Personnel Security Clearances
Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain Reform Efforts Gao ID: GAO-09-684T September 15, 2009Due to concerns about long standing delays in the security clearance process, Congress mandated reforms in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which requires, among other things, that the executive branch report annually to Congress. Since 2005, the Department of Defense's (DOD) clearance program has been on GAO's high-risk list due to delays and incomplete documentation. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts much of the government's clearance investigations. In 2007, the Director of National Intelligence and DOD established a Joint Reform Team to coordinate governmentwide improvement efforts for the process. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversees these efforts. Based on two recent GAO reports, this statement addresses (1) progress in reducing delays at DOD, (2) opportunities for improving executive branch reports to Congress and (3) the extent to which joint reform efforts reflect key factors for reform. GAO independently analyzed DOD clearances granted in fiscal year 2008, assessed the executive branch's 2006-2009 reports to Congress, and compared three joint reform reports to key transformation practices. GAO previously recommended that OMB improve the transparency in executive branch reporting and establish a strategic framework. OMB concurred or partially concurred with these recommendations.
DOD and OPM have made significant progress in reducing delays in making security clearance decisions and met statutory timeliness requirements for DOD's initial clearances completed in fiscal year 2008. IRTPA currently requires that decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances be made within an average of 120 days. In 2008, GAO found that OPM and DOD made initial decisions on these clearances within 87 days, on average. Opportunities exist for the executive branch to improve its annual reports to Congress. For example, the executive branch's 2009 report to Congress did not reflect the full range of time it took to make all initial clearance decisions and has provided little information on quality. Under the current IRTPA requirements, the executive branch can exclude the slowest 20 percent of clearances and then calculate timeliness based on an average of the remaining clearances. GAO analyzed 100 percent of initial clearances granted in 2008 without taking averages or excluding the slowest clearances and found that 39 percent took more than 120 days. The absence of comprehensive reporting limits full visibility over the timeliness of initial clearance decisions. With respect to quality, although IRTPA grants the executive branch latitude in reporting, the 2006-2009 reports provided little information on quality. However, the 2009 report identified quality measures that the executive branch proposes to collect. GAO has stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process. For example, GAO recently estimated that with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. Greater attention to quality could increase instances of reciprocity--an entity's acceptance of another entity's clearances. Initial joint reform efforts reflect key practices for organizational transformation that GAO has identified, such as having committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but the Joint Reform Team's reports do not provide a strategic framework that contains important elements of successful transformation, including long-term goals with outcome-focused performance measures, nor do they identify potential obstacles to progress and possible remedies. Further, GAO's prior work and IRTPA identified several factors key to reforming the clearance process. These include (1) engaging in governmentwide reciprocity, (2) consolidating information technology, and (3) identifying and reporting long-term funding requirements. However, the Joint Reform Team's information technology strategy does not yet define roles and responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability which is intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative. Also, the joint reform reports do not contain information on funding requirements or identify funding sources. The reform effort's success will depend upon the extent to which the Joint Reform Team is able to fully address these key factors moving forward. Further, it is imperative that OMB's Deputy Director for Management continue in the crucial role as chair of the Performance Accountability Council, which oversees joint reform team efforts.
GAO-09-684T, Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain Reform Efforts
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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, September 15, 2009:
Personnel Security Clearances:
Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Delays but Further Actions Are Needed
to Enhance Quality and Sustain Reform Efforts:
Statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Director: Defense Capabilities and
Management:
GAO-09-684T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-684T, a testimony to Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of
Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Due to concerns about long standing delays in the security clearance
process, Congress mandated reforms in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which requires, among other
things, that the executive branch report annually to Congress. Since
2005, the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) clearance program has been on
GAO‘s high-risk list due to delays and incomplete documentation. The
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts much of the government‘s
clearance investigations. In 2007, the Director of National
Intelligence and DOD established a Joint Reform Team to coordinate
governmentwide improvement efforts for the process. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) oversees these efforts.
Based on two recent GAO reports, this statement addresses (1) progress
in reducing delays at DOD, (2) opportunities for improving executive
branch reports to Congress and (3) the extent to which joint reform
efforts reflect key factors for reform. GAO independently analyzed DOD
clearances granted in fiscal year 2008, assessed the executive branch‘s
2006-2009 reports to Congress, and compared three joint reform reports
to key transformation practices. GAO previously recommended that OMB
improve the transparency in executive branch reporting and establish a
strategic framework. OMB concurred or partially concurred with these
recommendations.
What GAO Found:
DOD and OPM have made significant progress in reducing delays in making
security clearance decisions and met statutory timeliness requirements
for DOD‘s initial clearances completed in fiscal year 2008. IRTPA
currently requires that decisions on at least 80 percent of initial
clearances be made within an average of 120 days. In 2008, GAO found
that OPM and DOD made initial decisions on these clearances within 87
days, on average.
Opportunities exist for the executive branch to improve its annual
reports to Congress. For example, the executive branch‘s 2009 report to
Congress did not reflect the full range of time it took to make all
initial clearance decisions and has provided limited information on
quality. Under the current IRTPA requirements, the executive branch can
exclude the slowest 20 percent of clearances and then calculate
timeliness based on an average of the remaining clearances. GAO
analyzed 100 percent of initial clearances granted in 2008 without
taking averages or excluding the slowest clearances and found that 39
percent took more than 120 days. The absence of comprehensive reporting
limits full visibility over the timeliness of initial clearance
decisions. With respect to quality, although IRTPA grants the executive
branch latitude in reporting, the 2006-2009 reports provided little
information on quality. However, the 2009 report identified quality
measures that the executive branch proposes to collect. GAO has stated
that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the
clearance process. For example, GAO recently estimated that with
respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008,
documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports.
Greater attention to quality could increase instances of reciprocity”an
entity‘s acceptance of another entity‘s clearances.
Initial joint reform efforts reflect key practices for organizational
transformation that GAO has identified, such as having committed
leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but the Joint Reform
Team‘s reports do not provide a strategic framework that contains
important elements of successful transformation, including long-term
goals with outcome-focused performance measures, nor do they identify
potential obstacles to progress and possible remedies. Further, GAO‘s
prior work and IRTPA identified several factors key to reforming the
clearance process. These include (1) engaging in governmentwide
reciprocity, (2) consolidating information technology, and (3)
identifying and reporting long-term funding requirements. However, the
Joint Reform Team‘s information technology strategy does not yet define
roles and responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability
which is intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative. Also,
the joint reform reports do not contain information on funding
requirements or identify funding sources. The reform effort‘s success
will depend upon the extent to which the Joint Reform Team is able to
fully address these key factors moving forward. Further, it is
imperative that OMB‘s Deputy Director for Management continue in the
crucial role as chair of the Performance Accountability Council, which
oversees joint reform team efforts.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-684T] or key
components. For more information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202)
512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the sixth in a series
of hearings that this subcommittee has held to discuss the federal
government's personnel security clearance process. As you know,
security clearances are used to verify that national security
information--which in some cases could cause exceptionally grave damage
to U.S. national defense or foreign relations if disclosed--is
entrusted only to individuals who have proven reliability and loyalty
to the nation. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
the nation's defense and intelligence needs grew, prompting an
increased demand for personnel with security clearances. About 2.4
million people currently hold clearances,[Footnote 1] and in fiscal
year 2008 the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducted about
800,000 national security investigations in which it collected
background information on federal personnel in positions that require
clearances.
In response to concerns about delays in processing clearances and other
clearance issues, Congress set goals and established requirements for
improving the clearance process in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).[Footnote 2] Those
requirements include, among other things, improving the timeliness of
the clearance process, achieving interagency reciprocity (a government
entity's acceptance of another government entity's clearance
investigation or determination), establishing an integrated database to
track investigative and adjudicative information,[Footnote 3] and
evaluating available technology that could be used to conduct
investigations and adjudications. IRTPA also requires the executive
branch to provide a report to Congress, by February 15th of each year,
on the progress made during the preceding year toward meeting IRTPA's
requirements for security clearances, including the length of time
agencies take to complete investigations and adjudications, a
discussion of impediments to the implementation of IRTPA's
requirements, and any other information or recommendations the
executive branch considers appropriate.
Since 2005, we have designated the Department of Defense's (DOD)
personnel security clearance program a high-risk area.[Footnote 4] We
first designated DOD's clearance program as a high-risk area in 2005
due, primarily, to long-standing delays in the process.[Footnote 5] We
found that in fiscal year 2003, for example, DOD industry personnel
needed an average of 375 days to get a clearance and that such delays
increase national security risks, delay the start of classified work,
hamper employers from hiring the best-qualified workers, and increase
the government's cost of national security-related contracts.[Footnote
6] We maintained the high-risk designation in 2007 because of continued
delays and additional concerns about incomplete clearance documentation
in the investigation and adjudication phases of the security clearance
process.[Footnote 7] For example, we reported at that time that our
independent analysis of a sample of 2,259 initial top secret clearance
decisions for DOD industry personnel took an average of 325 days to
complete. During the 2007 review we also found that 47 of 50 clearance
investigative reports and adjudicative files that we analyzed were
missing required documentation. In 2009, despite significant
improvement in reducing delays, we continued to designate this program
as a high-risk area due to more stringent timeliness requirements that
will take effect in December 2009 and continued problems with
incomplete clearance documentation that I will be discussing today.
[Footnote 8]
In 2007, the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary
of Defense (Intelligence) established the Joint Reform Team to
coordinate governmentwide efforts to achieve IRTPA timeliness goals and
improve the processes related to granting security clearances and
determining suitability for government employment.[Footnote 9]
Currently, the Joint Reform Team is comprised of cognizant entities
within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), OPM--which conducts
background investigations for much of the federal government--the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (OUSDI). In accordance
with a recommendation made by the Joint Reform Team, Executive Order
13467 established a Suitability and Security Clearance Performance
Accountability Council, commonly known as the Performance
Accountability Council, as the head of the governmentwide governance
structure responsible for driving implementation and overseeing
clearance reform efforts and appointed OMB's Deputy Director for
Management as the chair. This governance structure was put in place, in
part, to sustain the momentum of clearance reforms, particularly
through the transition to a new administration.
As indicated in figure 1 (a timeline highlighting key events related to
the security clearance reform efforts), the Joint Reform Team has
issued three key reports, which collectively communicate the reform
effort's plans for reforming the security clearance process. First, in
April 2008, the Joint Reform Team issued its first report that
presented a proposed reformed security clearance process with more
extensive use of information technology than the current process. In
December 2008, the Team issued a report on the progress of the reform
efforts and provided further details on the plans to implement reforms.
Most recently, in March 2009, the Joint Reform Team finalized an
Enterprise Information Technology Strategy to support the reformed
security and suitability process and its associated milestones
described in the April and December reports.
Figure 1: Key Events Related to the Security Clearance Reform Efforts:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
December 17, 2004:
Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act passed;
January 2005:
Government Accountability Office places Department of Defense‘s
clearance program on its high-risk list;
June 27, 2005:
Executive Order 13881 designates Office of Management and Budget the
single entity to ensure centralization, uniformity, and reciprocity of
security clearance policies;
November 2005:
Office of Management and Budget issues a plan for improving the
security clearance process;
June 25, 2007:
The Joint Reform Team is formed to develop a plan for clearance reform,
including research priorities and an information technology strategy,
to achieve IRTPA goals;
April 30, 2008:
The Joint Reform Team issues a report on reforming the security
clearance and suitability process;
December 18, 2008:
The Joint Reform Team issues a report outlining reform progress and
further plans;
June 30, 2008:
Executive Order 13467 establishes the Performance Accountability
Council to drive implementation of the reform effort and designated the
Office of Management and Budget's Deputy Director for Management as
Chair;
March 17, 2009:
The Joint Reform Team issues an Enterprise Information Technology
Strategy to support the reformed security and suitability process.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
My statement today will highlight the key findings and recommendations
from two reports we issued in May 2009. Specifically, I will discuss
(1) DOD's and OPM's progress in reducing delays in the personnel
security clearance process for DOD personnel, (2) opportunities for
improving the executive branch's annual reports to Congress in terms of
timeliness and quality and (3) the extent to which joint reform efforts
reflect essential factors for reform.[Footnote 10] To assess the
timeliness for completing initial clearances, we reviewed IRTPA's
requirements; conducted an independent analysis of the timeliness of
450,000 initial clearances completed in fiscal year 2008 for military,
DOD civilian, and industry personnel; and analyzed the timeliness data
contained in the executive branch's 2009 annual report to Congress
regarding clearances granted in fiscal year 2008. To assess the extent
to which the executive branch has included transparent information on
timeliness as well as information on quality in its annual reports to
Congress, we analyzed reports that were issued in 2006 through 2009. In
addition, we reviewed clearance-related files for completeness and held
interviews with senior officials at OMB, DOD, ODNI, and OPM. To assess
the extent to which joint reform reports address essential factors for
reform, we compared the Joint Reform Team's reform plans to key
practices and implementation steps for mergers and organizational
transformations that we have previously identified.[Footnote 11] We
conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
DOD and OPM Have Made Significant Progress in Reducing Delays in the
Clearance Process for DOD Personnel:
Since 2005, DOD and OPM have made significant progress in reducing
delays in making personnel security clearance decisions and met
statutory timeliness requirements for DOD's initial clearances
completed in fiscal year 2008. IRTPA currently requires that decisions
on at least 80 percent of initial clearances be made within an average
of 120 days. In December of 2008, we conducted an analysis to assess
whether DOD and OPM were meeting the current timelines requirements in
IRTPA and examined the fastest 80 percent of initial clearance
decisions for military, DOD civilian, and DOD industry personnel. We
found that these clearance decisions were completed within 87 days, on
average, and well within IRTPA's requirements.
IRTPA further requires that by December 2009, a plan be implemented in
which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial clearance
decisions are made within 60 days, on average. We also analyzed the
executive branch's 2009 annual report to Congress, which presented an
average of the fastest 90 percent of initial clearance decisions in
anticipation of IRTPA's December 2009 requirements. The report stated
that the average time for completing the fastest 90 percent of initial
clearances for military and DOD civilians in fiscal year 2008 was 124
days. The report also stated that the average time for completing the
fastest 90 percent of initial clearances for private industry personnel
working on DOD contracts in fiscal year 2008 was 129 days.[Footnote 12]
DOD and OMB officials have noted that the existing clearance process is
not likely to allow DOD and other agencies to meet the timeliness
requirements that will take effect in December 2009 under IRTPA.
Opportunities Exist to Improve Executive Branch Reporting to Congress:
Annual Reports Could Benefit from Greater Transparency in Clearance
Timeliness Reporting:
IRTPA requires that the executive branch report annually on the
progress made during the preceding year toward meeting statutory
requirements for security clearances, including timeliness, and also
provides broad discretion to the executive branch to report any
additional information considered appropriate. Under the timeliness
requirements in IRTPA, the executive branch can exclude the slowest
clearances and then calculate the average of the remaining clearances.
Using this approach and anticipating IRTPA's requirement that by
December 2009, a plan be implemented under which, to the extent
practical, 90 percent of initial clearance decisions are made within an
average of 60 days, the executive branch's 2009 report cited as its
sole metric for timeliness the average of the fastest 90 percent of
initial clearances.
We conducted an independent analysis of all initial clearance decisions
that DOD made in fiscal year 2008 that more fully reflects the time
spent making clearance decisions. Without excluding any portion of the
data or taking an average, we analyzed 100 percent of 450,000 initial
DOD clearances decisions made in fiscal year 2008 for military, DOD
civilian, and DOD industry personnel. Figure 2 shows the full range of
time it took DOD and OPM to make clearance decisions in fiscal year
2008.
Figure 2: Timeliness of 100 Percent of GAO Sample of Initial DOD
Personnel Security Clearance Eligibility Decisions Made in Fiscal Year
2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Days to complete: 0-30;
Top secret: 316 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 30,504 clearances.
Days to complete: 31-60;
Top secret: 4,089 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 98,012 clearances.
Days to complete: 61-90;
Top secret: 11,818 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 65,555 clearances.
Days to complete: 91-120;
Top secret: 17,561 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 47,614 clearances.
Days to complete: 121-150;
Top secret: 11,334 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 27,740 clearances.
Days to complete: 151-180;
Top secret: 8,514 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 18,135 clearances.
Days to complete: 181-210;
Top secret: 6,737 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 13,713 clearances.
Days to complete: 211-240;
Top secret: 4,790 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 11,905 clearances.
Days to complete: 241-270;
Top secret: 3,363 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 9,369 clearances.
Days to complete: 271-300;
Top secret: 2,438 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 6,725 clearances.
Days to complete: 301-330;
Top secret: 1,592 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 5,118 clearances.
Days to complete: 331-360;
Top secret: 1,013 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 4,029 clearances.
Days to complete: 361-390;
Top secret: 750 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 3,276 clearances.
Days to complete: 391-420;
Top secret: 733 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 2,984 clearances.
Days to complete: 421-450;
Top secret: 746 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 2,563 clearances.
Days to complete: 451-480;
Top secret: 786 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 2,328 clearances.
Days to complete: 481-510;
Top secret: 753 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 1,941 clearances.
Days to complete: 511-540;
Top secret: 753 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 1,814 clearances.
Days to complete: 541-570;
Top secret: 831 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 1,718 clearances.
Days to complete: 571-600;
Top secret: 1,041 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 1,496 clearances.
Days to complete: 601-630;
Top secret: 1,261 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 1,382 clearances.
Days to complete: 631-660;
Top secret: 1,269 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 1,194 clearances.
Days to complete: 661-690;
Top secret: 1,138 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 1,041 clearances.
Days to complete: 691 or more;
Top secret: 2,450 clearances;
Confidential/secret: 2,023 clearances.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and OPM data.
[End of figure]
As you can see, our independent analysis of all of the initial
clearances revealed that 39 percent of the clearance decisions took
more than 120 days to complete. In addition, 11 percent of the initial
clearance eligibility decisions took more than 300 days to complete.
By limiting its reporting on timeliness to the average of the fastest
90 percent of the initial clearance decisions made in fiscal year 2008
and excluding mention of the slowest clearances, the executive branch
did not provide congressional decision makers with visibility over the
full range of time it takes to make all initial clearance decisions and
the reasons why delays continue to exist. In our recent report, we
recommended that the Deputy Director for Management at OMB (who is
responsible for submitting the annual report) include comprehensive
data on the timeliness of the personnel security clearance process in
future versions of the IRTPA-required annual report to Congress.
[Footnote 13] In oral comments in response to our recommendation, OMB
concurred, recognized the need for timeliness, and underscored the
importance of reporting on the full range of time to complete all
initial clearances. We note, Mr. Chairman, that you previously
submitted an amendment to expand IRTPA's provision on reporting on
clearance timeliness.[Footnote 14]
Annual Reports Could Provide Congress with Greater Visibility over
Quality Issues:
While IRTPA contains no requirement for the executive branch to report
any information on quality, the act grants the executive branch broad
latitude to include any appropriate information in its reports. The
executive branch's 2006 through 2009 IRTPA-required reports to Congress
on the clearance process provided congressional decision makers with
little information on quality--a measure that could include topics such
as the completeness of the clearance documentation of clearance
decisions. The 2006 and 2008 reports did not contain any mention of
quality, and the 2007 report mentioned a single quality measure--the
frequency with which adjudicating agencies returned OPM's investigative
reports because of quality deficiencies. The 2009 report does not
contain any data on quality but proposes two measures of investigative
report quality and identifies plans to measure adjudicative quality.
Specifically, the discussion of these measures is included in the Joint
Reform Team's December 2008 report, Security and Suitability Process
Reform, which was included in the executive branch's 2009 report.
We have previously reported that information on timeliness alone does
not communicate a complete picture of the clearance process, and we
have emphasized the importance of ensuring quality in all phases of the
clearance process. For example, we recently estimated that with respect
to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008,
documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports and
some DOD adjudicative files.[Footnote 15] We independently estimated
that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that adjudicators
used to make clearance decisions were missing required documentation,
and the documentation most often missing was employment verification.
[Footnote 16] Incomplete documentation may lead to increases in both
the time needed to complete the clearance process and in overall
process costs and may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards
are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy
individuals. Because the executive branch has not sufficiently
addressed quality in its reports, it has missed opportunities to
provide congressional decision makers with greater visibility over the
clearance process. In our most recent report, we recommended that the
Deputy Director for Management at OMB include measures of quality in
future versions of the IRTPA-required annual reports. In oral comments,
OMB concurred with our recommendation and emphasized the importance of
providing Congress more transparency about quality in the clearance
process.
Initial Reform Efforts Partially Reflect Key Practices for
Organizational Transformation and Essential Factors for Clearance
Reform, but Lack a Fully Developed Strategic Framework:
Initial joint reform efforts partially reflect key practices for
organizational transformation that we have identified, such as having
committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but reports
issued by the Joint Reform Team do not provide a strategic framework
that contains important elements of successful transformation,
including long-term goals with related outcome-focused performance
measures to show progress, nor do they identify potential obstacles to
progress and possible remedies. Consistent with some of the key
practices for organizational transformation,[Footnote 17] a June 2008
Executive Order established the Suitability and Security Clearance
Performance Accountability Council, commonly known as the Performance
Accountability Council, as the head of the governmentwide governance
structure responsible for achieving clearance reform goals and driving
and overseeing the implementation of reform efforts. The Deputy
Director for Management at OMB--who was confirmed in June 2009--serves
as the Chair of the Council, and the Order also designated the Director
of OPM and the Director of National Intelligence as Executive Agents
for Suitability and Security, respectively. Membership on the council
currently includes senior executive leaders from 11 federal agencies.
In addition to high-level leadership of the Performance Accountability
Council, the reform effort has benefited from a dedicated, multi-agency
implementation team--the Joint Reform Team--to manage the
transformation process from the beginning.[Footnote 18] The Joint
Reform Team, while not formally part of the governance structure
established by Executive Order 13467, works under the Council to
provide progress reports to the President, recommend research
priorities, and oversee the development and implementation of an
information technology strategy, among other things.
In addition to the key practices, the three reports issued by the Joint
Reform Team have begun to address essential factors for reforming the
security clearance process that we identified in prior work and that
are also found in IRTPA. These factors include (1) developing a sound
requirements determination process, (2) engaging in governmentwide
reciprocity, (3) building quality into every step of the process, (4)
consolidating information technology, and (5) identifying and reporting
long-term funding requirements.[Footnote 19]
While the personnel security clearance joint reform reports, which we
reviewed collectively, begin to address essential factors for reforming
the security clearance process, which represents positive steps, the
Joint Reform Team's information technology strategy does not yet define
roles and responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability
that is intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative. GAO's
prior work on key collaboration practices has stressed the importance
of defining these roles and responsibilities when initiating cross-
agency initiatives.[Footnote 20] In addition, the Joint Reform Team's
reports do not contain any information on initiatives that will require
funding, determine how much they will cost, or identify potential
funding sources. Without long-term funding requirements, decision
makers in both the executive and legislative branches will lack
important information for comparing and prioritizing proposals for
reforming the clearance processes. The reform effort's success will be
dependent upon the extent to which the Joint Reform Team is able to
fully address these key factors moving forward.
Although the high-level leadership and governance structure of the
current reform effort distinguish it from previous efforts, it is
difficult to gauge progress of reform, or determine if corrective
action is needed, because the council, through the Joint Reform Team,
has not established a method for evaluating the progress of the reform
efforts. Without a strategic framework that fully addresses the long-
standing security clearance problems and incorporates key practices for
transformation--including the ability to demonstrate progress leading
to desired results--the Joint Reform Team is not in a position to
demonstrate to decision makers the extent of progress that it is making
toward achieving its desired outcomes, and the effort is at risk of
losing momentum and not being fully implemented.
In our May 2009 report, we recommended that OMB's Deputy Director of
Management in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability
Council, ensure that the appropriate entities--such as the Performance
Accountability Council, its subcommittees, or the Joint Reform Team--
establish a strategic framework for the joint reform effort to include
(1) a mission statement and strategic goals; (2) outcome-focused
performance measures to continually evaluate the progress of the reform
effort toward meeting its goals and addressing long-standing problems
with the security clearance process; (3) a formal, comprehensive
communication strategy that includes consistency of message and
encourages two-way communication between the Performance Accountability
Council and key stakeholders; (4) a clear delineation of roles and
responsibilities for the implementation of the information technology
strategy among all agencies responsible for developing and implementing
components of the information technology strategy; and (5) long-term
funding requirements for security clearance reform, including estimates
of potential cost savings from the reformed process and provide them to
decision makers in Congress and the executive branch.[Footnote 21]
In oral comments on our report, OMB stated that it partially concurred
with our recommendation to establish a strategic framework for the
joint reform effort. Further, in written agency comments provided to us
jointly by DOD and ODNI, they also partially concurred with our
recommendation. Additionally, DOD and ODNI commented on the specific
elements of the strategic framework that we included as part of our
recommendation. For example, in the comments, DOD and ODNI agreed that
the reform effort must contain outcome-focused performance measures,
but added that these metrics must evolve as the process improvements
and new capabilities are developed and implemented because the effort
is iterative and in phased development. We continue to believe that
outcome-focused performance measures are a critical tool that can be
used to guide the reform effort and allow overseers to determine when
the reform effort has accomplished it goals and purpose. In addition,
DOD and ODNI asserted that considerable work has already been done on
information technology for the reform effort, but added that even
clearer roles and responsibilities will be identified moving forward.
Regarding our finding that, at present, no single database exists in
accordance with IRTPA's requirement that OPM establish an integrated
database that tracks investigations and adjudication information, DOD
and ODNI stated that the reform effort continues its iterative
implementation of improvements to systems that improve access to
information that agencies need. DOD and ODNI also acknowledged that
more work needs to be done to identify long-term funding requirements.
Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by reiterating that DOD and OPM are
meeting current IRTPA timeliness requirements, which means that 80
percent of initial clearance decisions are made within 120 days, on
average. This represents significant and noteworthy progress from our
finding in 2007, when we reported that industry personnel waited more
than 1 year, on average, to receive a top secret clearance. I would
also like to emphasize that, although the high-level leadership and
governance structure of the current reform effort distinguish it from
previous attempts at clearance reform, it is imperative that OMB's
newly appointed Deputy Director for Management continue in the crucial
role as chair of the Performance Accountability Council in deciding (1)
how to implement the recommendations contained in our most recent
reports, (2) what types of actions are necessary for developing a
corrective action plan, and (3) how the corrective measures will be
implemented.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have at this time.
Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this
testimony are David E. Moser, Assistant Director; James D. Ashley; Lori
Atkinson; Joseph M. Capuano; Sara Cradic; Mae Jones; Shvetal Khanna;
James P. Klein; Ron La Due Lake; and Gregory Marchand.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete
Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further
Improve the Clearance Process. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400]. Washington, D.C.: May 19,
2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed to
Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-488] Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January 22,
2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about Timeliness and
Quality. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-261R].
Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2008.
Personnel Security Clearance: Preliminary Observations on Joint Reform
Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility Process.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1050T]. Washington,
D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance
Process. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-776T].
Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD's
Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-551T]. Washington, D.C.: April 9,
2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform
Security Clearance Processes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-352T]. Washington, D.C.: February
27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More
Informed Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-350]. Washington, D.C.: February 13,
2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for
Industry Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-842T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to Improve
the Security Clearance Process. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1070]. Washington, D.C.: September
28, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record
Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security
Clearance Process. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-693R]. Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances
for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-748T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow
Clearances for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-747T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing
Problems with DOD's Program, but Concerns Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-233T]. Washington, D.C.: November 9,
2005.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The 2.4 million is an estimate provided by OPM. It excludes some
personnel who hold clearances to work in areas of national
intelligence.
[2] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 3001 (2004).
[3] The security clearance process currently consists of six phases:
requirements setting (the determination of whether a position requires
access to classified information), application submission (an
applicant's submission of required materials and the submission of a
request for a background investigation), investigation (OPM's or an OPM
contractor's collection of background information), adjudication (the
review of the information collected during the investigation to
determine clearance eligibility), appeal, and renewal.
[4] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-207] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2005);
High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2007);
and High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2009).
[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-207].
[6] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to
Reduce Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance
Eligibility for Industry Personnel, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-632] (Washington, D.C: May 26,
2004).
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310].
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271].
[9] Determinations of suitability for government employment in
positions in the competitive service and for career appointment in the
Senior Executive Service include consideration of aspects of an
individual's character or conduct that may have an impact on the
integrity or efficiency of their service. Exec. Order No. 13467,
Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment,
Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to
Classified National Security Information, at § 1.2(l) (June 30, 2008)
(citing 5 C.F.R. Part 731).
[10] GAO, Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is
Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-488] (Washington, D.C.:
May 19, 2009); and DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness
Reporting, Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are
Needed to Further Improve the Clearance Process, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400] (Washington, D.C.: May 19,
2009).
[11] GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation:
Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal
Agencies. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-293SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002); and Results-Oriented Cultures:
Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational
Transformations, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669]
(Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[12] The executive branch report also included information on
timeliness not specifically required by IRTPA, such as the average
length of time DOD and other agencies took to complete the application
submission phase of the clearance process.
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400].
[14] Senate Amendment 5351 to S.3001, the Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, would have proposed,
among other things, expanding IRTPA's reporting provision.
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400].
[16] We independently selected a stratified random probability sample
of 100 OPM investigative reports and associated DOD adjudicative files
from the population of 3,993 applications that were identified as
clearances that were favorably adjudicated in July 2008 by the central
adjudication facilities of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air
Force. We estimated that the total number of clearances DOD granted in
July 2008 was 3,500 (+/-300). For this population, we produced
statistical estimates that have a margin of error of plus or minus 10
percent or less at the 95 percent confidence level. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400] for further details.
[17] Key practices for government transformation refer to those agreed
upon in September 2002 at a forum we convened in which representatives
from major private and public sector organizations identified and
discussed practices and lessons learned from mergers, acquisitions, and
transformations that can serve to guide federal agencies as they
transform their processes in response to governance challenges. See
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-293SP].
[18] According to the Joint Reform Team, over 70 personnel from DOD,
OPM, and ODNI currently support the team's initiatives (including
approximately 17 full-time staff).
[19] Establishing a sound requirement-determination process, building
quality into every step of the process, and providing Congress with
long-term funding-requirements are identified in our previous work. See
GAO, Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform
Security Clearance Processes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-352T], (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27,
2008). Establishing governmentwide reciprocity and developing and
consolidating information technology are derived from § 3001(d) and (f)
of IRTPA.
[20] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct 21,
2005); and Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial
Environment Program Progressing, But Need for Management Improvements
Continues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-267]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar 14, 2005).
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-488].
[End of section]
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