Nuclear Nonproliferation
Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide Gao ID: GAO-11-227 December 15, 2010In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. Nonproliferation programs administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials in Russia and other countries. GAO assessed (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. To address these issues, GAO analyzed U.S. nuclear security strategies and plans and interviewed U.S. and Russian government officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on securing nuclear materials worldwide.
NSC officials have approved a governmentwide strategy for the President's 4-year global nuclear material security initiative that describes the scope and objectives of the interagency effort and identifies the main efforts by U.S. agencies and programs to support the initiative. However, this interagency strategy lacks specific details concerning how the initiative will be implemented, including the identity of vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed, agencies and programs responsible for addressing each site, planned activities at each location, potential challenges and strategies for overcoming those obstacles, anticipated timelines, and cost estimates. As a result, key details associated with the initiative are unclear, including its overall estimated cost, time frame, and scope of planned work. Three NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs GAO reviewed--the MPC&A program, the Materials Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) program, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)--have made varying degrees of progress in securing Russian nuclear warheads and materials. While the MPC&A program has made considerable progress securing Russia's nuclear warhead and material facilities, the MCC and GTRI programs have had more limited success achieving their objectives in Russia. Moreover, the future of these efforts in Russia is unclear because of questionable high-level Russian political commitment to nuclear security cooperation with the United States. Each of these three programs also faces implementation challenges. The MPC&A program, in particular, faces challenges in successfully completing upgrades against insider and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material facilities and in transitioning responsibility to Russia for sustaining MPC&A systems. Because of the time required to address these challenges, NNSA is unlikely to meet a deadline under current U.S. law requiring Russia to assume sole responsibility for sustaining MPC&A by January 1, 2013, and MPC&A program activities will need to continue in Russia beyond the statutory deadline. In addition to its efforts in Russia, NNSA is working with other countries on issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials. In two countries believed to have large nuclear material stockpiles--China and India--political sensitivities have limited NNSA's efforts in both nations to the relatively noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices, training, and demonstration projects instead of implementing MPC&A activities directly at nuclear sites. NNSA is also seeking to accelerate the removal of weapon-usable nuclear materials from other priority countries through the GTRI program, including key countries that made new commitments at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to relinquish or reduce their weapon-usable nuclear material stockpiles. In particular, NNSA officials reported progress in negotiations with several nations--including Ukraine and South Africa--following the summit for the removal of some highly enriched uranium located in those countries. GAO suggests that Congress consider extending the deadline for NNSA to complete Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program activities in Russia. GAO recommends that the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA take several actions regarding three nonproliferation program efforts in Russia, such as clarifying the remaining scope and costs of MPC&A work in Russia. GAO also recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) lead interagency development of a more detailed implementation plan for the President's 4-year initiative. DOE and NNSA agreed with the recommendations. NSC did not comment on GAO's recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Eugene E. Aloise Team: Government Accountability Office: Natural Resources and Environment Phone: (202) 512-6870GAO-11-227, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Chairman and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and
Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives:
December 2010:
Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to
Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide:
GAO-11-227:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-227, a report to the Chairman and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative
to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years.
Nonproliferation programs administered by the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials
in Russia and other countries. GAO assessed (1) U.S. governmentwide
efforts to implement the President‘s 4-year nuclear material security
initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA‘s nuclear
security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear
materials in countries other than Russia. To address these issues, GAO
analyzed U.S. nuclear security strategies and plans and interviewed
U.S. and Russian government officials. This report summarizes the
findings of GAO‘s classified report on securing nuclear materials
worldwide.
What GAO Found:
NSC officials have approved a governmentwide strategy for the
President‘s 4-year global nuclear material security initiative that
describes the scope and objectives of the interagency effort and
identifies the main efforts by U.S. agencies and programs to support
the initiative. However, this interagency strategy lacks specific
details concerning how the initiative will be implemented, including
the identity of vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and
facilities to be addressed, agencies and programs responsible for
addressing each site, planned activities at each location, potential
challenges and strategies for overcoming those obstacles, anticipated
timelines, and cost estimates. As a result, key details associated
with the initiative are unclear, including its overall estimated cost,
time frame, and scope of planned work.
Three NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs GAO reviewed”-the MPC&A
program, the Materials Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) program, and
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)-”have made varying
degrees of progress in securing Russian nuclear warheads and
materials. While the MPC&A program has made considerable progress
securing Russia‘s nuclear warhead and material facilities, the MCC and
GTRI programs have had more limited success achieving their objectives
in Russia. Moreover, the future of these efforts in Russia is unclear
because of questionable high-level Russian political commitment to
nuclear security cooperation with the United States. Each of these
three programs also faces implementation challenges. The MPC&A
program, in particular, faces challenges in successfully completing
upgrades against insider and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear
material facilities and in transitioning responsibility to Russia for
sustaining MPC&A systems. Because of the time required to address
these challenges, NNSA is unlikely to meet a deadline under current
U.S. law requiring Russia to assume sole responsibility for sustaining
MPC&A by January 1, 2013, and MPC&A program activities will need to
continue in Russia beyond the statutory deadline.
In addition to its efforts in Russia, NNSA is working with other
countries on issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear
materials. In two countries believed to have large nuclear material
stockpiles”-China and India”-political sensitivities have limited NNSA‘
s efforts in both nations to the relatively noncontroversial exchange
of nuclear security best practices, training, and demonstration
projects instead of implementing MPC&A activities directly at nuclear
sites. NNSA is also seeking to accelerate the removal of weapon-usable
nuclear materials from other priority countries through the GTRI
program, including key countries that made new commitments at the
April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to relinquish or reduce their
weapon-usable nuclear material stockpiles. In particular, NNSA
officials reported progress in negotiations with several nations-”
including Ukraine and South Africa-”following the summit for the
removal of some highly enriched uranium located in those countries.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO suggests that Congress consider extending the deadline for NNSA to
complete Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program
activities in Russia. GAO recommends that the Department of Energy
(DOE) and NNSA take several actions regarding three nonproliferation
program efforts in Russia, such as clarifying the remaining scope and
costs of MPC&A work in Russia. GAO also recommends that the National
Security Council (NSC) lead interagency development of a more detailed
implementation plan for the President‘s 4-year initiative. DOE and
NNSA agreed with the recommendations. NSC did not comment on GAO‘s
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-227] or key
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
A Governmentwide Strategy for the President's 4-Year Global Nuclear
Material Security Initiative Has Been Developed, but Details
Concerning the Initiative's Overall Cost, Time Frame, and Scope of
Work Are Unclear:
NNSA's Nuclear Security Programs Have Made Varying Levels of Progress
in Russia and Face Challenges That Are Delaying Program Implementation
and Could Increase Future Program Costs:
NNSA's Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Security in Other Countries
Are Under Way, but Progress Is Mixed:
Conclusions:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: NNSA National-Level Project Areas for MPC&A
Sustainability of Russian Nuclear Materials:
Appendix III: Seven Elements of MPC&A Sustainability and Selected
Indicators:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy and National
Nuclear Security Administration:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figure:
Figure 1: NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Abbreviations:
CAEA: China Atomic Energy Authority:
CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
GTRI: Global Threat Reduction Initiative:
HEU: highly enriched uranium:
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency:
Kg: kilogram:
LEU: low-enriched uranium:
MCC: Material Consolidation and Conversion:
MNSR: Miniature Neutron Source Reactor:
MOD: Ministry of Defense:
MOM: MPC&A operations monitoring:
MPC&A: Material Protection, Control, and Accounting:
NMIP: Nuclear Materials Information Program:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
NSC: National Security Council:
ODNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence:
SRF: Strategic Rocket Forces:
SSNM: special strategic nuclear material:
UN: United Nations:
WMD: weapons of mass destruction:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 15, 2010:
[End of section]
The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky:
Chairman:
The Honorable Rodney P. Frelinghuysen:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
One of the most serious threats facing the United States and other
countries is the possibility that other nations or terrorist
organizations could steal a nuclear warhead or nuclear weapon-usable
materials from poorly secured stockpiles in various locations around
the world.[Footnote 1] Terrorists or countries seeking nuclear weapons
could use as little as 25 kilograms (Kg) of weapon-grade highly
enriched uranium (HEU) or 8 Kg of plutonium to construct a nuclear
weapon. To address this threat and related nuclear proliferation
concerns, the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) implements more than 20 nonproliferation
programs worldwide.[Footnote 2] Among other things, these programs
include efforts to secure nuclear warheads; protect, consolidate, and
dispose of weapon-usable nuclear materials and radiological sources;
[Footnote 3] reduce the risks of nuclear smuggling; research and
develop nonproliferation technologies; redirect weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) expertise to peaceful research; and enhance
international export controls and International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) nuclear safeguards.[Footnote 4]
Many of these programs were initiated in the early 1990s, following
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and have focused principally on
improving nuclear security in Russia because of the large size of its
nuclear complex and its vast nuclear material and weapons stockpiles.
In 2005, the U.S. and Russian Presidents issued a joint statement in
Bratislava, Slovakia, on nuclear security cooperation between both
countries, including accelerating security improvements to Russian
nuclear material and warhead storage sites. Some NNSA programs are
winding down as work is completed in Russia--such as the program to
end Russian production of weapon-grade plutonium--while others are
planning to continue indefinitely. A major area of continuing focus is
ensuring the long-term sustainability of U.S.-funded security
improvements at nuclear facilities in Russia and other countries as
U.S. assistance phases out. Congress has required that the NNSA
program to improve Russian nuclear material and warhead security--
known as the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)
program[Footnote 5]--conclude efforts in that country by the beginning
of 2013, with Russia assuming responsibility for sustaining the
program at that time.[Footnote 6]
In recent years, NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs have focused
increasing attention on the security of weapon-usable nuclear
materials in countries beyond Russia and the former Soviet states. For
example, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was created in
2004 to consolidate and accelerate NNSA efforts to secure and recover
nuclear and radiological materials overseas and convert HEU-fueled
research reactors in dozens of countries around the world. The NNSA
programs have engaged more than 100 countries, and are seeking to
increase nuclear security work with several countries where there has
been limited prior cooperation. In fiscal year 2009, NNSA spent over
$2 billion on its nuclear nonproliferation programs.
The Obama administration has proposed to further strengthen and expand
U.S. efforts to reduce nuclear proliferation risks and improve nuclear
security worldwide. As Congress directed, President Obama created a
position within the National Security Council (NSC)--Special Assistant
to the President and Coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction--to
serve as the central organizer for U.S. efforts to improve nuclear
security and prevent nuclear terrorism worldwide.[Footnote 7] In April
2009, in a speech in Prague, Czech Republic, President Obama announced
a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material
around the world within 4 years. NSC staff have taken the lead in
coordinating efforts among different federal agencies that will
contribute to this 4-year nuclear material security initiative. In
addition, leaders of 47 nations--including Russia, China, India, and
Pakistan--endorsed this 4-year nuclear material security goal in a
communiqué from a Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the President in
April 2010. The summit work plan accompanying the communiqué committed
countries to voluntarily take steps to improve nuclear security by
bringing international nuclear agreements into force, improving
nuclear security standards, and exchanging information on nuclear
security best practices. Senior representatives from each government
will meet in December 2010 to evaluate progress toward the summit's
goals, and a follow-on summit is planned for 2012 in South Korea.
We have performed several reviews of NNSA nuclear nonproliferation
programs, as well as those implemented by the Department of State
(State) and Department of Defense (DOD), and found a number of
limitations, management weaknesses, and other challenges facing these
efforts. For instance, in 2005, we assessed the DOD and DOE strategies
guiding their nuclear nonproliferation programs and efforts to
coordinate DOE, DOD, and State nonproliferation activities.[Footnote
8] We found that there was no overall strategy integrating the threat
reduction and nuclear nonproliferation programs of these agencies. We
also found that coordination of DOD, DOE, and State border security
programs could be improved. To that end, we recommended that NSC issue
clear guidance for the coordination of border security programs, as it
has done with programs to employ biological weapons scientists. We
also recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy develop an
integrated plan for improved coordination of all U.S. threat reduction
and nonproliferation programs. DOE concurred with the report and our
recommendations. DOD concurred with the need for better integration of
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs but did not specify
whether it agreed about the need for an integrated plan, while neither
State nor NSC commented on the report.
This report responds to your request that we conduct a review of U.S.
nuclear nonproliferation strategies.[Footnote 9] Specifically, our
objectives were to assess (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement
the President's initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials
worldwide within 4 years; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of
NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to
secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. In September
2010, we reported to you on the results of our work in a classified
report. This report summarizes certain aspects of our classified
report.
To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed official
documentation, including an interagency document describing the
strategy for improving security of nuclear materials worldwide, an
international nuclear security status report, NNSA's plan for
advancing the President's initiative to secure vulnerable nuclear
materials around the world within 4 years, materials on MPC&A program
efforts in Russia, and other information on NNSA's efforts to secure
nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. We also interviewed
senior U.S. officials at NSC, NNSA, DOD, State, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and representatives of the
intelligence community. We also interviewed senior Russian officials
who have worked with the NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs,
including officials from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the
Russian State Corporation for Atomic Energy (Rosatom); the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MOD); Russian Federal Customs Service; and
Russian Federal Service of Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear
Supervision (Rostekhnadzor), which provides oversight of Russia's
civilian nuclear facilities. Additional details on our scope and
methodology can be found in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 to December 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
In 1991, Congress authorized DOD to establish the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program--the initial program of nuclear security
assistance to Russia and the former Soviet states and the origin of
some of the NNSA programs--to help Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan secure and protect former Soviet nuclear weapons.[Footnote
10] In 1992, the United States and Russia signed a CTR "umbrella
agreement" that established an overall legal framework for U.S.
nuclear security assistance to Russia.[Footnote 11] The United States
and Russia completed 7-year extension protocols for the umbrella
agreement in 1999 and 2006, and similar CTR umbrella agreements have
been concluded with other former Soviet states.
In 1993, DOE began implementing some CTR program activities funded by
DOD, principally the MPC&A effort to help secure weapon-usable nuclear
materials in the former Soviet Union. In 1995, DOE established its own
MPC&A program with its own funding, and in 1996, funding for the MPC&A
program shifted directly from DOD to DOE.[Footnote 12] The scope of
DOE nonproliferation programs further expanded with DOE assuming
responsibility for the CTR effort to shut down Russia's three
remaining plutonium production reactors,[Footnote 13] initiating
efforts to detect nuclear smuggling in Russia and other
countries,[Footnote 14] and undertaking programs to redirect WMD
scientific expertise through cooperative peaceful research
projects.[Footnote 15] In October 1999, DOE's nonproliferation
programs were realigned in the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation with the creation of NNSA. This office consists of
six line offices under which various nuclear nonproliferation programs
are implemented (see figure 1).
Figure 1: NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
[Refer to PDF for image: organizational chart]
Top level:
NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.
Second level, reporting to NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation:
* Office of Global Threat Reduction;
* Office of Nuclear Risk Reduction;
* Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation;
* Office of Fissile Materials Disposition;
* Office of Nonproliferation and International Security;
* Office of Research and Development.
Source: NNSA.
[End of figure]
The principal NNSA nuclear nonproliferation offices involved in
securing and eliminating nuclear warheads and materials in foreign
locations include the following:
* The Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation.
This office administers the MPC&A program through four suboffices: (1)
the Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection, which, in cooperation with
DOD, works with the Russian MOD, including the 12th Main Directorate,
the Russian organization responsible for nuclear munitions; Navy; and
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) to improve security of Russian warheads;
(2) the Office of Weapons Material Protection, which enhances MPC&A
systems at nuclear weapons material facilities controlled by Rosatom;
(3) the Office of Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites, which
conducts MPC&A upgrades at civilian nuclear facilities in Russia,
supports conversion of Russian HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU),
consolidates nonweapons Russian HEU and plutonium to fewer locations,
and cooperates with other key countries on nuclear security; and (4)
the Office of National Infrastructure and Sustainability, which is
working with Russia and other countries where MPC&A security
improvements have been made to develop and strengthen national-level
infrastructures that can sustain MPC&A systems over the long term.
* The Office of Global Threat Reduction. This office implements the
GTRI program, which protects, removes, and eliminates the use of
nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites
worldwide.[Footnote 16] GTRI subprograms work in the United States and
internationally to convert research reactors from use of HEU to LEU,
remove and dispose of excess nuclear and radiological materials, and
protect high-priority nuclear and radiological sources from theft. The
GTRI program has removed all significant amounts of HEU from 17
countries and Taiwan, including removals from Chile, Libya, Romania,
Taiwan, and Turkey, since the President's April 2009 Prague speech;
removed or assisted in the disposal of more than 2,800 Kg of HEU and
plutonium from 39 countries; and assisted in the conversion from the
use of HEU to LEU or verified the shutdown of 72 HEU research reactors
around the world, including reactors in the Czech Republic, Ukraine,
South Africa, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
* The Office of Nuclear Risk Reduction. This office has led work with
Russia under the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production
program to facilitate the permanent shutdown of the three remaining
Russian weapon-grade plutonium production reactors--which collectively
produced approximately 1.2 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium each
year--by refurbishing existing and constructing new replacement fossil-
fuel-based sources of power. The last reactor was shut down in April
2010, and the program is to come to an end in fiscal year 2011.
* The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition. This office has two
major missions: the disposition of surplus U.S. weapon-grade HEU, and
the elimination of U.S. and Russian plutonium no longer needed for
defense programs. Under this latter mission, the fissile material
disposition program will assist Russia in modifying reactors that will
dispose of 34 metric tons of Russian weapon-grade plutonium. In April
2010, the United States and Russia concluded a revised agreement
laying the groundwork for both countries to begin this process by 2018.
The two other U.S. agencies that conduct major nuclear
nonproliferation programs and activities overseas are DOD and State.
DOD administers the CTR program, which has facilitated the removal of
nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and has helped
Russia and Ukraine meet their arms control commitments by assisting in
the elimination of strategic delivery systems. CTR has also provided
assistance to secure Russian nuclear warheads, destroy the Russian
chemical weapons stockpile, reduce biological proliferation risks
across the former Soviet Union, and combat WMD smuggling in the
region. The CTR program has expanded its geographic scope in recent
years, notably helping Albania eliminate its chemical weapons.
State manages its own nonproliferation programs, provides support to
NNSA and other U.S. agency nuclear nonproliferation programs working
overseas, and conducts bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to address
proliferation threats around the world under the Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation.[Footnote 17] Among other
things, State's nuclear nonproliferation programs include efforts to
enhance international export controls and border security; counter
nuclear smuggling; redirect WMD expertise in Iraq, Libya, and other
countries to peaceful research; and sustain a Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund that provides supplemental funding to address
nonproliferation contingencies and other urgent threat reduction
efforts.
NSC staff have the principal role in coordinating the implementation
of NNSA, DOD, State, and other agency nonproliferation programs. While
NSC oversees development of general policy and establishes guidelines
for U.S. nonproliferation programs, it does not implement programs or
control their budgets.
A Governmentwide Strategy for the President's 4-Year Global Nuclear
Material Security Initiative Has Been Developed, but Details
Concerning the Initiative's Overall Cost, Time Frame, and Scope of
Work Are Unclear:
NSC officials approved a governmentwide strategy for the President's 4-
year initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide.
In addition, U.S. agencies--including NNSA, DOD, and State--have
identified individual plans in varying levels of development and
specificity describing how they intend to contribute to the 4-year
initiative. However, this interagency strategy lacks specific details
concerning how the initiative will be implemented, including the
identity of and details regarding vulnerable foreign nuclear material
sites and facilities to be addressed, agencies and programs
responsible for addressing each site, planned activities at each
location, potential challenges and strategies for overcoming those
obstacles, anticipated timelines, and cost estimates. As a result, key
details and objectives for the 4-year initiative remain unclear,
including the overall estimated costs, time frames, and scope of work
associated with the initiative.
NSC Has Approved an Interagency Strategy for the President's 4-Year
Global Nuclear Material Security Initiative, and Individual Agencies
Have Identified Plans for Contributing to This Goal:
NSC has approved an interagency document describing NNSA, DOD, and
State contributions to the President's initiative to secure all
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years.[Footnote 18]
According to NSC officials, this document serves as a governmentwide
strategy for the 4-year initiative. We reviewed a copy of this seven-
page document, "Interagency Efforts to Improve the Security of Nuclear
Weapons and Fissile Materials," which, among other things, describes
the scope and objectives of the interagency effort and identifies the
main activities by agencies and programs in support of the President's
4-year initiative.
Individual agencies have plans in varying levels of development and
specificity regarding their contributions to the 4-year nuclear
security goal. Specifically,
* NNSA was the only agency to have developed a formal written plan
with specific details regarding how it intends to contribute to the 4-
year nuclear material security goal. NNSA officials told us that they
had anticipated a presidential initiative to secure vulnerable nuclear
materials worldwide prior to the President's April 2009 announcement
and began developing a plan in 2008 based on statements made during
the 2008 presidential campaign. The classified NNSA plan details a
prioritized five-part effort, including (1) continuing nuclear
security cooperation, especially MPC&A upgrades and efforts to
transition responsibility for sustaining MPC&A systems; (2) expanding
nuclear security cooperation with other countries; (3) accelerating
nuclear material removal efforts with other countries; (4)
strengthening nuclear security standards, practices, and next-
generation international nuclear safeguards; and (5) building
international capabilities to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking and
smuggling. Among other things, the NNSA plan identifies specific sites
and facilities in various countries for engagement and includes
additional technical information that will support the development of
next steps for cooperation.
* DOD is planning to contribute to the President's 4-year initiative
through the CTR program. In February 2010, the CTR program announced a
Global Nuclear Lockdown initiative as its contribution, with funding
of $74.5 million for fiscal year 2011. While DOD has not developed a
detailed written plan similar to NNSA's, according to DOD officials,
the CTR program is planning to undertake several activities, including
the following:
- Working with NNSA to establish Centers of Excellence for Nuclear
Security in China and India to foster nuclear material security
training, facilitate exchange of nuclear material security best
practices, and explore possible cooperative activities to improve
nuclear material security infrastructure.
- Continuing to provide assistance to the Russian MOD for secure
transportation of nuclear warheads and working in collaboration with
NNSA to evaluate and provide possible future nuclear warhead security
assistance to the Russian MOD, including various forms of assistance
to sustain security improvements at Russian nuclear warhead storage
sites.
- Cooperating with NNSA and other countries to identify HEU in spent
nuclear fuel in locations where NNSA's GTRI program and other
international efforts are not active.
* State has also not developed a written plan similar to NNSA's for
contributing to the President's 4-year initiative, but according to
State officials, State intends to provide general diplomatic support
for the other agency programs in implementing their nuclear material
security activities abroad. State also intends to support several
international mechanisms and regimes relevant to the initiative,
including the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction,[Footnote 19] the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism,[Footnote 20] the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1540 Committee,[Footnote 21] and the Amendment to
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
[Footnote 22]
Interagency Strategy for the 4-Year Global Nuclear Material Security
Initiative Lacks Key Implementation Details, and the Initiative's
Overall Costs, Time Frames, and Scope Are Uncertain:
We found that the interagency strategy for the 4-year global nuclear
material security initiative lacks specific details concerning how the
initiative will be implemented, including the identity of and details
regarding vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to
be addressed, agencies and programs responsible for addressing each
site, planned activities at each location, potential challenges and
strategies for overcoming those obstacles, anticipated timelines, and
cost estimates. NSC officials told us that they believed developing
such a single, integrated cross-agency plan could take years. However,
we found that absent such an implementation plan, essential details
associated with the 4-year initiative remain unclear, including the
initiative's overall estimated costs, time frames, and scope of work.
Costs to Implement Initiative Are Unknown:
The overall costs associated with fulfilling the President's 4-year
initiative have not been estimated and are unknown. For its part, NNSA
estimated that approximately $700 million would need to be shifted to
its fiscal year 2010 and 2011 nuclear nonproliferation program budgets
from projected out-year budgets in NNSA's Future Years Nuclear
Security Plan in order to accelerate MPC&A and GTRI activities under
the 4-year work scope. NSC officials told us, however, that they did
not believe this was a valid estimate of costs associated directly
with the 4-year nuclear material security goal, in part because the
NNSA work scope encompasses activities that NSC believes fall outside
of the initiative's scope. In addition, these officials told us that
estimating the costs associated with the President's goal is
impossible because the initiative is predicated on other countries
providing assistance and cost sharing, and it is impossible to
forecast cooperation that may be possible with other countries in the
future, including resuming denuclearization efforts in North Korea.
Time Frames Are Uncertain:
NSC does not consider the 4-year time frame for securing nuclear
materials worldwide a hard and fast deadline. NSC officials told us
that the President did not state that nuclear material security would
or should be completed within 4 years when he announced the proposal
in 2009, and they did not believe the purpose of the initiative is to
achieve a specific level of nuclear material security around the world
within a specific period of time. Instead, these officials described
the value of the President's proposal in broader terms, specifically
as a "forcing function" to (1) accelerate ongoing U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation programs, (2) drive closer integration of nuclear
nonproliferation programs across the federal government, and (3)
mobilize greater international responsibility for and commitment to
nuclear material security. NSC officials stressed that the 4-year
initiative is international, and that responsibility rests with all
nations--not just the United States--to achieve this goal.
Scope of Foreign Sites to Be Covered by Initiative, Levels of Access
to Some Foreign Sites, and When Materials Will Be Considered Secure
Are Unclear:
Details relating to the overall scope of the 4-year initiative--
including the identity of and details regarding vulnerable foreign
nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed, how limitations
on access to nuclear facilities that some countries may impose will be
overcome, and the criteria used to judge when foreign nuclear sites
can ultimately be considered secure--remain vague.
Regarding the initiative's scope of foreign nuclear material sites,
NSC has led an interagency process to identify, classify, and
prioritize sites internationally based on information about the
amounts and types of material at those locations and security
vulnerabilities. This effort draws heavily on information from the
Nuclear Materials Information Program (NMIP), an interagency program
whose details are classified that organizes, consolidates, and
assesses information from a range of U.S. government agencies and
sources on worldwide nuclear material inventories, locations, and
security status in an integrated and continuously updated information
management system. On the basis of information from NMIP, nuclear
material sites around the world were placed in one of seven different
categories:
* sites in high-income countries with a relatively high degree of
security;
* sites now considered relatively secure based on prior assistance
from the MPC&A program and other U.S. nonproliferation assistance
programs;
* sites where MPC&A security upgrades have been made, but where
residual security concerns still remain;
* sites to be addressed by the GTRI program for protection and/or
removal of nuclear materials, or conversion of facilities so they no
longer require HEU;
* sites in countries that have been reluctant to relinquish their HEU
for shipment to more secure facilities in the United States or Russia;
* a separate category for several specific countries where there are
political sensitivities and access limitations to working with the
United States on nuclear material security issues; and:
* sites in high-income countries with large nuclear industries where
there may be security vulnerabilities.
According to the interagency strategy document for the 4-year nuclear
material security initiative, several hundred sites around the world
were determined to have significant amounts of nuclear material. While
the majority of these sites were determined to meet IAEA baseline
security guidelines, a large number of sites were determined to be
most vulnerable. NSC officials told us that a list of the most
vulnerable sites, derived from NMIP, is being used in planning for the
4-year nuclear material security initiative. We received and reviewed
information describing the NMIP methodologies and criteria used to
assess the security of nuclear material storage sites. However, the
interagency strategy document did not identify the total universe of
sites evaluated or the subset of sites determined to be most
vulnerable, and we did not obtain additional information specifying or
providing further details about these sites within the time frame of
this engagement.
In a 2008 U.S. government report inventorying known facilities and
sites worldwide with nuclear weapons or formula quantities of
strategic special nuclear materials,[Footnote 23] which draws on
information from NMIP, we found a list of foreign nuclear material
sites that could be within the scope of the 4-year effort. An NSC
official told us that this list would be comparable to the overall
scope of sites evaluated for inclusion under the 4-year nuclear
material security initiative. However, the inventory of facilities in
this document does not include detailed information for these sites--
such as warhead or material inventories, vulnerability assessments, or
risk ratings--that would allow us to understand and assess the
potential scope of the 4-year nuclear material security initiative.
NSC officials told us that even with the information available through
NMIP, there is a large universe of nuclear material sites around the
world and there are many unknowns and uncertainties concerning some
foreign nuclear material sites. For this reason, the scope of
international facilities with nuclear materials that are considered
vulnerable is constantly evolving. Furthermore, NSC officials also
told us that they are taking a broad view of what constitutes
vulnerable nuclear material. Specifically, they told us that any
material that could be used in a nuclear explosive device is
inherently dangerous and that some weapon-usable materials located in
high-income countries could still be considered vulnerable and within
the scope of the President's initiative.
In addition, it is unclear how the initiative intends to address
foreign sites with potentially vulnerable nuclear materials in cases
where the host countries have imposed access limitations that could
complicate or preclude security assessments and assistance. Some
countries with weapon-usable nuclear materials may resist nuclear
security cooperation with the United States, and U.S. programs may
never be given access to some foreign nuclear sites and facilities.
For example, the Russian government has refused to include in the
scope of cooperation with NNSA three major facilities in the closed
nuclear cities of Lesnoy, Trekhgorny, and Zarechny that are
responsible for serial production of nuclear weapons material.
[Footnote 24] NNSA has not been provided access to and is not
anticipating conducting future MPC&A work at those locations.
Finally, the criteria for determining when foreign nuclear material
sites can be considered secure remain vague. The interagency strategy
document for the initiative states that the goal of the effort is to
ensure that all nuclear material sites are secured at least to IAEA
guidelines on the "Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear
Facilities" (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4) and to integrate when and where
possible the most recent versions of these guidelines.[Footnote 25]
However, NSC and NNSA officials told us that nuclear material security
is a long-term and evolving endeavor that extends beyond making near-
term improvements to nuclear material sites, such as installing modern
MPC&A systems. While near-term security upgrades to nuclear material
are important, NSC and NNSA officials both told us--and as we have
previously reported[Footnote 26]--that effective and lasting nuclear
material security requires working with other countries to adopt
effective security practices so they can sustain MPC&A systems on
their own; removing and consolidating nuclear materials to fewer, more
secure locations; converting facilities such as research reactors so
they no longer require weapon-usable materials; and ultimately
eliminating nuclear materials wherever possible.
NNSA's Nuclear Security Programs Have Made Varying Levels of Progress
in Russia and Face Challenges That Are Delaying Program Implementation
and Could Increase Future Program Costs:
Three NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs we reviewed--the MPC&A
program, the nuclear Material Consolidation and Conversion (MCC)
program, and the GTRI program--have made varying degrees of progress
in securing Russian nuclear warheads and materials. The future of
these efforts in Russia could be jeopardized by an uncertain high-
level Russian political commitment to further nuclear security
cooperation with the United States. In addition, each of these
programs faces implementation challenges that could delay or prevent
achievement of its objectives in Russia. In particular, because of the
challenges facing the MPC&A program, NNSA is unlikely to meet the
deadline under current U.S. law requiring Russia to assume sole
responsibility for sustaining MPC&A by January 1, 2013, and MPC&A
program activities will likely need to continue in Russia beyond 2012.
NNSA Program Securing Russian Nuclear Warhead and Material Facilities
Has Made Progress, while NNSA Programs to Consolidate Russian HEU and
Convert Russian Research Reactors Have Produced More Limited Results:
While the MPC&A program has made considerable progress in improving
the security of Russia's nuclear warheads and material facilities, the
other two programs--MCC and GTRI--have had more limited success in
achieving their objectives in Russia.
MPC&A Program Has Implemented Security Upgrades at 110 Russian Nuclear
Warhead and Material Sites:
Through the MPC&A program, NNSA has improved security at 110 Russian
nuclear warhead and material sites. NNSA has completed a combination
of rapid and comprehensive MPC&A upgrades[Footnote 27] to 73 Russian
MOD nuclear warhead sites.[Footnote 28] However, there is currently no
agreement to conduct security upgrades at additional Russian warhead
facilities. NNSA has also implemented MPC&A upgrades at 37 Russian
nuclear material sites. A total of 214 Russian nuclear material
buildings at these 37 sites are included in NNSA's current scope of
work, of which 195 have been upgraded.
However, the MPC&A program's scope of upgrade work for Russian nuclear
warhead and material sites continues to evolve. For instance, the
MPC&A program is conducting additional work at some of the 73 Russian
MOD sites where MPC&A upgrades have already been made, such as
installing checkpoints to improve screening of vehicles and personnel
on the perimeter of four Russian Navy closed cities where nuclear
warhead sites are located. NNSA is also retrofitting and improving
previous upgrades to 15 Russian Navy warhead sites to address
vulnerabilities that were unknown at the time initial upgrades were
made. A similar replacement of outdated and obsolete MPC&A equipment
installed at 11 SRF sites has also been proposed by MOD. In addition,
at Russian nuclear material sites, NNSA is planning to replace
obsolete or nonfunctioning equipment and retrofit previously upgraded
systems that have reached the end of their expected lifetimes. NNSA
has also identified additional buildings at several Russian nuclear
material sites that it would like to add to the U.S.-Russian action
plan for future MPC&A upgrade work.
NNSA has also been working to transition to Russian ownership and
responsibility for sustaining the upgraded MPC&A systems that it has
provided to Russia. NNSA officials told us that this transition is
critical to effective long-term nuclear security in the country and to
ensuring that the significant U.S. investment in Russian MPC&A is not
wasted. As MPC&A upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead and material
sites have been completed, NNSA has typically funded a period of
sustainability assistance to the sites, including support for
maintenance, repair, and logistical services and spare equipment for
the improved security systems. In addition, NNSA has worked with
Russian government agencies and organizations to establish an
effective national MPC&A infrastructure through regulatory
development, training, inspections, and other forms of assistance,
such as equipping guard and protective forces for the sites. Joint
concepts and plans to transition responsibility for sustaining MPC&A
have been developed by NNSA with Rosatom and the Russian MOD under
which U.S. funding for sustainability is to gradually decrease while
Russian support gradually increases. In fiscal year 2009, NNSA spent
approximately $100 million on MPC&A sustainability efforts in Russia
for nuclear warheads and materials.
MCC Program Has Made Limited Progress in Facilitating Consolidation of
Russian HEU:
The MCC program supports (1) converting non-weapons-origin Russian HEU
to LEU and (2) reducing the number of buildings and sites in Russia
that contain HEU by consolidating materials in fewer, more secure
locations. While NNSA has made progress in the HEU-LEU conversion
component of the program, having facilitated the conversion of over 12
metric tons of Russian HEU, less progress has been made in the
consolidation component of the program. When it was created, in 1999,
the MCC program estimated that it would assist Russia in removing
material from 50 buildings and 5 sites completely by 2010. However, to
date, it has achieved removal of all HEU from only 1 site and 25
buildings.
GTRI Program Has Made Little Progress in Converting Research Reactors
in Russia from Use of HEU:
While NNSA officials told us that there is uncertainty about the total
number of Russian reactors using HEU, the GTRI program plans to
complete the conversion or verified shutdown of 71 HEU-fueled research
reactors and related facilities in Russia by 2020.[Footnote 29]
Although Russia has not yet agreed to convert any of these facilities,
Russia verified to the GTRI program in February 2010 that it had shut
down 3 of its research reactors, and GTRI officials told us that the
program has a commitment from Russia to close 5 additional HEU
research reactors. NNSA officials also told us that GTRI has achieved
an agreement in principle with Russia to conduct conversion
feasibility studies on 6 Russian research reactors, which could
facilitate completion of feasibility studies for other Russian
facilities once Russia agrees to them.
Future NNSA Nuclear Security Efforts in Russia Jeopardized by
Uncertain Political Commitment from the Russian Government:
NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation programs in Russia face an uncertain
future because of questionable high-level Russian political commitment
to continue cooperation with the United States on nuclear security.
For example, senior Russian officials at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Rosatom told us that nuclear materials in their country
are now fully secure and that they saw little value to continuing to
work with the United States on improving the security of its nuclear
facilities. This view was reiterated in the Russian government's
statement to the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, in which it
declared:
"Russia maintains its nuclear security at an appropriate level. The
Russian Federation confirms that all nuclear materials in its
territory and respective facilities are safely protected, so there are
no vulnerable nuclear materials or facilities in its territory, which
would raise concerns due to their security level."
As a consequence, some Russian officials have raised questions about
the need for continuing U.S. assistance to improve Russian nuclear
warhead and material security. For example, a Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs official told us that it was the ministry's position
that the CTR umbrella agreement should not be extended for a third
time when the current extension protocol expires in 2013. However,
without the privileges and immunities provided by the umbrella
agreement, NNSA officials told us that with the exception of the MPC&A
program's work with Rostekhnadzor, which occurs under a separate
government-to-government agreement, it would be impossible to continue
MPC&A program work in Russia.
Russian officials told us that it was important for Russia to be
considered an "equal partner" with the United States on nuclear
material security instead of being viewed as a recipient of U.S.
nuclear security assistance. Moreover, these officials said that the
emphasis of U.S.-Russian cooperation should be on nuclear
proliferation risks in countries other than Russia. However, these
officials did not provide us with specific examples of new initiatives
or proposals where the United States and Russia could work together in
the future to address nuclear security risks in other nations.
We also found that the Russian government's financial commitment to
provide and sustain effective nuclear security systems independent of
U.S. support is uncertain. Russian officials told us that the Russian
government considers its nuclear security budgets secret and refuses
to provide such information to the United States. This lack of
transparency makes it difficult to assess Russia's willingness and
ability to support an effective nuclear security program independent
of U.S. assistance.
Some NNSA Nuclear Security Programs Working in Russia Face
Implementation Challenges:
The MPC&A, MCC, and GTRI programs also face challenges to the
effective and timely implementation and completion of their efforts in
Russia. The MPC&A program in particular faces two principal challenges
to completing its efforts in Russia by the end of 2012, as required
under U.S. law, including (1) successfully completing upgrades against
insider and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material
facilities and (2) developing both Russian national-level
infrastructure and practices and procedures at Russian sites to ensure
effective long-term sustainability of MPC&A systems for nuclear
materials. To overcome these challenges, MPC&A program activities in
Russia will need to continue beyond 2012. NNSA also faces continuing
obstacles to completing a government-to-government agreement needed to
advance the consolidation component of the MCC program in Russia,
while Russian technical concerns over the conversion of its research
reactors from HEU and the absence of a formal conversion agreement
also pose obstacles to the achievement of GTRI program objectives.
Challenges to Mitigating Insider and Outsider Threats at Russian
Nuclear Material Facilities:
We found that NNSA faces challenges in implementing MPC&A upgrades
against insider and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material
facilities to reduce the risk of material theft. NNSA has sought to
work more actively with some Russian nuclear facilities to jointly
identify where additional or augmented MPC&A upgrades would be
desirable. While NNSA has proposed MPC&A upgrades at certain Russian
sites to address these concerns, we found that progress in
implementing upgrades at some locations and in some MPC&A technical
areas has been limited. Implementing certain types of upgrades--
especially those that Russian facilities believe could slow site
operations--can take considerable time, and require several rounds of
discussions and project demonstrations for NNSA and Russian
counterparts to reach agreement.
Challenges to Developing Russian National Infrastructure and Site-
Level Practices and Procedures for Long-Term MPC&A Sustainability:
NNSA is working to enhance Russia's national-level infrastructure to
sustain MPC&A systems for nuclear materials in 10 ongoing project
areas, including enhancement of Russian nuclear security culture,
developing Russian regulations for MPC&A operations, and strengthening
Russian inspection and oversight capabilities.[Footnote 30] Appendix
II identifies and describes the goals of the MPC&A program's national-
level sustainability project areas in Russia. In our interviews with
U.S. and Russian officials, we found that more work needs to be done
in several of these areas, including development of Russian MPC&A
regulations, nuclear security culture enhancement, MPC&A oversight and
inspection, and MPC&A operations monitoring.
The United States and Russia have also fostered development of MPC&A
sustainability practices and procedures at the Russian nuclear
material site level based on seven sustainability elements,[Footnote
31] such as the presence of an effective MPC&A management structure at
the site that plans, implements, tests, and evaluates the site's MPC&A
systems. For each of the seven sustainability elements, a series of
indicators has been established to monitor and rate progress at each
site toward these objectives. Appendix III identifies each of the
seven sustainability elements and selected indicators for each.
At certain Russian sites and in certain MPC&A sustainability areas, we
found that the MPC&A program has made limited progress and faces
challenges in developing effective practices and procedures consistent
with the seven elements of MPC&A sustainability. For instance, we
found that sustainability-related activities had not started or were
only in the early stages of implementation at some of the Russian
nuclear material sites where MPC&A activities are ongoing.
A Potentially Large Scope of MPC&A Work in Russia May Be Needed beyond
2012:
Because of the ongoing challenges confronting MPC&A program work in
Russia, an effective MPC&A system sustained solely by Russia is
unlikely to be achieved by the congressionally mandated January 1,
2013, deadline, and a potentially significant program of continued
U.S. assistance to Russia may be necessary beyond this date.
Specifically, a combination of continued MPC&A upgrades and
sustainability activities at some Russian nuclear material sites and
support for further development of Russian national-level MPC&A
sustainability infrastructure could continue through 2018.
Regarding Russian nuclear warhead sites, both NNSA and the Russian MOD
have exchanged proposals for upgrade work at certain warhead
facilities that could continue beyond 2012, including NNSA support for
replacing obsolete MPC&A equipment at 11 SRF sites as proposed by MOD.
NNSA officials also indicated that MPC&A sustainability activities for
Russian warhead MPC&A could continue past 2012, including assisting
MOD and the services with the implementation of MPC&A regulations.
NNSA has not developed firm out-year budget estimates for continuing
MPC&A efforts overall in Russia. However, NNSA officials told us that
they had roughly estimated that approximately $150 million per year
would be needed to support MPC&A efforts in Russia beyond fiscal year
2012, including approximately $40 million per year for national-level
sustainability activities and approximately $110 million per year to
support future site-level upgrades and sustainability programs.
MCC Program Faces Continuing Challenges in Consolidating Russian
Nuclear Materials to Fewer, More Secure Locations:
NNSA has made little progress in and faces continuing challenges to
advancing the consolidation component of the MCC program in Russia.
NNSA believes consolidating Russian HEU is important because it would
(1) reduce the burden on the MPC&A program by allowing it to focus on
securing a smaller number of Russian material sites, (2) allow Russia
to focus its MPC&A resources on fewer potential theft targets, and (3)
enhance nuclear security at a lower, more sustainable cost. NNSA
officials acknowledged that there has been limited nuclear material
consolidation progress in Russia and described two reasons for the
slow pace. First, NNSA is not aware of any Rosatom plan for reducing
the size of its nuclear complex, and therefore cannot make specific
proposals regarding potential MCC program support for such an effort.
Second, the MCC program has been implemented only on a pilot basis in
Russia. Efforts have been under way since 2007 to conclude a formal
government-to-government MCC agreement that, according to NNSA, would
give the program an agreed-upon legal framework for the continuation
and expansion of program activities. NNSA officials said that they
expected this agreement to be concluded during the July 2009 summit
meeting between President Obama and Russian President Medvedev in
Moscow. However, the agreement was reportedly rejected during Russian
government interagency review. As a consequence, NNSA officials told
us that plans to work with Russia on nuclear material consolidation
remain on "cold standby."
GTRI Program Faces Challenges in Converting Russian Research Reactors
from HEU to LEU:
NNSA also faces challenges in working with Russia to convert its
research reactors and related facilities currently utilizing HEU. NNSA
officials told us that Russian research reactor operators have
traditionally been wary of such conversion because of concerns about
the performance of replacement LEU-based fuels. In the 2005 joint U.S.-
Russian presidential statement in Bratislava, Slovakia, the United
States and Russia agreed to focus the reactor conversion program on
"third countries," thus excluding Russian reactors from U.S.-Russian
cooperation.
The GTRI program has achieved an agreement in principle with Russia to
conduct conversion feasibility studies on 6 Russian research reactors.
However, NNSA officials told us that completion of this agreement,
which was expected in early fiscal year 2010, has been delayed.
Moreover, NNSA officials told us that any agreement to conduct these
studies would not constitute an official Russian decision to convert
or undertake activities toward conversion. According to NNSA
officials, a formal government-to-government agreement would need to
be completed to facilitate the conversion of any Russian HEU research
reactors or related facilities, while Russian officials have indicated
that pursuing conversion activities beyond the feasibility study phase
may require implementation of a U.S.-Russian agreement for peaceful
nuclear cooperation.[Footnote 32]
NNSA's Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Security in Other Countries
Are Under Way, but Progress Is Mixed:
In addition to its efforts in Russia, NNSA is working with other
countries on issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear
materials. In two countries that are believed to have large nuclear
material stockpiles--China and India--NNSA's efforts have been
primarily limited to the relatively noncontroversial exchange of
nuclear security best practices, training, and demonstration projects,
rather than working to develop a program of security improvements at
nuclear material facilities in those countries. NNSA is also seeking
to accelerate the removal of weapon-usable nuclear materials from
other priority countries through the GTRI program, including key
countries that made new commitments at the April 2010 Nuclear Security
Summit to relinquish or reduce their weapon-usable nuclear material
stockpiles.
Limited Scope of NNSA Nuclear Security Cooperation with China and
India:
Beyond Russia, NNSA is also engaging China and India in discussions on
issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials. The
MPC&A program is the lead NNSA program involved in this effort.
However, because this cooperation is considered politically sensitive,
NNSA's approach in both nations has been limited to the relatively
noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices,
training, and demonstration projects.
Nuclear Security Efforts in China:
Since 2003, NNSA has held technical discussions primarily with Chinese
civilian nuclear officials--including officials of the China Atomic
Energy Authority (CAEA) and China National Nuclear Corporation--and
other Chinese nuclear experts principally through workshops and
training sessions on nuclear material security best practices, export
controls, and safeguards. NNSA also sponsored a 2005 joint technology
demonstration with CAEA in Beijing to promote modern MPC&A and
safeguards technologies. In total, NNSA officials estimated that
approximately $8.2 million has been spent on MPC&A cooperation with
China through March 2010.
To further the nuclear security dialogue with the Chinese civilian
nuclear sector, NNSA is working with China, in cooperation with DOD,
to establish a center of nuclear security excellence in the country,
where nuclear material security best practices could be exchanged and
related technologies demonstrated. At the April 2010 Nuclear Security
Summit, China announced its intent to cooperate on the development of
such a center. There is no official agreement among NNSA, DOD, and the
Chinese government to establish such a center, though a memorandum of
understanding is under discussion and may be signed in early 2011.
However, notwithstanding these plans, NNSA officials told us that they
do not anticipate conducting a program of site-specific upgrade work
in China in either the civilian or the defense sector.
Moreover, NNSA officials said that while CAEA supports continued MPC&A
cooperation with NNSA, a Chinese government reorganization has
replaced CAEA as the lead implementing agency under the existing
agreement that serves as the vehicle for the implementation of NNSA
nuclear nonproliferation activities in China. NNSA officials told us
that they believe CAEA is interested in pursuing a new bilateral
agreement with NNSA under which this cooperation could continue and
expand. The MPC&A program's interactions in China, however, are likely
to be limited to CAEA and China's civilian nuclear organizations.
While there has been some participation by Chinese defense personnel
in workshops, according to NNSA, Chinese military organizations--which
control the bulk of China's nuclear weapon-usable material inventory--
have shown little interest in discussing nuclear security
collaboration with the United States.
Separately, the GTRI program has worked with China through an IAEA
Coordinated Research Project to address conversion of Chinese-supplied
Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSR) located in China, and which
China exported to Ghana, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria.[Footnote
33] Existing replacement LEU fuels GTRI is developing for conversion
of other foreign research reactors may not be feasible for the Chinese
MNSRs. However, China has shut down one MNSR and converted another,
and according to State officials, replacement LEU fuel being developed
by China will likely be feasible for conversion of other Chinese
MNSRs. In addition, China has committed to the disposition of HEU from
Ghana, Nigeria, and Syria through an agreement with IAEA.
Nuclear Security Efforts in India:
NNSA is also seeking to work with India on a range of nuclear material
security subjects, including implementing a Design Basis Threat,
vulnerability assessments, physical protection systems, material
control and accounting, transportation security, and nuclear security
culture development. However, according to NNSA officials, there is no
active, bilateral cooperation with India on these issues. In total,
NNSA has spent less than $500,000 on activities designed to stimulate
a nuclear security dialogue with India through workshops sponsored
under the auspices of IAEA and other organizations.
NNSA officials told us that discussions of Indian nuclear facility
security with Indian officials has been very sensitive, though NNSA
officials anticipate that a planned center of nuclear excellence in
India, to be established in cooperation with DOD, could promote a
broader nuclear security dialogue. However, NNSA officials told us
that there is no official agreement with India to develop such a
center.
At the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, the Indian government
announced that it would work with IAEA and other international
partners to establish a regional Global Center for Nuclear Energy
Partnership in India that would have a nuclear security component,
along with other components related to nuclear power, radiation
safety, and civilian applications of nuclear energy. NNSA officials
told us that this announcement did not constitute a direct endorsement
of the center planned by NNSA and DOD, but that further negotiations
with the Indian government were expected to determine what role NNSA
and DOD could play in the center proposed by India.
Prospects for NNSA Removal of HEU from Other Countries Are Improving
after Nuclear Security Summit:
NNSA has also focused on efforts to remove weapon-usable material from
nearly two dozen countries through the GTRI program. NNSA officials
told us that some progress has been made in negotiations with several
countries for the removal of their HEU to either the United States or
Russia following the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit.
For example, NNSA officials told us that negotiations had been under
way with the Ukrainian government for many years concerning the
repatriation of its HEU inventory to Russia. During the Nuclear
Security Summit, the Ukrainian President pledged to "get rid of" all
Russian-origin HEU from the country by 2012, from all three sites
where the material is currently located. In May 2010, GTRI facilitated
the removal of a significant portion of Ukraine's HEU inventory--
specifically, the return of 56 Kg of HEU in spent fuel from the Kiev
Institute of Nuclear Research to Russia. This effort represented the
removal of more than a third of Ukraine's HEU inventory. Consistent
with the joint statement made by the U.S. and Ukrainian Presidents
during the Nuclear Security Summit, under which the United States
agreed to provide technical and financial assistance to help Ukraine
eliminate its HEU stocks, negotiations have been under way with the
Ukrainian government and nuclear institutes to complete an agreement
on an assistance package that would help facilitate the removal of
Ukraine's remaining HEU stocks.
In addition, NNSA officials told us that discussions occurred with the
South African Nuclear Energy Corporation on nuclear material security
issues following the Nuclear Security Summit. For instance, NNSA
completed a contract for the future return of U.S.-origin spent HEU
fuel located in South Africa to the United States. NNSA and the South
African Nuclear Energy Corporation also agreed to establish a joint
U.S.-South African technical working group to develop cost estimates
and address technical issues for the possible future disposition of
South African HEU in spent fuel form. The first meeting of the joint
working group occurred in August 2010, during which both sides agreed
to produce a joint feasibility study by the fall of 2010. Finally,
South Africa has decided to pursue production of the molybdenum-99
medical isotope using a research reactor--converted previously from
use of HEU to LEU fuel, with the help of the GTRI program--that will
now use LEU targets instead of HEU targets.[Footnote 34] According to
GTRI officials, South Africa would become the world's first major
molybdenum-99 producer to convert to an all-LEU process.
Conclusions:
The President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative has a
worthwhile objective and can provide an impetus to accelerate NNSA and
other U.S. government nuclear material security efforts with foreign
countries. The initiative's goal, however, seems unrealistic in light
of the formidable challenges to improving the security of nuclear
stockpiles worldwide, especially the reluctance of key countries such
as Russia to acknowledge weaknesses in their nuclear security systems.
The uncertainty surrounding the likelihood of securing all vulnerable
nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years is compounded by the
absence of a robust U.S. interagency implementation plan for the
initiative that clearly identifies vulnerable foreign nuclear material
facilities to be addressed, assigns clear agency and program
responsibilities for those locations, identifies activities to be
conducted at each location, reviews potential challenges and how those
obstacles could be overcome, estimates time frames for completing
activities at each site, and presents estimated funding needed to
achieve this goal. In addition to clarifying key objectives and
details concerning how the 4-year initiative would be implemented,
such a plan would provide Congress with a useful baseline on the
status of global nuclear material security and provide a framework to
systematically track progress.
Important challenges continue to confront NNSA efforts to work
cooperatively with Russia on nuclear material security. It is clear
that U.S.-Russian collaboration on MPC&A will take more time--
certainly beyond the January 1, 2013, deadline under current U.S. law--
to have confidence that Russia will be in a position to assume full
responsibility for sustaining U.S.-provided nuclear security systems
over the long term. Even if this deadline were amended, we believe it
is important for the program to provide Congress with realistic
estimated time frames, strategy, work scope, and costs for future work
in that country. In our view, the continuation of MPC&A assistance to
Russia beyond the current deadline should not be open-ended but for a
specified period of additional time, at the end of which Congress can
reassess the progress that has been made and evaluate the need to
authorize any additional extension.
The efforts of the MPC&A and other NNSA programs working in Russia
require cooperation from the Russian government, and we believe
greater Russian commitment and openness are essential for the NNSA
programs to succeed. As U.S. and Russian officials told us, it is
important that cooperation between the two countries on joint nuclear
security efforts be viewed as one of partnership and not U.S.
assistance. We believe an important measure of partnership is the
financial contributions from the foreign governments to the NNSA
programs being implemented in their countries. In that regard, if the
Russian government were to provide the United States with a clearer
and more thorough sense of its current and future spending plans on
nuclear security programs and activities, NNSA and other U.S. agency
officials could have more informed discussions with Russian
counterparts on where resources and cooperation are most urgently
needed.
While NNSA has made considerable progress securing Russian nuclear
warheads and materials at numerous sites where they are located, we
believe more progress is needed in consolidating and reducing the
number of locations in Russia with nuclear materials, and phasing out
the use of HEU at Russian research reactors and related facilities. In
our view, these steps would provide a higher level of security at
lower potential cost. Unfortunately, Russia has been reluctant to work
more actively with NNSA to consolidate its nuclear weapon-usable
materials and convert its HEU-fueled research reactors.
Beyond Russia, it is apparent that some countries and facilities that
are high priorities for the NNSA programs may be addressed by NNSA or
other U.S. nuclear security programs only in very limited or
restricted ways. While the President's April 2010 Nuclear Security
Summit helped draw high-level international political attention to the
threat of nuclear terrorism and proliferation risks, the process of
building relationships with certain countries will likely take many
years. Recognizing that progress on nuclear material security with
foreign countries requires mutual cooperation, we believe the centers
of nuclear security excellence that NNSA and DOD are planning to
jointly develop in China and India are good first steps toward
cultivating international nuclear security best practices and a shared
perception of nuclear security risks. These centers may represent a
model for engaging other countries in nuclear security dialogues and
possibly more extensive future cooperation.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Because of the likely need for the MPC&A program to work with Russia
past December 31, 2012, Congress may wish to consider amending the
current law--as initially laid out in the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003--to give the MPC&A program
additional time to work toward achievement of an MPC&A system that
Russia is prepared for and capable of sustaining on its own.
Considering input from the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator
of NNSA as recommended below, Congress may wish to consider such an
extension for a fixed period of time.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of
NNSA take the following three actions:
* to assist Congress in its decision whether and for how long to
extend the current deadline, clarify in a written plan the scope of
remaining MPC&A work in Russia beyond the current program deadline,
including information on remaining MPC&A activities by site or
facility, timelines, and estimated costs of completing MPC&A program
work in that country;
* to enhance NNSA nuclear nonproliferation program planning, and
provide a clearer picture of Russia's willingness and ability to
support and sustain MPC&A and other nuclear security investments the
United States has made in Russia, strengthen cooperation with the
Russian government regarding the transparency of its current and
future spending plans on nuclear security programs and activities; and:
* reevaluate NNSA strategies--with an eye toward new incentives,
inducements, or other sources of leverage--to persuade Russia to
expand its cooperation with the MCC and GTRI programs with the goal of
expediting the consolidation of Russian HEU to fewer locations and the
conversion of Russian HEU-fueled research reactors and related
facilities.
We are making the following recommendation to the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs:
To provide a clear sense of the overall scope of work anticipated
under the President's initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear
materials worldwide within 4 years, we recommend that NSC lead and
coordinate through NNSA, DOD, State, and other relevant agencies,
including members of the intelligence community, the development of a
comprehensive plan for implementing the initiative. Such a plan should
clearly identify the specific foreign countries, sites, and facilities
where materials have been determined to be poorly secured, and include
information specifying the agencies and programs responsible for
addressing each location; planned activities, potential implementation
challenges, and steps needed to overcome those challenges at each
location; and estimated time frames and costs associated with
achievement of the 4-year goal.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of our classified report to NNSA, DOE, NSC, State,
DOD, and ODNI for formal comment. DOE and NNSA provided written
comments on the classified draft report, the unclassified portions of
which are presented in appendix IV. NSC, State, DOD, and ODNI had no
written comments on our classified report. NNSA, DOE, NSC, State, and
DOD provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
DOE and NNSA agreed with our three recommendations that they (1)
clarify in a written plan for Congress the scope of remaining MPC&A
work in Russia beyond the 2013 program deadline, (2) strengthen
cooperation with the Russian government regarding the transparency of
its current and future spending plans on nuclear security programs and
activities, and (3) reevaluate strategies to persuade Russia to expand
its cooperation with the MCC and GTRI programs with the goal of
expediting the consolidation of Russian HEU to fewer locations and the
conversion of Russian HEU-fueled research reactors and related
facilities. DOE and NNSA responded that progress has already been made
in implementing the third recommendation.
DOE and NNSA took issue with our characterization that the GTRI
program has made little progress in converting Russian research
reactors using HEU to LEU. We noted in the report that Russia verified
to the GTRI program in February 2010 that it had shut down 3 HEU
research reactors and that the GTRI program has an agreement in
principle with Russia to conduct conversion feasibility studies on 6
Russian research reactors. We have modified the report to include
language noting that the GTRI program has obtained a commitment from
Russia to close 5 additional research reactors. However, we believe
the statement and the findings supporting it are factually correct,
for the following reasons. First, as we reported, the GTRI program
plans to complete the conversion or verified shutdown of 71 Russian
HEU-fueled research reactors and related facilities. To date, the
program acknowledges having verified the shutdown of only 3 of these
reactors. In our view, this constitutes little progress toward the
specific GTRI program objective relating to Russian research reactor
shutdown or conversion. DOE's and NNSA's comment that the GTRI
program's primary focus is on threat reduction efforts outside of
Russia is not relevant to our finding that limited progress has been
made toward this specific GTRI program goal in Russia. Moreover, the
prospects and timelines for future shutdowns or actual conversions of
Russian HEU research reactors are unclear and contingent on Russian
government support, which we also believe is uncertain. As we noted in
our report, NNSA officials told us that completion of the implementing
agreement with Russia to allow for conversion feasibility studies on 6
Russian research reactors that was expected in early 2010 has been
delayed, the agreement would not constitute a Russian agreement to
actually convert any of its facilities, and any future conversion
activities beyond feasibility studies may require implementation of a
U.S.-Russian agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
In addition, DOE and NNSA commented that some recent GTRI program
accomplishments were not addressed in our report. We have modified
language in our report to reflect those accomplishments.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretaries of Energy, State, and Defense; the
Administrator of NNSA; the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs; the Director of National Intelligence; and other
interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of our review were to assess (1) U.S. governmentwide
efforts to implement the President's initiative to secure all
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years; (2) the status
and challenges, if any, of the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3)
NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than
Russia.
To assess overall U.S. strategies and plans for implementing the 4-
year global nuclear material security initiative proposed by the
President, we obtained and reviewed relevant documentation on the
strategies for achieving this goal, including the interagency strategy
document for this effort; an overview of the Nuclear Materials
Information Program (NMIP) used to identify vulnerable nuclear
material sites overseas; the most recent annual report to Congress on
the security of nuclear weapons, strategic special nuclear materials,
and related equipment located outside the United States as of 2008;
and NNSA's "work scope" plan for securing nuclear materials worldwide
within 4 years. The Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of
State (State) did not develop comparable written plans detailing how
their programs would contribute to the 4-year initiative. We
interviewed National Security Council (NSC) officials on the
initiative, the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, and issues related
to broader national-level nuclear nonproliferation strategies and
planning. We also interviewed officials at NNSA, DOD, and State
concerning their contributions to the 4-year nuclear material security
initiative. We also interviewed officials from the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and representatives of the
intelligence community, and reviewed documentation provided to us by
ODNI, on issues and threats related to worldwide nuclear material
security.
We focused our evaluation of the status of and challenges facing NNSA
nuclear security programs in Russia on three NNSA nuclear
nonproliferation programs working in that country--the nuclear
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program; the
nuclear Material Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) program; and the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). We selected these three
programs because they work directly on securing Russian nuclear
warheads and materials in place (MPC&A program), converting Russian
highly enriched uranium (HEU) to non-weapon-usable low-enriched
uranium and consolidating the number of Russian sites with HEU to
fewer, more secure locations (MCC program), or eliminating Russian use
of HEU (GTRI program). We did not address other NNSA nuclear
nonproliferation programs in Russia that are nearing completion (such
as the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production program),
have not yet initiated significant programs of assistance to Russia
(such as the program that will assist Russia in the disposition of its
excess weapon-grade plutonium), or are indirectly related to nuclear
warhead or material security (such as nuclear smuggling detection or
weapons of mass destruction scientist reemployment programs).
To evaluate the status of and challenges facing the efforts of these
NNSA nuclear security programs in Russia, we examined these issues in
interviews with the NNSA Administrator, senior officials in the NNSA
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and the principal
nonproliferation program offices involved in nuclear material security
activities in Russia, including the Office of International Material
Protection and Cooperation, which implements the MPC&A and MCC
programs in Russia; the Office of Global Threat Reduction, which
administers the GTRI program to, among other things, facilitate
conversion of Russian research reactors and related facilities from
use of HEU to use of low-enriched uranium; the Office of Nuclear Risk
Reduction, which has facilitated the shutdown of Russia's last
remaining weapon-grade plutonium production reactors; and the Office
of Fissile Materials Disposition, which is working with Russia to
eliminate plutonium it has declared excess to defense needs.
We reviewed documentation and analyzed information provided to us by
NNSA describing nuclear warhead and material security program efforts
and the challenges they face in Russia, including documentation on the
status of MPC&A upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead and material sites
and efforts to transition responsibility to Russia for sustaining
MPC&A over the long term.
In addition, we obtained documentation from and interviewed senior
Russian officials who have worked with the NNSA nuclear
nonproliferation programs, including those from the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs; Russian State Corporation for Atomic Energy
(Rosatom); Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD); Russian Federal Customs
Service; and Russian Federal Service of Environmental, Technological,
and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor), which provides oversight of
Russia's civilian nuclear facilities.
We obtained and reviewed documentation from and interviewed U.S.
officials to assess NNSA's efforts to secure nuclear materials in
countries other than Russia. Specifically, we reviewed documentation
provided by NNSA and interviewed MPC&A program officials concerning
nuclear security program activities in China and India. We also
interviewed DOD officials on DOD's plans to work jointly with NNSA in
developing nuclear security centers of excellence in China and India.
We analyzed relevant information from and interviewed GTRI program
officials concerning program plans for foreign HEU removal and reactor
conversion.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 to December 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: NNSA National-Level Project Areas for MPC&A
Sustainability of Russian Nuclear Materials:
Project area: Regulatory development;
Goal: Provide a civilian regulatory structure in Russia for an
integrated MPC&A program.
Project area: Inspections;
Goal: Enhance Russian MPC&A inspections by establishing an
infrastructure with sufficient resources to enforce MPC&A regulations
though federal and industry oversight.
Project area: Material control and accountability measurements;
Goal: Assist Russia in improving the security of weapon-usable
material at high risk of theft or diversion, through development and
support of a sustainable and effective measurement-based MC&A program.
Project area: Rosatom training and technical support infrastructure
project;
Goal: Develop cost-effective, self-sustaining, and accessible training
and technical support for upgraded MPC&A systems in Russia.
Project area: MPC&A Education;
Goal: Educate the next generation of Russian safeguards and security
specialists to secure special nuclear material.
Project area: MPC&A operations monitoring (MOM);
Goal: Install MOM systems at non-Rosatom nuclear sites in Russia with
completed MPC&A upgrades to provide increased confidence that the
upgrades continue to operate effectively.
Project area: Transportation security;
Goal: Work with Rosatom to improve the security of Russian nuclear
materials in transit.
Project area: Protective force;
Goal: Ensure that a sufficient number of organized, equipped, and
trained protective force personnel are present to provide balanced
protection against all design basis threats to Russian special nuclear
material.
Project area: Federal information systems;
Goal: Operate and upgrade a Russian system designed to systematically
collect, process, and analyze site reports on quantities of nuclear
materials and inventory changes (project completed).
Project area: Certification and taxation;
Goal: Improve Russia's ability to certify MPC&A system-related
equipment and software effectively and in a timely manner.
Project area: Nuclear security culture;
Goal: Develop Russian regulatory requirements, evaluation criteria and
methodologies, and training programs to enhance nuclear security
culture at the site level, including creating a nuclear security
culture enhancement program at each site.
Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Seven Elements of MPC&A Sustainability and Selected
Indicators:
Element: Site MPC&A organization;
Description: MPC&A organizations at the site level plan, coordinate,
implement, test, and evaluate MPC&A operations and have sufficient
authority to carry out all aspects of their duties;
Selected indicators:
* Site has an established and documented MPC&A organization with clear
roles and responsibilities;
* Site has developed MPC&A plans of its own;
* Site has developed a budget for MPC&A organization, activities, and
personnel.
Element: Site operating procedures;
Description: MPC&A personnel follow existing regulatory requirements
for using systems, equipment, and technologies to ensure security of
nuclear materials at the sites and during transportation. The
development of regulatory requirements takes into account data from
vulnerability assessments and is customized to technical processes for
handling nuclear materials;
Selected indicators:
* Site has written procedures for all key MPC&A operations;
* Site procedures conform to Russian regulations;
* Site has a process for field evaluation of procedures.
Element: Human resource management and site training;
Description: The human resource management and personnel training
programs at the site ensure that employees have the requisite
knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform necessary MPC&A operations;
Selected indicators:
* Performance by site personnel complies with operating procedures;
* Site has established and resourced an on-site training organization;
* MPC&A training is required for each staff member every year.
Element: Operational cost analysis;
Description: Operation of MPC&A systems requires adequate funding to
ensure reduction of risk of theft and unauthorized use of nuclear
materials. An operational cost analysis should examine all categories
of costs associated with the upgrade and subsequent operation of MPC&A
programs;
Selected indicators:
* Site has identified life cycle costs, capital replacement costs, and
other costs for MPC&A equipment;
* Site's operating budget covers the site's MPC&A requirements;
* Site demonstrates ability to technically and financially sustain
MPC&A.
Element: Equipment maintenance, repair, and calibration;
Description: Timely preventive maintenance, repair, and calibration of
equipment provide for the efficient operation of all system components;
Selected indicators:
* Site has evaluated MPC&A system maintenance requirements;
* Site has developed a master list of MPC&A equipment installed and
maintenance and/or replacement priorities;
* Site has spare parts supply and extended equipment warranties or
replacement service contracts.
Element: Performance testing and operational monitoring;
Description: To evaluate MPC&A program effectiveness, it is necessary
to have a performance testing and operational monitoring program;
Selected indicators:
* Site has internal review program to evaluate MPC&A performance;
* Site is identifying and correcting MPC&A deficiencies;
* Site tracks number and type of MPC&A incidents.
Element: MPC&A system configuration management;
Description: To sustain the efficient operation of MPC&A systems, it
is necessary to track, log, and evaluate any changes that are
introduced into these systems' configuration;
Selected indicators:
* Changes to MPC&A system configuration are reviewed by appropriate
staff to verify system effectiveness is not degraded;
* Changes in configuration are communicated to and understood by site
staff.
Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy and National
Nuclear Security Administration:
NNSA:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
December 8, 2010:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciated the
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft
report, GA0-11-227, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S.
Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable
Nuclear Materials Worldwide. We understand that this work was done at
the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water
Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, to
assess (1) U.S. government-wide efforts to implement the President's 4-
year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and
challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and
(3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than
Russia.
NNSA appreciates GAO taking note of our accelerated efforts to meet
the President's four-year goal in his April 2009 Prague speech, and in
particular, that NNSA "anticipated a presidential initiative to secure
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide prior to the President's April
2009 announcement and began developing a plan based on statements made
during the 2008 Presidential campaign." Experienced observers of the
nonproliferation and arms control arena have long recognized the need
to address the proliferation threat outside of Russia, and it is one
of the most important reasons the Global Threat Reduction Initiative
(GTRI) was created in the first place. The 2008 Presidential election
provided an opportunity to make accelerated progress on a set of goals
recognized by both candidates to be of the highest national security
concern.
We do not agree with GAO's assertion that GTRI has made little
progress in converting Russian research reactors from the use of
highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel.
First, GTRI's primary focus has been on threat reduction efforts
outside of Russia, and second, as part of NNSA's comprehensive and
integrated approach to manage all our nonproliferation programs,
security upgrades were completed at all of the Russian civilian HEU
research reactor sites under our Material Protection, Control and
Accounting (MPC&A) program. NNSA's ultimate goal is permanent threat
reduction, by converting Russian research reactors from the use of HEU
to LEU fuel. To this end, we have verified the closure of three
Russian HEU research reactors, obtained a commitment for the closure
of five additional Russian HEU research reactors, and are awaiting
Russian approval to begin feasibility studies for the conversion of
six more Russian HEU research reactors. Of note, GTRI has converted or
verified the shutdown of 69 HEU research reactors around the world and
it was only within the past year that we significantly expanded GTRI's
reactor conversion work scope to include the additional 50 Russian
research reactors.
Your third objective was to assess NNSA efforts to secure nuclear
materials in countries other than Russia. We appreciate the fact that
you highlighted the extensive efforts already undertaken by NNSA to
remove all significant quantities of HEU from 18 countries outside
Russia. However, some of our recent accomplishments that fall within
the timeframe were not addressed. In particular, we have made major
progress on a number of threat reduction efforts in South Africa. The
contract for removal of all the U.S.-origin spent HEU fuel was signed
in August 2010, enabling this HEU to be returned to the United States
by June 2011. We also assisted South Africa with the successful
conversion of South Africa's Safari research reactor from the use of
HEU to LEU fuel in 2008, and assisted the South African Nuclear Energy
Corporation (Necsa) with the conversion of its Molybdenum-99 medical
isotope production process from the use of HEU to LEU targets.
In regard to the first recommendation, we agree that effective
communication with Congress on the anticipated scope of work beyond
2013 is very important. and we will continue to provide clear
descriptions of that work as the legislation is developed. We also
agree with the second recommendation and will work to find new
incentives/inducements to address the issue highlighted in the
classified report.
With regard to the third recommendation, we agree that NNSA should
develop new ideas to persuade Russia to expedite conversion of their
HEU-fueled research reactors and related facilities, and to sign a
Material Consolidation and Conversion agreement. We are pleased to
report that we have already begun implementation of this
recommendation.
Under separate cover, we will send technical comments to help clarify
and improve the report in areas that may be confusing or misleading.
Should you have any questions related to this response, please contact
JoAnne Parker, Director, Office of Internal Controls at 202-586-1913.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Gerald L. Talbot, Jr.
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Glen Levis (Assistant
Director), William Hoehn, William King, and Kevin Remondini made key
contributions to this report. Other technical assistance was provided
by Antoinette Capaccio and Alison O'Neill.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Weapon-usable nuclear materials are highly enriched uranium,
uranium-233, and any plutonium containing less than 80 percent of the
isotope plutonium-238. Such materials are also often referred to as
fissile materials or strategic special nuclear materials.
[2] NNSA was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 (1999). It is a separate
semiautonomous agency within DOE, with responsibility for the nation's
nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.
[3] Radiological sources include radioactive material, such as cobalt-
60, cesium-137, and strontium-90. While these materials cannot be used
to create a nuclear weapon, they could be fabricated into a so-called
dirty bomb or device to disperse radioactive materials.
[4] IAEA is an independent international organization based in Vienna,
Austria, that is affiliated with the United Nations and has the dual
mission of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and verifying
that nuclear technologies and materials intended for peaceful purposes
are not diverted to weapons development efforts.
[5] The MPC&A program provides modern nuclear security systems to
facilities in Russia and other countries that, among other things,
include physical protection systems, such as fencing and video
surveillance equipment; material control systems, such as tamper-
indicating seals for nuclear material storage containers and other
access control equipment; and material accounting systems, such as
nuclear measurement equipment and computerized databases, to inventory
and track nuclear materials.
[6] Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,
Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 3156, 116 Stat. 2458, 2739-2740 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 2343(b)(1) (2006)). In March 2010, the Department of Energy
sent a request to Congress requesting that the MPC&A program be
allowed to work in Russia beyond this deadline.
[7] 50 U.S.C. § 2931 (2006).
[8] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need
Better Integration, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-157] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28,
2005).
[9] In a separate report to be issued early next year, we plan to
assess NNSA's financial support for its nonproliferation programs and
evaluate the extent to which nonproliferation programs are being
coordinated across the U.S. government.
[10] In 1991, Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act
of 1991, popularly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar Act, authorizing U.S.
threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, because of
concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. Pub.
L. No. 102-228, 105 Stat. 1691 (1991) (see 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note). The
legislation authorized funding to assist the former Soviet Union with
its efforts to (1) destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; (2)
transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with
their destruction; and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against the
proliferation of such weapons.
[11] The official title of the umbrella agreement is the Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction
of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation.
[12] For information on the MPC&A program, see GAO, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian
Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded
Security Upgrades Is Uncertain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-404] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2007).
[13] Further information about this program can be found in GAO,
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Effort to Close Russia's Plutonium
Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-662] (Washington, D.C.:
June 4, 2004).
[14] For previous GAO reports on these efforts, see GAO, Combating
Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems
Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to
Other Countries, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-311]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006), and Preventing Nuclear Smuggling:
DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection
Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-375] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31,
2005).
[15] For information on NNSA's WMD scientist redirection programs, see
GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist Weapons
Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-189] (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 12, 2007); Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist
Weapons Scientists in Russia's Nuclear Cities Face Challenges,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-429] (Washington, D.C.:
May 3, 2001); and Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE's
Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed Weapons
Scientists, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-99-54]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 1999).
[16] There is a geographic division of labor between MPC&A and GTRI
efforts to secure foreign nuclear material. The MPC&A program
addresses sites in foreign countries including Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, China, and India. GTRI addresses
security at civilian research reactors and related facilities
utilizing nuclear weapon-usable materials in all other countries that
are not considered high-income. For an assessment of the GTRI effort,
see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: National Nuclear Security
Administration Has Improved the Security of Reactors in Its Global
Research Reactor Program, but Action Is Needed to Address Remaining
Concerns, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-949]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009).
[17] The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation was
formed as a result of a 2005 State reorganization that combined
nonproliferation and arms control issues under one bureau. For more
information on this reorganization, see GAO, State Department: Key
Transformation Practices Could Have Helped in Restructuring Arms
Control and Nonproliferation Bureaus, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-738] (Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2009).
[18] This document also identifies potential contributions from the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), including assistance and
other forms of cooperation from NRC to help countries develop
regulatory programs for physical protection of nuclear materials and
facilities. We did not interview NRC officials concerning NRC plans
for its contributions to the President's 4-year initiative.
[19] Under the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction, which was announced by the G-8
nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) at their 2002 summit, the G-8 members
agreed to raise $20 billion over 10 years for nonproliferation-related
assistance, initially to Russia, of which the United States agreed to
provide $10 billion.
[20] At the July 2006 G-8 summit, the United States and Russia
announced the creation of this nonbinding initiative under which
partner nations agreed to a set of principles to enhance national,
regional, and collective capabilities against nuclear terrorism. The
initiative currently includes 82 partner nations and four official
observer organizations.
[21] United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted in
April 2004, requires all states to adopt and enforce laws prohibiting
proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive
materials within their borders. The UN 1540 Committee focuses on
identifying assistance projects for states in need and matching donors
to improve their WMD controls.
[22] This convention establishes security requirements for the
protection of nuclear materials in international transit against
terrorism. In 2005, the convention was amended to extend its scope to
include nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport, as
well as protection of nuclear material and facilities from sabotage.
Entry into force of the amendment requires two-thirds ratification,
acceptance, or approval of the 138 parties; only 41 have so far
ratified, accepted, or approved the amendment.
[23] A formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM)
means 2 Kg or more of plutonium, 5 Kg or more of uranium-235 contained
in HEU, 2 Kg or more of uranium-233, or 5 Kg or more in any
combination of material computed by the equation: grams = (grams of
uranium-235 contained in HEU) + (2.5 X [grams uranium-233 + grams of
plutonium]). A formula quantity of SSNM is also often referred to as
Category I SSNM.
[24] These 3 cities are part of a complex of 10 closed nuclear cities
where access is restricted and which formed the core of the former
Soviet Union's nuclear weapons complex. Many of these cities are in
geographically remote locations and were so secret that they did not
appear on any publicly available maps until 1992.
[25] Since 1972, IAEA has provided its member states with guidelines
for the physical protection of nuclear material, most recently in 1999.
[26] GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration Has Improved the
Security of Reactors in Its Global Research Reactor Program, but
Action Is Needed to Address Remaining Concerns, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-949] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17,
2009).
[27] NNSA conducts MPC&A security upgrades in two phases: Rapid
upgrades include improvements such as bricking up windows where
material is stored; installing strengthened doors, locks, and nuclear
container seals; and establishing controlled access areas.
Comprehensive upgrades include electronic systems to detect intruders,
central alarm stations, and computerized nuclear material accounting
systems.
[28] In reference to the MPC&A program work at Russian nuclear warhead
and material locations, the term "site" typically refers to a complex
of more than one building with nuclear warheads or materials, though
some Russian sites of MPC&A cooperation do constitute a single
building or individual handling facility. MPC&A upgrades may be made
to the overall site perimeter in addition to individual buildings
located within the site boundaries.
[29] The scope of Russian facilities does not include 19 HEU-fueled
research reactors that have been declared to have a solely military
purpose, 2 reactors with a unique design such that conversion has
already been determined to be technically unfeasible, and an
unspecified number of Russian naval propulsion reactors fueled with
HEU.
[30] One national-level MPC&A sustainability project area with Russia
has been completed--working with Russia to upgrade a federal
information system to systematically collect, process, and analyze
reports from Russian nuclear material sites on their nuclear material
inventories.
[31] According to NNSA's guidelines for sustaining and transitioning
MPC&A systems in Russia, the seven elements that are key to an
effective and sustainable MPC&A program are site MPC&A organization;
site operating procedures; human resource management and site
training; operational cost analysis; equipment maintenance, repair,
and calibration; performance testing and operational monitoring; and
MPC&A system configuration management.
[32] The United States has 26 agreements in force for peaceful nuclear
cooperation with foreign countries, the European Atomic Energy
Community, IAEA, and Taiwan. For more information on this subject, see
GAO, U.S.-Russia Nuclear Agreement: Interagency Process Used to
Develop the Classified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Needs to Be
Strengthened, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-743R]
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2009); 2010 Resubmission of the U.S.-
Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Further Actions Needed by State
and Other Agencies to Improve the Review of the Classified Nuclear
Proliferation Assessment, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1039R] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21,
2010); and Nuclear Commerce: Governmentwide Strategy Could Help
Increase Commercial Benefits from U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
with Other Countries, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-36] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4,
2010).
[33] A Coordinated Research Project is an IAEA-supported collaborative
research effort involving researchers from developing and
industrialized countries to solve a problem of common interest
relevant to nuclear technology.
[34] Molybdenum-99 generates another isotope, technetium-99m, through
the radioactive decay process that is used widely for diagnostic
imaging procedures in nuclear medicine. The United States consumes
roughly half of the world's supply of molybdenum-99.
[End of section]
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