Combating Gangs
Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central American Gang Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts Gao ID: GAO-10-395 April 23, 2010Thousands of gang members in the United States belong to gangs such as MS-13 and 18th Street that are also active in Central American countries. Federal entities with responsibilities for addressing Central American gangs include the National Security Council (NSC); the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State; and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO was asked to review federal efforts to combat transnational gangs. This report addresses (1) the extent to which the federal government has developed a strategy to combat these gangs, and (2) how federal agencies have implemented the strategy and other programs to combat these gangs, coordinated their actions, and assessed their results. GAO examined federal agencies' antigang plans, resources, and measures; interviewed federal, state, and local officials in seven localities representing varying population sizes and geographic regions; and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials in El Salvador and Guatemala where U.S. agencies have implemented antigang programs. The results of these interviews are not generalizable.
The NSC, in conjunction with State, DOJ, DHS, and USAID, developed a strategy to combat gangs with connections to Central America; however, the strategy lacks an approach or framework to oversee implementation and performance goals and measures to assess progress. GAO previously reported that characteristics such as defining the problem to be addressed as well as the scope and methodology of the strategy; describing agencies' activities, roles, and responsibilities; providing an approach to oversee implementation; and establishing performance measures, among other characteristics, can enhance a strategy's effectiveness. While the antigang strategy contains some of these characteristics, such as identifying the problems and risks associated with the gangs, describing the scope and purpose of the strategy, and defining roles and responsibilities of federal agencies as well as specific implementation activities, it lacks other characteristics such as an approach for overseeing implementation and goals and measures for assessing progress. For example, although agencies coordinate the strategy's implementation through an interagency task force, agency officials reported that this task force does not oversee the strategy's implementation and that no entity exercises oversight responsibility for the strategy's implementation. Similarly, while State and USAID are developing measures to assess the outcomes of their antigang programs, these measures do not encompass all programs under the strategy or track results of the strategy as a whole. Incorporating these characteristics could enhance the accountability of agencies to implement the strategy and provide a means for assessing progress. To carry out the strategy and combat transnational gangs, federal agencies have implemented programs and taken steps to coordinate their actions and develop performance measures to assess results of individual programs; but, coordination could be strengthened in an antigang unit in El Salvador by reaching agreement on Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) role in the unit, the only such unit currently in Central America. Agencies use various interagency groups to coordinate with each other, such as DOJ's Anti-gang Coordination Committee. However, improved coordination at the FBI-initiated antigang unit in El Salvador could enhance information sharing. While the FBI requests information directly from Salvadoran police, ICE requests go to its country attache, then to FBI agents at the unit who pass it on to Salvadoran police, as ICE does not have an agent at the unit. Prior GAO work has shown that agencies should facilitate information sharing and look for opportunities to leverage resources. Although FBI and ICE officials agree that the process could be improved by posting an ICE agent at the unit and have been discussing the possibility since 2008, they have not yet reached agreement on ICE's role. By reaching agreement, the FBI and ICE could strengthen coordination and information sharing. While agencies have established measures to assess programs, as some of the programs are just starting, data collection for many measures is in the early stages.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Eileen R. Larence Team: Government Accountability Office: Homeland Security and Justice Phone: (202) 512-6510GAO-10-395, Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central American Gang Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2010:
Combating Gangs:
Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central American Gang Strategy,
but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts:
GAO-10-395:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-395, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Thousands of gang members in the United States belong to gangs such as
MS-13 and 18th Street that are also active in Central American
countries. Federal entities with responsibilities for addressing
Central American gangs include the National Security Council (NSC);
the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State;
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO was
asked to review federal efforts to combat transnational gangs. This
report addresses (1) the extent to which the federal government has
developed a strategy to combat these gangs, and (2) how federal
agencies have implemented the strategy and other programs to combat
these gangs, coordinated their actions, and assessed their results.
GAO examined federal agencies‘ antigang plans, resources, and
measures; interviewed federal, state, and local officials in seven
localities representing varying population sizes and geographic
regions; and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials in El Salvador and
Guatemala where U.S. agencies have implemented antigang programs. The
results of these interviews are not generalizable.
What GAO Found:
The NSC, in conjunction with State, DOJ, DHS, and USAID, developed a
strategy to combat gangs with connections to Central America; however,
the strategy lacks an approach or framework to oversee implementation
and performance goals and measures to assess progress. GAO previously
reported that characteristics such as defining the problem to be
addressed as well as the scope and methodology of the strategy;
describing agencies‘ activities, roles, and responsibilities;
providing an approach to oversee implementation; and establishing
performance measures, among other characteristics, can enhance a
strategy‘s effectiveness. While the antigang strategy contains some of
these characteristics, such as identifying the problems and risks
associated with the gangs, describing the scope and purpose of the
strategy, and defining roles and responsibilities of federal agencies
as well as specific implementation activities, it lacks other
characteristics such as an approach for overseeing implementation and
goals and measures for assessing progress. For example, although
agencies coordinate the strategy‘s implementation through an
interagency task force, agency officials reported that this task force
does not oversee the strategy‘s implementation and that no entity
exercises oversight responsibility for the strategy‘s implementation.
Similarly, while State and USAID are developing measures to assess the
outcomes of their antigang programs, these measures do not encompass
all programs under the strategy or track results of the strategy as a
whole. Incorporating these characteristics could enhance the
accountability of agencies to implement the strategy and provide a
means for assessing progress.
To carry out the strategy and combat transnational gangs, federal
agencies have implemented programs and taken steps to coordinate their
actions and develop performance measures to assess results of
individual programs; but, coordination could be strengthened in an
antigang unit in El Salvador by reaching agreement on Immigration and
Customs Enforcement‘s (ICE) role in the unit, the only such unit
currently in Central America. Agencies use various interagency groups
to coordinate with each other, such as DOJ‘s Anti-gang Coordination
Committee. However, improved coordination at the FBI-initiated
antigang unit in El Salvador could enhance information sharing. While
the FBI requests information directly from Salvadoran police, ICE
requests go to its country attaché, then to FBI agents at the unit who
pass it on to Salvadoran police, as ICE does not have an agent at the
unit. Prior GAO work has shown that agencies should facilitate
information sharing and look for opportunities to leverage resources.
Although FBI and ICE officials agree that the process could be
improved by posting an ICE agent at the unit and have been discussing
the possibility since 2008, they have not yet reached agreement on
ICE‘s role. By reaching agreement, the FBI and ICE could strengthen
coordination and information sharing. While agencies have established
measures to assess programs, as some of the programs are just
starting, data collection for many measures is in the early stages.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the NSC revise the antigang strategy to include an
approach for oversight and performance measures and that DOJ and DHS
reach agreement on the composition of an antigang unit in El Salvador.
The NSC did not comment. DOJ and DHS agreed with our recommendation to
them.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-395] or key
components. For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-
8777 or larencee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Interagency Antigang Strategy Clarifies Roles and Specifies Agency
Activities, but Lacks an Approach for Oversight and Comprehensive
Measures to Assess Implementation Efforts:
U.S. Federal Agencies Have Implemented Programs to Combat
Transnational Gangs, but Could Take Additional Action to Enhance
Coordination Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Leadership Structure and Key Transnational Criminal
Activities of MS-13 and 18th Street:
Appendix II: Characteristics of Other Transnational Gangs:
Appendix III: Federal Agencies' Programs to Address Transnational
Gangs with Connections to Central America:
Appendix IV: Federal Agencies' Entities and Mechanisms for
Coordinating Transnational Antigang Efforts:
Appendix V: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix VIII: Comments from the United States Agency for
International Development:
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Categories Related to the Strategy to Combat the Threat of
Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico and Corresponding
Implementing Agencies:
Table 2: Examples of Measures USAID Tracks for Its Efforts to Combat
Transnational Gangs from Central America:
Table 3: Performance Measures and Reported Results for the FBI's
Efforts to Combat Transnational Gangs:
Table 4: Examples of Federal Efforts or Projects Implemented to Combat
Central American Transnational Gangs, by Agency and Country Where
Implemented:
Table 5: Headquarters-Level Entities Focused on Coordination of
Antigang Efforts:
Figures:
Figure 1: Federal Departments and Agencies with Key Roles in Combating
Transnational Gangs:
Figure 2: Youth Participating in Activities at USAID-sponsored Youth
Centers in El Salvador:
Figure 3: ICE Gang-Related Arrests (Fiscal Years 2006 through 2009):
Abbreviations:
ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives:
BOP: Federal Bureau of Prisons:
CARSI: Central American Regional Security Initiative:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
EOUSA: Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
GangTECC: National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination
Center:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
INTERPOL: International Criminal Police Organization:
IOCPCC: International Organized Crime Policy Coordinating Committee:
MS-13: Mara Salvatrucha:
NDIC: National Drug Intelligence Center:
NGIC: National Gang Intelligence Center:
NSC: National Security Council:
OMG: outlaw motorcycle gang:
SOUTHCOM: U.S. Southern Command:
State: Department of State:
the Strategy: Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from
Central America and Mexico:
TAG: Transnational Anti-Gang unit:
Treasury: Department of the Treasury:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
USAO: U.S. Attorneys' Offices:
USMS: U.S. Marshals Service:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 23, 2010:
The Honorable Lamar S. Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
United States Senate:
According to the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment by the National
Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) and National Drug Intelligence Center
(NDIC), as of September 2008, there were approximately 1 million gang
members in the United States--a 25 percent increase over 2005
membership levels.[Footnote 1] The assessment found that street gangs
that operate throughout most of the United States are a significant
threat that has become magnified as national-and regional-level street
gangs migrate from urban areas to suburban and rural communities.
According to the assessment, gang members engage in a host of criminal
activities such as homicide, extortion, drug distribution, and other
crimes. Gangs such as the Latin Kings, the Jamaican Posse, Mara
Salvatrucha (MS-13), and 18th Street, as well as outlaw motorcycle
gangs like the Hells Angels, have been identified by federal law
enforcement officials as transnational gangs--gangs whose members are
present in and criminally active in more than one country. Of these,
gangs with ties to Central America such as MS-13 and 18th Street have
been specifically identified as posing serious threats to the public
safety of communities in the United States and in Central American
countries due to their extremely violent nature, the breadth of their
criminal activities, and their rapid expansion.[Footnote 2] Our report
focuses primarily on U.S. federal agencies' efforts to combat these
gangs with ties to Central America.
A wide variety of federal departments and agencies have
responsibilities for addressing the issue of gangs with ties to
Central America, including the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland
Security (DHS), State (State), and Defense (DOD), and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID). Under the auspices of the
National Security Council's (NSC) International Organized Crime Policy
Coordinating Committee (IOCPCC),[Footnote 3] these departments and
agencies have collaboratively developed an interagency strategy to
combat the threat of criminal gangs with connections to Central
America and Mexico. In addition, these departments and agencies work
together and with Central American countries and nongovernmental
organizations to, among other things, exchange information for use in
investigating gang crime, remove gang members who are illegally
residing in the United States, and support programs to help prevent
young people from becoming gang members or to intervene to provide at-
risk youth with alternatives to being part of a gang. In July 2009 we
reported on federal efforts to combat gang crime within the United
States and coordination mechanisms among federal, state, and local
agencies for domestic-based antigang efforts.[Footnote 4] We discuss
the status of our July 2009 recommendations relevant to transnational
gangs later in this report.
You asked us to examine the extent to which U.S. federal agencies have
taken steps to address the problem of transnational gangs. This report
focuses on U.S. federal agencies' efforts to combat Central American
gangs, addressing the following questions: (1) To what extent has the
U.S. federal government developed a strategy to combat transnational
gangs with connections to Central America? and (2) How have U.S.
federal agencies implemented this strategy and related programs to
combat transnational gangs with connections to Central America, and to
what extent have federal agencies coordinated these programs and
assessed their results? In addition, we provide information on the
leadership structure and transnational criminal activities of MS-13
and 18th Street (see appendix I) and other U.S. gangs that federal law
enforcement agencies have identified as having transnational
connections (see appendix II). We also provide additional details on
federal programs for combating transnational gangs (see appendix III)
and federal antigang coordinating mechanisms and entities (see
appendix IV).
To determine to what extent the U.S. federal government has developed
a strategy to combat transnational gangs with connections to Central
America, we examined the interagency strategy developed by various
federal departments and agencies under the auspices of the NSC, called
the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central
America and Mexico (the Strategy), and compared the contents of the
strategy to select criteria in our prior work on desirable
characteristics of an effective national strategy, including (1) clear
purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) discussion of problems, risks,
and threats; (3) desired goals, objectives, activities, and
performance measures; and (4) delineation of roles and
responsibilities.[Footnote 5] We also examined the roles and
activities of the various federal departments and agencies under the
Strategy, including DOJ, DHS, State, DOD, the Department of the
Treasury (Treasury), and USAID, and their component agencies, such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) within DOJ and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS, that are
responsible for carrying out efforts under the Strategy. In regard to
the NSC, we discussed its role in developing and implementing the
Strategy with a mix of the departments and agencies that participated
in the NSC's IOCPCC such as State, DOJ, and USAID.
To determine how U.S. federal agencies have implemented programs to
carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs, coordinated
these programs and assessed their results, we examined a mix of DOJ's,
DHS's, State's, USAID's, and their component agencies' plans,
performance data, reports, and assessments for fiscal years 2006
through 2009. We compared federal agencies' efforts to coordinate and
share information on their transnational antigang programs to select
criteria on effective interagency collaboration and results-oriented
government.[Footnote 6] In addition, we reviewed federal agencies'
budget requests for fiscal years 2008 through 2010; appropriations
acts for DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID and supplemental appropriations
acts for those fiscal years; and expenditure plans for U.S. provision
of antigang assistance to countries in Central America. To assess the
reliability of statistical information, such as data on performance
and outcomes, we discussed the sources of the data with agency
officials and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of
data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report. To obtain information on federal efforts to
combat the gangs as well as the extent to which agencies have
coordinated their efforts with other agencies, we interviewed a mix of
federal, state, and local law enforcement officials in seven locations
in the United States as well as a mix of officials from U.S. federal,
foreign, and three nongovernmental agencies in El Salvador and
Guatemala. The locations we selected were based on a mix of criteria
that included locations (1) along the U.S. borders; (2) where U.S.
federal agencies have implemented antigang programs; and (3) where
federal law enforcement agencies have conducted operations involving
gangs with connections to Central America. For our site visits to
foreign locations, we consulted with officials of federal agencies to
identify in which foreign locations their agencies had efforts
underway. Of the countries in the region, agency officials suggested
we visit El Salvador and Guatemala because more antigang initiatives
were underway and further along compared to efforts in other
countries. Given this, we selected these countries to obtain more
information on these efforts and evaluate the effect they have had on
the gang problem. To obtain information on the process of how ICE
handles and removes gang members who are in the United States
illegally, we visited ICE's South Texas Detention Facility in
Pearsall, Texas, and interviewed officials with ICE's Office of
Detention and Removal Operations. We also observed activities related
to gang prevention efforts in El Salvador and Guatemala, such as those
at the youth centers, and interviewed participants, local government
officials involved in the efforts, and members of the community about
their views of the programs and the programs' effect. The information
we obtained from interviewing officials in the U.S. and Central
American locations cannot be generalized across all locations in the
United States or Central America. However, because we selected these
locations based on a variety of factors, they provided us with an
overview of the agencies' antigang programs, examples of coordination
and measurements to assess results, and any challenges with
implementation of the programs. Additional details on our scope and
methodology, including the locations we visited, are in appendix V.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through April
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Overview of Gangs with Connections to Central America:
Both the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs were formed in Los Angeles,
California. MS-13 was founded by Salvadoran immigrants, many of whom
came to the United States to escape the civil war in their native
country in the 1980s. The 18th Street gang was founded primarily by
Mexican immigrants in the 1960s, though it currently accepts members
from other backgrounds. MS-13's early membership is reported to have
included former guerrillas and Salvadoran government soldiers whose
combat experience during the Salvadoran civil war contributed to the
growth of the gang's notoriety as one of the more violent Los Angeles
street gangs. The end of the Central American civil wars and changes
in U.S. immigration laws helped to facilitate the removal of tens of
thousands of Central Americans illegally in the United States to their
native countries in the 1990s, including MS-13 and 18th Street gang
members who subsequently spread their gang culture and operations to
those countries.[Footnote 7] MS-13 and 18th Street gang members
removed from the United States to Central American countries
established gangs in those countries.
Within the United States, NGIC has reported that MS-13 has between
8,000 and 10,000 members nationally. The FBI has reported that MS-13
operates in at least 42 states and the District of Columbia.
Traditionally, in the United States, MS-13 has consisted of loosely
affiliated groups; however, law enforcement officials have reported
the coordination of criminal activity among MS-13 gang members
operating in the Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, and
Washington, D.C., metropolitan areas. In the 2009 National Gang Threat
Assessment, the NGIC and NDIC indicated that MS-13 members have been
involved in a wide range of crimes within U.S. communities, including
homicide, drive-by shootings, assault, robbery, weapons trafficking,
the transportation and distribution of drugs, identity theft, and
prostitution operations. The 18th Street gang is active in 28 states
and has a membership estimated at between 30,000 and 50,000. According
to the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment, in California, for
example, about 80 percent of 18th Street gang members are illegal
aliens from Mexico and Central America. In the United States, 18th
Street gang members have been involved in homicide, assault, robbery,
street-level drug distribution, auto theft, and identification fraud.
Although estimates vary, in the Central American countries of El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, USAID has estimated that
there are approximately 63,000 gang members,[Footnote 8] while the
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has estimated total gang membership
in Central America to be approximately 70,000.[Footnote 9] According
to USAID, the majority of these members belong to MS-13 and 18th
Street. Within Central American countries, these gangs engage in a
range of criminal and violent acts, including homicide, kidnapping,
drug smuggling, and extortion, among other crimes.
Overview of Federal Agencies' Missions and Roles in Combating
Transnational Gangs:
The NSC is the President's principal forum for considering national
security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security
advisors and cabinet officials. The council also serves as the
President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among
various government agencies. As such, under its IOCPCC, the NSC
coordinated with other federal departments and agencies to develop a
strategy to combat the threat of criminal gangs from Central America.
Various other federal departments and agencies play key roles in U.S.
federal government efforts to address transnational gangs. As shown in
figure 1, these departments include DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and DOD.
Figure 1: Federal Departments and Agencies with Key Roles in Combating
Transnational Gangs:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Department of Justice (DOJ):
* Criminal Division:
- Gang Unit;
- International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program;
- Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and
Training;
* Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF);
* Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA);
* Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
* U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol;
* Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA);
* U.S. Attorneys.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS):
* U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);
* U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
State Department:
* Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs;
* Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement(ICE)
U.S. Customs and Border Protection(CBP)
Department of Homeland Security(DHS)
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID):
* Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean;
* Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance.
Department of Defense (DOD):
* U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).
Source: GAO analysis of DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and DOD information.
[End of figure]
DOJ Component Agencies' Roles and Responsibilities for Combating
Transnational Gangs:
Within DOJ, seven components have key roles in law enforcement efforts
to combat transnational gangs--the Criminal Division; the 93 U.S.
Attorneys in 94 judicial districts across the nation that operate with
administrative and operational support from the Executive Office for
U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA); and four law enforcement agencies--the FBI;
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA); and U.S. National Central Bureau of
Interpol.[Footnote 10] The Criminal Division, along with the U.S.
Attorneys, is charged with enforcing most federal criminal laws and
can prosecute a wide range of criminal matters, including those
involving transnational gangs and gang members.[Footnote 11] The
Criminal Division's International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program[Footnote 12] and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial
Development, Assistance and Training[Footnote 13] have been involved
in providing antigang training for law enforcement officials and
prosecutors from Central America. Also part of the Criminal Division
is the Gang Unit, a specialized group of prosecutors charged with
developing and implementing strategies to address gangs. In addition
to prosecuting gang cases, the Gang Unit prosecutors assist U.S.
Attorneys on legal issues and multidistrict cases, as well as work
with domestic and foreign law enforcement to coordinate enforcement
strategies. The 93 U.S. Attorneys prosecute the majority of criminal
cases as well as civil litigation handled by DOJ. EOUSA provides
general executive assistance and guidance to U.S. Attorneys' Offices
(USAO) and has a national gang coordinator who acts as a liaison
between the USAOs and other DOJ components involved in gang
prosecution efforts.[Footnote 14] The FBI's transnational gang efforts
target violent crime and criminal enterprises associated with
transnational gangs. ATF's primary involvement with MS-13 and 18th
Street is related to gang members' illegal possession of, or
trafficking in, firearms. DEA targets gangs in connection with
specific drug sources or large-scale suppliers who distribute illicit
drugs to the gangs. The U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol is
the point of contact for all International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL) matters in the United States, including secure
communications with police authorities in INTERPOL member countries.
[Footnote 15] As such, among other things, the National Central Bureau
receives and sends out notices to INTERPOL bureaus in other countries
concerning information or the location of gang members or suspects
involved in gang activities.
DHS Component Agencies' Roles and Responsibilities for Combating
Transnational Gangs:
Within DHS, ICE's Office of Investigations has a National Gang Unit
that manages and coordinates national efforts to combat the growth and
proliferation of transnational criminal street gangs. Gang members who
are involved in crimes with a nexus to the border, or are foreign-born
and are in the United States illegally may be subject to ICE's dual
criminal and administrative authorities that are used to disrupt and
dismantle transnational gang activities with criminal prosecutions and
removal from the United States. In addition, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), the DHS component that protects U.S. borders against
terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug smuggling, among other
threats, has a role in identifying gang members at the borders. Upon
the arrest of a suspected gang member, CBP will contact ICE and
determine if enforcement action is to be taken by CBP or ICE based
upon whether the apprehension took place between the ports of entry or
at a port of entry. CBP has developed an Anti-Gang Initiative to
improve the agency's awareness of gangs through increased partnerships
with other federal agencies and to provide gang awareness training for
its personnel.
State and USAID Bureaus' Roles and Responsibilities for Combating
Transnational Gangs:
Two State bureaus, the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, are
involved in efforts to address gang violence in Central America. The
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is responsible for managing and
promoting U.S. interests in the region and fostering cooperation on
issues such as drug trafficking and crime. The Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs advises the U.S. government on
the development of policies and programs to combat narcotics and
crime, and works with host nations to strengthen their capabilities so
that they can bolster their own effectiveness in fighting drug
trafficking and crime including transnational gangs.
USAID provides economic, development, and humanitarian assistance to
other countries and, with respect to transnational gangs, is the
primary agency responsible for managing gang intervention and
prevention efforts in Central America.[Footnote 16] These efforts are
carried out principally through the agency's Bureau for Latin America
and the Caribbean and missions in Central America, with technical
assistance and support from the Democracy and Governance Office of the
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. The agency
works with foreign governments and local communities in Central
America to support and implement a broad range of programs focused on,
among other things, creating employment opportunities and alternatives
to participating in gangs.
DOD Roles and Responsibilities for Combating Transnational Gangs:
DOD, and specifically SOUTHCOM, has tracked the growth of the gangs in
the Central American countries that are within its area of
responsibility. Although SOUTHCOM does not have any specific programs
in place in Central America to combat transnational gangs, it monitors
information on gangs that either pose a threat to the sovereignty of
governments in the region or are involved in drug trafficking.
The Mérida Initiative:
U.S.-sponsored antigang programs in Central America are being funded
in part by the Mérida Initiative. This initiative was announced by the
Bush Administration in October 2007 as a multinational effort to
confront criminal organizations whose actions affect Mexico, Central
America, and the Caribbean countries of the Dominican Republic and
Haiti, and spill over into the United States.[Footnote 17] Through
this initiative, the U.S. federal government is providing equipment,
training, and other assistance to help these countries address drug
and arms trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, and other crime issues such
as gangs and organized crime.[Footnote 18] For Central America,
funding under the Mérida Initiative is administered by State and has
been allocated to various areas and efforts, including to combat
transnational gangs, improve Central American countries' judicial
systems, enhance airport and border security in the region, refurbish
patrol boats used by Central American countries for intercepting drug
traffickers in coastal waters, and a broad range of crime prevention
programs, including programs directed at youth at-risk. In fiscal year
2008, the Supplemental Appropriations Act appropriated $60 million for
the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative.[Footnote 19] In
fiscal year 2009, the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act appropriated
$105 million for Mérida Initiative activities in Central America.
[Footnote 20] Up to $83 million was appropriated for Mérida Initiative
activities in Central America for fiscal year 2010 by the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010.[Footnote 21] We recently completed work
looking at the status of funds for the initiative and have work
ongoing examining U.S. counternarcotics and anticrime assistance
provided to Mexico under the initiative.[Footnote 22] We plan to issue
a report on this work later this year.
As of February 2010, federal agencies were developing a strategy for a
regional security initiative in Central America, called the Central
American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). This new initiative is
in accordance with direction in the conference report accompanying the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, which removed the Central
American portion from the Mérida Initiative and placed funding for
Central American programs into the new CARSI.[Footnote 23] Under this
new initiative, Central American programs initially funded by the
Mérida Initiative, including antigang programs under the Strategy,
would be subsumed into CARSI. According to officials from State and
USAID, the CARSI strategy is still under development and officials did
not have an estimate as to when it would be completed.
In addition to funding provided under the Mérida Initiative, federal
agencies have used funding from their operating accounts to implement
antigang programs in Central America and the United States. For
example, in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 the FBI funded $200,000 and
$965,000 from its operating account for establishment of the
Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) unit in El Salvador and the operations
of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force, an FBI task force that
coordinates FBI-led investigations of MS-13 and 18th Street gangs,
respectively. Further, ICE uses funding to conduct transnational gang
investigations in the United States and abroad. According to ICE
officials, $20.4 million that Congress directed to be used for ICE's
antigang activities in fiscal year 2008 funded 119 positions to expand
ICE's efforts to combat transnational street gangs.[Footnote 24]
Additionally, USAID officials reported starting their gang prevention
programs before Mérida Initiative funding became available and have
used non-initiative resources to promote antigang and rule-of-law
programs in Central America.
The Interagency Antigang Strategy Clarifies Roles and Specifies Agency
Activities, but Lacks an Approach for Oversight and Comprehensive
Measures to Assess Implementation Efforts:
Various federal departments and agencies under the auspices of the NSC
developed an interagency strategy for combating gangs with connections
to Central America that defines the roles and responsibilities of
federal agencies in carrying out the strategy, identifies the problems
and risks associated with the gangs, defines its scope and purpose,
and identifies specific activities to be taken to achieve results.
However, it lacks other key characteristics, such as providing an
approach or framework to include an entity for overseeing
implementation, and goals and measures for assessing progress and
performance in implementing the strategy.
The Antigang Strategy Identifies Roles, Responsibilities, and
Activities for Federal Agencies in Combating Transnational Gangs:
To respond to the threats criminal gangs such as MS-13 and 18th Street
pose to the countries in which they operate, U.S. federal agencies
developed the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from
Central America and Mexico (the Strategy). Issued in July 2007,
[Footnote 25] this interagency strategy was developed under the
auspices of the NSC's IOCPCC, comprised of representatives from
various federal agencies, including State, DOJ, DHS, USAID, and DOD.
[Footnote 26] The Strategy is designed to combat the threat posed by
gangs with links to Central America and Mexico by adopting an approach
that integrates law enforcement with youth crime prevention and
interventions that provide alternatives to gangs. The Strategy is also
designed to be regional in scope, with the United States working with
the other countries affected by the gangs to avoid transferring the
gang problem to neighboring countries. To implement this approach, the
Strategy includes five broad categories under which federal agencies
are to take actions to combat transnational gangs--diplomacy,
repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention--
and identifies the activities for agencies to implement under each of
these categories. As shown in table 1, for each category, the Strategy
identifies agencies that are to implement the individual activities
and a lead agency to coordinate these activities. Specifically, the
Strategy identifies State as the lead agency for the diplomacy
category and, along with USAID, the lead agency for the capacity
enhancement category; DHS as the lead agency for the repatriation
category and, along with DOJ, the lead agency for the law enforcement
category; and USAID as the lead agency for the prevention category.
Table 1: Categories Related to the Strategy to Combat the Threat of
Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico and Corresponding
Implementing Agencies:
Strategy category and description: Diplomacy: Carry out diplomatic
efforts with affected countries to establish a coordinated and
comprehensive approach to the gang problem;
Lead agency for the category: State;
Example of activities identified under each category: Work with
multilateral organizations, including the Central American Integration
System and the Organization of American States, to coordinate and
support a regional strategy;
Agency responsible for the activity: State and USAID.
Example of activities identified under each category: Pursue a policy
of engagement with target countries, working with them to identify the
best initiatives to pursue at any given time;
Agency responsible for the activity: State and USAID.
Strategy category and description: Repatriation: Expedite the
repatriation (removal) process of gang members and provide receiving
countries with criminal history information of the gang members;
Lead agency for the category: DHS;
Example of activities identified under each category: Expand the
Electronic Travel Document[A] system to countries in the region as
conditions permit;
Agency responsible for the activity: DHS.
Example of activities identified under each category: Provide
receiving countries with related information that could help
facilitate the reintegration of individuals removed from the United
States;
Agency responsible for the activity: DOJ and DHS.
Strategy category and description: Law enforcement: Identify and
exploit the gangs' vulnerabilities in order to disrupt their criminal
activities and dismantle their criminal infrastructure;
Lead agency for the category: DOJ and DHS;
Example of activities identified under each category: Develop
effective channels for sharing intelligence and operational
enforcement information pertinent to antigang activities;
Agency responsible for the activity: DOJ and DHS.
Example of activities identified under each category: Deter and deny,
through bilateral and multilateral law enforcement activities, the
ability of criminal gangs to engage in transnational criminal
activities or recruit new members;
Agency responsible for the activity: DOJ and DHS.
Strategy category and description: Capacity enhancement: Strengthen
the capacity of criminal justice systems in Central America and Mexico
to identify, prosecute, and incarcerate gang leaders and operatives,
as well as seize and have them forfeit their assets;
Lead agency for the category: State and USAID;
Example of activities identified under each category: Provide training
and technical assistance to selected elements within the justice
system in each country and support the development of regular channels
of communication and cooperation among them;
Agency responsible for the activity: DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID.
Example of activities identified under each category: Support
community efforts to combat gang crime and violence in the region,
including collaboration between law enforcement entities and
communities;
Agency responsible for the activity: State, USAID, and DOJ.
Strategy category and description: Prevention: Strengthen the capacity
of governments, nongovernmental organizations, and communities to
reduce gang activity by discouraging youth from joining gangs and
providing rehabilitation and integration options for youth who leave
gangs;
Lead agency for the category: USAID;
Example of activities identified under each category: Support efforts
to provide rehabilitation and reintegration programs and services to
individuals removed from the United States to prevent them from
joining a criminal gang or continuing involvement with criminal gangs
upon return;
Agency responsible for the activity: USAID, State, DOJ, and DHS.
Example of activities identified under each category: Assist community-
based organizations and local authorities to provide youth with
productive alternatives to criminal gang activity or encourage them to
leave gangs (e.g., job placement, vocational skills
training/alternative education, drug rehabilitation);
Agency responsible for the activity: USAID and DOJ.
Source: Department of State.
Notes: Data are from the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal
Gangs from Central America and Mexico.
[A] Under the Electronic Travel Document system, ICE electronically
sends travel document applications to the consular officials of these
countries who can then electronically sign and certify the documents
stating that the countries will receive the illegal aliens to be
removed. These documents are also available to ICE electronically.
This program eliminates the need for consular officials to visit in
person the individual awaiting removal from the United States before
issuing documents, helping to reduce the amount of time it takes for
ICE to receive travel documents from foreign countries and ultimately
remove illegal aliens. The system has been implemented in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras.
[End of table]
As part of our prior work on desirable characteristics of effective
national strategies, we have reported that such strategies are the
foundation for defining what agencies seek to accomplish.[Footnote 27]
As such, we found that having characteristics like a description of
agencies' activities, roles, and responsibilities as part of a
strategy helps to enhance the strategy's effectiveness. Strategies
that include characteristics such as these provide policymakers and
implementing agencies with a planning tool that can better help ensure
accountability and more effective results.[Footnote 28]
In addition to defining activities, roles, and responsibilities of
participating agencies, the Strategy also defines its scope and
purpose and identifies the problems, risks, and threats associated
with transnational gangs. In our prior work, we found that desirable
characteristics of effective national strategies also include a
discussion of purpose, scope, problems, risks, and threats. For
example, in defining its purpose and scope, the Strategy notes that
effectively addressing the problem of these transnational gangs
requires close coordination and information sharing among the affected
countries in Central America and Mexico and a comprehensive approach
that includes law enforcement, prevention, intervention,
rehabilitation, and reintegration for gang members, which the five
categories of the Strategy are intended to address. In regards to
identifying the problem, the Strategy states that gangs such as MS-13
and 18th Street threaten U.S. regional interests in fostering stable
democracies and the U.S. domestic interest in protecting U.S. citizens
from gang violence and crime. These characteristics help indicate why
the Strategy was developed and identify the specific national issues
and threats toward which the Strategy is directed.
The Strategy's Lack of an Oversight Framework Hinders Efforts to
Enhance Accountability:
Even as the Strategy contains several characteristics of effective
national strategies, it lacks other characteristics, such as providing
an approach for overseeing implementation of programs and efforts
across its different categories. Our prior work on effective national
strategies found that they include an approach or framework for
overseeing their implementation or describe the organizations that
will provide oversight, which enhances the accountability of agencies
and stakeholders to implement programs as planned.[Footnote 29] This
is especially important for the U.S. antigang strategy given that (1)
there are eight federal departments or agencies involved in
implementing the Strategy; (2) these agencies have wide-ranging
missions and programs--from USAID's mission to implement gang
prevention and youth intervention programs to ICE's mission to remove
foreign-born gang members from the United States; and (3) the Strategy
specifies 35 different activities under the five categories that
federal agencies are to implement.
With regard to oversight, the Strategy itself does not identify an
approach or framework for providing oversight across agencies'
implementation of the Strategy's categories and activities and,
according to DOJ, State, and USAID officials, one does not exist.
Although the Strategy designates lead departments or agencies for each
category, such as State leading the Diplomacy category and USAID
leading the Prevention category, the Strategy does not designate an
approach to provide oversight of the overall implementation of the
Strategy across the Strategy's various categories. Further, while
members of an interagency antigang task force have discussed agencies'
efforts to implement the Strategy, this task force is not intended to
provide this oversight. According to DOJ, State, and USAID officials,
under the auspices of the NSC, the International Anti-Gang Task Force,
which is chaired by DOJ's Criminal Division and includes
representatives from DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID, has responsibility
for sharing information on the implementation of the Strategy.
However, this task force is not intended to, nor does it, provide
oversight for holding agencies accountable for implementation of their
activities under the Strategy. Additionally, State's regional gang
advisor stated that no single department or entity has been identified
as having oversight responsibility for the Strategy's implementation.
DOJ officials did not know why an oversight mechanism was not included
in the Strategy, noting that, as a result, there is no enforcement
mechanism to ensure that agencies are implementing their respective
parts of the Strategy. USAID officials told us that after the Strategy
was developed, the individual within the NSC who had been responsible
for coordinating development of the Strategy stated that the council's
IOCPCC was to oversee the implementation of the Strategy; however this
did not occur in part because the individual left the council.
Additionally, although federal agencies are developing a strategy for
the newly formed CARSI, participating agencies have not yet determined
the oversight framework, if any, that is to be used for this broader
initiative or whether the existing antigang Strategy will be
incorporated into CARSI. Thus, it is too early to tell whether CARSI
will provide an oversight approach for federal agencies' antigang
programs. Regardless of whether the antigang Strategy is incorporated
into the new CARSI, or whether the NSC or some other agency or entity
is responsible for oversight, establishing an approach or framework
for oversight across the Strategy's categories could help enhance the
accountability of agencies to implement activities as laid out in the
Strategy and provide visibility over the extent to which agencies'
individual efforts are achieving their intended results under the
Strategy.
The Strategy's Lack of Performance Goals and Measures Hinders Efforts
to Assess Progress:
Our prior work found that effective national strategies set clear
goals and related performance measures for assessing progress made in
achieving intended results. The Strategy, however, does not identify
the goals that are to be achieved through its implementation and the
associated measures to track the progress made in achieving those
goals, which could be established and monitored through an oversight
approach or framework. We have reported that performance measurement
is important because decision makers can use performance information
to identify problems or weaknesses in programs, identify factors
causing problems, and modify processes to address the
problems.[Footnote 30] USAID officials told us that after the Strategy
was initially developed, the NSC intended to establish performance
measures for implementation of the Strategy, but this did not occur in
part because the individual within the NSC who had been responsible
for coordinating development of the Strategy left the council.
Although the Strategy itself lacks goals and measures to gauge results
and assess progress across the Strategy's categories and activities,
State and USAID, for their parts of the Strategy, have begun to
develop mechanisms to assess the results of their efforts being
implemented under the Mérida Initiative, including the initiative's
antigang programs. For example, for its part, State has drafted four
gang-specific performance measures within the broader set of measures
it is developing for the Mérida Initiative: (1) number of arrests of
suspected gang members completed by police units trained/equipped
through Mérida Initiative funding in countergang strategies, (2)
number of arrests and prosecutions of gang leaders in the region, (3)
number of gang-related crime occurrences and homicides in the region,
and (4) number of instances where gang-related information is passed
from the TAG to U.S. law enforcement for review/action. State
officials noted that the department is working with its embassies to
determine if Central American countries will be capable of providing
the department with the requisite data needed to determine results and
outcomes for these measures, as these countries control much of the
data, often in disparate data sets and across various ministries. As
of November 2009, State officials also reported that they were in the
process of reviewing bids from contractors to develop performance
measures for the department's Mérida Initiative programs, including
its antigang programs, and to work directly with the host nations to
obtain the necessary data to determine the results and outcomes of the
efforts based on these measures.[Footnote 31]
In addition to the measures State is developing to evaluate the
results of Mérida Initiative-funded programs in Central America, USAID
has developed a Mérida Initiative Central America Results Framework
that includes an effect evaluation to be conducted by Vanderbilt
University through a contractual arrangement with USAID. The agency
intends for this evaluation to assess the long-term effect and measure
the results of its programs in Central American communities that are
the focus of USAID crime prevention efforts under the Mérida
Initiative, including those related to gangs. The evaluation consists
of five elements: (1) community surveys, (2) reviews of demographic
data in the communities, (3) focus groups, (4) interviews with
stakeholders such as community leaders, and (5) community observations
such as physical infrastructure. Vanderbilt University officials are
to conduct the evaluations every 18 months in communities where USAID-
sponsored crime prevention activities have been implemented and
communities where no activities have been implemented, with these
latter communities serving as control groups in order to establish a
baseline. Specifically with respect to the surveys, USAID plans to use
the results to gauge the effect of its crime prevention programs
through community and citizen perceptions on safety and security. To
minimize any duplication and take advantage of survey efforts already
underway, USAID officials stated that they plan to incorporate the
survey questions on community and citizen perceptions on safety and
security as part of a broader survey Vanderbilt University will be
conducting in the region in 2010.
Although State and USAID have begun to develop mechanisms to help
assess the outcomes of antigang programs implemented under the Mérida
Initiative, these mechanisms do not encompass all of the Strategy's
categories and activities, nor do they include the antigang programs
of other federal agencies, such as those of DOJ and DHS. For example,
while the measures State is developing, such as the numbers of arrests
of gang members and leaders in the region, relate to the law
enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention categories of the
Strategy, these measures do not encompass the diplomacy or
repatriation categories of the Strategy. According to State and USAID
officials as well as officials from the FBI and ICE, State and USAID
have not consulted or worked with DOJ and DHS agencies such as FBI and
ICE in developing these performance measures because State's and
USAID's measures are intended to encompass only their own programs and
efforts. According to State, USAID, DOJ, and DHS officials, each
agency focuses on developing performance-related goals and measures
for its own programs as opposed to other agencies' antigang programs
for which it is not responsible, and, therefore, less familiar. As a
result, the performance measures State and USAID are developing cannot
serve as overall indicators of the federal government's progress in
implementing the Strategy as they do not take into account all of the
federal agencies' antigang programs to be implemented under the
Strategy's five categories, including those programs led by DOJ and
DHS. In the absence of goals and performance measures or other
mechanisms for monitoring and assessing the progress and performance
of agencies' antigang programs across the categories of the Strategy,
it will be difficult for the federal government to determine if the
overall interagency antigang effort is achieving the intended results
and to hold agencies accountable for implementing the Strategy.
U.S. Federal Agencies Have Implemented Programs to Combat
Transnational Gangs, but Could Take Additional Action to Enhance
Coordination Efforts:
Federal agencies have implemented a variety of programs to carry out
the Strategy and combat transnational gangs with connections to
Central America. To coordinate their implementation of antigang
programs, agencies use a variety of mechanisms such as interagency
committees and task forces. However, for the antigang unit in El
Salvador, coordination among the FBI, ICE, and Salvadoran law
enforcement in sharing investigative information on gangs could be
enhanced by reaching agreement on ICE's participation in the unit.
Further, although agencies have taken steps to develop performance
measures and obtain data on those measures to track the results of
programs, agencies are just starting to collect performance data due
to the early stage of implementation of most of these programs.
Additionally, federal agencies have identified various factors that
are largely outside their control and that can affect their
implementation of programs, such as challenges facing Central American
countries in sustaining antigang programs.
Federal Agencies Have Developed a Variety of Programs to Implement the
Interagency Strategy:
To carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs with
connections to Central American countries, federal agencies have
developed and implemented a variety of programs in the United States
and in host countries in the region, such as El Salvador and
Guatemala. This variety of programs reflects the different categories
of the strategy and includes diplomatic efforts to establish a
coordinated approach to the gang problem; efforts to facilitate the
repatriation of gang members who are in the United States illegally;
mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of investigative information
between U.S. law enforcement agencies and foreign law enforcement
agencies; programs to provide training to Central American law
enforcement officials; and programs to provide recreational and
vocational opportunities for at-risk youth, among others. Additional
details on federal agencies' antigang programs under each category of
the Strategy are as follows:[Footnote 32]
* Diplomacy: State has led efforts to engage diplomatically with
Central American countries to discuss gang issues. The department has
led discussions with member countries of the Central American
Integration System. Under this initiative, the United States and
Central American countries first held discussions regarding regional
gang threats in July 2007, at which time the United States announced
the Strategy. The countries held a second, and the most recent,
dialogue in December 2008, which focused on discussing practical
measures to combat the threats of criminal gangs, narcotics
trafficking, and illicit trafficking of firearms in Central America.
At the conclusion, all participating countries signed a communiqué
pledging their continued support in the fight against transnational
threats, including gangs.
* Repatriation: ICE has implemented the Electronic Travel Document
system to facilitate the issuance of travel documents for the removal
of illegal aliens, including gang members, to El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras. Under this program, ICE electronically sends travel
document applications to the consular officials of these countries;
these officials can then electronically sign and certify the documents
stating that the countries will receive the illegal aliens to be
removed.[Footnote 33] These documents are available to ICE
electronically through the Electronic Travel Document system. This
program eliminates the need for consular officials to visit in person
the individual awaiting removal from the United States before issuing
documents, helping to reduce the amount of time it takes for ICE to
receive travel documents from foreign countries and ultimately remove
illegal aliens. According to ICE officials, the program can eliminate
approximately 5 to 7 days that an alien would spend in detention, thus
decreasing the cost incurred by the government.
* Law Enforcement: In 2005, ICE implemented Operation Community
Shield--a nationwide initiative to arrest and remove criminal alien
gang members from the United States. ICE began the operation to target
violent transnational street gangs through the use of ICE's broad law
enforcement powers to identify, prosecute, and ultimately remove gang
members from the United States. Although initially focused on MS-13,
ICE expanded Operation Community Shield to target all transnational
criminal street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. For
its part, the FBI has implemented various programs to facilitate the
exchange of information, such as criminal histories of suspected gang
members, between law enforcement agencies in the United States and
Central American countries. For example, in 2007, the FBI established
a joint U.S.-Salvadoran Transnational Anti-Gang unit in El Salvador--
called TAG--to exchange information on gangs and gang members between
the Salvadoran national police and U.S.-based law enforcement agencies
for use in criminal investigations and gang-member prosecutions in
both countries. The unit includes investigators and analysts from the
Salvadoran national police, prosecutors from El Salvador's Attorney
General's Office, and two FBI agents. The TAG unit's exchange of
information on gang members has aided U.S. gang investigations in
locations such as Charlotte, North Carolina; Omaha, Nebraska; and Los
Angeles, California. The FBI plans to establish units like this in
Guatemala and Honduras. Further, in 2006, the FBI began the Central
American Fingerprint Exploitation program to collect and store
existing criminal fingerprint records and other biometric information
from the countries of Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize, and
Honduras in FBI databases and make them available to all U.S. local,
state, and federal law enforcement agencies. These records are
searched in the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System, with resulting matches shared with the contributing country
for investigative purposes.[Footnote 34] The FBI has deployed the
system in El Salvador, conducted assessments to determine how to
deploy the system to Belize and Panama, and plans to conduct more
assessments for deploying the system to Guatemala and Honduras. In
addition, beginning in 2008, the FBI, with funding from State, has
implemented the Central American Law Enforcement Exchange program
wherein law enforcement personnel from El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras have visited locations in the United States to receive
antigang training and share investigative practices with U.S. law
enforcement personnel. In exchange, law enforcement personnel from the
United States have visited El Salvador to provide antigang training
and share practices with Central American police.[Footnote 35] Also
related to law enforcement, ICE, in conjunction with State,
established an international gang task force in Honduras in January
2010. Comprised of four Honduran police officers and one ICE agent,
the task force is charged with developing intelligence to initiate and
support gang investigations in the United States and Honduras.
* Capacity Enhancement: To help enhance the capacity of Central
American governments to address gangs, beginning in 2006, State, DOJ,
DHS, and other agencies have provided antigang training courses to
Central American law enforcement officials through the International
Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador.[Footnote 36] The academy
provides law enforcement training to officials from countries in
Central and South America and the Caribbean. The training courses have
focused on various aspects of gang enforcement efforts, such as police
investigative techniques, prosecution, witness protection, and prison
gang management, and participants have included police, prosecutors,
judges, prison staff, border agents, and prevention and rehabilitation
officials from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and
Belize. As another example of capacity enhancement, USAID has provided
technical assistance and training to police, prosecutors, and judges,
among others, to reform justice-sector institutions in El Salvador to
help improve the investigation, prosecution, and prevention of crimes
including those committed by gangs.
* Prevention: USAID has implemented gang prevention, intervention, and
rehabilitation programs in Central American countries to provide youth
with alternatives to joining gangs and assist former gang members'
reentry into society. For example, through partnerships with faith-
based and nongovernmental organizations and local governments in
Central America, USAID has started youth centers in specific
communities to provide a safe environment for recreational and
vocational opportunities for young people. Figure 2 shows individuals
participating in activities at these youth centers in El Salvador.
Figure 2: Youth Participating in Activities at USAID-sponsored Youth
Centers in El Salvador:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: The photographs have been altered to protect identities.
[End of figure]
Additionally, USAID has sponsored a community-based policing program
in Guatemala to improve the relationship between the police and local
citizens by establishing collaborative partnerships between law
enforcement and the communities they serve to solve problems and
increase trust. According to USAID, the agency plans to expand the
community policing program to five new communities in Guatemala as
well as five communities each in El Salvador and Panama.
Federal Agencies Have Coordinated Their Antigang Programs through
Various Mechanisms, but Could Strengthen Coordination by Examining the
Establishment and Composition of a Salvadoran-Based Law Enforcement
Unit:
Federal agencies have taken action to coordinate their antigang
programs and share information with each other through various
interagency and coordinating groups. For example, DOJ has established
several entities to coordinate and share information on gang
enforcement efforts, including transnational gangs, among DOJ and DHS
component agencies. These entities include the Anti-Gang Coordination
Committee that is comprised of representatives from a variety of DOJ
components and agencies, as well as representatives from DHS's ICE,
and meets at least quarterly each year to report on the status of
antigang efforts and disseminate information for coordination. Another
entity used to coordinate, share information and intelligence on
gangs, and serve as a deconfliction center for gang operations is the
National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center
(GangTECC).[Footnote 37] GangTECC is comprised of participants from
the FBI, ATF, DEA, and ICE, among other DOJ and DHS components, and
has responsibility for coordinating multijurisdictional investigations
of all gangs except FBI-led investigations involving the MS-13 and
18th Street gangs. In addition, the FBI's MS-13 National Gang Task
Force has only FBI participants and is responsible for coordinating
FBI's multijurisdictional investigations involving MS-13 and 18th
Street gangs. Further, within Central American countries, federal
agencies have mechanisms for coordinating and sharing information on
antigang programs. For example, in El Salvador at the U.S. embassy,
U.S. government agency officials who are involved in implementing
antigang programs, such as officials from DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and
DOD, hold regular meetings to discuss antigang activities and
coordinate their implementation efforts. Appendix IV provides
additional information on the roles and responsibilities of these and
other headquarters-level coordinating entities as well as task forces
that coordinate antigang efforts at the field level within the United
States.
In July 2009, we reported on the benefits and challenges associated
with some of these various coordinating mechanisms. Specifically, we
reported that entities such as the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee,
GangTECC, and the MS-13 National Gang Task Force provide DOJ and DHS
with a means to operate across agency boundaries and facilitate
communication among participating agencies at the headquarters level.
[Footnote 38] However, we also reported that while some overlaps in
mission may be appropriate, the entities had not clearly identified
their roles and responsibilities, resulting in possible gaps or
unnecessary overlaps in agencies' coordination and sharing of
information on gang enforcement efforts, including those involving
transnational gangs. Specifically, we reported that GangTECC and the
MS-13 National Gang Task Force had overlapping missions and
responsibilities for coordination and deconfliction of
multijurisdictional investigations involving the MS-13 and 18th Street
gangs. The two entities had these overlaps in part because the MS-13
National Gang Task Force already existed when GangTECC was established
in 2006 and was not dismantled or folded into GangTECC at that time.
We reported that both entities risked unnecessary federal resource
expenditures to fund two entities when a single group could be more
efficient. We recommended that DOJ, in consultation with DHS,
articulate and differentiate roles, responsibilities, and missions of
headquarters-level entities, which would strengthen headquarters-level
coordination efforts to help ensure that they are not expended on
overlapping missions. DOJ agreed with our recommendation and as of
February 2010, DHS and DOJ officials reported that they are discussing
ways to streamline processes, modify policies, and establish cross-
cutting performance measures for federal gang programs.
At the field level, FBI and ICE could strengthen their coordination
and sharing of information on gang members and investigations
specifically in El Salvador by reaching agreement on ICE's
participation in the TAG.[Footnote 39] In El Salvador, both ICE and
FBI contact the Salvadoran national police to request information and
intelligence on gangs to assist in the agencies' gang investigations.
The FBI makes its requests directly through its agents assigned to the
TAG, while ICE's requests for Salvadoran national police information
on gangs or gang members are sent through ICE's country attaché in El
Salvador who forwards them to the FBI agents at the TAG. The FBI
agents then pass the requests to Salvadoran national police officials
if the FBI agents do not have the information needed to fulfill ICE's
requests.[Footnote 40] FBI and ICE officials stated that this process
for coordinating information requests for the Salvadoran national
police through the TAG has worked well, but that the process could be
further strengthened by ICE's participation in the TAG unit. Our work
on effective interagency coordination has shown that collaborating
agencies should organize joint and individual efforts and facilitate
information sharing.[Footnote 41] Collaborating agencies also look for
opportunities to leverage each others' resources, thus obtaining
additional benefits that would not be available if they were working
separately. Coordinating in this way could yield benefits in terms of
leveraging efforts already underway and minimizing any potential
unnecessary duplication in federal agencies' requests for information
on gang members or gang investigations. Various U.S. and Salvadoran
officials have cited potential benefits that could be gained from ICE
and FBI both participating in the TAG. The director of El Salvador's
national police stated that he would like to see federal law
enforcement agencies other than the FBI involved in the TAG unit,
particularly ICE, because of ICE's role in managing the removal of
gang members from the United States to El Salvador. The unit chief of
FBI's MS-13 National Gang Task Force stated that the FBI would also
benefit from ICE participating in the TAG to assist in deconflicting
enforcement operations between the FBI and ICE in El Salvador. ICE's
El Salvador country attaché stated that having an ICE agent at the TAG
would streamline the current process since an ICE agent would be
working directly at the TAG and be able to better identify possible
connections between FBI and ICE gang cases and requests for
information, thereby expediting information sharing.
The FBI and ICE have discussed signing a joint memorandum of
understanding to provide parameters for ICE's participation in the
TAG. According to the unit chief of the FBI's MS-13 National Gang Task
Force, in 2008 the FBI presented ICE with a memorandum of
understanding for ICE to participate in the TAG unit in which the FBI
legal attaché would manage the TAG and coordinate TAG gang
investigations with ICE. The FBI memorandum required ICE to coordinate
all of its activities related to the TAG with the FBI legal attaché.
However, according to the head of ICE's National Gang Unit, ICE would
like to participate in the TAG more as an equal partner as opposed to
being subordinate to the FBI. ICE officials stated that clarification
is needed in regards to the administrative details on placing an ICE
agent at the TAG such as housing and the location of the ICE agent's
office, as well as agreement on the extent to which an ICE agent
assigned to the TAG could focus on work for ICE-specific
investigations as needed.
To help obtain this clarification and try to reach consensus on ICE
participation in TAG, ICE officials stated that as of February 2010
they have not yet completed the process of drafting language to
clarify their points of concern in the memorandum of understanding and
plan to provide this draft language, once completed, to the FBI for
its consideration. Further, the FBI and ICE have initiated discussions
to conduct an assessment of ICE's possible participation in TAG by
having an ICE agent who would conduct the assessment assigned to the
unit on a temporary basis. However, as of February 2010, ICE and FBI
have not yet reached agreement on this temporary assignment and ICE's
plans to conduct the assessment because the two agencies disagree
about the type and scope of the work that the agent would conduct for
the assessment. The FBI and ICE could strengthen their coordination on
gang investigations and enhance the efficiency of their existing
process for exchanging information through the TAG by reaching
consensus on ICE's participation in the unit. By reaching agreement on
ICE's role, which the FBI and ICE have been considering since 2008,
the two agencies would be in a better position to leverage their
existing resources and information-sharing processes for gang
investigations with a nexus to El Salvador.
Federal Agencies Have Established Performance Measures for Their Own
Antigang Programs, but Some Programs Are in the Early Stages of
Collecting Performance Data:
Earlier in this report, we discussed federal government efforts to
measure the results achieved with the overall Strategy. Separately,
federal agencies have established performance measures, such as
numbers of arrests of gang members, for assessing their own individual
antigang efforts. However, as most of these programs are in the early
stages of implementation, agencies' data on their programs'
performance cannot yet be used to assess the level of activity or
program results across time. For example, USAID officials said that
because most of the Mérida Initiative funding for its Central American
programs was not released to USAID field missions until July and
August 2009, programs funded by the Mérida Initiative have yet to have
any appreciable results to measure. In addition, several antigang
programs in Central America have yet to be fully implemented. For
example, ICE and the FBI are seeking to establish the Criminal History
Information Program in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras pending
the hiring of needed analysts and completion of interagency
agreements--expected to occur by the summer of 2010.
Although federal agencies' performance data do not yet indicate the
level of progress or results achieved over time, federal agencies have
begun to report data on their levels of activity to date. For example,
State has established measures for the antigang training courses
offered through the International Law Enforcement Academy in El
Salvador, including tracking data on the number of gang classes
offered and the number of participants successfully completing them.
According to State, the academy has offered 10 gang-related training
courses since 2006 with a total of 416 participants from various
countries including El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico. In
addition to these measures, State asks participants to complete course
evaluations and uses these evaluations to make modifications to the
antigang training courses, such as changes in curriculum.
USAID has also established measures for its own antigang programs, as
shown in table 2. For example, USAID has established measures for its
community policing program, such as the number of communities that
have implemented community policing programs.
Table 2: Examples of Measures USAID Tracks for Its Efforts to Combat
Transnational Gangs from Central America:
Activity/program: Community Action Fund;
Description of program: Provide employment-generating activities and
education for youth at risk of gang involvement;
Date began: 2008;
Examples of measures to be tracked: Number of people who have
benefited from U.S. government-supported educational and socioeconomic
opportunities.
Activity/program: Community Policing Program;
Description of program: Promotes collaboration between communities and
police in prevention activities to undermine gang effectiveness and
recruitment, resulting in successful arrests of gang members and
greatly improved cooperation and trust between the police and citizens
of the communities;
Date began: 2008;
Examples of measures to be tracked: Number of communities with joint
police-citizen groups (e.g., community committees, police/school
liaison, police/citizen activities, etc.).
Activity/program: Gang Prevention Program;
Description of program: Increases security through community and
private-sector partnerships that work with at-risk youth to reduce
gang recruitment, crime, and violence by building the capacity of
communities and governments and by enhancing law enforcement efforts;
Date began: 2008;
Examples of measures to be tracked: Number of communities assisted in
crime prevention with U.S. government support.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Data sources include conversations with agency officials.
[End of table]
USAID also requires program contractors to develop performance indexes
for their respective programs. For example, the private contractor
conducting USAID's Community-based Crime and Violence Prevention
Project plans to review local government records to measure the crime
rate in project-targeted communities. For other efforts related to
youth outreach centers, performance indicators tracked by program
contractors include measures such as the number of youth who have
received a job through the support of the outreach center or because
of the skills acquired through the center.
With regard to its gang enforcement efforts, ICE reports on the number
of gang-related criminal and administrative arrests, among other
measures.[Footnote 42] As shown in figure 3, the number of criminal
and administrative gang-related arrests made by ICE has generally
increased since fiscal year 2006, the first full year that it compiled
this information.
Figure 3: ICE Gang-Related Arrests (Fiscal Years 2006 through 2009):
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Gang-related criminal arrests: 647;
Gang-related administrative arrests: 1,988.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Gang-related criminal arrests: 1,442;
Gang-related administrative arrests: 1,860.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Gang-related criminal arrests: 1,654;
Gang-related administrative arrests: 2,211.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Gang-related criminal arrests: 1,718;
Gang-related administrative arrests: 2,020.
Source: ICE.
[End of figure]
As shown in table 3, the FBI has also established various measures for
each of its primary programs to combat transnational gangs. Among
others, these measures include the number of gang cases worked and the
number of countries and officials participating in the Central
American Law Enforcement Exchange Program.
Table 3: Performance Measures and Reported Results for the FBI's
Efforts to Combat Transnational Gangs:
FBI program/activity: MS-13 National Gang Task Force;
Performance measure:
* Number of gang cases worked;
* Number of coordination meetings with FBI Field Divisions and legal
attaches;
* Training provided to federal, state, local, and international law
enforcement partners;
Outputs reported:
* According to the FBI, the task force conducted 19 investigations in
fiscal year 2007, 29 investigations in fiscal year 2008, and 140
investigations in fiscal year 2009;
* The task force reported conducting 10 case-coordination meetings in
fiscal year 2007, 15 meetings in fiscal year 2008, and 23 meetings in
fiscal year 2009;
* The task force reported conducting 12 trainings for law enforcement
partners in fiscal year 2007, 10 trainings in fiscal year 2008, and 15
trainings in fiscal year 2009.
FBI program/activity: TAG unit;
Performance measure: Number of requests for information received by
the TAG to investigate leads on suspected gang members including
whether a "hit" was made on the lead (i.e., a positive result);
Outputs reported: During fiscal year 2008, the first year the FBI
tracked performance metrics for the TAG, countries including El
Salvador made 696 inquiries regarding transnational connections of
suspected gang members. For fiscal year 2009, the FBI reported a total
of 480 inquiries to the TAG.
FBI program/activity: TAG unit;
Performance measure: Number of contraband items recovered during TAG-
assisted prison searches in El Salvador;
Outputs reported: The FBI reported that 27 prison searches were
conducted between September 2007 and November 2009. Over 1,000 items
were seized during these prison searches.
FBI program/activity: TAG unit;
Performance measure: The number of arrests made by El Salvadoran law
enforcement working in antigang operations who received coaching,
advice, and instruction from the TAG unit;
Outputs reported: According to the FBI, from the TAG's inception in
September 2007 to July 2009, 16 gang members were arrested.
FBI program/activity: Central American Law Enforcement Exchange
Program;
Performance measure: Number of countries and officials participating
in the program;
Outputs reported: FBI officials reported that in 2008, four officers
from El Salvador and four officers from the United States (Los
Angeles) participated in the first version of this program, which was
referred to as the "Officer Exchange Program."
FBI program/activity: Central American Law Enforcement Exchange
Program;
Performance measure: Number of countries and officials participating
in the program;
Outputs reported: According to the FBI's after-action report,
"Exchange Class I" was conducted in March 2009 consisting of 27
participants representing four countries and nine law enforcement
organizations. In addition to the United States, the countries
included El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. In October 2009, 27
officers from law enforcement agencies in the United States, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama participated in a third
exchange.
FBI program/activity: Central American Fingerprint Exploitation;
Performance measure: Number of positive hits from foreign fingerprint
data for subjects with U.S. criminal histories. The MS-13 National
Gang Task Force maintains a record of all positive hits, warrants, and
sexual offenders who are located;
Outputs reported: According to FBI officials, approximately 3 million
criminal fingerprint records from Central America and Mexico have been
acquired. In particular, El Salvador, the only Central American
country where the FBI has fully implemented the Central American
Fingerprint Exploitation, has provided 75,000 fingerprint records in
fiscal year 2009 to the FBI with 10,556 matches against U.S. criminal
records for a match rate of approximately 15 percent.
Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.
[End of table]
In addition to these measures, the FBI has prepared after-action
reports for the Central American Law Enforcement Exchange Program that
summarize the results of the exchanges, including feedback from
program participants, and has used these reports to modify the
program. For example, according to the FBI, future exchange classes
will include more practical and operational experiences (such as ride-
alongs with local police officers and observation of police
operations). Moreover, future classes will include more allowances for
travel time and representation from more U.S. and foreign police
departments.
For the TAG, the FBI did not start to collect data for the unit's
measures, such as the number of requests for assistance the unit
receives, until April 2008, about 6 months after the unit was
established. According to FBI officials, no systematic log or other
mechanism was used to track and record data on the TAG's activities
from September 2007 through April 2008, because, at the start-up of
the unit, agents were assigned on a temporary basis and were primarily
focused on establishing and initiating the operations of the unit.
Thus, the FBI lacks information about the unit's activity levels for
its first 6 months of operation. Since FBI agents have been stationed
at the TAG for 2-year, long-term rotations, these agents have
developed and maintained a log to track the unit's activities and
assistance provided to FBI offices and other law enforcement agencies.
This data maintained by the TAG is used by FBI, particularly the MS-13
National Gang Task Force, to identify trends in where transnational
gang members are located and traveling to and proactively target
specific geographic areas for gang education or enforcement activities.
Various Factors Affect U.S. Efforts to Implement Antigang Programs in
Central American Countries:
Even as agencies have worked to implement antigang programs in Central
America, various factors in the region largely outside of the control
of U.S. agencies pose challenges to the implementation of the
programs. These factors include: the ability of host countries to
sustain programs after U.S. support ends; Central American law
enforcement personnel issues; and legal restrictions in Central
American countries, such as El Salvador, that diminish the benefits of
efforts.
* Sustainability of programs by host countries: Federal agencies have
identified challenges facing Central American countries in sustaining
antigang programs currently being initiated and implemented in the
region. Specifically, State officials identified several factors
outside the control of U.S. agencies that contribute to the
uncertainty as to whether Central American countries will be able to
sustain antigang programs over the long term. These officials reported
that the ability of partner countries to take responsibility for
managing and supporting U.S.-funded antigang programs is hampered by
the fact that these countries often do not have the financial
resources to sustain the programs in the absence of U.S. funds. State
officials said that the ability of foreign countries to sustain
antigang programs is hindered by other factors as well, such as
corruption throughout the countries' police and judiciary structures;
a lack of investment in police training to make the countries' police
forces more professional and accountable; the countries' inability to
provide police forces with equipment such as communications gear and
transportation assets; and the ability of the gangs to quickly adapt
to law enforcement strategies.
To help address these issues, federal agencies have taken steps prior
to implementing these programs to plan for how the programs will be
sustained, particularly after U.S. federal funding ends. For example,
State officials said that when the department first developed and
implemented these programs, it took into account the ability of
foreign countries to take over and manage antigang programs initially
funded and managed by the United States. Specifically, the officials
noted that they worked directly with host country officials to gain an
understanding of what programs or efforts the countries needed and
what the countries might be able to support, both in terms of
resources available and a supportive political climate, and then used
that as a starting point to identify and shape the efforts that would
receive U.S. support. According to USAID officials, USAID also took
similar steps to work with host country officials to identify antigang
efforts the countries had planned or were already underway for which
USAID could provide additional support. Officials stated that they
chose this approach because they sought to support local initiatives
and programs whenever possible, as programs already planned or
implemented by the host countries are more likely to be sustained by
the countries themselves. Rather than setting up similar programs that
would compete for resources, providing support for the host countries'
programs helped to broaden the reach of the programs into additional
areas that the host countries may not have had resources for
otherwise. Further, USAID officials reported that they coordinated
with the host countries and other donors to ensure that the host
countries would assume responsibility for the activities when USAID
funding expires. In regard to FBI-led efforts such as the TAG, FBI
officials stated that they also considered the ability of the foreign
government to support these efforts during negotiations between the
foreign governments, such as El Salvador, and the FBI to establish the
units.
To help prepare for sustaining antigang programs over the long term,
federal agencies have also taken action after these programs have been
implemented. For example, at the country level, USAID officials work
directly with host government partners and with other donors through
regular donor coordination groups and meetings to identify best
practices for sustaining efforts and incorporating those practices
into programs. Further, FBI officials have discussed with the
Salvadoran government ways for the government to provide the resources
and commitment needed to help sustain the TAG unit over the long term.
According to the unit chief of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force who
manages the TAG, other than what the FBI pays for in the salaries and
living expenses of the FBI agents based at the TAG, the Salvadoran
government provides the other resources necessary to sustain the TAG's
operations.
* Screening process for law enforcement personnel and transfer of
personnel: Finding a sufficient number of Central American law
enforcement personnel who can pass the screening process required to
participate in U.S. investigative and information-sharing programs can
complicate the implementation of those programs. For example, in order
to become part of the FBI's TAG unit, police officers must receive a
background screening before initially joining the unit and undergo a
polygraph every 6 months thereafter. Under the rules of the TAG, if
officers fail the polygraph, they must leave the unit. FBI officials
stated that, as was the case in El Salvador when they set up the TAG
in that country, they expect to face challenges in identifying and
successfully screening a sufficient number of Guatemalan and Honduran
police officers to participate in the units planned for those
countries.[Footnote 43] To address this challenge, the FBI is planning
to establish smaller TAG units in Guatemala and Honduras (10 officers
each instead of the 20 stationed at the Salvadoran TAG) and set aside
more time and resources for screening Guatemalan and Honduran police
officers for the units. FBI officials also stated that one
disadvantage of the first officer exchange with El Salvador was that
of the four participating Salvadoran police officers, only two
officers continued to work on gang investigations in El Salvador after
the exchange was completed with the other two being transferred to
different areas within the Salvadoran police force. Although the FBI
has an agreement with participating countries that requires exchange
participants to be involved in gang investigations for at least 2
years after the exchange has concluded so they can put into practice
the training they received and share it with their colleagues, FBI
officials noted that there is little they can do to ensure
participating countries abide by this requirement.
* Legal restrictions: According to officials we interviewed from the
FBI and DOJ's Criminal Division, Central American countries' laws can
also pose challenges for conducting gang investigations in the region,
or for federal agencies that may seek the extradition of individuals
to face trial for crimes committed in the United States. According to
an FBI official with the MS-13 National Gang Task Force, legal
restrictions in countries such as El Salvador do not permit law
enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance or wiretaps as part of
their investigations. According to this official, while this
restriction has not hindered the ability of the Salvadoran national
police to conduct investigations, it takes more time and effort to
develop and corroborate the evidence through the use of other
investigative methods. According to an official from DOJ's Criminal
Division, a recent amendment to the Salvadoran constitution now allows
the use of electronic surveillance as a tool in criminal
investigations and the Salvadoran National Assembly is currently
considering implementing legislation. In regard to the extradition of
gang members wanted in the United States, FBI officials noted that
countries such as El Salvador have laws that prohibit the extradition
of individuals to other countries where they could face a more severe
punishment than would be given in El Salvador for the same crime. As
an example, the unit chief of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force
stated that the FBI had requested the extradition of a gang leader
imprisoned in El Salvador for prosecution in Baltimore, Maryland,
where the individual would have likely faced a longer prison sentence
for the crime. However, the FBI's request for extradition was denied,
preventing the gang leader from facing the charges against him in the
United States. Nevertheless, DOJ's Criminal Division reported that on
December 22, 2009, the Supreme Court of El Salvador voted to permit
the first extradition of a Salvadoran national pursuant to the
extradition treaty between the United States and El Salvador.[Footnote
44] Officials explained that future extraditions may still be limited
by the penalties applicable to extradited individuals, such as the
death penalty and life imprisonment. To help address these challenges,
DOJ's Criminal Division continues to work with El Salvador under the
existing treaty to facilitate extradition between the United States
and El Salvador.
Despite these challenges, officials from the agencies we interviewed
stated that they continue to work to address or mitigate the effect of
these challenges and to ensure their antigang programs are both
sustainable and effective.
Conclusions:
Given the rapid growth of transnational gangs, their propensity for
violence, and the public safety threats they pose, the response to
these gangs requires a comprehensive and collaborative approach on the
part of federal agencies that have different responsibilities and
missions for combating transnational gangs. The Strategy to Combat the
Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico (the
Strategy) provides a roadmap for federal departments and agencies to
follow in designing and implementing efforts to combat the gangs.
However, while individual federal agencies may be familiar with the
implementation of their own antigang programs, or those in the
Strategy for which they are responsible, they do not necessarily have
the visibility across the Strategy's categories to determine the
extent to which the broader strategy is being implemented. Regardless
as to whether it remains a separate effort or is incorporated into the
broader CARSI being developed, incorporating an approach for
overseeing the interagency effort to combat transnational gangs would
help provide visibility by designating an agency or entity to ensure
that the Strategy is being implemented as planned. In addition, as the
Strategy and related antigang efforts are implemented, it will be
important to be able to track the effect the Strategy as a whole is
having against the transnational gang problem. By establishing
performance goals and measures or other mechanisms to evaluate the
progress made in implementing the Strategy, federal agencies,
Congress, and other stakeholders could have more specific information
relating to agencies' performance under the Strategy, thereby enabling
them to make more informed decisions as to what adjustments to the
Strategy might be necessary, if any, to achieve its desired effect.
Relatedly, while federal agencies have taken various actions to
collaborate on their transnational antigang efforts, agencies such as
the FBI and ICE can take steps to further resolve their roles and
participation in the TAG unit in El Salvador, especially given that
the FBI and ICE have been discussing this participation since 2008. By
reaching agreement on ICE's participation in the unit, both agencies
could realize additional information-sharing benefits not only with
each other, but with foreign counterparts, and help ensure that
resources to combat gangs in El Salvador are used efficiently and
effectively.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To strengthen oversight and accountability for implementation of the
Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America
and Mexico (the Strategy), we recommend that the Special Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, in conjunction with DOJ,
DHS, State, USAID, and DOD, revise the Strategy to include, or include
in the CARSI if the Strategy is incorporated into that initiative:
* an approach or framework for overseeing implementation of the
Strategy and antigang efforts in Central America, and:
* performance goals and measures to assess progress made in achieving
intended results under the Strategy.
To strengthen federal agencies' coordination of antigang efforts and
maximize use of federal law enforcement resources in El Salvador, we
recommend that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security reach agreement on ICE's role and participation in the TAG
unit.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report for review to the Departments of
Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State
(State); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and
the National Security Council (NSC). DHS, DOJ, and USAID provided
written comments on the draft report. DOD, State, and the NSC did not
provide comments.
In their written comments, DHS and DOJ concurred with our
recommendation that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security reach agreement on ICE's role and participation in the TAG
unit in El Salvador, and outlined steps they have begun to take to
address this recommendation. For example, DHS commented that ICE
officials have reviewed the FBI's memorandum on the TAG to clarify the
roles and responsibilities of ICE and the FBI within the unit in El
Salvador. DOJ also commented that any agreement on DHS's participation
in the TAG unit in El Salvador should also address DHS's participation
in future TAG units that the FBI expects to create in Guatemala and
Honduras.
In its written comments, USAID commented that it acknowledges the
importance of increased interagency coordination to help bolster U.S.
government efforts to address the threat of criminal gangs in Central
America and the United States.
DHS's, DOJ's, and USAID's written comments are contained in appendixes
VI, VII, and VIII, respectively. We also incorporated technical
comments provided by DHS, DOJ, and USAID as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs; the Attorney General; the
Secretaries of Homeland Security, State, and Defense; the
Administrator of USAID; selected congressional committees; and other
interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Please
contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IX.
Signed by:
Eileen R. Larence:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Leadership Structure and Key Transnational Criminal
Activities of MS-13 and 18th Street:
Federal agencies have specifically identified two primary gangs with
connections to Central America--Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th
Street--as posing the most significant public safety threats to the
United States and Central American countries among transnational
gangs. This appendix summarizes information federal agencies have on
the leadership structure and transnational criminal activities of
these two gangs.
Leadership of the Gangs:
Federal agencies have reported that these gangs generally do not have
a centralized leadership structure. Rather, most gang cliques--or
local gang groups--tend to operate in specific areas or communities in
the United States and Central America and have autonomy to function
independently without reporting to a central authority or leadership.
However, law enforcement officials have reported that in some gang
cliques activities are directed by gang leaders incarcerated in
Salvadoran prisons. These leaders communicate by cell phones or coded
written messages that are smuggled in and out of the prisons. Of the
five U.S. locations[Footnote 45] we visited to discuss gang
investigations with federal, state, and local law enforcement, three
reported instances in which gang leaders incarcerated in El Salvador
directed gang members to organize new cliques, coordinate with cliques
in other parts of the country, and carry out criminal activities,
including murder. For example, an investigation in Charlotte, North
Carolina, found that MS-13 clique leaders were sent to establish
cliques at the behest of leaders in El Salvador. Further, according to
the FBI, cliques convene periodically with gang leadership to
determine future criminal activities and punishments for individual
delinquent gang members.
Transnational Criminal Activities of the Gangs:
Transnational gangs engage in criminal activities that not only affect
local communities in the United States and Central American countries,
but that also stretch beyond U.S. and Central American borders. For
example, in its 2006 Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that gang
activity has transcended the borders of Central America, Mexico, and
the United States and evolved into a transnational concern.[Footnote
46] USAID reported that while gang activity used to be territorially
confined to local neighborhoods, globalization, sophisticated
communications technologies, and travel patterns have facilitated the
expansion of gang activity across neighborhoods, cities, and
countries. Further, the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment indicated
that U.S. street gangs are expanding their influence in most regions
and broadening their presence outside the United States to develop
associations with criminal organizations in Mexico and Central
America. According to federal agencies, major cross-border criminal
activities in which transnational gangs engage include drug
trafficking and distribution, human smuggling, and extortion, among
others.
With regard to drug trafficking and distribution, assessments
conducted by the National Gang Intelligence Center, the National Drug
Intelligence Center, the U.S. Agency for International Development,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicate that
connections exist between drug trafficking organizations and MS-13 and
18th Street gangs and these connections may be expanding. Several
agencies also suggested that both gangs' connections with prison gangs
such as the Mexican Mafia[Footnote 47] may provide a link to drug
trafficking organizations, as one of the prison gangs' main sources of
income is extorting money from drug distributors outside prison and
distributing various narcotics within and outside the prison system.
Further, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has reported that drug
trafficking organizations have worked with MS-13 and 18th Street gangs
to distribute their narcotics in Central America and the United
States.[Footnote 48] MS-13 and 18th Street gangs have also been
identified as engaging in retail street distribution of narcotics in
the United States, for example. Although connections between gangs and
drug trafficking organizations exist and may be growing, these
connections may not yet reflect large-scale, organized cooperation
between gangs and drug-trafficking organizations. For example, Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials stated that while
individual gangs and gang members might work with drug trafficking
organizations for their own personal gain, DEA has not observed or
obtained evidence of high-level, organized cooperation between gangs
and drug trafficking organizations. Likewise, the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime has reported that because the Central
American drug market is too small for gangs to develop into major
distributors, the gangs lack the maritime capabilities required for
the transport of drugs from Central America, and gangs have limited
involvement in the U.S. narcotics market, the link between Central
American gangs and drug trafficking organizations may not yet be well-
developed.
In addition to their involvement in drug trafficking and distribution,
transnational gangs have also been involved in other cross-border
crime, including alien smuggling and extortion. For example, the 2009
National Gang Threat Assessment indicated that U.S.-based gang members
are increasingly involved in cross-border criminal activity that
includes smuggling illegal aliens from Mexico into the United States.
Moreover, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the FBI reported that
MS-13 is known to smuggle persons from Central America into the United
States from Mexico. The FBI has also reported that 18th Street may be
involved in human trafficking and alien smuggling. However, the FBI
stated that it is difficult to determine gang members' roles--whether
they are organizing the border crossings, smuggling other aliens into
the country, or being smuggled themselves.
In addition, federal agencies have reported that extortion and retail
drug distribution provide financial support for both MS-13 and 18th
Street. Cliques have been reported to extort those who conduct illicit
activities themselves, such as prostitution or drug distribution
entities, within the gangs' territory. In the United States,
transnational gang members are known also to extort money from
businesses that operate within gang territory in exchange for not
inflicting harm on the businesses or those businesses' owners, family
members, or workers. Both MS-13 and 18th Street gangs also conduct
extortion across international borders. For example, gang members in
the United States may extort immigrants with threats that they will
retaliate against family members in Central America if law enforcement
is notified. In some instances, the gangs have coupled extortion with
kidnapping. The FBI has reported that MS-13 has kidnapped illegal
immigrants and then extorted money from their families for the
immigrants' safe return.
Finally, with regard to links to terrorists, federal agencies have
found no indication that U.S. gangs with transnational ties have
routine relationships.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Characteristics of Other Transnational Gangs:
According to the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), three basic
types of gangs have been identified by gang investigators: street
gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. The focus of this
report has been on gangs with ties to Central America, such as Mara
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street, which belong to the "street gang"
category. However, all three categories contain gangs with members who
are either present or criminally active (or both) in more than one
country. This appendix provides examples of other gangs in these
categories, including descriptions of their transnational activities.
Most of the information presented in this appendix is from the April
2008 Attorney General's Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent
Street Gangs in Suburban Areas and supplemented by information
obtained from interviews with agency officials.
Street Gangs:
According to federal law enforcement, street gangs are typically
associated with a particular neighborhood, town, or city, which they
may incorporate into the name of their gang. However, law enforcement
officials report that several street gangs have attained regional or
national status and operate in a number of states throughout the
country. Two examples of these street gangs that also have
transnational connections include the following:
* Florencia 13: Florencia 13 originated in Los Angeles in the early
1960s. Gang membership is estimated to be more than 3,000. This gang
operates primarily in California, but is expanding to other states.
Drug trafficking is a primary source of income for the gang whose
members smuggle cocaine and methamphetamine from Mexico into the
United States for distribution. Florencia members are also involved in
other criminal activities including assault, drive-by shooting, and
homicide.
* Latin Kings: Latin Kings is a collection of over 160 structured
gangs, referred to as chapters, operating in 158 cities in 34 states
in the United States. The gang's membership is estimated to be 20,000
to 35,000. Most members are Mexican-American or Puerto Rican males
whose main source of income is street-level drug sales. The gang
obtains drugs primarily from Mexican drug trafficking organizations
that operate along the U.S.-Mexico border. Members also engage in
other criminal activity such as assault, burglary, homicide, identity
theft, and money laundering.
Prison Gangs:
According to federal law enforcement officials, prison gangs are
criminal organizations that operate within federal and state prison
systems as self-perpetuating criminal entities. These gangs also
operate outside of prisons typically through the activities of members
who have been released from prison into communities. Examples of
prison gangs with transnational connections include the following:
* Barrio Azteca: Barrio Azteca is one of the most violent prison gangs
in the United States. The gang is highly structured and has an
estimated membership of 2,000. Most members are either Mexican
national or Mexican American males. Barrio Azteca is most active in
the southwestern United States, primarily in federal, state, and local
corrections facilities in Texas and outside of prison in southwestern
Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The gang's main source of income is
derived from smuggling illegal drugs from Mexico into the United
States for distribution both inside and outside prisons. Gang members
often transport illicit drugs across the border for drug trafficking
organizations. Gang members are also involved in other crimes
including alien smuggling, arson, assault, extortion, kidnapping, and
weapons violations.
* Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos: This is a Hispanic prison gang
formed in Texas in the late 1980s. It operates in most prisons in the
state and on the streets in many communities in Texas, particularly
Laredo. The gang is also active in several cities in Mexico, and its
largest contingent in that country is located in Nuevo Laredo. The
gang is structured and is estimated to have 1,000 members. These
members maintain close ties to several Mexican drug trafficking
organizations and are involved in the trafficking of large quantities
of illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States for distribution.
* Mexican Mafia: This gang was formed in the late 1950s within the
California prison system. It is loosely structured and has strict
rules that must be followed by the estimated 350 to 400 members. Most
of these members are Mexican American males who previously belonged to
a Southern California street gang. Mexican Mafia is active in 13
states, but California remains the power base. The gang's main source
of income is extorting drug distributors outside prison and
distributing illegal drugs within the prison system and on the
streets. Some members have direct links to Mexican drug trafficking
organizations. Other criminal activities include controlling gambling
and homosexual prostitution in prison.
* Mexikanemi: The Mexikanemi prison gang was formed in the early 1980s
within the Texas prison system. The gang is highly structured and
estimated to have 2,000 members, most of whom are Mexican national or
Mexican American males who were living in Texas at the time of their
incarceration. This gang poses a significant drug trafficking threat
to communities in the southwest region of the United States,
particularly Texas. Gang members reportedly traffic illegal drugs from
Mexico into the United States for distribution inside and outside of
prison. Gang members obtain these drugs from Mexican drug trafficking
organizations.
* Surenos: As some individual Hispanic street gang members enter the
prison systems, they put aside rivalries with other Hispanic gangs and
unite under the name Surenos. The original Mexican Mafia members, most
of whom were from Southern California, considered Mexicans from the
rural, agricultural areas of Northern California as weak and viewed
them with contempt. To distinguish themselves from these northern
agricultural workers, members of Mexican Mafia began to refer to the
Hispanic gang members that worked for them as Surenos (Southerners).
Surenos gang members' main source of income is retail-level
distribution of illegal drugs both within prison systems and in the
community, as well as the extortion of drug distributors on the
streets. Some members have direct links to Mexican drug trafficking
organizations and broker deals for Mexican Mafia as well as their own
gang. Other criminal activities of Surenos members include assault,
car jacking, home invasion, homicide, and robbery.
* Texas Syndicate: Texas Syndicate is one of the largest and most
violent prison gangs. It is active on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico
border and poses a significant drug trafficking threat to communities
in the southwest region. The gang is highly structured and is
estimated to have 1,300 members, most of whom are Mexican American
males between 20 and 40 years of age. Gang members smuggle illegal
drugs from Mexico into the United States for distribution inside and
outside of prison. Gang members have direct working relationships with
drug trafficking organizations.
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs:
According to federal law enforcement, outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMG)
have been in the United States longer than many other gangs and are
most numerous in the United States. According to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Gang Unit, there are more than 300 active OMGs in the
United States, ranging in size from single chapters with five or six
members to hundreds of chapters with thousands of members worldwide.
DOJ considers OMGs to be transnational criminal organizations because
they typically maintain chapters in more than one country and engage
in illicit cross-border activities. OMG chapters are found on every
continent.
OMGs are highly organized with well-defined hierarchies, defined rules
in the form of either bylaws or constitutions, and clear recruitment,
acceptance, and promotion processes for members. OMGs have a distinct
chain of command, much like a corporation with positions such as
president, vice-president, treasurer, sergeant-at-arms, and road
captain at the chapter level. Generally, OMG organizational structure
consists of individual chapters grouped by geographic region all being
headed by a national president. While national and international
presidents may exist, each regional chapter is run by its own
president. The gang leadership requires loyalty and obedience from
members. OMG members may be governed by a code of ethics, a
constitution, or a strict set of bylaws. Descriptions of major OMGs
present in the U.S. follows--including details on the gangs'
transnational connections.
* Hells Angels Motorcycle Club: According to U.S. law enforcement
officials, the Hells Angels are the largest and the most criminally
prominent of the "Big Five" OMGs.[Footnote 49] The gang includes 2,000
to 2,500 members belonging to over 230 chapters in the United States
and 26 foreign countries. In the United States, law enforcement
officials estimate that Hells Angels has more than 92 chapters in 27
states with over 800 members. Gang members produce, transport, and
distribute marijuana and methamphetamine and transport and distribute
cocaine, hashish, heroin, and other drugs. Other crimes perpetrated by
Hells Angels members include assault, extortion, homicide, money
laundering, and motorcycle theft.
* Bandidos: U.S. law enforcement authorities consider the Bandidos and
Hells Angels to be the two largest OMGs in the United States. This
gang has approximately 900 members belonging to over 93 chapters in
the United States, with a total of 2,000 to 2,500 members when the
membership in 13 other countries is added to U.S. membership. Bandidos
is involved in transporting and distributing cocaine and marijuana and
producing, transporting, and distributing methamphetamine. The gang is
most active in the Pacific, southeast, southwest, and west central
regions of the United States and is expanding in these regions by
forming new chapters and allowing members of support clubs[Footnote
50] to form or join Bandidos chapters.
* Mongols Motorcycle Club: According to law enforcement officials, the
Mongols Motorcycle Club is an extremely violent OMG that poses a
serious criminal threat to the Pacific and southwest regions of the
United States. Mongols members transport and distribute cocaine,
marijuana, and methamphetamine and frequently commit violent crimes
including assault, intimidation, and murder to defend Mongols
territory and uphold its reputation. Most of the club's 300 members
are Hispanic males who live in the Los Angeles area, and many are
former street gang members with a long history of using violence to
settle grievances. The club also maintains ties to Hispanic street
gangs in Los Angeles. In the 1980s, the Mongols OMG seized control of
southern California's OMG activity from the Hells Angels and today is
allied with the Bandidos, Outlaws, and Pagan's OMGs against the Hells
Angels.
* Outlaws: Outlaws has more than 1,700 members belonging to 176
chapters in the United States and 12 foreign countries. U.S. law
enforcement officials estimate that Outlaws has more than 86 chapters
in 21 states with over 700 members in the United States. Outlaws are
the dominant OMG in the Great Lakes Region of the United States. Gang
members produce, transport, and distribute methamphetamine and
transport and distribute cocaine and marijuana. Other criminal
activities engaged in by Outlaws include arson, assault, explosives
operations, extortion, fraud, homicide, intimidation, kidnapping,
money laundering, prostitution, robbery, theft, and weapons
violations. Outlaws compete with the Hells Angels for membership and
territory.
* Vagos Motorcycle Club: The Vagos OMG has hundreds of members in the
United States and Mexico and poses a serious criminal threat to those
areas in which chapters are located. Law enforcement reports that
Vagos has approximately 300 members among 24 chapters in California,
Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, and three chapters in Mexico. Club members
produce, transport, and distribute methamphetamine and distribute
marijuana. Vagos members also have been implicated in other criminal
activities including assault, extortion, insurance fraud, money
laundering, murder, vehicle theft, weapons violations, and witness
intimidation.
* Black Pistons: This OMG is the official support club of the Outlaws
Motorcycle Club. Established in 2002 with the backing of the Outlaws,
Black Pistons has expanded rapidly throughout the United States and
into Canada and Europe. The club has an estimated 70 domestic chapters
in 20 states and an unknown number of foreign chapters in Belgium,
Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Norway, and Poland. The exact number
is unknown but is estimated to be more than 200 in the United States.
The Outlaws OMG uses Black Pistons chapters as sources of prospective
new members. The Outlaws also uses Black Pistons chapters to conduct
criminal activity, especially transporting and distributing drugs.
Black Piston members also engage in assault, extortion, fraud,
intimidation, and theft.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Federal Agencies' Programs to Address Transnational
Gangs with Connections to Central America:
Federal agencies have developed and implemented a wide range of
programs to combat transnational gangs in the United States that have
links to Central America. As shown in table 4, some of these efforts
directly combat the gangs while others seek to improve criminal
justice systems to increase the ability of Central American countries
to apprehend and prosecute criminals including gang members (such as
Community Policing and Justice Sector Reform). As also shown in table
4, other efforts are aimed at improving educational and employment
opportunities of youth to reduce the motivation for joining gangs
(such as Youth Centers).
Table 4: Examples of Federal Efforts or Projects Implemented to Combat
Central American Transnational Gangs, by Agency and Country Where
Implemented:
Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Country: El Salvador;
Effort or project: Transnational Anti-Gang Unit (TAG);
Description of effort/project: Through the TAG, information on MS-13
and 18th Street gang members is shared between U.S. law enforcement
agencies and El Salvador's Civilian National Police for use in
criminal investigations and gang-member prosecutions. The TAG includes
investigators from the Salvadoran police, Salvadoran prosecutors, and
FBI agents. TAG funding is provided by the State Department.
Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: Central American Fingerprint Exploitation;
Description of effort/project: This program collects biometric and
fingerprint records maintained by Central American law enforcement
agencies and makes them accessible to U.S. law enforcement agencies.
The program helps countries acquire automated fingerprint technology
along with technical and other support. The system has been deployed
in El Salvador, and assessments have been conducted in Belize and
Panama and are planned for Guatemala and Honduras. Funding is provided
by the State Department.
Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: MS-13 National Gang Task Force;
Description of effort/project: To combat the transnational and
national criminal activities of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, the
FBI established this task force in 2005. The task force coordinates
local, state, federal, and international FBI-led investigations of
those gangs. It also manages the operation of the TAG.
Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: Central American Law Enforcement Exchange;
Description of effort/project: This is an exchange program for law
enforcement personnel from Central America and the United States to
share best practices, establish contacts, and receive antigang
training. The first exchange occurred with four gang officers from El
Salvador's national police traveling to Los Angeles where they spent
30 days with gang officers of the Los Angeles Police and Sheriff's
Departments. The Los Angeles officers subsequently visited El Salvador
for 30 days. The FBI has modified the program to a 3-week session that
includes training at the FBI Academy. In the second exchange, which
occurred in March 2009, 28 officers from the United States, El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala participated.
Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: Central American Intelligence Program;
Description of effort/project: The objective of this program is to
share intelligence, standardize reports and other intelligence
products, and minimize the communication gaps between countries that
allow gang members to operate across borders. The program is a joint
initiative of the FBI and the State Department and consists of
criminal-intelligence analysts from the United States, El Salvador,
Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, and Canada who work on gang-related
matters.
Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: Criminal History Information Program;
Description of effort/project: The FBI, in conjunction with U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), is working to implement
this project to transmit the criminal histories to law enforcement
authorities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras of deportees being
returned to those countries. Under this program, ICE is to provide the
FBI with a list of the criminals from these countries detained by ICE
with final orders of removal. Next, FBI analysts compile the criminal
histories of these detainees and transmit the information to law
enforcement officials in each country. As of November 2009, the FBI
was still in the process of hiring analysts and negotiating with the
El Salvadoran government--the first country where the program will be
implemented.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: Electronic Travel Document System;
Description of effort/project: This is an internet-based system to
facilitate the issuance of travel documents for the removal of illegal
aliens, including gang members. ICE has implemented the system in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: Operation Community Shield;
Description of effort/project: This is an ICE initiative to combat
transnational gangs by arresting and removing from the United States
criminal aliens who are gang members. ICE works with state and local
law enforcement agencies to investigate transnational gang members who
are foreign-born and in the country illegally or have been involved in
crimes.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE);
Country: Honduras;
Effort or project: Operation Community Shield--Honduras;
Description of effort/project: ICE established Operation Community
Shield-Honduras in January 2010 in conjunction with the Department of
State. This specialized law enforcement unit in Honduras represents
ICE's first international antigang task force and consists of four
Honduran National Police gang enforcement officers and one ICE Special
Agent. This specialized unit is charged with developing actionable
gang intelligence to initiate and support current gang investigations
in Honduras and the United States.
Lead implementing agency: Department of State;
Country: El Salvador;
Effort or project: Security Threat Intelligence Unit Program;
Description of effort/project: The purpose of this initiative is to
collect, analyze, exploit and share gang intelligence within the
prison system. According to the State Department, an effective
intelligence program is essential in curtailing criminal activity both
inside and outside the prisons since several thousand gang members,
including much of the key leadership, are incarcerated throughout
Central America.
Lead implementing agency: Department of State;
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: U.S.-Central American Integration System[A]
Dialogue;
Description of effort/project: This initiative includes talks between
the United States and countries participating in the Central American
Integration System to promote regional coordination against
transnational threats such as criminal gangs.
Lead implementing agency: Department of State;
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: Antigang Training;
Description of effort/project: This initiative provides training to
Central American law enforcement officials through the U.S.-sponsored
International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador. Training
includes investigative techniques, prosecution, witness protection,
rehabilitation, and management of gang members in prison. Participants
have included police, prosecutors, judges, prison staff, border
agents, and prevention and rehabilitation officials.
Lead implementing agency: Department of State;
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: Regional Corrections Advisor for Central America;
Description of effort/project: The Regional Corrections Advisor serves
as the regional corrections expert on the full range of corrections
issues in Central America for the Department of State's Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. The advisor coordinates
corrections programs with the Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement's Senior Corrections Advisor and the Regional Gangs
Advisor for Central America. The advisor provides technical
corrections expertise, policy guidance, technical assistance and
training on behalf of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement for regional governments.
Lead implementing agency: Department of State;
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: Corrections Officer Exchange Program;
Description of effort/project: Several state corrections departments
have agreed to participate in this program for the identification and
exchange of best practices with countries in the region.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: El Salvador;
Effort or project: Justice Sector Reform;
Description of effort/project: The purpose of this program is to
provide technical assistance and training to strengthen justice-
sector institutions in El Salvador that will allow them to improve the
investigation, prosecution, and prevention of crimes including those
committed by gangs. The recipients of USAID's assistance efforts
include the El Salvadoran Attorney General and Public Defender's
offices, the National Civilian Police, judges, and the courts.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: El Salvador;
Effort or project: Dispute Mediation Centers Network;
Description of effort/project: According to USAID, this program
improves access to the justice system and promotes a culture of
lawfulness and nonviolence by resolving conflicts through peer
mediation. Through this program, USAID seeks to improve the
reliability and effectiveness of the mediation centers through
training, technical assistance, and public outreach. In implementing
this program, USAID is working with the El Salvadoran Public
Defender's Office, the Attorney General's Office, courts, schools, and
selected municipalities. The program targets schools in areas with
populations of students most at risk to be recruited to join gangs, in
order to teach those youth how to resolve differences without
resorting to violent practices or joining violent groups such as
street gangs. USAID is also implementing a similar program in
Nicaragua.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: El Salvador;
Effort or project: Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention
Program;
Description of effort/project: Under this program, USAID partners with
local-government officials, community leaders, and private groups to
develop prevention plans in selected municipalities at high risk for
gang activity. Specifically, 10 high-risk communities in five
municipalities are participating in the development of crime
prevention projects such as recreational infrastructure, sports
activities, and vocational and arts centers.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: El Salvador;
Effort or project: National Gang Prevention Policy;
Description of effort/project: USAID provides technical assistance and
training to strengthen El Salvador's National Council for Public
Security to formulate national-level policy on gang prevention and
coordinate prevention activities throughout the country. USAID intends
for this program to increase coordination between the national and
local governments and bring together law enforcement officials,
judges, and prosecutors to counter gangs and gang-related violence.
Beneficiaries of this program are the government of El Salvador and
selected municipalities throughout the country.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Guatemala;
Effort or project: Youth Centers;
Description of effort/project: To reach at-risk youth, USAID started
centers to provide a safe environment and access to sports activities
and skills training. USAID is implementing this program through
partnerships with faith-based organizations, the Rotary Club,
nongovernmental organizations, and various municipalities.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Guatemala;
Effort or project: Youth Challenge Program;
Description of effort/project: According to USAID, this program
provides opportunities to develop new skills and offer free-time
alternatives that reduce the vulnerability to gang recruitment for
over 2,500 at-risk youth. This program builds on the results achieved
under the Youth Alliance Program (responsible for "Youth Centers"
above) and seeks to open additional centers and provide job placement
to former gang members. This program partners faith-based
organizations, the Rotary Club, small nongovernmental organizations,
and municipalities.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Guatemala;
Effort or project: Community-Based Policing;
Description of effort/project: USAID has sponsored this program in
Villa Nueva, Guatemala, as part of an effort to reduce crime in the
community--including crimes related to gang activity. According to
USAID, the most important program activities include a diagnostic
assessment to improve the effectiveness of the national police, police
training, and youth crime prevention activities--including those
related to involvement with gangs. For example, the program
facilitated a number of interventions that targeted youth at risk of
joining street gangs. Recipients of assistance under this program
include police, prosecutors, and members of the judiciary in addition
to the communities in which they all serve.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Guatemala;
Effort or project: 24-hour Courts;
Description of effort/project: According to USAID, the purpose of the
24-hour courts is to provide increased efficiency in processing
criminal cases--including those involving criminal gangs over which
these courts have jurisdiction. This program is a joint effort of four
justice institutions in Guatemala--courts, prosecutors, public
defenders, and police.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Guatemala;
Effort or project: United Nations Commission against Impunity in
Guatemala;
Description of effort/project: Under this program, USAID supports the
commission through direct funding and training of Guatemalan
prosecutors and judges in the correct use of the law against organized
criminal networks that have penetrated Guatemala.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Guatemala;
Effort or project: Crimes Against Life Unit;
Description of effort/project: This program has provided for the
reorganization of the Guatemala City Crimes Against Life Unit,
procedural changes, and better case screening that has allowed the
unit to increase prosecutions of homicides, including those related to
gang violence.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Guatemala;
Effort or project: Desafio 100;
Description of effort/project: According to USAID, this program is to
help change public perception of reformed gang members. Desafio 100
provides a partnership between USAID and the business community in
Guatemala to provide 100 former gang members with jobs and special
training.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Guatemala;
Effort or project: National Gang Prevention Policy;
Description of effort/project: Under this program, USAID will promote
and assist Guatemalan institutions to develop and implement a national
policy to institutionalize and promote sustainability of crime
prevention programs for youth at risk of joining gangs. Participants
in this program include the government of Guatemala and the judiciary.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Honduras;
Effort or project: Education for All;
Description of effort/project: Under this program, USAID partners with
the Honduran Ministry of Education, schools, communities, and other
donors to provide education and vocational training for at-risk youth
that will result in alternatives to joining gangs. Volunteer
facilitators with diverse backgrounds implement the program at
learning centers situated in factories, businesses, schools, and
community centers throughout the country.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Honduras;
Effort or project: Civil Rights and Values for Youth;
Description of effort/project: USAID intends for this program to
provide civic education and problem-solving skills for 20,000 at-risk
youth from disadvantaged populations in Honduras. According to USAID,
students are less likely to engage in criminal activities if they are
educated in values and reintegrated into society. Program participants
receive training in the fundamentals of civil society, volunteerism, a
free-market economy, and democratic participation. USAID's program
partners include nongovernmental organizations, Regional Ministry of
Education Coordinators, Peace Corps volunteers, and other local
partners in order to target vulnerable youth subject to violence,
migration, gang recruitment, and school desertion.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Honduras;
Effort or project: Municipal Conciliation Centers;
Description of effort/project: USAID intends for this program to
promote crime and violence prevention through alternative dispute
resolution. The program has set up seven centers throughout Honduras.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Honduras;
Effort or project: National Gang Prevention Policy;
Description of effort/project: Under this program, USAID partners with
the Government of Honduras, local governments, the judiciary, and the
private sector to develop a national policy framework for supporting
municipal and community-led initiatives that address the root causes
of gangs. These initiatives include job placement and infrastructure
projects that support community efforts to address root problems and
improve security such as educational facilities, street lighting, and
safer community spaces.
Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America;
Effort or project: Regional Gang Prevention Program, Central American
Region;
Description of effort/project: The purpose of this program is to
support development of innovative gang prevention programs through
small grants to various organizations. It will support public,
private, and civil society organizations to implement gang prevention
programs for at-risk youth and ex-gang members. This program address
gang violence in three phases: (1) initiatives to prevent at-risk
youth from joining gangs, (2) offer opportunities to entice youth to
leave gangs, and (3) rehabilitation efforts for ex-gang members to
prevent them from returning to crime. Recipients of assistance under
this program include the governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras along with the judiciaries in these countries.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by each applicable agency.
[A] The Central American Integration System is a regional entity
created by Central American countries to, among other things, promote
regional coordination against transnational threats such as criminal
gangs.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Federal Agencies' Entities and Mechanisms for
Coordinating Transnational Antigang Efforts:
Federal agencies have coordinated their programs to combat
transnational gangs through working groups at the interagency level,
coordinating groups within Central American countries, and federally
led antigang task forces at the local level. For example, at the
headquarters level, through the National Gang Intelligence Center
(NGIC), representatives of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA);
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and Bureau
of Prisons (BOP), among other components, and the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) coordinate and
share information on gangs that are a threat to U.S. communities.
Table 5 provides additional information about headquarters-level
entities' coordination of antigang efforts. These coordinating
entities have different roles and responsibilities, but in general,
they serve as mechanisms for deconflicting cases;[Footnote 51]
providing law enforcement agencies with information on gangs and gang
activities, including transnational gangs; and coordinating
participating agencies' strategies and task forces.
Table 5: Headquarters-Level Entities Focused on Coordination of
Antigang Efforts:
Entity: Anti-Gang Coordination Committee;
Year established: 2006;
Lead agency or office: DOJ Office of Deputy Attorney General;
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI, ATF, U.S. Marshals
Service (USMS), DEA, BOP, Executive Office for United States Attorneys
(EOUSA), Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
National Drug Intelligence Center, Civil Rights Division, Criminal
Division, Office of Legal Policy, Budget Office, Office of Legislative
Affairs, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Management Division, Office
of Justice Programs, Attorney General's Advisory Committee, Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services, Tax Division, National Gang
Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center (GangTECC), NGIC, and
National Institute of Justice;
DHS: ICE, CBP;
Department of the Treasury: Internal Revenue Service;
Staff: None;
Coordination/information-sharing role: Organize DOJ's efforts to
combat gangs, including to provide recommendations to Deputy Attorney
General on all matters related to antigang activities, review
applications for funds for gang-related task forces from U.S.
Attorneys and approve creation of violent-crime task forces around the
country.
Entity: National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC);
Year established: 2005;
Lead agency or office: DOJ FBI;
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI, DEA, ATF, USMS, BOP, and
National Drug Intelligence Center;
DHS: ICE, CBP;
Department of Defense: National Guard;
Staff: About 22, including a director, two deputy directors, 13 FBI
intelligence analysts, and at least one analyst detailed from each
participating agency;
Coordination/information-sharing role: Provide law enforcement
agencies with information and analysis of federal, state, and local
law enforcement intelligence focusing on gangs that pose a significant
threat to U.S. communities.
Entity: National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center
(GangTECC);
Year established: 2006;
Lead agency or office: DOJ Criminal Division;
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI, DEA, ATF, BOP, USMS, and
Criminal Division;
DHS: ICE;
Staff: About 14, including a director, deputy director, and agents
detailed from participating agencies;
Coordination/information-sharing role: Coordinate and deconflict
overlapping gang-related investigations and prosecutions and serve as
a coordinating center for multijurisdictional gang investigations.
Entity: MS-13 National Gang Task Force;
Year established: 2004;
Lead agency or office: DOJ FBI;
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI;
Staff: Supervisor, four FBI supervisory special agents, and six FBI
analysts;
Coordination/information-sharing role: Coordinate the development of
multijurisdictional FBI investigations of MS-13 and 18th Street gangs,
including transnational investigations, into national-level
investigations and prosecutions.
Entity: Transnational Antigang unit (TAG);
Year established: 2007;
Lead agency or office: DOJ FBI;
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ FBI, El Salvador's Civilian
National Police;
Staff: Two FBI agents;
30 Salvadoran police officials and staff;
Coordination/information-sharing role: Provide information on MS-13
and 18th Street gang members and their criminal activities in the
United States and Central America. Information is shared between U.S.
law enforcement agencies and the Salvadoran National Police. The TAG
was created and implemented by the MS-13 National Gang Task Force to
assist in combating the growing threat posed by transnational gangs
and drug cartels in Central America.
Entity: Gang Unit;
Year established: 2006;
Lead agency or office: DOJ Criminal Division;
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ Criminal Division;
Staff: 12 prosecutors;
Coordination/information-sharing role: Coordinate with local U.S.
Attorneys' Offices on legal issues and multidistrict gang cases and
work with law enforcement agencies to achieve coordinated prevention
and enforcement strategies.
Source: GAO analysis of DOJ and DHS information.
[End of table]
In localities we contacted, law enforcement agencies obtained
assistance from the antigang coordinating entities to support their
investigations of MS-13 and 18th Street gangs and gang members. For
example, in one location we visited, the National Gang Intelligence
Center provided an analyst to an FBI antigang task force to help that
task force analyze MS-13 gang data for an ongoing investigation. At
another location, the FBI antigang task force obtained assistance from
the TAG unit in El Salvador to help identify two MS-13 gang members
who were in a Salvadoran prison and communicated with MS-13 gang
members in the United States to direct the gang members' criminal
activities. Additionally, DOJ's Gang Unit has assisted with the
prosecution of MS-13 and 18th Street gang cases in the United States.
For example, in one location we contacted, the Gang Unit assisted the
local U.S. Attorney's Office with the prosecution of a gang case under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.[Footnote 52]
The Gang Unit provided this assistance because, according to the U.S.
Attorney's Office, the office did not have enough experienced
attorneys who were familiar with using the Act to prosecute gang
members.
At the field level, federal law enforcement agencies utilize task
forces to coordinate their gang enforcement efforts. For example, the
FBI's Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Forces coordinate with federal,
state, and local law enforcement to investigate all active gang
threats, but have conducted investigations on MS-13 and 18th Street
gangs across the country. In locations we contacted, including Omaha,
Nebraska; Los Angeles, California; and Charlotte, North Carolina, FBI
task forces investigated MS-13 gangs and determined that gang members
in those locations were communicating with gang members in El
Salvador.[Footnote 53] Similar to the FBI's Violent Gang Safe Street
Task Forces, ATF's Violent Crime Impact Teams, which partner ATF with
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to reduce firearms-
related violent crime including gang crime, may investigate gangs with
transnational connections in specific locations.[Footnote 54] For
example, in 2007 ATF led an investigation in Baltimore, Maryland,
involving MS-13 gang members who committed murder and robbery. Through
its task force, ATF coordinated this investigation with other agencies
including FBI, ICE, the United States Attorneys' Office, local police
agencies, and the Salvadoran national police to investigate and
prosecute these gang members. In addition, through Operation Community
Shield, ICE works primarily with state and local law enforcement
agencies to investigate gangs whose members are foreign-born or in the
United States illegally, or both, or have been involved in crimes with
a nexus to the U.S. borders.[Footnote 55]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Scope and Methodology:
To determine to what extent the U.S. federal government has developed
a strategy to combat transnational gangs with connections to Central
America, we examined the interagency strategy, called the Strategy to
Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico
(the Strategy), and compared the contents of the Strategy to select
criteria in our prior work on desirable characteristics of an
effective national strategy, including (1) clear purpose, scope, and
methodology; (2) discussion of problems, risks, and threats; (3)
desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures; and
(4) delineation of roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 56] In regard
to the National Security Council (NSC), we discussed its role in
developing and implementing the Strategy with a mix of the departments
and agencies that participated in the NSC's International Organized
Crime Policy Coordinating Committee (IOCPCC) such as the Department of
State (State), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID).[Footnote 57] We also examined
the roles and activities of the various federal agencies under the
Strategy including DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
State, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of the Treasury
(Treasury), and USAID and their component agencies. To do this we
reviewed antigang program documents and interviewed officials from
DOJ, DHS, State, DOD, Treasury, and USAID in headquarters as well as
component agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
within DOJ and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within
DHS to obtain their views about the framework, including the different
categories, of the Strategy.
To determine how U.S. federal agencies have implemented programs to
carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs, coordinated
these programs, and assessed their results, we examined a mix of
DOJ's, DHS's, State's, USAID's, and their component agencies' plans,
performance data, reports, and assessments for fiscal years 2006
through 2009. We compared federal agencies' efforts to coordinate and
share information on their transnational antigang programs to criteria
in our prior work on effective interagency collaboration and results-
oriented government.[Footnote 58] To assess the reliability of
statistical information we obtained, such as data on program
performance and outcomes, we discussed the sources of the data with
agency officials and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation
of data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report. In addition, we examined federal
agencies' funding allocated to transnational antigang programs. In
particular, we reviewed agencies' budget requests for fiscal years
2008 through 2010; appropriations acts for DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID
for those fiscal years; and expenditure and other plans for the Mérida
Initiative.[Footnote 59] To obtain information on federal efforts to
combat the gangs as well as the extent to which the agencies
coordinated their efforts with other agencies, we interviewed a mix of
federal, state, and local law enforcement officials in seven U.S.
locations--Baltimore, Maryland; Charlotte, North Carolina; Laredo and
McAllen, Texas; Los Angeles, California; Nashville, Tennessee; and
Omaha, Nebraska--and U.S. federal, foreign, and three nongovernmental
agencies' officials in El Salvador and Guatemala. To understand the
process of how ICE handles and removes gang members who are in the
United States illegally, we visited ICE's South Texas Detention
Facility in Pearsall, Texas, and interviewed officials with ICE's
Office of Detention and Removal Operations. We selected the U.S.
locations and El Salvador and Guatemala based on a mix of criteria
that included locations (1) along the U.S. borders, (2) where U.S.
federal agencies have implemented antigang programs, and (3) where
federal law enforcement agencies have conducted operations involving
gangs with connections to Central America. For our site visits to
foreign locations, we consulted with officials of federal agencies to
identify in which foreign locations their agencies had efforts
underway. Of the countries in the region, agency officials suggested
we visit El Salvador and Guatemala because more antigang initiatives
were underway and further along as compared to efforts in other
countries. Given this, we selected these countries to obtain more
information on these efforts and evaluate the effect they have had on
the gang problem. We selected the South Texas Detention Facility
because it was the facility identified by ICE officials for handling
the most gang members awaiting removal. More specifically, in the U.S.
locations we interviewed officials from some of the following federal
agencies: the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); U.S.
Attorneys' Office; ICE; and in Laredo, Texas, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). We also interviewed a mix of state and local law
enforcement officials in Charlotte, North Carolina; Los Angeles,
California; Nashville, Tennessee; and Omaha, Nebraska. In Guatemala
and El Salvador, we interviewed a mix of officials from the following
federal agencies: DOJ's Office of International Affairs, FBI, DEA;
ICE; State; USAID; the State-sponsored International Law Enforcement
Academy; and DOD. We also interviewed a mix of officials from
Salvadoran and Guatemalan government agencies, including the
countries' national police and the Salvadoran prosecutors' office. We
also observed some of the activities related to USAID-sponsored
prevention efforts in El Salvador and Guatemala such as the youth
centers and interviewed participants, local government officials
involved in the efforts, and members of the community about their
views and the effect of the programs. Additionally, we interviewed
officials from intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations
such as the Organization of American States, Washington Office on
Latin America, the Central American Coalition for Prevention of Youth
Violence, the Centro de Formacion y Orientacion, and the Instituto
Universitario de Opinion Publica to obtain their perspectives on the
gang problem in Central America. We also interviewed officials from
contractors and companies such as Creative Associates International,
Inc., and Pepsi Co. that have partnered with USAID or participated in
USAID efforts to establish gang prevention programs and provide
employment opportunities for ex-gang members in countries such as El
Salvador and Guatemala. The information we obtained from interviewing
officials in the U.S. and Central American locations cannot be
generalized across all locations in the United States or Central
America. However, because we selected these locations based on a
variety of factors, they provided us with an overview of the agencies'
antigang programs, examples of coordination and measurements to assess
results, and any challenges with implementation of the programs.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through April 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
April 9, 2010:
Ms. Eileen R. Larence:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Larence:
RE: Draft Report GAO-10-395, Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have
Implemented a Central American Gang Strategy, but Could Strengthen
Oversight and Measurement of Efforts (Engagement Code 440702):
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the
opportunity to review and comment on the draft report referenced
above. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) makes two
recommendations, one of which specifically is addressed to DHS.
The draft report recommends that the Attorney General and the
Secretary of DHS reach agreement on the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement's (ICE) role and participation in the joint U.S.-
Salvadoran Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) unit in order to strengthen
federal agencies' coordination of anti-gang efforts and maximize use
of federal law enforcement resources in El Salvador. We concur with
the recommendation Officials within ICE's Office of International
Affairs, Office of Investigations and Office of Principal Legal
Advisor have reviewed and revised the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) TAG memo to clarify ICE/FBI roles and
responsibilities within the TAG in El Salvador. Currently a memorandum
of understanding is being drafted.
The second recommendation is directed to the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs GAO recommends that the
Special Assistant in conjunction with the Department of Justice, DHS,
State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department
of Defense revise the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs
from Central America and Mexico. DHS officials defer to the Special
Assistant to the President. DHS remains committed to assisting the
Special Assistant and interagency partners in strengthening oversight
and accountability for implementing the strategy and related
revisions. This would include participating in a multi-agency
oversight mechanism, which would use performance measures to report
progress in implementation.
Technical comments have been provided previously under separate cover.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael E. McPoland, for:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Office of the Deputy Attorney General:
Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General:
Chair of the Attorney General's Anti-Gang Coordination Committee:
Washington, D.C. 20530:
April 13, 2010:
Eileen R. Larence:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Team:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Larence:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft Report on Combating Gangs (April
2010) and for the opportunity to respond on behalf of the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ). In the report, GAO recommends DOJ and the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reach an agreement on the
composition of an anti-gang unit located in El Salvador, and the roles
of its members. DOJ fully agrees with this recommendation and has
already taken steps to facilitate such an agreement.
As part of its gang strategy for the region, the FBI intends to create
similar anti-gang units in Guatemala and Honduras. To strengthen
federal agencies' coordination of anti-gang efforts and maximize use
of federal law enforcement resources in the region, DOJ strongly
believes that any agreement to ensure DHS's participation in the
current unit, located in El Salvador, should also address its
participation in the forthcoming units. We are working to reach this
broader agreement for our anti-gang activities in the region.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jennifer Shasky Calvery:
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from the United States Agency for
International Development:
USAID:
From The American People:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW:
Washington, DC 20523:
www.usaid.gov:
April 9, 2010:
Ms. Eileen R. Larence:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Larence:
I am pleased to provide the formal response of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) to the GAO draft report "Combating
Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central American Gang
Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts"
(GAO-10-395, engagement 440702).
The enclosed USAID comments are provided for incorporation with this
letter as an appendix to the final report.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit
review.
Sincerely.
Signed by:
Drew W. Luten:
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Management:
Enclosure: a/s:
[End of letter]
USAID Comments On GAO Draft Report No. GA0-10-395:
USAID appreciates the GAO's thorough investigation of the question of
U.S. Government interagency coordination to address the problem of
crime and violence related to gangs operating between the United
States and Central America. USAID is committed to furthering the U.S.
Government's anti-gang strategy and welcomes the GAO's attention to
these critical issues; in addition to its targeted anti-gang
programming, USAID has long been engaged in institutional capacity
building of the justice sector and violence prevention in Central
America. We also appreciate the GAO's recognition of our efforts
toward monitoring and impact evaluation of our anti-gang program, and
acknowledge the importance of increased inter-agency coordination to
bolstering USG efforts against the threat of criminal gangs both in
Central America and within the U.S.
As the GAO noted, the gang problem is multifaceted, dynamic, and
transnational in nature. As such, concerned actors continue to
struggle with a dearth of reliable, accurate data on questions such as
the numbers and demographics of gang members, or what percentage of
crimes in Central America can truly be attributed to criminal gangs.
This lack of reliable data presents a hurdle to measuring the overall
impact of USG efforts to combat gang-related crime and violence.
However, our progress has been significant. As noted in the report,
USAID among others has helped to fill this information gap through
activities such as the 2006 Central America and Mexico Gangs
Assessment and our current efforts to measure impact of our Central
American crime and violence prevention programs.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Rebecca Gambler, Assistant
Director; Heather Dowey; Sally Gilley; Mike Harmond; Chris Hatscher;
Michael Lenington; Amanda Miller; Janet Temko; and Adam Vogt made
significant contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] National Gang Intelligence Center and National Drug Intelligence
Center, 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment (Washington, D.C.:
January 2009). The 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment is a
collaborative effort between the NGIC and the NDIC to examine the
threat posed to the United States by criminal gangs. The assessment is
based on federal, state, and local law enforcement information and is
supplemented by information retrieved from open sources. Information
and data used for that report were collected through September 2008.
The NGIC is a multiagency effort that integrates the gang intelligence
assets of federal, state, and local law enforcement entities to serve
as a centralized intelligence resource for gang information and
analytical support. The NDIC was established by the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-396, § 9078, 106
Stat. 1876, 1919 (1992). Placed under the direction and control of the
Attorney General, NDIC was established to "coordinate and consolidate
drug intelligence from all national security and law enforcement
agencies, and produce information regarding the structure, membership,
finances, communications, and activities of drug trafficking
organizations." Id.
[2] MS-13 and 18th Street are Hispanic street gangs with members in
both the United States and Central American countries. Throughout this
report, we refer to "transnational gangs" as those gangs in the United
States with connections to Central America. Appendix I provides
additional information on MS-13 and 18th Street.
[3] The IOCPCC is an interagency committee of the NSC made up of
various departments and agencies of the federal government such as
DOJ, DHS, State, DOD, and USAID.
[4] GAO, Combating Gangs: Better Coordination and Performance
Measurement Would Help Clarify Roles of Federal Agencies and
Strengthen Assessment of Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-708] (Washington, D.C.: July 24,
2009).
[5] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004), and GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy
Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2006).
[6] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[7] The changes to immigration laws were included in two major pieces
of legislation passed in 1996: The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110
Stat. 3009-546 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. These laws expanded the
offenses that constitute an "aggravated felony" rendering a noncitizen
removable, and contracted available avenues of relief from removal.
[8] USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment (April 2006).
[9] SOUTHCOM is 1 of 10 unified combatant commands in DOD. It is
responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and
security cooperation for Central and South America, the Caribbean
(except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions), and Cuba as
well as for the force protection of U.S. military resources at these
locations.
[10] The same U.S. Attorney serves the District of Guam and the
District of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
[11] Only federal laws specifically assigned to other divisions within
DOJ are outside the purview of the Criminal Division. For example, a
National Security Division was established in September 2006 with
specific responsibility for international and domestic terrorism and
other national security threats.
[12] The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program was established in 1986 to help train police officers in Latin
America. Its mission is to work with foreign governments around the
world to develop professional and transparent law enforcement
institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce
the threat of transnational crime and terrorism.
[13] The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and
Training was established in 1991 to develop and administer technical
assistance designed to enhance the capabilities of foreign justice-
sector institutions and their law enforcement personnel to allow them
to more effectively partner with DOJ in combating terrorism,
trafficking in persons, organized crime, corruption, financial crimes,
and other transnational crime.
[14] EOUSA provides operational support for information technology,
training, and other functions, and prepares an annual statistical
report of U.S. Attorneys, among other functions.
[15] INTERPOL is the world's largest international police
organization, with 188 member countries. Created in 1923, it
facilitates cross-border police cooperation, and supports and assists
all organizations, authorities, and services whose mission is to
prevent or combat international crime.
[16] Prevention refers to efforts to prevent, reduce, or minimize the
incidence of gang activity and its negative consequences by dissuading
at-risk youths from joining gangs. Intervention refers to efforts to
support, encourage, and positively address the needs of individuals
attempting to leave or who have left a gang, and may include efforts
to persuade individuals to leave a gang.
[17] The initiative was named for the location of a March 2007 meeting
between Presidents George W. Bush and Felipe Calderón of Mexico. The
Mexican portion of the initiative is intended to complement U.S. and
Mexican domestic efforts against drug, human, and weapons trafficking.
Subsequently, Congress added funding for Haiti and the Dominican
Republic to address concerns about increased drug trafficking in the
Caribbean.
[18] State has identified the following four strategic goals for the
Mérida Initiative: (1) break the power and impunity of criminal
organizations; (2) assist the governments of Mexico and Central
America in strengthening border, air, and maritime controls; (3)
improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; and (4) curtail
gang activity in Mexico and Central America and diminish demand for
drugs in the region.
[19] Pub. L. No. 110-252, § 1407(a), 122 Stat. 2323, 2340. Amounts
appropriated for Mérida activities include those appropriated "to
combat drug trafficking and related violence and organized crime, and
for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of
law activities, and maritime security." The act appropriated $65
million for assistance for the countries of Central America, Haiti,
and the Dominican Republic, of which $2.5 million each was required to
be made available for assistance to Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
[20] Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 7045(f), 123 Stat. 524, 887. Amounts
appropriated for Mérida activities include those appropriated "to
combat drug trafficking and related violence and organized crime, and
for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of
law activities, and maritime security."
[21] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, §
7045(f), 123 Stat. 3934, 3374 (2009). Amounts appropriated for Mérida
activities include those available "to combat drug trafficking and
related violence and organized crime, and for judicial reform,
institution building, anti-corruption, rule of law activities, and
maritime security." As described above, funds requested for Mérida
activities were directed to be made available for CARSI. H.R. Rep. No.
111-366, at 1482 (2009) (Conf. Rep.).
[22] GAO, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-253R] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 3,
2009).
[23] See H.R. Rep. No. 111-366, at 1482 (2009) (Conf. Rep.).
[24] See explanatory statement accompanying Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007),
at 1041 (noting that additional funding had been provided in the act
"to enhance the unique Federal role ICE plays in investigating and
disrupting organized transnational criminal gangs").
[25] The Strategy was announced at a July 2007 U.S.-Central American
Integration System summit on security issues. The Central American
Integration System is a regional entity created by Central American
countries to promote regional integration. Among other things, one of
the objectives of the system is to set up a new model of regional
security and eradicate violence.
[26] According to State officials, U.S. embassies in Central America
and Mexico and representatives from the Mexican and Central American
governments also provided input to the development of the Strategy.
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788].
[28] In prior work, to develop these desirable characteristics of an
effective national strategy, we reviewed several sources of
information. First, we gathered statutory requirements pertaining to
national strategies, as well as legislative and executive branch
guidance. We also consulted the Government Performance and Results Act
of 1993, general literature on strategic planning and performance, and
guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on the President's
Management Agenda. In addition, among other things, we studied past
reports and testimonies for findings and recommendations pertaining to
the desirable elements of a national strategy. Furthermore, we
consulted widely within GAO to obtain updated information on strategic
planning, integration across and between the government and its
partners, implementation, and other related subjects. For more
information on how these characteristics were developed, see
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T].
[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788].
[30] GAO, Aviation Security: A National Strategy and Other Actions
Would Strengthen TSA's Efforts to Secure Commercial Airport Perimeters
and Access Controls, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-399] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2009).
[31] In addition to establishing performance measures for Mérida-
funded programs in Central America, State plans to periodically
discuss program results with countries in Central America.
Specifically, under the terms of the agreements between the United
States and the governments of each Central American country for
implementing Mérida programs, representatives of each government will
meet quarterly to evaluate the Mérida programs' progress toward
achieving the performance measures described above.
[32] Appendix III provides a complete list of federal agencies'
programs and efforts to combat transnational gangs with connections to
Central America.
[33] When an alien is ordered removed from the Unites States, a
consular official from the alien's country of origin must issue a
travel document that allows the alien to return to his country. Once
the alien's citizenship or nationality has been verified, the consular
official issues a travel document to effect the alien's repatriation.
[34] The Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System is a
national fingerprint and criminal history system maintained by the
FBI. Incorporating gang members' criminal biometric data/fingerprint
records from the Central American Fingerprint Exploitation should make
the data/records accessible by all U.S. local, state, and federal
agencies by means of this system.
[35] The first round of exchanges occurred in May 2008 with four gang
officers from El Salvador's national police traveling to Los Angeles
where they spent 30 days with gang officers of the Los Angeles Police
and Sheriff's Departments. The Los Angeles--based officers
subsequently traveled to El Salvador for 30 days. The FBI then
modified the program to a 3-week session that includes training at the
FBI Academy and other learning opportunities in Washington, D.C.; Los
Angeles; and El Salvador. In March 2009, 28 officers from 11 different
law enforcement agencies across the United States, El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala participated. In October 2009, 27 officers
from law enforcement agencies in the United States, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama participated.
[36] State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs funds the International Law Enforcement Academies. There are
four academies, which are located in Europe (Budapest, Hungary),
Southeast Asia (Bangkok, Thailand), Central America (San Salvador, El
Salvador), and Southern Africa (Gaborone, Botswana); a regional
training center in Lima, Peru; and a graduate-level academy (Roswell,
New Mexico), in a cooperative effort with Treasury, DOJ, and DHS.
[37] "Deconfliction" is the coordination and information sharing among
law enforcement agencies on multijurisdictional investigations to help
ensure officer safety and the effective use of resources.
[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-708].
[39] As of March 2010, El Salvador is the only Central American
country to host a TAG. The FBI is in the process of establishing
another TAG in Guatemala in 2010. Although one has also been planned
for Honduras, it has been postponed indefinitely due to political
unrest in the country.
[40] According to ICE's country attaché, sometimes when special ICE
enforcement operations ongoing in the United States result in a
temporarily high volume of ICE requests for information, ICE has sent
an agent on a temporary-duty basis to El Salvador to help the attaché
process ICE requests and work with the TAG to fulfill the requests.
[41] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[42] Criminal arrests include aliens subject to removal who are
charged with criminal violations, whereas administrative arrests refer
to aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States but have not
been charged with criminal violations.
[43] As of August 2009, FBI officials stated that establishment of a
transnational antigang unit in Honduras has been placed on hold
because of the political instability in the country.
[44] See Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America
and El Salvador, April 18, 1911, 37 Stat. 1516.
[45] We interviewed a mix of federal, state, and local law enforcement
officials regarding MS-13 or 18th Street investigations in Los
Angeles, California; Omaha, Nebraska; Nashville, Tennessee; Baltimore,
Maryland; and Charlotte, North Carolina.
[46] USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment (Washington,
D.C.: April 2006). This is the most recent regionwide assessment of
gangs conducted by USAID.
[47] The Mexican Mafia prison gang operates mainly within the
California Department of Corrections. It is loosely structured and has
strict rules that must be followed by the estimated 350 to 400
members. Most members are Mexican American males who previously
belonged to a Southern California street gang. The gang's main source
of income is extorting drug distributors outside prison and
distributing various narcotics within and outside the prison system.
Some members of these prison gangs have direct links to Mexican drug
trafficking organizations and broker deals for themselves and their
associates. MS-13 and 18th Street are linked to numerous prison gangs,
such as the Mexican Mafia, and these relationships are advantageous.
Members must pay taxes to prison gangs in exchange for protection in
prison. If members refuse, they risk being killed by the prison gangs.
[48] SOUTHCOM, Intelligence Assessment: Criminal Gang and Drug
Trafficking: A Relationship of Convenience (March 13, 2008).
[49] The remaining four OMGs that make up the "Big Five" include the
Bandidos Motorcycle Club (Bandidos), the Mongols Motorcycle Club
(Mongols), the Outlaws Motorcycle Club (Outlaws), and the Pagans
Motorcycle Club (Pagans).
[50] "Support clubs" are members of subordinate clubs that swear
allegiance to a mother club and whose purpose is to do the "dirty
work" of the mother club.
[51] "Deconfliction" is the coordination and information sharing among
law enforcement agencies on multijurisdictional investigations to help
ensure officer safety and the effective use of resources.
[52] While the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was
originally enacted to dismantle organized crime groups such as the
Mafia, prosecutors have successfully used it to bring cases against
members of organized gangs. The Act prohibits the commission of a
pattern of racketeering activity to invest in, maintain an interest
in, or participate in, directly or indirectly, an enterprise, the
activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; it also
prohibits conspiracy to commit any of these activities. See 18 U.S.C.
§§1961-68.
[53] The FBI's Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Forces are part of the
FBI's Safe Streets Violent Crime Initiative which was designed to
allow each field office to address violent street gangs and drug-
related violence through FBI-sponsored task forces. The task forces
were established in 1992 to serve as long-term and coordinated teams
of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and prosecutors.
These task forces focus on disrupting and dismantling the most violent
and criminally active gangs in the United States. According to the
FBI, as of August 2009, 153 Safe Streets Task Forces are focused on
violent gangs in 54 FBI field offices.
[54] ATF's Violent Crime Impact Teams were established in 2004 through
partnerships with state and local agencies to reduce firearms-related
violent crime including violent gang crime in small geographic areas
experiencing an increase in violent crime. According to ATF, as of
April 2009, 31 Violent Crime Impact Teams were operating in locations
across the country.
[55] ICE's Operation Community Shield was established in 2005 through
partnerships with state and local law enforcement agencies as a
national law enforcement initiative that targets violent transnational
street gangs through the use of ICE's broad law enforcement powers to
identify, locate, arrest, prosecute, and ultimately remove gang
leaders, members, and associates from communities. Under this
initiative, investigations focus on transnational street gangs whose
members are subject to ICE's immigration and customs authorities
because the members are foreign-born or in the country illegally, or
both, or have been involved in crimes with a nexus to the U.S. borders
(i.e., narcotics trafficking and human trafficking).
[56] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004), and GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy
Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2006). In addition to these four characteristics, our prior work
identified two other characteristics which were outside the scope of
our review: identification of future costs and resources needed and
discussion of the strategy's integration with other strategies,
entities, or efforts.
[57] During the course of our review, we attempted to meet with
officials of the NSC to discuss the Strategy and its implementation,
but were unsuccessful.
[58] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[59] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 110-117, 123
Stat. 3034 (2009); Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
8, 123 Stat. 524; Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-252, 122 Stat. 2323.
[End of section]
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