Federal Real Property
An Update on High Risk Issues
Gao ID: GAO-09-801T July 15, 2009
In January 2003, GAO designated federal real property as a high-risk area because of long-standing problems with excess and underutilized property, deteriorating facilities, unreliable real property data, over-reliance on costly leasing, and security challenges. In January 2009, GAO found that agencies have taken some positive steps to address real property issues but that some of the core problems that led to the designation of this area as high risk persist. This testimony focuses on (1) progress made by major real property-holding agencies to strategically manage real property, (2) ongoing problems GAO has identified in recent work regarding agencies' efforts to address real property issues, and (3) underlying obstacles GAO has identified through prior work as hampering agencies' real property reform efforts governmentwide.
OMB and real property-holding agencies have made progress in strategically managing real property. In response to an administration reform initiative and related executive order, agencies have, among other things, established asset management plans, standardized data, and adopted performance measures. According to OMB, the federal government disposed of excess real property valued at $1 billion in fiscal year 2008, bringing the total to over $8 billion since fiscal year 2004. OMB also reported success in developing a comprehensive database of federal real property assets and implemented a GAO recommendation to improve the reliability of the data in this database by developing a framework to validate these data. GAO also found that the Veterans Administration has made significant progress in reducing underutilized space. In another report, GAO found that six agencies reviewed have processes in place to prioritize maintenance and repair items. While these actions represent positive steps, some of the long-standing problems that led GAO to designate this area as high risk persist. Although GAO's work over the years has shown that building ownership often costs less than operating leases, especially for long term space needs, in 2008, the General Services Administration (GSA), which acts as the government's leasing agent, leased more property than it owned for the first time. Given GSA's ongoing reliance on leasing, it is critical that GSA manage its leasing activities effectively. However, in January 2007, GAO identified numerous areas that warranted improvement in GSA's implementation of four contracts for national broker services for its leasing program. GSA has implemented 7 of GAO's 11 recommendations to improve these contracting efforts. Although GAO is encouraged by GSA's actions on these recommendations, GAO has not evaluated their impact. Moreover, in more recent work, GAO has continued to find that the government's real property data are not always reliable and agencies continue to retain excess property and face challenges from repair and maintenance backlogs. Regarding security, GAO testified on July 8, 2009, that preliminary results show that the ability of the Federal Protective Service (FPS), which provides security services for about 9,000 GSA facilities, to protect federal facilities is hampered by weaknesses in its contract security guard program. Among other things, GAO investigators carrying the components for an improvised explosive device successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS's guards at each of the 10 federal facilities where GAO conducted covert testing. As GAO has reported in the past, real property management problems have been exacerbated by deep-rooted obstacles that include competing stakeholder interests, various budgetary and legal limitations, and weaknesses in agencies' capital planning. While reforms to date are positive, the new administration and Congress will be challenged to sustain reform momentum and reach consensus on how such obstacles should be addressed.
GAO-09-801T, Federal Real Property: An Update on High Risk Issues
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and
Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, July 15, 2009:
Federal Real Property:
An Update on High Risk Issues:
Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-09-801T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-801T, a testimony to Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In January 2003, GAO designated federal real property as a high-risk
area because of long-standing problems with excess and underutilized
property, deteriorating facilities, unreliable real property data, over-
reliance on costly leasing, and security challenges. In January 2009,
GAO found that agencies have taken some positive steps to address real
property issues but that some of the core problems that led to the
designation of this area as high risk persist.
This testimony focuses on (1) progress made by major real property-
holding agencies to strategically manage real property, (2) ongoing
problems GAO has identified in recent work regarding agencies‘ efforts
to address real property issues, and (3) underlying obstacles GAO has
identified through prior work as hampering agencies‘ real property
reform efforts governmentwide.
This testimony is largely based on GAO‘s extensive body of work on real
property high-risk issues, including reports on efforts by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) and executive branch agencies to address
real property issues. No new recommendations are being made.
What GAO Found:
OMB and real property-holding agencies have made progress in
strategically managing real property. In response to an administration
reform initiative and related executive order, agencies have, among
other things, established asset management plans, standardized data,
and adopted performance measures. According to OMB, the federal
government disposed of excess real property valued at $1 billion in
fiscal year 2008, bringing the total to over $8 billion since fiscal
year 2004. OMB also reported success in developing a comprehensive
database of federal real property assets and implemented a GAO
recommendation to improve the reliability of the data in this database
by developing a framework to validate these data. GAO also found that
the Veterans Administration has made significant progress in reducing
underutilized space. In another report, GAO found that six agencies
reviewed have processes in place to prioritize maintenance and repair
items.
While these actions represent positive steps, some of the long-standing
problems that led GAO to designate this area as high risk persist.
Although GAO‘s work over the years has shown that building ownership
often costs less than operating leases, especially for long term space
needs, in 2008, the General Services Administration (GSA), which acts
as the government‘s leasing agent, leased more property than it owned
for the first time. Given GSA‘s ongoing reliance on leasing, it is
critical that GSA manage its leasing activities effectively. However,
in January 2007, GAO identified numerous areas that warranted
improvement in GSA‘s implementation of four contracts for national
broker services for its leasing program. GSA has implemented 7 of GAO‘s
11 recommendations to improve these contracting efforts. Although GAO
is encouraged by GSA‘s actions on these recommendations, GAO has not
evaluated their impact. Moreover, in more recent work, GAO has
continued to find that the government‘s real property data are not
always reliable and agencies continue to retain excess property and
face challenges from repair and maintenance backlogs. Regarding
security, GAO testified on July 8, 2009, that preliminary results show
that the ability of the Federal Protective Service (FPS), which
provides security services for about 9,000 GSA facilities, to protect
federal facilities is hampered by weaknesses in its contract security
guard program. Among other things, GAO investigators carrying the
components for an improvised explosive device successfully passed
undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS‘s guards at
each of the 10 federal facilities where GAO conducted covert testing.
As GAO has reported in the past, real property management problems have
been exacerbated by deep-rooted obstacles that include competing
stakeholder interests, various budgetary and legal limitations, and
weaknesses in agencies‘ capital planning. While reforms to date are
positive, the new administration and Congress will be challenged to
sustain reform momentum and reach consensus on how such obstacles
should be addressed.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-801T] or key
components. For more information, contact Mark L. Goldstein at (202)
512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee:
We welcome the opportunity to provide this update on our recent work on
issues that led us to designate federal real property as a high-risk
area. As you know, in January 2003, we designated federal real property
a high-risk area because of long-standing problems with excess and
underutilized property, deteriorating facilities, unreliable real
property data, over-reliance on costly leasing, and building security
challenges.[Footnote 1] As we have reported as part of the high-risk
series, the federal real property portfolio largely reflects a business
model and the technological and transportation environment of the
1950s. Many federal real property assets are no longer needed; others
are not effectively aligned with, or responsive to, agencies' changing
missions. We issued our latest update on this area in January 2009,
finding that agencies have taken some positive steps to address real
property issues but that some of the core problems that led to our
designation of this area as high risk persist.[Footnote 2] My testimony
today is based on our extensive body of work related to these issues.
[Footnote 3] We also spoke with officials at the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA) to
update our information on agencies' efforts to address our prior
recommendations, and we reviewed recently-introduced initiatives
related to agencies' real property disposal authorities.[Footnote 4] My
testimony focuses on (1) progress made by major real property-holding
agencies to strategically manage real property,[Footnote 5] (2) ongoing
problems we have identified in recent work regarding agencies' efforts
to address real property issues, and (3) underlying obstacles we have
identified through prior work as hampering agencies' real property
reform efforts governmentwide. We conducted our work in Washington,
D.C., in June and July 2009 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Under Real Property Initiative, Agencies Have Taken Actions to
Strategically Manage Real Property and Address Some Long-standing
Problems:
Major real property-holding agencies and OMB have made progress toward
strategically managing federal real property. In April 2007, we found
that in response to the President's Management Agenda (PMA) real
property initiative and a related executive order, agencies covered
under the executive order had, among other things, designated senior
real property officers, established asset management plans,
standardized real property data reporting, and adopted various
performance measures to track progress.[Footnote 6] The administration
had also established a Federal Real Property Council (FRPC) that guides
reform efforts.
Under the real property initiative, OMB has been evaluating the status
and progress of agencies' real property management improvement efforts
since the third quarter of fiscal year 2004 using a quarterly scorecard
[Footnote 7] that color codes agencies' progress--green for success,
yellow for mixed results, and red for unsatisfactory. As Figure 1
shows, according to OMB's analysis, many of these agencies have made
progress in accurately accounting for, maintaining, and managing their
real property assets so as to efficiently meet their goals and
objectives. As of the first quarter of 2009, 10 of the 15 agencies
evaluated had achieved green status. According to OMB, the agencies
achieving green status have established 3-year timelines for meeting
the goals identified in their asset management plans; provided evidence
that they are implementing their asset management plans; used real
property inventory information and performance measures in decision
making; and managed their real property in accordance with their
strategic plan, asset management plan, and performance measures. (For
more information on the criteria OMB uses to evaluate agencies'
efforts, see appendix I.)
Figure 1: PMA Executive Branch Management Scorecard Results for the
Real Property Initiative:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
GSA:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Success (green);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Success (green);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Success (green);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Success (green).
State:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Success (green);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Success (green);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Success (green).
VA:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Success (green);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Success (green);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Success (green).
NASA:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Success (green);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Success (green).
DOE:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Success (green);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Success (green).
Labor:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Success (green).
DHHS:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Mixed results (yellow).
DOI:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Mixed results (yellow).
DOJ:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Success (green);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Success (green).
DOT:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Success (green).
USAID[A]:
1st quarter, FY 2004: N/A;
1st quarter, FY 2005: N/A;
1st quarter, FY 2006: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Success (green).
DOD:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Mixed results (yellow).
Army Corps:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Mixed results (yellow).
DHS:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Mixed results (yellow).
USDA:
1st quarter, FY 2004: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2005: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2006: Unsatisfactory (red);
1st quarter, FY 2007: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2008: Mixed results (yellow);
1st quarter, FY 2009: Mixed results (yellow).
Source: OMB scorecards.
Note: USAID was not evaluated until fourth quarter fiscal year 2005.
[End of figure]
OMB has also taken some additional steps to improve real property
management governmentwide. According to OMB, the federal government
disposed of excess real property valued at $1 billion in fiscal year
2008, bringing the total to over $8 billion since fiscal year 2004.
[Footnote 8] OMB also reported success in developing a comprehensive
database of federal real property assets, the Federal Real Property
Profile (FRPP). OMB recently took further action to improve the
reliability of FRPP data by implementing a recommendation we made in
April 2007 to develop a framework that agencies can use to better
ensure the validity and usefulness of key real property data in the
FRPP. According to OMB officials, OMB now requires agency-specific
validation and verification plans and has developed a FRPP validation
protocol to certify agency data. These actions are positive steps
towards eventually developing a database that can be used to improve
real property management governmentwide. However, it may take some time
for these actions to result in consistently reliable data, and, as
described later in this testimony, in recent work we have continued to
find problems with the reliability and usefulness of FRPP data.
Furthermore, our work over the past year has found some other positive
steps that some agencies have taken to address ongoing challenges.
Specifically:
* In September 2008, we found that from fiscal year 2005 through 2007,
VA made significant progress in reducing underutilized space (space not
used to full capacity) in its buildings from 15.4 million square feet
to 5.6 million square feet.[Footnote 9] We also found that VA's use of
various legal authorities, such as its enhanced use lease authority
(EUL), which allows it to enter into long-term agreements with public
and private entities for the use of VA property in exchange for cash or
in-kind consideration, likely contributed to its overall reduction of
underutilized space since fiscal year 2005. However, our work also
shows that VA does not track the overall effect of its use of these
authorities or of the space reductions.
* In October 2008, we found that in dealing with repair and maintenance
backlogs, six agencies we reviewed focus on maintaining and repairing
real property assets that are critical to their missions, and have
processes in place to prioritize maintenance and repair items based on
the effects those items may have on their missions.[Footnote 10]
Longstanding Problems in Real Property Management Persist:
In spite of some progress made by OMB and agencies in managing their
real property portfolios, our recent work has found that agencies
continue to struggle with the long-standing problems that led us to
identify federal real property as high-risk: an over-reliance on costly
leasing--and challenges GSA faces in its leasing contracting;
unreliable data; underutilized and excess property and repair and
maintenance backlogs; and ongoing security challenges faced by agencies
and, in particular, by the Federal Protective Service (FPS), which is
charged with protecting GSA buildings.
Over-Reliance on Costly Leasing Continues, and GSA's Initial
Implementation of Leasing Contracting Faced Problems:
Over-Reliance on Costly Leasing Continues:
One of the major reasons for our designation of federal real property
as a high-risk area in January 2003 was the government's over reliance
on costly leasing. Under certain conditions, such as fulfilling short-
term space needs, leasing may be a lower-cost option than ownership.
However, our work over the years has shown that building ownership
often costs less than operating leases, especially for long-term space
needs.
In January 2008, we reported that federal agencies' extensive reliance
on leasing has continued, and that federal agencies occupied about 398
million square feet of leased building space domestically in fiscal
year 2006, according to FRPP data.[Footnote 11] GSA, USPS, and USDA
leased about 71 percent of this space, mostly for offices, and the
military services leased another 17 percent. For fiscal year 2008, GSA
reported that for the first time, it leased more space than it owned.
In 10 GSA and USPS leases that we examined in the January 2008 report,
decisions to lease space that would be more cost-effective to own were
driven by the limited availability of capital for building ownership
and other considerations, such as operational efficiency and security.
For example, for four of seven GSA leases we analyzed, leasing was more
costly over time than construction--by an estimated $83.3 million over
30 years. Although ownership through construction is often the least
expensive option, federal budget scorekeeping rules require the full
cost of this option to be recorded up front in the budget, whereas only
the annual lease payment and cancellation costs need to be recorded for
operating leases, reducing the up-front commitment even though the
leases are generally more costly over time. USPS is not subject to the
scorekeeping rules and cited operational efficiency and limited capital
as its main reasons for leasing.
While OMB made progress in addressing long-standing real property
problems, efforts to address the leasing challenge have been limited.
We have raised this issue for almost 20 years. Several alternative
approaches have been discussed by various stakeholders, including
scoring operating leases the same as ownership, but none have been
implemented. In our 2008 report, we recommended that OMB, in
consultation with the Federal Real Property Council and key
stakeholders, develop a strategy to reduce agencies' reliance on leased
space for long-term needs when ownership would be less costly. OMB
agreed with our recommendation. According to OMB officials, in response
to this recommendation, an OMB working group conducted an analysis of
lease performance. OMB is currently using this analysis as it works
with officials of the new administration to assess overall real
property priorities in order to establish a roadmap for further action.
GSA's Initial Implementation of the National Brokers Services Contracts
Demonstrated Need for Numerous Improvements:
With GSA's ongoing reliance on leasing, it is critical that GSA manage
its in-house and contracted leasing activities effectively. However, in
January 2007, we identified numerous areas in GSA's implementation of
four contracts for national broker services that warranted improvement.
[Footnote 12] Our findings were particularly significant since, over
time, GSA expects to outsource the vast majority of its expiring lease
workload.
At one time, GSA performed lease acquisition, management, and
administration functions entirely in-house. In 1997, however, GSA
started entering into contracts for real estate services to carry out a
portion of its leasing program, and in October 2004, GSA awarded four
contracts to perform broker services nationwide (national broker
services), with contract performance beginning on April 1, 2005. GSA
awarded two of the four contracts to dual-agency brokerage firms--firms
that represent both building owners and tenants (in this case, GSA
acting on behalf of a tenant agency). The other two awardees were
tenant-only brokerage firms--firms that represent only the tenant in
real estate transactions. Because using a dual-agency brokerage firm
creates an increased potential for conflicts of interest, federal
contracting requirements ordinarily would prohibit federal agencies
from using dual-agency brokers, but GSA waived the requirements, as
allowed, to increase competition for the leasing contracts.[Footnote
13] When the contracts were awarded, GSA planned to shift at least 50
percent of its expiring lease workload to the four awardees in the
first year of the contracts and to increase their share of GSA's
expiring leases to approximately 90 percent by 2010--the fifth and
final year of the contracts. As of May 30, 2009, GSA estimated that the
total value of the four contracts was $485.6 million.
We reviewed GSA's administration of the four national broker services
contracts (i.e., the national broker services program) for the first
year of the contracts which ended March 31, 2006. In our January 2007
report, we identified a wide variety of issues related to GSA's early
implementation of these contracts. Problems included inadequate
controls to (1) prevent conflicts of interest and (2) ensure compliance
with federal requirements for safeguarding federal information and
information systems used on behalf of GSA by the four national brokers.
We also reported, among other matters, that GSA had not developed a
method for quantifying what, if any, savings had resulted from the
contracts or for distributing work to the brokers on the basis of their
performance, as it had planned. We made 11 recommendations designed to
improve GSA's overall management of the national broker services
program. As figure 2 shows, GSA has implemented 7 of these 11
recommendations; has taken action to implement another recommendation;
and, after consideration, has decided not to implement the remaining 3.
(For more details on the issues we reported in January 2007 and GSA's
actions to address our recommendations, see app. II). We are encouraged
by GSA's actions on our recommendations but have not evaluated their
impact.
Figure 2: GSA's Progress in Implementing Our Recommendations on the
National Broker Services Program:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Category: Conflicts of interest:
Recommendation: Assess the adequacy of the two dual-agency brokers‘
conflict wall controls;
Status: Recommendation has been implemented.
Recommendation: Modify the two dual-agency brokers‘ contracts to ensure
that GSA can enforce recommendations resulting from its conflict wall
inspections;
Status: GSA considered but did not implement the recommendation.
Recommendation: Establish consistent dual-agency and tenant-only
conflict-of-interest contract requirements;
Status: Recommendation has been implemented.
Recommendation: Establish additional controls to mitigate the inherent
conflict of interest created by allowing the brokers to represent the
government while negotiating commissions with building owners;
Status: GSA considered but did not implement the recommendation.
Category: Compliance with Federal Information Security Management Act
requirements:
Recommendation: Assess the risk from unauthorized access to GSA
information collected or maintained by the four brokers;
Status: Recommendation has been implemented.
Recommendation: Modify the four brokers‘ contracts to include controls
appropriate to the assessed risk to ensure that the brokers safeguard
information in accordance with the Federal Information Security
Management Act;
Status: GSA considered but did not implement the recommendation.
Recommendation: Test the effectiveness of federal information security
policies, procedures, and practices related to the national broker
services program;
Status: Recommendation has been implemented.
Category: Program implementation and evaluation:
Recommendation: Develop processes for quantifying expected savings from
the national broker services program;
Status: Recommendation has been implemented.
Recommendation: To prepare for performance-based distribution, clarify
the number and types of completed task orders needed to establish a
record of the brokers‘ performance;
Status: GSA's actions to implement the recommendation are ongoing.
Recommendation: Collect data on GSA‘s distributions of task orders for
rural and urban areas;
Status: Recommendation has been implemented.
Recommendation: Clarify and revise terminology in the national broker
services program contracts and administrative guide to ensure
applicability of evaluation measures and conformance to the National
Institutes of Health‘s performance-related terminology;
Status: Recommendation has been implemented.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Problems with Unreliable Data Persist:
Quality governmentwide and agency-specific data are critical for
addressing the wide range of problems facing the government in the real
property area, including excess and unneeded property, deterioration,
and security concerns. In April 2007, we reported that although some
agencies have made progress in collecting and reporting standardized
real property data for FRPP, data reliability is still a challenge at
some of the agencies, and agencies lacked a standard framework for data
validation.[Footnote 14] We are pleased that OMB has implemented our
recommendation to develop a framework that agencies can use to better
ensure the validity and usefulness of key real property data in the
FRPP, as noted earlier. However, in the past 2 years, we have found the
following problems with FRPP data:
* In our January 2008 report on agencies' leasing, we found that, while
FRPP data were generally reliable for describing the leased inventory,
data quality concerns, such as missing data, would limit the usefulness
of FRPP for other purposes, such as strategic decision making.[Footnote
15]
* In our October 2008 report on federal agencies' repair and
maintenance backlogs, we found that the way six agencies define and
estimate their repair needs or backlogs varies.[Footnote 16] We also
found that, according to OMB officials, FRPP's definition of repair
needs was purposefully vague so agencies could use their existing data
collection and reporting process. Moreover, we found that condition
indexes, which agencies report to FRPP, cannot be compared across
agencies because their repair estimates are not comparable. As a
result, these condition indexes cannot be used to understand the
relative condition or management of agencies' assets. Thus, they should
not be used to inform or prioritize funding decisions between agencies.
In this report, we recommended that OMB, in consultation with the
Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, explore the potential for
adding a uniform reporting requirement to FRPP to capture the
government's fiscal exposure related to real property repair and
maintenance. OMB agreed with our recommendation.
* In our February 2009 report on agencies' authorities to retain
proceeds from the sale of real property, we found that, because of
inconsistent and unreliable reporting, governmentwide data reported to
FRPP were not sufficiently reliable to analyze the extent to which the
six agencies with authority to sell real property and retain the
proceeds from such sales actually sold real property.[Footnote 17] Such
data weaknesses reduce the effectiveness of the FRPP as a tool to
enable governmentwide comparisons of real property efforts, such as the
effort to reduce the government's portfolio of unneeded property.
Furthermore, although USPS is not required to submit data to FRPP, in
December 2007, we found reliability issues with USPS data that also
compromised the usefulness of the data for examining USPS's real
property performance.[Footnote 18] Specifically, we found that USPS's
Facility Database--developed in 2003 to capture and maintain facility
data--has numerous reliability problems and is not used as a
centralized source for facility data, in part because of its
reliability problems. Moreover, even if the data in the Facility
Database were reliable, the database would not help USPS measure
facility management performance because it does not track performance
indicators nor does it archive data for tracking trends.
Agencies Face Ongoing Challenges with Underutilized Property and Repair
and Maintenance Backlogs:
In April 2007, we reported that among the problems with real property
management that agencies continued to face were excess and
underutilized property, deteriorating facilities, and maintenance and
repair backlogs. We reported some federal agencies maintain a
significant amount of excess and underutilized property. For example,
we found that Energy, DHS, and NASA reported that over 10 percent of
their facilities were excess or underutilized.[Footnote 19] Agencies
may also underestimate their underutilized property if their data are
not reliable. For example, in 2007, we found during limited site visits
to USPS facilities that six of the facilities we visited had vacant
space that local employees said could be leased, but these facilities
were not listed as having vacant, leasable space in USPS's Facilities
Database (see figure 3).[Footnote 20] At that time, USPS officials
acknowledged the vacancies we cited and noted that local officials have
few incentives to report facilities' vacant, leasable space in the
database.
Figure 3: Vacant, Possibly Leasable Space in USPS Facilities Not Listed
in the Facilities Database (FDB):
[Refer to PDF for image: six photographs, with accompanying
information]
Circle City Station, Indianapolis, Indiana:
* Vacant area: A large portion of the second floor.
* Status: Postal officials said the Postal Service never built out the
second floor because the space was not needed and could be subleased or
returned to building owner.
* Status listed in FDB: No vacant leasable space.
Denton Main Post Office, Texas:
* Vacant area: Entire second floor of the large post office.
* Status: Postal officials said half of the building was occupied by
other federal agencies that moved out about 10 years ago and that the
space could be leased.
* Status listed in FDB: No vacant leasable space.
Downtown Finance Station, Gary, Indiana:
* Vacant area: The basement (pictured) is completely vacant, and the
second floor is used once per month or less for training.
* Status: Postal officials said the Postal Service never used more than
just the main floor and could lease the excess space.
* Status listed in FDB: No vacant leasable space.
Fort Worth Downtown Station, Texas:
* Vacant area: Second floor (pictured) and basement are vacant. Third
floor used periodically for storage and training.
* Status: Postal officials said most of the building has been vacant
since the mail processing function was removed years ago.
* Status listed in FDB: No vacant leasable space.
Richland Station, Dallas, Texas:
* Vacant area: Much of the second floor of this 53,000-square-foot post
office.
* Status: Postal officials said the office space has been vacant for
years, and another portion (pictured above) has not been occupied since
the Postal Service purchased the building in 1989.
* Status listed in FDB: No vacant leasable space.
East Chicago Main Post Office, Indiana:
* Vacant area: The entire second floor, which consists of several
offices.
* Status: Postal officials said it has been vacant for years and could
be leased.
* Status listed in FDB: No vacant leasable space.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Underutilized properties present significant potential risks to federal
agencies because they are costly to maintain and could be put to more
cost-beneficial uses or sold to generate revenue for the government. In
2007, we also reported that addressing the needs of aging and
deteriorating federal facilities remains a problem for major real
property-holding agencies, and that according to recent estimates, tens
of billions of dollars will be needed to repair or restore these assets
so that they are fully functional.[Footnote 21] In October 2008, we
reported that agency repair backlog estimates are not comparable and do
not accurately capture the government's fiscal exposure.[Footnote 22]
We found that the six agencies we reviewed had different processes in
place to periodically assess the condition of their assets and that
they also generally used these processes to identify repair and
maintenance backlogs for their assets. Five agencies identified repair
needs of between $2.3 billion (NASA) and $12 billion (DOI). GSA
reported $7 billion in repair needs. The sixth agency, DOD, did not
report on its repair needs. Table 1 provides a summary of each agency's
estimate of repair needs.
Table 1: Selected Agencies' Processes for Conducting Condition
Assessments and Estimating Repair Needs to Calculate FRPP Condition
Index for Fiscal Year 2007:
Agency: DOE;
Assets assessed: All assets;
Frequency of assessments: At least every 5 years;
What is included in the estimate of repair needs (backlog): Work not
done in time frame identified;
Identified repair needs: $3.3 billion.
Agency: NASA;
Assets assessed: All assets;
Frequency of assessments: Annually;
What is included in the estimate of repair needs (backlog): Work
required to bring the asset up to current standards;
Identified repair needs: $2.3 billion.
Agency: DOI;
Assets assessed: Assets valued at $5,000 or more;
Frequency of assessments: Every 5 years;
What is included in the estimate of repair needs (backlog): Work not
done in time frame identified;
Identified repair needs: $12.0 billion[A].
Agency: VA;
Assets assessed: All assets;
Frequency of assessments: At least every 3 years;
What is included in the estimate of repair needs (backlog): Work
required to correct identified deficiencies in systems determined to be
in poor or critical condition;
Identified repair needs: $5.9 billion.
Agency: GSA;
Assets assessed: All assets;
Frequency of assessments: Every 2 years;
What is included in the estimate of repair needs (backlog): Work
identified to be done now or within the next 10 years;
Identified repair needs: $7.0 billion.
Agency: DOD;
Assets assessed: All assets;
Frequency of assessments: Varies by military service;
What is included in the estimate of repair needs (backlog): No backlog
estimated;
Identified repair needs: [B].
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] According to DOI officials, DOI recognizes that due to the scope,
nature and variety of DOI assets, exact estimates of backlogs are very
difficult to determine. As a result, DOI prefers to think of its
estimate as a range.
[B] DOD did not compute a dollar amount for repair needs in 2007.
[End of table]
Agencies and Federal Protective Service Face Ongoing Security
Challenges:
In addition to other ongoing real property management challenges, the
threat of terrorism has increased the emphasis on physical security for
federal real property assets. In 2007, we reported that all nine major
real property-holding agencies reported using risk-based approaches to
prioritize security needs, as we have suggested, but cited a lack of
resources for security enhancements as an ongoing problem. For example,
according to GSA officials, obtaining funding for security
countermeasures, both security fixtures and equipment, is a challenge
not only within GSA but for GSA's tenant agencies as well.[Footnote 23]
Moreover, last week we testified before the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that preliminary results
show that the Federal Protective Service's (FPS) ability to protect
federal facilities is hampered by weaknesses in its contract security
guard program.[Footnote 24] We found that FPS does not fully ensure
that its contract security guards have the training and certifications
required to be deployed to a federal facility and has limited assurance
that its guards are complying with post orders. For example, FPS does
not have specific national guidance on when and how guard inspections
should be performed; and FPS's inspections of guard posts at federal
facilities are inconsistent, and the quality varied in the six regions
we visited. Moreover, we identified substantial security
vulnerabilities related to FPS's guard program. GAO investigators
carrying the components for an improvised explosive device successfully
passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS's
guards at each of the 10 level IV federal facilities where we conducted
covert testing.[Footnote 25] Once GAO investigators passed the control
access points, they assembled the explosive device and walked freely
around several floors of these level IV facilities with the device in a
briefcase. In response to our briefing on these findings, FPS has
recently taken some actions including increasing the frequency of
intrusion testing and guard inspections. However, implementing these
changes may be challenging, according to FPS. We previously testified
before this subcommittee in 2008 that FPS faces operational challenges,
funding challenges, and limitations with performance measures to assess
the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities. We
recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of DHS direct the
Director of FPS to develop and implement a strategic approach to better
manage its staffing resources, evaluate current and alternative funding
mechanisms, and develop appropriate performance measures. DHS agreed
with the recommendations. According to FPS officials, FPS is working on
implementing these recommendations.[Footnote 26]
Underlying Obstacles Hamper Agencies' Real Property Reform Efforts
Governmentwide:
As GAO has reported in the past, real property management problems have
been exacerbated by deep-rooted obstacles that include competing
stakeholder interests, various legal and budget-related limitations,
and weaknesses in agencies' capital planning. While reforms to date are
positive, the new administration and Congress will be challenged to
sustain reform momentum and reach consensus on how the obstacles should
be addressed.
Several Agencies Cited Competing Stakeholder Interests as Impeding Real
Property Management Decision Making:
In 2007, we found that some major real property-holding agencies
reported that competing local, state, and political interests often
impede their ability to make real property management decisions, such
as decisions about disposing of unneeded property and acquiring real
property. For example, we found that USPS was no longer pursuing a 2002
goal of reducing the number of "redundant, low-value" retail
facilities, in part, because of legal restrictions on and political
pressures against closing them.[Footnote 27] To close a post office,
USPS is required to, among other things, formally announce its
intention to close the facility, analyze the impact of the closure on
the community, and solicit comments from the community. Similarly, VA
officials reported that disposal is often not an option for most
properties because of political stakeholders and constituencies,
including historic building advocates or local communities that want to
maintain their relationship with VA. In addition, Interior officials
reported that the department faces significant challenges in balancing
the needs and concerns of local and state governments, historical
preservation offices, political interests, and others, particularly
when coupled with budget constraints.[Footnote 28] If the interests of
competing stakeholders are not appropriately addressed early in the
planning stage, they can adversely affect the cost, schedule and scope
of a project.
Despite its significance, the obstacle of competing stakeholder
interests has gone unaddressed in the real property initiative. It is
important to note that there is precedent for lessening the impact of
competing stakeholder interests. Base Realignment and Closure Act
(BRAC) decisions, by design, are intended to be removed from the
political process, and Congress approves all BRAC decisions as a whole.
OMB staff said they recognize the significance of the obstacle and told
us that FRPC would begin to address the issue after the inventory is
established and other reforms are initiated. But until this issue is
addressed, less than optimal decisions based on factors other than what
is best for the government as a whole may continue.
Legal and Budgetary Limitations Continue to Hamper Agencies' Disposal
Efforts:
As discussed earlier, budgetary limitations that hinder agencies'
ability to fund ownership leads agencies to rely on costly leased space
to meet new space needs. Furthermore, the administrative complexity and
costs of disposing of federal property continue to hamper efforts by
some agencies to address their excess and underutilized real property
problems. Federal agencies are required by law to assess and pay for
any environmental cleanup that may be needed before disposing of a
property--a process that may require years of study and result in
significant costs. As valuable as these legal requirements are, their
administrative complexity and the associated costs of complying with
them create disincentives to the disposal of excess property. For
example, we reported that VA, like all federal agencies, must comply
with federal laws and regulations governing property disposal that are
intended to protect subsequent users of the property from environmental
hazards and to preserve historically significant sites, among other
purposes.[Footnote 29] We have reported that some VA managers have
retained excess property because the administrative complexity and
costs of complying with these requirements were disincentives to
disposal.[Footnote 30] Additionally, some agencies reported that the
costs of cleanup and demolition sometimes exceed the costs of
continuing to maintain a property that has been shut down. In such
cases, in the short run, it can be more beneficial economically to
retain the asset in a shut-down status.
Some federal agencies have been granted authorities to enter into EULs
or to retain proceeds from the sale of real property. Recently, in
February 2009, we reported that the 10 largest real property-holding
agencies have different authorities for entering into EULs and
retaining proceeds from the sale of real property, including whether
the agency can use any retained proceeds without further congressional
action such as an annual appropriation act, as shown in table 2.
[Footnote 31]
Table 2: Agencies' Authorities Regarding EULs and Real Property Sales:
Agency: DOD;
Authority to enter into EULs and retain leasing proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from EULs without further congressional
action: [Check];
Authority to sell real property and retain sales proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from sales without further congressional
action: [Check][A].
Agency: DOE;
Authority to enter into EULs and retain leasing proceeds: [Check][B];
Authority to use proceeds from EULs without further congressional
action: [Empty];
Authority to sell real property and retain sales proceeds: [Empty];
Authority to use proceeds from sales without further congressional
action: [Empty].
Agency: GSA;
Authority to enter into EULs and retain leasing proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from EULs without further congressional
action: [Empty];
Authority to sell real property and retain sales proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from sales without further congressional
action: [Empty].
Agency: DOI[C];
Authority to enter into EULs and retain leasing proceeds: [Empty];
Authority to use proceeds from EULs without further congressional
action: [Empty];
Authority to sell real property and retain sales proceeds: [Empty];
Authority to use proceeds from sales without further congressional
action: [Empty].
Agency: DOJ;
Authority to enter into EULs and retain leasing proceeds: [Empty];
Authority to use proceeds from EULs without further congressional
action: [Empty];
Authority to sell real property and retain sales proceeds: [Empty];
Authority to use proceeds from sales without further congressional
action: [Empty].
Agency: NASA;
Authority to enter into EULs and retain leasing proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from EULs without further congressional
action: [Check];
Authority to sell real property and retain sales proceeds: [Empty];
Authority to use proceeds from sales without further congressional
action: [Empty].
Agency: State[D];
Authority to enter into EULs and retain leasing proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from EULs without further congressional
action: [Check];
Authority to sell real property and retain sales proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from sales without further congressional
action: [Check][E].
Agency: USDA (except the Agricultural Research Service[F] and the
Forest Service);
Authority to enter into EULs and retain leasing proceeds: [Empty];
Authority to use proceeds from EULs without further congressional
action: [Empty];
Authority to sell real property and retain sales proceeds: [Empty];
Authority to use proceeds from sales without further congressional
action: [Empty].
Agency: USDA (Forest Service)[G];
Authority to enter into EULs and retain leasing proceeds: [Check][H];
Authority to use proceeds from EULs without further congressional
action: [Check];
Authority to sell real property and retain sales proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from sales without further congressional
action: [Check].
Agency: USPS;
Authority to enter into EULs and retain leasing proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from EULs without further congressional
action: [Check];
Authority to sell real property and retain sales proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from sales without further congressional
action: [Check].
Agency: VA;
Authority to enter into EULs and retain leasing proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from EULs without further congressional
action: [Check];
Authority to sell real property and retain sales proceeds: [Check];
Authority to use proceeds from sales without further congressional
action: [I].
Source: GAO analysis and information provided by the above agencies.
Note: Authorities through fiscal year 2008.
[A] In certain cases, the use of proceeds from the sale of DOD real
property is subject to further congressional action.
[B] According to DOE, the department has determined that it has EUL
authority on the basis of the definition set forth in OMB Circular A-11
(June 2008). DOE officials said that the department has not entered
into any EULs using this authority.
[C] While DOI has certain authorities to sell real property, we did not
include in the scope of our review lands managed by DOI.
[D] State has used its authority under 22 U.S.C. § 300 to exchange,
lease, or license real property outside of the country. According to
State, in exceptional cases, the department has relied on this
authority to enter into long-term leases to conserve historically
significant properties, such as the Talleyrand Building in Paris,
France. State's authorization to sell and retain proceeds from the sale
of real property applies to its properties located outside of the
United States and to properties located within the United States
acquired for an exchange with a specified foreign government.
[E] According to State, committee reports accompanying State's
appropriations acts routinely require the department to notify Congress
through the reprogramming process of the specific planned use of the
proceeds of the sale of excess property. Furthermore, State indicated
that it routinely includes discussion of the use of proceeds from the
sale of real property in its budget justifications and financial plans.
[F] Because USDA's Agricultural Research Service received pilot
authority to enter into EULs for certain properties effective June
2008, but had not entered into any EULs during our review, we did not
include it in the scope of our review.
[G] We are listing the Forest Service separately from USDA because it
has authority to sell administrative property and retain the proceeds
from the sales, unlike the rest of USDA.
[H] Although the Forest Service has EUL authority, it has not used that
authority.
[I] Under certain circumstances, VA can use the proceeds from the sale
of former EUL property without further congressional action.
[End of table]
Officials at five of the six agencies with the authority to retain
proceeds from the sale of real property, (the Forest Service, GSA,
State, USPS, and VA) said this authority is a strong incentive to sell
real property.[Footnote 32] Officials at the five agencies that do not
have the authority to retain proceeds from the sale of real property
(DOE; DOI; DOJ; NASA; and USDA except for the Forest Service) said they
would like to have such expanded authorities to help manage their real
property portfolios. However, officials at two of those agencies said
that, because of challenges such as the security needs or remote
locations of most of their properties, it was unlikely that they would
sell many properties.
We have previously found that, for agencies which are required to fund
the costs of preparing property for disposal, the inability to retain
any of the proceeds acts as an additional disincentive to disposing of
real property. As we have testified previously, it seems reasonable to
allow agencies to retain enough of the proceeds to recoup the costs of
disposal, and it may make sense to permit agencies to retain additional
proceeds for reinvestment in real property where a need exists.
[Footnote 33] However, in considering whether to allow federal agencies
to retain proceeds from real property transactions, it is important for
Congress to ensure that it maintains appropriate control and oversight
over these funds, including the ability to redistribute the funds to
accommodate changing needs.
Two current initiatives relate to these issues. The administration's
2010 budget includes a real property legislative proposal that, among
other things, would permit agencies to retain the net proceeds from the
transfer or sale of real property subject to further Congressional
action. On May 19, 2009, H.R. 2495, the Federal Real Property Disposal
Enhancement Act of 2009, was introduced in the House of
Representatives, and this bill, like the administration's legislative
proposal, would authorize federal agencies to retain net proceeds from
the transfer or sale of real property subject to further congressional
action. Additionally, both the administration's legislative proposal
and H.R. 2497 would establish a pilot program for the expedited
disposal of federal real property.
Weaknesses in Capital Planning Still Exists:
Over the years, we have reported that prudent capital planning can help
agencies to make the most of limited resources, and failure to make
timely and effective capital acquisitions can result in acquisitions
that cost more than anticipated, fall behind schedule, and fail to meet
mission needs and goals. In addition, Congress and OMB have
acknowledged the need to improve federal decision making in the area of
capital investment. A number of laws enacted in the 1990s placed
increased emphasis on improving capital decision-making practices and
OMB's Capital Programming Guide and its revisions to Circular A-11 have
attempted to address the government's shortcomings in this area.
However, we have continued to find limitations in OMB's efforts to
improve capital planning governmentwide. For example, real property is
one of the major types of capital assets that agencies acquire, and
therefore shortcomings in the capital planning and decision-making area
have clear implications for the administration's real property
initiative.[Footnote 34] However, while OMB staff said that agency
asset management plans are supposed to align with their capital plans,
OMB does not assess whether the plans are aligned. Moreover, we found
that guidance for the asset management plans does not discuss how these
plans should be linked with agencies' broader capital planning efforts
outlined in the Capital Programming Guide. Without a clear linkage or
crosswalk between the guidance for the two documents, agencies may not
link them. Furthermore, the relationship between real property goals
specified in the asset management plans and longer-term capital plans
may not be clear. In April 2007, we recommended that OMB, in
conjunction with the FRPC, should establish a clearer link between
agencies' efforts under the real property initiative and broader
capital planning guidance.[Footnote 35] According to OMB officials, OMB
is currently considering options to strengthen agencies' application of
the capital planning process as part of Circular A-11, with a focus on
preventing cost overruns and schedule delays.
Federal Real Property Reform Efforts Continue to Face Challenges:
In 2007, we concluded that the executive order on real property
management and the addition of real property to PMA provided a good
foundation for strategically managing federal real property and
addressing long-standing problems. These efforts directly addressed the
concerns we had raised in past high-risk reports about the lack of a
governmentwide focus on real property management problems and generally
constitute what we envisioned as a transformation strategy for this
area. However, we found that these efforts were in the early stages of
implementation, and the problems that led to our high-risk designation-
-excess property, repair backlogs, data issues, reliance on costly
leasing, and security challenges--still existed. As a result, this area
remains high risk until agencies show significant results in
eliminating the problems by, for example, reducing inventories of
excess facilities and making headway in addressing the repair backlog.
While the prior administration took several steps to overcome some
obstacles in the real property area, the obstacles posed by competing
local, state, and political interests went largely unaddressed, and the
linkage between the real property initiative and broader agency capital
planning efforts is not clear. In 2007, we recommended that OMB, in
conjunction with the FRPC, develop an action plan for how the FRPC will
address these key problems.[Footnote 36] According to OMB officials,
these key problems are among those being considered as OMB works with
administration officials to assess overall real property priorities in
order to establish a roadmap for further action. While reforms to date
are positive, the new administration and Congress will be challenged to
sustain reform momentum and reach consensus on how the ongoing
obstacles should be addressed.
Madam Chair, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may
have at this time.
Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Mark
Goldstein on (202) 512-2834 or by email at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Key
contributions to this testimony were also made by Keith Cunningham,
Dwayne Curry, Susan Michal-Smith, Steven Rabinowitz, Kathleen Turner,
and Alwynne Wilbur.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Executive Branch Management Scorecard Standards for the
Real Property Initiative:
In April 2007, we found that adding real property asset management to
the President's Management Agenda (PMA) had increased its visibility as
a key management challenge and focused greater attention on real
property issues across the government. As part of this effort, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) identified goals for agencies to
achieve in right-sizing their real property portfolios. To achieve
these goals and gauge an agency's success in accurately accounting for,
maintaining, and managing its real property assets so as to efficiently
meet its goals and objectives, the administration established the real
property scorecard in the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. The
scorecard consists of 13 standards that agencies must meet to achieve
the highest status--green--as shown in figure 1. These 13 standards
include 8 standards needed to achieve yellow status, plus 5 additional
standards. An agency reaches green or yellow status if it meets all of
the standards for success listed in the corresponding column in figure
1 and red status if it has any of the shortcomings listed in the column
for red standards.
Figure 4: PMA Executive Branch Management Scorecard Standards for the
Real Property Initiative:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Green standards:
Agency:
* Meets all yellow standards for success;
* Established an OMB-approved 3-year rolling timeline with date certain
deadlines by which agency will address opportunities and determine its
priorities as identified in the asset management plan;
* Demonstrated steps taken toward implementation of asset management
plan as stated in yellow standards (including meeting established
deadlines in 3-year timeline, meeting prioritized management
improvement actions, maintaining appropriate amount of holdings, and
estimating and optimizing cost levels);
* Accurate and current asset inventory information and asset
maximization performance measures are used routinely in management
decision making (such as reducing the amount of unneeded and underused
properties); and;
* The management of agency property assets is consistent with the
agency‘s overall strategic plan, the agency asset management plan, and
the performance measures established by the FRPC as stated in the
Federal Real Property Asset Management Executive Order.
Yellow standards:
Agency:
* Has a Senior Real Property Officer (SRPO) who actively serves on the
FRPC;
* Established asset management performance measures, consistent with
the published requirements of the FRPC;
* Completed and maintained a comprehensive inventory and profile of
agency real property, consistent with the published requirements of the
FRPC;
* Provided timely and accurate information for inclusion into the
governmentwide real property inventory database; and;
* Developed an OMB-approved comprehensive asset management plan that:
- Complies with guidance established by the FRPC;
- Includes policies and methodologies for maintaining property holdings
in an amount and type according to agency budget and mission;
- Seeks to optimize level of real property operating, maintenance, and
security costs.
Red standards:
Agency:
* Does not actively participate on the FRPC;
* Has not established asset management performance measures or has
asset management performance measures that are inconsistent with the
published requirements of the FRPC;
* Has not completed or does not maintain a comprehensive inventory and
profile of agency real property consistent with the published
requirements of the FRPC;
* Does not provide timely and accurate information for inclusion into
the governmentwide real property inventory database; or;
* Has not developed an OMB-approved comprehensive asset management
plan.
Source: OMB.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Status GAO Recommendations Related to GSA's National
Broker Services Program:
Table 3: Explanation and Implementation Status of Recommendations
Related to GSA's National Broker Services Program:
Reported issue: 1. While the General Services Administration (GSA) had
confirmed that the two dual agency firms (firms that represent both
building owners and tenants) had established "conflict walls" to help
prevent the electronic and physical sharing of information between the
brokers' employees, it had not assessed whether the conflict walls were
adequate to prevent unauthorized information sharing between employees
within the same firm who represent GSA, and other employees within the
same firm who represent building owners;
Recommendation: Assess the adequacy of the two dual-agencies' conflict
wall controls and recommend actions, if applicable, to correct any
identified weaknesses;
Status/Actions taken: Implemented; GSA assessed the adequacy of the
dual agencies' conflict walls and, on May 22, 2007, concluded that the
conflict walls were satisfactory.
Reported issue: 2. GSA conducted a preliminary inspection of the
conflict walls maintained by the two dual-agency brokers, but had not
ensured that the brokers implemented its inspection recommendations.
GSA's inaction was attributable, in part, to uncertainty about whether
GSA's contracts with the brokers permitted it to require brokers to
implement its inspection recommendations;
Recommendation: Modify the two dual-agency contracts to ensure that GSA
can enforce recommendations resulting from its conflict wall
inspections;
Status/Actions taken: Not implemented; GSA reviewed its contracts with
the two dual-agency brokers and determined that the language in the
contracts was already sufficient to ensure that it could enforce
compliance with its inspection recommendations. Therefore, according to
GSA, there was no need to modify the contracts.
Reported issue: 3. GSA had not established consistent conflict-of-
interest contract requirements for all of its contractors.
Specifically, while GSA required its dual-agency brokers (firms that
represent both building owners and tenants) to (1) execute additional
agreements to safeguard proprietary information; (2) notify GSA of any
conflicts of interest discovered during the performance of work; and
(3) include a conflict-of-interest clause in all of their subcontracts,
its contracts with the two tenant-only contractors (firms that
represent only tenants) did not contain similar requirements;
Recommendation: Establish consistent dual-agency and tenant-only
conflict-of-interest contract requirements, including, at a minimum,
the three conflict-of-interest requirements that address situations
also faced by the two tenant-only firms;
Status/Actions taken: Implemented; GSA included the three conflict of
interest requirements in its contracts with the two tenant-only brokers
in May 2007. In addition, GSA included other conflict-of-interest
requirements in the tenant-only broker contracts in response to other
questions we posed during our review. Previously these requirements had
been only explicitly applicable to the dual-agency brokers. Ensuring
consistency in contractor requirements will help ensure that tenant-
only firms are aware of all of the requirements applicable to their
disclosure of potential or actual conflicts of interest. GSA also
revised its administrative guide to reflect this point.
Reported issue: 4. Despite federal requirements, GSA had not fully
assessed the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the
misuse of information and information systems used on behalf of GSA by
the four national brokers. Such an assessment is required by the
Federal Information Security Management Act to help ensure that
contractors and others are protecting an agency's information and
information systems in a manner commensurate with the risk level
assigned to the information and information systems by the agency;
Recommendation: Assess the risk and magnitude of harm that could result
from unauthorized access to, or use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of, GSA information collected or
maintained by the four brokers (and their subcontractors) and the
information systems used by the brokers on behalf of GSA;
Status/Actions taken: Implemented; GSA performed the recommended risk
assessment on August 30, 2007, and concluded that the risk level was
"moderate."
Reported issue: 5. While requirements of the Federal Information
Security Management Act are applicable to the national broker services
brokers, GSA's contracts with them did not require the brokers to
comply with the act's requirements;
Recommendation: Modify the four national broker services' contracts to
include controls appropriate to the assessed risk to ensure that the
brokers and their subcontractors safeguard information and information
systems in accordance with the Federal Information Security Management
Act;
Status/Actions taken: Not implemented; GSA informed us in August 2007
that it had developed a plan to complete the assessment and
accreditation required to bring each of the four brokers into
compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act. As
part of that process, GSA determined that it was in the best interest
of the government to identify and analyze the brokers' existing
controls and use them, where possible, to meet the requirements of the
act. GSA expected this process would take several months to complete.
In the interim, GSA stated that it would be inappropriate to modify the
contracts. However, GSA further stated that, if warranted by its
assessments of the brokers, it may modify its individual contracts with
the brokers in the future.
Reported issue: 6. Despite federal requirements, GSA had not tested the
information security controls associated with its national brokers
program, including the controls used by its four national brokers. The
Federal Information Security Management Act requires such testing to
ensure that controls are adequate for protecting agency information,
including information maintained by contractors (and subcontractors).
Testing must be conducted at least once per year;
Recommendation: Test the effectiveness of federal information security
policies, procedures, and practices related to the national broker
services program, including, as appropriate, broker controls for
safeguarding GSA's information;
Status/Actions taken: Implemented; GSA developed a process to test the
effectiveness of controls used for safeguarding its program information
and, as of March 15, 2008, had completed testing at one of the four
brokers. According to GSA, "The continuous monitoring required by its
process means that it is never complete but must be done repeatedly..."
throughout the life of the contracts.
Reported issue: 7. Conflict of interest controls were not adequate to
ensure that brokers would not increase the government's rental costs by
favoring building owners who offer them higher commissions.
Specifically, we concluded that, until such time as GSA establishes
effective controls to mitigate the brokers' inherent conflict of
interest by, among other possible actions, precluding them from
accepting commissions in excess of the rate approved by the contracting
officer's technical representatives and included in GSA's solicitation
for offers, there will remain at least the perception that the brokers
might favor-at the government's expense--building owners who pay higher
commissions;
Recommendation: Establish additional controls to mitigate the inherent
conflict of interest created by allowing the brokers to represent the
government, while also negotiating their commissions with building
owners;
Status/Actions taken: Not implemented; GSA initiated a "multi-faceted
approach" to address this recommendation, including an assessment of
(1) peer review findings and (2) the results of prior protests on
leasing actions. According to GSA, its assessment did not identify any
instances of abuse or inappropriate actions by the brokers.
Consequently, GSA determined that there was no need to establish
additional controls.
Reported issue: 8. While GSA anticipated that using national brokers
would results in (1) reduce rental costs to the government, and (2)
agency savings from reduced fees, administrative expenses, and
personnel by shifting costs to the national broker services contracts,
it had not developed a process for quantifying the expected savings;
Recommendation: Develop processes for quantifying expected savings from
(1) rent reductions attributable to the brokers' greater knowledge of
the commercial real estate market and (2) agency savings associated
with reduced fees, administration expenses, personnel costs, and
operational efficiencies associated with using the national broker
services contracts;
Status/Actions taken: Implemented; GSA developed a process for
quantifying savings from the national broker services program.
Specifically, GSA extracted "as much relevant and reliable historical
data as available" on its prior (regional/zonal) contracts and compared
the data to available data on the national broker services contracts
through the end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. GSA's
analysis identified numerous cost savings attributable to its use of
the national broker services contracts, including $25 million in
commission credits earned by the brokers and/or credited to customer
agencies.
Reported issue: 9. While GSA initially expected to start performance-
based task order distributions after the first year of the contract, it
delayed doing so because too few task orders had been completed to
establish a record of their performance on a variety of commission-
eligible task orders. When we completed our review in January 2007, GSA
expected to begin performance-based distributions on April 1, 2007--the
start of the third contract year. Before GSA can move to performance-
based distributions, we reported that GSA must (1) ensure that it has
sufficient data on each broker's performance and (2) develop clearly
defined guidance and processes for allocating additional future work to
those brokers who excel relative to the others;
Recommendation: As part of GSA's effort to prepare for performance-
based distribution decisions, clarify the number and types of completed
task orders needed to establish a record of the brokers' performance;
Status/Actions taken: Open[A]; According to a GSA official, GSA
developed and tentatively approved a plan for implementing performance-
based work distributions. However, it was forced to suspend
implementation of the plan when testing revealed unspecified flaws that
would have negatively impacted the national broker services program.
According to this official, GSA is now focusing its efforts on
developing a methodology for implementing performance-based work
distributions for the follow-on national broker services contracts that
are expected to begin on April 1, 2010.
Reported issue: 10. Although GSA collected data on the number and size
of the task orders distributed to the four national broker services
brokers, it did not collect data on the geographic area (e.g., rural or
urban) covered by the task orders. Such data was needed because GSA's
contracts with the brokers specify that each broker will be provided
projects on a nationwide basis in both rural and urban areas during the
initial period of contract performance, as long as their performance is
acceptable;
Recommendation: Begin collecting data on GSA's distributions of task
orders for rural and urban areas (i.e., similar geographic areas)
during the initial period of the contracts;
Status/Actions taken: Implemented; GSA developed a methodology and
subsequently collected and analyzed data to better inform its
distribution of task orders between the brokers during the initial
period of the contracts.
Reported issue: 11. The national contracts and administrative guidance
had numerous inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and omissions that raised
questions about how GSA could ensure consistency in its regions'
evaluations of the brokers' performance. Problems included inapplicable
evaluation criteria; variations in the criteria identified for use at
different evaluation stages by the contracts, and inconsistencies
between GSA's and National Institutes of Health's (NIH) performance-
related terminology;
Recommendation: To improve overall management of the national broker
services program, (1) clarify the national broker services contracts
and the administrative guide to ensure that the evaluation measures
used are applicable to the brokers' performance at each stage of
evaluation. (2) Regarding the brokers' required annual performance
evaluations, revise the terminology in GSA's contracts and
administrative guide, as appropriate, to conform to NIH's required
evaluation factors. (3) In addition, ensure that the various evaluation
stages and processes are properly and adequately described in GSA's
administrative guide;
Status/Actions taken: Open, but implemented[B]; GSA revised its
administrative guide to clarify when each evaluation factor is to be
used in assessing contractor performance at each stage of evaluation.
The revised guidance also (1) clarifies how the National Institutes of
Health's required annual evaluation fits within GSA's evaluation
processes and (2) describes GSA's various evaluation stages and
processes. (GAO intends to initiate action to close this
recommendation.)
Source: GAO.
[A] In describing the status of recommendation 9 as "open", we are
referring to the formal status of this recommendation in our
recommendation tracking system. The description of GSA's ongoing
actions demonstrates that GSA's actions to implement the recommendation
are ongoing, as summarized in Figure 2 of the testimony.
[B] In describing the status of recommendation 11 as "open, but
implemented" we are referring to the fact that in our recommendation
tracking system, the recommendation is currently listed as open.
However, as the description of GSA's actions to implement the
recommendation demonstrate, we believe GSA has adequately implemented
this recommendation and we plan to close this recommendation as
implemented in our tracking system.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-122] (Washington, D.C.; Jan. 2003);
the report on real property is a companion to GAO's 2003 high-risk
update, GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-119] (Washington, D.C.; Jan. 2003);
GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-207] (Washington, D.C.; Jan. 2005),
and GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.; Jan. 2007.)
[2] GAO High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January
2009).
[3] See, among others referenced in this testimony, GAO, Federal Real
Property: Progress Made Toward Addressing Problems, but Underlying
Obstacles Continue to Hamper Reform, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-349], (Washington, D.C., Apr. 13,
2007) and GAO, Federal Real Property: An Update on High-Risk Issues,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-895T], (Washington, D.C.
May 24, 2007).
[4] Appendix, The President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2010,
General Provisions Government-Wide, p. 14-16, and The Federal Real
Property Disposal Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 2495, 111th Cong.
(2009).
[5] Our 2007 report and testimony focusing on federal real property as
high risk [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-349] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-895T] from which we drew
much of this testimony, focused on eight of the largest real property-
holding agencies, including the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy
(DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), the Interior (DOI), State (State); and
Veterans Affairs (VA); GSA; and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). Also included is the United States Postal
Service (USPS), which is an independent establishment in the executive
branch and is among the largest property holders in terms of owned and
leased space. Other recent work has included different agencies, which
are described in the relevant sections of this testimony.
[6] Executive Order 13327 was signed by the President in February 2004
and established new federal property guidelines for 24 executive branch
departments and agencies, not including USPS. The PMA is an
administration program that has raised the visibility of key
governmentwide management challenges, among other things. The real
property PMA initiative, formally called the Federal Asset Management
Initiative, is a program initiative applicable to the 15 largest
landholding agencies.
[7] The agencies included on OMB's quarterly scorecard include GSA,
State, VA, NASA, DOE, the Department of Labor (Labor), the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ),
the Department of Transportation (DOT), the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), DOD, Army Corps of Engineers (Army
Corps), DHS, and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).
[8] The source for real property disposal valuation is the FRPP. The
FRPP calculates total disposals by using the market price for those
properties disposed through sale and the replacement value for those
properties disposed through demolition or other conveyance. The
replacement value represents the cost necessary to replace a facility
and is often a higher than market value.
[9] GAO, Federal Real Property: Progress Made in Reducing Unneeded
Property, but VA Needs Better Information to Make Further Reductions,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-939] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 10, 2008).
[10] GAO, Federal Real Property: Government's Fiscal Exposure from
Repair and Maintenance Backlogs Is Unclear, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-10] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 16,
2008). For this report, we reviewed the six agencies that had told us
in 2007 they had over $1 billion in repair and maintenance backlogs
associated with their held assets: DOD, DOE, DOI, VA, GSA, and NASA.
[11] GAO, Federal Real Property: Strategy Needed to Address Agencies'
Long-standing Reliance on Costly Leasing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-197], (Washington, D.C.: Jan 24,
2008).
[12] GAO, GSA Leasing: Initial Implementation of the National Broker
Services Contracts Demonstrates Need for Improvements, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-17], (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,
2007).
[13] While GSA waived the contracting requirements, it developed
controls to help detect and mitigate conflicts of interest, including a
control requiring the two dual-agency brokers to develop and maintain
"conflict walls" to isolate GSA's procurement-sensitive information.
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-349].
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-197].
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-10]. The six
agencies reviewed in this study each had told us in 2007 that they had
over $1 billion in repair and maintenance backlogs and included DOD,
DOE, DOI, VA, GSA, State, and NASA.
[17] GAO, Federal Real Property: Authorities and Actions Regarding
Enhanced Use Leases and Sale of Unneeded Real Property, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-283R] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 17,
2009). The six agencies with authority to sell real property and retain
the proceeds from such sales are DOD, GSA, The United States Department
of Agriculture's (USDA) Forest Service, USPS, and VA.
[18] GAO, U.S. Postal Service Facilities: Improvements in Data Would
Strengthen Maintenance and Alignment of Access to Retail Services,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-41], (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 10, 2007).
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-349].
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-41].
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-349].
[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-10]. The six
agencies reviewed in this study--DOD, DOE, DOI, VA, GSA, and NASA--each
had told us in 2007 that they had over $1 billion in repair and
maintenance backlogs.
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-349].
[24] GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered
By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T]. (Washington, D.C.: July 8,
2009). FPS, which is part of DHS, provides law enforcement and related
security functions to about 9,000 GSA facilities. To accomplish its
mission of protecting GSA facilities, in 2009, FPS had a budget of
about $1 billion, 1,200 full-time employees, and about 13,000 contract
security guards.
[25] Of the 10 level IV facilities we penetrated, 8 were government
owned, 2 were leased, and included offices of a U.S. Senator and U.S.
Representative, as well as agencies such as the DOH, State, and DOJ.
The level of security FPS provides at each of the 9,000 facilities
varies depending on the building's security level. Based on DOJ's 1995
Vulnerability Assessment Guidelines, there are five types of security
levels, with a level IV facility--which includes high risk law
enforcement and intelligence agencies--having over 450 employees and a
high volume of public contact. FPS does not have responsibility for a
Level V facility, which includes the White House and the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Interagency Security Committee has recently
promulgated new security level standards that will supersede the 1995
DOJ standards.
[26] GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces
Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal
Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683],
(Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008) and GAO, Homeland Security: The
Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Raise Concerns
About Protection of Federal Facilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-897T], (Washington, D.C.: June 19,
2008.)
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-41].
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-349].
[29] GAO, VA Health Care: Key Challenges to Aligning Capital Assets and
Enhancing Veterans' Care, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-429] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5,
2005).
[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-429].
[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-283R]. For this
review, we studied the authorities of the 10 largest real property-
holding federal agencies (by value of real property). These 10 agencies
include USDA, DOD, DOE, DOI, DOJ, State, VA, GSA, NASA, and USPS. For
the purposes of this review, the term "real property" does not include
real property that DOD has or is planning to dispose of through the
Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) process, lands managed by DOI
or the Forest Service (except for Forest Service administrative sites),
and transfers of individual properties specifically authorized by
Congress. Under the BRAC process, the Secretary of Defense is
authorized to close certain military bases and dispose of property. In
the scope of our review, we included real property disposed of by DOD
through its authority to convey or lease existing property and
facilities outside of the BRAC process.
[32] The sixth agency, DOD, stated that this authority was not a strong
incentive to dispose of excess real property.
[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-895T].
[34] Other capital assets include information technology, major
equipment, and intellectual property.
[35] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-349].
[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-349].
[End of section]
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