain hard-copy
third-party information.
[D] Additional time may be needed in this phase if DISCO adjudicators
identify major security issues in the investigative report. Such cases
may be submitted to DOHA for the clearance eligibility determination.
[End of table]
Delays in Determining Eligibility Are Caused by Many Factors:
As table 1 shows, industry personnel granted eligibility for top secret
clearances from DISCO from January to February 2006 waited an average
of 446 days for their initial clearances or 545 days for their
clearance updates. DOD may, however, have issued interim clearances to
some of these industry personnel, which might have allowed them to
begin work before they received their final clearances. IRTPA requires
that beginning in December 2006, 80 percent of clearances be completed
in an average of 120 days. Delays were found in each phase of the
clearance process that we examined:
* Application submission. The application-submission phase of the
clearance process took an average of 111 days for the initial
clearances that DISCO adjudicated in January and February 2006 (see
table 1). The starting point for our measurement of this phase was the
date when the application was submitted by the facility security
officer. Our end point for this phase was the date that OPM scheduled
the investigation into its Personnel Investigations Processing System.
We used this starting date because the government can begin to incur an
economic cost if an industry employee cannot begin work on a classified
contract because of delays in obtaining a security clearance and this
end date because OPM currently uses this date as its start point for
the next phase in the clearance process. The government plan for
improving the clearance process noted that "investigation submission"
(i.e., application submission) is to be completed within an average of
14 calendar days or less. Therefore, the 111 days taken for the
application-submission phase was nearly 100 more days on average than
allocated. Several factors contributed to the amount of time we
observed in the application-submission phase, including rejecting
applications multiple times because of inaccurate information (as
reported in an April 2006 DOD Office of Inspector General report);
multiple completeness reviews--the corporate facility security officer,
DISCO adjudicators, and OPM staff; and manually entering data from
paper applications if eQIP was not used.
* Investigation. Investigations for the initial top secret clearances
of industry personnel adjudicated in January and February 2006 took an
average of 286 days, compared to OMB's 180-day goal for that period
(see table 1). During the same period, investigations for top secret
clearance updates or "reinvestigations" took an average of 419 days,
almost one and a half times as long as the initial investigations (no
goal is given for clearance updates or reinvestigations). The mandated
February 2007 OMB report to Congress noted that "Reinvestigation
timeliness has not been addressed, because the improvement effort
focused on individuals for whom initial security clearances are
required to perform work." Our September 2006 report identified many
factors that inhibited the speed with which OPM can deliver
investigative reports to DISCO and other adjudication facilities. Those
causes included backlogged cases that prevent the prompt start of work
on new cases, the relative inexperience of the investigative workforce,
slowness in developing the capability to investigate overseas leads,
and difficulty obtaining access to data in governmental records.
* Adjudication. DISCO adjudicators took an average of 39 days to grant
initial clearance eligibility to the industry personnel in our
population (see table 1). The measurement of this phase for our
analysis used the same start and stop dates that OPM uses in its
reports, starting on the date that OPM closed the report and continuing
through the date that DISCO adjudicators decided clearance eligibility.
IRTPA requires that at least 80 percent of the adjudications made from
December 2006 through December 2009 be completed within an average of
30 days. As of June 2006, DISCO reported that it had adjudicated 82
percent of its initial top secret clearances within 30 days.
Delays in any phase of the clearance process cost money and threaten
national security. Delays in completing initial security clearances may
have a negative economic impact on the costs of performing classified
work within or for the U.S. government. For example, in a May 2006
congressional hearing, a representative of a technology association
testified that retaining qualified personnel resulted in salary
premiums as high as 25 percent for current clearance holders.[Footnote
11] Delays in completing clearance updates can have serious but
different negative consequences than those stemming from delays in
completing initial clearance-eligibility determinations. In 1999, the
Joint Security Commission reported that delays in initiating
reinvestigations for clearance updates create risks to national
security because the longer individuals hold clearances the more likely
they are to be working with critical information.
OMB's and OPM's Timeliness Reporting Does Not Convey Full Magnitude of
Delays:
The statistics that OMB and OPM have provided to Congress on the
timeliness of the personnel security clearance process do not convey
the full magnitude of the investigation-related delays facing the
government. While our September 2006 report noted additional problems
with the transparency of the timeliness statistics, I will review our
concerns about five such issues: (1) limited information on
reinvestigations for clearance updating, (2) not counting the total
number of days to finish the application-submission phase, (3) shifting
some investigation-related days to the adjudication phase or not
counting them, (4) not counting the total number of days to complete
closed pending cases, and (5) not counting the total number of days to
complete investigations sent back for rework.
Limited information on reinvestigations for clearance updating. In its
mandated February 2007 report to Congress, OMB acknowledged that
"reinvestigation timeliness has not been addressed," but the findings
from our population of industry personnel (obtained using DOD's,
instead of OPM's, database to assess timeliness) indicated that
clearance update reinvestigations took about one and a half times as
long as the initial investigations. The absence of timeliness
information on clearance update reinvestigations does not provide all
stakeholders--Congress, agencies, contractors attempting to fulfill
their contracts, and employees awaiting their clearances--with a
complete picture of clearance delays. We have noted in the past that
focusing on completing initial clearance investigations could
negatively affect the completion of clearance update reinvestigations
and thereby increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.
Not counting all days to finish the application-submission phase. OMB's
February 2007 report noted that its statistics do not include "the time
to hand-off applications to the investigative agency." The gray section
of the application-submission phase in table 1 shows some of the
activities that were not counted when we examined January and February
2006 clearance documentation for industry personnel. These activities
could be included in timeliness measurements depending on the
interpretation of what constitutes "receipt of the application for a
security clearance by an authorized investigative agency"--IRTPA's
start date for the investigation phase.
Shifting some investigation-related days to the adjudication phase or
not counting them. In our September 2006 report, we raised concerns
about how the time to complete the adjudication phase was measured. The
activities in the gray section of the adjudication phase in table 1
show that the government's procedures for measuring the time required
for the adjudication phase include tasks that occur before adjudicators
actually receive the investigative reports from OPM. More recently,
OMB's February 2007 report to Congress noted that its timeliness
statistics do not include "the time to — hand-off investigation files
to the adjudicative agency" and estimated this handling and mailing
time at up to 15 days.
Not counting all days for closed pending cases. OPM's May 2006
testimony before Congress did not indicate whether the timeliness
statistics on complete investigations included a type of incomplete
investigation that OPM sometimes treats as being complete. In our
February 2004 report, we noted that OPM's issuance of "closed pending"
investigations--investigative reports sent to adjudication facilities
without one or more types of source data required by the federal
investigative standards--causes ambiguity in defining and accurately
estimating the backlog of overdue investigations. In our February 2004
report, we also noted that cases that are closed pending the provision
of additional information should continue to be tracked separately in
the investigation phase of the clearance process. According to OPM,
from February 20, 2005, through July 1, 2006, the number of initial top
secret clearance investigative reports that were closed pending the
provision of additional information increased from 14,841 to 18,849, a
27 percent increase. DISCO officials and representatives from some
other DOD adjudication facilities have indicated that they will not
adjudicate closed pending cases since critical information is missing.
OPM, however, has stated that other federal agencies review the
investigative reports from closed pending cases and may determine that
they have enough information for adjudication. Combining partially
completed investigations with fully completed investigations overstates
how quickly OPM is supplying adjudication facilities with the
information they require to make their clearance-eligibility
determinations.
Not counting all days when inadequate investigations are returned.
OMB's February 2007 report stated that its statistics do not include
the time incurred to "return the files to the investigative agency for
further information." OPM's procedure is to restart the measurement of
investigation time for the 1 to 2 percent of investigative reports that
are sent back for quality control reasons, which does not hold OPM
fully accountable for total investigative time when deficient products
are delivered to its customers. In fact, restarting the time
measurement for reworked investigations could positively affect OPM's
statistics if the reworked sections of the investigation take less time
than did the earlier effort to complete the large portion of the
investigative report.
IRTPA establishes timeliness requirements for the security clearance
process. Specifically, it states that "each authorized adjudicative
agency shall make a determination on at least 80 percent of all
applications for a personnel security clearance pursuant to this
section within an average of 120 days after the date of receipt of the
application for a security clearance by an authorized investigative
agency." IRTPA did not identify situations that could be excluded from
mandated timeliness assessments. Without fully accounting for the total
time needed to complete the clearance process, Congress will not be
able to accurately determine whether agencies have met IRTPA-mandated
requirements or determine if legislative actions are necessary.
OPM Delivered Incomplete Investigative Reports, and DISCO-Adjudicated
Cases Did Not Document All Clearance-Determination Considerations:
OPM provided incomplete investigative reports to DOD adjudicators,
which they used to determine top secret clearance eligibility. Almost
all (47 of 50) of the sampled investigative reports we reviewed were
incomplete based on requirements in the federal investigative
standards. In addition, DISCO adjudicators granted clearance
eligibility without requesting additional information for any of the
incomplete investigative reports and did not document that they
considered some adjudicative guidelines when adverse information was
present in some reports. Granting clearances based on incomplete
investigative reports increases risks to national security. In
addition, use of incomplete investigative reports and not fully
documenting adjudicative considerations may undermine the government's
efforts to increase the acceptance of security clearances granted by
other federal agencies.
Almost All of the Sampled Investigative Reports Were Incomplete:
In our review of 50 initial investigations randomly sampled from the
population used in our timeliness analyses, we found that 47 of 50 of
the investigative reports were missing documentation required by the
federal investigative standards. The missing data were of two general
types: (1) the absence of documentation showing that an investigator
gathered the prescribed information in each of the applicable 13
investigative areas and included requisite forms in the investigative
report and (2) the absence of information to help resolve issues (such
as conflicting information on indebtedness) that were raised in other
parts of the investigative report. The requirements for gathering these
types of information were identified in federal investigative standards
published about a decade ago.
At least half of the 50 reports did not contain the required
documentation in 3 investigative areas: residence (33 of 50),
employment (32), and education (27). In addition, many investigative
reports contained multiple deficiencies within each of these areas. For
example, multiple deficiencies might be present in the residence area
because investigators did not document a rental record check and an
interview with a neighborhood reference. Moreover, 44 of the 50
investigative reports had 2 to 6 investigative areas out of a total of
13 areas with at least one piece of missing documentation.
We also found a total of 36 unresolved issues in 27 of the
investigative reports. The three investigative areas with the most
unresolved issues were financial consideration (11 of 50 cases),
foreign influence (11), and personal conduct (7). Federal standards
indicate that investigations may be expanded as necessary to resolve
issues. According to OPM, (1) issue resolution is a standard part of
all initial investigations and periodic reinvestigations for top secret
clearances and (2) all issues developed during the course of an
investigation should be fully resolved in the final investigative
report provided to DOD.
One investigative report we examined serves as an example of the types
of documentation issues we found during our review. During the course
of this particular investigation, the subject reported having
extramarital affairs; however, there was no documentation to show that
these affairs had been investigated further. Also, the subject's
clearance application indicated cohabitation with an individual with
whom the subject had previously had a romantic relationship, but there
was no documentation that record checks were performed on the
cohabitant. Moreover, information in the investigative report indicated
that the subject had defaulted on a loan with a balance of several
thousand dollars; however, no other documentation suggested that this
issue was explored further. When we reviewed this and other deficient
investigative reports with OPM Quality Management officials, they
agreed that the investigators should have included documentation to
resolve the issues.
While we found that the interview narratives in some of the 50 OPM
investigative reports were limited in content, we did not identify them
as being deficient for the purposes of our analysis because such an
evaluation would have required a subjective assessment that we were not
willing to make. For example, in our assessment of the presence or
absence of documentation, we found a 35-word narrative for a subject
interview of a naturalized citizen from an Asian country. It stated
only that the subject did not have any foreign contacts in his birth
country and that he spent his time with family and participated in
sports. Nevertheless, others with more adjudicative expertise voiced
concern about the issue of documentation adequacy. Top officials
representing DOD's adjudication facilities with whom we consulted were
in agreement that OPM-provided investigative summaries had been
inadequate.
When we reviewed our findings in meetings with the Associate Director
of OPM's investigations unit and her quality management officials they
cited the inexperience of the rapidly expanded investigative workforce
and variations in training provided to federal and contractor
investigative staff as possible causes for the incomplete investigative
reports we reviewed. Later, in official agency comments to our
September 2006 report, OPM's Director indicated that some of the
problems that we reported were the result of transferred staff and
cases when OPM accepted DOD investigative functions and personnel.
However, OPM had had 2 years to prepare for the transfer between the
announced transfer agreement in February 2003 and its occurrence in
February 2005. Furthermore, the staff and cases were under OPM control
until the investigative reports were subsequently transferred to OPM
for adjudication in January or February of 2006. In addition, 47 of the
50 investigative reports that we reviewed were missing documentation
even though OPM had quality control procedures for reviewing the
reports before they were sent to DOD.
In our November 2005 testimony evaluating the government plan for
improving the personnel security clearance process, we stated that
developers of the plan may wish to consider adding other indicators of
the quality of investigations. During our review, we asked the
Associate Director of OPM's Investigations Unit if OMB and OPM had made
changes to the government plan to address quality measurement and other
shortcomings we identified. OPM's Associate Director said that the plan
had not been modified to address our concerns but that implementation
of the plan was continuing.
DISCO Adjudicators Granted Top Secret Clearance Eligibility for Cases
with Missing Information:
Our review found that DISCO adjudicators granted top secret clearance
eligibility for all 47 of the 50 industry personnel whose investigative
reports did not have full documentation. In making clearance-
eligibility determinations, the federal guidelines require adjudicators
to consider (1) guidelines covering 13 specific areas, such as foreign
influence and financial considerations; (2) adverse conditions or
conduct that could raise security concerns and factors that might
mitigate (alleviate) the condition for each guideline; and (3) general
factors related to the whole person. According to a DISCO official,
DISCO and other DOD adjudicators are to record information relevant to
each of their eligibility determinations in JPAS. They do this by
selecting applicable guidelines and mitigating factors from prelisted
responses and may type up to 3,000 characters of additional
information.
The adjudicators granted eligibility for the 27 industry personnel
whose investigative reports (discussed in the prior section) contained
unresolved issues without requesting additional information or
documenting in the adjudicative report that the information was
missing. The following is an example of an unresolved foreign influence
issue, which was not documented in the adjudicative report, although
DISCO officials agreed that additional information should have been
obtained to resolve the issue before the individual was granted a top
secret clearance. A state-level record check on an industry employee
indicated that the subject was part owner of a foreign-owned
corporation. Although the DISCO adjudicator applied the foreign
influence guideline for the subject's foreign travel and mitigated that
foreign influence issue, there was no documentation in the adjudicative
report to acknowledge or mitigate the foreign-owned business. When we
asked why adjudicators did not provide the required documentation in
JPAS, the DISCO officials as well as adjudication trainers said that
adjudicators review the investigative reports for sufficient
documentation to resolve issues and make judgment calls about the
amount of risk associated with each case by weighing a variety of past
and present, favorable and unfavorable information about the person to
reach an eligibility determination.
Seventeen of the 50 adjudicative reports were missing documentation on
a total of 22 guidelines for which issues were present in the
investigative reports. The missing guideline documentation was for
foreign influence (11), financial considerations (5), alcohol
consumption (2), personal conduct issues (2), drug involvement (1), and
foreign influence (1). DISCO officials stated that procedural changes
associated with JPAS implementation contributed to the missing
documentation. DISCO began using JPAS in February 2003, and it became
the official system for all of DOD in February 2005. Before February
2005, DISCO adjudicators were not required to document the
consideration of a guideline issue unless the adverse information could
disqualify an individual from being granted a clearance eligibility.
After JPAS implementation, DISCO adjudicators were trained to document
in JPAS their rationale for the clearance determination and any adverse
information from the investigative report, regardless of whether an
adjudicative guideline issue could disqualify an individual from
obtaining a clearance. The administrators also attributed the missing
guideline documentation to a few adjudicators attempting to produce
more adjudication determinations.
Delivery and Use of Incomplete Investigations Increase Risks to
National Security and Reciprocity:
Decisions to grant clearances based on incomplete investigations
increase risks to national security because individuals can gain access
to classified information without being vetted against the full federal
standards and guidelines. Furthermore, if adjudication facilities send
the incomplete investigations back to OPM for more work, the
adjudication facilities must use adjudicator time to review cases more
than once and then use additional time to document problems with the
incomplete investigative reports.
Incomplete investigations and adjudications undermine the government's
efforts to move toward greater clearance and access reciprocity. An
interagency working group, the Security Clearance Oversight Steering
Committee, noted that agencies are reluctant to be accountable for poor
quality investigations, adjudications conducted by other agencies or
organizations, or both. To achieve fuller reciprocity, clearance-
granting agencies need to have confidence in the quality of the
clearance process. Without full documentation of investigative actions,
information obtained, and adjudicative decisions, agencies could
continue to require duplicative investigations and adjudications.
Concluding Observations:
Incomplete timeliness data limit the visibility of stakeholders and
decision makers in their efforts to address long-standing delays in the
personnel security clearance process. For example, not accounting for
all of the time used when personnel submit an application multiple
times before it is accepted limits the government's ability to (1)
accurately monitor the time required for each step in the application-
submission phase and (2) identify positive steps that facility security
officers, DISCO adjudicators, OPM investigative staff, and other
stakeholders can take to speed the process. The timeliness-related
concerns identified in my testimony show the fragmented approach that
the government has taken to addressing clearance problems. When I
testified before this Subcommittee in November 2005, we were optimistic
that the government plan for improving the clearance process prepared
under the direction of OMB's Deputy Director for Management would be a
living document that would provide the strategic vision for correcting
long-standing problems in the personnel security clearance process.
However, nearly 2 years after first commenting on the plan, we have not
been provided with a revised plan that lays out how the government
intends to address the shortcomings that we identified in the plan
during our November 2005 testimony. Continued failure to address the
shortcomings we have cited could significantly limit the positive
impact that the government has made in other portions of the clearance
process through improvements such as hiring more investigators and
promoting reciprocity.
While eliminating delays in the clearance process is an important goal,
the government cannot afford to achieve that goal by providing
investigative and adjudicative reports that are incomplete in the key
areas required by federal investigative standards and adjudicative
guidelines. Also, the incomplete investigative and adjudicative reports
could suggest to some security managers that there is at least some
evidence to support agencies' concerns about the risks that may come
from accepting the clearances issued by other federal agencies, and
thereby negatively affect OMB's efforts toward achieving greater
reciprocity. Further, as we pointed out in November 2005, the almost
total absence of quality metrics in the governmentwide plan for
improving the clearance process hinders Congress's oversight of these
important issues. Finally, the missing documentation could have longer-
term negative effects, such as requiring future investigators and
adjudicators to devote time to obtaining the documentation missing from
current reviews when it is time to update the clearances currently
being issued.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony please contact me at
(202)512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this
testimony are Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Kurt A. Burgeson;
Nicolaas C. Cornelisse; Alissa H. Czyz; Ronald La Due Lake; Beverly C.
Schladt; and Karen D. Thornton.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record
Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security
Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances
for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow
Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.: May
17, 2006.
GAO's High-Risk Program. GAO-06-497T. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance
Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process.
GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing
Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06-233T.
Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection Issues
Associated with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. GAO-06-71SU.
Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2005.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance
Program. GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles
Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires
Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T.
Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January
2005.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of
Clearances for Industry Personnel, GAO-06-748T (Washington, D.C.: May
17, 2006); DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some
Long-standing Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain, GAO-06-
233T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2005); and DOD Personnel Clearances:
Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the
Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk Designation, GAO-05-842T
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005). Since January 2005, we have provided
the Subcommittee with additional information in our answers to sets of
questions for the records: GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and
Answers for the Record Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on
Fixing the Security Clearance Process, GAO-06-693R (Washington, D.C.:
June 14, 2006), and Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel
Security Clearance Program and the Government Plan for Improving the
Clearance Process, GAO-06-323R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2006).
[2] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to
Improve the Security Clearance Process, GAO-06-1070 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 28, 2006).
[3] 5 C.F.R. § 1312.4, Classification of National Security Information
(2006).
[4] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005), and High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2007).
[5] Pub. L. No. 108-458.
[6] The White House, Exec. Order No. 13381, (June 27, 2005). On June
29, 2006, the executive order was extended until July 1, 2007.
[7] Office of Management and Budget, Report of the Security Clearance
Oversight Group Consistent with Title III of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (February 2007).
[8] GAO-06-1070.
[9] GAO-06-233T.
[10] DOD Directive 5200.2, DOD Personnel Security Program (Apr. 9,
1999), establishes policy and procedures for granting DOD military,
civilian, and industry personnel access to classified information.
Additionally, DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, DOD Personnel Security Program
(January 1987), establishes DOD personnel security policies and
procedures; sets forth standards, criteria, and guidelines upon which
personnel security determinations shall be based; prescribes the types
and scopes of personnel security investigations required; details the
evaluation and adverse action procedures by which personnel security
determinations shall be made; and assigns overall program management
responsibilities. The policies and procedures for granting industry
personnel security clearances and adjudicative procedural guidance for
appealing cases if an unfavorable clearance decision is reached also
are contained in DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (Apr. 20, 1999).
[11] Doug Wagoner, statement for the record, hearing before the
Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives (May 17,
2006).
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